Albania : Competitiveness Development Policy Lending Project
Web Resource
The Albania Competitiveness
Development Policy Loan (DPL) was financed by an
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loan
in the amount of $77.72 million and approved by the World
Bank Group Board of Executive Directors on January 31, 2017.
The DPL was designed as a stand-alone operation. The
objective of the Show MoreThe Albania Competitiveness
Development Policy Loan (DPL) was financed by an
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loan
in the amount of $77.72 million and approved by the World
Bank Group Board of Executive Directors on January 31, 2017.
The DPL was designed as a stand-alone operation. The
objective of the DPL was “to enhance Albania’s
competitiveness by improving the investment regime, making
it easier to do business, and facilitating trade. Ratings
for the Competitiveness Development Policy Lending Project
are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Risk
to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was
moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was
moderately unsatisfactory. This assessment offers the
following lessons: (i) It is crucial for prior actions to
address the key binding constraints to achieving the stated
objective of a DPL. (ii) Prior actions of this operation did
not have a sufficient level of ambition to make a
significant contribution to enhancing competitiveness. (iii)
At implementation, it is crucial for IFC to determine
warning signals regarding inadequate client commitment and
show flexibility and patience only to those clients that
show proof of trust, ownership, and commitment. (iv) For
progress in the uptake of the local clearance procedure or
the approved economic operator programs by businesses, it is
crucial to have in place (i) a clear communication and
outreach strategy, (ii) a systematic approach to educating
businesses and customs about the benefits of these programs,
(iii) strong engagement of customs and other border agencies
with the private sector, and (iv) a culture of trust between
customs and the business community. (v) Doing Business (DB)
indicators as targets and metrics of reforms do not work
very well, even if they are valid ways to point to a problem
area. (vi) Clear assignment of responsibility for collection
of particular data needs to be assigned at the outset.
Côte d’Ivoire : Agriculture Sector Support Project
Web Resource
The Agriculture Sector Support
Project (PSAC) in Côte d’Ivoire was conceived in 2010–12 to
support government reforms to achieve a more competitive,
sustainable, and private sector–led cash crop sector and to
ensure sustained increases in producers’ incomes. The PSAC
focused on Côte d’Ivoire’s five key export commodities: Show MoreThe Agriculture Sector Support
Project (PSAC) in Côte d’Ivoire was conceived in 2010–12 to
support government reforms to achieve a more competitive,
sustainable, and private sector–led cash crop sector and to
ensure sustained increases in producers’ incomes. The PSAC
focused on Côte d’Ivoire’s five key export commodities:
cocoa, rubber, oil palm, cotton, and cashew nuts. It
supported value chain development for these commodities
through three strategic pathways: (i) improving production
technologies and smallholder farmer access to them, (ii)
improving smallholder farmer access to markets, and (iii)
enhancing value chain governance. An integrated package of
productivity, marketing, and institutional interventions was
implemented for each commodity as a pilot in its most
important or representative production region. Ratings for
this project are as follows: Outcome was moderately
satisfactory, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory,
and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was modest. This
assessment offers the following lessons: (i) Project
relevance and efficacy are enhanced by aligning projects
with national strategies, building on existing institutional
mechanisms and stakeholder consensus and supporting ongoing
activities. (ii) Project efficiency and sustainability are
enhanced by ensuring continuity in coordination and
management staffing from design to implementation to
postproject internalization. (iii) Projects with short time
frames need to set realistic goals on institutional
development and governance improvement, while adapting to
institutional and political risks, to be effective. (iv)
Effective institutional development requires elaborate
methodologies and monitoring frameworks, instead of merely
end goals and flexible ad hoc approaches. (v) Reinforcing
the role of IPOs and producer cooperatives in agricultural
value chains requires buy-in from both the state and the
private sector on a well-defined and well-balanced
demarcation of roles and powers, and a solid and loyal base
of professionalized cooperatives ensuring true
representativity. (vi) A diverse set of productivity
enhancement interventions can support overcoming challenges
of rural poverty, lack of competitiveness, demographic
pressure, and land scarcity. (vii) Sustainability of project
achievements can be compromised if contingencies among
development pathways are not recognized or if they are not
capitalized on by the government. (viii) Co-financing
provides critical leverage and ownership; however, sustained
effects require co-management and arrangements for
postproject continuation.
