
Poverty Reduction Support Credits

An Evaluation of World Bank Support

Part II: Appendix Tables, Annexes, and References

IEG

INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP

<Report No.>

October 19, 2009

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFR	Sub-Saharan Africa Region
AAPs	Assessment and Action Plans
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AfDB	African Development Bank
ALCID	Adjustment Lending Conditionality and Implementation Database
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CAE	Country Assistance Evaluation
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CDF	Comprehensive Development Framework
CFAA	Country Financial Accountability Assessment
COFOG	Classification of the functions of government
CPAR	Country Procurement Assessment Report
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CPRGS	Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (Vietnam)
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
CSP	Corresponding Sector Projects
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DfID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPL	Development Policy Loan
EAP	East Asia and Pacific Region
ECA	Europe and Central Asia Region
EU	Euros
GBS	General budget support
GDP	Gross domestic product
GFS	Government Finance Statistics
GNI	Gross National Income
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IDD	International Development Department (University of Birmingham School of Public Policy)
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean Region
LC	Legal Conditions
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDRI	Multi-donor Debt Relief Initiative
MKUTUKA	Tanzania National Poverty Reduction Strategy
MNA	Middle East and North Africa Region
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NDS	National Development Strategy

ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
OPCS	Operations Policy and Country Services
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PAM	Performance Assessment Matrix
PBA	Program-Based Approaches
PBL	Policy-based lending
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessment
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PFM(P)	Public Financial Management (and Procurement)
PG	Poverty gap
PG Sq	Squared poverty gap
POVCAL	Online program for calculating poverty measures
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Review
PREM	Poverty Reduction and Economic Management
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ROSC	Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes
SAR	South Asia Region
SWAps	Sector Wide Approaches
TTL	Task team leader
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USD	US Dollars
WB	World Bank
WDI	World Development Indicators

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Appendix Table A1.1 PRSCs Shares in Bank Lending by Volume of Disbursement

	(US\$ m.) (FY01 - FY08)								
	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	Total
PRSC Amounts Disbursed (\$m)	0.0	294.7	643.8	709.3	1450.8	1236.3	1285.2	973.3	6593.3
PRSC Approvals by Region (\$m)									
AFR		194	335	459	951	893	737	743	4313
EAP		101	160	107	104	104	110	190	876
ECA			21	19	32	59	59	40	230
LAC				49	61	30	25		166
MNA									0
SAR			128	75	303	150	353		1009
PRSCs and Policy Based Lending									
All IDA Policy Based Loans (PBLs)(US\$m)	1,276	1,919	3,018	1,554	2,515	2,425	2,227	2,713	17,646
All Policy Based Loans (IBRD+IDA) (US\$m)	5,673	6,845	8,502	6,033	6,272	7,824	6,496	6,298	53,942
<i>PRSCs/All IDA Policy Based loans (%)</i>	0%	15%	21%	46%	58%	51%	58%	36%	37%
<i>PRSCs/ All PBLs (IBRD+IDA) (%)</i>	0%	4%	8%	12%	23%	16%	20%	15%	12%
PRSCs and All Lending									
All Loans to IDA Countries (US\$m)	5,056	5,965	6,996	6,548	8,582	8,493	8,091	8,583	58,315
All Loans to IDA/IBRD Countries (US\$m)	17,276	17,857	19,275	17,170	18,672	20,743	19,635	19,650	150,278
<i>PRSCs / (All IDA Loans) (%)</i>	0%	5%	9%	11%	17%	15%	16%	11%	11%
<i>PRSCs/ All Bank Loans (IDA+IBRD) (%)</i>	0%	2%	3%	4%	8%	6%	7%	5%	4%
<i>IDA Policy Based Loans /All IDA Loans (%)</i>	25%	32%	43%	24%	29%	29%	28%	32%	30%

Notes: Two-tranche PRSCs counted as a single operation. IDA countries includes Blend.

Source: Business Warehouse, World Bank

Appendix Table A1.2 Poverty Reduction Support Credits – Shares in Bank Lending (Numbers) (FY01-08)

	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	TOTAL	FY08%
PRSCs Approved (Nos)	2	2	7	10	17	15	19	15	87	
Regional Distribution of PRSC Approvals (Nos)										
AFR	1	1	4	5	11	11	11	10	54	62%
EAP	1		1	1	2	2	2	2	11	13%
ECA		1		1	3	2	4	3	14	16%
LAC			1	2			1		4	5%
MNA									0	0%
SAR			1	1	1		1		4	5%
<i>Supplemental PRSC credits</i>						1		1	2	
PRSCs and Policy Based Lending¹										
IDA Policy Based Loans (PBLs) (Nos) ²	15	23	24	23	31	30	35	29	210	
PBLs to All Countries (IBRD+IDA) (Nos)	30	44	45	41	53	51	57	45	366	
<i>PRSCs/All IDA Policy Based loans (%)</i>	13%	9%	29%	43%	55%	50%	54%	52%	41%	
<i>PRSCs/ All Policy Based Loans (IBRD+IDA) (%)</i>	7%	5%	16%	24%	32%	29%	33%	33%	24%	
Memo item: Number of all supplemental PBLs (Nos)	16	7	5	2	3	2	0	2	37	
PRSCs and All Lending¹										
PBLs+Other Loans All IDA Countries (Nos)	127	133	141	158	162	173	187	199	1280	
All PBLs+Other Loans (IDA+IBRD) (Nos)	218	229	240	245	277	286	298	298	2091	
<i>PRSCs / (All IDA Loans) (%)</i>	2%	2%	5%	6%	10%	9%	10%	8%	7%	
<i>PRSCs/ All Bank Loans (IDA+IBRD) (%)</i>	1%	1%	3%	4%	6%	5%	6%	5%	4%	

Notes: 1. Two-tranche PRSCs counted as a single operation. IDA countries include Blend countries.

2. Not including Supplemental operations.

Source: Business Warehouse, World Bank

Appendix Table A1.3 Poverty Reduction Support Credits By Country and Date (FY01-08)

	PRSC Name	Approval FY	Series	Country Fiscal Year	Dates of Disbursement	Volumes of PRSC IDA Disbursements ² (US\$ mil.)	Volume of Total IDA Disbursements in Country (US\$ mil.)	PRSC Disbursements as share of Total IDA Disb. in PRSC FY
1	Albania PRSC 1	2002	1	Jan-Dec	08/31/2002	21.2	75.6	28.0%
2	Albania PRSC 2	2004	1	Jan-Dec	12/31/2003	19.0	63.5	29.9%
3	Albania PRSC 3	2005	1	Jan-Dec	12/31/2004	10.6	66.4	16.0%
4	Armenia PRSC 1	2005	1	Jan-Dec	12/31/2004	21.2	75.1	28.2%
5	Armenia PRSC 2	2006	1	Jan-Dec	04/30/2006	20.3	55.0	36.9%
6	Armenia PRSC 3	2007	1	Jan-Dec	04/30/2007	28.6	85.1	33.6%
7	Armenia PRSC 4	2008	1	Jan-Dec	03/31/2008	19.7	82.0	24.0%
8	Azerbaijan PRSC 1	2005	1	Jan-Dec	03/31/2006	18.8	57.1	32.9%
9	Benin PRSC 1	2004	1	Jan-Dec	08/31/2004	19.7	43.8	45.0%
10	Benin PRSC 2	2005	1	Jan-Dec	12/31/2005	28.3	51.3	55.2%
11	Benin PRSC 3	2007	1	Jan-Dec	01/31/2007	30.2	59.9	50.4%
12	Benin PRSC 4	2007	2	Jan-Dec	04/30/2008	43.1	88.1	49.0%
(1) ⁴	Benin PRSC 5	2009	2	Jan-Dec				
13	Burkina Faso PRSC 1	2002	1	Jan-Dec	10/31/2001	46.4	76.1	60.9%
14	Burkina Faso PRSC 2	2003	1	Jan-Dec	11/30/2002	37.3	74.5	50.0%
15	Burkina Faso PRSC 3	2004	1	Jan-Dec	10/31/2003	50.6	127.5	39.7%
16	Burkina Faso PRSC 4	2004	2	Jan-Dec	07/31/2004	60.2	119.2	50.5%
17	Burkina Faso PRSC 5	2005	2	Jan-Dec	09/30/2005	58.2	143.7	40.5%
18	Burkina Faso PRSC 6	2006	2	Jan-Dec	09/30/2006	62.1	150.8	41.2%
19	Burkina Faso PRSC 7	2008	3	Jan-Dec	09/30/2007	91.6	173.0	52.9%
(2)	Burkina Faso PRSC 8	2009	3	Jan-Dec				
20	Cape Verde PRSC 1	2005	1	Jan-Dec	05/31/2005	14.5	29.8	48.6%
21	Cape Verde PRSC 2	2006	1	Jan-Dec	07/31/2006	10.3	24.5	42.1%
22	Cape Verde PRSC 3	2007	1	Jan-Dec	07/31/2007	10.4	19.5	53.2%
(3)	Cape Verde PRSC 4	2009	<i>Transitory</i>	Jan-Dec	10/30/2008	(9.5)	(14.4)	(66.0%)
23	Ethiopia PRSC 1	2004	1	8 July - 7 July	03/31/2004	123.3	422.0	29.2%
24	Ethiopia PRSC 2	2005	1	8 July - 7 July	12/31/2004	137.0	373.3	36.7%
25	Georgia PRSO 1 ¹	2006	1	Jan-Dec	11/30/2005	19.7	75.4	26.1%
26	Georgia PRSO 2	2007	1	Jan-Dec	12/31/2006	20.4	70.5	28.9%
27	Georgia PRSO 3	2007	1	Jan-Dec	07/31/2007	20.2	96.0	21.1%
28	Georgia PRSO 4	2008	1	Jan-Dec	08/31/2008	(21.8)	(40.8)	(53.5%)
	Georgia PRSO 4 - Suppl. Fin.		1		12/2/2008	(37.9)	(40.8)	(93.0%)
29	Ghana PRSC 1	2003	1	Jan-Dec	06/30/2003	128.2	228.9	56.0%
30	Ghana PRSC 2	2005	1	Jan-Dec	07/31/2004	127.5	321.5	39.7%
31	Ghana PRSC 3	2006	1	Jan-Dec	08/31/2005	123.4	435.6	28.3%
32	Ghana PRSC 4	2006	2	Jan-Dec	06/30/2006	143.1	435.6	32.9%
33	Ghana PRSC 5	2007	2	Jan-Dec	06/30/2007	110.1	225.9	48.7%
34	Ghana PRSC 6	2008	2	Jan-Dec	06/30/2008	98.1	222.4	44.1%
(4)	Ghana PRSC 7	2009	2	Jan-Dec				
35	Guyana PRSC 1	2003	1	Jan-Dec	12/31/2003	13.4	20.9	63.8%
36	Honduras PRSC 1	2004	1	Jan-Dec	11/30/2004	61.2	209.2	29.3%
37	Lao PDR PRSC 1	2005	1	Oct - Sept	09/30/2005	9.7	36.3	26.7%
38	Lao PDR PRSO 2	2006	1	Oct - Sept	09/30/2006	8.3	53.4	15.5%
39	Lao PDR PRSO 3	2007	1	Oct - Sept	1/30/2008	10.6	50.7	20.9%
40	Lao PDR PRSO 4	2008	2	Jan-Dec	08/31/2008	(9.6)	(18.1)	(53.4%)
(5)	Lao PDR PRSO 5 ¹	2009	2	Jan-Dec				
41	Lesotho PRSC 1	2008	1	1 April - 31 March	8/22/2008	(8.1)	(12.6)	(11.2%)
42	Madagascar PRSC 1	2005	1	Jan-Dec	08/31/2004	125.1	324.3	38.6%
43	Madagascar PRSC 2	2006	1	Jan-Dec	08/31/2005	79.2	212.9	37.2%
44	Madagascar PRSC 3	2007	1	Jan-Dec	08/31/2006	40.1	183.3	21.9%
45	Madagascar PRSC 4	2008	2	Jan-Dec	09/30/2007	40.9	224.0	18.2%
46	Madagascar PRSC 5	2008	2	Jan-Dec	08/31/2008	(48.5)	(103.9)	(46.7%)
(6)	Madagascar PRSC 6	2009	2	Jan-Dec				
47	Malawi PRSC 1	2008	1	July - June	12/31/2007	20.8	79.5	26.1%
(7)	Malawi PRSC 2	2009	1	July - June				

Appendix Table A1.3 Poverty Reduction Support Credits By Country and Date (FY01-08)

(p2 of 2)

	PRSC Name	Approval FY	Series	Country Fiscal Year	Dates of Disbursement	Volumes of PRSC IDA Disbursements ² (US\$ mil.)	Volume of Total IDA Disbursements in Country (US\$ mil.)	PRSC Disbursements as share of Total IDA Disb. in PRSC FY
48	Mali PRSC 1	2007	1	Jan-Dec	08/31/2007	45.9	178.6	25.7%
49	Mali PRSC 2	2008	1	Jan-Dec	06/30/2008	42.6	178.6	23.8%
(8)	Mali PRSC 3	2009	1	Jan-Dec				
50	Moldova PRSC 1	2007	1	Jan-Dec	04/30/2007	10.3	42.8	24.0%
51	Moldova PRSC 2	2008	1	Jan-Dec	08/31/2008	(9.8)	(18.9)	(52.1%)
(9)	Moldova PRSC 3	2009	1	Jan-Dec				
52	Mozambique PRSC 1	2005	1	Jan-Dec	09/30/2004	60.0	223.0	26.9%
53	Mozambique PRSC 2 - 1st	2006	1	Jan-Dec	10/31/2005	60.0	307.5	19.5%
	Mozambique PRSC 2 - 2nd				03/31/2006	60.0	307.5	19.5%
54	Mozambique PRSC 3	2007	2	Jan-Dec	02/28/2007	69.7	263.7	26.5%
55	Mozambique PRSC 4	2008	2	Jan-Dec	03/31/2008	61.8	206.0	30.0%
(10)	Mozambique PRSC 5	2009	2	Jan-Dec				
56	Nepal PRSC 1	2004	1	16 July - 15 July	12/31/2003	74.9	100.9	74.3%
57	Nicaragua PRSC 1 - 1st	2004	1	Jan-Dec	03/31/2004	36.0	141.6	25.4%
	Nicaragua PRSC 1 - 2nd Tranche				03/31/2006	30.3	77.5	39.1%
58	Nicaragua PRSC 2	2007	1	Jan-Dec	01/31/2007	25.2	54.7	46.0%
59	Pakistan PRSC 1	2005	1	Jan-Dec	09/30/2004	303.4	984.4	30.8%
	Pakistan PRSC 1 - Suppl. Fin.				10/31/2005	149.9	1,211.8	12.4%
60	Pakistan PRSC 2	2007	1	Jan-Dec	05/31/2007	352.9	1,189.3	29.7%
61	Rwanda PRSC 1	2005	1	Jan-Dec	12/31/2004	69.2	138.1	50.1%
62	Rwanda PRSC 2	2006	1	Jan-Dec	12/31/2005	53.8	101.3	53.1%
63	Rwanda PRSG 3	2007	1	Jan-Dec	05/31/2007	51.5	107.1	48.1%
64	Rwanda PRSG 4	2008	2	Jan-Dec	03/31/2008	72.4	139.9	51.8%
(11)	Rwanda PRSG 5	2009	2	Jan-Dec				
65	Senegal PRSC 1	2005	1	Jan-Dec	01/31/2005	31.3	217.7	14.4%
66	Senegal PRSC 2	2006	1	Jan-Dec	09/30/2006	30.8	151.8	20.3%
67	Senegal PRSC 3	2007	1	Jan-Dec	08/31/2007	20.7	96.6	21.4%
68	Sri Lanka PRSC 1	2003	1	Jan-Dec	06/30/2003	127.5	202.3	63.1%
69	Tanzania PRSC 1	2003	1	Jul - Jun	08/31/2003	132.6	336.9	39.3%
70	Tanzania PRSC 2	2005	1	Jul - Jun	09/30/2004	150.5	459.8	32.7%
71	Tanzania PRSC 3	2006	1	Jul - Jun	11/30/2005	149.6	339.3	44.1%
72	Tanzania PRSC 4	2006	2	Jul - Jun	07/31/2006	206.4	415.6	49.7%
73	Tanzania PRSC 5	2007	2	Jul - Jun	09/30/2007	195.2	505.3	38.6%
(12)	Tanzania PRSC 6	2009	2	Jul - Jun	11/30/2008	(150.3)	(267.7)	(56.2%)
(13)	Tanzania PRSC 7	2009	2	Jul - Jun				
74	Uganda PRSC 1	2001	1	Jul - Jun	12/31/2001	147.7	167.1	88.4%
75	Uganda PRSC 2	2003	1	Jul - Jun	05/31/2003	168.7	256.2	65.8%
76	Uganda PRSC 3	2004	1	Jul - Jun	05/31/2004	152.9	353.6	43.2%
77	Uganda PRSC 4	2005	1	Jul - Jun	04/30/2005	155.3	291.0	53.4%
78	Uganda PRSC 5	2006	2	Jul - Jun	06/30/2006	137.0	315.5	43.4%
79	Uganda PRSC 6	2007	2	Jul - Jun	06/30/2007	126.1	296.4	42.6%
80	Uganda PRSC 7	2008	2	Jul - Jun				
(14)	Uganda PRSC 8	2010	3	Jul - Jun				
81	Vietnam PRSC 1 - 1st Tranche	2001	1	Jan-Dec	10/31/2001	100.6	331.5	30.4%
	Vietnam PRSC 1 - 2nd Tranche				01/31/2003	160.2	457.9	35.0%
82	Vietnam PRSC 2	2003	1	Jan-Dec	12/31/2003	106.7	426.8	25.0%
83	Vietnam PRSC 3	2004	1	Jan-Dec	10/31/2004	103.6	407.9	25.4%
84	Vietnam PRSC 4	2005	1	Jan-Dec	12/31/2005	94.8	418.9	22.6%
85	Vietnam PRSC 5	2006	1	Jan-Dec	01/31/2007	102.2	489.9	20.9%
86	Vietnam PRSC 6	2007	2	Jan-Dec	12/31/2007	179.4	649.2	27.6%
87	Vietnam PRSC 7	2008	2	Jan-Dec	10/24/2008	(141.4)	(330.0)	(42.8%)
(15)	Vietnam PRSC 8	2009	2	Jan-Dec				
(16)	Zambia PRSC 1	2009	1	Jan-Dec				
	Total Disbursements (FY01-FY08)					6,592	19,585	33.7%

2. Operations shaded in grey are in the pipeline for FY09 or FY10 and dates and figures should be considered indicative. Figures in parentheses reflect i Sources: Business Warehouse/Client Connection, World Bank

Appendix Table A1.4 PRSCs in Proportion to Country Income, Budget and Aid Flows (CY99 to CY08)

