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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

ROMANIA

**GENERAL CADASTRE AND LAND REGISTRATION PROJECT
(LOAN-4258)
AND
AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SERVICES PROJECT
(LOAN 4533)**

June 18, 2008

*Sector Evaluation Division
Independent Evaluation Group*

Currency Equivalents

Currency Unit = RON (New Romanian Lei)

1998	US\$1.00 = RON 1.095
1999	US\$1.00 = RON 1.826
2000	US\$1.00 = RON 2.593
2001	US\$1.00 = RON 3.160
2002	US\$1.00 = RON 3.350
2003	US\$1.00 = RON 3.260
2004	US\$1.00 = RON 2.907
2005	US\$1.00 = RON 3.108
2006	US\$1.00 = RON 2.568
2007	US\$1.00 = RON 2.456

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AKIS	Agricultural Knowledge and Information System
ANCA	National Agency for Agricultural Consulting
ANCPPI	National Agency for Cadastre and Real Estate Publicity
ASB	Agricultural Services Board
ASSP	Agricultural Support Services Project
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CAS	County Assistance Strategy
CGS	Competitive Grant Scheme
ERR	Economic Rate of Return
EU	European Union
FRR	Financial Rate of Return
GC-LR	General Cadastre and Registration Project
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOR	Government of Romania
IAC	International Agricultural Center
IACS	Integrated Administration and Control System
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
JIS	Joint Information System
Judet	County
LBOs	Land Book Offices
LPIS	Land Parcel Identification System
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MAKIS	Modernizing Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems
MOAI	Ministry of Administration and Interior
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPV	Net Present Value
OJCA	County Centers for Agricultural Consulting
OJCGCs	Local cadastre offices
ONCGC	National Office for Cadastre, Geodesy and Cartography
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PDO	Project Development Objectives
PMU	Project Management Units
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
RON	Romanian Lei (new)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
YSP	Young Scientists Program

Fiscal Year

Government: January 1-December 31

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The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEGWB annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEGWB staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

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Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

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This report was prepared by Richard Burcroff and Nalini Kumar. Richard Burcroff traveled to Romania in March 2008. Marie Charles provided administrative support.

Principal Ratings

Romania General Cadastre and Land Registration Project L4258

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
Outcome	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Sustainability**	Not rated	Not rated	Not rated
Institutional Development Impact***	Not rated	Not rated	Not rated
Monitoring and Evaluation	Not rated	Not rated	Modest
Risk to Development Outcome	Moderate	Moderate	Negligible to Low
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

Romania Agricultural Support Services Project L4533

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Sustainability**	Highly Likely	Likely	Not rated
Institutional Development Impact***	Substantial	Substantial	Not rated
Monitoring & Evaluation	Not rated	Not rated	Substantial
Risk to Development Outcome	Not rated	Not rated	Negligible to Low
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEGWB product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

**As of July 1, 2006, Sustainability has been replaced by Risk to Development Outcome. As the scales are different, the ratings are not directly comparable.

***As of July 1, 2006, Institutional Development Impact is assessed as part of the Outcome rating.

Key Staff Responsible

Romania General Cadastre and Land Registration Project L4258

<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
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Romania Agricultural Support Services Project L4533

<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
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Preface

This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the General Cadastre and Land Registration Project and the Agricultural Support Services Project in Romania. The General Cadastre and Land Registration Project (Loan 4258) for US\$ 25.5 million equivalent was approved on December 9, 1997. The loan closed on June 30, 2006, 30 months behind schedule. At project closure US\$ 24.5 million or 96 percent of the original loan had been disbursed. An Implementation Completion Report was submitted on December 19, 2006. The Agricultural Support Services Project (Loan 4533) for US\$ 11.0 million equivalent was approved on January 27, 2000. The project closed on December 31, 2005, 12 months behind schedule. At project closure US\$ 10.8 million or 98 percent of the original loan had been disbursed. An Implementation Completion Report was submitted June 23, 2006.

This report was prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) based on the Implementation Completion Reports, Staff Appraisal Reports, Loan Agreements, as well as a review of Bank files. An IEG mission was in Romania in March 2008 and held interviews with a number of stakeholders including representatives of Government and the implementing agencies, Parliamentarians, donor agencies and civil society organizations in Romania, agribusiness representatives and private contractors engaged by the project authorities, and local staff and beneficiaries. The cooperation and assistance of all stakeholders and government officials is gratefully acknowledged.

Following standard IEG procedures, a copy of the draft PPAR was sent to government officials and agencies for their review and comments. No comments were received.

Summary

This Performance Assessment Report reviews two projects one that supported the development of Romania's land markets and another that supported the transition of Romanian agriculture from a centrally planned and publically owned sector to privately owned commercial farming: The General Cadastre and Land Registration Project (GC-LR) and the Agricultural Support Services Project (ASSP).

The GC-LR was a large scale pilot program to introduce a general cadastre for private holdings in Romania and to systematize and create a considerably more efficient land registration and titling system. This project was approved December 9, 1997 and closed on June 30, 2006. Its main features are now being extended nationwide, with support from a semi-repeater being financed with Bank assistance.

The ASSP provided support to a first phase of reforms to Romania's agricultural technology system. It introduced private contracting for both applied research programs and farmer information (extension) services to quickly augment farm-level productivity. It was approved January 27, 2000 and closed on December 31, 2005. Its main features also are being scaled up under a follow-on Bank-assisted loan.

The land system reform that GC-LR supported was arguably the most far-reaching amongst former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Romania's agricultural sector plays a far more significant role in its national economy than in any other EU member state and ASSP's support for the agricultural technology system was critical to the sector's development.

In Romania, during the two years following the events of 1989, lands were restituted mainly to previous owners or their offspring, often following procedures conjured locally without much preparation or coordination among localities. The process was a rapid one and had several desirable features: (i) the state and collective farming system was completely broken up and their lands were converted to privately owned holdings, (ii) the new private holdings could in principle be inherited, sold or leased in and out, (iii) farm land could be employed for whatever purpose the new owners chose – there were no longer official dictates on what could be produced and what might be sold.

The very rapid process of restitution effectively truncated the ability of rural influentials from the *ancien regime* to retain control, as has been so evident in many parts of the Former Soviet Union. But it also introduced issues which the GC-LR Project was designed to address. Principal among these was the need to unify and harmonize the two land registration systems then being practiced in Romania, each being legate from Romania's pre-socialist era. The authorities eventually decided to create a land book system, patterned on the system adopted in Transylvania, but modified (in the project) to ease harmonization with the inscription/transcription system being applied elsewhere in Romania. Second, a systematic general cadastre was needed to provide a firm basis for creating land records and verifying titles. Lastly, the entire registration and titling process needed to be streamlined and digitalized in order to save costs and markedly reduce the unreasonably long delays infused in pre-project titling procedures.

The GC-LR's outcome is rated Satisfactory against the ICR Review rating of Highly Satisfactory. This downgrade was made taking into account the substantial lag in project implementation, essentially until end FY04 when major (and successful) adjustments in project organization and implementation arrangements were introduced. As the GC-LR project got underway it became quickly evident that placement of the cadastral function and land registration responsibilities under two separate heads was not going to work. (This was a reflection of the Austro-Hungarian approach, which foundered on the shoals of Romania's two distinct land recording systems once implementation of the operation commenced.) Nonetheless, bureaucratic inertia, in-fighting and institutional pride prevented the consolidation of these inter-related functions within the purview of a single, task focused agency. However, following the unification of the project's cadastre and land registration systems under the purview of a semi-independent and self-financed agency, implementation literally took off.

Bank performance was Satisfactory. Project design fundamentals were the subject of hot debate within the Romanian government and with and within civil society during the mid-1990s prior to the Bank becoming directly involved. It is to the credit of staff, that once recognition of the need for the project had gelled, staff was able to promote the views of those protagonists supporting the more needed elements of project design and project management in a sensitive and effective manner.

The Borrower's performance over the life of the project was Moderately Satisfactory. Agency directors and deputy ministers assigned to the project constantly changed and this made implementation progress difficult. The Government also failed to achieve a timely resolution of the major implementation issue, especially the need to unify responsibilities. The excellent progress made after 2003 once unification had been achieved helped counterbalance the limited initial progress and is reflected in this rating.

The ASSP's outcome is rated Satisfactory. The project faced some implementation challenges arising from weak and politicized leadership in the project management unit which was ultimately overcome. The project's risk to development outcome is Negligible to Low. The technologies disseminated through the Competitive Grant Scheme (CGS) component are sustainable, because these are simple, low-cost technologies, which require exclusively inputs (seeds, plant nutrients and animal medications) and services (artificial insemination, quality controls) available in the country. They provide high rates of return and substantial incremental net incomes. It is therefore highly unlikely that farmers will revert to previous practices. By contributing to the building up and strengthening of NGOs and farmers' associations, the Project has also enhanced the ability of farmers to maintain and further promote the disseminated technologies, as this will enable increased exchanges of experience and accelerate spillovers. Both Bank and Borrower performance was Satisfactory. Despite initial teething problems, the Government was committed to the project, and was proactive in the preparation process.

Building on the completion report, the assessment of these projects suggests the following broad lessons:

For the GC-LR Project

- Borrower commitment and ownership can turn even the most difficult of projects around. Sometimes this commitment can come from political events which have nothing directly to do with the project.
- A key success factor for a viable land administration system is the establishment of a workable institutional structure. The experience of Romania shows that the single agency model and the creation of a semi-autonomous self finance agency appears to work best and this could have wider applicability in the Central and East European context.
- The building of public confidence in the system and ensuring the public has access to the professional support services (notaries, real estate agents) is necessary not only for successful implementation, but for truly achieving the objective of secure property markets.
- Projects may place too high expectations on automation and underestimate the complexity of large scale information technology system development.
- Sustainability needs to be built into project design; and this is largely about human capacity.

For the ASSP Project:

- Farmers and rural business owners will respond enthusiastically to innovative technologies corresponding to their needs. There has to be consultation and a demand driven element in any serious research and extension endeavor.

Vinod Thomas
Director-General
Evaluation

1. Background and Context

OVERVIEW

1.1 Romania is a middle income country that endured a wrenching (but inevitable) decline in incomes at the onset of its transition in 1989 from a centrally planned economy to a fully functioning market economy. Through most of the 1990s, GDP stagnated following an initial decline but began to recover in the late 1990's after Romania began its European Union (EU) accession process under Commission tutelage. Since the turn of the century, the country's real GDP growth has been very encouraging, between 4-5 percent p.a. in 2000-2005, and fully 7.8 percent in 2006. According to the most recent poverty assessment, the share of the population living beneath the poverty line has fallen markedly from 41 percent in the late 1990s to about 12 percent in 2005. .

1.2 Agriculture activities in the country remain an important source of rural household income, employing 33 percent of the country's labor force in full- and seasonal farm operations. Following the collapse of communism, Romania instituted one of the most rapid and ambitious land reform programs among the transitioning countries in Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Grounded in land restitution to former owners, the land privatization program, effectively destroyed the state and collective farm system almost overnight, and impaled the sources of rural political power previously availed by socialist farm managers and the rural cadre. The effects on production and productivity were profoundly negative, however, as a very large number of small and fragmented farms replaced the far larger industrial farming units of the Ceaucescu era. State-owned marketing and inputs distribution channels dissolved as well. The outcome in the 1990s was a reversion to semi-subsistence farming for much of the decade, and a very sluggish recovery of production and productivity. In more recent years, with some land consolidation under lease-holding, with investments in rural infrastructure, the appearance of private marketing channels, openings for exports and a strong recovery in consumer incomes, agricultural has experienced moderate growth - 3.5 percent in 2006. Meanwhile the share of agriculture in GDP has declined from about 23 percent in 1990 to 10.5 percent in 2007.

THE WORLD BANK IN ROMANIA

1.3 The World Bank resumed lending in 1991 during the beginning of Romania's transition to a market economy. Between FY91 and FY06, the Bank approved a total of 50 IBRD financed operations with commitments of US\$ 5.0 billion, about \$300 million a year. Lending volumes were higher in the 1990s at \$335 million a year, compared to FY00-05 at \$288 million per year. Adjustment operations accounted for about 40 percent of total lending since 1991. The Bank's financial assistance accounted for about 30 percent of all net multilateral assistance over the 1992- 2004 period, and 16 percent of all net inflows, public and private. At end-2004, debt to IBRD represented about 15 percent of all

external debt outstanding. Table 1 provides an indication of the effectiveness of Bank lending based on the 2005 Country Assistance Evaluation by the Independent Evaluation Group (then the Operations Evaluation Department (OED)). Approval and implementation of the Agricultural Support Services and the General Cadastre and Land Registration Project (the two projects being assessed in this report) took place within the framework of three sequential Country Assistance Programs, as recorded in CAS documents issued in 1997, 2001 and (for the General Cadastre & Land Registration Project) in 2006 (Annex A for details on the development and CAS context).

