Displaying 1 - 10 of 710
Montenegro: Institutional Development and Agriculture Strengthening Project (MIDAS) (PPAR)
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The original project development objective was to “improve delivery of government assistance for sustainable agriculture and rural development in a manner consistent with the EU pre-accession requirements.” Original financing was expected to be a $15.7 million loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and a $4 million grant from the Global Environment Facility ( Show MoreThe original project development objective was to “improve delivery of government assistance for sustainable agriculture and rural development in a manner consistent with the EU pre-accession requirements.” Original financing was expected to be a $15.7 million loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and a $4 million grant from the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The Global Environment Objective was to “mainstream sustainable land use and natural resource management into MAFWM’s [the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management] policies, programs and investments” (World Bank 2009).
Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Overall efficacy was substantial, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) A clear articulation of the expected transformation of the agriculture sector, and a logically associated and well-defined path to follow at the institutional and production level, is crucial in justifying reforms and achieving desired outcomes. (ii) A practical “learning by doing” pilot approach can help identify and address bottlenecks and prepare the sector for new practices and procedures. (iii) Sector weaknesses need to be addressed in a holistic manner at institutional, administrative, regulatory, and production levels to comprehensively foster a country’s agriculture sector competitiveness. (iv) Projects supporting compliance with market standards can help beneficiaries meet necessary conditions for market participation, but they do not guarantee market inclusion or expansion without connection support for new market linkages. (v) Access to finance for agricultural producers should be assessed at appraisal to test the extent to which limited credit is an overarching constraint to broader sector development.
Morocco: Municipal Solid Waste Sector Development Policy Loans 1-4 (PPAR)
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The development objective of the first Development Policy Loan series (DPLs 1 and 2) was to improve the financial, environmental, and social performance of Morocco’s MSW sector. The development objective of the second DPL series (DPL 3 and 4) was to improve the economic, environmental, and social performance of Morocco’s MSW sector. The slight revision of the project development objectives Show MoreThe development objective of the first Development Policy Loan series (DPLs 1 and 2) was to improve the financial, environmental, and social performance of Morocco’s MSW sector. The development objective of the second DPL series (DPL 3 and 4) was to improve the economic, environmental, and social performance of Morocco’s MSW sector. The slight revision of the project development objectives between the two-program series comprised changing the “financial performance” part of the initial objective to “economic performance” in the second series.
Ratings for Loans 1 and 2 were as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was significant, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Ratings for Loans 3 and 4 were as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was significant, Bank performance was satisfactory, Borrower performance was satisfactory. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) A policy loan can be a viable instrument to start reforms in the MSWM sector, cover multiple aspects, and obtain the government’s sustained attention and commitment for a nationwide program. However, because of the sector’s complexity, with many actors involved at the national and local levels, these reforms require long-term engagement using various instruments. (ii) Continued attention to strengthening municipalities, both financially and institutionally, is key to enabling them to fulfill their service provision mandate on SWM sustainably. (iii) Behavioral change and leveraging technology are critically needed to establish separation at source and promote waste reduction, reuse, and recycling, promoting the evolution into a circular economy and ensuring environmental sustainability. (iv) Integrated upstream interventions including policy reforms, incentives and investments for circular economy (along with focus on collection and disposal) are needed to achieve sustainable solid waste management systems. (v) Scaling up the formalization of waste pickers requires broader enabling policy changes and capacity building and incentives at the local government level.
Côte d’Ivoire: First, Second, and Third Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PPAR)
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The Côte d’Ivoire Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) series provides an opportunity to test the hypothesis that a DPO series can effectively help restore a post-conflict country to growth and catalyze longer-term reforms when there is a sound underlying macroeconomic framework and capable administration. The PPAR adds value to the initial Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) validation of this Show MoreThe Côte d’Ivoire Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) series provides an opportunity to test the hypothesis that a DPO series can effectively help restore a post-conflict country to growth and catalyze longer-term reforms when there is a sound underlying macroeconomic framework and capable administration. The PPAR adds value to the initial Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) validation of this programmatic series by reviewing the sustainability of reforms undertaken, applying the new Implementation Completion and Results Report Review methodology for development policy financing, and incorporating views of a wider range of stakeholders to draw lessons.
