Country assistance strategies should be tailored better to FCS, with clear articulation and monitoring of risks and contingencies for rapid adjustment of strategic objectives, implementation mechanisms and results frameworks if those risks materialize. This would enable formulation of more realistic country strategies and tailored performance assessments when risks that are monitored lead to changes in strategic objectives.abc
Project level outcome ratings have improved in FCS. However, lack of realism and selectivity in most FCS country strategies evaluated has resulted in lower-outcome ratings for Country Assistance Strategy Completion Reports (CASCR). Most FCS strategies have not been underpinned by systematic analysis of the drivers of fragility, conflict, and violence. Recent CAS documents in FCS make greater use of fragility and conflict analysis but even so, FCS strategies do not include scenarios based on political economy and conflict risks, with built-in contingencies to adjust objectives and results if risks materialize.
WB: Agree. Implementation of this recommendation is already underway. Recent analysis by the Bank shows that strategies finalized after the publication of the 2011 WDR performed better in integrating sensitivity to drivers of fragility, conflict, and violence than those finalized prior to the WDR.
Additionally, within the framework of IDA 17, Management is proposing to incorporate commitments leading to better understanding of the underlying drivers of conflict and fragility in new FCS strategies, including through the analysis of the new country diagnostic assessments.
Management will actively track in CASs, the analysis of drivers of fragility and conflict and ensuring strategy documents are responsive to such analysis.
Likewise, due regard will be given to contingency planning to adjust development objectives and results expectations as opportunities and risks materialize in FCS.
Action 2A: All Country Partnership Frameworks (CPF) in IDA FCS are informed by analysis of drivers of fragility, conflict and violence.
Indicator: Percentage of new CPFs in IDA FCS that are informed by analysis of drivers of fragility, conflict and violence.
Baseline: A 2013 CAS baseline study indicates less than 40 percent of CAS/ISN for IDA FCS incorporate analysis of drivers of fragility, conflict and violence.
Target: 100 percent of new CPFs in IDA FCS are informed by analysis of drivers of fragility, conflict and violence.
Timeline: FY17.
Action 2B: Articulation of risk and its monitoring through a new Program Learning Reviews (PLRs) for FCS Country Partnership Frameworks.
Indicator: The percentage of CPFs in FCS including risk monitoring in the PLRs.
Baseline: None. Fragility, conflict and violence (FCV) risk and the performance of the country portfolio with regard to FCV risk are not systematically reviewed in current CPPRs. The PLR will replace the CPPR in FY15 and will include a review of risk assessment/mitigation measures.
Target: 100 percent of new Program Learning Reviews in IDA FCS include monitoring of FCV risks.
Timeline: 30 percent in FY 15 60 percent in FY16, 100 percent in FY17.
The recent SCP/CPF evaluation assessed the integration of FCV issues in the new country assistance framework. The evaluation found that fragility was comprehensively discussed in four of the five SCDs (Chad, Colombia, Cô te d'Ivoire, and Mali) and were aligned with the discussion in the fragility assessment. The Cô te d'Ivoire and Mali SCDs explicitly referred to their respective fragility assessments and included deep discussions on the historical nature of fragility in the country, as well as the current drivers of fragility. Fragility issues were also discussed in the same four country CPFs (not covered in the Uganda CPF), though not in as much detail as in the SCDs. In two CENs for the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau there is little reference to their fragility assessments, though the CEN for the Central African Republic was completed in mid-2015 and the fragility assessment was not completed until the first quarter of 2016.
While there are good examples of how fragility assessments are currently being applied to CPFs, IEG would argue that it is still too early to argue for the recommendation be classified as "complete". The 100% of CPFs referred to in the management response is presented with insufficient evidence at this point for IEG to confirm this is actually the case. Additional material and evidence from the assessment would be required for us to have confidence in this statement.
As part of IDA18 commitments, Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRAs) will help in deepening Bank's knowledge on FCV and learning from operational experience.