1.4 The two operations were designed and implemented in a rapidly changing economic environment. The chaos and uncertainty of the 1990s following the collapse of Communism in Romania gradually gave way towards the latter half of the decade to the new structure of market mediated economic activity, guided by requisites for accession to the EU per the Community's *acquis communautaire*. In the present century, Romania's agricultural sector benefited during the accession process from a sizable and growing inflow of cohesion and structural funds from the EU, which are now being substantially augmented by disbursements under the two pillars of the common Agricultural Policy (CAP) following Romania's formal acceptance as an EU member state in January 2007.

Table 1. Summary of Outcome Ratings of Bank Lending by CAS Objective

<i>Development Objective</i>	<i>Outcome Rating</i>	
	1991-1999	2000-2004
Sustainable Private Sector Growth	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory
Poverty Reduction and Human Development	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Governance and Institution Building	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory

Source: OED CAE (2005)

THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR CONTEXT

1.5 In the second half of the 1990s, when designs for the two projects being reviewed were finalized, agriculture remained a major contributor to the Romanian economy. The sector contributed 20 percent of GDP and provided about 35 percent of total employment in the country. Romania had and still has about 14.8 million ha of good agricultural land. Despite a rich natural resource base, however, Romania's agricultural production had been performing well beneath its potential. Average yields of major crops like wheat, barley, and sugar beets had declined substantially following the break-up of Romania's collective farms in 1989 and 1990. Since 1990, productivity of livestock in Romania also fell off dramatically. Exacerbated by falling demand as household incomes fell in the wake of de-collectivization, these declines in agriculture typically ensued from:

- the sudden (though not unexpected) collapse of the farm inputs supply system,
- a break up of distribution channels previously operated under state procurement orders,
- a growing vacuum in the provision of production and marketing credits as the capitalization of state banking channels collapsed,
- the replacement of large state-owned industrial farming operations with an extraordinarily large number of smallholders cultivating very small, fragmented farmsteads, often as semi-subsistence operations, and
- an inability to adapt and rapidly expand the agricultural technology system to serve Romania's much larger post-land reform clientele.

1.6 By the mid-1990s, little progress had been made to reduce land fragmentation in the agricultural areas and create functioning land markets. Similarly, attempts to create state managed research and extension advisory systems within the Ministry of Agriculture had merely resulted in an enlarged public payroll with little demonstrable effect on yields and incomes at the farm level.

1.7 Recognition that non-traditional remedial action would be required had gained adherents both in government and throughout civil society in rural areas, especially among commercial farmers and nascent agribusiness enterprises who desired both a more stable and business friendly environment and structural changes that would allow them to expand operations.

1.8 Bank assistance was requested to help the by then fairly influential reform element in government to strengthen and restructure programs intended to improve agricultural performance and incomes. Beginning in 1997, the Bank responded with three operations focused on the agricultural sector, plus thematic support for privatization, PSD, financial sector reform and strengthening of Romania's social safety net. The agricultural operations included an Agriculture Sector Adjustment Loan (ASAL) designed to rectify and promote the liberalization of incentives programs for agriculturalists, while supporting associated improvements in the legal and regulatory environment, and the two projects being assessed in this report:

- the General Cadastre and Land Registration (GC-LR) Project, designed to record and secure rights in order to foster development of rural and urban land markets; *and*
- the Agriculture Support Services (ASSP) Project, which was designed to rapidly augment the diffusion of available agricultural technologies and to fund contracts for adaptive research projects, contested by demonstrable need and demand.

2. Project Objectives, Design and Implementation

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN

General Cadastre and Land Registration (GC-LR) Project

2.1 The GC-LR project design supported the objectives of the 1997 CAS, by fostering the creation of an efficient system for securing land titles and a cost-effective mechanism for land transactions. By facilitating land transactions, the project sought to help consolidate economically non-viable agriculture farm units and facilitate the sustainable, efficient use of land, other natural resources and infrastructure.

2.2 The project specifically aimed to: (a) Establish an efficient system for securing land titles of real estate owners which can be expanded nationwide; (b) Create a general cadastre system which provides clear and current definition of real estate parcels which form the basis for real estate registration; and (c) Set up a simple, safe and cost effective procedure for land transactions.

2.3 To support the development objectives, financing and advisory assistance was provided in the project through its three components:

Development of the General Cadastre:

- to include support for aerial photography, base map development, cadastral surveys and a land information system, and
- to strengthen the National Office for Cadastre, Geodesy and Cartography (ONCGC) and the local cadastre offices (OJCGCs).

Establishment of Land Book System:

- to operationalize 76 land book offices in 18 judets in suitably equipped offices with an automated land book system;
- train staff in the new land book system; and
- provide institutional support for the local land book offices.

General Institutional Strengthening:

- via the provision of technical assistance to guide the implementation trials and to enhance the planning and management capacity of the project agencies;
- information system design and development for the cadastre and land book; and assistance to carry out cost recovery studies.

2.4 The first two components would support the development of the key institutions involved in land administration in Romania - the cadastre and the land book offices. The third component would bring together the two parts of the system with technical assistance and development of the IT system.

2.5 The Project was appraised in July 1997 and approved December 9, 1997. A loan in the amount of US\$25.5 million equivalent was declared effective May 20, 1998, and closed June 30, 2006 following a 2½ year extension of the closing date. The target population included current and future real estate owners, private investors in agriculture, housing and industry, commercial banks and other users of land ownership information. The project was estimated to cover about 3 million hectares of rural land and 75,000 hectares of urban land.

Agricultural Support Services Project (ASSP)

2.6 The ASSP had two development objectives: (a) to boost agricultural productivity, sustainability and incomes by providing immediately needed technology, information and training for private farmers and agro-processors, and (b) to improve efficiency, cost effectiveness and client relevance in the management of research and extension.

2.7 The project's components included the financing of a Competitive Grant Scheme (CGS) that would be responsive to the needs of farmers and agro-processors; test a number of locally formulated projects to design, select, fund and deliver extension programs; and build capacity to create farmer confidence in research and extension systems, learn from pilot experiences and feed experience gained into the reform process. The CGS was not intended to fully absorb core funding for the research complex. However, it would (should have, and did) require a reallocation of limited budgetary funds to relevant and effective institutions.

2.8 A second project component fostered the design and creation of more effective extension delivery to private farmers and agro-processors. The curricula encompassed farm management skills, organization and mobilization of small farmers for input supply, mechanization and marketing, and low or reduced cost options for small farmers in crop and animal production and on-farm processing. The extension component also featured the testing and monitoring methods of extension new to Romania. The delivery mechanisms tested would include: (i) farmer to farmer extension; (ii) private-public partnerships; and (iii) mass media.

2.9 The project's institution building component supported The National Agency for Agricultural Consulting (ANCA) – a semi-autonomous agency within the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) – in carrying out innovative programs, including a rapid impact extension program using “off-the-shelf” results of available research, the creation of a rural radio program, and the preparation and distribution of farm management handbooks. A final component featured support for developing an action plan and capacity to reform the Romanian Agricultural Knowledge and Information System (AKIS), in the form of technical assistance and training.

2.10 The project was appraised in October 1999 and approved on January 27, 2000. A loan in the amount of US\$11.0 million equivalent was declared effective

on August 24, 2000. The Project closed on December 31, 2005 following a one year extension of the original closing date.

IMPLEMENTATION

2.11 During the implementation period, neither the development objectives nor the project components had to be adjusted for either of the two projects under review. However the structure for implementing the GC-LR project was adjusted in 2004, near to the original closing date, while closing of the ASSP had to be extended by a year.

General Cadastre and Land Registration Project

2.12 The most significant change during the implementation of the GC-LR project was in the institutional structure. At the start of the project there were two implementing agencies – the Ministry of Justice through the land book courts and the separate National Office for Cadastre, Geodesy and Cartography. This dual agency land administration system, common in Central and Eastern Europe especially in the former territories of the Austro- Hungarian Empire, effectively split the project in two.

2.13 In 2004, the government of Romania recognized the inherent difficulties in this dual land administration system and agreed with the Bank experts that a single land administration agency - in line with international good practice - was the best way forward. The Bank team had made several presentations to government officials to explain the rationale for this change. The new National Agency for Cadastre and Real Estate Publicity (ANCPI) was officially established by government decree in May 2004 and began operating in January 2005. While this change did not affect the scope of the project or number of components, it did require significant change in the project management arrangements - including going from two Project Management Units (PMU) to one. Amendments to the loan agreement were necessary to make these changes in project management arrangements and to modify the very inflexible Schedule 1 to allow for the one agency to make disbursements for all components.


2.14 It should be noted that this change represented a statesmanlike move by the MOJ to forego significant financial interest (from the registration fees), which has been an obstacle in other countries in the region to such a reform. The MOJ also realized that staff, space and other valuable court resources were being used for essentially uncontested, routine real estate transactions and hindering the real business of the courts and judiciary. The importance of this achievement for the project and for Romania cannot be overstated.

2.15 The original project closing date was December 31, 2003. The loan was extended in the third quarter of 2003, for another 18 months until June 30, 2005. The extension was agreed in recognition of the difficult start-up period of the project and frequent changes in management of the implementing agencies

resulting in a two-year delay in implementation. At the time of the request for closing date extension, the project was moving forward with several important activities including systematic cadastre services in two *judets* and the joint information system development. A further 12 month extension of the closing date was agreed in late 2004 as part of the loan agreement amendments. This final extension was granted due to the merger and establishment of the new unified agency and the opportunity this afforded to complete the institutional reforms under the project.

2.16 The pattern of disbursements for the GC-LR Project very much reflects the slow pace of implementation before 2004, and the pronounced acceleration that developed after responsibilities had been combined and transferred to the ANCPi (Figure 1 and Table 2). By end FY03, 4 years after the project was declared effective, only 28.2 percent of the Bank’s funds had been disbursed. But by end FY06, the project’s closing date, the remaining 71.8 percent had been disbursed.

Figure 1. Progression of GC-LR Project Disbursements



Source: ICR of the GC-LR project

Table 2. Disbursement Profiles

FY	GC-LR			ASSP		
	US\$ Mln	%	Cumulative	US\$ Mln	%	Cumulative
1998	0.0	0.0	0.0	-na-	-na-	-na-
1999	0.7	2.7	2.7	-na-	-na-	-na-
2000	0.6	2.6	5.3	-na-	-na-	-na-
2001	1.0	4.0	9.3	0.2	2.2	2.2
2002	1.4	5.8	15.1	1.0	8.8	11.0
2003	3.2	13.1	28.2	1.7	15.4	26.4
2004	3.9	15.9	44.1	2.9	26.6	53.0
2005	1.5	6.0	50.1	3.4	31.6	84.6
2006	12.2	49.9	100.0	1.7	15.4	100.0
Totals	24.5	100.0		10.8	100.0	

Source: IEG Calculations Based on Project Data

The Agricultural Support Services Project

2.17 The ASSP project initially suffered from weak management in the PMU and resistance from bureaucratic interests within the Ministry of Agriculture. However, in 2001 a reformist State Secretary of Agriculture was appointed whose tenure lasted an unprecedented 4 years. The present dynamic Director of the PMU was appointed in March 2002 and obstruction to the PMU and project activities from within MARD was over-ridden. In turn, the CGS literally took off, and the very large majority of the sub-projects it supported (through provision of technical advisory services only) are still in operation today.


2.18 The provision of rapid impact advisory services, through ANCA proved far less successful, largely because budgetary responsibilities for financing the operations of ANCA's regional offices were transferred from MARD to the Ministry of the Interior and Administration throughout most of the project's implementation period. This reassignment placed *de facto* control over the local offices within the purview of municipal mayors and *judet* level officials, thereby politicizing their operations and vitiating any control over their activities that might have been desired by ANCA and the MARD. It was only towards the end of the implementation period that budgeting responsibility was returned to MARD. The response (in terms of serving project objectives) was both immediate and strong. But on the ANCA side of the operation, it was a bit late to have much impact.

2.19 A minor reallocation of funds took place in the ASSP's institutional support component at the request of MARD, in order to extend, because of its success, the Young Scientists Program (YSP), and respond to a specific request of

the Ministry for technical assistance on policy-making and sector agricultural policies.

2.20 The ASSP was far less seriously handicapped at project start-up than the GC-LR project. Following the assignment of the new PMU director, implementation and disbursements from the Bank loan proceeded according to the formally revised disbursement plan (Figure 2 and Table 2).