Ratings for these projects were as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome wash, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and the Quality of monitoring and evaluation was moderately unsatisfactory. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) Designing DPO series with too many unrelated prior actions may undermine achievement of results. (ii) A clear results chain is needed to prioritize critical actions and monitor results. (iii) Critical reforms that require sequencing over an extended period for effective implementation should be complemented by institutional measures for sustained implementation and technical assistance projects to build capacity. (iv) In post-conflict situations, the need for budget support provides an opportunity for introducing and accelerating reforms.
Republic of Congo: Support for Economic Diversification Project (PPAR)
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The original objective of the Support for Economic Diversification Project as stated at appraisal stage was “to promote private sector growth and investment in the non-oil sectors in the Republic of Congo.” The revised objective of the project after the 2014 restructuring was “to promote private investment in select non-oil value chains and to support SME [small and medium enterprise] development Show MoreThe original objective of the Support for Economic Diversification Project as stated at appraisal stage was “to promote private sector growth and investment in the non-oil sectors in the Republic of Congo.” The revised objective of the project after the 2014 restructuring was “to promote private investment in select non-oil value chains and to support SME [small and medium enterprise] development.”
Ratings for this project were as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Overall efficacy was negligible for original PDO and modest for revised PDO, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was modest. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) When working with low-capacity clients, especially in countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence, design should be simple with a minimum of components and limited requirements for coordination. (ii) For investment climate reform type projects, particularly in countries with strong centralized power dynamics, a key champion at the highest level of the government and coordination among the various ministries are crucial to bringing the public and private sectors together and helping identify and implement the reforms needed to improve the investment climate and competitiveness. (iii) It is crucial for projects involving large counterpart funding, especially in countries where public revenues are highly dependent on natural resources, to consider the risk of commodity price fluctuations for counterpart funding at the time of appraisal and seek to mitigate such risk. (iv) A matching grant scheme should clearly identify the needs of the beneficiaries at the time of the project design, especially in countries similar to the Republic of Congo that lack an entrepreneurship mind-set, have a large informal sector, and lack funding from financial institutions to firms.
Azerbaijan: ARP II Integrated Solid Waste Management Project (PPAR)
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This assessment seeks to identify what worked and what did not work under the Absheron Rehabilitation Program II Integrated Solid Waste Management Project in Azerbaijan. The project was designed in 2008 to support the reform of the Greater Baku area solid waste management. Its project development objective was to support (i) improving solid waste disposal management; (ii) increasing waste Show MoreThis assessment seeks to identify what worked and what did not work under the Absheron Rehabilitation Program II Integrated Solid Waste Management Project in Azerbaijan. The project was designed in 2008 to support the reform of the Greater Baku area solid waste management. Its project development objective was to support (i) improving solid waste disposal management; (ii) increasing waste collection coverage; and (iii) enhancing waste data information and financial management capacity in the Greater Baku area. The project closed in 2018,
after 10 years of implementation and $76.6 million disbursed under the two
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loans.
Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was modest. This project performance assessment offers the following lessons: (i) Significant spending on modern waste facilities alone is not sufficient to ensure an effective municipal solid waste disposal system. (ii) Closing illegal dumps is likely to be ineffective without complementary measures to strengthen institutional accountability and achieve behavior change. (iii) It is important to think through the sequencing of sector interventions in unreformed sectors to prioritize interventions that ensure a minimum threshold of viability and reforms that may enable meaningful progress.