The Bank will adopt a risk-based approach for identifying fragility beyond those countries on the FCS harmonized list and deepen knowledge on the mitigation/prevention of FCV risks through a flagship report drawing on lessons from operational experience and impact evaluations.
Action 2A: Completed: By the end of Fy17 100% of CPFs have been informed by analyses of fragility, conflict and violence through Risk and Resilience Assessments (RRAs).
Action 2B: Completed: All PLRs in IDA FCV countries include a review of risk assessment and mitigation measures.
IEG recognizes that the performance on Action 2A over the last 12 months has been very good. The framing for the assessments (now widely recognized as risks and resilience assessments (RRAs)) has been expanded and improved based on recent lessons. In addition, IEG is aware of the work that was done on the CPFs for Chad, Mali, Cote D'Ivoire and Haiti. These recent strategies appear to show some improvement on the early attempts, including DRC and Nigeria which did not illustrate how FCV issues were being appropriately integrated across the partnership. With regards to the results, management claims it is too early to tell other than some of the evidence on the tracking of risk in the PLRs. Much like last year, IEG is still looking for more detail on whether the claimed continual and systematic monitoring of risks actually makes a difference to programming, not just commitments to 'foster ownership' and 'increase selectivity'. Some of this work is now mature enough that there should be some evidence of responses based on shifts and changes in risk outcomes. This is not being reported against. Likewise, IEG's concern with regards to the systems to track change within, between and across the various CPFs is also unclear. In terms of Action 2B, only 2 of the 15 approved PLRs in FY16 were IDA FCS countries, thus it remains difficult to draw any specific conclusions other than the PLR process did lead to the specific provision of some analytical work in DRC and a set of fairly vague recommendations for the Republic of Congo.
**see full update attached**
In reviewing IDA CPFs for fragility sensitivity and compliance with the relevant IDA-17 commitment, we note three considerations: (i) a brief description of the underlying drivers of fragility to inform (ii) programming choices that are tailored to be responsive to the issues driving fragility in the country and (iii) sensible implementation arrangements that take into consideration limitations of capacity and access. In FY16 Chad, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire and Haiti delivered CPFs to the Board. All 4 were underpinned by an FCV analysis. Regarding programming choices, the approach taken by the CI team was a proactive one with a focus on land tenure backed by a new land operation an infrastructure program safety nets operation and an Urban ESW to address regional disparities in development benefits and a Youth program. The Mali CPF was devoted to addressing the development deficits of the majority of the population (in the southern parts of the country). While this attention is definitely not misplaced, the CPF also implicitly recognizes that any meaningful and durable peace agreement will require the state to follow the not so popular path of providing greater autonomy of decision-making and resources to the North. Following the recognition that the incomplete implementation of decentralization promised in the previous peace agreements have not resulted in the improved socio-economic development of the region but only led to the increased distrust in the state - the team has committed itself to dialogue with the government on Decentralization and Integrated Territorial Development.
However, as mentioned in the FY15 update, the sample size of completed CPFs are too small to draw rigorous conclusions on the impact of FAs/ RRAs on country programs. Going forward, building on experiences from countries such as Kyrgyzstan, DRC, or Nigeria, WBG will develop monitoring to track the share of projects that are addressing FCV drivers and to establish if projects are designed in a conflict sensitive way. This information will be critical for assessing the progress WBG is making addressing the underlying causes of FCV.
On the PLR: 15 PLRs were approved in FY 16. Out of these, two covered IDA FCS. It was agreed that 60 percent of FCS PLRs would articulate risk monitoring and we would agree that the target was met. The DRC approach to dealing with risk monitoring in the PLR is (reflected in the annex) was based on the risk and conflict studies undertaken through the Great Lakes Regional Conflict Facility (GLRCF) TF. Risks linked to Eastern DRC are very much in the focus of the PLR. The team identifies specific risks related to elections, corruption and conflict. It proposes the following measures in response: i) flexibility in implementation and simplification of geographic targeting, ii) restructuring where reforms will stall due to elections, iii) future fast-tracking of reform components wherever there is traction in the sector iv) undertaking of periodic risk and conflict assessments for programs operating in the East and close coordination with other partners like UN v) strengthening approaches within projects to operate in an insecure and low government capacity areas by using CDD approaches to build community cohesion, such as the Eastern Recovery and Reinsertion Project.