Figure 2. Progression of ASSP Project Disbursements



Source: ICR of ASSP Project

3. Analysis

RELEVANCE

3.1 Each project, through its design(s), components and modalities, supported the development objectives stipulated in the project documentation. In turn, their development objectives were governed by and closely linked to applicable elements of the Bank's 1997 country strategy for Romania, and - while under implementation - to the two subsequent CASs. In other words, the objectives of the GC-LR and ASSP projects were consistent with the CASs, which had identified agriculture as a priority area on the grounds of good prospects for a supply response, and with Government policy for the agricultural sector, which aimed at transforming small and fragmented farmsteads into profitable farm enterprises.

General Cadastre and Land Registration Project

Relevance of Objectives

3.2 The project objectives were *highly* relevant to conditions in Romania. Romania began a major land restitution and privatization program in the early

1990s. By July 1997, almost 70 percent of the 4.3 million applicants who applied under Law 18/1991 for restitution of land and property in the former collective farms had been issued property titles (*titluri de proprietate*) confirming the transfer of land into private ownership. Nearly all residential apartments had also been privatized. However, as there was no functional national land administration system in place, the records of real estate ownership were disorganized and fragmented, and partly as a result, there was little land market development in either urban or rural areas. In the Bank's program to assist Romania in improving the macroeconomic framework, supporting private sector development, and creating a better policy environment, one of the key elements was to support the development of land markets and establishment of secure land registration and titling mechanisms.

3.3 The GC-LR project was centrally focused on Romania's ongoing privatization efforts, especially in the realm of real estate transactions and the privatization of state enterprises. By facilitating land transactions, the project aimed to consolidate economically non-viable farming units and promote the sustainable, efficient use of land, other natural resources and infrastructure. In doing so, the project was intended to encourage private sector development in rural areas, and equally important, by providing opportunities for local private companies in mapping, surveying, IT/data entry and processing and the involvement of professional notaries.

Relevance of Design

3.4 Relevance of design was **substantial**. Two systems of land registration were operating in Romania --a Civil Code system of inscription and transcription which is a deeds registration system that was adapted from the French property code, and the land book or Grund Buch system, inherited from the Austro-Hungarian Empire - a title registration system. Both systems fell into disuse during the communist regime as most of the land was collectivized and no records of parcels and of ownership were maintained. Although both the systems have been revived, the lack of uniformity between the two, and inadequate and outdated cadastral maps have constrained property registration. The Law No. 7 of 1996 for General Cadastre and Real Estate Publicity recognized the advantages of the land book system, which registers properties rather than individual transactions, and provided the legal framework to establish a uniform system to be introduced progressively throughout the country.

3.5 Government was keen to introduce the uniform parcel-based land registration system in as many parts of the country as possible. Seven of Romania's 42 judets (counties) were selected in the project to receive the initial tranche of project-type benefits.

3.6 The two main approaches to land mapping and registration in the project were the method of registration based on systematic general cadastre, a thorough, cost-effective and systematic approach foreseen in Law 7 of 1996, but also a time

consuming approach, and the demand responsive but more costly sporadic cadastre and registration, to be introduced wherever Land Book Offices had been established under the project. The cost effectiveness and public acceptance of each method was to be monitored and the proportions of each adjusted accordingly.

3.7 Under Law 18 of 1991, agricultural land, which had been collectivized in uneconomically large units, has been redistributed to the previous owners and their heirs into uneconomically small and fragmented parcels. About one third of the new landowners were living in towns and had little interest in farming themselves. The project was intended to rely eventually upon the operation of the market to consolidate land into economic units, to move underutilized assets into more intensive use, and to provide an exit route for owners who want to sell or lease, else proved uncompetitive as farmers or businessmen.

3.8 When the project was being formulated, a major issue was whether to rely upon public agencies or private contractors for execution of mapping, cadastral survey and other related work. As the public sector could not match the salaries and benefits that e.g. surveyors and notaries could earn in private practice, it was agreed that the project should depend heavily on the private sector for mapping and data entry work, that licensed surveyors would execute the cadastral surveys and that private notaries (who are board certified professional lawyers) would be engaged to handle conveyancing. As a side benefit, it was expected that engaging private professionals would allow the ONCGC and MOJ to concentrate on strategic issues, quality control, standards, supervision, and records maintenance.

3.9 Prior to the creation of ANCPI and the unification of responsibilities for cadastre and the land book system, the project design was clearly flawed and is rated *Modest*. Following the unification, the commendable implementation progress reflects the outcome of a much more robust design, which is rated *High*.

3.10 Overall Relevance of the GC-LR project on the basis of objectives and design is considered *Substantial*.

Agricultural Support Services Project

Relevance of Objectives

3.11 The project objectives were *highly* relevant to conditions in Romania. The ASSP was designed in the late 1990s to address six major challenges then facing Romania's agricultural research, extension and educational system:

- to re-orient the system to make it serve private agriculture based on market principles; to adopt socio-economic, ecological, and business criteria in planning, priority setting, monitoring and evaluating the agriculture knowledge system;

- to restructure, selectively rehabilitate, decentralize and consolidate the system to make it efficient, effective and financially sustainable;
- to develop and strengthen the linkages between researchers and users, and among research, extension and training activities; and
- to facilitate increased investment in agricultural knowledge and information system (AKIS), both public and private.

3.12 These reforms are long term and the appraisal document appreciated that these might require 10-15 years to achieve.

3.13 As a first step, there was a need to selectively support the research and extension system to serve private agriculture with already available technology and information. This became known as the “rapid impact” approach, which intended to bring increased productivity of crop and livestock, increased profitability through better farm management and collective bargaining for inputs and markets, and increased sustainability through more ecologically-sound technologies and practices. At the same time, there was a longer term need for an action plan to reform the agricultural knowledge system.

3.14 The ASSP was conceived to address an urgent need for the generation, acquisition and dissemination of appropriate agricultural technology, to improve agriculture output and its quality. The continued application by farmers of dated crop and animal production technologies, inherited from the Communist Era, was a major constraining factor, as was a poorly equipped and unresponsive research complex and an under-funded and demoralized extension service. In their training and orientation, both services were inadequate to meet the rural challenges of the emerging market economy.

3.15 A few specifics: In 1997 there were 22 Central Research Institutes, 98 regional stations and 5 agricultural universities with varying responsibilities for agricultural research. Since the mid-1970s, however, there had been little new investment in agricultural research. At project inception, the agricultural research system suffered from an excessive emphasis on basic science over applied research; on farm output over efficient farm production; narrowly focused scientists; lack of client orientation; professional isolation; public sector dominance; doubtful financial sustainability; and only marginal accountability to intended beneficiaries.

3.16 Prior to decollectivization, technology was transferred directly from research institutes to managers and technicians employed by the state and collective farms. There was little need for extension or advisory services for private farmers. Once the state and collective farms had been broken up, the Ministry of Agriculture posted several thousand agriculturists to 41 judets (to all counties except Bucharest) to initiate a farmer advisory service. Though most possessed specialized technical skills, their diagnostic, farm management and extension skills were quite limited. They also lacked experience working in a client-responsive environment. A different approach to extension was clearly

required to serve the needs of Romania's now numerous and quite inexperienced small farmers. Moreover, the farming population continued to distrust any Government effort (however well meaning) to promote the formation of cooperatives or farmer associations as means to simplify extension outreach and buttress the farmer's market power and facilitate credit processing and approvals.

Relevance of Design

3.17 The project design was ***substantially*** relevant. The project design featured a two pronged approach: (i) support targeted, priority activities in research and extension that will provide immediate benefit to farmers and agro-processors which will serve as a catalyst to jump start the reform process; and (ii) provide assistance in developing an action plan to reform AKIS that could be supported through investments in the next phase.

3.18 The project assisted a first phase in a long-term program to reform Romanian agricultural research, education and extension to respond better to newly emerging realities and opportunities.

3.19 Prior to project approval, a number of extension proposals had already been developed by farmer groups, non-government organizations and industry associations. The extension contracts to be signed in the project with these stakeholder groups would explore ways to shift the cost of some advisory services from government to users, input suppliers and marketing organizations, and also develop linkages among agriculture sector institutions to improve the accountability and relevance of advisory services to farmers.

3.20 Prior to appraisal, the Government, with encouragement of EU-PHARE, had recently formalized the National Agricultural Advisory Agency (ANCA, Ordinance dtd. November 1998), a governmental agency responsible for agriculture advisory services. Considering budgetary constraints and the already increasing role of the private sector in the provision of extension services, it is noteworthy that Government recognized the need to keep ANCA small and decentralized. ANCA brought together about 1,300 technical staff, mostly at communal level, who were previously employed in State and collective farms. Judet level staff were made responsible for the planning and provision of extension services based on a needs assessment to be carried out periodically with farmers. As Government had plans to privatize ANCA in the future, the ASSP furnished direct support for ANCA's extension programs, whose judet and commune-level offices could also compete for funds from the CGS to finance extension plans developed for their respective areas.

3.21 The Overall Rating for the ASSP project for Relevance on the basis of objectives and design is ***Substantial***.

EFFICACY

General Cadastre and Land Registration Project

3.22 Recorded real estate transactions more than doubled between 2003-2006, then doubled again in 2007. The number of mortgage loans has increased from 1,948 mortgage loans recorded by the National Bank of Romania in 2001 to 82,675 in 2005. A truly vibrant real estate market is developing at long last in Romania, largely due to the project's impact. Annex B presents a summary of key performance indicators in log frame matrix format.

3.23 As a new member state, Romania is receiving transfers of some €2 billion annually in agriculture subsidies from the EU. The project has established the technical base for the Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) needed to identify farmers eligible for direct payments under the EU CAP's Pillar 1. This has been done by strengthening the geodetic control network and developing national standards and procedures for orthophoto and other geographic information. The project produced orthophotos covering 40 percent of the territory of Romania and the balance was produced using GOR funds according to the norms developed within the project. The project has provided a solid basis (legal, technical, institutional) for a secure and transparent land market, for systematic cadastre and registration activities in urban and rural areas, and for forests restitution.

3.24 Importantly, a secure land book system has been established throughout the whole country. A simple cadastre system is also in place and has now been integrated with the land book to provide a one-stop-shop for property transactions (simple, efficient and cost effective). The overall processing times have been significantly reduced and the quality of the processing has significantly increased. The public are more aware of the need for registration, and the process has been professionalized. 80 percent of the applications are submitted directly by notaries or surveyors on behalf of clients. The average time required to process a standard transaction (sale) is now down to an average of 10 days from 30 to 60 days just two years ago. The transaction processes are now simpler and more transparent.

3.25 The GC-LR operation fully attained its objectives. As indicated in Annex B, all of the projects' quantitative objectives were exceeded by the closing date. In doing so, the project developed fundamental public infrastructure needed to underpin the transition to a market based rural economy, thus serving its development objectives quite well.

3.26 For example, by end FY06, when the project closed, (i) cadastral and land book offices had been opened in all 42 *judets* – per the target set forth in the appraisal document (ii) more than 3 million land books had been opened (titles registered), against the target at appraisal of about 1 million, and (iii) the number of real estate transactions recorded annually increased to more than 435,000 – more than double the increase targeted in the appraisal document. In addition, the new system is much more efficient and user friendly. For example, the processing time for standard property registration has been reduced from several

months on average when the project was appraised to an average of 10 days (the appraisal document's target for processing was only three days, but with the benefit of hindsight, this seems too optimistic). By project component:

3.27 *General Cadastre.* ANCPI now has complete digital orthophoto coverage of the whole country, which exceeds the appraisal target by a factor of eight. The Agency has also introduced the concept of cadastral index mapping to allow it to provide a geographical reference for all parcels, though without precise field boundaries. Cadastre services are carried out by the 42 regional offices involving 3085 cadastral units. The number of sporadic registrations (on demand) entered into the cadastre has increased from 165,258 in 1999 to 594,783 in 2005. It is estimated that the numbers in 2006 were another 20-30% higher. This growth can be seen in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Number of cadastral registrations (1999-2005)

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Urban	76,851	175,032	170,442	162,927	198,919	230,348	271,226
Rural	34,411	65,701	75,695	76,305	108,045	154,387	235,947
Apartments	48,900	150,056	139,256	123,645	114,845	94,389	84,665
Land units	5,196	4,150	1,971	1,352	2,223	2,706	2,945
Totals	165,258	394,939	387,364	364,229	424,032	481,830	594,783

Source: ICR GC-LR project

3.28 By project's end, 4,741,391 property units were entered in the cadastre database, against the appraisal document target of 3.1 million, while more than 670,000 parcels had been surveyed, against the original target of 650,000.

3.29 *Land Registration System.* The increase in the number of rural parcels is particularly notable in recent years as entry into the EU provides an impetus for land market activity in rural areas. A unified national registration system has been established in all 42 *judets*, per the target at appraisal, with professional registrars (119 licensed registrars) in place throughout the country. There are 163 offices throughout the country providing efficient, integrated registration and cadastre services.