	CY95	CY96	CY97	CY98	CY99	CY00	CY01	CY02	CY03	CY04	CY05	CY06	CY07	CY08
Albania														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	660.0	900.0	800.0	890.0	980.0	1,170.0	1,330.0	1,390.0	1,650.0	2,080.0	2,570.0	2,940.0	3,290.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	2,482.8	3,085.0	2,246.6	2,788.1	3,495.5	3,790.5	4,236.6	4,577.0	5,820.8	7,648.4	8,540.8	9,311.0	10,889.7	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.) ¹	805.4	784.6	688.5	941.4	1,199.2	1,176.5	1,293.0	1,395.9	1,640.6	2,183.6	2,349.1	2,592.1	3,296.3	3,690.3
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	180.2	226.5	165.8	268.5	487.7	317.5	268.5	308.0	348.8	299.1	313.9	320.7	305.2	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											3.7		13.0	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.) ²	43.3	32.3	18.9	63.7	80.6	64.4	34.3	79.3	60.9	66.9	33.7	45.8	53.9	38.8
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)								21.2	19.0	10.6				
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	12.5	13.6	0.1	36.9	49.2	24.2		7.9		9.2			10.7	
ODA/GNI	7.3%	7.3%	7.4%	9.6%	14.0%	8.4%	6.3%	6.7%	6.0%	3.9%	3.7%	3.4%	2.8%	
PRSC/ODA								6.9%	5.4%	3.6%				
PRSC/World Bank Disb.								26.7%	31.1%	15.9%				
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures								1.5%	1.2%	0.5%				
PRSC/GBS											0.0%		0.0%	
Armenia														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	450.0	520.0	560.0	590.0	610.0	660.0	710.0	800.0	950.0	1,160.0	1,500.0	1,960.0	2,640.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	1,466.5	1,641.7	1,738.1	1,954.1	1,900.4	1,964.5	2,182.0	2,464.4	2,901.6	3,684.0	5,033.0	6,601.9	9,476.0	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	371.0	416.2	418.6	407.0	453.4	413.1	440.3	460.3	540.0	626.0	912.2	1,156.6	2,095.4	2,963.3
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	217.6	292.2	166.1	194.2	209.2	215.9	211.7	293.5	248.7	253.8	171.7	213.4	351.6	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)							56.6	4.5	46.8	19.3	6.3	34.1	32.4	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	91.8	92.5	77.4	42.3	66.2	54.4	55.0	66.5	77.4	78.5	34.3	64.0	93.0	80.0
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)										21.2		20.3	28.6	19.7
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	64.3	121.4	59.9	14.7	23.4	25.2	14.4	35.1	42.8					
ODA/GNI	14.8%	17.8%	9.6%	9.9%	11.0%	11.0%	9.7%	11.9%	8.6%	6.9%	3.4%	3.2%	3.7%	
PRSC/ODA										8.3%		9.5%	8.1%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.										27.0%		31.8%	30.7%	24.6%
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures										3.4%		1.8%	1.4%	0.7%
PRSC/GBS										100.0%		59.5%	88.0%	
Azerbaijan														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	400.0	400.0	450.0	510.0	570.0	610.0	660.0	720.0	820.0	950.0	1,270.0	1,890.0	2,550.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	3,038.9	3,114.5	3,953.3	4,433.1	4,536.3	4,987.4	5,371.5	5,851.3	6,833.8	7,979.9	11,598.9	18,301.7	26,169.0	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	542.8	646.7	823.2	1,055.2	1,079.2	1,098.3	1,065.1	1,725.7	2,075.1	2,245.4	3,002.8	5,747.9	8,572.6	14,097.8
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	118.6	96.1	184.1	120.2	169.4	139.1	229.2	349.3	300.6	175.9	211.7	205.6	225.3	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	30.2	35.8	55.4	20.8	60.5	27.2	27.6	56.9	74.7	49.2	47.5	65.3	73.7	106.2
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)												18.8		
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	30.2	61.4	35.0		42.5				30.3	34.4				
ODA/GNI	3.9%	3.1%	4.7%	2.7%	3.7%	2.8%	4.3%	6.0%	4.4%	2.2%	1.8%	1.1%	0.9%	
PRSC/ODA												9.1%		
PRSC/World Bank Disb.												28.7%		
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures												0.3%		
Benin														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	310.0	310.0	340.0	340.0	330.0	340.0	320.0	330.0	370.0	450.0	510.0	530.0	570.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	1,965.0	2,162.0	2,126.9	2,321.2	2,371.8	2,242.6	2,350.5	2,781.3	3,515.5	4,005.7	4,258.7	4,623.4	5,427.6	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	444.5	430.8	401.7	381.3	419.3	452.8	481.8	548.3	733.6	813.0	971.0	641.3		
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	280.1	287.8	220.7	205.2	211.0	240.8	278.1	220.7	301.0	391.2	348.0	375.0	469.9	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											90.6		138.9	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	30.6	40.5	18.8	19.9	48.0	36.2	47.9	22.9	27.5	41.7	49.2	31.9	61.7	91.5
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)										19.7	28.3		30.2	43.1
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)		19.0			18.2		10.0		10.4					
ODA/GNI	14.3%	13.3%	10.4%	8.8%	8.9%	10.7%	11.8%	7.9%	8.6%	9.8%	8.2%	8.1%	8.7%	
PRSC/ODA										5.0%	8.1%		6.4%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.										47.2%	57.5%		49.0%	47.1%
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures										2.4%	2.9%			
PRSC/GBS										29.4%	40.4%		32.4%	

Appendix Table A1.4 PRSC Countries: PRSCs in Proportion to Country Income, Budget and Aid Flows (CY99 to CY08)

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	CY95	CY96	CY97	CY98	CY99	CY00	CY01	CY02	CY03	CY04	CY05	CY06	CY07	CY08
Burkina Faso														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	230.0	240.0	250.0	240.0	250.0	240.0	240.0	240.0	280.0	340.0	400.0	420.0	430.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	2,369.5	2,593.5	2,445.5	2,802.1	3,009.4	2,606.0	2,806.6	3,287.8	4,269.0	5,102.3	5,410.8	5,756.5	6,720.0	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	496.0	541.2	553.9	616.5	714.2	594.6	624.0	700.0	874.9	1,093.7	1,217.1	1,431.9	1,712.3	1,852.6
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	490.0	418.7	368.2	399.9	398.2	337.8	393.6	476.9	521.7	642.6	696.0	869.7	930.4	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											167.8		268.7	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	84.7	50.4	34.9	58.1	63.4	37.6	71.4	67.8	108.5	132.9	124.6	151.1	163.0	174.3
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)							46.4	37.3	50.6	60.2	58.2	62.1	91.6	
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	43.2	43.2		15.5	24.7									
ODA/GNI	20.7%	16.1%	15.1%	14.3%	13.2%	13.0%	14.0%	14.5%	12.2%	12.6%	12.9%	15.1%	13.8%	
PRSC/ODA							11.8%	7.8%	9.7%	9.4%	8.4%	7.1%	9.8%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.							64.9%	55.0%	46.7%	45.3%	46.8%	41.1%	56.2%	
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures							7.4%	5.3%	5.8%	5.5%	4.8%	4.3%	5.3%	
PRSC/GBS							56.4%	34.2%	35.2%	36.5%	34.7%		34.1%	
Cape Verde														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	1,150.0	1,220.0	1,240.0	1,240.0	1,290.0	1,280.0	1,240.0	1,210.0	1,400.0	1,630.0	1,920.0	2,190.0	2,430.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	485.3	495.4	498.3	534.0	575.1	520.0	544.1	604.6	781.0	907.0	972.3	1,136.7	1,385.2	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	253.6	215.3	204.4	197.6	239.8	248.2	164.6	210.5	246.7	363.5	411.4	457.9	479.0	
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	115.7	116.5	110.8	129.6	135.8	93.9	77.2	91.7	143.3	143.2	162.0	138.4	163.4	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											14.6		32.5	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	6.0	7.6	8.3	22.7	24.1	10.4	16.0	22.0	19.0	13.8	27.2	22.1	22.7	20.8
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)											14.5	10.3	10.4	
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)				14.6	15.0		7.0	8.1	4.3					
ODA/GNI	23.8%	23.5%	22.2%	24.3%	23.6%	18.1%	14.2%	15.2%	18.3%	15.8%	16.7%	12.2%	11.8%	
PRSC/ODA											8.9%	7.4%	6.3%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.											53.2%	46.7%	45.6%	
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures											3.5%	2.3%	2.2%	
PRSC/GBS											99.1%		31.9%	
Ethiopia														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	150.0	150.0	150.0	130.0	130.0	130.0	130.0	120.0	110.0	140.0	160.0	190.0	220.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	7,545.4	8,439.4	8,793.8	8,003.1	7,774.8	8,119.4	8,117.4	7,751.3	8,492.0	9,990.4	12,269.0	15,127.5	19,407.8	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	1,359.5	1,604.9	1,492.7	1,531.6	1,848.0	2,110.2	1,967.3	2,030.5	2,393.9	2,374.9	2,861.2	3,372.7	4,030.4	5,171.5
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	876.5	816.0	578.3	660.2	643.1	686.1	1,095.7	1,302.7	1,599.5	1,808.9	1,915.6	1,947.8	2,422.5	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											355.8		0.0	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	83.7	141.6	64.8	69.1	156.3	136.6	455.3	464.5	251.3	484.5	234.1	347.1	324.1	549.3
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)										260.3				
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	30.1	105.6					144.7	127.4						
ODA/GNI	11.6%	9.7%	6.6%	8.2%	8.3%	8.5%	13.5%	16.8%	18.8%	18.1%	15.6%	12.9%	12.5%	
PRSC/ODA										14.4%				
PRSC/World Bank Disb.										53.7%				
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures										11.0%				
PRSC/GBS											0.0%		0.0%	
Georgia														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	510.0	610.0	730.0	770.0	730.0	700.0	680.0	730.0	860.0	1,050.0	1,330.0	1,670.0	2,120.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	2,574.2	3,023.8	3,638.0	3,805.2	2,945.3	3,174.8	3,252.0	3,429.1	4,022.7	5,220.0	6,506.5	7,922.7	10,399.7	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	332.3	605.3	825.1	779.3	630.4	564.5	580.8	598.2	699.0	1,061.9	1,664.9	2,316.0	3,459.0	4,693.3
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	209.1	309.4	241.9	208.7	244.6	169.4	291.6	312.5	225.6	314.5	295.2	360.0	382.2	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	85.1	76.3	64.2	52.8	78.8	18.1	63.1	61.3	43.5	64.8	60.9	79.7	76.2	123.4
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)											19.7	20.4	20.2	21.8
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	75.4	137.0	40.6	0.1	53.1		29.8	19.5		24.4				
ODA/GNI	8.1%	10.2%	6.6%	5.5%	8.3%	5.3%	9.0%	9.1%	5.6%	6.0%	4.5%	4.5%	3.7%	
PRSC/ODA											6.7%	5.7%	5.3%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.											32.3%	25.6%	26.5%	17.7%
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures											1.2%	0.9%	0.6%	0.5%

Appendix Table A1.4 PRSC Countries: PRSCs in Proportion to Country Income, Budget and Aid Flows (CY99 to CY08)

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	CY95	CY96	CY97	CY98	CY99	CY00	CY01	CY02	CY03	CY04	CY05	CY06	CY07	CY08
Ghana														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	350.0	360.0	370.0	370.0	370.0	320.0	280.0	260.0	300.0	370.0	440.0	510.0	590.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	6324.5	6782.0	6750.4	7322.3	7546.1	4830.7	5201.2	6030.3	7459.4	8673.9	10533.2	12595.6	15162.9	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	1965.5	2058.5	1994.1	2138.2	2018.9	1379.3	1736.4	1607.6	2207.8	2952.3	3295.1	4268.6	5158.1	5595.0
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	648.4	649.8	494.0	702.1	609.5	599.7	640.5	657.8	968.2	1403.4	1146.1	1175.6	1150.9	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											295.8		377.6	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)									278.0	311.0	282.0	309.0		
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	242.1	243.8	237.0	261.3	218.5	203.9	192.9	99.0	245.1	295.3	324.8	270.0	233.9	256.0
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)									128.2	127.5	123.4	143.1	110.1	98.1
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	66.1	90.9	34.0	74.0	80.0	96.0	113.5	0.5						44.7
ODA/GNI	10.3%	9.6%	7.3%	9.6%	8.1%	12.4%	12.3%	10.9%	13.0%	16.2%	10.9%	9.3%	7.6%	
PRSC/ODA									13.2%	9.1%	10.8%	12.2%	9.6%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.									52.3%	43.2%	38.0%	53.0%	47.1%	38.3%
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures									5.8%	4.3%	3.7%	3.4%	2.1%	1.8%
PRSC/GBS									46.1%	41.0%	43.8%	46.3%	29.1%	
									13%	11%	9%	7%	7%	
Guyana														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	720.0	850.0	910.0	880.0	900.0	890.0	880.0	890.0	920.0	940.0	1,080.0	1,160.0	1,300.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	567.2	650.4	673.0	647.8	638.1	660.6	637.1	667.2	691.2	675.8	787.3	862.8	998.7	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	242.4	279.3	319.1	280.7	248.0	316.2	329.1	326.0	332.6	366.5	459.3	531.1		
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	85.7	141.8	264.6	92.9	87.2	115.8	112.1	71.8	95.9	147.8	149.7	172.9	124.0	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	17.7	16.2	17.9	9.3	6.7	6.3	7.2	5.8	20.2	6.8	2.3	12.6	2.6	5.7
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)									13.4					
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	7.8	15.7	8.1									9.8		
ODA/GNI	15.1%	21.8%	39.3%	14.3%	13.7%	17.5%	17.6%	10.8%	13.9%	21.9%	19.0%	20.0%	12.4%	
PRSC/ODA									13.9%					
PRSC/World Bank Disb.									66.2%					
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures									4.0%					
Honduras														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	640.0	670.0	720.0	750.0	790.0	940.0	1,020.0	1,130.0	1,200.0	1,300.0	1,400.0	1,470.0	1,600.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	3,648.6	3,775.6	4,450.7	4,993.1	5,209.0	6,950.6	7,200.6	7,395.3	7,756.2	8,331.3	9,211.0	10,236.0	11,680.5	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	776.2	793.7	918.0	1,061.0	1,298.1	1,442.3	1,600.8	1,608.5	1,770.1	1,768.0	1,946.2	2,097.9	2,728.2	3,714.5
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	402.4	356.0	296.4	316.4	816.2	449.0	676.6	475.4	390.6	653.9	691.2	587.2	464.2	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											82.6		18.4	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	84.6	51.8	95.0	67.9	273.0	38.2	97.9	88.2	44.5	125.0	151.3	57.6	45.6	51.1
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)										61.2				
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	46.4	62.7	62.1	30.5	7.2		32.7				67.5	11.6		13.1
ODA/GNI	11.0%	9.4%	6.7%	6.3%	15.7%	6.5%	9.4%	6.4%	5.0%	7.8%	7.5%	5.7%	4.0%	
PRSC/ODA										9.4%				
PRSC/World Bank Disb.										49.0%				
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures										3.5%				
PRSC/GBS											0.0%		0.0%	
Lao PDR														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	360.0	390.0	380.0	310.0	290.0	290.0	310.0	330.0	350.0	420.0	450.0	500.0	580.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	1,757.5	1,866.7	1,704.6	1,243.2	1,431.6	1,662.6	1,685.1	1,765.5	2,025.3	2,409.5	2,613.1	2,998.7	3,637.5	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	360.2	391.6	352.6	267.8	254.7	349.6	356.8	304.8	370.5	329.3	449.2	561.9	668.8	
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	306.9	331.0	329.1	276.2	295.5	281.6	245.5	278.0	301.2	269.8	295.8	364.1	396.4	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)													4.25	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	27.7	59.6	41.8	25.2	20.6	20.2	30.8	32.7	48.4	37.1	51.6	49.4	42.4	52.7
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)											9.7	8.3		9.6
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)		19.6							7.0	12.3				
ODA/GNI	17.5%	17.7%	19.3%	22.2%	20.6%	16.9%	14.6%	15.7%	14.9%	11.2%	11.3%	12.1%	10.9%	
PRSC/ODA											3.3%	2.3%		
PRSC/World Bank Disb.											18.8%	16.8%		18.3%
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures											2.2%	1.5%		
PRSC/GBS														0.0%

Appendix Table A1.4 PRSC Countries: PRSCs in Proportion to Country Income, Budget and Aid Flows (CY99 to CY08)

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	CY95	CY96	CY97	CY98	CY99	CY00	CY01	CY02	CY03	CY04	CY05	CY06	CY07	CY08
Lesotho														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	770.0	770.0	780.0	650.0	620.0	590.0	540.0	490.0	530.0	660.0	840.0	980.0	1,000.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	1,319.9	1,263.2	1,348.7	1,133.2	1,148.5	1,072.4	927.1	848.1	1,286.9	1,620.3	1,729.1	1,873.8	1,957.1	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	444.4	455.6	492.6	436.8	513.9	431.1	339.1	330.0	471.1	576.4	655.0	690.0	807.1	964.9
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	112.7	103.2	91.6	61.2	31.0	36.7	55.0	76.3	79.3	95.6	69.1	72.1	129.5	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	19.9	18.9	19.7	17.7	10.2	17.7	15.9	25.6	18.2	15.9	13.4	11.8	16.8	26.4
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)														
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)														
ODA/GNI	8.5%	8.2%	6.8%	5.4%	2.7%	3.4%	5.9%	9.0%	6.2%	5.9%	4.0%	3.8%	6.6%	
PRSC/ODA														
PRSC/World Bank Disb.														
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures														
Madagascar														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	230.0	240.0	240.0	250.0	240.0	240.0	250.0	220.0	280.0	290.0	290.0	280.0	320.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	3,001.7	3,837.1	3,454.2	3,664.7	3,675.4	3,807.1	4,470.0	4,325.9	5,394.2	4,284.6	4,961.7	5,419.1	7,244.2	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	529.4	858.8	616.2	745.4	662.1	702.1	832.6	665.9	1,055.5	1,099.1	1,075.4	1,181.5	1,371.3	2,088.2
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	299.4	354.7	833.1	481.0	358.5	321.7	367.0	371.3	543.0	1249.6	913.9	749.9	892.0	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)													98.8	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	76.0	77.5	130.3	77.7	83.3	93.9	96.8	163.4	194.6	317.7	224.8	183.7	207.5	216.0
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)										125.1	79.2	40.1	40.9	48.5
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)			68.0			35.6	29.4	80.3						
ODA/GNI	10.0%	9.2%	24.1%	13.1%	9.8%	8.4%	8.2%	8.6%	10.1%	29.2%	18.4%	13.8%	12.3%	
PRSC/ODA										10.0%	8.7%	5.4%	4.6%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.										39.4%	35.2%	21.9%	19.7%	22.5%
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures										11.4%	7.4%	3.4%	3.0%	2.3%
PRSC/GBS													41.4%	
Malawi														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	160.0	170.0	200.0	200.0	170.0	150.0	140.0	150.0	180.0	220.0	220.0	230.0	250.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	1,350.1	2,242.0	2,622.1	1,709.1	1,734.2	1,707.2	1,683.4	2,621.3	2,384.5	2,582.1	2,813.4	3,125.3	3,528.4	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	443.2	567.8	612.3	512.7	526.8	539.4	562.1	679.5	691.8	835.7	722.5	663.8	866.6	816.0
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	434.1	491.5	343.9	434.6	446.8	446.2	406.0	376.4	515.2	503.7	580.7	683.8	734.7	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											113.4		84.6	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	73.3	141.3	106.7	130.7	88.2	97.0	107.7	51.2	75.4	74.8	115.7	75.7	77.4	52.5
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)													20.8	
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	27.6	104.8	31.7	61.8	3.0	30.4	55.9	0.5		24.6		24.5		
ODA/GNI	32.2%	21.9%	13.1%	25.4%	25.8%	26.1%	24.1%	14.4%	21.6%	19.5%	20.6%	21.9%	20.8%	
PRSC/ODA													2.8%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.													26.8%	
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures													2.4%	
PRSC/GBS										0.0%			24.6%	
Mali														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	270.0	260.0	280.0	280.0	270.0	260.0	250.0	250.0	320.0	390.0	450.0	460.0	500.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	2,418.8	2,569.3	2,422.0	2,546.1	2,525.8	2,392.4	2,463.7	3,102.6	4,202.6	4,679.2	5,098.7	5,523.7	6,591.3	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	579.8	615.2	584.5	648.5	672.1	539.8	624.4	731.0	914.7	1,103.8	1,265.3	1,327.1	1,668.4	1,731.6
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	539.8	489.7	428.9	347.4	354.5	359.9	357.7	474.8	554.3	581.5	704.3	825.0	1,017.2	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											124.0		211.5	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	85.5	84.2	74.9	47.9	56.9	49.3	70.5	91.0	110.8	76.5	117.5	108.8	143.3	108.2
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)													45.9	42.6
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	41.3	87.3	27.9	1.1	9.8	8.9	25.0	45.9	42.6	0.0	24.6	25.6		
ODA/GNI	22.3%	19.1%	17.7%	13.6%	14.0%	15.0%	14.5%	15.3%	13.2%	12.4%	13.8%	14.9%	15.4%	
PRSC/ODA													4.5%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.													32.0%	39.3%
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures													2.8%	2.5%
PRSC/GBS										0.0%			21.7%	

