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Report/Evaluation Type:Project Level Evaluations (PPARs)
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Uzbekistan: Irrigation and Drainage Interventions to Support the Agriculture Sector (PPAR)

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This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group on the Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Project Phase I and the Uzbekistan Rural Enterprise Support Project Phase II in the Republic of Uzbekistan. This PPAR provides insights into how these two projects identified and addressed critical irrigation sector needs to Show MoreThis is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group on the Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Project Phase I and the Uzbekistan Rural Enterprise Support Project Phase II in the Republic of Uzbekistan. This PPAR provides insights into how these two projects identified and addressed critical irrigation sector needs to improve the country’s irrigation and drainage systems and institutions, both at on-farm and inter-farm levels. The assessment pays special attention to the effectiveness and sustainability of capacity-building support provided to water consumer associations in both projects. Based on such assessment, the PPAR draws common lessons regarding the design and implementation of both projects, which were led by two separate World Bank Global Practices: Water, and Agriculture. The lessons from this PPAR feed into IEG’s forthcoming Evaluation on Strengthening Irrigation Management Models for Sustainable Service Delivery. Ratings for the Ferghana Valley Water Resources Management Project Phase I are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Lessons from this project include: (1) Establishing adequate institutional arrangements is critical for sustainable use of improved agricultural technologies and practices such as land leveling and deep ripping. (ii) Sound selection criteria for identifying beneficiaries and areas are crucial for the farmers’ uptake and use of water-saving technologies. Ratings for the Rural Enterprise Support Project Phase II are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was moderate, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Lessons include: (1) Coordinated and mutually reinforcing capacity building of financial institutions and farmers is crucial for establishing viable on-farm investments. (ii) Clear concept, measurement, and disclosure arrangements at project appraisal for sensitive data can ensure the availability of results at project completion.

Armenia: Energy Efficiency Project (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) evaluates the development effectiveness of the Energy Efficiency Project in Armenia. The project was selected for a PPAR to learn from an innovative pilot project that influenced the design and experience of other energy efficiency projects and interventions. Energy efficiency is of strategic importance for the World Bank given its role in Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) evaluates the development effectiveness of the Energy Efficiency Project in Armenia. The project was selected for a PPAR to learn from an innovative pilot project that influenced the design and experience of other energy efficiency projects and interventions. Energy efficiency is of strategic importance for the World Bank given its role in supporting climate change mitigation, which is a major corporate priority. The project development objective was to reduce energy consumption of social and other public facilities in Armenia and decrease greenhouse gas emissions through the removal of barriers to the implementation of energy efficiency investments in the public sector. The project was financed through a Global Environment Facility (GEF) grant and government funds totaling $10.7 million. The project was implemented in 2012–16. Ratings from the Energy Efficiency Project were as follows: Outcomes was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Energy efficiency revolving funds can be market enablers by partnering with commercial and financial institutions, but there are few prospects for scale up and energy efficiency market transformation without the commitment of private businesses. (ii) Practical demonstration of the technical and financial feasibility of an innovative energy efficiency transaction program can only influence positive systemic change in the legal and regulatory framework if there is government commitment to the approach and long‐term funding. (iii) Appropriate legislation and regulation can provide incentives to undertake energy efficiency measures, but they are not sufficient without a strong government energy efficiency agency in place that is responsible for monitoring and enforcement. (iv) The design of a pilot project needs to go beyond demonstration effects and lay the foundation for sustainable operations over time.

Romania: Hazard Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project (PPAR)

