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Report/Evaluation Type:Project Level Evaluations (PPARs)
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Azerbaijan: ARP II Integrated Solid Waste Management Project (PPAR)

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This assessment seeks to identify what worked and what did not work under the Absheron Rehabilitation Program II Integrated Solid Waste Management Project in Azerbaijan. The project was designed in 2008 to support the reform of the Greater Baku area solid waste management. Its project development objective was to support (i) improving solid waste disposal management; (ii) Show MoreThis assessment seeks to identify what worked and what did not work under the Absheron Rehabilitation Program II Integrated Solid Waste Management Project in Azerbaijan. The project was designed in 2008 to support the reform of the Greater Baku area solid waste management. Its project development objective was to support (i) improving solid waste disposal management; (ii) increasing waste collection coverage; and (iii) enhancing waste data information and financial management capacity in the Greater Baku area. The project closed in 2018, after 10 years of implementation and $76.6 million disbursed under the two International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loans. Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was modest. This project performance assessment offers the following lessons: (i) Significant spending on modern waste facilities alone is not sufficient to ensure an effective municipal solid waste disposal system. (ii) Closing illegal dumps is likely to be ineffective without complementary measures to strengthen institutional accountability and achieve behavior change. (iii) It is important to think through the sequencing of sector interventions in unreformed sectors to prioritize interventions that ensure a minimum threshold of viability and reforms that may enable meaningful progress.

Guinea: Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Project (PPAR)

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At the time of project appraisal, agriculture and mining were the main sources of economic growth in Guinea. The country’s mining sector contributed 20 to 25 percent of government revenues. However, Guinea’s economic performance was not proportionate with its natural resource endowment, since agriculture and mining performed modestly. After years of instability, Guinea’s first Show MoreAt the time of project appraisal, agriculture and mining were the main sources of economic growth in Guinea. The country’s mining sector contributed 20 to 25 percent of government revenues. However, Guinea’s economic performance was not proportionate with its natural resource endowment, since agriculture and mining performed modestly. After years of instability, Guinea’s first democratically elected president assumed power in December 2010. Although the political transition was difficult, macroeconomic stability was restored, and debt sustainability dramatically improved with the attainment of the highly indebted poor countries completion point in September 2012. However, the private sector in Guinea was not able to contribute enough to growth and help realize the country’s potential because of several underlying constraints: weak legal and regulatory environment for paying taxes and protecting investors; weak access to finance; low human capital; weak governance; and weak infrastructure. The Guinea Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Development Project (P128443) was approved on January 28, 2013, restructured on February 2, 2016, and closed as scheduled on December 31, 2017. The project was financed by a credit from the International Development Association for $10 million. The objective of the project was to support the development of MSMEs in various value chains and to improve business processes of Guinea’s investment climate. Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Overall efficacy was modest, Bank performance was unsatisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was modest. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) For effective public-private dialogue it is crucial to have (a) a champion at the highest government level who can bring the public and private sector together to identify and implement business environment reforms; and (b) agreement among various private sector associations to identify a private sector representative who can lead the dialogue on their behalf. (ii) Projects should include measures to ensure sustainability of support centers that provide capacity building to MSMEs after project closing. (iii) Design and implementation of credit registries should be based on international best practice standards. (iv) Integrating a rigorous impact assessment into the design of World Bank projects supporting MSMEs would help discern the causal effects of project interventions on MSME development.

Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Sao Tome, Principe: Internet and Mobile Connectivity (Central African Backbone Program APL 1A and APL 2) (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Central Africa Backbone Project Adaptable Program Loan (APL) 1A implemented in three countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad; and the Central Africa Backbone Project APL 2 implemented in Sao Tome and Principe. The objectives of the projects were to help Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Central Africa Backbone Project Adaptable Program Loan (APL) 1A implemented in three countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad; and the Central Africa Backbone Project APL 2 implemented in Sao Tome and Principe. The objectives of the projects were to help to increase the geographical reach and usage of regional broadband network services and reduce their prices to end-users. Ratings for these projects are as follows: Outcome is unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome is substantial, Bank and Borrow performance are both moderately unsatisfactory. For APL 2, the ratings are: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is substantial, Bank performance is satisfactory, and Borrow performance is moderately satisfactory. Lessons from the projects include: (i) A thorough political economy assessment and high-level national and regional commitment are key ingredients for complex regional ICT projects. (ii) The experience from the Central Africa Backbone APL 1 and 2 project shows that public private partnership arrangements are difficult to implement in multiple countries, particularly when countries have asymmetrical needs and incentives with respect to increasing competition for the provision of international and national capacity. (iii) Technical assistance for the preparation of legislation and sector strategies is only the first step to creating an enabling environment for the ICT sector. (iv) Assessing and funding the capacity needs of Regional Economic Communities is important for project coordination and implementation, so that they can carry out their functions effectively. (v) In weak capacity environments, it is beneficial that the projects build the needed institutional capacity for the Borrower to further / implement the crucial reforms and to ensure sustainability of the investments in the country.