Appendix Table A1.4 PRSC Countries: PRSCs in Proportion to Country Income, Budget and Aid Flows (CY99 to CY08)

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	CY95	CY96	CY97	CY98	CY99	CY00	CY01	CY02	CY03	CY04	CY05	CY06	CY07	CY08
Moldova														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	480.0	490.0	500.0	460.0	400.0	370.0	400.0	460.0	570.0	720.0	940.0	1,080.0	1,260.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	1,724.0	1,750.3	1,977.5	1,674.0	1,195.4	1,310.0	1,576.5	1,771.5	2,215.0	2,934.8	3,347.0	3,809.1	5,030.7	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	666.4	743.0	945.9	747.9	426.7	444.8	435.6	524.1	659.9	899.7	1,107.1	1,368.8	1,846.6	2,666.8
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)			65.3	39.6	107.2	122.6	119.1	141.7	117.9	119.5	170.1	224.0	269.2	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											22.1		55.9	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	50.2	0.0	40.4	30.1	74.1	36.1	18.3	26.2	18.2	20.0	24.8	26.5	45.0	29.9
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)													10.3	9.8
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	50.2	50.2	35.0		55.3	19.2	5.1	10.6						
ODA/GNI	0.0%	0.0%	3.3%	2.4%	9.0%	9.4%	7.6%	8.0%	5.3%	4.1%	5.1%	5.9%	5.4%	
PRSC/ODA													3.8%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.													22.8%	32.9%
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures													0.6%	0.4%
PRSC/GBS											0.0%		18.4%	
Mozambique														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	130.0	160.0	180.0	220.0	240.0	230.0	230.0	230.0	230.0	260.0	290.0	310.0	320.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	2,068.6	3,010.8	3,572.7	4,029.3	4,240.0	4,017.5	3,770.6	4,028.3	4,468.5	5,358.0	6,095.1	6,141.2	6,748.7	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	580.1	599.7	824.7	855.8	1,009.9	991.5	1,187.0	1,227.7	1,169.7	1,444.0	1,506.2	1,943.2	2,276.8	3,303.1
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	1,062.4	885.7	948.1	1,040.2	818.8	905.8	962.5	2,217.9	1,048.8	1,243.4	1,289.9	1,604.7	1,776.7	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)										192.1	288.7	360.6	382.9	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	160.1	220.9	148.1	131.2	79.5	97.5	51.6	297.6	160.1	197.0	241.8	247.9	246.6	276.3
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)										60.0	60.0	60.0	69.7	61.8
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	66.2	180.7	47.8	46.5				212.4	70.7					
ODA/GNI	51.4%	29.4%	26.5%	25.8%	19.3%	22.5%	25.5%	55.1%	23.5%	23.2%	21.2%	26.1%	26.3%	
PRSC/ODA										4.8%	4.7%	3.7%	3.9%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.										30.5%	24.8%	24.2%	28.3%	22.4%
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures										4.2%	4.0%	3.1%	3.1%	1.9%
PRSC/GBS										25.1%	21.3%	16.6%	18.2%	
Nepal														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	200.0	210.0	220.0	210.0	210.0	220.0	230.0	230.0	250.0	270.0	300.0	320.0	340.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	4,406.6	4,529.4	4,926.4	4,863.1	5,045.6	5,514.3	6,030.2	6,042.9	6,321.8	7,251.1	8,202.7	9,007.0	10,270.2	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	784.3	845.5	726.3	810.4	777.2	852.8	990.3	954.1	936.6	1,042.3	1,240.9	1,304.3	1,614.8	2,074.2
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	428.6	388.4	401.9	400.8	350.0	387.3	391.8	361.1	462.9	425.1	422.9	511.8	598.4	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)													66.3	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	81.5	61.8	54.5	62.5	49.5	48.7	43.2	34.0	101.6	72.5	46.2	65.0	78.0	101.9
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)									74.9					
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)														
ODA/GNI	9.7%	8.6%	8.2%	8.2%	6.9%	7.0%	6.5%	6.0%	7.3%	5.9%	5.2%	5.7%	5.8%	
PRSC/ODA										16.2%				
PRSC/World Bank Disb.									73.7%					
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures									8.0%					
PRSC/GBS													0.0%	
Nicaragua														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	520.0	660.0	660.0	670.0	700.0	730.0	730.0	730.0	760.0	820.0	890.0	930.0	980.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	2,820.6	2,996.2	3,118.7	3,387.2	3,545.6	3,734.5	3,862.4	3,826.0	3,911.3	4,264.2	4,727.6	5,176.4	5,537.6	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	648.4	656.2	670.6	665.0	877.4	939.2	1,078.7	857.8	926.5	1,016.0	1,131.2	1,203.3	1,291.4	1,554.5
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	649.1	930.9	411.4	602.6	672.7	561.2	931.2	517.9	835.9	1,241.5	763.1	731.7	833.7	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											93.3		139.7	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	18.1	68.8	50.5	104.7	120.3	87.3	62.6	71.7	112.3	63.1	61.2	61.2	53.2	28.3
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)										36.0			25.2	
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)		42.8		54.7		16.1			16.2					
ODA/GNI	23.0%	31.1%	13.2%	17.8%	19.0%	15.0%	24.1%	13.5%	21.4%	29.1%	16.1%	14.1%	15.1%	
PRSC/ODA										2.9%			3.0%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.										28.6%			47.3%	
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures										3.5%			1.9%	
PRSC/GBS										57.6%	0.0%		18.0%	

Appendix Table A1.4 PRSC Countries: PRSCs in Proportion to Country Income, Budget and Aid Flows (CY99 to CY08)

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	CY95	CY96	CY97	CY98	CY99	CY00	CY01	CY02	CY03	CY04	CY05	CY06	CY07	CY08
Pakistan														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	490.0	500.0	500.0	470.0	470.0	490.0	500.0	510.0	560.0	640.0	730.0	800.0	870.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	61,092.4	63,107.0	61,935.8	61,626.1	62,426.3	72,978.3	71,107.9	72,873.6	85,940.2	100,132.1	111,767.4	129,371.8	146,248.4	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	14,388.3	16,172.9	14,398.2	14,618.0	13,771.7	14,084.1	12,743.8	14,570.5	15,156.8	16,667.2	18,817.9	23,399.5	27,463.0	35,640.2
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	820.9	881.9	595.8	1,052.5	732.9	700.4	1,941.5	2,135.7	1,070.5	1,432.6	1,618.5	2,144.7	2,212.4	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	525.5	651.1	722.9	348.2	660.1	300.8	669.2	961.1	145.3	782.8	848.3	1016.1	1179.2	241.1
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)										303.4			352.9	
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	7.9	7.9	250.0		350.0		343.9	712.4		191.5	445.9	298.4	427.8	
ODA/GNI	1.3%	1.4%	1.0%	1.7%	1.2%	1.0%	2.7%	2.9%	1.2%	1.4%	1.4%	1.7%	1.5%	
PRSC/ODA										21.2%			16.0%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.										38.8%			29.9%	
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures										1.8%			1.3%	
Rwanda														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	220.0	230.0	270.0	260.0	260.0	240.0	220.0	210.0	200.0	210.0	250.0	280.0	320.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	1,298.9	1,368.4	1,835.1	1,982.7	1,919.8	1,719.6	1,652.2	1,621.6	1,746.0	1,936.5	2,354.1	2,850.5	3,306.0	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	265.1	310.6	363.5	376.5	380.0	338.0	356.7	343.7	401.7	476.1	610.8	693.3	849.2	
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	694.7	465.3	229.6	350.1	373.1	321.5	304.6	358.2	334.9	489.6	573.9	585.8	712.6	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											198.5		213.4	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	34.8	42.6	52.9	66.7	69.2	37.2	53.3	73.3	25.5	141.9	112.8	55.0	100.4	139.2
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)										69.2	53.8		51.5	72.4
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)					38.0	16.1	30.8	46.0		44.4				
ODA/GNI	53.5%	34.0%	12.5%	17.7%	19.4%	18.7%	18.4%	22.1%	19.2%	25.3%	24.4%	20.5%	21.6%	
PRSC/ODA										14.1%	9.4%		7.2%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.										48.8%	47.7%		51.3%	52.0%
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures										14.5%	8.8%		6.1%	
PRSC/GBS										53.3%	27.1%		24.1%	
Senegal														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	540.0	520.0	520.0	510.0	500.0	490.0	470.0	450.0	530.0	640.0	740.0	760.0	820.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	4,724.3	4,992.9	4,600.2	5,002.0	5,057.9	4,601.0	4,799.8	5,232.2	6,753.0	7,938.2	8,531.7	9,106.5	10,965.6	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	879.0	973.3	829.7	938.5	991.9	877.5	1,007.4	1,073.9	1,481.8	1,869.8	2,092.2	2,271.0	3,041.2	3,700.7
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	659.3	573.9	423.1	501.2	535.4	425.1	416.0	449.2	453.8	1,052.6	686.2	826.2	842.8	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											59.5		96.2	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	106.8	109.6	60.7	85.0	49.2	92.8	120.5	115.4	110.4	180.4	180.1	129.8	128.7	127.0
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)											31.3		30.8	
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	59.4	86.5	5.7	26.1		48.1	70.7	49.8			9.2	15.6	20.7	54.4
ODA/GNI	14.0%	11.5%	9.2%	10.0%	10.6%	9.2%	8.7%	8.6%	6.7%	13.3%	8.0%	9.1%	7.7%	
PRSC/ODA											4.6%	3.7%	2.5%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.											17.4%	23.7%	16.1%	
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures											1.5%	1.4%	0.7%	
PRSC/GBS											52.5%		21.5%	
Sri Lanka														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	700.0	740.0	790.0	810.0	820.0	850.0	840.0	860.0	950.0	1,070.0	1,200.0	1,350.0	1,540.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	12,859.5	13,701.8	14,917.5	15,545.4	15,373.0	16,016.1	15,464.5	16,851.3	18,710.5	20,457.6	24,106.8	27,891.8	32,003.4	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	3,970.4	3,956.2	3,985.4	4,161.0	3,951.9	4,360.8	4,324.4	4,212.7	4,327.3	4,713.0	5,818.7	6,863.2	7,469.2	13,808.1
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	553.8	486.3	331.1	424.7	263.0	275.8	332.1	343.6	677.0	508.7	1,157.1	791.7	588.8	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	106.2	104.1	78.3	98.2	48.4	46.7	39.0	91.0	204.1	70.0	153.9	156.4	120.4	141.6
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)									127.5					
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	1.4	3.4	0.1											
ODA/GNI	4.3%	3.5%	2.2%	2.7%	1.7%	1.7%	2.1%	2.0%	3.6%	2.5%	4.8%	2.8%	1.8%	
PRSC/ODA										18.8%				
PRSC/World Bank Disb.										62.5%				
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures										2.9%				

Appendix Table A1.4 PRSC Countries: PRSCs in Proportion to Country Income, Budget and Aid Flows (CY99 to CY08)

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	CY95	CY96	CY97	CY98	CY99	CY00	CY01	CY02	CY03	CY04	CY05	CY06	CY07	CY08
Tanzania														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	160.0	180.0	210.0	230.0	250.0	260.0	270.0	270.0	290.0	310.0	350.0	370.0	400.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	5,130.6	6,378.4	7,562.1	8,277.5	8,542.5	8,958.8	9,355.6	9,578.8	10,134.6	11,153.0	14,001.9	14,096.9	16,128.8	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	848.8	1,027.6	1,043.3	1,151.4	1,215.4	1,458.6	1,647.1	1,740.5	2,211.8	2,694.9	3,318.4	3,570.0	4,301.1	4,443.4
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	869.1	870.2	943.7	999.6	989.7	1,034.8	1,275.3	1,256.8	1,721.4	1,764.5	1,488.7	1,825.3	2,810.8	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											573.3		745.4	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	159.8	134.4	182.9	101.8	199.0	141.9	118.8	148.0	431.3	485.8	286.2	428.7	502.7	418.1
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)									132.6	150.5	149.6	206.4	195.2	
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	1.0	1.0	53.2	2.5	60.1	44.8	38.5	50.6	139.3	153.2		48.9	51.1	
ODA/GNI	16.9%	13.6%	12.5%	12.1%	11.6%	11.6%	13.6%	13.1%	17.0%	15.8%	10.6%	12.9%	17.4%	
PRSC/ODA									7.7%	8.5%	10.0%	11.3%	6.9%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.									30.7%	31.0%	52.3%	48.2%	38.8%	
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures									6.0%	5.6%	4.5%	5.8%	4.5%	
PRSC/GBS											26.1%		26.2%	
Uganda														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	220.0	270.0	290.0	280.0	270.0	260.0	240.0	230.0	230.0	250.0	270.0	300.0	340.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	5,697.7	5,998.8	6,252.8	6,576.1	5,984.6	5,818.8	5,570.9	5,719.4	6,126.8	6,694.2	8,504.2	9,256.8	10,991.1	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	926.8	947.3	1,031.4	994.6	1,005.7	1,364.5	1,167.4	1,362.1	1,385.3	1,719.9	1,773.3	1,713.4	2,143.0	2815.3
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	832.9	673.7	813.0	655.3	605.5	844.7	825.1	731.8	999.2	1,217.4	1,194.8	1,549.0	1,727.8	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)				66.4	39.2	175.9	311.2	369.0	404.8	408.8				
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	159.5	123.9	216.5	112.4	147.8	189.9	297.9	183.1	277.5	315.5	317.0	279.1	371.6	180.7
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)							147.7		168.7	152.9	155.3	137.0	252.3	
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	66.9	72.0	91.1		44.8	71.8	61.5	73.7						
ODA/GNI	14.6%	11.2%	13.0%	10.0%	10.1%	14.5%	14.8%	12.8%	16.3%	18.2%	14.0%	16.7%	15.7%	
PRSC/ODA							17.9%		16.9%	12.6%	13.0%	8.8%	14.6%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.							49.6%		60.8%	48.5%	49.0%	49.1%	67.9%	
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures							12.6%		12.2%	8.9%	8.8%	8.0%	11.8%	
PRSC/GBS							47.4%		41.7%	37.4%				
Vietnam														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	250.0	300.0	340.0	350.0	360.0	390.0	410.0	430.0	470.0	540.0	620.0	700.0	790.0	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	20,509.6	24,267.7	26,351.7	26,708.5	28,301.5	30,725.9	32,071.8	34,511.3	38,912.5	44,588.1	52,039.5	59,673.6	69,791.6	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	4,683.1	5,700.3	6,055.6	5,634.7	5,867.9	7,040.7	7,921.5	8,469.3	10,451.9	11,901.5	14,495.8	16,753.8	21,170.6	
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	834.8	936.0	998.3	1,177.3	1,428.6	1,681.4	1,431.2	1,274.5	1,765.2	1,832.4	1,905.0	1,845.5	2,496.7	
GBS Disb. (US\$ mil.)											337.0		672.8	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	47.0	188.6	180.8	254.3	157.9	174.3	278.5	260.7	567.0	443.9	392.8	345.1	755.4	597.7
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)							100.6		106.7	103.6	94.8		102.2	
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	29.8	89.4		33.8									53.4	
ODA/GNI	4.1%	3.9%	3.8%	4.4%	5.0%	5.5%	4.5%	3.7%	4.5%	4.1%	3.7%	3.1%	3.6%	
PRSC/ODA							7.0%		6.0%	5.7%	5.0%		4.1%	
PRSC/World Bank Disb.							36.1%		18.8%	23.3%	24.1%		13.5%	
PRSC/Gov't Expenditures							1.3%		1.0%	0.9%	0.7%		0.5%	
PRSC/GBS							67.1%		76.2%	66.0%	100.0%		22.0%	

Appendix Table A1.4. PRSC Countries: PRSCs in Proportion to Country Income, Budget and Aid Flows (CY99 to CY08)

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	CY95	CY96	CY97	CY98	CY99	CY00	CY01	CY02	CY03	CY04	CY05	CY06	CY07	CY08
Averages														
GNI per capita, Atlas method (US\$)	417.4	456.3	477.0	476.7	482.2	494.1	500.7	513.7	576.3	671.1	793.0	910.4	1,050.7	
GNI (US\$ mil.)	6,098.1	6,653.5	6,885.8	7,021.2	7,116.7	7,625.3	7,718.2	8,131.8	9,373.2	10,759.3	12,445.0	14,362.9	16,951.8	
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	1,429.1	1,599.9	1,561.9	1,590.9	1,594.6	1,670.8	1,698.4	1,824.4	2,078.8	2,379.2	2,784.1	3,337.9	4,415.2	5,589.8
Total ODA Disb. (US\$ mil.)	489.3	483.6	417.7	449.7	458.3	447.1	542.1	589.8	615.7	750.4	738.3	803.8	927.0	
Gen. Budget Support Disb. (GBS) (US\$ mil.)				33.2	19.6	55.5	110.5	106.4	135.9	161.8	173.1	186.7	178.4	
World Bank Disb. (US\$ mil.)	93.8	106.5	105.7	88.2	110.8	80.2	116.4	135.6	132.3	174.7	158.5	162.5	193.3	156.8
PRSC Disb. (US\$ mil.)							98.2	29.2	91.3	104.1	67.5	63.1	82.1	42.8
non-PRSC WB PBL Disb. (US\$ mil.)	38.3	64.4	50.0	29.5	54.6	36.4	63.3	88.9	40.8	57.5	136.8	62.1	112.7	37.4
ODA/GNI (%)	15.7%	13.6%	11.9%	11.3%	11.7%	11.1%	11.8%	12.1%	11.3%	12.7%	10.6%	10.4%	10.0%	
GBS/ODA (%)			0.0%	7.4%	4.3%	12.4%	20.4%	18.0%	22.1%	21.6%	23.4%	23.2%	19.2%	
PRSC/ODA (%)							12.2%	7.3%	12.0%	9.3%	7.8%	7.2%	6.6%	
PRSC/Bank Disbursements							50.2%	40.8%	49.2%	38.0%	38.2%	34.2%	36.1%	31.5%
PRSC/Govt. Expenditures							7.1%	3.4%	5.2%	5.4%	4.1%	3.0%	2.9%	1.4%
PRSC/GBS							57.0%	34.2%	49.8%	49.6%	27.8%	40.8%	22.6%	

Notes: 1-Budget expenditures are calculated as the sum of Current and Capital Expenditures plus Net Lending, and expressed in current US\$ million.
2-World Bank Disbursement figures represents the total amount of IDA (and IBRD, where applicable) lending disbursed in the given calendar year.

