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Cote d'Ivoire - Women in Development Pilot Support Project

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The project's overall outcome was unsatisfactory for the following reasons: None of the project's six principal activities to be implemented over 24 months were carried out in full and none of the objectives had been achieved when the project closed in 1995, two years behind schedule. About 40 percent of the loan was Show MoreThe project's overall outcome was unsatisfactory for the following reasons: None of the project's six principal activities to be implemented over 24 months were carried out in full and none of the objectives had been achieved when the project closed in 1995, two years behind schedule. About 40 percent of the loan was cancelled. The likelihood of sustainability was significantly reduced by the non-completion of key project activities. Both World Bank and Borrower performances were unsatisfactory. The added value of this review is to redress a deficiency in the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) that was noted in the OED Evaluative Memorandum pertaining to the ICR not drawing specific lessons related to the WID-only focus of the project. From that perspective, the following lessons were drawn: As gender is a cross-cutting issue, the most effective way to integrate women's issues into mainstream activities is for staff of technical ministries to implement women-specific initiatives. Having a women's agency implement an activity within the purview of a technical ministry will undermine effective integration and marginalize relevant women-specific projects. The most appropriate role for a women's ministry/agency is to assist technical agencies with planning, analytical support, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation to document results and lessons.

Mexico - Contractual Savings Development Program Project (CSDP I) and Second Contractual Savings Development Program Project (CSDP II)

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This performance audit report covers the Contractual Savings and Development Program Project (CSDP I) and the Second Contractual Savings and Development Program Project (CSDP II). The outcome of CSDP I was highly satisfactory -- except for the reforms to INFONAVIT (Instituto del Fondo Nacional del la Vivienda de los Show MoreThis performance audit report covers the Contractual Savings and Development Program Project (CSDP I) and the Second Contractual Savings and Development Program Project (CSDP II). The outcome of CSDP I was highly satisfactory -- except for the reforms to INFONAVIT (Instituto del Fondo Nacional del la Vivienda de los Trabajadores); all of the objectives were met. CSDP II, which built on the success of CSDP I, was rated less satisfactory. No further progress was made on reforming INFONAVIT, this has implications for the fiscal costs of reform: if required contributions to INFONAVIT have low returns, the government's guarantee of minimum levels of pension income may be called. Little progress was made on preparing the way for reform of the public pension system. Lessons learned from these two projects include: a) The pace of a series of single tranche adjustment operations can be tailored to suit the ability of the country to undertake them, rather than trying to predict what will become the most binding constraints. b) Pension reforms should expand its coverage to government workers and workers in the informal sector. This requires specific efforts for each group. c) Pension reform is a complex process and requires complementary financial sector reforms to be successful. d) Mexico is subject to a substantial country risk premium, which results in high real interest rates on domestic debt.

Hungary - Product Market Development Project

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The audit assessed the outcome of the project as satisfactory, with likely sustainability, and substantial institutional development impacts. Regardless of success, lessons drawn from the project focus on three main findings: 1) The value of the project lies in that it focused on significant institutional, policy, and regulatory Show MoreThe audit assessed the outcome of the project as satisfactory, with likely sustainability, and substantial institutional development impacts. Regardless of success, lessons drawn from the project focus on three main findings: 1) The value of the project lies in that it focused on significant institutional, policy, and regulatory aspects required to improve the marketability, and competitiveness of Hungarian products. Specific action plans within both the private, and public sectors were critical contributions to the project, and, though intangible, the impact of this technical assistance surpassed the impact of the line of credit component (98 percent of project costs alone). The project played a catalytic role in the promotion of private investments, while strong government ownership, and solid project preparation helped raise the impact of the project. 2) Restrictions, contradictory to privatization goals, warrant the Bank to redefine policies regarding allocation of funds for financing used assets, particularly in the context of transition economies. 3) The Bank's reporting requirements, disbursement conditions, and procurement guidelines are perceived to reduce competitiveness in financing private sector investments; thus, an in-depth analysis of the expected benefits from these conditionalities is suggested.

Kyrgyz Republic - Rehabilitation Credit Project (RC) and Privatization and Enterprise Sector Adjustment Credit Project (PESAC)

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This performance and audit report covers two credits: the Rehabilitation Credit Project (RC) and the Privatization and Enterprise Sector Adjustment Credit Project (PESAC). RC was the Bank's first operation in the Kyrgyz Republic. The outcome is rated as marginally satisfactory, institutional development impact as modest, and Show MoreThis performance and audit report covers two credits: the Rehabilitation Credit Project (RC) and the Privatization and Enterprise Sector Adjustment Credit Project (PESAC). RC was the Bank's first operation in the Kyrgyz Republic. The outcome is rated as marginally satisfactory, institutional development impact as modest, and sustainability uncertain. Lessons learned from the RC are: a) resources cannot be expected to be used well when prices are distorted and budgeting and expenditure control systems are weak; and b) flexible "umbrella" technical assistance programs call for strong management and supervision. PESAC's outcome is rated as marginally satisfactory, its institutional development impact as modest, and sustainability as uncertain. Lessons learned from PESAC include: a) Since profit incentives to restructure privatized enterprises have been swamped by dis-enabling factors in the business environment, it is all the more crucial that steps be taken to improve that environment; b) stronger enforcement of rules is needed to prevent inside-dealing and other forms of corruption; and c) stronger trigger mechanisms are needed to force warranted liquidations and bankruptcies.