Rwanda : Transformation of Agriculture Sector Program Phase 3 Program-for-Results
Web Resource
Ratings for the Transformation of
Agriculture Sector Program Phase 3 Program-for-Results are
as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Bank
performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of
monitoring and evaluation was modest. This assessment offers
the following lessons: (i) PforRs should start with
relatively Show MoreRatings for the Transformation of
Agriculture Sector Program Phase 3 Program-for-Results are
as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Bank
performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of
monitoring and evaluation was modest. This assessment offers
the following lessons: (i) PforRs should start with
relatively mature and ready-to-implement activities, in this
case including soil erosion control and enhanced
technological innovation, which led to early results in land
husbandry and increased agricultural productivity. (ii)
Incentivizing institutional reforms is an added value of the
PforR instrument that needs to be internalized by all
stakeholders across sectors and at both national and
subnational levels. (iii) Any gaps in capacity and
eligibility to request and execute budgets need to be
addressed first to ensure the effective functioning of the
fund disbursement mechanism—based on DLI achievements—from
the central treasury to the line ministry and affiliated institutions.
Bhutan - Fiscal Sustainability and Investment Climate Development Policy Credit Series
Web Resource
This Project Performance Assessment
Report (PPAR) evaluates a development policy credit (DPC)
series for Bhutan consisting of the First and Second Fiscal
Sustainability and Investment Climate Development Policy
Credits. The program development objective was to promote
fiscal discipline, improve access to finance for Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment
Report (PPAR) evaluates a development policy credit (DPC)
series for Bhutan consisting of the First and Second Fiscal
Sustainability and Investment Climate Development Policy
Credits. The program development objective was to promote
fiscal discipline, improve access to finance for
enterprises,1 and improve the climate for business entry and
investment in Bhutan. Ratings are as follows: Outcome was
moderately unsatisfactory, and Bank performance was
moderately unsatisfactory. The experience with this DPC
series suggests several lessons for Bhutan that may also be
relevant to countries in similar situations: (i) DPCs should
be more selective, focusing on fewer and better-sequenced
reforms. Selectivity filters should include reforms that
address critical constraints to economic growth and
stability, those that have government and parliamentary
support, and those for which complementary implementation
support—including to address concerns of Parliament—is
available. (ii) DPCs in Bhutan should have more thorough
assessments of technical capacity and implementation risks
and pay more attention to risk mitigation. (iii) Greater
attention is needed to foster coordination across ministries
and agencies. For this purpose, investment project financing
with results-based (disbursement-linked) indicators or
Programs-for-Results may be more efficacious instruments to
support the achievement of objectives. (iv) DPCs in Bhutan
that aim to address economic growth should be informed by a
more rigorous assessment of major constraints to private
sector development. (v) Bank Group management should
consider what steps are feasible when legislation supported
by development policy financing prior actions is not enacted.
Arab Republic of Egypt : Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project and Farm-Level Irrigation Modernization Project
Web Resource
Ratings for the Integrated Irrigation
Improvement and Management Project are as follows: Outcome
was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was
modest, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and
Borrow performance was moderately satisfactory. Ratings for
the Farm-Level Irrigation Modernization Project are as Show MoreRatings for the Integrated Irrigation
Improvement and Management Project are as follows: Outcome
was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was
modest, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and
Borrow performance was moderately satisfactory. Ratings for
the Farm-Level Irrigation Modernization Project are as
follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to
development outcome was modest, and Bank performance was
moderately satisfactory. This assessment offers the
following lessons: (i) In irrigation systems, such as the
Nile Delta’s, that are organized along a hierarchical canal
network, irrigation improvement efforts can realize greater
impact by applying a systematic approach to rehabilitation,
as was done through these two projects, as opposed to
addressing different levels of the canal system in
isolation. (ii) Efficient implementation of irrigation
improvement works requires coordinating and sequencing
activities that fall under the mandate of many different
entities, which are often beyond the authority of the
project implementing agency. (iii) Effecting behavior
changes in on-farm water use, agronomic practices, and
diversification to higher-value crops requires support
beyond improvements to the irrigation water delivery system.
(iv) Successfully reforming the institutions that manage
irrigation and drainage services, both water users and
government agencies, requires greater attention to
incentives for collaboration. (v) In a context such as the
Nile Delta, where overall efficiency of the irrigation
system is already high, there is little scope for addressing
water savings at the basin level through infrastructure improvement.
Jamaica : Early Childhood Development Project
Web Resource
Ratings for the Early Childhood
Development Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately
unsatisfactory, Bank performance was moderately
unsatisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was
modest. This assessment offers the following lessons: (1)
Collaboration, strong national ownership of the NSP, and
financial Show MoreRatings for the Early Childhood
Development Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately
unsatisfactory, Bank performance was moderately
unsatisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was
modest. This assessment offers the following lessons: (1)
Collaboration, strong national ownership of the NSP, and
financial support are requisite conditions but do not ensure
performance and outcomes because the World Bank must also
provide rigor and candor in its dialogue and advice. (ii)
Country teams need to share and archive lessons and
implementation knowledge, including Global Practice
knowledge, across projects. (iii) The institutional
arrangements for cross-sectoral or cross-ministerial action
and coordination are less likely to succeed when authority
is centered in one of the involved ministers or ministries.