Sources:

Gross National Income per capita, Atlas method	World Development Indicators, World Bank based on World Bank and OECD national accounts data
Gross National Income	World Development Indicators, World Bank, based on World Bank and OECD national accounts data
Government Expenditures (US\$ mil.)	Live Database, World Bank
Total ODA Disbursements (US\$ mil.)	OECD-DAC Aid Aggregates database
General Budget Support Disbursements	IEG Case Studies, OECD Paris Declaration Monitoring Surveys, OECD GBS Evaluation Case Studies
World Bank Lending Disbursements (IDA+IBRD)	Business Warehouse, World Bank
PRSC Disbursements	Business Warehouse, World Bank

Government expenditures data: IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database was considered as a primary source but coverage for the set of PRSC countries is limited and incomplete over this time period. The present table uses total current and capital expenditures plus net lending, from the World Bank's internal Live Database, which is updated by Bank regional staff. This permits the construction of a variable for government expenditures that is largely consistent with GFS government expense data and has coverage for most of this period.

General budget support disbursements: There is no consistent time series data on this variable. The above dataset is based on reported OECD data on budget support flows by country, combined from the following sources: For 2005 and 2007 data are taken from the OECD Paris Declaration Monitoring survey. For earlier years, data are based on reported general budget support flows from seven OECD GBS evaluation case studies, from a parallel ODI case study on Ghana and from seven IEG country case studies undertaken for this evaluation. Data on General Budget Support flows is only available for 21 PRSC countries.

World Bank disbursements and PRSC disbursements: World Bank Business Warehouse data. Total World Bank disbursements includes concessionary lending and grants from the International Development Association (IDA) and, where applicable, non-concessionary flows from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

Appendix Table A2.1 CPIA Scores: PRSC Countries, and other IDA Countries (FY01-07)

	FY07	FY06	FY05	FY04	FY03	FY02	FY01
Overall CPIA Score							
Average CPIA score all IDA countries	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2
Average CPIA score all IDA countries CPIA levels 3 and above	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Average CPIA score all PRSC countries	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8
Quality of Budget & Financial Mgt. (Q.13) CPIA score							
Average PFM CPIA score all IDA countries	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3
Average PFM CPIA score 3+ IDA countries	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.4
Average PFM CPIA score PRSC countries	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.8	3.8
Public Sector CPIA Average Score (Q.'s 12-16)							
Average Public Sector CPIA score all IDA countries	3.1	3	3.1	3.1	3	3	3
Average Public Sector CPIA score 3+ IDA countries	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4
Average Public Sector CPIA score PRSC countries	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.2

Source: World Bank CPIA database

Appendix Table A2.2 PRSC Legal Conditions and Corresponding Sector Projects – No. of Countries

All Sectors >	1 Agr Fishing Rural Env Nat. Res. ²	2 Edu- cation	3 Econ Mgmt, Law Justice Public Admin ³	4 Energy & Mining	5 Finance	6 Health	7 Indus-try & Trade ⁴	8 Information & Communication	9 Trans- portation	10 Water & Sanitation
PRSC 1 LC with CP1	10	14	20	5	8	13	10	1	5	4
LC No CP	1	2	21	1	1	2	3	2		2
PRSC 2 LC with CP	8	13	16	5	2	15	9	1	4	4
LC No CP		3	16	1	5		3		2	1
PRSC 3 LC with CP	8	5	11	3	3	10	5			2
LC No CP		2	13		1		2	1		2
PRSC 4 LC with CP	5	5	8	3	3	9	4	1		2
LC No CP		2	8	1			3	2	2	2
PRSC 5 LC with CP	4	4	5	1	2	6	1		1	3
LC No CP	1	1	2	1			1			1
PRSC 6 LC with CP	4	3	4			3	1		1	1
LC No CP		1	2		1		1			1
PRSC 7 LC with CP	2	1	1			2	2			1
LC No CP		1	2				1			1

continued next page

Appendix Table A2.2 PRSC Legal Conditions and Corresponding Sector Projects – No. of Countries

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o/w Economic Mng't, Law, Justice and Public Admin	1 Accountability and Anti-corruption	2. Civil Service	3 Decentralization	4 Economic Management	5 Labor and Soc. Protection	6 Legal Judicial	7 Other Public Sector5	8 Property Rights	9 PFMP	10 Tax Policy
PRSC 1 LC with CP	1	8	1	2	9			3	15	3
LC No CP	6	8	2	10	3	5			11	5
PRSC 2 LC with CP	3	7	1	3	8			1	12	2
LC No CP	2	5		5	1	4		3	7	5
PRSC 3 LC with CP	1	2	3		2	0			10	
LC No CP	4	4		4		2		2	5	4
PRSC 4 LC with CP	2	4	2						8	
LC No CP	3	2		1	2	1		1	3	2
PRSC 5 LC with CP	1	1	1	1					5	
LC No CP	1	1			1			1	1	
PRSC 6 LC with CP	1	2	3	1					3	
LC No CP	1					1			1	
PRSC 7 LC with CP	1	1	2		1				3	
LC No CP	1							1		1

Notes: 1 Table lists Legally Binding policy actions (i.e. Prior Actions) for each operation across all PRSC countries (FY01-08). First row of each operation indicates the number of countries in which there was a policy action for each sector where there was also a corresponding sector project. The second row indicates the number of countries in which there was a policy action for the sector, but where there was no corresponding sector project.

2 - Includes policy actions from: Agriculture, Fishing, and Rural Development and Environment and Natural Resources.

3 - Includes policy actions from public sector listed below

4 - Includes policy actions from: Industry and Trade and Public Enterprise and Privatization

5 - There are no observations for this sector because given that this is catches any miscellaneous public sector conditions, there are no obvious corresponding sector projects to match it with.

Source: ALCID database, World Bank

Appendix Table A2.3 PRSC Program Benchmarks and Corresponding Sector Projects

All Sectors >	1 Agr Fishing Rural Env Nat. Resources ²	2 Edu- cation	3 Econ Mgmt, Law Justice Pub- lic Admin ³	4 Energy & Mining	5 Finance	6 Health	7 Industry & Trade ⁴	8 Information & Communication	9 Trans- portation	10 Water & Sanita- tion
PRSC 1 PB with CP ¹	8	4	12	1	4	6	6	2	3	6
PG No CP	3		13	4	3		5	3		
PRSC 2 PB with CP	7	2	11	1	5	3	5	2	3	2
PG No CP	5		15		1		1	2		1
PRSC 3 PB with CP	7	5	9	1	3	2	2		4	4
PG No CP	3		12		3		2	2	1	
PRSC 4 PB with CP	2	1	5		1	2	3		3	3
PG No CP	2		5		2			1		
PRSC 5 PB with CP	1	1	3	1			2		1	2
PG No CP	1		4		1			1		
PRSC 6 PB with CP			2	2	1		2	1		2
PG No CP	1		3					1		
PRSC 7 PB with CP			1	1	1				1	1
PG No CP			1					1		
o/w Economic Manage- ment, Law, Justice and Public Administration	1 Account- ability and Anti- corruption	2. Civil Service	3 Decentralization	4 Economic Management	5 Labor and Social Protec- tion	6 Legal Judicial	7 Other Pub- lic Sector⁵	8 Property Rights	9 PFMP	10 Tax Policy
PRSC 1 PB with CP	3	3	5	3	6			2	1	3
PG No CP	2	2	2	6	0	3		3		4
PRSC 2 PB with CP	2	2	6		5	2			1	1
PG No CP	3	1	2	5	2	5		1		3
PRSC 3 PB with CP	3	2	5	1	6	2		2		1
PG No CP	2	4		5		2		2		3
PRSC 4 PB with CP		1	3	1	1					1
PG No CP		3		1	2	1		2		1
PRSC 5 PB with CP	1	2	3							
PG No CP				1	2	1				1
PRSC 6 PB with CP				1	1					1
PG No CP				1	2	1		1		1
PRSC 7 PB with CP										1
PG No CP		1				1				

Notes: 1 - Table lists Desired, but Not Legally Binding policy actions (i.e. Benchmarks) for each operation across all PRSC countries (FY01-08). First row of each operation indicates the number of countries in which there was a policy action for each sector where there was also a corresponding sector project. The second row indicates the number of countries in which there was a policy action for the sector, but where there was no corresponding sector project.

2 - Includes policy actions from: Ag., Fishing, and Rural Develop. and Environ. and Natural Res.

3 - Includes policy actions from public sector listed below

4 - Includes policy actions from: Industry and Trade and Public Enterprise and Privatization

5 - There are no observations for this sector because given that this is catches any miscellaneous public sector conditions, there are no obvious corresponding sector projects to match it with.

Source: ALCID database, World Bank

Appendix Table A2.4 PRSC Operations : Intended and Actual Replacement of Sectoral Lending (FY01-08)

CAS Dates:	Prior Sectoral Project Closure Dates:	Sectoral project resumed since: *
Benin: Interim CAS 2001; CAS 2004-2007	Health (Population and Health, 2002; Education (Education Development Project, 2001)	Health: 2006; Education: 2008
Burkina Faso: CAS 2000- 2003; 2003 Interim-CAS	Health (Health/ Nutrition, 2001)	Health 2006
Madagascar CAS 2004-2007	Education (Education Sector Develop- ment Project, 2005); Water (Third Social Fund, 2003)	Education 2009; Water 2006
Mozambique CAS 2004- 2007	Health (Health Sector recovery, 2003)	Health 2008
Uganda CAS 2001-2003, CAS 2005-2009		Education 2008 Health 2009

Source: CAS reports and CAS completion reports of PRSC countries, relevant program documents, Country Assistance Evaluation reports. World Bank and IEG.

Appendix Table A2.5. PRSC Countries: Non-PRSC Sectoral Lending – Examples from Health and Education

Health

Benin	Malaria Control Booster program (60% health) (2006-)
Burkina Faso	Health Sector Support (2006-)
Mozambique	Health Service Delivery project (pipeline 2009)
Madagascar	Second health sector support credit (2000- Dec. 2007) Sustainable Health System dev. Project (2007-)
Tanzania	Second Health Sector Development Project (2004-2009)
Uganda	Uganda Health Infrastructure and Systems Support Project (pipeline 2009)

Education

Benin	Education for All Fast track initiative, 2008
Madagascar	Education for Growth pipeline project (2009) (higher edu., vocational training)
Tanzania	Secondary Education Development Program (2004-2007) Science & Technology Higher Education Program (higher edu.) (Phase 1) 2008
Uganda	Post-primary Education and Training (pipeline 2009)
Mozambique	Higher Education Project (2002-)

Source: CAS reports and CAS completion reports of PRSC countries, relevant program documents, Country Assistance Evaluation reports. World Bank and IEG.

Appendix Table A2.6 PRSC Legal Conditions, Benchmarks and Corresponding Sector Projects

(Nos.)

All Sectors	Legally Binding Policy Action		Program Benchmark	
	Corresponding sectoral project	No corresponding sectoral project	Corresponding sectoral project	No corresponding sectoral project
1. Agr Fishing Rural Env Nat Resource	41	2	25	15
2. Education	45	12	13	0
3. Econ Mgmt, Law Justice Pub Admin	65	64	43	53
4. Energy & Mining	17	4	7	4
5. Finance	18	8	15	10
6. Health	58	3	13	0
7. Industry & Trade	32	14	20	8
8. Inform & Comm	3	5	5	11
9. Transportation	11	4	15	1
10. Water & Sanitation	17	10	20	1
Total	307	126	176	103
o/w Economic Management, Law, Justice and Public Administration				
1. Accountability and Anti-corruption	10	18	9	7
2. Civil Service	25	20	10	11
3. Decentralization	13	2	22	4
4. Economic Management	7	20	6	19
5. Labor and Social Protection	20	7	19	8
6. Legal & Judicial Reform	0	13	4	14
7. Other Public Sector5				
8. Property Rights	4	8	2	9
9. PFMP	56	28	2	0
10. Tax Policy	5	17	8	13
Total	140	133	82	85

Source: ALCID database, World Bank

Appendix Table A2.7 Conditions and Benchmarks in Adjustment Operations (1980-2008)

(Average Nos.)

	1980-2008	1980-1991	1991-2001	2001-2008	2001-2004	2005-2008
Core conditions: PRSCs						
Average number				11.6	12.0	11.1
Trend (change in conditions/year)				-0.50*	-1.40*	-0.32
t-statistic				-2.20	-2.86	-0.08
Number of operations				87	37	66
Core conditions: Other PBLs						
Average number	24.8	26.1	31.9	16.4	19.6	11.4
Trend (change in conditions/year)	-0.50*	2.83*	-1.02*	-2.50*	-3.45*	-1.53*
t-statistic	-6.01	8.46	-3.04	-8.23	-4.58	-3.31
number of operations	801	248	334	278	175	139
Program benchmarks: PRSCs						
Average number				29.7	36.0	29.1
Trend (change /year)				-2.85	8.66*	-10.11*
t-statistic				-1.91	3.34	-3.94
number of operations				87	37	66
Program benchmarks: other PBLs						
Average number	14.4	18.5	11.9	13.2	12.9	13.6
Trend (change /year)	-0.25*	0.70	-0.98*	0.71	2.80*	-0.53
t-statistic	-2.92	1.80	-3.74	1.40	2.57	-0.37
number of operations	801	248	334	278	175	139

Notes: 1. *Indicates change is statistically significant with 95% confidence
 2. Vietnam's first PRSC operation in 2001 is an outlier which has been considered a non-PRSC operation here, as it began preparation as a structural adjustment credit. However, considering it as a PRSC operation or dropping it altogether does not materially affect the outcomes.

Source: ALCID database through end-FY2008

Appendix Table A2.8 Country Series – Trends Over Time in Triggers and Prior Actions (FY01-08)

Country	Triggers			Triggers or Prior Actions		
	Slope	t-stat	operations	Slope	t-stat	operations
Burkina Faso	-1.05	-1.31	6	-1.51**	-2.45**	7
Ghana	1.5	1.42	5	0.64	1.02	6
Madagascar	-0.9	-1.73	4	-0.53	-1.04	5
Mozambique	3	1.73	3	1.08	0.98	5
Tanzania	1.5	1.46	4	0.65	1.39	5
Uganda	-0.49	-0.59	6	-0.63	-1.2	7
Vietnam	0.42	2.29*	5	-2.34	-1.62	8
All PRSC except 1st Vietnam				-0.39	-1.67*	87
All PRSCs all countries	-0.046	-0.15	60	-0.88	-3.03***	88

Note: * Significant at 10%, **Significant at 5%, ***Significant at 1%

Source: Estimates based on the ALCID database

Appendix Table A2.9 PRSC Prior Actions / Triggers – Trends over Time by Country

	PRSC 1		PRSC 2		PRSC 3		PRSC 4		PRSC 5		PRSC 6		PRSC 7	
	PA	T	PA	T	PA	T	PA	T	PA	T	PA	T	PA	T
Albania	17	11	17	15	10									
Armenia	7	12	13	9	9	7	7							
Azerbaijan	13													
Benin	10	10	8	15	14	14	15							
Burkina Faso	17	16	13	8	7	11	8	10	9	9	8	10	10	
Cape Verde	10	16	9	11	11									
Ethiopia	14	10	10											
Georgia	14	21	21	18	10	16	15							
Ghana	9	9	9	10	10	8	8	8	8	14	11			
Guyana	12													
Honduras	14													
Lao PDR	10	11	10	11	11		7							
Lesotho	10													
Madagascar	10	13	13	10	9	10	10	10	10					
Malawi	7													
Mali 2/	11	7	7											
Moldova	9	7	7											
Mozambique T1 ³	8	6	6		7	12	10							
Mozambique T2 ¹		6												
Nepal	10													
Nicaragua T ¹	9	7	9											
Nicaragua T ²	9													
Pakistan	11	15	13											
Rwanda	11	13	13	13	13		10							
Senegal	11	21	12	15	10									
Sri Lanka	26													
Tanzania	7	6	13	8	8	10	10	9	9					
Uganda T ¹	12	10	13	10	10	7	8	11	11	12	13			11
Uganda T ²												3		3
Vietnam T ¹	43		19	14	40	15	15	15	15		12	14		13
Vietnam T ²		12												
Avg Prior Actions	12.5		11.8		12.3		10.3		10.3		11			9.3
Avg triggers		11.4		11.9		11		10.5		11.7		9		

Notes: 1. Two tranche operations occurred in only 4 countries, and only once in the series for each of these countries, as indicated above.

2. In Mali and Nicaragua, the first operation also defined triggers.

3. In : Lao PDR PRSC 4, Mozambique PRSC 3, Rwanda PRSC 4, Vietnam PRSC 2 and PRSC 6 and Uganda PRSC 7 tranche 2, prior actions were also defined.

Source: PRSC Project Documents, Development Credit Agreements, and ALCID database

Appendix Table A2.10 Modifications to Triggers by Nature and by Country (2001-2008)

	Total Number of triggers	Down-graded,	Dropped	Reduced to limit total conditions	Re-placed	Post-poned	New prior actions introduced	Net Modifications	Gross Modifications + new prior actions	Gross Modifications % Total Triggers (%)	Net Modifications net as a % of Total Triggers (%)	Rank	Rank (by number of triggers modified)
Mali	7	3		2				5	5	71	71.4	1	9
Senegal	36	1	2	9	2	1		15	15	42	41.7	2	1
Lao PDR	22	6	1					7	7	32	31.8	3	6
Rwanda	26	8						8	8	31	30.8	4	5
Cape Verde	27	2	2	5			1	8	8	33	29.6	5	4
Moldova	7	2						2	2	29	28.6	6	15
Pakistan	15	1	2		1			4	4	27	26.7	7	11
Ghana	49	9	1	2	1			13	13	27	26.5	8	2
Mozambique	24	4				2		6	6	25	25	9	8
Ethiopia	9	2						2	2	22	22.2	10	14
Madagascar	43	4	3					7	7	16	16.3	11	7
Burkina Faso	64	8				3	2	9	9	17	14.1	12	3
Nicaragua	27	2	7				7	2	2	33	7.4	13	16
Georgia	55	1	1	3		6	7	4	4	20	7.3	14	10
Armenia	28	2	1				1	2	2	11	7.1	15	12
Benin	39	3			2	3	6	2	2	21	5.1	16	13
Uganda	53	4	4				8	0	0	15	0	17	17
Tanzania	33	4				4	9	-1	1	24	-3	18	18
Vietnam	70	3	9		4		32	-16	16	23	-22.9	19	20
Albania	26	-1			1		8	-8	8	0	-30.8	20	19
Total	660	68	33	21	11	19	81	71	71				
Average											16.74		

Source: IEG analysis of data from PRSC credit agreements and Program documents.