3.30 Three million new land books have been opened in the former transcription-inscription areas (south and east of the country). This points to both an increase in land market activity, as well as more recognition of the need to register private properties. Standard applications are registered in some ten days, and alterations to land parcels are processed in 15-20 days. ANCPI is managing some 4,000 cases per day (2007) - both cadastre and registry transactions. Most transactions are being registered with ANCPI and this is supported by the growth in numbers recorded by the Agency.

3.31 *Joint Information System.* International IT consultants were engaged to develop a uniform, digitalized information system which was developed and tested for the project. The system was needed to both insure consistency among the land books and the information these contained, and to measurably speed up the rate of processing applications for title and the retrieval of cadastral data to certify parcel locations, boundaries and plot sizes. By end FY03, the system had been contracted and developed, and by the project's closing date, it had been rolled out and piloted in 7 *judets*, 2 of which were completed. (The target at appraisal was completion of 7 pilots, though the system architecture and design had to be modified when the cadastre and land book offices were unified, causing some delay). It presently is being installed nationwide using GOR funds with the assistance of database management consultants, who also are engaged in system redesign to work out some kinks in the original design.

3.32 The JIS was originally conceived as a dual architecture system supporting cadastral and land book applications across two institutions. This complicated the workflows. Following the institutional merger, the JIS essentially retains the cadastral and land book components though the level of integration is higher. The cadastre module includes functions to manage the cadastral information (textual and graphical), provide updates and maintenance, and support the servicing of requests for information as well as maintaining the geometry of boundaries. The land book module supports intake of applications, checking of documents, registration and receipt to client, all with built-in electronic workflow.

3.33 *Related Outcomes.* Other agencies have been able to use the data generated by the project for their own purposes. This includes use of the orthophotos by the Agriculture Ministry in the preparation of the IACS/LPIS system necessary for EU subsidy payments. One happily unexpected outcome has been the growth and growing sophistication of the private sector in Romania. The private sector has grown with the project providing numerous and increasingly sophisticated services - cadastre surveying, data entry, digitization of cadastre plans, document scanning and indexing. This is a positive development for the future programs and projects of ANCPPI in this sector but also for Romania as it enters the EU and foreign investment increases along with the need for sophisticated and well managed surveying (for road construction, housing development), scanning and data entry services and others. Detailed outcomes are listed in Annex B.

3.34 Owing to the substantial lag in project implementation, essentially until end FY04 when major (and successful) adjustments in project organization and implementation arrangements were introduced, a rating of ***Substantial*** is assigned using the procedure established by IEG and OPCS for restructured projects.

Agricultural Support Services Project

3.35 *Project Objectives.* The project had two objectives (i) increase agricultural productivity, sustainability and income by providing immediately needed

technology information and training for private farmers and agro-processors, and (ii) improve efficiency, cost effectiveness and client relevance in the management of research and extension.

3.36 The Government and Bank staff involved in project preparation recognized the urgent need to adapt existing proven technology to support private farmers. The role of agricultural extension needed to be rationalized and developed within a framework where the roles of the public and private sectors in technology dissemination were clearly defined. Given the prevailing and severe budgetary limitations for both research and extension, these two aspects of agricultural knowledge transfer both needed to be developed in parallel so they could be closely linked and be financially sustainable.

3.37 The design of the project also reflected implications from Romania's pending accession to EU regarding the organization and management of agricultural research and extension. In the OECD countries, a large and increasing share of agricultural research and extension is managed through private companies and farmer organizations. The project's focus on private farms, including small farms, was critical as this group urgently required appropriate technologies and information for the uptake of agricultural practices that were not only productive, but also profitable. The project thus aimed to build institutional and human capacity to undertake relevant research and extension activities for new farmers, conforming with the agricultural and environmental standards required by the EU.

3.38 While no quantitative performance targets were established by the appraisal team (which is difficult to do for this kind of operation)¹, the project's achievements suggest that the ASSP fully satisfied its development objectives. The project contributed to improved productivity of crops and livestock production and raised incomes of the beneficiaries. There was considerable improvement in milk quality and increase in quantity. Production of forage crops and field crops also increased. For example, the introduction of superior seed on 3600 ha. in a seed potato subproject is reported to have led to an 11% increase in yield. Further, the disseminated technology has led to quality increase, which has generated an increase in price of 32%. The effects of these achievements are reflected in the individual ERRs estimated for the CGS sub-projects as noted in the section on efficiency. Key performance indicators are shown in Annex B. By component:

3.39 *Competitive Grant Scheme.* The CGS has been implemented from the start based on a rigorous set of criteria and indicators that were set out in the

¹ Both ex-ante and ex-post quantification of net benefits from research and extension investments (rates of return) is usually not undertaken since it is difficult, if not impossible to anticipate with any degree of precision the outcome of these activities. This is mainly due to difficulties in linking cause (costs) and effect (outcomes), because so many exogenous influences from the meta-levels and the macro-economy that are both difficult to identify and capture usually govern the success or failure of technology transfer investments (such as those in the ASSP).

Operational Manual and which have been modified and adjusted as experience was gained. A total of seven calls for proposals were organized, the first in June 1999 and the final one in November 2004. Some 2575 proposals in total were received. Following screening by the CGS Secretariat for quality and responsiveness to established priorities, successful recipients were invited to submit full project proposals, which were also pre-screened by the Secretariat and then forwarded to local peer reviewers for evaluation, prior to submission to the Agricultural Services Board (ASB) for final selection. A total of 329 proposals were fully evaluated, and 154 sub-projects were approved by the ASB for financing. Out of these, 149 were successfully implemented, and only 5 (i.e. 3%) were considered unsatisfactory during implementation; three of which were cancelled. The implementation period for the sub-projects has averaged 3 years, but decreased rapidly in the later tranches. A large majority of sub-projects promoted the transfer of available technologies, as $\frac{3}{4}$ of projects had extension components only, while the remainder combined applied research and extension activities.

3.40 Start-up of the scheme was slower than expected, as the first disbursements took place only in September, 2001, more than one year after the project became effective. This was due to lack of experience in procurement and financial management procedures of the initial project team, as well as by the Ministry of Agriculture. This initial delay, followed by slow disbursement in the following two years, was responsible for the need to extend the project by one year. Remarkable progress was made, however, during the last years by the PMU team, which was finally able to carry out the sub-projects and fully disburse the funds under this component by the extended closing date of the project.

3.41 The grant scheme was successful in generating partnerships between public sector and private sectors operators, as 334 public agencies and 227 private organizations (farmers' associations, NGOs, commercial companies) were involved in such partnerships for the implementation of the 154 sub-projects. Indeed, 58% of the grant funds had been awarded to private organizations. The scheme has also contributed to establish links with agro-processing and marketing companies, as 23 sub-projects were implemented by such companies or in partnership with them (among which 15 in the milk production sector).

3.42 *ANCA Related Programs.* The Rapid Impact Program was designed to assist ANCA in improving its capacity to transfer rapid impact and on-the shelf available technologies. The program was initiated in 2000. Altogether, brochures covering 86 different technologies were published with a total printing of 410,000 copies. Also, an electronic data base comprising available technologies was built up within ANCA, which was an additional activity recommended by the mid-term review. ANCA's Rural Radio and Mass Media Program produced agricultural radio programs, and trained ANCA in mass media communication techniques.

3.43 Although considerable time was required to implement the program, due to managerial and procurement delays, it helped improve the communication

skills of ANCA and its regional personnel. Radio broadcasting has continued in some counties after termination of the air-time contract, being financed mainly by revenues from advertising. A contract has recently been signed by ANCA with the national radio station for a regular agricultural information broadcasting service.

3.44 *The AKIS Action Plan.* A free standing component in the project – the action plan provided local and international technical assistance for a wide-ranging review of the Agricultural Knowledge and Information System that provided the basis upon which a semi-repeater project (MAKIS) for modernizing the system was prepared and approved by the World Bank. This component also enhanced, through technical assistance, study tours and workshops, the awareness of stakeholders on best practices, and facilitated, a consensus on the broad objectives of the new MAKIS project.

3.45 *TA and Training.* Featuring fellowships in foreign countries, a “Young Scientists” program enhanced the knowledge of young Romanian researchers in agriculture and food safety issues. Co-funded by USAID, a total of 34 scientists benefitted from enrollment in studies at Iowa State University and the University of Wisconsin. The program is reported to be successful, taking into account the influential positions acquired by many applicants upon their return to Romania, and because it led the way to the creation of a new scholarship program financed by USAID, the “Norman Borlaug International Science and Technology Fellows Program” - in September 2004. Because of the good feedback received from the Young Scientists Program, the project financed three additional training programs not identified at appraisal.

3.46 Overall, the CGS was managed in an efficient manner. The administration cost of the scheme was less than 10 percent of the total cost of the CGS sub-projects. For the CGS component, a highly effective monitoring and information management system was set up. According to the project’s M&E data base 58,000 farmers have benefitted, through the 154 sub-projects. The number of farmers having adopted at least a part of the technologies proposed is reported by the implementation reports of the sub-projects at 46,000, an average adoption ratio of nearly 80%. Further evidence of a high adoption rate was brought, for instance through discussions with dairy plants, which confirm a noticeable improvement in the quality of milk in areas where milk quality improvement sub-projects took place; the same evidence was brought forward for potato seeds sub-projects.

3.47 The Institutional support component exceeded expectations as far as training activities are concerned. While selectively improving the capabilities of ANCA/OJCA staff to practice demand driven extension and improve their communication skills, the assistance brought to ANCA through the component was not sufficient to significantly improve the performance of ANCA as a whole, which would have required restructuring measures not foreseen at appraisal that ultimately lay beyond the scope of the project.

3.48 The overall rating for Efficacy of the ASSP Project is *Substantial*.

EFFICIENCY

General Cadastre and Land Registration Project

3.49 Efficiency is considered *Substantial*. No attempt was made to estimate an ERR at Appraisal. Project economic benefits at completion were estimated in the ICR with reference to: (i) impact on property; (ii) environmental impact; (iii) beneficiary savings from streamlining the registration process and, (iv) impact on the banking system. On the costs side of the ledger, the total project investment costs were included in the analysis. It is noteworthy that actual costs are some 40% less than planned. Annual incremental operating costs of ANCPI are estimated at 5% of total annual cumulative investment costs. On the basis of very conservative assumptions regarding the quantification of project benefits and taking into account the overall project investment cost, the post-project ERR has been assessed at 13.7 percent.

3.50 At the time of project design, the Government of Romania did not have a general policy on cost recovery in public sector service provision. However, ANCPI is now on strong financial footing and the Agency continuation seems assured. Its financial surplus is being utilized to meet the needs of future investment programs of the Agency, principally its participation in the Bank assisted CESAR Project (also a semi-repeater) and mainly including expanding space and building facilities for staff.

3.51 This assessment has reviewed and agrees with the methodology and assumptions behind the ERR computations and financial results presented in the ICR. While the expected project benefits had been fully achieved by the project's closing date, most accrued following the creation of ANCPI in 2004 and the unification of implementation responsibilities within this new agency. Also, a 2½ year extension of the project's original closing data was required for these benefits to accrue. The rating again was assigned per the procedure established by IEG and OPCS for restructured projects.

Agricultural Support Services Project

3.52 Efficiency is rated *High*. An overall economic analysis to determine the Net Present Value (NPV) and the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) is very difficult to perform for an applied research and extension project, especially when including a competitive grant scheme and an institutional support component. At appraisal no attempt was made to compute summary NPVs, ERRs or financial ratios. In the ICR, however, a detailed economic and financial analysis of a sample of completed sub-projects financed under the CGS (which represents 82 percent of the project cost) was carried out. The ERRs for CGS sub-projects amenable to an economic impact analysis vary from 46 percent to more than 200 percent. The resulting ERR for the entire project was 103 percent, well above the

assumed opportunity cost of capital, and would be even higher were net benefits from spill-overs and other externalities factored in. The methodology has been reviewed, it was done professionally and is endorsed by this assessment.

OUTCOMES

3.53 Based on an assessment of relevance, efficacy and efficiency, the outcome of both the projects is rated *Satisfactory*.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION RESULTS

General Cadastre and Land Registration Project

M&E Design

3.54 The project design for monitoring and evaluation was fairly general. Responsibilities for M & E at appraisal were as assigned to the Project Coordinating Unit, which would base its monitoring on data furnished by the local cadastral and land book offices. A foreign M&E expert was to be assigned to assist the PCU during year 1 to design a simple management information system for M&E, reporting formats for each component, including targeted annual performance objectives and monitoring indicators using a somewhat general results framework set forth in Annex 1 of the PAD. During the mid-term review, the project M&E design was to be adjusted, if needed.