Malawi - The First and Second Education Sector Credit Projects

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OED rates outcomes as satisfactory though marginally so. Despite the problems, the projects achieved a threefold expansion in classroom capacity, well beyond original expectations. In urban areas, enrollment in primary school has become the social norm. Nevertheless, delays allowed rapid increases in the school-aged population Show MoreOED rates outcomes as satisfactory though marginally so. Despite the problems, the projects achieved a threefold expansion in classroom capacity, well beyond original expectations. In urban areas, enrollment in primary school has become the social norm. Nevertheless, delays allowed rapid increases in the school-aged population to outpace the enrollment increases. Primary education remains far from universal and dropout and graduation rates remain high, especially for the rural poor, while student achievement levels have declined drastically. Institutional impact is rated as modest. OED rates sustainability as uncertain in light of recent developments Budgetary shortfalls cast doubt on the government's commitment to complete the unfinished business in primary education and put at risk in a pre-election period the widespread public support for the mass education policy. IDA's performance is rated as satisfactory overall, though the lack of realism is cause for concern because of the economic costs of delays and shortfalls. OED proposes that staff's preoccupation with the long-term policy reforms and their very commitment and responsiveness to the countries' educational needs may have led them to regard the implementation risks as a normal cost of doing business. In turn this may have encouraged day-to-day trouble shooting at the expense of fundamental reassessment and more radical remedies.

Caribbean Region - Fifth and Sixth Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) Projects

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The outcomes of the Fifth Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) Project was rated as unsatisfactory and the Sixth Caribbean Development Bank Project as highly unsatisfactory. The audit report examines the causes of the difficult relationship between the CDB and the World Bank and recommends measures to strengthen this partnership. This Show MoreThe outcomes of the Fifth Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) Project was rated as unsatisfactory and the Sixth Caribbean Development Bank Project as highly unsatisfactory. The audit report examines the causes of the difficult relationship between the CDB and the World Bank and recommends measures to strengthen this partnership. This report makes the following recommendations: 1) As the Bank addresses portfolio issues, it needs to devote adequate resources to pursuing collegial remedies. This may involve additional staff and budget resources to bring along key partners especially when changes are sought in the long-established procedures and relationships, and where operations have been given satisfactory ratings for long periods of time. 2) Performance indicators should be agreed as part of the loan package. 3) Deadlines for completed ICRs should not override the need for full consultation and incorporation of borrower comments. 4) For the future, staff should not be engaged in supervising Bank lending to an agency in which they were formerly employed. 5) Triggers determining the time at which commitment fees will begin to accrue should be unambiguously agreed and stated in the loan documents. 6) Fee arrangements in future loans should be geared to agreed performance benchmarks, rather than the fixed fee arrangements contained in the two projects. 7) Procedures should be agreed that eliminate the scope for the Bank to reverse a decision concerning subprojects.

Madagascar - First Environment Program Project

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The audit downgrades the Implementation Completion Report's assessment of outcome to marginally unsatisfactory, as well as both the Bank, and Borrower performances to unsatisfactory. The ratings reflect the overly ambitious, and complex project, which failed to establish long-term foundations for bio-diversity conservation, Show MoreThe audit downgrades the Implementation Completion Report's assessment of outcome to marginally unsatisfactory, as well as both the Bank, and Borrower performances to unsatisfactory. The ratings reflect the overly ambitious, and complex project, which failed to establish long-term foundations for bio-diversity conservation, and management; neither did the project establish regulatory frameworks, policy studies, nor training programs, or evaluation systems, critical to assessing bio-diversity conservation impacts. The lack of financing sources limited the ability for sustainable institutions to achieve measurable results, thus institutional development impacts are rated modest to negligible, with an unlikely sustainability. Lessons address the Bank's reluctance in taking realistic account of project risks, which leads to faulty project designs, and implementation problems, aggravated under circumstances of weak local capacities. This leads to the fact that the creation of national environmental institutions cannot be accomplished within the constraints of a five-year project timetable. Furthermore, the lack of continuity in project, and country management in the Bank, leads to frequent re-ordering of priorities, hindering the success of project implementation.