Appendix Table A2.11 PRSC Countries' Policy Based Lending Gross Disbursements (FY95-08)

Country	PBL Type	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08
Albania	PRSC									21.2	19	10.6			
Albania	non-PRSC	13.1	2.9	0.2	29.7	36.4	20	24.2		7.9		9.2			10.7
Albania Total Disb.		39.6	34.5	23.3	52.9	66.9	52	65.7	35.9	75.6	63.5	66.4	33.1	49.2	50
Armenia	PRSC											21.2	20.3	28.6	19.7
Armenia	non-PRSC	63.4	30.3	29.1	58.6	14.7	43.3	19.8	14.3	41.3	22.2				
Armenia Total Disb.		79.7	58.2	60.5	74.4	51.1	81.1	52.8	50.5	74.4	64.4	75.1	55	85.1	82
Azerbaijan	PRSC												18.8		
Azerbaijan	non-PRSC		61.4		35	42.5			30.3	34.4					
Azerbaijan Total Disb.		0	63.4	9.7	57.9	63.2	23.8	27.5	55.3	69	42.3	54.5	57.1	52	90.1
Benin	PRSC											19.7	28.3	30.2	43.1
Benin	non-PRSC	16.5	19			18.2			10	10.4					
Benin Total Disb.		35	48	21.6	17.9	44.8	31	35.7	43.3	29.8	18.9	43.8	51.3	59.9	88.1
Burkina Faso	PRSC								46.4	37.3	50.6	60.2	58.2	62.1	91.6
Burkina Faso	non-PRSC	51.2	20.2			15.5	24.7								
Burkina Faso Total Disb.		89.8	71.5	41.9	36.2	53	66.8	27	76.1	74.5	127.5	119.2	143.7	150.8	173
Cape Verde	PRSC											14.5		10.3	10.4
Cape Verde	non-PRSC				14.6		15		7.1	12.4					
Cape Verde Total Disb.		4.7	6.6	8.9	22.4	8.6	26.2	8.9	17.1	26.9	13.8	29.8	10.5	24.5	19.5
Ethiopia	PRSC											123.3	137.5		
Ethiopia	non-PRSC	73.5	75.8	0.1					144.7	127.4					
Ethiopia Total Disb.		152.4	129.3	63.7	72.3	148.1	105.2	270.4	437.4	362.1	422	373.3	301.2	356.5	441.1
Georgia	PRSC												19.7	20.4	20.2
Georgia	non-PRSC	28.9	78.5	29.7	40.7	20.6	32.5		29.8	19.5		24.4			
Georgia Total Disb.		32	91.3	45.9	75.3	69.5	51.3	25.8	68.8	57.9	40.7	65.4	75.4	70.5	96
Ghana	PRSC									128.2		127.5	266.5	110.1	98.1
Ghana	non-PRSC	25	65.6	46.4	25.6	51.7	80	98.8	110.7	0.5					
Ghana Total Disb.		168.8	261	274.2	211.3	222.9	196.2	196.7	204.4	228.9	143.3	321.5	435.6	225.9	222.4
Guyana	PRSC										13.4				
Guyana	non-PRSC	2.9	7.9	7.8	8.1									9.8	
Guyana Total Disb.		12	18.6	15	17.7	8.1	6.2	7	7.5	6.2	20.9	3.6	2.5	12.3	4.6
Honduras	PRSC											61.2			
Honduras	non-PRSC	74.7	17.4	42.3	19.8	37.1	0.6		32.7			67.2	11.8		13.1
Honduras Total Disb.		104	51.9	80	50.5	186.9	158.7	42.4	105.6	76.8	47.3	209.2	77.2	41.6	62.2
Lao PDR	PRSC												9.7	8.3	10.6
Lao PDR	non-PRSC			19.6						7	12.2	0.1			
Lao PDR Total Disb.		31.4	28.6	65.2	26.5	27.8	18.1	29.9	30.5	41.2	46.8	41.6	36.3	58.4	50.7
Madagascar	PRSC											125.1	79.2	40.1	40.9
Madagascar	non-PRSC			68				65.1	27.8	52.4					
Madagascar Total Disb.		72.4	71.6	144.8	69.1	71.3	81.8	110.2	101.3	216.5	166.4	324.3	212.9	183.3	224

Appendix Table A2.11 PRSC Countries' Policy Based Lending Gross Disbursements (FY95-08)

(p2 of 2)

Country	PBL Type	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08
Malawi	PRSC														20.8
Malawi	non-PRSC	42.3	76.7	0.5	31.7	64.4	30.7	56	0.5			24.6	24.5		
Malawi Total Disb.		82.7	142.1	54.4	110.8	142.5	112.5	107.4	56.1	59.8	67.6	89.3	129.6	43.4	79.5
Mali	PRSC														88.5
Mali	non-PRSC	39.8	31.2	26.1	23.3	9.8		33.7	25	21.1	42.6	24.6	25.6		
Mali Total Disb.		88.9	69	71	66.9	62.3	42.3	75.9	71.4	78.2	113.5	115.5	112.9	79	178.6
Moldova	PRSC													10.3	
Moldova	non-PRSC	39.7	30		35	34.7	20.6	19.2	5.1	10.6					
Moldova Total Disb.		39.7	30	0.8	54.2	59.3	36.8	36.5	17.4	29.8	19.4	20.1	24.7	42.8	27
Mozambique	PRSC											60	120	69.7	61.8
Mozambique	non-PRSC	105.8	46.6	149	46.5					212.4	70.7				
Mozambique Total Disb.		197	151.2	263.6	126	78	77.2	89.9	69.1	292.5	183.5	223	307.5	263.7	206
Nepal	PRSC										74.9				
Nepal	non-PRSC														
Nepal Total Disb.		78.6	82.4	58.4	52.5	59.9	46.1	47.3	38	27.2	100.9	80.7	67	75	80.6
Nicaragua	PRSC										36		30.3	25.2	
Nicaragua	non-PRSC	38.8	37.2	5.6		54.7		16.1		16.2					
Nicaragua Total Disb.		56.3	55.6	49.2	45.4	170.5	70.5	65.6	78.1	96.6	141.6	69.6	77.5	54.7	24.5
Pakistan	PRSC											303.4	149.9	352.9	
Pakistan	non-PRSC	146.6			250	350		343.9	510.3	202.1	191.5	299.4	444.9	427.8	
Pakistan Total Disb.		690.7	521.2	644.7	605.9	682.5	307.5	646.7	868.7	355.9	303.5	984.4	1211.8	1193.7	323.4
Rwanda	PRSC											69.2	53.8	51.5	72.4
Rwanda	non-PRSC					38		46.9		46	22.1	22.3			
Rwanda Total Disb.		1	57.8	34.9	70.3	83.4	29.2	67.5	27.6	72.3	47.8	138.1	101.3	107.1	139.9
Senegal	PRSC											31.3		30.8	20.7
Senegal	non-PRSC	35	34.8	22.5		26.1		76.4	42.4	49.8		8.8	7.2	8.8	
Senegal Total Disb.		70.5	89.2	113.4	44.6	81.1	55.4	115.5	97.8	138.1	142.9	217.7	109.3	151.8	96.6
Sri Lanka	PRSC									127.5					
Sri Lanka	non-PRSC	2	1.3	1.1											
Sri Lanka Total Disb.		95.3	108.9	87.7	71.3	87	45.9	47.4	69.1	202.3	81.2	112.6	146.1	156.9	118.1
Tanzania	PRSC										132.6	150.5	149.8	206.4	195.2
Tanzania	non-PRSC	7.8			53.2	51.2	26.9	30.1	87.7	139.5	44	109.6	48.9		51.1
Tanzania Total Disb.		126.5	166.9	135.7	152.7	165.5	162.4	115.3	169.9	255.9	336.9	459.8	339.3	415.6	505.3
Uganda	PRSC								147.7	169.4	152.9	155.3	137	126.1	
Uganda	non-PRSC	102.5	49.5	49.3	44.8	44.8	38.5	76.4	18.4	73.7					
Uganda Total Disb.		192.9	160.9	165.5	167.7	156.9	151	167.1	256.2	353.6	291	315.5	296.4	377.6	156
Vietnam	PRSC								100.6	160.2	106.7	103.6	94.8	102.2	179.4
Vietnam	non-PRSC	90.7		59.6	33.8										53.4
Vietnam Total Disb.		166.1	35.1	246.6	237.6	206.6	156.1	159.8	331.5	457.9	426.8	407.9	418.9	489.9	649.2
Note: PRSC															
Source: World Bank data from Business Warehouse															

Appendix Table A2.12 Years with Adjustment Lending – Pre and Post PRSC (FY 96 to 2008)

	% Years with an Adjustment Loan Disbursement (5 years pre PRSC)	% Years with a PRSC disbursement (after commencement of PRSC)	% Years with a PRSC or other policy based loan after commencement of PRSC
Armenia	100	100	100
Uganda	100	75	87.5
Tanzania	100	33.3	83.3
Ghana	100	83.3	83.3
Mali	100	50	50
Pakistan	80	75	75
Albania	80	75	66.7
Senegal	60	75	100
Georgia	60	100	100
Madagascar	60	100	100
Rwanda	60	100	100
Benin	60	80	80
Cape Verde	60	75	75
Honduras	60	33.3	60
Nicaragua	60	60	60
Lao PDR	40	75	100
Burkina Faso	40	100	100
Malawi	40	100	100
Mozambique	40	100	100
Vietnam	40	87.5	87.5
Moldova	40	50	50
Ethiopia	40	66.7	40
Azerbaijan	40	50	25
Guyana	20	33.3	33.3
Nepal	-	33.3	20
Sri Lanka	-	50	16.7
Lesotho	-	-	-
Average	54.8	68.9	70.1

Source: Estimated from Disbursement Data from Business Warehouse and Appendix Table A2.22. PRSC Countries' Policy Based Lending Gross Disbursements (FY95-08)

Appendix Table A2.13 PRSCs Compared to Past Adjustment Lending - Variability of the Volume of Lending

Country	Avg vol adj lending (5 yrs before PRSC) (no exclusions)	Avg vol of Adj lending (5 years after start of PRSC - or to present)	Difference between lending volumes before and after PRSCs	Ratio of post PRSC Lending to pre PRSC lending	Coeff of variation - prePRSC years	Coeff of variation PRSC and subsequent years	Ratio of CV of PRSCs to CV of Adjust. Lending
Azerbaijan	12.93	4.69	-8.24	0.36	1.374	2	1.456
Albania	22.06	13.58	-8.47	0.62	0.625	0.96	1.534
Armenia	28.18	22.43	-5.75	0.8	0.469	0.18	0.394
Senegal	33.73	28.24	-5.49	0.84	0.987	0.83	0.839
Ethiopia	54.44	52.16	-2.27	0.96	1.374	1.37	0.999
Nicaragua	17.41	18.29	0.88	1.05	1.284	0.94	0.729
Cape Verde	6.88	8.79	1.91	1.28	1.001	0.7	0.702
Mozambique	56.62	77.88	21.27	1.38	1.63	0.36	0.224
Mali	27.77	44.24	16.47	1.59	0.305	1.41	4.642
Pakistan	249.57	406.33	156.77	1.63	0.762	0.7	0.912
Georgia	12.48	20.52	8.04	1.64	0.931	0.04	0.048
Ghana	73.37	126.55	53.19	1.72	0.474	0.75	1.578
Lao PDR	3.85	7.65	3.81	1.99	1.451	0.56	0.388
Malawi	9.83	20.77	10.94	2.11	1.369	N/A	NA
Moldova	3.14	6.71	3.57	2.14	1.507	0.87	0.575
Honduras	14.1	30.68	16.59	2.18	1.355	1.79	1.324
Madagascar	29.08	66.79	37.71	2.3	1.022	0.54	0.532
Rwanda	23.02	67.31	44.28	2.92	1.01	0.28	0.274
Benin	7.72	24.27	16.54	3.14	1.007	0.66	0.653
Tanzania	49.83	196.27	146.44	3.94	0.488	0.22	0.461
Vietnam	18.69	94.23	75.54	5.04	1.453	0.62	0.425
Uganda	28.81	146.44	117.63	5.08	0.909	0.51	0.561
Burkina Faso	8.02	50.54	42.52	6.3	1.428	0.18	0.129
Guyana	1.62	14.22	12.59	8.75	2.236	1.87	0.838
Lesotho	0	0	0		N/A	N/A	N/A
Nepal	0	14.99	14.99		N/A	2.24	N/A
Sri Lanka	0	25.51	25.51		N/A	2.24	N/A
Average	29.37	58.89	29.52	2	1.1	0.91	0.829

Source: Estimates based on Disbursement Data from Business Warehouse, World Bank, based on Appendix Table A2.22. PRSC Countries' Policy Based Lending Gross Disbursements (FY95-08)

Appendix Table A2.14 PRSCs Compared to Past Adjustment Lending - Variability of the Share

(% of Total Lending)

Country	Coeff. of Variation (5 yrs before PRSC)	Coeff. of Variation (PRSC and Subsequent 5 Years)	Coeff. of Variation (PRSC and Subsequent Years to present)
Mozambique	1.473	0.191	0.191
Burkina Faso	1.385	0.18	0.164
Guyana	2.236	1.377	1.732
Vietnam	1.443	0.586	0.447
Rwanda	0.944	0.121	0.038
Lao PDR	1.42	0.776	0.782
Madagascar	1.1	0.49	0.49
Benin	0.967	0.566	0.566
Tanzania	0.404	0.064	0.517
Georgia	0.933	0.613	0.613
Moldova	1.381	1.088	1.088
Cape Verde	0.934	0.679	0.679
Honduras	1.406	1.288	1.732
Armenia	0.286	0.187	0.187
Nicaragua	0.984	0.972	0.972
Ethiopia	1.37	1.384	0.883
Ghana	0.498	0.593	0.524
Uganda	0.077	0.179	0.646
Pakistan	0.564	0.68	1.349
Senegal	0.989	1.169	1.188
Albania	0.608	0.93	0.745
Azerbaijan	1.372	2	1.414
Mali	0.254	1.414	1.414
Lesotho	N/A	N/A	N/A
Malawi	1.408	N/A	N/A
Nepal	N/A	2.236	1.732
Sri Lanka	N/A	2.236	1.414
Average	1.021	0.858	0.818

Source: Estimates based on Disbursement Data from Business Warehouse, World Bank, based on Appendix Table A2.22. PRSC Countries' Policy Based Lending Gross Disbursements (FY95-08)

Appendix Table A2.15 Budget Support Commitments and Disbursements: 11 PRSC Countries¹

	2004	2005	2006	2007
Average Commitments (US\$ mil.)	218.36	234.51	233.33	220.72
Average Disbursements (US\$ mil.)	171.19	209.18	194.41	208.38
% Average Difference	-21.60	-12.11	-16.68	-5.59

Note: 1 – Data covers the following 11 PRSC countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda

Source: Analysis based on Strategic Partnership for Africa Budget Support Working Group Survey Database (2009).

Appendix Table A2.16. PRSCs – Regularity of Disbursements by Quarter

Number of Operations in a PRSC Country Disbursing in the Same Quarter (out of total number of PRSCs in that country)	Frequency (Number of Countries)	Range (% operations disbursing in the same quarter)
Madagascar (5 out of 5), Nicaragua (2 out of 2)	2	100
Tanzania (4 of 5)	1	80-99
Lao PDR (3 of 4), Vietnam (6 of 8)	3	70-79
Albania (2 of 3), Ghana (4 of 6), Tanzania (4 of 6), Georgia (3 of 5), Mozambique (3 of 5), Senegal (2 of 3), Cape Verde (2 of 3)	6	60-69
Burkina Faso (4 of 7), Armenia (2 of 4), Rwanda (2 of 4)	3	50-59
Total No. of countries with half or more disbursements in the same quarter	15	50-100
Benin (0 of 4), Ethiopia (0 of 2), Moldova (0 of 2), Pakistan (0 of 3)	5	0.00

Note: In seven countries, there has been only one operation and therefore there is no basis for comparison across operations. These are: Azerbaijan, Guyana, Honduras, Lesotho, Malawi, Nepal, Sri Lanka

Source: Quarterly disbursement data, World Bank

Appendix Table A3.1 PRSC Results Frameworks – End-of-Series Outcomes and their Indicators

	All Series		Series 1		Series 2	
	n=38	%	n=27	%	n=10	%
Are there indicators to monitor achievement of end-of-series outcomes?						
Yes, for most PRSCs	29	76%	19	70%	9	90%
Only for some	9	24%	8	30%	1	10%
No indicators to monitor achievement of end- of- series outcomes	0	0	0	0	0	0
Are included end-of-series outcome indicators measurable?						
Almost all included end- of- series outcomes are measurable	26	68%	15	56%	10	100%
More than half of included end of series outcomes are measurable	4	11%	4	15%	0	0%
Less than half of included end- of- series outcomes are measurable	8	21%	8	30%	0	0%
None of included end- of- series outcomes are measurable	0	0%	0	0	0	0%
Do end-of-series outcome indicators have targets?						
Yes, (almost all) have end of series targets	18	47%	11	41%	6	60%
End of series outcome indicators only partly have targets	17	45%	13	48%	4	40%
No targets at all	3	8%	3	11%	0	0
Approximately how many end-of-series outcome indicators do not have well defined targets?						
All or almost all	4	11%	4	15%	0	0%
More than 3/4	6	16%	6	22%	0	0%
More than half	5	13%	4	15%	1	10%
Less than half	7	18%	3	11%	4	40%
None (All of end-of -series outcome indicators do have well defined targets)	16	42%	10	37%	5	50%
Approximately how many end-of-series outcome indicators do not have quantified targets?						
All or almost	1	3%	1	4%	0	0%
About half of end-of-series outcome indicators do not have quantified targets	14	37%	12	44%	2	20%
Few end-of- series outcome indicators don't have quantified targets	12	31%	8	30%	4	40%
None (All of end-of -series outcome indicators do have well defined targets)	11	29%	6	22%	4	40%

Source: IEG Results Framework Analysis

Appendix Table A3.2 PRSC Results Frameworks – Baseline and Intermediate Indicators

	All Series		Series 1		Series 2	
	n=38	%	n=27	%	n=10	%
Do end-of series outcome indicators have baselines						
Yes, all (almost all) baselines for end of series outcomes are there	19	50%	12	44%	6	60%
End of series outcomes only partially have baselines	12	32%	8	30%	4	40%
There are only very few or no baselines	7	18%	7	26%	0	0%
Are there intermediate (annual) outcome indicators						
No there are no intermediate indicators	23	61%	18	67%	5	50%
Yes, there are intermediate outcome indicators but incomplete	7	18%	5	18%	2	20%
Yes, there are intermediate outcome indicators for most areas	8	21%	4	15%	3	30%
If Yes, are there targets for intermediate (annual) outcome indicators?						
Yes, intermediate outcomes mostly have targets	7	47%	3	33%	3	60%
Yes, intermediate outcomes have targets but incomplete	8	53%	6	67%	2	40%

Source: IEG Results Framework Analysis

Appendix Table A3.3 PRSC Operationalizing National Strategies through Budgets – Select PRSC Countries

	What are the links of the PRS to the budget process?	Is there a budget calendar, clarity of political involvement?	For budget execution, is there an MTEF?	Is there integrated budget reporting for PRS and budget?
Albania	3.5	4	3.5	1
Burkina Faso	2	4	2	1.5
Madagascar	2	2	2	1
Malawi	1	N/A	1	1
Mali*	1.5	N/A	1.5	2
Mozambique	3.5	4	4	3
Rwanda	2	4	3	3
Tanzania	4	N/A	4	2
Uganda	4	4	4	2
Average	2.6	3.7	2.8	1.8

Notes: The following scoring system has been applied to descriptive materials presented in this study: 1-Very Weak/Non-existent, 2-Weak, 3-Modest, 4-Sound. Data were obtained over the period 1998-2007.

* Progress has subsequently been reported in the 2008 Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review for Mali.