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Romania’s Hazard Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness (HRMEP) project, which was implemented between 2004 and 2012, was one of the World Bank’s first efforts to provide ex ante assistance to reduce or mitigate a country’s vulnerabilities to natural disasters related to floods, landslides, and earthquakes. The government sought the support of the World Bank to reduce vulnerability to these Show MoreRomania’s Hazard Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness (HRMEP) project, which was implemented between 2004 and 2012, was one of the World Bank’s first efforts to provide ex ante assistance to reduce or mitigate a country’s vulnerabilities to natural disasters related to floods, landslides, and earthquakes. The government sought the support of the World Bank to reduce vulnerability to these and other natural disasters in a proactive manner, leading to the approval of the HRMEP. The project development objective (PDO) was to assist the government in reducing the environmental, social, and economic vulnerability to natural disasters and catastrophic mining accident spills of pollutants. The PDO also included how the objective would be achieved: (i) the strengthening of emergency management and risk financing capacity; (ii) earthquake risk reduction; (iii) flood and landslide risk reduction; and, (iv) risk reduction of mining accidents in the Tisza Basin in northwest Romania. Ratings for the Hazard Risk Emergency Preparedness Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome was significant, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately unsatisfactory. Key lessons from the experience of the project include the following: (i) Depending on multiple, functionally independent implementing agencies for multisector projects can increase complexity without providing commensurate benefits. (ii) Multisectoral, multihazard efforts to reduce vulnerability to disasters may not offer synergies or economies of scope in the absence of clear logical links between activities and incentives for coordination by the institutions responsible for them. (iii) In a project designed to mitigate the risk of natural disasters, it is essential that sites critical for vulnerability reduction are both properly identified and systematically supported throughout the life of a project. (iv) When supporting structural retrofits, financing only the retrofitting and not the cost of returning buildings to functionality is likely to lead to problems with implementation.

Armenia: Achievements and Challenges in Improving Health Care Utilization – A Multiproject Evaluation of the World Bank Support to the Health System Modernization (2004-2016) (PPAR)

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This is the multiproject Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the Adaptable Program Loan (APL) Health System Modernization series (comprising a first phase P073974, a second phase P104467, and an additional financing P121728). It evaluates the extent to which the APL series achieved its intended outcomes and offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the long-term engagement of the Show MoreThis is the multiproject Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the Adaptable Program Loan (APL) Health System Modernization series (comprising a first phase P073974, a second phase P104467, and an additional financing P121728). It evaluates the extent to which the APL series achieved its intended outcomes and offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the long-term engagement of the World Bank in reform of the Armenia health sector aiming to inform and guide future investments in the health sector. The APL series was selected for an indepth field-based assessment due to its potential for learning from long-term engagement of the World Bank in health sector reforms; its clustering nature that allows coverage of multiple lending operation in the same country; and the relatively low coverage of previous IEG project evaluations in the country. Ratings for the Health System Modernization Project I are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was negligible to low, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Project II ratings are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was moderate, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from both projects include: (i) An approach that exploits synergies and lessons from other World Bank engagements in the health sector is important for undertaking complex reforms and helping the government stay the course of the reform. (ii) Macro and micro health policies need to be combined in a manner that the unintended consequences of policy changes are not overlooked. (iii) A shortened period between the approval dates of successive phases of an APL can limit the opportunity to incorporate lessons from previous phases into the design of new ones. (iv) In country contexts with strong social and cultural factors affecting uptake of health care services, supply-side and systemwide policy reforms need to be combined with demand-side interventions addressing the health-seeking behavior of patients. (v) While investments in infrastructure are not enough for health system modernization, they can help ensure acceptance of the proposed organizational changes involving strong stakeholders in the hospital sector.

Kenya: Agricultural Productivity Program (KAPP I and II)

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This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) covers the Kenya Agricultural Productivity Program (KAPP) and Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Program (KAPAP). This report was commissioned to assess the development results and outcomes of the projects, and to document the experiences and lessons from the innovative institutional and policy reforms carried out to accelerate Show MoreThis is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) covers the Kenya Agricultural Productivity Program (KAPP) and Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Program (KAPAP). This report was commissioned to assess the development results and outcomes of the projects, and to document the experiences and lessons from the innovative institutional and policy reforms carried out to accelerate agricultural productivity growth and commercialization of smallholder agriculture in Kenya. The sequential implementation of two projects offered an opportunity to assess the extent to which certain institutional and policy reforms—to bring pluralism in the agricultural extension system and increase the performance of the agricultural research system—have contributed to crop-livestock productivity growth. It also allows evaluation of whether the changes introduced are likely to be sustained. This report covers two projects and ratings for each are as follows: Kenya Agricultural Productivity Project - Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was high, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Project – Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately unsatisfactory. The following lessons are drawn from the experience of the KAPP program: (i) Sustained government ownership and commitment are key to achieve complex and sectorwide institutional reforms. (ii) Effectiveness of institutional reforms and project outcomes requires sustained effort through continuous realignment with the changing context. (iii) Participatory and client-driven approaches with strong priority setting and regular evaluation are critical to stimulate and transform the agricultural research system. (iv) Provision of agricultural extension services to poor small-scale farmers as a public good requires a sustainable financing mechanism. (v) Public sector funding for extension services can be decoupled from public provision to strengthen complementarities and create space for private sector participation and improved service delivery. (vi) Scaling up the contracted service delivery model using the privatized extension system requires development of new public regulatory and quality control systems.

