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Report/Evaluation Type:Project Level Evaluations (PPARs)
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Peru - Lima Transport Project

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This Project Performance Assessment Report evaluates the Lima Transport Project (2003-11) in Peru. The project supported the goal of the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima to enhance economic productivity and quality of life within the Lima metropolitan population, especially in the peri-urban poor neighborhoods, through a public-private partnership. The overall project development outcome is Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report evaluates the Lima Transport Project (2003-11) in Peru. The project supported the goal of the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima to enhance economic productivity and quality of life within the Lima metropolitan population, especially in the peri-urban poor neighborhoods, through a public-private partnership. The overall project development outcome is rated Satisfactory; relevance of the project is rated Substantial; relevance of the project design is rated modest. Efficacy of subobjectives is Substantial. Efficiency is rated Substantial; Bank and borrower performance are both rated Moderately Satisfactory. The PPAR highlights four lessons covering integration of transport corridors, sound risk allocation, and the shift toward nonmotorized transport.

China : renewable energy scale-up program - phase 1

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The China Renewable Energy Scale-up Program (CRESP) was designed to enable a long-term policy dialogue and engagement with the government to develop renewables on a national scale. The backbone of the CRESP partnership was a three-phase program to develop a legal and policy framework and to support technology improvements, standards and certification, preparation, and implementation of innovative Show MoreThe China Renewable Energy Scale-up Program (CRESP) was designed to enable a long-term policy dialogue and engagement with the government to develop renewables on a national scale. The backbone of the CRESP partnership was a three-phase program to develop a legal and policy framework and to support technology improvements, standards and certification, preparation, and implementation of innovative renewable energy projects across the country. Ratings for the project are as follows: Outcome was highly satisfactory, Risk to development was low, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. The main lessons that emerge from the experience of this complex project are: (i) Combining institutional development and investments in one package can help overcome difficult challenges. (ii) Adequate time and resources for preparation and consultations should be planned and allowed. (iii) Cost-shared grants can enhance selectivity and efficiently leverage knowledge transfer, technology improvement, and counterpart funding. (iv) A long-term, predictable price signal can provide an effective stimulus for continuing investments in renewable energies.

Ethiopia - Road Sector Development Program

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The ratings for the Road Sector Development Program (RSDP) of Ethiopia were as follows: outcome was satisfactory; risk to the development outcome was negligible too low; Bank performance was satisfactory; and Borrower performance was also satisfactory. Lessons learned from the projects included: (i) even in a very low income country, a successful infrastructure program can be established with Show MoreThe ratings for the Road Sector Development Program (RSDP) of Ethiopia were as follows: outcome was satisfactory; risk to the development outcome was negligible too low; Bank performance was satisfactory; and Borrower performance was also satisfactory. Lessons learned from the projects included: (i) even in a very low income country, a successful infrastructure program can be established with strong government commitment, sound preparation, continuity of management and funding flow, and a coordinated multi-donor approach. The RSDP support project showed that the up-front focus on policy issues can contribute substantially to a successful outcome; (ii) a successful roads program needs to be monitored by means of establishing appropriate and practical indicators with a dedicated unit to measure progress and report regularly to the decision-makers. The indicators need to be able to establish progress with the softer issues such as income generation, improvements in skills levels, and creation of employment opportunities; and (iii) in a large road program, specific attention needs to be given to effective contract administration. The appointment of dispute resolution experts can yield significant benefits including avoidance of costly arbitration.

Ethiopia, Mali, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia - Africa Stockpiles Program Project

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Ratings for the Africa Stockpiles Program were as follows: outcome was unsatisfactory, risk to development outcome was moderate, Bank performance was unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Some of the key lessons learned from the project include lessons for environmental operations, project design and institutional capacity. Some of these lessons are: 1) investments Show MoreRatings for the Africa Stockpiles Program were as follows: outcome was unsatisfactory, risk to development outcome was moderate, Bank performance was unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Some of the key lessons learned from the project include lessons for environmental operations, project design and institutional capacity. Some of these lessons are: 1) investments in highly technical environmental cleanup operations often face significant unknowns with respect to the nature and extent of the pollution problem and the available options for remedial actions; 2) a horizontal adaptable program loan may not add efficiencies in preparation or synergies in implementation if country circumstances are significantly different and if there is little opportunity for intercountry cooperation and coordination; 3) complex international partnership arrangements, such as those in the ASP-P1, can result in conflicts in defining roles and responsibilities, challenges in effective coordination, and confusion in project interventions.

Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Sao Tome and Principe : internet and mobile connectivity : Central African backbone program (APL 1A and APL 2)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Central Africa Backbone Project Adaptable Program Loan (APL) 1A implemented in three countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad; and the Central Africa Backbone Project APL 2 implemented in Sao Tome and Principe. The objectives of the projects were to help to increase the geographical reach Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Central Africa Backbone Project Adaptable Program Loan (APL) 1A implemented in three countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad; and the Central Africa Backbone Project APL 2 implemented in Sao Tome and Principe. The objectives of the projects were to help to increase the geographical reach and usage of regional broadband network services and reduce their prices to end-users. Ratings for these projects are as follows: Outcome is unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome is substantial, Bank and Borrow performance are both moderately unsatisfactory. For APL 2, the ratings are: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is substantial, Bank performance is satisfactory, and Borrow performance is moderately satisfactory. Lessons from the projects include: (i) A thorough political economy assessment and high-level national and regional commitment are key ingredients for complex regional ICT projects. (ii) The experience from the Central Africa Backbone APL 1 and 2 project shows that public private partnership arrangements are difficult to implement in multiple countries, particularly when countries have asymmetrical needs and incentives with respect to increasing competition for the provision of international and national capacity. (iii) Technical assistance for the preparation of legislation and sector strategies is only the first step to creating an enabling environment for the ICT sector. (iv) Assessing and funding the capacity needs of Regional Economic Communities is important for project coordination and implementation, so that they can carry out their functions effectively. (v) In weak capacity environments, it is beneficial that the projects build the needed institutional capacity for the Borrower to further / implement the crucial reforms and to ensure sustainability of the investments in the country.

Jamaica - Fiscal and Debt Sustainability Development Policy Project

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is part of a set of project performance assessments exploring g development outcomes in different country contexts that are faced with particular challenges during the recent global financial crisis, such as the small, middle-income states of the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, and St Lucia. The objectives of the Jamaica Fiscal and Debt Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is part of a set of project performance assessments exploring g development outcomes in different country contexts that are faced with particular challenges during the recent global financial crisis, such as the small, middle-income states of the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, and St Lucia. The objectives of the Jamaica Fiscal and Debt Sustainability Development Policy Project were to (i) enhance fiscal and debt sustainability; (ii) increase the efficiency of financial management and budget processes; and (iii) reduce distortions and enhance the efficiency of the tax system. This single-tranche development policy loan (DPL), operational from January 2009 through January 2010, was targeted to assisting government in addressing immediate issues of fiscal and debt sustainability. It also provided an opportunity to engage with government on Jamaica's medium-term development program. The outcome of the project is rated as moderately satisfactory. Three key lessons emerged, (i) it is essential for the Bank to work in close collaboration with the IMF and other development partners in DPL operations to ensure complementarities and increase the likelihood of success of the overall program; (ii) a single DPL can be a useful entry point to address an emergency, and to engage with a country where the Bank had no ongoing macroeconomic policy dialogue for an extended period. Notably, a country such as Jamaica that undergoes a systemic crisis needs a medium-term programmatic approach; (iii) the Bank is often called upon to make difficult choices in its policy based lending which can involve high-risk/high reward strategic issues. In this case, it was clear from the beginning that the program would be subject to high macroeconomic risks and the success was not guaranteed. The Bank proceeded to support government's reform program that was conceptually sound but the risk of failures was high due to the magnitude of the problem facing the country. Under such conditions, the Bank might alternatively focus its early efforts more on institutional strengthening such as through advisory services to build capacity and to participate with significant funding in a broader reform program supported by IMF and other IFIs. The subsequent program was part of such a broader package.

Vietnam - Education Projects : School Readiness and Escuela Nueva

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The government and people of Vietnam place a high value on education. The government’s Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2010–20 and the Socio-Economic Development Plan 2016–20 emphasize the importance of investment in human capital to develop people’s skills in support of a knowledge-based economy. This assessment covers two projects: Vietnam School Readiness and Promotion Project, and the Show MoreThe government and people of Vietnam place a high value on education. The government’s Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2010–20 and the Socio-Economic Development Plan 2016–20 emphasize the importance of investment in human capital to develop people’s skills in support of a knowledge-based economy. This assessment covers two projects: Vietnam School Readiness and Promotion Project, and the Global Partnership for Education-Vietnam Escuela Nueva Project. Objectives for these projects are: (i) to raise school readiness for five-year old children, in particular for those most vulnerable to not succeeding in a school environment, through supporting selected elements of Vietnam’s Early Childhood Education (ECE) program, and (ii) to introduce and use new teaching and learning practices in the classroom targeting the most disadvantaged groups of primary students. Ratings for the Vietnam School Readiness and Promotion Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Bank performance was satisfactory, Quality of M&E was substantial, and Risk to development outcome was low. Ratings for the Global Partnership for Education – Vietnam Escuela Nueva Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was modest, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. IEG identified the following lessons from its evaluation of the two operations: (i) In addition to lending, the World Bank can add value through the transmission of knowledge from experiences and lessons that help shape reforms. (ii) When significant pedagogical changes are required of teachers, incentives, support, and long-term commitment are needed (probably more than education systems realize). (iii) When scaling up or adopting a systemwide approach, it is important to understand and design this approach in accordance with the decentralized context and challenges faced at the various levels of administration. (iv) Targeting disadvantaged areas does not translate into targeted efforts for specific vulnerable groups. (v) When scaling up, the importance of consultation and communication cannot be underestimated.