Source: 'Minding the Gaps...' (World Bank, GTZ and BMZ 2007)

Appendix Table A4.1 The PRSC and Donor Harmonization: Frameworks for Joint Support

The PRSC and Donor Harmonization: Use of a Common Performance Assessment Framework or Other Budget Support Coordination		
Country	Joint Support Framework	Nature of Joint Support - Comments
Albania	No other budget support.	N/A
Armenia	Had other budget support which cofinanced the PRSC but with no common PAF like instrument.	Dutch cofinancing (EU 5 mil./year) disbursed in 2006 & 2007
Azerbaijan	No other budget support.	N/A
Benin	Has other budget support and a common PAF is developing.	The PRSC matrix, called the Government policy agenda matrix was harmonized with AfDB from 2002: EC and European bilaterals were harmonized separately in <i>Approche Budgétaire Conjointe – Réduction de la Pauvreté</i> , in December 2007 an MOU was agreed for a common matrix derived from PRSP among all donors.
Burkina Faso	Under PRSC 1-3, the PRSC matrix was separate from the Soutien Budgétaire Commun (joint EC and European Donor Group) matrix. A joint PAF was initiated by PRSC 4 and implemented by PRSC 5.	Initially, PRSC and AfDB operated separately from SBC matrix as the EC-led approach focused on results rather than policy actions and had a two-tranche modality, but this was gradually harmonized with the PRSC over time into the Cadre General d'Organisation des Appuis Budgétaires (CGAB) matrix. Now the government agrees with donors on its PRSP Priority Action Plan, and donors (including Bank) select conditionalities for their own matrices, whether they follow EC or Bank modalities.
Cape Verde	Initially (PRSC 1) there was no joint matrix but from PRSC2-4 a common PAF has operated.	The Bank signed an MOU committing to harmonization for PRSC 1, but it was not until PRSC 2 that a joint PAF was implemented, as part of "Partnership Framework between Budget Support Partners and the Government of Cape Verde for the provision of Budget Support". All Bank triggers are part of the joint matrix document.
Ethiopia	Has had other budget support and attempts were made to negotiate a common PAF. PRSC 2 indicates that all donors draw conditions from the government's Budget Support Matrix derived from the PRSP.	There was a process of joint discussion of policy matrices, and that this process became more harmonized between PRSC1 and 2, but the degree of formalization into a common PAF is not clear.
Georgia	As of the end of FY08 there was no other GBS although the PRSO 4 supplemental credit was eventually to be cofinanced by ADB.	N/A
Ghana	There is a common framework and the PRSC is almost fully integrated into the multi-donor PAF.	The Bank signed an MOU for Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) in 2003, but a common matrix was not finally implemented until PRSC 3. The PRSC and MDBS matrices merged in 2006, and the PAF review process was not fully harmonized until PRSC 5. MDBS and Bank matrices the very similar up to 2006. After a harmonized, common PAF was agreed, the Bank has still sometimes added additional triggers (e.g., in the energy sector) in areas with no donor consensus.
Guyana	No	N/A
Honduras	No other GBS, although 2 donors were considering it and preparing for potential future cofinancing/joint support (which has not so far occurred).	N/A
Lao PDR	There is other budget support but no common PAF.	Other donors came forward relatively late for GBS to Lao. Japan is cofinancing PRSO 3, and the PRSO 4-7 matrix has been jointly appraised with Japan, the EC and ADB who are committing to cofinancing it. AusAID may join as well. During PRSO 1-3, program loans of the ADB have administrative similarities with GBS (they disburse into the general budget); but they are not regarded as GBS by the MoF presumably because of their sector specificity and the probability that there is implicit earmarking of funds for the concerned sector (though this could not be verified). The Bank matrix is currently the only matrix of policy conditionality.
Lesotho	There is some other budget support and the beginnings of a common framework emerging.	A PAF was designed, but has not been signed nor implemented by the GBS group as of PRSC 1 approval, although this is expected.
Madagascar	There is a government matrix jointly agreed upon (Madagascar Action Plan) from which donors draw conditionalities	The GoM has its own matrix: the Madagascar Action Plan (MAP), from which the PRSC and other donors derive conditions. This is close to a common PAF, but Bank and other donors have their own performance frameworks and matrices which seem to differ considerably. For PRSC 3-5 Bank staff believed that the matrix is close to a common PAF for PRSC 4 and the second PRSC series. Chosen PRSC policy actions are consistent with the MAP matrix and are critical to the success of the MAP objectives
Malawi	There is other budget support coordinated under a joint PAF.	The Common Approach to Budget Support (CABS) is the joint donor GBS framework, which includes a common matrix. IDA participated in the 2007 revision of the PAF, to align it closely with the MDGs and identify suitable indicators for 2008 and 2009. As part of the revision, the PAF has been expanded to cover the Government program in support of reforms to foster economic growth (with a focus on agriculture and business environment) and social protection, which complemented pre-existing indicators on Public Financial Management, social sectors and governance. To maintain the same total number of indicators, preexisting indicators were substantially streamlined.
Mali	There is some additional GBS but limited harmonization although some is developing	There was no common PAF for PRSC 1. Donors and the GoM have decided to develop a joint conditionality and performance matrix, to be ready in April 2008. PRSC 3 will begin a new programmatic series to correspond with this new matrix which will serve as the PAF. Implementing a joint matrix, if considerably differ from the current PRSC matrix, may necessitate waiting for the preparation of a new PRSC series based on the joint framework.
Moldova	There is other GBS though no common PAF	There is an MOU among donors committing them to harmonize procedures and frameworks
Mozambique	There is other GBS and also a common PAF. Initially for PRSCs 1-3 coordination occurred outside a PAF.	The Bank / PRSC has always been a member of the GBS group with harmonization around the PA. PRSC4 marks the first year that the PRSC is fully aligned with the PAF assessed in April/May 2007. All measures under PRSC are now drawn from the PAF matrix. However, the Bank's processing schedule has not been able to be fully synchronized to the current year's PAF. PRSC4 approved in early 2008 marks the first year that the PRSC matrix draws entirely from the PAF that was assessed during the joint review of May 2007 taking stock of achievements in 2006. The Bank made a supplementary assessment of performance in those areas where there appeared to be a shortfall during appraisal of PRSC4 in December 2007. As of PRSC5, the Bank planned to fully align its policy matrix with the PAF 2007.
Nepal	No other budget support.	ADB prepared GBS, but it was not delivered with the PRSC.
Nicaragua	There is other budget support as well as a joint framework.	The Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM) is the joint matrix of policy actions agreed on by the GBS donors and GoN. The recent Sandanista government produced a new 2007 PAM with no PRSP, which was therefore unusable according to standards of the PRSC/PRS. The PRSCs were not fully integrated with general budget support operations funded by other donors: its policy matrix is similar but not identical to that used by the budget support group.

Appendix Table A4.1 The PRSC and Donor Harmonization: Frameworks for Joint Support (p. 2of 2)

Country	Joint Support Framework	Nature of Joint Support
Pakistan	Yes, there is other budget support and attempts at harmonization though no common PAF.	It appears that there was collaboration but no common framework
Rwanda	There is other budget support as well as a joint matrix though it is not universally used.	Only the WB and AfDB use the common PAF, other donors use their own frameworks. The initial partnership framework was signed by DfID and the EC and endorsed by the WB, AfDB and Sweden
Senegal	There is other GBS and some harmonization though no PAF	Bank GBS support is parallel to other donors though there is a common matrix of public financial management policy measures agreed upon by GBS donors. A joint MOU was drafted during PRSC 3. There may be some common parallel EU donor matrix.
Sri Lanka	No other budget support.	2 donors were involved in discussion, but support never materialized
Tanzania	There is other budget support under a common PAF arrangement	From the beginning government and donors have agreed on a rolling, annually reviewed and updated three-year PAF for monitoring progress in implementing agreed reforms under the Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS), and the number of donors participating has increased over time. A Partnership Framework Memorandum was agreed on among donors and government to harmonize PRBS with the PRSC. A second generation PAF based on the national poverty reduction strategy, the MKUTUKA, includes reduced conditionalities and indicators. The Bank and donors state their intention to abstain from introducing other reforms/conditionalities outside of the common-PAF. The only substantive area where the Bank's policy matrix deviates from the common PAF is environment where dialogue and support takes place largely outside the budget support mechanism.
Uganda	There is other budget support under a common PAF arrangement. Prior arrangements for harmonization also existed.	Initially, for PRSC 1-3, some donors were de facto cofinancing the PRSC matrix (DfID, EU, Ireland, Dutch) while others had a parallel matrix either for sector budget support or budget support earmarked for poverty-reducing expenditures. Budget support was partly general, partly sectoral, and partly tied from five donors to what was called the Poverty Action Fund. This was however not a PAF (Performance Assessment Framework), but rather earmarked poverty-targeted expenditures. By PRSC 4 there was a common Performance Assessment Framework around the national poverty strategy (PEAP), but not all donors were aligned with it. Some introduced new actions midstream, although this has improved over time. From around PRSC 5 or 6, other donors saw the Bank as a partner in a joint PRSC matrix negotiated directly with government and other donors. The PRSC did not cover all areas of the PEAP.
Vietnam	There is other budget support and a joint approach.	The PRSC matrix has always been and continues to be the only joint donor matrix, cofinanced by other donors. The Government is understood to prefer this arrangement as it simplifies conditionality negotiation and it has appreciated the Bank's leadership position.

Sources: PRSC Program Documents, IDD and Associates / OECD-DAC (2005/6) report and case studies; Paris Declaration Monitoring Report 2008, country case studies IEG seven country case studies.

Appendix Table A4.2 PRSC Aid Harmonization: Coordinated Missions (2005-2007)

2006/2008 Survey Countries	2006 Survey		2008 Survey		Coordinated Missions/ Total Missions (%) (PDM Indicator 10a)		Progress
	Coordinated donor missions ⁴	Total donor missions	Coordinated donor missions ⁴	Total donor missions	2005	2007	2007 / 2005
	(missions)	(missions)	(missions)	(missions)	(for reference)	c = a / b	(% points)
	a	b	a	b			
-I. PRSC COUNTRIES-							
Albania	23	257	83	291	9%	29%	+19
Benin	25	175	45	179	14%	25%	+11
Burkina Faso	63	375	42	330	17%	13%	-4
Cape Verde	8	74	109	250	11%	43%	+33
Ethiopia	55	207	65	221	27%	29%	+3
Ghana	66	336	106	272	20%	39%	+19
Honduras	112	521	49	236	22%	21%	-1
Laos			101	569		18%	
Madagascar			121	509		24%	
Malawi	43	180	40	178	24%	22%	-2
Mali	22	300	33	214	7%	15%	+8
Moldova	40	201	33	229	20%	14%	-5
Mozambique	144	310	57	337	46%	17%	-30
Nepal			60	262		23%	
Nicaragua	34	358	51	257	9%	20%	+10
Rwanda	21	244	45	216	9%	21%	+12
Senegal	47	310	44	266	15%	17%	+2
Tanzania	94	542	64	407	17%	16%	-2
Uganda	79	456	66	313	17%	21%	+4
Viet Nam	76	791	131	752	10%	17%	+8
<i>o/w World Bank</i>	<i>232</i>	<i>1 076</i>	<i>446</i>	<i>1 365</i>	<i>22%</i>	<i>33%</i>	<i>+11</i>
Total	1 185	6 713	1 792	7 653			
Average	66	373	85	364	18%	23%	+5
-II. NON-PRSC IDA COUNTRIES w/ OVERALL CPIA SCORE 3.0 and above1-							
Bangladesh	55	286	74	362	19%	20%	+1
Bolivia ¹	44	257	53	180	17%	29%	+12
Burundi	34	139	37	275	24%	13%	-11
Cambodia	146	568	44	358	26%	12%	-14
Cameroon			59	227		26%	
Kenya	29	319	120	248	9%	48%	+39
Kyrgyz Republic	79	340	78	342	23%	23%	-0
Mauritania	50	362	16	143	14%	11%	-2
Mongolia	12	479	21	296	3%	7%	+4
Niger	35	168	95	616	21%	15%	-5
Nigeria			13	68		19%	
Papua New Guinea			33	136		24%	
Sierra Leone			28	103		27%	
Yemen	120	458	84	290	26%	29%	+3
Zambia	23	155	18	113	15%	16%	+1
<i>o/w World Bank</i>	<i>97</i>	<i>621</i>	<i>172</i>	<i>730</i>	<i>16%</i>	<i>24%</i>	<i>+8</i>
Total	626	3 531	771	3 757			
Average	57	321	51	250	18%	21%	+4
Difference from PRSC	- 9	- 52	- 34	- 114	0	-1	-2

Appendix Table A4.2 PRSC Aid Harmonization: Coordinated Missions (2005-2007)

(p2 of 2)

2006/2008 Survey Countries	2006 Survey		2008 Survey		Coordinated Missions/ Total Missions (%) (PDM Indicator 10a)		Progress
	Coordinated donor missions ⁴	Total donor missions	Coordinated donor missions ⁴	Total donor missions	2005	2007	2007 / 2005
	(missions)	(missions)	(missions)	(missions)	(for reference)	c = a / b	(% points)
	a	b	a	b			
-III. NON-PRSC IDA COUNTRIES w/OVERALL CPIA SCORE LESS THAN 3.0 (or N/A)-							
Afghanistan	94	363	72	193	26%	37%	+11
Central African Rep.			12	120		10%	
Chad			23	126		18%	
Congo, Dem. Rep.	80	208	68	318	38%	21%	-17
Cote d'Ivoire			57	87		65%	
Haiti			60	287		21%	
Kosovo ²			20	177		11%	
Liberia ²			15	136		11%	
Sudan			49	332		15%	
Togo			11	73		15%	
<i>o/w World Bank</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>111</i>	<i>98</i>	<i>310</i>	<i>36%</i>	<i>32%</i>	<i>-4</i>
Total	174	571	385	1 849			
Total (combined with II.)	668	3 420	993	4 789			
Average	87	286	39	185	32%	22%	- 3
Average (with II.)	62	316	46	224	20%	22%	+2
Difference from PRSC	21	- 87	- 47	- 180	+15	0	- 8
Cumul. Difference from PRSC	5	- 5	- 5	- 26	+2	0	-2
-IV. NON-PRSC IBRD COUNTRIES-							
Colombia			44	141		31%	
Dominican Republic	17	85	34	107	20%	32%	+12
Egypt	69	381	48	222	18%	22%	+4
Gabon			5	96		5%	
Indonesia			74	590		13%	
Jordan			20	78		25%	
Morocco			59	505		12%	
Peru	9	81	52	185	11%	28%	+17
Philippines			56	310		18%	
South Africa	32	169			19%		
Ukraine			32	292		11%	
<i>o/w World Bank</i>	<i>44</i>	<i>134</i>	<i>121</i>	<i>293</i>	<i>33%</i>	<i>41%</i>	<i>+8</i>
Total	127	716	422	2 526			
Total (combined with II. & III.)	927	4 818	1579	8132			
Average	32	179	42	253	17%	20%	+11
Average (with II. & III.)	55	283	45	232	19%	21%	+2
Difference from PRSC	- 34	- 194	- 43	- 112	- 1	- 3	+6
Difference from PRSC	- 11	- 90	- 40	- 132	+2	-2	-3
Notes: 1-If Overall CPIA score was 3.0 or greater during FY05-07, it is included in this group. 2-CPIA score not available. 3-Ratio is c = a / b except where disbursements recorded by government are greater than aid scheduled for disbursement (c = b / a). Averages include the statistic presented for all countries (a/b when it is presented, b/a when it is). 4-Number of coordinated missions by country were adjusted to avoid double counting except for: Zambia, Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Egypt.							

Appendix Table A4.3 PRSC Aid Harmonization: Coordinated Analytic Work (2005-2007)

2006/2008 Survey Countries	2006 Survey		2008 Survey		Coordinated Analytic work (% total) (PDM Indicator 10b)		Progress
	Coordinated donor analytic work*	Total donor analytic work	Coordinated donor analytic work*	Total donor analytic work	2005	2007	2007 / 2005
	(analyses)	(analyses)	(analyses)	(analyses)	(for reference)	c = a / b	(% points)
	a	b	a	b			
-I. PRSC COUNTRIES-							
Albania	17	74	24	71	22%	34%	+12
Benin	28	74	33	75	38%	44%	+7
Burkina Faso	35	78	40	102	45%	39%	-6
Cape Verde	8	22	41	64	34%	64%	+30
Ethiopia	26	53	57	82	50%	70%	+20
Ghana	19	47	44	74	40%	60%	+20
Honduras	64	141	23	52	45%	43%	-2
Laos			23	89		25%	
Madagascar			50	119		42%	
Malawi	21	35	61	100	60%	61%	+1
Mali	12	40	24	61	30%	39%	+9
Moldova	11	22	40	87	50%	46%	-4
Mozambique	55	87	51	161	63%	32%	-32
Nepal			25	90		28%	
Nicaragua	34	64	38	74	53%	52%	-1
Rwanda	25	68	34	81	36%	42%	+6
Senegal	46	113	23	80	40%	28%	-12
Tanzania	31	81	72	111	38%	65%	+27
Uganda	59	146	95	175	40%	54%	+14
Viet Nam	35	144	51	94	24%	54%	+30
o/w World Bank	39	79	43	77	49%	56%	+6
Total	523	1 289	846	1 842			
Average	31	76	42	92	42%	46%	+4
-II. NON-PRSC IDA COUNTRIES w/ OVERALL CPIA SCORE 3.0 and above1-							
Bangladesh	26	70	53	128	38%	42%	+4
Bolivia ¹	15	50	67	139	30%	48%	+18
Burundi	17	30	48	65	55%	74%	+19
Cambodia	76	118	20	118	64%	17%	-48
Cameroon			16	32		49%	
Kenya	26	79	39	50	32%	78%	+46
Kyrgyz Republic	40	75	26	68	53%	38%	-16
Mauritania	33	56	16	62	59%	25%	-34
Mongolia	21	60	11	33	35%	32%	-3
Niger	31	77	27	85	40%	32%	-8
Nigeria			11	32		33%	
Papua New Guinea			17	29		59%	
Sierra Leone			9	16		56%	
Yemen	80	145	15	48	55%	31%	-24
Zambia	35	77	32	69	46%	46%	+1
o/w World Bank	36	74	28	52	49%	54%	+5
Total	400	837	405	974			
Average	36	76	27	65	46%	44%	-2
Difference from PRSC	6	0	- 15	- 27	+4	- 2	- 6

Appendix Table A4.3 PRSC Aid Harmonization: Coordinated Analytic Work (2005-2007)

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2006/2008 Survey Countries	2006 Survey		2008 Survey		Coordinated Analytic work (% total) (PDM Indicator 10b)		Progress
	Coordinated donor analytic work*	Total donor analytic work	Coordinated donor analytic work*	Total donor analytic work	2005	2007	2007 / 2005
	(analyses)	(analyses)	(analyses)	(analyses)	(for reference)	c = a / b	(% points)
	a	b	a	b			
-III. NON-PRSC IDA COUNTRIES w/OVERALL CPIA SCORE LESS THAN 3.0 (or N/A)-							
Afghanistan	50	147	32	97	34%	32%	-1
Central African Rep.			10	42		23%	
Chad			11	30		35%	
Congo, Dem. Rep.	53	149	19	82	35%	23%	-12
Cote d'Ivoire			17	22		75%	
Haiti			39	74		53%	
Kosovo ²			21	77		27%	
Liberia ²			16	24		66%	
Sudan			51	114		45%	
Togo			12	58		21%	
o/w World Bank	13	16	21	30	81%	70%	-11
Total	102	296	226	620			
Total (combined with II.)	502	1 133	631	1 594			
Average	51	148	23	62	34%	40%	- 7
Average (with II.)	39	87	25	64	44%	42%	-2
Difference from PRSC	20	72	- 20	- 30	- 7	- 6	- 11
Cumul. Difference from PRSC	8	11	- 17	- 28	+3	-4	-6
-IV. NON-PRSC IBRD COUNTRIES-							
Colombia			68	153		44%	
Dominican Republic	14	30	32	51	48%	62%	+14
Egypt	41	103	37	66	40%	56%	+16
Gabon			20	53		37%	
Indonesia			50	110		45%	
Jordan			20	43		47%	
Morocco			35	138		25%	
Peru	8	55	23	149	15%	15%	+0
Philippines			9	27		33%	
South Africa	7	9			75%		
Ukraine			42	105		40%	
o/w World Bank	0	8	23	36	0%	64%	+64
Total	71	197	333	895	2	4	30
Total (combined with II. & III.)	572	1,330	964	2,489			
Average	18	49	33	90	44%	40%	10
Average (with II. & III.)	34	78	28	71	44%	42%	-3
Difference from PRSC	-13	-27	-9	-3	+3	-6	+6
Cumul. Difference from PRSC	3	2	-15	-21	+3	-4	-7
Notes: 1-If Overall CPIA score was 3.0 or greater during FY05-07, it is included in this group. 2-CPIA score not available. 3-Ratio is c = a / b except where disbursements recorded by government are greater than aid scheduled for disbursement (c = b / a). Averages include the statistic presented for all countries (a/b when it is presented, b/a when it is). 4-Number of coordinated missions by country were adjusted to avoid double counting except for: Zambia, Rwanda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Egypt.							