(iv) Intersectoral coordination may more likely be sustained
with “light mechanisms” and financial resources that empower
ministries and national agencies to focus on achieving a
convergence of common policies, actions, and results.
Kyrgyz Republic: The First and Second Development Policy Operations and Programmatic Governance and Competitiveness Development Policy Operation
Web Resource
The World Bank approved two
programmatic series of development policy operations (DPOs)
from 2013 through 2016 to improve governance and private
sector development in the Kyrgyz Republic. The strategic
focus of both series’ objectives was highly relevant to the
country context: weak governance (which had become evident
during Show MoreThe World Bank approved two
programmatic series of development policy operations (DPOs)
from 2013 through 2016 to improve governance and private
sector development in the Kyrgyz Republic. The strategic
focus of both series’ objectives was highly relevant to the
country context: weak governance (which had become evident
during the 2010 revolution) and the need to shift to a
private sector–oriented model of development to increase
long-term economic growth. Ratings for First and Second
Development Policy Operations are as follows: Outcome was
moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome was
high, and Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory.
Ratings for the Governance and Competitiveness Development
Policy Operation was moderately unsatisfactory for outcome,
high for risk to development outcome, and moderately
unsatisfactory for Bank performance. The findings of this
Project Performance Assessment Report lead to several
operationally relevant lessons include: (i) In a high-risk
context, DPOs that are more targeted may have a greater
chance of success, with implementation supported by
complementary interventions (for example, investment
projects and advisory services and analytics). (ii)
Discussion of risks to the success of budget support
operations should reflect the compounding of risks from
parallel budget support operations. (iii) Analytics that
take a broader view of constraints to achieving DPO
objectives (in this case, those related to private sector
development) are needed to ensure relevant design; more
narrowly targeted analytics help justify specific reforms.
(iv) The focus on governance and competitiveness was
appropriate but raises questions regarding whether DPOs are
the right modality in the Kyrgyz Republic to achieve reforms
that frequently are slow to come to fruition.
Vietnam : Results-Based Rural Water Supply and Sanitation under the National Target Program
Web Resource
Ratings for the Results-Based Rural
Water Supply and Sanitation under the National Target
Program project are as follows: Outcome was highly
satisfactory, Bank performance was highly satisfactory, and
Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. The
RWSS PforR’s experience suggests the following lessons: (i)
PforR Show MoreRatings for the Results-Based Rural
Water Supply and Sanitation under the National Target
Program project are as follows: Outcome was highly
satisfactory, Bank performance was highly satisfactory, and
Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. The
RWSS PforR’s experience suggests the following lessons: (i)
PforR design needs to be closely aligned with national
policies and regulations, particularly regarding financial
management. (ii) PforR design and implementation need to
exercise equity and inclusivity in targeting beneficiaries
to avoid selection bias against hard-to-reach ethnic and the
poorest minorities and to reduce their vulnerability in the
long term. (iii) The existence of an enabling environment
for private participation could enhance the effectiveness of PforRs.
Panama : First, Second, and Third Programmatic Fiscal Management and Efficiency of Expenditures Development Policy Loan
Web Resource
Ratings for the First, Second, and
Third Programmatic Fiscal Management and Efficiency of
Expenditures Development Policy Loans are as follows:
Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was
not applicable, Bank performance was moderately
satisfactory, and Borrower performance was not applicable.
This assessment Show MoreRatings for the First, Second, and
Third Programmatic Fiscal Management and Efficiency of
Expenditures Development Policy Loans are as follows:
Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was
not applicable, Bank performance was moderately
satisfactory, and Borrower performance was not applicable.
This assessment offers the following lessons: (i)
Development policy financing design requires realism and
clarity about risks to implementation, and (ii) Social
protection reform in Panama was a matter of political will
rather than resource availability.
Tanzania : First Business Environment and Competitiveness for Jobs Development Policy Operation
Web Resource
Ratings for the First Business
Environment and Competitiveness for Jobs Development Policy
Operation are as follows: Outcome was moderately
unsatisfactory, and Bank performance was moderately
unsatisfactory. This assessment offers the following
lessons: (i) Although informed risk taking is a feature of
DPOs that incorporate Show MoreRatings for the First Business
Environment and Competitiveness for Jobs Development Policy
Operation are as follows: Outcome was moderately
unsatisfactory, and Bank performance was moderately
unsatisfactory. This assessment offers the following
lessons: (i) Although informed risk taking is a feature of
DPOs that incorporate difficult reforms, the associated
risks of the BEFJ programmatic series in Tanzania were not
clearly acknowledged. (ii) In Tanzania, complex operations
that span several ministries may strain the capacity of
government counterparts. More focused operations that
require less coordination could well be more effective.
(iii) Relying predominantly on the Doing Business indicators
to identify reform priorities missed addressing some of the
most important priorities.