North Macedonia: Regional and Local Roads Program Support Project (PPAR)

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This PPAR assesses the development effectiveness of the Regional and Local Roads Program Support project in North Macedonia, which was approved in 2008. The original development objective of the project, “to reduce cost of access to markets and services for communities served by regional and local roads,” was revised through a level I restructuring in 2013 “to reduce the cost of safe access to Show MoreThis PPAR assesses the development effectiveness of the Regional and Local Roads Program Support project in North Macedonia, which was approved in 2008. The original development objective of the project, “to reduce cost of access to markets and services for communities served by regional and local roads,” was revised through a level I restructuring in 2013 “to reduce the cost of safe access to markets and services for communities served by regional and local roads in North Macedonia’s territory, and to improve institutional capacity for investment planning and road safety.” The revised objective thus introduced the element of road safety to access, as well as institutional capacity for investment planning and road safety. Ratings for the Regional and Local Roads Program Support Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Objective criteria developed and applied in a participatory manner can support a transparent framework to allocate investments and maintenance funds in the roads sector. (ii) The decentralization of responsibilities to local governments needs to be accompanied by the availability of commensurate resources and capacity building. (iii) Road safety and road design elements need to be jointly integrated into the project design and monitoring framework to mitigate risks to the effectiveness of road projects. (iv) Road project appraisal requires sufficient time and technical due diligence to ensure effective and timely project implementation.

Ethiopia: Urban Local Government Development Project (PPAR)

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This is the Project Performance Assessment Report for the Urban Local Government Development Project (ULGDP) in Ethiopia, which was approved by the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors on May 29, 2008, and closed on December 31, 2014. The project’s development objective was to support improved performance in the planning, delivery, and sustained provision of priority municipal services and Show MoreThis is the Project Performance Assessment Report for the Urban Local Government Development Project (ULGDP) in Ethiopia, which was approved by the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors on May 29, 2008, and closed on December 31, 2014. The project’s development objective was to support improved performance in the planning, delivery, and sustained provision of priority municipal services and infrastructure by urban local governments across the country. Ratings for Urban Local Government Development Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was negligible to low, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) There is a trade‐off between scope and development outcomes in municipal operations that use performance‐based grants. It is critical to ensure that funding is sufficient to both incentivize behavior at the city level and offer a meaningful level of technical assistance. (ii) A one‐size‐fits‐all approach is ineffective in urban development projects that target multiple cities at various stages of development. (iii) Performance‐based grants should be considered as a preferred method of intermediating intergovernmental fiscal resources to urban local governments in the context of emerging urban systems. (iv) Promoting autonomous decision making at the city level although ensuring that operational rules and supervision are in place is a necessary condition to ensuring the intended use of funds in municipal finance projects. (v) Urban development projects need to balance targeting core city administrative functions as well as improving city management and planning competencies.