Guinea: Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Project (PPAR)
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At the time of project appraisal, agriculture and mining were the main sources of economic growth in Guinea. The country’s mining sector contributed 20 to 25 percent of government revenues. However, Guinea’s economic performance was not proportionate with its natural resource endowment, since agriculture and mining performed modestly. After years of instability, Guinea’s first democratically Show MoreAt the time of project appraisal, agriculture and mining were the main sources of economic growth in Guinea. The country’s mining sector contributed 20 to 25 percent of government revenues. However, Guinea’s economic performance was not proportionate with its natural resource endowment, since agriculture and mining performed modestly. After years of instability, Guinea’s first democratically elected president assumed power in December 2010. Although the political transition was difficult, macroeconomic stability was restored, and debt sustainability dramatically improved with the attainment of the highly indebted poor countries completion point in September 2012. However, the private sector in Guinea was not able to contribute enough to growth and help realize the country’s potential because of several underlying constraints: weak legal and regulatory environment for paying taxes and protecting investors; weak access to finance; low human capital; weak governance; and weak infrastructure. The Guinea Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Development Project (P128443) was approved on January 28, 2013, restructured on February 2, 2016, and closed as scheduled on December 31, 2017. The project was financed by a credit from the International Development Association for $10 million. The objective of the project was to support the development of MSMEs in various value chains and to improve business processes of Guinea’s investment climate.
Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Overall efficacy was modest, Bank performance was unsatisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was modest. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) For effective public-private dialogue it is crucial to have (a) a champion at the highest government level who can bring the public and private sector together to identify and implement business environment reforms; and (b) agreement among various private sector associations to identify a private sector representative who can lead the dialogue on their behalf. (ii) Projects should include measures to ensure sustainability of support centers that provide capacity building to MSMEs after project closing. (iii) Design and implementation of credit registries should be based on international best practice standards. (iv) Integrating a rigorous impact assessment into the design of World Bank projects supporting MSMEs would help discern the causal effects of project interventions on MSME development.
Benin: Ninth and Tenth Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PPAR)
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Benin was a low-income country with a gross domestic product per capita of $1,291 at the time of preparation of the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) 9 and 10 series in 2014. Its economy was driven by agricultural production (of cotton in particular) and reexport and transit trade with Nigeria. As a result, Benin’s economy was vulnerable to trade policy changes or economic downturns in Show MoreBenin was a low-income country with a gross domestic product per capita of $1,291 at the time of preparation of the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) 9 and 10 series in 2014. Its economy was driven by agricultural production (of cotton in particular) and reexport and transit trade with Nigeria. As a result, Benin’s economy was vulnerable to trade policy changes or economic downturns in Nigeria. The development objectives of this series were to: (i) promote good governance and high-quality public financial management, and (ii) strengthen private sector competitiveness.
Ratings for the Ninth and Tenth Poverty Reduction Support Credit project are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was not applicable. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) Relevant lessons from previous operations need to be taken on board when designing new DPF operations. (ii) Prior actions need to be substantive, that is, be critical to reforms with value added. (iii) The World Bank should design projects with a clear understanding of the likely “winners and losers;” failure to do this makes it more likely that projects will not be implemented as planned or sustained over time. (iv) Distributional impact analysis from DPF-supported reforms should inform the design of operations.
Nepal: Shunaula Hazar Din – Community Action for Nutrition Project (PPAR)
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Improvements in child nutrition in Nepal have lagged behind the country’s economic, social, and human development progress over the past decades. At the time of project design in 2011, Nepal ranked among the top countries with the highest national prevalence of stunted growth (40 percent) in children under the age of five, and the country was not on track to reach the Millennium Development Goal’ Show MoreImprovements in child nutrition in Nepal have lagged behind the country’s economic, social, and human development progress over the past decades. At the time of project design in 2011, Nepal ranked among the top countries with the highest national prevalence of stunted growth (40 percent) in children under the age of five, and the country was not on track to reach the Millennium Development Goal’s target of reducing the rate of malnutrition by half. Improving child nutrition is essential for enhancing human capital accumulation, boosting economic growth, and reducing poverty, since the consequences of undernutrition for young children last through adulthood and reduce their potential to learn and to contribute to society. The project was the World Bank’s first stand-alone lending operation in support of Nepal’s nutrition agenda. The project name, “Sunaula Hazar Din,” which means “golden 1,000 days,” reflects the importance of the period from conception to 24 months of age as a window of opportunity to prevent undernutrition before it surfaces. The project’s objective was to improve practices that contribute to reduced undernutrition of women of reproductive age and children under the age of two. At entry, the project covered 15 districts (out of 75 districts in the country), selected based on levels of stunted growth and poverty. A second objective was added in 2015, after the devastating earthquake that struck the country in April, to provide emergency nutrition and sanitation response to vulnerable populations in earthquake affected areas. The project was then operational in 23 districts.