Appendix Table A4.4 PRSC and Other Countries: Program - Based Aid, Budget Support (2005-2007)

2006/2008 Survey Countries	2006 Survey				2008 Survey				Indicator 9		Progress	Budget Support Share		Progress
	Programme-based approaches			Total aid disbursed (USD m)	Programme-based approaches			Total aid disbursed (USD m)	2005 e = c / d	2007 e = c / d	2007 / 2005 (% points)	2005 f = a / d	2007 f = a / d	2007 / 2005 (% points)
	Budget support (USD m)	Other PBAs (USD m)	Total (USD m)		Budget support (USD m)	Other PBAs (USD m)	Total (USD m)							
	a	b	c = a + b	d	a	b	c = a + b	d	e = c / d	e = c / d	(% points)	f = a / d	f = a / d	(% points)
---I. PRSC COUNTRIES---														
Albania	4	13	17	343	13	29	42	293	5%	14%	+9	1%	4%	+3
Benin	91	64	155	255	139	53	192	392	61%	49%	-12	36%	35%	-0
Burkina Faso	168	101	269	593	269	204	473	827	45%	57%	+12	28%	32%	+4
Cape Verde	15	26	40	110	32	15	47	152	37%	31%	-6	13%	21%	+8
Ethiopia	356	322	678	1 288	0	1 303	1 303	1 986	53%	66%	+13	28%	0%	-28
Ghana	296	256	552	1 047	378	377	755	1 097	53%	69%	+16	28%	34%	+6
Honduras	83	102	185	432	18	54	72	427	43%	17%	-26	19%	4%	-15
Laos					4	28	32	348		9%			1%	
Madagascar					99	204	303	697		44%			14%	
Malawi	113	79	192	605	85	132	217	517	32%	42%	+10	19%	16%	-2
Mali	124	176	300	625	212	118	329	811	48%	41%	-8	20%	26%	+6
Moldova	22	0	22	139	56	11	67	221	16%	30%	+14	16%	25%	+9
Mozambique	337	249	586	1 267	461	278	740	1 595	46%	46%	+0	27%	29%	+2
Nepal					66	73	139	609		23%			11%	
Nicaragua	93	163	256	533	140	145	285	620	48%	46%	-2	17%	23%	+5
Rwanda	198	39	237	571	213	84	297	774	42%	38%	-3	35%	28%	-7
Senegal	60	235	295	515	96	174	270	695	57%	39%	-18	12%	14%	+2
Tanzania	573	222	795	1 433	745	395	1 141	1 877	55%	61%	+5	40%	40%	-0
Uganda	391	152	543	1 088	435	402	837	1 275	50%	66%	+16	36%	34%	-2
Viet Nam	337	328	665	1 956	673	863	1 536	2 659	34%	58%	+24	17%	25%	+8
<i>o/w World Bank</i>	<i>1 054</i>	<i>335</i>	<i>1 389</i>	<i>2 776</i>	<i>1 245</i>	<i>602</i>	<i>1 847</i>	<i>3 504</i>	<i>50%</i>	<i>53%</i>	<i>+3</i>	<i>38%</i>	<i>36%</i>	<i>-2</i>
Total	3 261	2 526	5 787	12 800	4 135	4 943	9 078	17 871						
Average	192	149	340	753	207	247	454	894	43%	42%	0	24%	22%	-2
---II. NON-PRSC IDA COUNTRIES w/ OVERALL CPIA SCORE 3.0 and above¹---														
Bangladesh	300	457	757	1 837	540	328	868	1 733	41%	50%	+9	16%	31%	+15
Bolivia ¹	101	152	253	791	80	127	207	514	32%	40%	+8	13%	16%	+3
Burundi	6	70	76	142	76	31	107	302	54%	36%	-18	4%	25%	+21
Cambodia	15	98	113	470	40	162	202	711	24%	28%	+4	3%	6%	+2
Cameroon					51	154	205	518		40%			10%	
Kenya	65	233	298	667	0	225	225	738	45%	30%	-14	10%	0%	-10
Kyrgyz Republic	10	12	22	187	9	32	41	234	12%	18%	+6	5%	4%	-1
Mauritania	0	61	61	165	6	122	127	363	37%	35%	-2	0%	2%	+2
Mongolia	26	23	50	171	4	3	8	119	29%	6%	-23	15%	4%	-12
Niger	33	89	123	393	85	124	210	428	31%	49%	+18	8%	20%	+11
Nigeria					0	25	25	651		4%			0%	
Papua New Guinea					111	45	155	369		42%			30%	
Sierra Leone					38	40	78	289		27%			13%	
Yemen	11	172	184	370	11	59	70	330	50%	21%	-28	3%	3%	+0
Zambia	143	222	365	773	182	248	430	919	47%	47%	-0	18%	20%	+1
<i>o/w World Bank</i>	<i>348</i>	<i>434</i>	<i>781</i>	<i>1 326</i>	<i>561</i>	<i>317</i>	<i>879</i>	<i>1 577</i>	<i>59%</i>	<i>58%</i>	<i>-1</i>	<i>26%</i>	<i>37%</i>	<i>+11</i>
Total	710	1 590	2 301	5 966	1 234	1 726	2 960	8 220						
Average	65	145	209	542	82	115	197	548	36%	32%	-4	9%	12%	+3
Difference from PRSC	- 127	- 4	- 131	- 211	- 124	- 132	- 257	- 346	- 6	- 11	- 3	- 15	- 9	6

Appendix Table A4.4 PRSC and Other Countries: Program - Based Aid and Budget Support (2005-2007)

(p2 of 2)

2006/2008 Survey Countries	2006 Survey			2008 Survey				Indicator 9		Progress	Budget Support Share		Progress	
	Programme-based approaches			Total aid disbursed (USD m)	Programme-based approaches			Total aid disbursed (USD m)	2005	2007	2007 / 2005	2005	2007	2007 / 2005
	Budget support (USD m)	Other PBAs (USD m)	Total (USD m)		Budget support (USD m)	Other PBAs (USD m)	Total (USD m)		e = c / d	e = c / d	(% points)	f = a / d	f = a / d	(% points)
	a	b	c = a + b	d	a	b	c = a + b	d	e = c / d	e = c / d	(% points)	f = a / d	f = a / d	(% points)
---III. NON-PRSC IDA COUNTRIES w/OVERALL CPIA SCORE LESS THAN 3.0 (or N/A)---														
Afghanistan	559	485	1 043	2 437	774	666	1 440	3 623	43%	40%	-3	23%	21%	-2
Central African Rep.					10	47	56	164		34%			6%	
Chad					0	2	2	148		1%			0%	
Congo, Dem. Rep.	206	297	503	934	200	12	212	1 019	54%	21%	-33	22%	20%	-2
Cote d'Ivoire					1	4	5	190		3%			0%	
Haiti					64	354	418	682		61%			9%	
Kosovo ²					0	5	6	227		2%			0%	
Liberia ²					40	104	144	675		21%			6%	
Sudan					16	147	162	846		19%			2%	
Togo					3	30	33	85		39%			4%	
<i>o/w World Bank</i>	<i>258</i>	<i>379</i>	<i>637</i>	<i>638</i>	<i>334</i>	<i>180</i>	<i>514</i>	<i>1 178</i>	<i>100%</i>	<i>44%</i>	<i>-56</i>	<i>40%</i>	<i>28%</i>	<i>-12</i>
Total	764	782	1546	3372	1 108	1 370	2 478	7 659						
Total (combined with II.)	1 475	2 372	3 847	9 337	2 342	3 096	5 438	15 878						
Average	382	391	773	1 686	111	137	248	766	48%	24%	-18	22%	7%	-2
Average (with II.)	113	182	296	718	94	124	218	635	38%	29%	-6	11%	10%	-1
Difference from PRSC	190	242	433	933	- 96	- 110	- 206	- 128	+6	-18	-18	-1	-15	0
Cumul. Difference from PRSC	- 78	34	- 44	- 35	- 113	- 123	- 236	- 258	-4	-14	-6	-13	-12	+1
---IV. NON-PRSC IBRD COUNTRIES---														
Colombia					37	24	62	395		16%			9%	
Dominican Republic	4	4	8	156	183	66	249	391	5%	64%	+59	3%	47%	+44
Egypt	144	487	630	1 030	0	690	690	1 413	61%	49%	-12	14%	0%	-14
Gabon					0	0	0	60		0%			0%	
Indonesia					1 994	127	2 121	4 129		51%			48%	
Jordan					147	222	370	473		78%			31%	
Morocco					603	678	1 281	1 822		70%			33%	
Peru	33	54	87	559	34	15	50	407	16%	12%	-3	6%	8%	+3
Philippines					583	45	628	1 951		32%			30%	
South Africa	0	154	154	583					27%			0%		
Ukraine					0	26	26	345		8%			0%	
<i>o/w World Bank</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>173</i>	<i>1 187</i>	<i>194</i>	<i>1 381</i>	<i>2 392</i>	<i>0%</i>	<i>58%</i>	<i>+58</i>	<i>0%</i>	<i>50%</i>	<i>+50</i>
Total	181	699	880	2327	3583	1894	5477	11385						
Total (combined with II. & III.)	1 656	3 071	4 727	11 665	5 925	4 990	10 915	27 264						
Average	60	233	293	805	696	332	1 028	2 097	22%	40%	+25	5%	23%	+21
Average (with II. & III.)	97	181	278	686	169	143	312	779	36%	31%	-2	10%	13%	+3
Difference from PRSC	- 132	84	- 47	52	489	85	574	1 203	-21	-2	+26	-19%	2%	+23
Cumul. Difference from PRSC	- 94	32	- 62	- 67	- 37	- 105	- 142	- 115	-7	-11	-2	-14	-9	+6

Notes: 1-If Overall CPIA score was 3.0 or greater during FY05-07, it is included in this group. 2-CPIA score not available. 3-Ratio is c = a / b except where disbursements recorded by government are greater than aid scheduled for disbursement (c = b / a). Averages include the statistic presented for all countries (a/b when it is presented, b/a when it is).

Appendix Table A5.1 PRSC Public Financial Management and Procurement Desk Review

Indicator		Albania	Armenia	Benin	Burkina Faso - Series 1	Burkina Faso - Series 2	Cape Verde	Ethiopia	Georgia	Ghana - Series 1	Ghana - Series 2	
Diagnost.	a2	Comprehensive diagnostics (0-3)	2	3	2	3	2	2	3	2	1	3
	b1	Fiduciary risks acknowledged (0-3)	3	3	3	3	2	3	3	3	2	2
	b2	Fiduciary risks addressed (0-2)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2
	c2	Strategy emphasis same as AAA (0-3)	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	2
Design	d1	Results framework (0-3)	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	2
	e1	Country PFMP strategy harmonized among donors (0-3)	1	1	3	3	3	2.5	3	2	3	3
	e2	Delays (0-2)	1	2	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
	f1	Capacity building needs (0-3)	3	2	1.5	2	2	1	N/A	2	2	N/A
Results	g2	Objectives achieved (0-3)	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	N/A
	h1	Progress where PRSC emphasized (-1 - 3)	2	2	2	3	2	2	N/A	1	2	N/A
	h1(i)	Comprehensiveness (-1 - 3)	2	N/A	0	0	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A
	h1(ii)	Extent of extrabudgetary resources (-1 - 3)	2	3	0	2	2	2	N/A	1	3	2
	h1(iii)	Budget predictability (-1 - 3)	N/A	3	2	2	2	3	1	0	3	2
	h1(iv)	Donor funds on budget (-1 - 3)	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
	h1(v)	Classification (-1 - 3)	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	3	3	2
	h1(vi)	MTEFs (-1 - 3)	1	0	0	3	2	1	N/A	1	0	0
	h1(vii)	Arrears (-1 - 3)	N/A	2.5	-1	3	2	3	N/A	3	3	N/A
	h1(viii)	Internal control (-1 - 3)	N/A	N/A	0	2	2	1	N/A	1	1	N/A
	h1(xi)	Reporting (-1 - 3)	2	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	3	N/A
	h1(xii)	Procurement (-1 - 3)	1	1	1	1	1	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A
i1	CPIA scores (-1 - 2)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	N/A	
i2	Change in number of benchmarks	N/A	N/A	0	+1	+2	N/A	N/A	N/A	+5	N/A	

Indicator		Lao PDR	Madagascar	Mozambique	Nicaragua	Pakistan	Rwanda	Senegal	Tanzania	Uganda - Series 1	Uganda - Series 2	Vietnam	Average*	
Diagnost.	a2	Comprehensive diagnostics (0-3)	1	3	3	3	1	2	3	3	2	3	2	2.3
	b1	Fiduciary risks acknowledged (0-3)	3	2	3	3	2	2	3	2	3	3	2	2.6
	b2	Fiduciary risks addressed (0-2)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2.0
	c2	Strategy emphasis same as AAA (0-3)	2	3	2	3	3	2	3	3	1	2	3	2.3
Design	d1	Results framework (0-3)	3	2	2	1	2	1	3	2	1	2	1	1.6
	e1	Country PFMP strategy harmonized among donors (0-3)	3	3	3	1	2	3	2	3	1	3	3	2.4
	e2	Delays (0-2)	2	2	1	1.5	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1.2
	f1	Capacity building needs (0-3)	2	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	N/A	2	2.2
Results	g2	Objectives achieved (0-3)	2	1	2	2	1	N/A	N/A	2	1	N/A	3	1.7
	h1	Progress where PRSC emphasized (-1 - 3)	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	2.0
	h1(i)	Comprehensiveness (-1 - 3)	0	0	2	0	1	N/A	N/A	2	0	0	1	0.8
	h1(ii)	Extent of extrabudgetary resources (-1 - 3)	0	2	1	1	2.5	1	-1	2	0	0	0	1.3
	h1(iii)	Budget predictability (-1 - 3)	1	3	2	2	0	2	3	2	-1	3	0	1.8
	h1(iv)	Donor funds on budget (-1 - 3)	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0.4
	h1(v)	Classification (-1 - 3)	1	2	0	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	1	2.3
	h1(vi)	MTEFs (-1 - 3)	1	0	0	1	1	2	1	3	2	2	1	1.1
	h1(vii)	Arrears (-1 - 3)	1	0	2	3	0	1	-1	2	0	0	0	1.3
	h1(viii)	Internal control (-1 - 3)	N/A	0	1	0	1	1	N/A	3	1	0	0	0.9
	h1(xi)	Reporting (-1 - 3)	0	1	3	0	1	3	0	3	2	2	1	1.2
	h1(xii)	Procurement (-1 - 3)	N/A	1	2	1	N/A	N/A	1	1	1	N/A	1	0.9
	i1	CPIA scores (-1 - 2)	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0.6
	i2	Change in number of benchmarks	N/A	0	+1	+2	N/A	N/A	N/A	+2	N/A	N/A	+1	+1.56

*Averages do not include scores where N/A is given in the sample (e.g., if there is one N/A for question c4, then the average will be computed for all the other scores).

Note: Underlying diagnostic work, design and implementation, and performance of PFMP reforms in 21 PRSC series across 18 PRSC countries which had more than one PRSC operation over 2001-2007. Where responses are coded as N/A it was not possible to evaluate that PRSC series on that particular rating area because of lack of information from the desk review
Source: IEG portfolio analysis of PRSC program documents, CFAAs, CPARs, PERS, HIPC AAPs, IMF ROSCs on Fiscal Transparency and PEFAs

Appendix Table A5.2 PRSC PFMP Performance Indicators for Results- Budget Formulation

Benchmark	Score	No	Countries	Examples
FORMULATION				
Coverage of fiscal information matches GFS definition of the general government sector	3	1	Burkina Faso 2	Burkina Faso 2: A positive result was the inclusion of autonomous public entities on budget and improved budget coverage. Tanzania: Has a less positive result. While it was able to produce reports on expenditure and revenue for all Councils in 2004/5 for first time, but their accuracy has been questioned.
	2	3	Albania, Mozambique, Tanzania	
	1	2	Pakistan, Vietnam	
	0	8	Benin Burkina Faso 1, Ghana 1, Lao PDR, Madagascar Nicaragua, Uganda 1-2	
	-1	0		
	N/A	7	Armenia, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana 2, Rwanda, Senegal	
Extrabudgetary sources at 3 percent or less of total spending	3	3	Armenia, Ghana 1, Pakistan (score=2.5)	Ghana – 1: High score linked to increase of relevant information included in the budget documentation. Progress on reporting the capture of non-tax revenues. In second series, there was improved coverage of internally generated funds, externally-financed expenditures and statutory funds. Senegal: Worsening of indicator due to sharp increase in extra-budgetary resources as share of total spending, from 6.8% in 2003 to 24% in 2007, and indication that some of this occurred after 2005.
	2	7	Albania, Burkina Faso 1-2, Cape Verde, Ghana 2, Madagascar Tanzania	
	1	4	Georgia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda	
	0	5	Benin, Lao PDR, Uganda 1-2, Vietnam	
	-1	1	Senegal	
	N/A	1	Ethiopia	
No more than 2 of 3 years with: (i) aggregate variance of total budget expenditure above 5%; AND (ii) agreed sub-government level, or GFS functional level, variance above 10%	3	6	Armenia, Cape Verde, Ghana 1, Madagascar, Senegal, Uganda 2	Madagascar: According to the 2004 HIPC AAP data were too poor to even know what the level of outturn was (estimated roughly at 15-20%). Two years later, according to the PEFA, there was clear improvement to benchmark level. Uganda – 1: Negative score as aggregate outturn variation from the budget increased from -2% to -20%, at both central and subnational levels due to poor reporting on the execution of donor projects and pressures to approve supplementary allocations by the central government. Trend reversed during second loan in series
	2	8	Benin Burkina Faso 1-2, Ghana 2, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania	
	1	2	Ethiopia, Lao PDR	
	0	3	Georgia, Pakistan, Vietnam	
	-1	1	Uganda 1	
	N/A	1	Albania	
100% inclusion of donor funds in central, state and local government budgets, in realized budget expenditure data	3	0		Senegal: Poor score because although some donor financing is shown in the government budget about 70% of direct donor payments do not appear in Treasury accounts.
	2	0		
	1	8	Armenia, Benin Burkina Faso 2, Ghana 1, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Tanzania, Vietnam	
	0	13	Albania, Burkina Faso 1, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana 2, Lao PDR, Madagascar Mozambique, Pakistan, Senegal, Uganda 1-2	
	-1	0		
	N/A	0		
Use of administrative and economic classifiers, AND either functional (to subfunctional level) or programmatic classifiers	3	10	Albania, Armenia, Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana 1, Pakistan, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda 1-2	Ghana - 1: Achieved significant improvement moving from an aggregated functional and economic type classification lumping together domestic and externally financed expenditures to an improved system using 10 standard COFOG classifications and earning the HIPC benchmark. Mozambique: Although new classification
	2	8	Benin Burkina Faso 1-2, Ethiopia, Ghana 2, Madagascar Nicaragua, Rwanda	
	1	2	Lao PDR, Vietnam	
	0	1	Mozambique	