Bolivia: Rural Alliances Project (PPAR)

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Around the turn of the millennium, based on lessons learned from projects in Bolivia and elsewhere, the World Bank began tinkering with the model of decentralized, community-driven development, trying to make it a more effective vehicle for boosting incomes generated by private sector productive activities in poor rural areas. The conviction was growing that past efforts to raise production Show MoreAround the turn of the millennium, based on lessons learned from projects in Bolivia and elsewhere, the World Bank began tinkering with the model of decentralized, community-driven development, trying to make it a more effective vehicle for boosting incomes generated by private sector productive activities in poor rural areas. The conviction was growing that past efforts to raise production incomes had underperformed because they had not, at the project design phase, paid enough attention to the potential of existing—and, more importantly, new—markets, nor had they developed ways to better link small-scale producers to those markets. The rural alliances model has now been applied to 18 operations in 10 countries throughout the Latin America and Caribbean Region. It seeks to promote links between buyers and organized groups of poor rural producers. The objective of the project, as stated in the development credit agreement, was to test a model to improve accessibility to markets for poor rural producers in pilot areas. Ratings for the project as follows: Outcomes was highly satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was negligible to low, Bank performance was highly satisfactory, and Borrower performance was highly satisfactory. IEG draws six lessons from the assessment: (i) In a country such as Bolivia, where the productivity of small-scale producers is low and there is substantial scope for increasing sales to the domestic market, the first step for a productive alliance is to boost the quantity and quality of the marketed surplus. (ii) Once producer groups are well organized, alliances can help producers obtain sustainable, postproject finance, enhancing the sustainability of the alliance arrangement. (iii) Project management can be greatly enhanced when strict quality controls are applied by independent parties, without political interference. (iv) Technical assistance works best when it is based on a flexible menu that accommodates the varied capacity building needs of different subprojects. (v) Agile disbursement of project funds enhances beneficiary commitment and increases the efficiency of subproject implementation. (vi) Having a knowledgeable national coordinator who helps design the project and provides long-term leadership greatly enhances the achievement of project objectives.

Rwanda: Urban Infrastructure and City Management Project (UICMP) (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report reviews the Rwanda Urban Infrastructure and City Management Project (UICMP). The project was approved on November 10, 2005 and became effective on June 2, 2006. The project’s original closing date of March 31, 2009, was extended by nine months to December 31, 2009. The project was financed by an International Development Association (IDA) grant ($20 Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report reviews the Rwanda Urban Infrastructure and City Management Project (UICMP). The project was approved on November 10, 2005 and became effective on June 2, 2006. The project’s original closing date of March 31, 2009, was extended by nine months to December 31, 2009. The project was financed by an International Development Association (IDA) grant ($20 million) and a Professional Human Resource Development grant ($0.46 million), and contributions from the government of Rwanda ($2.6 million). The Nordic Development Fund provided parallel financing ($6.4 million). The project development objective (PDO) was to increase access to urban infrastructure and services in the primary city of Kigali and the two secondary cities of Butare and Ruhengeri through physical investment and upgrading and improved management tools. Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was moderate, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Main lessons from this operation are as follows: (i) The World Bank’s absence in a sector creates knowledge and implementation gaps for both World Bank and client, requiring significant catch-up transaction costs. (ii) Using a delegated management agency to address the weak implementation capacity of local governments requires a focus on building such capacity and a clear exit strategy to ensure long-term sustainability. (iii) To maximize learning from pilot project components, their lessons should be documented and disseminated to inform the future work of the World Bank and government.

Albania: Secondary and Local Roads Project (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Secondary and Local Roads Project in Albania approved in 2008. The project development objective was to improve access to essential services and economic markets via the provision of all-weather roads for the resident population in the rural areas of Albania. This would be achieved through Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Secondary and Local Roads Project in Albania approved in 2008. The project development objective was to improve access to essential services and economic markets via the provision of all-weather roads for the resident population in the rural areas of Albania. This would be achieved through reconstructing selected secondary and local roads; building the competencies of the implementation agency Albanian Development Fund (ADF); building an asset management system for the secondary and local road networks; and improving capacity in the local community for maintenance. Ratings for the Secondary and Local Roads Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome as moderate, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Implementing a successful multidonor programmatic approach to sector development requires the combination of government commitment with credible planning and common rules of engagement. (ii) Concentrating competencies within one agency may frustrate future decentralization of responsibilities. (iii) In the absence of need-based and credible linkages to resource allocation, a road asset management system may not get sufficient traction.