Philippines - First and Second Rural Finance Projects

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The audit rates both the First, and Second Rural Finance Projects (RFPI and RFPII) as satisfactory, likewise for both the Bank, and Borrower performances, concurring with the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) ratings. However, the audit rates sustainability as likely for both operations, downgrading the RFPII highly Show MoreThe audit rates both the First, and Second Rural Finance Projects (RFPI and RFPII) as satisfactory, likewise for both the Bank, and Borrower performances, concurring with the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) ratings. However, the audit rates sustainability as likely for both operations, downgrading the RFPII highly satisfactory ICR rating, given that Government losses are implied by current foreign exchange rates, while on-lending was entirely in local currency, an inadequate risk, particularly in the wake of the Asian crisis. Among the lessons learned, the importance for long-term sustainability is addressed, suggesting that narrowing the project focus could be double-edged, for while realistic focus narrowing did achieve targeted results, the narrowing that took place between RFPI and RFPII was not successful, to the extent that potential policy conditionalities were avoided, which could weaken institutional development. In addition, disruptions in the financial system, such as subsidizing interest rates, adversely affects market-based financial development, instead policy reforms should address financial liberalization, to include, not only decontrol of interest rates, but elimination of restrictions that limit competition. Basically, sustainability of credit operations, require a project design that meets market-based, demand-driven credit needs, and access to continuous funding.

Serbia - Country assistance strategy completion report (CASCR) for the period FY2005-FY2007 : IEG review

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The FY05 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) sought to support the government's development priorities for FY05-FY07, defined by two pillars: European Integration and poverty reduction. The CAS program supported these objectives through programs aimed at: (a) creating a smaller, more sustainable, more efficient public sector; (b Show MoreThe FY05 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) sought to support the government's development priorities for FY05-FY07, defined by two pillars: European Integration and poverty reduction. The CAS program supported these objectives through programs aimed at: (a) creating a smaller, more sustainable, more efficient public sector; (b) creating a larger, more dynamic, private sector; and (c) reducing poverty levels and improving social protection and access to public services. IEG rates the overall outcome as moderately satisfactory. IEG concurs with the CASCR that progress toward objectives (b) and (c) has been satisfactory for the most part but rates progress toward the first objective as moderately unsatisfactory because of the limited fiscal consolidation and short-term improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of the pension system. While IEG sees merit in the flexibility with which the lending program was maintained, it rates Bank performance as moderately satisfactory due to shortcomings in assessing political economy realities and gearing the program towards the key constraints for accession to the EU. A number of external developments, including better than expected privatization revenues, allowed Serbia to make progress in poverty reduction and private sector development while not forcefully addressing the fundamental structural issues faced by the public sector. Looking forward, the CASCR identifies a number of lessons and IEG is in general agreement with these lessons while noting the importance of (i) the Bank being selective, strategic and explicit about the criteria on which the selectivity is based and how Bank's interventions fit into the overall aid program, especially in the case of countries looking for EU accession; and (ii) a CAS results framework that is simple and coherent and relies mostly on significant well-defined indicators that can be effectively monitored.

Ukraine - Country assistance strategy completion report (CASCR) review for the period FY2004-07 : IEG review

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As the country assistance strategy (CAS) was a joint strategy between the Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC), this review of the CAS completion report (CR) covers the Bank-related aspects and is evaluated by Independent Evaluation Group-World Bank (IEG-WB); IFC-related aspects of the CASCR are reviewed by IEG- Show MoreAs the country assistance strategy (CAS) was a joint strategy between the Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC), this review of the CAS completion report (CR) covers the Bank-related aspects and is evaluated by Independent Evaluation Group-World Bank (IEG-WB); IFC-related aspects of the CASCR are reviewed by IEG-IFC. This review examines the implementation of the FY2004-07 Ukraine CAS and 2005 CAS progress report, and evaluates the 2007 Ukraine CASCR. IEG has also prepared a country assistance evaluation (CAE). The CAE reviews the outcomes of the Bank's assistance to Ukraine over the FY1999-2006 period and rates the overall outcome as moderately satisfactory. The FY2004-07 CAS, based on Ukraine's performance under the Bank Group's FY2000-03 and an ambitious program advanced by the government in 2003, envisaged a period of fairly comprehensive, rapid policy reform, and institutional development, supported by a substantial program of Bank Group lending and non-lending assistance. Outcomes of Bank support and Bank performance are both rated moderately satisfactory. IEG will underscore for close attention in implementing the new strategy the importance of flexibility across areas of engagement and instruments deployed, monitoring progress in implementation closely, and adjusting the overall program focus and instruments as required in response to emerging constraints and opportunities in Ukraine.