Review of the 2009-2013 Djibouti Country Assistance Strategy Completion Report (CASCR)
This review examines the implementation of the FY2009-FY2012 Djibouti Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of FY2009, and assesses the CAS Completion Report (CASCR). The CAS was implemented by IDA. The CAS program was aligned with the government’s strategy, and its results framework mapped well into... Full Description »
This review examines the implementation of the FY2009-FY2012 Djibouti Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of FY2009, and assesses the CAS Completion Report (CASCR). The CAS was implemented by IDA. The CAS program was aligned with the government’s strategy, and its results framework mapped well into development outcomes derived from the national strategy. In this context, the CAS program aimed at supporting (i) economic growth through reducing constraints and associated costs to private sector development; (ii) access to basic social services and human development through increasing access to quality basic education, improving access to and quality of health services, and strengthening social protection and direct support to the poor; and (iii) governance and public sector management through improving expenditure transparency, and monitoring and evaluation. IEG rates the overall outcome of IDA support as moderately unsatisfactory. The CAS program achieved its objectives in health and education, where there was government ownership, but did not achieve them in private sector development, governance and public sector management, where government commitment was more uncertain, particularly following a change in leadership. In the areas of governance and monitoring and evaluation, the objectives of the program were not supported by appropriate Bank interventions and required capacity building. Under pillar I on growth, World Bank support helped improve access to electricity services modestly, but did not succeed in improving the efficiency of public utilities, or in opening up the telecommunications sector. Improvements in business regulations were very limited and the financial sector was strengthened by the IMF’s implementation of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) recommendations. Under pillar II on basic social services and human development, Bank support fostered a substantial improvement in education and health services through government commitment, well specified programs, and good monitoring of outcomes. Expected results to strengthen social protection and direct support to the poor are taking more time than envisaged. Under pillar III on governance and public sector management, there was some progress in developing legal frameworks for improved expenditure transparency, but implementation of these frameworks is taking more time than envisaged. Progress in improving monitoring and evaluation has been very slow in the absence of good statistical systems, weak capacity and limited World Bank attention to this issue. The experience of the World Bank’s program in Djibouti shows that (i) when government ownership is unclear the likelihood of success is limited; (ii) the absence of an effective supervision system prevents timely identification and solution of problems during implementation; (iii) when there is a mismatch between objectives and interventions the program is likely to fail to achieve its objectives; (iv) weak monitoring and evaluation compounds the problems of executing a program where the interventions are weakly linked to the objectives, as was the case with governance; (v) incorporating lessons from past programs and interventions is likely to lead to more realistic outcomes; and (vi) complex results frameworks with multiple and unmeasurable indicators make it difficult to monitor the program and evaluate its impact.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : CAS Completion Report Reviews , Country : Djibouti
March 5, 2014