Benin: Ninth and Tenth Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PPAR)

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Benin was a low-income country with a gross domestic product per capita of $1,291 at the time of preparation of the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) 9 and 10 series in 2014. Its economy was driven by agricultural production (of cotton in particular) and reexport and transit trade with Nigeria. As a result, Benin’s economy was vulnerable to trade policy changes or economic Show MoreBenin was a low-income country with a gross domestic product per capita of $1,291 at the time of preparation of the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) 9 and 10 series in 2014. Its economy was driven by agricultural production (of cotton in particular) and reexport and transit trade with Nigeria. As a result, Benin’s economy was vulnerable to trade policy changes or economic downturns in Nigeria. The development objectives of this series were to: (i) promote good governance and high-quality public financial management, and (ii) strengthen private sector competitiveness. Ratings for the Ninth and Tenth Poverty Reduction Support Credit project are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was not applicable. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) Relevant lessons from previous operations need to be taken on board when designing new DPF operations. (ii) Prior actions need to be substantive, that is, be critical to reforms with value added. (iii) The World Bank should design projects with a clear understanding of the likely “winners and losers;” failure to do this makes it more likely that projects will not be implemented as planned or sustained over time. (iv) Distributional impact analysis from DPF-supported reforms should inform the design of operations.

Nepal: Shunaula Hazar Din – Community Action for Nutrition Project (PPAR)

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Improvements in child nutrition in Nepal have lagged behind the country’s economic, social, and human development progress over the past decades. At the time of project design in 2011, Nepal ranked among the top countries with the highest national prevalence of stunted growth (40 percent) in children under the age of five, and the country was not Show MoreImprovements in child nutrition in Nepal have lagged behind the country’s economic, social, and human development progress over the past decades. At the time of project design in 2011, Nepal ranked among the top countries with the highest national prevalence of stunted growth (40 percent) in children under the age of five, and the country was not on track to reach the Millennium Development Goal’s target of reducing the rate of malnutrition by half. Improving child nutrition is essential for enhancing human capital accumulation, boosting economic growth, and reducing poverty, since the consequences of undernutrition for young children last through adulthood and reduce their potential to learn and to contribute to society. The project was the World Bank’s first stand-alone lending operation in support of Nepal’s nutrition agenda. The project name, “Sunaula Hazar Din,” which means “golden 1,000 days,” reflects the importance of the period from conception to 24 months of age as a window of opportunity to prevent undernutrition before it surfaces. The project’s objective was to improve practices that contribute to reduced undernutrition of women of reproductive age and children under the age of two. At entry, the project covered 15 districts (out of 75 districts in the country), selected based on levels of stunted growth and poverty. A second objective was added in 2015, after the devastating earthquake that struck the country in April, to provide emergency nutrition and sanitation response to vulnerable populations in earthquake affected areas. The project was then operational in 23 districts. Ratings for the Community Action for Nutrition Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, overall efficacy was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. Lessons from the project include: (i) A community-driven implementation approach may not enforce the multisectoral design approach of the project to address the multiple determinants of nutrition. (ii) Equal RRNI-cycle time frames across the menu of goals can slant the selection of goals toward those for which technical know-how is already available, and hence overshadow the spirit of flexibility of the CDD approach. (iii) In settings with limited human resources, the implementation of innovative operations such as RRNIs requires a robust operational planning that takes into account a steep learning curve, strong preparatory arrangements that address weak capacities at entry, and adequate project readiness at entry. (iv) Good collaboration with specialized development partners in emergency relief facilitated the effective responses that maintained the focus on nutrition and on the original intent of the project. (v) Good collaboration with specialized development partners in emergency relief facilitated the effective responses that maintained the focus on nutrition and on the original intent of the project. (vi) In CDD projects that support the achievement of goals yet to be chosen by communities, and which are thus unknown at the outset, additional efforts to collect more granular baseline data at the ward level can facilitate the assessment of the project achievements at completion.