The Congo Republic PLR considered risks in a range of areas (political, macroeconomic, government capacity and fiduciary - all of which has ramifications for fragility ) and identified some actions to address those risks. Specifically the PLR proposes to: i) foster ownership and **see full update attached**
The record of engagement with regards to Action 2A provides an excellent start to IEG's recommendation and the reach of the undertaking is evident. However, it is disappointing that there is not more detail on how the Fragility Assessments are being received and whether they are influencing programming in the broader portfolio. With regards to the SCD and CPF reforms outlined, there is little explanation of any results (even in the very short term) or if there has been movement since the first of these was undertaken in 2012. The Myanmar example provides a useful case study of how it has been implemented, but it would be helpful for IEG to see more detail on whether the claimed continual and systematic monitoring of risks actually takes place and whether it makes any difference to programming. In addition, without an explanation of what systems have been set up to track the differences within, between and across the various CPFs, IEG is concerned that the process is being undertaken without adequate mechanisms to identify where the approach is working and where it is not having the desired impact.
In terms of Action 2B, it is difficult to draw any specific conclusions here other than a PLR was prepared in Burundi and did include the monitoring of FCV risks for consideration. In this case, while there was evidence of a trigger, subsequent changes to programming have not yet occurred so in terms of judging the impact of the process on programming it is too early to tell.
Since 2012, 31 Fragility Assessments have been conducted, including in 19 FCSs and six non-IDA fragile countries. By the end-September 2015, three CPFs would be prepared for FCSs, and seven more are expected by the end of FY16. 100% of CPFs in IDA FCS has been informed by analysis of drivers and fragility. Support for these have included (i) preparation and updates of country specific Fragility Assessments (ii) integrating FCV issues in SCDs and translating them into FCV- sensitive programs in the CPFs. While the sample size of completed SCDs and CPFs are too small to draw rigorous conclusions, it is clear that there is central recognition that FCV concerns influence the narrative on constraints and opportunities to growth, shared growth and its sustainability. Myanmar has progressed from the SCD to the CPF stage. The Myanmar CPF has used conflict sensitivity throughout the portfolio to further understand how to operate in areas where government is not seen as legitimate or how to engage with non-state service providers in those areas. Further, in using its risk-reward ratio as a selectivity criterion, the program does not shy away from higher risk interventions particularly in its support for communities in conflict-affected areas where engagement may be more complicated or costly. It has also put in place continual and systematic monitoring of conflict risks to enable projects to engage with and scale up in response to changes in the conflict dynamics and to ensure flexibility of the program given the continued fragility of the peace process. A guidance note to undertake fragility assessments and to incorporate FCV considerations in SCDs and CPFs has been prepared to support teams to better understand the fragile context of client countries and to translate that analysis into country strategies and operations. Periodic training to country teams on embedding fragility analyses in SCDs and preparing FCV sensitive country strategies is regularly offered at headquarters and in the regions. Looking forward by end of FY17, an assessment of all CPFs in FCV countries will be carried out to understand success and gaps in the effort to engender fragility sensitive programming.
Out of the 9 PLRs prepared in FY 15, only Burundi is a classified FCS country, in which PLR monitoring of FCV risks was included. The PLR explicitly noted that if the political / violence risk were to materialize, adjustments would be made to the program including on budget support with a greater emphasis on the resilience pillar. As noted in the PLR, election related violence did occur and the situation is being closely monitored by development partners including the Bank. The portfolio performance remains strong and the Bank expects to reach the results (adjusted) in the PLR except for some of the policy results under pillar 1 that were to be supported under the new DPO series. So the major adjustment is expected to be in the program going forward. Finally, the SCD and the new CPF will be proposing adjustments to future strategy in case the political and economic context does not improve.