M&E Implementation

3.55 The uptake of effective M&E was hampered by the dual institutional structure of the project, and the lack of cooperation between the agencies. There was also a lack of understanding on the part of the borrower of the importance of monitoring data for project management and decision making. Reliance was therefore placed on the routine control statistics generated by the land book and cadastre offices, and on output based reporting. No baseline data was collected during project preparation as there was little data available. The new Agency which is already operating on a self-financing basis, has recognized the need for regular performance monitoring and a great deal of monitoring data has been collected in the last year of the project, which has continued with Agency funds. Regular quarterly M&E reporting, which had ceased in 2002, were restarted in 2004 and ANCPI continues this function today.

M&E Utilization

3.56 By the project's closing date, the design of a far more robust electronic M&E system had been installed by ANCPI, and utilization had begun. It is expected that utilization will really advance under the follow-up Complementing EU Support For Agricultural Restructuring (CESAR) (FY08) project, in conformance with E.U. standards. ANCPI already produces regular monitoring

reports to management and their database contains most of the data required for CESAR performance monitoring. However, this system will be expanded under CESAR to track the advance of capacity building activities, the geographic expansion of systematic title registration, and the evaluation of customer satisfaction. CESAR M&E will consist of a combination of process monitoring, ad-hoc and ex-ante assessments, and impact evaluation. It will be conducted both at the Project level and at the regional and local level, using both administrative and survey data collection mechanisms, including rapid assessments (such as community profiling). Outcomes are being monitored both through the ANCP's internal M&E as well as through independent evaluation/beneficiary assessments commissioned by the Agency.

3.57 On the basis of M&E design, implementation and utilization, an overall rating of *Modest* is assigned.

AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SERVICES PROJECT

M&E Design

3.58 The original design featured three types of M&E in the project: (1) monitoring through quarterly and progress reports prepared by the PMU, based on input provided by ASB and ANCA; (2) evaluation of the CGS funded programs to be undertaken by the ASB in conjunction with outside agencies; and (3) ex-post evaluation of the overall project by an outside agency (agricultural universities, economic institutes, local and foreign). Utilizing a very detailed results framework as set forth in Annex 1 of the appraisal document the overall project evaluation was to assess if project-assisted activities achieved intended results in terms of technology development, dissemination, and adaptation; actual and potential impact on farm incomes; institutional capacity development; human resource development; etc mainstreaming successful extension messages and delivery mechanisms and in designing future initiatives for strengthening and reforming research and extension systems. A foreign expert was to assist the PMU during Year 1 to design a simple management information system for M&E, reporting formats for each component, including targeted annual performance objectives. The project design would be adjusted, if needed, following recommendations made in the mid-term review.

M&E Implementation

3.59 The progress of the CGS grants was closely monitored by the PMU, utilizing routine electronic reporting and frequent and very professional analysis and evaluation under the direction of an M&E/IT consultant on long-term hire by the PMU. The monitoring system has proved very useful in identifying both results and the problem sub-projects, in leading to rapid corrective measures, and for planning the activities of the PMU. As a result of close monitoring, the status of the portfolio improved markedly from the third tranche onwards. According to the project monitoring data base, 58,000 farmers have benefited, through the 154

sub-projects and also from training courses averaging 2.5 days. CGS grants also financed 3,000 demonstration days for 36,000 farmers on 1,700 demonstration fields, and 745 local workshops for 50,000 participants. The grant recipients published about 1,000 brochures and leaflets with print-runs of 700,000 copies, as well as 680 press and journal articles. One third of sub-grants also prepared radio and TV information broadcasts. Brochures were published (4,000 copies in total) presenting the results of 20 CGS sub-projects, and an impact analysis (200 copies on DVDs) was distributed covering a sample of 30 sub-projects.

3.60 An average adoption ratio of nearly 80 percent was recorded among CGS sub-project beneficiaries. The high adoption rate was also evidenced anecdotally through discussions with dairy plants, which confirmed a noticeable improvement in the quality of milk in areas where milk quality improvement projects were sited. In those sub-projects where genetically improved animals were bred and/or imported and support was provided for marketing there was a significant improvement in milk quantity also. For the potato seeds projects, superior cultivars and training in appropriate cultivation and storage techniques raised output and reduced spoilage.

M&E Utilization

3.61 The success of the CGS component helped to change attitudes towards research funding priorities, stimulated new partnerships between research institutes, universities, extension agents and farmers, as well as between the public and private sector agencies, and promoted farmers' associations. The mainstreaming of the CGS under the recently approved Modernizing Agricultural Knowledge And Information Systems (MAKIS), (FY05) project provides an opportunity to scale up these achievements and fully mainstream the CGS' component's features within the Ministry of Agriculture.

3.62 On the basis of the effective design for monitoring the ASSP's large CGS component, its implementation and diligent utilization, an overall rating for M&E of ***Substantial*** is assigned.

RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

3.63 Perhaps the most significant outcome is that these projects have truly taken-off. Key features from the GC-LR project have been incorporated in the recently approved CESAR project (FY08), which was designed to facilitate harmonization of the tested components of the new cadastre and registration system with EU requirements while extending systematic cadastre and the digitalized information system to several additional *judets*. The parallel Bank assisted MAKIS project (FY05), aims to scale-up the competitive grants scheme from the ASSP and also promote agri-food marketing, again in harmony with Community requirements.

3.64 Significantly, during the inter-regnum between formal closure of the GC-LR and ASSP and approval of the two semi-repeaters, the Government continued implementation of both project designs from its own resources, while mainstreaming several aspects of the ASSP. (With establishment of the ANCPI in 2004, the cadastre and digitalized land recording systems had already been mainstreamed.) It is worthy of note that implementation arrangements for the two semi-repeaters will feature coordination between them at the central and local levels in order to maximize beneficiary impact. This was lacking for the most part in the two projects under review, owing mainly to the still nascent presence of systematic cadastre in Romania's 42 *judets*, save for the 7 that were the focus of the project.

General Cadastre and Land Registration Project

3.65 ANCPI has been firmly established as the single registration and cadastre agency (self-financed). Any change to this institutional outcome would be costly and institutionally quite difficult. The land books have been physically transferred as have many of the staff. The new integrated business processes are in operation in all offices and clients are generally satisfied. The new information system that includes integrated workflows for registration and cadastre will further seal the marriage of these two functions. ANCPI rolled out the new system to six offices in 2006 bringing the total to 13 of 42, including Bucharest, Brasov and some of the largest, busiest offices. The rollout has continued in 2007 and 2008 to all 42 *judets*. This will further improve the quality and efficiency of the registration and cadastre services provided.

3.66 The private surveyors, notaries, banks and other interested key stakeholder groups are generally pleased with ANCPI and interested in increased cooperation. Their support is crucial as they are the main customers of the Agency in the future.

3.67 ANCPI is self-financing, allowing it a greater amount of autonomy. The main weakness and vulnerability of the system is that the Director of ANCPI is a political appointee and therefore subject to changes at the ministerial level. The new Agency has already had five directors in four years and this instability at the top continues to be a concern. ANCPI's senior technical managers joined the agency from the former ONGCG when ANCPI was established in 2004. Their continued involvement in the project and the further development of ANCPI's activities during the post-project period have contributed to the stability and ultimate success of the unified management system. However, the management needs be stabilized to consolidate the agency's successes.

3.68 There are two developing issues which could impede the smooth operation of ANCPI's services at the county level and a more rapid accrual of project benefits. These include (i) the difficulty in replacing authorized title investigators, many of whom are moving into private practice, and (ii) an escalating number of land and title disputes that are landing before the courts.

3.69 The title investigators play an important role in the finalizing of titles. They verify that the surveyors have accurately located and delineated registered properties whose putative owners have applied for title. When they do their job competently (and most do), proper verification can head off most disputes and lead to a quick resolution. ANCPI's authorized investigators have had some professional training, and it was the agency's intention to retain this function and capability on staff. Over the past two years, however, the lure of private practice has depleted their ranks in many country offices, who have had little success in recruiting replacements as even ANCPI's reasonably generous pay-scale has proved insufficient in the face of earnings from private practice. This has resulted in the occasional shoddy verification by untrained staff, and might be contributing to a bulge in court cases in 2007, following several years of decline (Table 4 below). The Agency's management team is aware of the issue, and might consider a contracting out of verification services should the loss of trained staff continue.

3.70 In its brief existence, ANCPI's superb technical managers have demonstrated a capability and willingness to address emerging problems and issues head-on, and before these cause major difficulties. There is every reason to expect that ANCPI will continue to do so, both in the context of the CESAR semi-repeater, and of continued harmonization with the EU's policy, technical and administrative requirements of member states. The overall risk to development outcomes appears to be slight, at most, and is assigned a rating of *Negligible to Low*.

Table 4. Romania – Civil Cases Before Romania's Courts of First Instance

Nature of the case	2005			2006			2007		
	No. of cases			No. of cases			No. of cases		
	Stock at period start	New cases	Solved cases	Stock at period start	New cases	Solved cases	Stock at period start	New cases	Solved cases
1.2.1 Restitution claims, out of which:	4965	8525	8060	5430	9941	8484	6887	10002	9573
1.2.1.1. Between natural and/or private law legal persons	2931	6057	5450	3538	7798	6230	5106	8016	7499
1.2.1.2. Of property confiscated by the state between 1945 - 1989	1004	786	1157	633	939	787	785	801	859
1.2.1.3. Claims according to Law # 10/2001	412	332	537	207	309	294	222	295	286
IV. LITIGATIONS RELATED TO LAND REGISTRATION , out of which:				3478	30174	18398	15254	38346	34128
1. Litigations resulting from Law # 18/1991 and Law # 1/2000				2551	24251	14931	11871	28196	25634
2. Other litigations related to land registration				935	8175	5309	3801	10794	9228
Total litigations	97909	660538	669998	88449	466014	384401	170062	541753	518812
Complaints against Land Book registration or denial of registration - Law # 7/1996 and Gov. Emergency Ordinance # 41/2004				229	1660	1273	616	2598	2157
Total general - civil law cases	148876	814820	792558	171138	910972	871020	211090	768338	724519

Source: Ministry of Justice

Agricultural Support Services Project

3.71 Regarding the first development objective of the Project, the technologies disseminated through the CGS component are sustainable, because these are simple, low-cost technologies, which require exclusively inputs (seeds, plant nutrients and animal medications) and services (artificial insemination, quality controls) available in the country. They provide high rates of return and substantial incremental net incomes. It is therefore highly unlikely that farmers will revert to previous practices. The principal uncertainty relates to the promotion and certification of organic farming, the long term sustainability of which will depend on the competitive advantage of Romania versus other EU member states, where organic farming is often heavily subsidized. This risk is however limited, considering the small weight of organic farming sub-projects in the total CGS portfolio (7 percent).

3.72 By contributing to the building up and strengthening of NGOs and farmers' associations, the Project has also enhanced the ability of farmers to maintain and further promote the disseminated technologies, as this will enable increased exchanges of experience and accelerate spillovers. The ASSP initially was targeted at poor, subsistence small farmers, which are unlikely to be sustainable within the context of accession to EU. Very small farms will probably not survive long, because of competitive pressures and new sanitary EU requirements. Field surveys show however that, although not initially targeted, farmers who attended most regularly the training and demonstration sessions organized through the CGS program, and who drew the highest benefits from the project, were medium size or progressive farmers, who have the best chances to adapt to the new future context.

3.73 A factor that could soon affect several project beneficiaries is the forthcoming allocation of the EU's milk marketing quota for Romania, currently set at 1 million liters per year. Although Romanian farmers currently produce at twice the level the EU will allow on the market, much is consumed in the producer's household or otherwise does not meet EU standards for intra-community trade. Unfortunately, many project beneficiaries who now husband improved breeds or operate modern dairy plants and milk collection centers face great uncertainty about the volume of production that might be authorized as the quota is parceled out to individual cooperatives and enterprises.

3.74 Chances are, in the short run at least, the quota won't be fully utilized as many farmers and dairy need to upgrade their production before qualifying for an allocation. Over time, however, the competition for allotments could become intense.

3.75 The sustainability of the improvements brought by the Project to the efficiency, cost effectiveness and client relevance of the management of research and extension will depend, as far as public institutions are concerned, on their ability to capitalize upon the experience gained through the Project. These endeavors will be strongly supported by the new MAKIS project, which has been designed to expand activities initiated under ASSP and to support agricultural research institutions and advisory systems.

3.76 The overall risk to Development outcomes is thus deemed ***Negligible to Low***.

BANK PERFORMANCE

3.77 There is no question that the Bank played an extremely important role during the design stage of the two projects and once these were under implementation. The design fundamentals of both projects were the subject of hot debate within the Romanian government and with and within civil society in the mid-1990s prior to the Bank becoming directly involved. It is to the credit of staff, that once recognition of the need for both projects had gelled, staff was able to promote the views of those protagonists supporting the more needed elements of project design, in a sensitive and effective manner.