Brazil: Rio State Fiscal Efficiency for Quality of Public Service Delivery Development Policy Loan (DPL III) (PPAR)

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This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group for the Fiscal Efficiency for Quality of Public Service Delivery Development Policy Loan (DPL) III (P126465) to the state of Rio de Janeiro for $300 million. The program covered three policy areas: (i) tax administration, (ii) public financial Show MoreThis is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group for the Fiscal Efficiency for Quality of Public Service Delivery Development Policy Loan (DPL) III (P126465) to the state of Rio de Janeiro for $300 million. The program covered three policy areas: (i) tax administration, (ii) public financial management, and (iii) education and health. It achieved some of its objectives and targets in the short term (in fiscal years 2013–14), but these achievements were not sustained. Ratings for the Rio State Development Policy Loan III are as follows: Outcome was unsatisfactory, and Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory. The assessment offers the following lessons: (i) Subnational programs supporting institutional reform in areas such as tax administration, public financial management, education, and health require a long-term strategic vision and sufficient time for implementation. (ii) It was difficult to achieve fiscal sustainability in Rio state by reforming only a few technical aspects of tax administration without accounting for important issues, such as pensions, dependence on unstable oil revenues, weak institutions, and chronic corruption. (iii) An assessment of the Rio state’s fiscal situation, its implementation capacity, and medium-term perspectives could have improved the program’s design since the state was in dire financial situation and lacked the bandwidth to properly prepare and execute the 12 loans it was simultaneously negotiating with multiple lenders.

Ethiopia: Sustainable Land Management Project I and II (PPAR)

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Serious long-term degradation of communal areas and farmlands results in substantial losses to the economy. The combination of fragile soils, steep slopes, agroclimatic conditions, environmentally unsustainable intensification of agriculture, and traditional cultivation techniques practiced by smallholder farmers in Ethiopia over many decades has led to excessive soil erosion and land degradation Show MoreSerious long-term degradation of communal areas and farmlands results in substantial losses to the economy. The combination of fragile soils, steep slopes, agroclimatic conditions, environmentally unsustainable intensification of agriculture, and traditional cultivation techniques practiced by smallholder farmers in Ethiopia over many decades has led to excessive soil erosion and land degradation. Two sequential projects were designed and implemented to achieve the SLMP’s objectives. Sustainable Land Management Project Phase I (SLMP I) introduced SLM practices in selected areas of the country to rehabilitate previously uneconomical and unproductive degraded areas within 45 critical watersheds situated in six regional states. SLMP II sought to scale up this support by expanding the geographical coverage to 135 watersheds and continued addressing poor farmland management practices, rapid depletion of vegetation cover, unsustainable livestock grazing practices, and land tenure insecurity. SLMP II also sought to integrate new activities targeting land productivity, deforestation, and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Ratings for the Sustainable Land Management Project I are as follows: Overall outcome is satisfactory, Risk to development outcomes is moderate, Bank performance is moderately satisfactory, Borrower performance is moderately satisfactory, and Quality of M&E is negligible. For Sustainable Land Management Project II, they are as follows: Overall outcome is satisfactory, Overall efficacy is substantial, Bank performance is moderately satisfactory, and Quality of M&E is modest. Lessons from these projects include: (i) Watershed management programs can lead to significant land restoration outcomes when appropriate structural and biological measures are introduced to treat the affected landscape with active participation of the local community. (ii) Area closures are relevant for the restoration of degraded lands but require increased investments for alternative supply of forages to convince the local communities to forgo livestock grazing and other benefits during the process of natural regeneration. (iii) Farm productivity growth requires arresting both the on-site and off-site soil erosion to prevent the degradation of farmlands and enable investments in modern farm inputs. (iv) Effective demonstration of upfront economic and livelihood benefits is fundamental for smallholder farmers to protect and maintain the SLM practices introduced on their lands through project support. (v) In drought-prone areas, small-scale irrigation is the key enabler for translating the benefits of land restoration into reduction in household vulnerability to climate shocks through income diversification and protection against droughts. (vi) Market-oriented agroforestry interventions (for example, Acacia decurrens) that provide sustainable income for smallholders can be vital ingredients in creating incentives for the adoption of biological measures for land restoration and improving household resilience to climate shocks.