Trinidad and Tobago - Youth Training and Employment Partnership Project (YTEPP)

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This audit report rates the outcome of the Youth Training and Employment Partnership Project (YTEPP) as satisfactory. The project did achieve a sound level of technical sustainability, but it failed to engage the government on the critical issue of financial sustainability. Also the report finds that several trade-offs were Show MoreThis audit report rates the outcome of the Youth Training and Employment Partnership Project (YTEPP) as satisfactory. The project did achieve a sound level of technical sustainability, but it failed to engage the government on the critical issue of financial sustainability. Also the report finds that several trade-offs were made at the design stage that compromised the project's sustainability. Most significant was the packaging of the project as a temporary program. The project experience provides several insights of broad applicability. 1) It is important to balance responsiveness to borrowers' requests for loans with selectivity based on likely value-added for the country. In this case, the investments made are unlikely to sustain a flow of benefits in the long term. 2) Justification for Bank financing needs to be based on economic analysis, taking into account the economic costs and returns on the investment and the most efficient use of Bank borrowing for the country. 3) It is necessary to address the points made at internal review in substance rather than by window-dressing. In this project, the issue of financial sustainability was not squarely addressed and left problems to be resolved during implementation. 4) It is important to build in evaluations to allow policy-makers to assess the case for continued support for a project, based on empirical findings about achievements and shortcomings relative to a control group.

Mauritania - Public Enterprise Sector Adjustment Program Project

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The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) did an assessment of the Public Enterprise Sector Adjustment Program (PESAP) in 1996 (See PPAR report no. 15832). The purpose of reassessing the PESAP is to test the durability of its results, that is, whether the findings of an evaluation change if the operation is evaluated after a Show MoreThe Operations Evaluation Department (OED) did an assessment of the Public Enterprise Sector Adjustment Program (PESAP) in 1996 (See PPAR report no. 15832). The purpose of reassessing the PESAP is to test the durability of its results, that is, whether the findings of an evaluation change if the operation is evaluated after a longer interval, in this case in 2003 rather than in 1996. The reassessment focuses on the initial evaluation findings, facts that have emerged since the evaluation, and the current assessment in 2003. The exercise is important for the reliability and credibility of OED's evaluations and could help determine which OED should undertake assessment of certain operations, especially adjustment programs. The outcome of the PESAP is rated satisfactory as in the 1996 PPAFL Although the institutional development impact of Bank assistance as a whole in the Public Enterprise sector has been substantial, the impact of the PESAP on institutional development has been modest, compared to moderate in the 1996 PPAR. The sustainability is rated likely, compared to uncertain in the PPAR. Bank and Borrower performances are rated satisfactory, as in the PPAR. The following lessons of general applicability emerge from this re-assessment: 1) The reform of the parapublic sector is a very long process measured in decades rather than in years. Its outcome in economic terms and impact on private sector development take many years to materialize. Issues are numerous and complex: legal, social, financial, etc. Bank country assistance strategies and projects should plan public enterprise reforms over a long period of time. 2) Proper sequencing in PE reforms is critical. The first step should be streamlining and strengthening the legal and institutional framework. 3) To move from a phase of rehabilitation/restructuring to a phase of privatization or public-private partnership is a big step and may represent for some governments a difficult and delicate decision. Continuous Bank support is essential. 4) A broad PE reform managed and monitored at the central level should be complemented by sector reform supported by technical assistance projects, especially in the case of public utilities. 5) In PE reforms, performance agreements may be valuable tools in the rehabilitation and restructuring phase, but their purpose is limited and their success highly dependent on the commitment and independence of each side. 6) The setting up of a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system is essential to monitor PEs' operational and financial performance in a consistent manner and over a length of time. It also requires a staff capable of analyzing data. Bank projects should pay particular attention to this at preparation/appraisal.

Ghana - Trade and Investment Gateway Project (GHATIG)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) reviews Bank experience for the Ghana Trade and Investment Gateway Project, effective from 1999 through December 2009 (with an original closing date of December 2005). The project objectives were to attract a critical mass of export-oriented investors to Ghana to accelerate export-led growth and to facilitate trade. This evaluation rates the Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) reviews Bank experience for the Ghana Trade and Investment Gateway Project, effective from 1999 through December 2009 (with an original closing date of December 2005). The project objectives were to attract a critical mass of export-oriented investors to Ghana to accelerate export-led growth and to facilitate trade. This evaluation rates the project outcome as moderately satisfactory. The lack of flexibility in the original project design and the undue reliance on the performance of a single private developer are among the key factors that contributed to the limited success before restructuring. Legal challenges further protracted the process of the replacement of the private developer. Finally, following restructuring, the project successfully addressed the main constraints of on-site infrastructure. The assessment identified three lessons to be learned from the Ghana Trade and Investment Gateway project, (i) in the context of Ghana where fiscal incentives of Free Zones apply to the entire country, the original concept of the Free Zone enclave did not work. A multi-purpose industrial park, which targets all types of investors instead of only export-oriented companies, is a more suitable model in this environment; (ii) effective market research and flexible project design are crucial elements for success of a public-private partnership project; and (iii) institutional reforms and trade logistics improvement can play a significant role in facilitating trade.