3.78 This was no small accomplishment, as Romania was still reeling from the post-Ceaușescu economic collapse and from a level of civil unrest that at one stage threatened to lead to civil war. Among potential foreign donors, the Bank also very much played a lead role, although the Bank's Resident Manager Bucharest kept the international community informed of progress and difficulties during periodic and frequent meetings of donor representatives in those years. EU-PHARE, offered limited support for the ASSP, by encouraging Government to create ANCA as a semi-independent agency in 1998, and financing a strategic review of AKIS as a prelude to formulating an action plan for AKIS. USAID provided pre-project bridge financing until the project was declared effective.

QUALITY AT ENTRY

General Cadastre and Land Registration Project

3.79 At the time of project preparation, the land market in Romania was not operating according to market norms. Indeed it was hardly operating at all. Nationwide, the number of transactions was significantly below what would be expected in a modern market based economy. The procedures were not consistent across the country, were time consuming, generated a significant number of disputes and involved several agencies with many bureaucratic steps. Previous politically driven land reform programs had resulted in large numbers of unregistered titles (from the Law 18 restitution for instance) supported by weak field sketches (parceling plans). Further, there was a general lack of transparency in real estate dealings. The public found it difficult to obtain advice and assistance resulting in incomplete applications, rejections, multiple visits and general dissatisfaction with the reliability of services.

3.80 Though this project was one of the first of its type in the ECA region, experience from other Bank projects suggested that for any real progress to be made certain elements must be in place before a large investment can be expected to yield results. These factors included a clear legal framework, a simple institutional structure and government commitment. The project at design stage was built on the legal and institutional changes created in 1996 which were considered acceptable by the Bank at the time. The following supportive steps were taken at the time of project preparation and demonstrated government commitment to the project going forward:

- The Law 7/1996 provided the legal basis for a single land registration system across the whole country able to support both sporadic (demand based) and systematic registration.
- The creation of the new National Office for Cadastre, Geodesy and Cartography in November 1996 paved the way for the establishment of a national system of cadastre, bringing together the urban and rural data into a single agency.

3.81 Though the legal and institutional structures were considered sufficient to move forward with the project, it was also recognized that a simpler, pilot-oriented project was necessary to further solidify the reforms. Therefore, the project was designed to focus on a limited number of *judets* selected based on pre-determined criteria including the economic potential of the area and the number of transactions and land disputes. Systematic cadastre would be piloted in 7 *judets*; and sporadic registration would be supported in 18 *judets* (76 land book offices). The project was planned to be implemented progressively over the 5 years, beginning with trials to test methodologies and operational procedures for both systematic and sporadic processes.

3.82 Quality at Entry was considered satisfactory by QAG. The project preparation team was aware that legal basis for land administration was newly established and that, especially on the cadastral side, there was a new institution to be created, skilled up and professionalized. On the registration side, a major overhaul of the legal procedures was necessitated by the adoption of the land book system across the country.

3.83 For these reasons, the project designers took a step by step approach to identify the three components for support: (a) development of the cadastre; (b) establishment of a land book system; and (c) institutional strengthening. The first two components would allow the two implementing entities (ONCGC and MOJ) to focus on their own needs and issues, while the third component would focus on technical assistance and the development of the joint information system designed to bring the two parts of the system together. The risk of the dual agency approach was known at project entry, however the World Bank team recognized that both institutions were facing considerable internal changes (new laws, procedures, extensive data capture/data conversion programs) and it was expected that the technical integration would proceed downstream once these initial issues were resolved.

3.84 To minimize risk of poor integration and connectivity, it was decided to implement a digitalized Joint Information System and to have an on-site TA contractor to respond more quickly to the clients' needs. The project also recognized the lack of skilled staff in the public sector and the recruitment difficulties posed by low public sector salaries, thus opted to rely on the private sector for mapping, cadastre surveying and data entry work.

3.85 Several key risks were identified at entry, including institutional capacity and skills to complete the project and institutional cooperation between the two implementing entities. However, the risk of poor institutional cooperation was considered to be moderate.

3.86 Events evidenced the flaw in the Project's dual structure for implementation. The quality at entry is assigned a rating of *Moderately Satisfactory*.

Agricultural Support Services Project

3.87 Although the project was not subject to QAG assessment the quality at entry was clearly satisfactory. The project design and objectives provided an adequate and well balanced strategy to remedy in the short term the deficiencies of the research and extension system and, in the longer term, to prepare for an in-depth restructuring of the knowledge transfer system in agriculture. It is worth noting that the Project did not aim at achieving during its lifetime the necessary reforms of the agricultural research and extension system, but was viewed as a first step in a long term process towards this end. A number of institutional and organizational potential risks had been adequately identified during appraisal (non professional management of the CGS, favoritism in provision of grants, lack of availability of competent management staff, lack of experience of contractors, difficulties for ANCA to implement its activities) although most of these, save for the last one, either did not materialize, else were successfully handled during implementation.

3.88 The Bank's overall performance in the identification, preparation assistance, and appraisal of the project is rated *Satisfactory*. The preparation process was adequately performed in a reasonable time, leading to a well designed project addressing Government priorities as outlined in the CAS.

QUALITY OF SUPERVISION

General Cadastre and Land Registration Project

3.89 As the GC&LR project got underway it became quickly evident that placement of the cadastral function and land registration responsibilities under two separate heads was not going to work. (This was a reflection of the Austro-Hungarian approach, which foundered on the shoals of Romania's two distinct land recording systems once implementation of the operation commenced.) Nonetheless, bureaucratic inertia, infighting and institutional pride prevented the consolidation of these inter-related functions within the purview of a single, task focused agency. Matters came to a head in 2003, when a joint portfolio review of all Bank project recommended to the Prime Minister (PM) that an independent and largely self-financed agency be created to jointly administer the cadastral and land registration aspects of the project, else cancel the outstanding balance of the loan. The PM was presented with four short briefing papers which outlined the advantages of a unified system while showing how poorly the land recording side of the project was performing in its then current incarnation as a step-child within the Ministry of Justice. The PM agreed with the Bank and ordered that implementation responsibilities be unified.

3.90 What followed was not an easy implementation situation. The (new) Minister of Justice realized that he needed 300 additional judges to administer the existing land recording/deed book system, if the Ministry of Justice was also to carry out its primary and routine juridical responsibilities. He then agreed in 2004 - amidst considerable angst

within MOJ and the legal profession at large - to transfer MOJ's land book responsibilities to the newly created ANCPI and also signed off on this new agency's authorization to assess fees for service. It was a genuine exercise of political will, and as events later proved, one that spelled the difference between project success and failure.

3.91 The Bank undertook regular supervision missions. Mission staff included the appropriate technical experts and the client was pleased with the advice and guidance provided. The project was declared a problem project (Implementation status rated unsatisfactory) once in late 1999 due to slow implementation progress and weak management within ONCGC. Implementation progress was rated satisfactory during the following mission in mid-2000. Curiously, the project remained satisfactory from then on. In light of events, it appears that the supervision team was a bit kind in its supervision ratings as implementation delays and weak management continued to plague the project.

3.92 There could have been stronger information technology expertise early on in the development of the Joint Information System which might have mitigated some of the difficulties with the long contract implementation period. Development of complex IT systems requires depth and experience which the client was lacking. The team, though experienced, also would have benefited from more specialized IT expertise in supervision of the IT system. The procurement method used - combined hardware and software bid was, in hindsight, not the best method. Again, the project, as one of the first of its kind in the region, provided good lessons learned for other projects in the region.

3.93 After several years of difficult project implementation and lack of inter-agency cooperation, the Bank team strongly advocated for changes in the institutional set-up to move toward a single agency. This advice was listened to and the GOR's decision to establish a single agency for registration and cadastre is considered a significant outcome of the project. The Bank team promptly adjusted to the changes in institutional structure and project management arrangements and mobilized significant expertise to advise the new agency.

3.94 The Bank's overall performance in support of the GC-LR Project is rated **Satisfactory**. Save for problems supervising the IT component, good technical expertise was provided and the client was appreciative of the advice and guidance.

Agricultural Support Services Project

3.95 In the course of implementation, the Bank conducted nine supervision missions (almost two per year) and a midterm review. In general, the composition of the Bank missions in term of appropriate skill mix, expertise, and staff continuity was assured, with consultants mobilized for specific areas when needed. The project implementation progress was carefully monitored by the supervision team, and was recorded in the Implementation Status Reports (ISR). The supervision mission ratings for achievement of the project's development objective and implementation progress have all been satisfactory, with the exception of unsatisfactory ratings for project monitoring/evaluation in 2002, for procurement delays in late 2003 and for project management early in the project's life.

3.96 The Bank showed flexibility and reacted promptly to the requests of the implementing agency. The Bank was supportive to the project management, and generally intervened when necessary, for instance to draw the attention of the implementing agency when changes were needed in the project team, to draw the attention of ANCA on delays in the implementation of their sub-components, and to explain the project concept to new Ministry officials in order to gain their support following changes in Government.

3.97 Though the quality at entry was clearly satisfactory, the Bank should have opposed with greater vigor the Government's decision to transfer the administrative responsibility for the local extension offices from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Interior. In practice this vitiated the ability of the local extension offices to carry out ANCA's rapid impact program. The Bank's overall performance in support of the ASSP Project is rated *Satisfactory*.

BORROWER PERFORMANCE

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

General Cadastre and Land Registration Project

3.98 The Government of Romania (GOR) was committed to achieving the development objectives throughout implementation, however the Agency directors and deputy ministers assigned to the project constantly changed and this made implementation progress difficult. Though these changes were sometimes in response to lack of implementation progress and unsatisfactory ratings by the Bank team, it is clear that implementation would have been faster and smoother had there been more consistent management and high level leadership.

3.99 In the first 5 years of the project, the Government also failed to achieve a timely resolution of implementation issues, especially the need to unify responsibilities, the M&E arrangements initially were inadequate and M&E data were not readily available (or even used) in decision making, while the coordination between the cadastral agency and the Ministry of Justice was intermittent and weak.

3.100 Owing to these factors, the Government's performance is rated *Moderately Satisfactory*.

Agricultural Support Services Project

3.101 The sequence of events surrounding implementation of the ASSP were happily less dramatic but nonetheless filled with consequence. This project faced two major hurdles in implementation. Staff involvement in both instances helped keep the project focused on its DOs. The first instance, following project inception, involved very weak and politicized leadership of the PMU, whose first incumbent was simply not in agreement with the ASSP's design and modalities. In particular, this person was more attuned to preserving MARD's then existing research and extension services (limited though they were, both in numbers and motivation as well as capabilities), than to

revitalizing these functions through the project's contracting-out and partial fee-for-service features.

3.102 With the appointment of a new and dynamic State Secretary within MARD in 2001, support for the PMU and the project moved center stage in MARD's program agenda, and a new, equally dynamic PMU director was appointed who quickly managed to get things moving in the project's large CGS component.

3.103 However, throughout most of the ASSP's implementation period, the rapid impact extension component administered by ANCA generally lagged. This was due mainly to a decision by GOR to transfer administrative and budgeting responsibilities from MARD to the Ministry of Interior's line, which effectively placed control over ANCA's regional offices under Romania's municipal mayors.

3.104 The results were dysfunctional to say the least. It was only in 2004, following repeated entreaties from the MARD and pressure from the Bank, that the Council of Ministers decided to transfer line and budgeting responsibilities back to the MARD. By the time the ASSP project closed, a fairly rapid turnaround in ANCA's extension outreach activities had begun, however the effort began too late and was still too limited for the component to really be labeled a success. On the other hand, the revitalized CGI following the change in PMU leadership earlier in the decade, moved into the advisory gap caused by ANCA's administrative problems, and became as much a rapid impact program as it was an applied research facility. The results are admirably recorded by findings from this component's computerized M & E system.

3.105 The Government was highly committed to the project, and was proactive in the preparation process. In particular, it was able to get financial support from USAID to start project activities before disbursements were made possible on the Bank loan. All institutional arrangements of the project were in place and operational before the project was approved by the Board.

3.106 In view of the importance of the highly successful CGS scheme, which accounted for more than 80 percent of the total project investment, the Government's performance is rated *Satisfactory*.

IMPLEMENTING AGENCY PERFORMANCE

General Cadastre and Land Registration Project

3.107 Instability at the leadership level in the government was somewhat mitigated by the skilled staff in the project PMUs, especially the one responsible for the general cadastre. The GOR came to recognize the difficulties of the dual agency model and made the necessary decision to merge the cadastre and land book offices in 2004. This was an important decision and politically quite brave of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Administration and Interior given the vested interests involved.