Ratings for the Community Action for Nutrition Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, overall efficacy was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. Lessons from the project include: (i) A community-driven implementation approach may not enforce the multisectoral design approach of the project to address the multiple determinants of nutrition. (ii) Equal RRNI-cycle time frames across the menu of goals can slant the selection of goals toward those for which technical know-how is already available, and hence overshadow the spirit of flexibility of the CDD approach. (iii) In settings with limited human resources, the implementation of innovative operations such as RRNIs requires a robust operational planning that takes into account a steep learning curve, strong preparatory arrangements that address weak capacities at entry, and adequate project readiness at entry. (iv) Good collaboration with specialized development partners in emergency relief facilitated the effective responses that maintained the focus on nutrition and on the original intent of the project. (v) Good collaboration with specialized development partners in emergency relief facilitated the effective responses that maintained the focus on nutrition and on the original intent of the project. (vi) In CDD projects that support the achievement of goals yet to be chosen by communities, and which are thus unknown at the outset, additional efforts to collect more granular baseline data at the ward level can facilitate the assessment of the project achievements at completion.
Mongolia CLR Review FY13-21
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This review examines the implementation of the FY13-FY17 Mongolia Country Partnership
Strategy (CPS), which was endorsed by the World Bank Group (WBG)’s Board of Executive
Directors in April 2012, updated in the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) of December 2016
(which extended the CPS by six months) and further revised in the PLR of November 2019. At that
time, the CPS period was extended Show MoreThis review examines the implementation of the FY13-FY17 Mongolia Country Partnership
Strategy (CPS), which was endorsed by the World Bank Group (WBG)’s Board of Executive
Directors in April 2012, updated in the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) of December 2016
(which extended the CPS by six months) and further revised in the PLR of November 2019. At that
time, the CPS period was extended retroactively by three years until December 31, 2020.
The CPS had three Focus Areas: (1) enhance Mongolia’s capacity to manage the mining
economy sustainably and transparently; (2) build a sustained and diversified basis for economic
growth and employment in urban and rural areas; and (3) address vulnerabilities and growing
inequality through improved access to services and better service delivery, safety net provision,
and improved disaster risk management. The CPS objectives were well aligned with the country’s
own development goals as set out in various government programs and strategies.
Brazil: Rio State Fiscal Efficiency for Quality of Public Service Delivery Development Policy Loan (DPL III) (PPAR)
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This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group for the Fiscal Efficiency for Quality of Public Service Delivery Development Policy Loan (DPL) III (P126465) to the state of Rio de Janeiro for $300 million. The program covered three policy areas: (i) tax administration, (ii) public financial management, and (iii) education Show MoreThis is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group for the Fiscal Efficiency for Quality of Public Service Delivery Development Policy Loan (DPL) III (P126465) to the state of Rio de Janeiro for $300 million. The program covered three policy areas: (i) tax administration, (ii) public financial management, and (iii) education and health. It achieved some of its objectives and targets in the short term (in fiscal years 2013–14), but these achievements were not sustained.
Ratings for the Rio State Development Policy Loan III are as follows: Outcome was unsatisfactory, and Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory. The assessment offers the following lessons: (i) Subnational programs supporting institutional reform in areas such as tax administration, public financial management, education, and health require a long-term strategic vision and sufficient time for implementation. (ii) It was difficult to achieve fiscal sustainability in Rio state by reforming only a few technical aspects of tax administration without accounting for important issues, such as pensions, dependence on unstable oil revenues, weak institutions, and chronic corruption. (iii) An assessment of the Rio state’s fiscal situation, its implementation capacity, and medium-term perspectives could have improved the program’s design since the state was in dire financial situation and lacked the bandwidth to properly prepare and execute the 12 loans it was simultaneously negotiating with multiple lenders.