Albania: Secondary and Local Roads Project (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Secondary and Local Roads Project in Albania approved in 2008. The project development objective was to improve access to essential services and economic markets via the provision of all-weather roads for the resident population in the rural areas of Albania. This would be achieved through Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Secondary and Local Roads Project in Albania approved in 2008. The project development objective was to improve access to essential services and economic markets via the provision of all-weather roads for the resident population in the rural areas of Albania. This would be achieved through reconstructing selected secondary and local roads; building the competencies of the implementation agency Albanian Development Fund (ADF); building an asset management system for the secondary and local road networks; and improving capacity in the local community for maintenance. Ratings for the Secondary and Local Roads Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome as moderate, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Implementing a successful multidonor programmatic approach to sector development requires the combination of government commitment with credible planning and common rules of engagement. (ii) Concentrating competencies within one agency may frustrate future decentralization of responsibilities. (iii) In the absence of need-based and credible linkages to resource allocation, a road asset management system may not get sufficient traction.

Jamaica: Rural Economic Development Initiative (PPAR)

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The national poverty rate in Jamaica declined over the two decades prior to appraisal, but rural poverty remained stubbornly high. The Government of Jamaica recognized that if the country was to achieve its goal of “Developed World” status, as indicated in the Government’s Vision 2030 plan, economic development in rural areas needed to keep pace with that experienced in urban Show MoreThe national poverty rate in Jamaica declined over the two decades prior to appraisal, but rural poverty remained stubbornly high. The Government of Jamaica recognized that if the country was to achieve its goal of “Developed World” status, as indicated in the Government’s Vision 2030 plan, economic development in rural areas needed to keep pace with that experienced in urban areas. In 2008, the Government requested World Bank support for a project that would promote rural economic development and income generation by improving access to markets for small-holder farmers and by encouraging rural tourism development. Unusual among the Bank’s productive alliance projects, the present project sought to combine both agriculture and tourism, reflecting the unique circumstances of Jamaica’s rural landscape and the potential for agriculture to engage more with the tourism sector, a major contributor to foreign currency receipts. The Bank also determined that the rural agriculture and tourism sectors offered the most significant potential for rural growth and development. The resulting Bank project, the Rural Economic Development Initiative (REDI), was designed to stimulate rural economic growth and increase rural incomes. Ratings for the Rural Economic Development Initiative are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Overall efficacy was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was negligible. This assessment offers the following issues: (i) For complex productive alliance projects involving the selection of multiple rural subprojects and the introduction of new private-sector market concepts to rural communities, substantial investment to ensure project implementation readiness during project preparation can contribute to a faster and more effective project start. (ii) For productive alliance projects introducing modern technologies and new business management practices into rural populations, ensuring adequate skills and capacity in the implementing agencies will enhance the achievement of results. (iii) Technical assistance supporting private sector market approaches can be critical for linking rural agricultural and tourism operations to new and evolving markets.

Malawi: Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Development Project, and Agricultural Development Program Support Project (PPAR)

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The World Bank has been supporting the government of Malawi in its effort to promote sustainable growth in agricultural productivity. The Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Development Project (IRLADP) supported irrigation farming through the integrated provision of hardware, mainly irrigation infrastructure, and software, mainly local and institutional capacity building. The Show MoreThe World Bank has been supporting the government of Malawi in its effort to promote sustainable growth in agricultural productivity. The Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Development Project (IRLADP) supported irrigation farming through the integrated provision of hardware, mainly irrigation infrastructure, and software, mainly local and institutional capacity building. The Agricultural Development Program Support Project (ADPSP) addressed the efficiency of decision-making at the institutional agricultural policy and farm input–productivity level. The objective of the Project Performance Assessment Report is to assess how the farm-level support of both projects contributed to sustainable increases in agricultural productivity among smallholder farmers (SHFs). Both projects fostered an integrated approach to increases in agricultural productivity by promoting the uptake of traditional measures to support supply (irrigation, modern inputs, and agronomic knowledge) together with complementary practices of improved land and water management. Ratings for the Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Development Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Overall efficacy was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. Ratings for the Agricultural Development Program Support Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Overall efficacy was modest, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation is modest. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) An integrated and participatory approach to agricultural development can initiate sustainable productivity growth among SHFs. In the context of a SHF-dominated agricultural sector and low productivity, traditional support measures of input supply are needed to close agronomic yield gaps. (ii) Agricultural projects with a supply-side focus on productivity growth that ignore market linkages are unlikely to provide the right agribusiness mind-set or incentives for farmers to sustainably invest in longer-term agricultural productivity. (iii) A government’s insufficient capacity and resources for agricultural sector development make it difficult to maintain an innovative but intensive demand-driven approach to service delivery in agriculture. (iv) Sustainable land and water management practices require a comprehensive approach that goes beyond irrigation or demonstration plots. (v) For projects preparing an Agriculture Sector-Wide Approach, monitoring production outcomes without a counterfactual does not allow an understanding of what is driving the anticipated productivity increases.