3.108 Following the unification of agency responsibilities, The National Agency for Cadastre and Real Estate Publicity (ANCPI) worked hard over final two years of the project to ensure the integration of the cadastre and land registry offices in all 42 *judets*,

to integrate the business processes to improve service to customers, to complete the joint information system, and to complete the project to meet its intended development objective. After the project closed, ANCPPI's program continued using its own resources and some government funding, and now is receiving support as a major component in the Bank assisted CESAR project (FY08). Implementing Agency Performance is therefore rated *Satisfactory*.

Agricultural Support Services Project

3.109 Despite its lack of previous experience with World Bank projects, MARD provided a dedicated coordination and oversight of the project, and reacted adequately to the slow start of PMU activities by replacing the key management staff. Throughout the project life a satisfactory financial management system has been maintained. The PMU has respected the relevant loan financial covenants, by submitting to the WB quarterly financial monitoring reports and annual audit reports. All audit reports have been submitted timely and all the audit opinions have been clean. Overall, the financial management capacity built throughout the ASSP has been successfully transferred and scaled up in the new project, MAKIS, with the systems, procedures and staffing satisfactorily used as part of the new project's institutional arrangements. Throughout the project life procurement management was done at satisfactorily level. The Borrower maintained a good procurement monitoring system and, as most of contracts were below prior review threshold, was able to implement project at efficient level and with good quality. There were no deviations from the Guidelines requirements noticed during post-review. As in case of financial management, capacity built throughout the ASSP has been successfully transferred and scaled up for MAKIS, with the systems, procedures and staffing satisfactorily used as part of the new project's institutional arrangements. Performance is rated *Satisfactory*.

OVERALL BORROWER PERFORMANCE

3.110 Though there were extreme difficulties in the early years of the project with consistency of management and inter-agency cooperation, the final outcome of a single, off-budget agency is a successful one and to the credit of the Romanian government for making the decision to integrate the registry and cadastre. The new Agency - ANCPPI - has worked hard over the final two years of the project to complete all of the work and commit and spend almost half of the loan funds. This has been done successfully without sacrificing quality. Overall the borrower's performance for the GC-LR project is rated *Moderately Satisfactory*.

3.111 Overall borrower performance for the ASSP project is rated *Satisfactory*.

4. Lessons

4.1 Building on the completion report, the assessment of these projects suggests the following broad lessons:

GENERAL CADASTRE AND LAND REGISTRATION PROJECT

Lesson 1

Borrower commitment and ownership can turn even the most difficult of projects around. Sometimes this commitment can come from political events which have nothing directly to do with the project. In Romania the EU Accession led to building of commitment towards the project. It facilitated the all important restructuring of the land registration system which was a prerequisite for the development of a land market. The resultant amalgamation of holdings enabled the commercialization of farming and allowed farmers to avail themselves of the EU common agricultural policy subsidies. The influence of the EU was indirect, though Romanian officials agree that beginning in 2002-2003, when the pre-Accession process and harmonization procedures got underway, a sea change in attitudes amongst the government's policy advisory bodies and line administrators occurred. This most sobering realization led to a much more constructive approach to policy reform, once the promises from Accession became more widely known, and consequences of a failure to reform became increasingly evident.

Lesson 2

A key success factor for a viable land administration system is the establishment of a workable institutional structure. The experience of Romania shows that the single agency model and the creation of a semi-autonomous self finance agency appears to work best and this could have wider applicability in the Central and East European context. The GC-LP project experienced severe problems due to the historic institutional structure and lack of institutional cooperation. These were not fully known at the time of project design and were only overcome by the establishment of a single agency responsible for both the title registration and cadastre. The Romanian situation was further complicated in that there was a prior history of separate responsibility for urban and rural cadastres. This experience suggests that where systems are immature and responsibilities diffused across several organizations the adoption of a single agency structure within the early phases of the project is critical for successful implementation. In the case of Romania, it was a combination of political will on the part of the government, strong support from the Country Director, and sound technical advice of the Bank team that came together to establish the single agency.

Lesson 3

The building of public confidence in the system and ensuring the public has access to the professional support services (notaries, real estate agents) is necessary not only for successful implementation, but for truly achieving the objective of secure property markets.

In Romania there has been a significant increase in the use of professional services by the public in land market transactions. In many regions the notaries are responsible for managing the transaction on behalf of the clients and this leads to better preparation of documents, fewer rejections and faster solution of cases. The establishment of the unified

system, merging the land registration and cadastre functions, has also improved public confidence as the public observes better and faster service delivery.

Lesson 4

Projects may place too high expectations on automation and underestimate the complexity of large scale IT system development. The project (like many land administration projects) involved the creation of an information system to manage real estate records and support transactions across the country. The information system development component experienced difficulties and was severely delayed. The original scope called for a system to be established in two institutional structures but exhibit a large degree of integration. Simpler is better and a phased approach to development, with a first generation system being upgraded later to a more sophisticated one, may be preferable in countries where IT management is weak and system requirements are unclear or undecided. Finally, more attention must be paid in both design and implementation to building sufficient IT and management capacity in the beneficiary agencies to manage such large IT systems development, rollout and maintenance.

Lesson 5

Sustainability needs to be built into project design; and this is largely about human capacity. In view of its highly technical nature, it is highly desirable that leadership of the responsible agency be a technically trained person. Similarly, there are real advantages to assigning program management to a semi-independent and preferably self-financed agency such as ANCP. When the legal profession and numbers of qualified surveyors in the country reach a minimum threshold, the handling of major functions relating both to mapping as well as registration and titling should be contracted out in full to privately organized associates and organizations.

AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SERVICES PROJECT

Lesson 6

Farmers and rural business owners will respond enthusiastically to innovative technologies corresponding to their needs. There has to be consultation and a demand driven element in any serious research and extension endeavor. The competitive grant approach proved to be an excellent vehicle both for generating applied research findings and extending these to farmers. Farmer distrust and reluctance to form associations can be overcome, especially when residents and local influentials (e.g. the local mayors and priests) serve as point persons and main advocates. As a result, stakeholder assumption of responsibility for financing the on-farm investments and capitalization of processing facilities ensued. This contributed considerably to the sustainability of the sub-projects, most of which either remain in operation today or have been broadened into new areas and lines of production and marketing.

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FOR THE AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SERVICES PROJECT

- PAD (Report No. 19731-RO)
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FOR OTHER RELEVANT ROMANIA PROJECTS

- PAD: Complementing EU Support for Agricultural Restructuring Project (Report No. 40998-RO)
- PAD: Modernizing Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems Project (Report No. 30274-RO)
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IEG Guidelines:

- Harmonized Evaluation Criteria for ICR and OED Evaluations
- Rating the Outcome of Projects with Formally Revised Objectives

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Annex A. The CAS Context

Features of the 1997 CAS. The Bank's role and strategy in support of Romania's economic development similarly evolved, as reflected in the above-noted CAS documents. The 1997 CAS was established following three years of declining GDP growth, political instability and a seemingly stalled and fitful transition.

The CAS document noted that Romania, through the end of 1996, had lagged behind many other Central European countries in its transition to a market economy, and was failing to capitalize on the development potential offered by its large market size, natural resources and well-educated labor force. Structural reforms were slow and shallow, resulting in erratic and unstable macroeconomic performance. Poverty also increased sharply - as much as 20 percent of the population was deemed poor in 1996, five times that recorded in 1989 when the transition began. Popular dissatisfaction with the slow pace of reform helped produce, following the November 1996 elections, a new Government which within three months had announced and initiated an "ambitious and far-reaching" reform program.

Designed to support reform and govern Bank Group operations in FY98-FY00, the centerpieces of the CAS aimed to promote the resumption of growth and the reduction of poverty. The strategy had three broad strands, which are worth recounting here:

- over the near-term, the Bank Group would provide substantial advice and finance for the ambitious reform program launched by the new administration;
- over the medium-term, priority would be given to advice and financing for EU accession-related sector programs; while
- throughout the CAS period, the Bank Group would expand its development assistance management role in Romania and broaden and deepen partnerships with the EU, foreign and domestic foundations, private business and the NGO community.

The detailed aims of the Bank Group's financial and advisory assistance were (not surprisingly) to promote structural reforms and private sector development. The main supporting vehicles were three adjustment operations, including an Agriculture Sector Adjustment Loan (ASAL). The ASAL was to be supported by projects designed to (i) develop rural financial intermediaries while the shell of the state-owned Banca Agricola was sold-off to commercial banking interests, (ii) improve the functioning of the land market in the wake of a somewhat hasty and ill-prepared land reform, and (iii) improve marketing channels and raise product standards to EU norms.

The CAS document noted that difficulties with earlier Bank financed projects had arisen because the projects were designed and approved in advance of the accompanying policy framework. Thus the need for placing a renewed emphasis on macroeconomic and sector reforms was recognized, in order to provide the right environment for Bank supported investments. Further, some of the earlier projects had been overloaded with detail and unclear objectives. In the future, project preparation and approval were to be streamlined and kept tightly focused on specific development objectives.

The 2001 CAS. The international financial crisis of 1997-98, continued political instability and perhaps also an inadequate cohort of entrepreneurial and administrative talent quickly vitiated the reform process which the 1997 CAS aimed to support, resulting in the following rather sobering assessment in 2001:

“The starting point for the transition process in Romania was, in many respects, more difficult than in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Pre-transition policies emphasized self-reliance, which resulted in excessive focus on heavy industry and large infrastructure projects. During the 1980s, the rapid repayment of the US\$11 billion foreign debt (20 to 30 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP)) imposed severe strains on the population, with deep cuts in imports and a widening of the technological gap. Towards the end of the 1980s the Romanian economy was on the verge of collapse and no attempts to reform had yet been made.”

Given this difficult legacy, the Romanian authorities during the 1990s took a gradualist and piecemeal approach to reform. The imposition of hard budget constraints and privatization of state-owned enterprises were significantly delayed. While social concerns were understandable, this strategy failed to produce sustainable gains in either economic or social conditions (poverty increased sharply, with the share of the population living below the national poverty line doubling in the second half of the 1990s, from 20 to 41 percent).

The CAS document concluded that “Lack of political will to reform, and constrained institutional and governance capacity are at the root of Romania's less-than-satisfactory economic performance and worsened social conditions.” Frequent changes in legislation, with a strong reliance on emergency measures and few efforts to build the institutional capacity to enforce the new legislation, or to carry out new responsibilities; resulted in an instability in the legal framework and the delays in building needed administrative capacity. By the *fin de siecle*, nearly all sectors, including farming and the agribusiness sector were laboring under a very unattractive business environment, one that discouraged foreign direct investment and private sector development.

The 2001 CAS was hopeful that the reformist program of another newly elected Government had identified the right priorities, and that its program would at long last lay the bases for a pragmatic approach to reforming the economy and raising living standards by improving the quality of Government services and creating an attractive business environment.

Important development challenges remained, however, particularly with regard to further enterprise privatization, reform of the banking and financial sector, restructuring and deregulation of the energy sector, fiscal decentralization, land privatization and continued reform of the agriculture sector, access to quality education in rural areas, and reform of the pension system to ensure sustainability in the context of an aging population. Cognizant of the limitations of the broad based adjustment lending instruments featured in the 1997 CAS, the Bank Group sought to address these challenges in FY02-FY04 with a more balanced and focused mix of fast disbursing loans (e.g. PALs) and investment project instruments, IFC and MIGA facilities and enhanced training and knowledge transfer activities.

The structural change agenda was a primary focus for this CAS. Central for the rural economy were land privatization and agricultural sector reforms. The CAS noted that while land privatization began early in the transition process (1991) through the restitution of land used by large cooperatives to the former owners, almost two-thirds of the land transferred through restitution went to elderly farmers, with the remainder to younger, generally poorer households. Most farms in 2001 (and even today, though less so) are small semi-subsistence units of about two hectares, run by owners with limited farming skills and with weak integration into factor and commodity markets. The CAS emphasized that these structural problems would require public and private investment in rural marketing infrastructure, and increased research and extension aimed at integrating small households into commodity and input markets. Meanwhile, the privatization of state farms, which were chronic loss-makers, remained a critical unfinished task. State owned farmlands continued to tie up substantial portions of arable land (17 percent in late 2000) that is the best in the country. While the agricultural subsidy allocation was improved

through the establishment of an input-voucher scheme, the 2001 CAS recognized that the new Government's decision to allocate most of the budget transfers to "advanced producers" with no ceiling on the transfer per beneficiary will benefit primarily large land holders.

Pre-Graduation - The 2006 CPA. Technically a Country Partnership Agreement (CPA), the 2006 CAS document was issued jointly by the Bank and IFC. It's strategic directions were substantially modified from the broader and more comprehensive strategic agendas of the earlier CASs, in recognition that (i) the requisites of Romania's then imminent EU Accession were determining the Government's development policy and program objectives, and (ii) the sheer volume of Cohesion and Structural Funds being availed from the EU in the form of pre-accession support had rapidly become Romania's most important source of official external finance. Harmonization of Romania's development policies, programs and legal and regulatory infrastructure with EU requirements and the continued implementation of associated structural reforms were thus adopted as the guiding principle for future Bank Group assistance. The Government agreed in 2006 that assistance from the Bank Group under the FY06-FY09 CPA would initially focus on implementing the unfinished accession agenda, then would be recast upon Accession to support Romania's post-Accession policy and structural reforms needs as an EU member state.

Noting that EU accession aspirations have enhanced macroeconomic stability and spurred renewed Romanian commitment to reforms in recent years, the economy grew robustly at 4 to 5 percent per year during 2000-05, with inflation declining from above 40 percent in 2000 to 8.6 percent in 2005, the lowest level since the start of transition. Furthermore, structural and institutional reform accelerated during the same period. The private sector's share of GDP has moved closer to EU-8 levels, with e.g. more than 90 percent of banking assets being held by the private sector, and a substantial reduction of quasi-fiscal deficits. The independence of the judiciary had been strengthened. In sum, the prospect of Accession witnessed a sea-change in public attitudes towards modernization and vastly strengthened the hands of politicians and leaders in civil society favoring reform, structural change and less pervasive public sector intervention and management.

Nonetheless, the Government agreed that Romania still has to complete the ongoing reform agenda which it will have to pursue to underpin growth and improve living standards. The CPA observes that restructuring of the enterprise sector is by no means complete. Financial intermediation is still low compared to that of EU-8. Increasing productivity in the agriculture sector remains a major development challenge. Further improvements in the business environment include increasing labor market flexibility and reducing labor taxation., A skills mismatch with market needs will require a reorientation of the educational system. Poor governance and weak institutional capacity continue to be key concerns.

Importantly, the CPA emphasizes that the agricultural sector continues to present a major development challenge. It made note that 67 percent of the poor continued to reside in rural areas (though their numbers were falling sharply), and that the 4.8 million Romanians working in agriculture (part and full-time) constitute fully 72 percent of the agricultural labor force in all EU-15 countries combined. However a weak policy framework and the slow pace of restructuring (especially of land) had resulted in low productivity, though the sector remains potentially quite competitive given its ample endowment of arable land and moderate climate.

The CPS was thus constructed on three pillars: (i) accelerating structural and institutional reforms to support sustainable growth; (ii) addressing fiscal vulnerabilities and modernizing the public sector; and (iii) targeting poverty reduction and promoting social inclusion. The CPS lists a set of principles that will govern the choice and design of Bank lending operations. Key amongst these

is a commitment to flexibility – in program emphasis, in choice of financial instruments and indeed in the selection of components – movement towards alignment of Bank procedures with country systems. Bank programs in Romania will continue to incorporate elements of the Middle Income Country (MIC) agenda, including reducing project preparation time, accelerating project completion, and introducing new products and approaches. With reference to the project being assessed, this altered modus operandi has already had important (and actually quite beneficial) influences on the design of semi-repeaters (discussed below), where a menu of components proposed by Bank staff was revised at the project identification and pre-appraisal stage following government consultations.

Annex B. Project Performance Indicators

The General Cadastre & Land registration Project

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Increase the number of recorded real estate transactions by 30%			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	184,704 recorded transactions annually	increase by 30%		436,086 recorded transactions annually
Date achieved	12/31/2003	12/30/1997		12/31/2005
Comments (incl. % achievement)	more than doubled			
Indicator 2 :	land book and cadastre offices operational in all 42 judets			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	land book offices functioning in only half the country. National cadastre agency just beginning.	operational in all 42 judets		Functioning land book and cadastre offices in all 42 judets
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006

Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 3 :	About 1 million titles registered by the end of the project.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n/a	1 million titles registered		3 million land books opened (titles registered)
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 4 :	650,000 parcels surveyed during the project period.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n/a	650,000		671,575 parcels surveyed
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 5 :	About 3.1 million units will be entered in the cadastre database			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n/a	3.1 million		4,741,391 property units entered into digital database
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 6 :	processing time for standard registration within 3 days (does not include new survey)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	several months on average	3 days		An average of 10 days
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 7 :	processing time for alteration of land parcel and registration within 15 days			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	several months	15 days		average of 20 days
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006
Comments				

(incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 8 :	Potential real estate disputes reduced by 30% in the project areas			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n/a	decrease by 30%		n/a
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Information not available from the courts. Decrease of 32% in administrative appeals within ANCPI from 1417 to 860.			
Indicator 9 :	Inquiries on real estate information increased by 25%			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	1,044,536 annually	increase by 25%		1,427,616 land book extracts issued annually
Date achieved	12/31/2002	12/31/1997		12/31/2005
Comments (incl. % achievement)	increase of more than 30%			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	established digital cadastre system			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	no digital cadastre system	systematic cadastre pilots in 7 offices; eleven offices prepared for sporadic cadastre and registration		7 judets support digital sporadic cadastre and registration; 2 systematic pilots completed
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	All 42 judets support sporadic registration and cadastre with manual system; digital system to be rolled out nationwide in 2007			
Indicator 2 :	A fully operational land book system established			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	land book system operational in half the country	establish land book system nationwide		land book system operational nationwide
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 3 :	public awareness campaign implemented			

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	no PAC and little awareness of the public	mass media spot seen by citizens		PAC not implemented
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)				
Indicator 4 :	develop joint information system to support cadastre and registration services			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	no digital system	system contracted and developed		system developed and piloted in 7 judets
Date achieved	05/20/1998	09/30/2003		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	will be rolled out nationwide in 2006-07			
Indicator 5 :	develop joint information system to support cadastre and registration services			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	no digital system	system contracted and developed		system developed and piloted in 7 judets
Date achieved	05/20/1998	09/30/2003		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	will be rolled out nationwide in 2006-07			
Indicator 6 :	contract aerial photography, base mapping orthophotography and data entry			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n/a	survey 12,000 sq. kms		aerial photography and orthophoto maps covering 95,000 sq kms
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997		06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	covering 40% of the territory of Romania			
Indicator 7 :	develop joint information system to support cadastre and registration services			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	no digital system	system contracted and developed		system developed and piloted in 7 judets
Date achieved	05/20/1998			06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	will be rolled out nationwide in 2006-07			
Indicator 8 :	maintain project management unit(s)			
Value (quantitative)	n/a	PCU and 2 PMUs established		PMU(s) maintained throughout project

or Qualitative)			
Date achieved	05/20/1998	12/31/1997	06/30/2006
Comments (incl. % achievement)	implementation arrangements changed during implementation, but required management structure maintained		

The Agricultural Support Services Project

Outcome / Impact Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix	Projected in last PSR ¹	Actual/Latest Estimate
Existing on-the-shelf technology is transferred to farmers and agro-processors	30	228
A number of innovative technologies and promotional materials produced, relevant on-farm research and demonstration established	200	85 new technologies 1671 demonstration sites established
Wide participation from the public and private sector for research and extension contracts	2,000	2,575 applications received for the CGS
Number of collaborative work between public and private sector agencies	120	Public-private partnerships between 227 private implementers and 334 public institutions
Number of collaborative work among research and extension service providers	80	154
Number of farmers and agro-processors that have benefited from the research and extension activities	7,000	50,000
ASB has representation from the various stakeholders	13	13

Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix	Projected in last PSR ¹	Actual/Latest Estimate
Number of research and extension contracts funded	150	154
Rapid impact program: number of extension messages disseminated by ANCA	20	63
TA contracts	30	74
Peer review work completed for CGS projects	500	500
Local training for: PMU staff, CGS applicants, ASB members, peer reviewers	6 man-months	48.3
Overseas training: Young scientist program; mass media; extension staff exchange	5 man-months	36
Farm management handbook produced and distributed	1	1
Radio programs developed and released	30	300
Workshops completed	25	27
AKIS Action Plan developed	1	1

¹ End of project

Annex C. Basic Data Sheets

Romania — General Cadastre and Land Registration Project L4258

Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Total project costs	37.30	32.42
Loan/Credit amount	25.50	24.60

Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Begin Appraisal L4258	--	07/06/1997
Begin Approval L4258	--	12/09/1997
Signing L4258	--	01/23/1998
Effectiveness Loan, L4258	05/20/1998	05/20/1998
Closing for Loan, L4258	12/31/2003	06/30/2006

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. Staff Weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY94	--	142.46
FY95	--	89.67
FY96	--	11.85
FY97	--	33.32
FY98	--	102.77
FY99	--	0.00
FY00	--	0.00
FY01	--	0.00
FY02	--	0.00
FY03	--	0.00

FY04	--	0.00
FY05	--	0.00
FY06	--	0.00
FY07	--	0.00
Total:	--	380.07
Supervision/ICR		
FY94	--	0.00
FY95	--	0.00
FY96	--	0.00
FY97	--	0.00
FY98	--	39.11
FY99	--	77.64
FY00	33	91.35
FY01	17	44.02
FY02	17	96.28
FY03	20	67.94
FY04	22	101.56
FY05	24	128.40
FY06	17	97.57
Total:	154	764.80

Includes Trust Funds for project preparation and supervision

Other Project Data

Borrower/Executing Agency:

FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Loan no.</i>	<i>Amount (US\$ million)</i>	Board date
Complementing EU Support For Agricultural Restructuring Project (CESAR)	P100638	65.0	November 27, 2007

Romania - Agricultural Support Services Project L4533

Key Project Data *(amounts in US\$ million)*

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Total project costs	17.8	17.6
Loan/Credit amount	11.0	10.9

Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Begin Appraisal L4533	--	10/08/1999
Begin Approval L4533	--	01/27/2000
Signing L4533	--	03/27/2000
Effectiveness Loan, L4533	05/15/2000	08/24/2000
Closing for Loan, L4533	12/31/2004	12/31/2005

Mission Data

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	
				<i>Implementation Progress</i>	<i>Development Objective</i>
Identification/ Preparation	July 96				
Appraisal	10/11/96		Team Leader ; Operations Officer	S	S
	12/17/96		Team Leader; Fin. Mgmt. Spec.; Procurement Special		
Supervision	02/14/2000	3	Team Leader (1); Agricultural Spec. (1); Agricultural Consultant (1)	S	S
	11/16/2000		Team Leader (1); Agricultural Spec. (1); Agricultural Consultant (1)		
	05/09/2001	3	Team Leader (1); Agricultural Spec. (1); Agricultural Consultant (1)	S	S
	11/02/2001	2	Team Leader (1); Agricultural Spec. (1);	HS	S
	06/28/2002	3	Agricultural Consultant (1)	S	S
	12/05/2002 (Mid-term review)	6	Team Leader (1); Agricultural Spec. (1); Sr. Operations Officer (1);	S	S
	10/10/2003	5	Program Asst. (1); Sr. Procurement Special (1)	S	S
	06/17/2004	4	Task Team Leader (1); Sr. Operations Officer (1);	S	S
	11/26/2004	2	Consultants (2); Program Asst. (1); Fin. Mgmt. Spec. (1)	S	S
	12/14/2005	6	Task Team Leader (1); Sr. Operations	S	S

<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	
			<i>Implementation Progress</i>	<i>Development Objective</i>
		Officer (1); Consultants (2); Program Asst. (1) Task Team Leader (1); Consultant (1); Fin. Mgmt. Spec. (1); Procurement Spec. (1) Task Team Leader (1); Consultant (1) Acting Task Team Leader (1); Consultant (2); Program Assistant (1); Fin. Mgmt. Spec. (1); Procurement Spec. (1)		
ICR				

Mission Data
Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

<i>No.</i>	<i>Date ISR Archived</i>	<i>Performance rating: Development Objective</i>	<i>Performance rating: Implementation Progress</i>
1	01/08/1998	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
2	06/18/1998	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory
3	11/09/1998	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
4	03/24/1999	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
5	11/29/1999	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory
6	06/19/2000	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
7	06/30/2000	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
8	12/17/2000	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
9	12/18/2000	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
10	06/29/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
11	12/19/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
12	06/27/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
13	09/16/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
14	01/28/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
15	06/10/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
16	12/08/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
17	01/21/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
18	06/23/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
19	09/02/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
20	05/12/2005	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
21	06/29/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
22	12/08/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
23	05/30/2006	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

Other Project Data

Borrower/Executing Agency:

FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS

<i>Operation</i>	<i>ID.</i>	<i>Amount (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Board date</i>
Modernizing Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems Project (MAKIS)	P086949	50.0	November 16, 2004