Appendix Table A5.2 PRSC PFMP Performance Indicators for Results- Budget Formulation

Benchmark	Score	No	Countries	Examples
	-1	0		system made definite improvements in the process from 2003 on, effectiveness requires implementation of integrated financial management system, which was still not complete by 2006 PEFA, making sub-functional reporting unreliable.
	N/A	0		
Medium term forecasts have been integrated into the budget formulation cycle on a multiyear basis	3	2	Burkina Faso 1, Tanzania	Tanzania: Positive achievements: MTEF is now a 3 year rolling operation, and in 2004/5 significant efforts were made to link the PRSP and sector strategies more explicitly with budget allocations as part of the Strategic Budget Allocation System.
	2	4	Burkina Faso 2, Rwanda, Uganda 1-2	
	1	8	Albania, Cape Verde, Georgia, Lao PDR, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Senegal, Vietnam	
	0	6	Armenia, Benin Ghana 1-2, Madagascar Mozambique	Benin: MTEF is integrated with the investment budgeting process, but there is an issue with reliability of future fiscal year estimates.
	-1	0		
	N/A	1	Ethiopia	
Source: IEG portfolio analysis of PRSC program documents, CFAAs, CPARs, PERS, HIPC AAPs, IMF ROSCs on Fiscal Transparency and PEFAs				

Appendix Table A5.3 Results-Execution, Reporting, and Procurement

Benchmark	Score	No	Countries	Examples
EXECUTION				
Expenditure arrears are no more 5% of total expenditure	3	6	Armenia (score=2.5), Burkina Faso 1, Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana 1, NIC	Cape Verde: Prior to the beginning of the PRSC, it is likely that more than 5% of expenditure were in arrears, but by the end of 2008 all arrears were expected to be cleared, and no new ones to be created except for the tariff deficit. Senegal: In 2006 there was noticeable up-tick in arrears to the order of about 5% of total expenditure. Also, no comprehensive system to report and monitor arrears, further complicating the problem.
	2	3	Burkina Faso 2, Mozambique, Tanzania	
	1	2	Lao PDR, Rwanda	
	0	5	Madagascar Pakistan, Uganda 1-2, Vietnam	
	-1	2	Benin Senegal	
	N/A	3	Albania, Ethiopia, Senegal	
Systematic effectiveness of internal control environment (activities, information produced, monitoring)	3	1	Tanzania	Tanzania: National Audit Office conducts an audit of parts of the payroll system, there is a comprehensive set of controls that are generally understood (but sometimes excessive), and internal audit has been strengthened as institutional issues are addressed, audit committees put in place, and some of the major capacity constraints are being addressed. Georgia: Some improvements in compliance with control procedures, but no uniform system to report on payroll controls across government (separate systems for each spending unit), and no clear legal requirements for ministries to maintain effective internal control framework despite the basic ones instituted in MoF. Internal audit system is severely lacking, without established procedures in accordance with international standards or supported by a legal framework.
	2	2	Burkina Faso1-2	
	1	7	Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana 1, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uganda 1	
	0	5	Benin Madagascar Nicaragua, Uganda 2, Vietnam	
	-1	0		
	N/A	6	Albania, Armenia, Ethiopia, Ghana 2, Lao PDR, Senegal	
REPORTING				
Complete audited report of budget expenditures is presented to legislature 6 months-1 year	3	4	Ghana 1, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania	Mozambique: Progress made by the Supreme Audit Institution, Tribunal Administrative, in improving the timeliness of submission of national accounts. The 1998 consolidated general expenditures could not be audited and presented to the National Assembly until 2001, which demonstrates how much things have improved since then. Georgia: No consolidated financial statements for overall financial position, although there are both an audited Annual Report of State Budget Execution, and Budget execution report, submitted to Parliament. There are also weaknesses in legislative oversight of spending. Among concerns are that opposition members have only a minor role (since they have only 35 seats out of 225), and the parliamentary finance committee has reportedly never criticized the government on financial matters, nor has it launched independent investigations.
	2	3	Albania, Uganda 1-2	
	1	6	Burkina Faso 1, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Madagascar Pakistan, Vietnam	
	0	7	Armenia, Benin Burkina Faso 2, Lao PDR, Nicaragua, Senegal	
	-1	0		
	N/A	1	Ghana 2	
PROCUREMENT				
clear and enforceable rules (with commensurate follow through on those rules) in procurement that promote competition, transparency and value for money	3	0		Mozambique: Establishment of a procurement authority has allowed for improved competition in contract bidding and better regulation of exceptions to competitive bidding. 50-75% of contracts awarded on open competitive basis. Justification for use of less competitive methods is now approved only in accordance with clear regulatory requirements. Nicaragua: first phase of e-disclosure launched as a government website. Provides up-to-date information on annual procurement plans and government tenders that are underway. Training and related modernization of government procurement units have also contributed to greater transparency and efficiency in government expenditure.
	2	1	Mozambique	
	1	11	Albania, Armenia, Benin Burkina Faso 1-2, Madagascar Nicaragua, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda 1, Vietnam	
	0	2	Georgia, Ghana 1	
	-1	0		
	N/A	7	Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana 2, Lao PDR, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uganda 2	
Source: IEG portfolio analysis of PRSC program documents, CFAAs, CPARs, PERS, HIPC AAPs, IMF ROSCs on Fiscal Transparency and PEFAs				

Appendix Table A6.1 Growth Rates Disaggregated – PRSC and other IDA Countries (% per annum)

	1985-1999	2000-2007	Difference	% Difference
Per Capita GDP growth				
<i>PRSC countries</i>	0.8	4.2	3.4	425
Better Performing Non-PRSC	0.5	3.3	2.8	560
Non-PRSC countries	-0.1	2.5	2.6	-2600
All IDA countries	0.2	3.0	2.8	1400
Export growth				
<i>PRSC countries</i>	6.1	10.6	4.5	74
Better Performing Non-PRSC	5.5	8.2	2.7	49
Non-PRSC countries	5.3	9.3	4	75
All IDA countries	5.7	9.7	4	70
Inflation				
<i>PRSC countries</i>	51.2	6.7	-44.5	-87
Better Performing Non-PRSC	53.6	12.8	-40.8	-76
Non-PRSC countries	120.7	117.1	-3.6	-3
All IDA countries	97.7	71.9	-25.8	-26
Agriculture				
<i>PRSC countries</i>	3.1	3.4	0.3	10
Better Performing Non-PRSC	2.0	2.4	0.4	20
Non-PRSC countries	2.5	2.6	0.1	4
All IDA countries	2.4	2.7	0.3	13
Industry				
<i>PRSC countries</i>	4.0	7.2	3.2	80
Better Performing Non-PRSC	3.6	5.0	1.4	39
Non-PRSC countries	3.2	5.6	2.4	75
All IDA countries	3.6	6.1	2.5	69
Services				
<i>PRSC countries</i>	4.0	6.4	2.4	60
Better Performing Non-PRSC	3.5	5.2	1.7	49
Non-PRSC countries	2.6	4.8	2.2	85
All IDA countries	3.3	5.6	2.3	70

Notes: Data for individual PRSC countries' growth rates are provided in Appendix Table A6.2

Non-PRSC countries are those which have never had a PRSC or not had one before 2005.

"Better Performing Non-PRSC countries" are those non PRSC countries with a CPIA of 3.0 or greater in 2007. This reduces the non-PRSC sample from 52 to 37 countries. Countries eliminated are: Angola, CAR, Chad, Comoros, Congo DR, Congo Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Solomon Is., Sudan, Togo, Zimbabwe

Source: IEG estimates based on data from the World Development Indicators

Appendix Table A6.2 Growth Rates of Per Capita Income in 22 PRSC countries (% p.a.)

	1985-00	2000-07
Albania	0.0	4.8
Armenia	-0.4	13.1
Azerbaijan	-8.4	16.1
Benin	0.2	0.5
Burkina Faso	1.4	2.5
Cape Verde	2.5	2.7
Ethiopia	-0.5	4.8
Ghana	1.6	3.2
Guyana	3.5	1.5
Honduras	0.7	3.3
Lao PDR	3.2	4.9
Madagascar	-1.3	0.4
Mozambique	2.5	5.6
Nepal	2.4	1.1
Nicaragua	-1.0	2.1
Pakistan	1.9	3.3
Rwanda	-1.6	3.5
Senegal	-0.3	1.8
Sri Lanka	3.5	4.5
Tanzania	0.1	4.0
Uganda	3.0	2.3
Vietnam	5.1	6.3

Note: Trend fitted growth rates. PRSC countries omitted are Georgia, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, and Lesotho. See Appendix Table A6.3 for an analysis of selection effects.

Source: WDI data base

Appendix Table A6.3 PRSC and Non-PRSC Countries' Growth Rates: Sample Selection Effects

Indicator	1985 -1999			2000-2007		
	27 Countries	22 Countries	17 Countries	27 Countries	22 Countries	17 Countries
Growth of GDP per capita	0.2	0.8	0.9	4.3	4.2	3.8
Exports ,growth rate	6.1	6.1	6.5	10.0	10.6	10.7
Investment/GDP	21.6	20.3	18.3	25.1	23.8	23.9
Avg Savings Rate (GDS)/GDP	4.7	3.1	3.6	8.4	8.2	8.3
Inflation (CPI)	48.6	51.2	46.4	7.0	6.7	6.3
Agriculture	2.8	3.1	3.5	3.2	3.4	4.0

Note: The 27 countries are all those having PRSCs 2001-2008. The 22 country sample eliminates five countries with first PRSCs after 2005 (Georgia, Mali, Moldova, Malawi, and Lesotho). The 17 country sample is based on the 22 country sample less Azerbaijan, Guyana, Honduras, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, which received only one PRSC.

Source: World Bank, WDI databank.

Appendix Table A6.4 PRSC and Non-PRSC Countries: Savings and Investment Ratios (% of GDP)

	1985-1999	2000-2007	Difference	% Difference
Investment				
PRSC countries	20.3	23.8	3.5	17
Better Performing Non-PRSC	23.9	22.9	-1.0	-4.0
non-PRSC countries	22.0	21.6	-0.4	-2.0
all IDA countries	21.4	22.6	1.2	6.0
Savings				
PRSC countries	3.1	8.2	5.1	165
Better Performing Non-PRSC	8.2	9.2	1.0	12
non-PRSC countries	7.9	9.4	1.5	19
all IDA countries	7.5	9.7	2.2	29
External Balance				
PRSC countries	-17.2	-15.7	1.5	-9
Better Performing Non-PRSC	-15.6	-14.6	1.0	-6
non-PRSC countries	-14.1	-12.8	1.3	-9
all IDA countries	-13.9	-13.5	0.4	-3

Source: IEG estimates based on WDI data..

Appendix Table A6.5 PRSC and Non-PRSC Countries: Disaggregated CPIA Scores, 1999 & 2007

	1999 ¹	2007	% Change
PRSC			
Economic Management	3.9	4.1	5.7
Structural Policies	3.5	3.7	7.0
Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity	3.5	3.7	5.2
Public Sector Management	3.1	3.4	9.7
Overall	3.5	3.7	7.2
Non-PRSC - Better Performers¹			
Economic Management	3.5	3.7	6.3
Structural Policies	3.3	3.6	8.3
Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity	3.2	3.4	5.3
Public Sector Management	3.0	3.2	8.0
Overall	3.2	3.5	7.3
Non-PRSC			
Economic Management	3.3	3.4	2.8
Structural Policies	3.1	3.4	7.0
Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity	3.0	3.2	5.2
Public Sector Management	2.8	3.0	6.8
Overall	3.1	3.2	5.6

Note: ¹ Non-PRSC countries with CPIA of 3.0 or greater in 1999

Source: IEG Estimates

Appendix Table A6.6 POVCAL Poverty Data for IDA and PRSC Countries

Year	H	PG	PG Sq	Year	H	PG	PG Sq
All IDA Countries (n = 56):				Non-PRSC Countries (n=46)			
1984	47.5	22.4	13.5	1984	45.0	22.3	14.1
1990	46.9	21.6	12.9	1990	51.0	14.5	5.6
1999	43.7	18.0	10.0	1999	44.1	18.6	10.6
% change	-7.8	19.5	26.4	% change	-2.1	-16.7	-25.0
2005	37.6	14.3	7.4	2005	39.3	15.2	8.0
% change	-14.1	-20.6	-26.0	% change	-10.8	-18.2	-24.7
PRSC Countries (n= 20)				Better Performing Non-PRSC Countries (n=24)			
1984	45.0	22.3		1984	49.1	24.4	16.1
1990	51.0	14.5		1990	45.2	21.3	13.2
1999	44.1	18.6		1999	42.9	17.4	9.6
% change	-2.1	-16.7		% change	-12.6	-28.5	-40.5
2005	39.3	15.2		2005	37.3	13.9	7.0
% change	-10.8	-18.2		% change	-13.0	-20.5	-26.6

Note: Simple averages of country data for each year and category.

H = Poverty Headcount (numbers below poverty line divided by total population, using \$38 per month, 2005 PPP, POVCAL estimates). These numbers differ from the usual POVCAL estimates because they are simple averages of country data, unweighted by country population.

PG = Poverty Gap (an index of the gap between the poverty line and the income of those living below the poverty line)

PG Sq = Squared Poverty Gap (places more weight on those whose income is furthest from the poverty line)

N = number of countries. The number of PRSC and non-PRSC countries differs slightly from other tables because of the lack of data for all countries.

Source: World Bank POVCAL database

Appendix Table A6.7 MDG Goals/ Social Indicators (% of population)

	1990	1991	1995	2000	2006	Difference (%)		Avg Annual Change	
						(1990/1to 2000/1)	(2001 - 2006)	(1990/1to 2000/1)	(2001 to 2006)
Primary Enrollment, net									
PRSC	n.a.	62.8	n.a.	68.9	79.1	9.7	14.8	1.0	2.5
Better Performing Non PRSC	n.a.	67.6	n.a.	75.1	80.0	11.1	6.5	1.1	1.1
Non PRSC	n.a.	62.8	n.a.	70.6	75.2	12.4	6.5	1.2	1.1
All IDA countries	n.a.	62.8	n.a.	70.1	76.5	11.6	9.1	1.2	1.5
Secondary Enrollment, gross									
PRSC	n.a.	31.2	n.a.	40.1	49.3	28.5	22.9	2.9	3.8
Better Performing Non PRSC	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.			0.0	0.0
Non PRSC	n.a.	36.4	n.a.	43.8	55.1	20.3	25.8	2.0	4.3
All IDA countries	n.a.	34.6	n.a.	42.8	53.2	23.7	24.3	2.4	4.0
Infant Mortality (per 1000)									
PRSC	82.8	n.a.	76.2	67.1	58.2	-19.0	-13.3	-1.9	-2.2
Better Performing Non PRSC	80.7	n.a.	74.6	68.1	61.3	-15.6	-10.0	-1.6	-1.7
Non PRSC	87.6	n.a.	82.6	76.5	70.1	-12.7	-8.4	-1.3	-1.4
All IDA countries	86.2	n.a.	80.7	73.7	66.6	-14.5	-9.6	-1.5	-1.6
Child Mortality (per 1000)									
PRSC	125.6	n.a.	115.3	101.3	87.5	-19.3	-13.6	-1.9	-2.3
Better Performing Non PRSC	133.7	n.a.	122.8	111.1	99.7	-16.9	-10.3	-1.7	-1.7
Non PRSC	130.0	n.a.	120.8	110.9	101.3	-14.7	-8.7	-1.5	-1.4
All IDA countries	130.7	n.a.	122.0	110.9	99.9	-15.1	-9.9	-1.5	-1.7
Access to Safe Water									
PRSC	57.3	n.a.	64.6	68.9	73.9	20.2	7.3	2.0	1.2
Better Performing Non PRSC	64.6	n.a.	68.8	71.9	74.7	11.3	3.9	1.1	0.6
Non PRSC	62.9	n.a.	65.8	68.9	71.5	9.5	3.8	1.0	0.6
All IDA countries	61.2	n.a.	65.4	68.9	72.2	12.6	4.8	1.3	0.8
Access to Sanitation									
PRSC	25.5	n.a.	38.4	41.5	46.2	62.7	11.3	6.3	1.9
Better Performing Non PRSC	45.3	n.a.	51.9	54.0	54.5	19.2	0.9	1.9	0.2
Non PRSC	36.4	n.a.	43.6	45.5	46.1	25.0	1.3	2.5	0.2
All IDA countries	33.1	n.a.	42.0	44.3	46.1	33.8	4.1	3.4	0.7

Note: Years were chosen on the basis of most complete observations.

Source: World Bank, WDI data bank

Appendix Table A6.8 Objectives of PRSC Operations in Health, Education and Water Supply/ Sanitation

Objective Type ¹	Freq. of Objective (Nos)	Freq. of Objective (%)	Freq. of Operation (Nos)	Freq. of Operation (%)
A. Health				
Improved efficiency and accountability of resource use	29	15.1	29	15.4
Improved access and utilization of care	57	29.7	53	28.2
Improved health outcomes	26	13.5	26	13.8
Enhanced service delivery	22	11.5	22	11.7
Improved sectoral management and regulation	23	12	23	12.2
Increased private provision and community participation	1	0.5	1	0.5
Higher sectoral spending	1	0.5	1	0.5
Combat HIV/AIDS	11	5.7	11	5.9
Increased financial protection	14	7.3	14	7.4
Other	8	4.2	8	4.3
Total	192	100	188	100
B. Education				
Increased efficiency	24	11.6	24	12.2
Improved access	50	24.2	47	24
Increased educational attainment	19	9.2	19	9.7
Improved learning outcomes	11	5.3	11	5.6
Improved sectoral management	17	8.2	17	8.7
Improved equity in access	6	2.9	6	3.1
Improved teacher incentives	9	4.3	9	4.6
Improved quality	49	23.7	41	20.9
Other	22	10.6	22	11.2
Total	207	100	196	100
C. Water Supply/Sanitation				
Increase urban access	21	25.9	21	25.9
Increase rural access	25	30.9	25	30.9
Improve management and maintenance	12	14.8	12	14.8
Improve sectoral donor coordination	1	1.2	1	1.2
Improve efficiency	4	4.9	4	4.9
Improve quality and service delivery	3	3.7	3	3.7
Strengthen financial sustainability	4	4.9	4	4.9
Improve hygiene	1	1.2	1	1.2
Other	10	12.3	10	12.3
Total	81	100	81	100

Source: T. Haq, "Social Sectors In PRSCs" IEG Background Paper, December 2008 (IEG World Bank).

Appendix Table A6.9 PRSC Conditions in Health, Education and Water Supply / Sanitation

	Frequency of Conditions		Frequency of Conditions		Frequency of Operations		Frequency of Operations	
	Core	Non-core	Core %	Non-core %	Core	Non-core	Core %	Non-core %
1. Health Sector Conditions								
Sectoral budget formulation, execution, allocation	17	53	19.8	16.5	16	38	19.8	15.6
Benefits package, health insurance and public subsidies	14	39	16.3	12.1	14	29	17.3	11.9
Human resource management	3	35	3.5	10.9	3	27	3.7	11.1
Preparation/adoption of strategy or plan	6	23	7.0	7.1	5	18	6.2	7.4
Health sector management and governance	4	21	4.7	6.5	4	18	4.9	7.4
Targeted programs in underserved areas	3	19	3.5	5.9	3	15	3.7	6.1
HIV/AIDS	5	19	5.8	5.9	4	18	4.9	7.4
Provider network organization, provider payment	5	19	5.8	5.9	5	15	6.2	6.1
Decentralization	1	15	1.2	4.7	1	14	1.2	5.7
Pharmaceutical policy	1	11	1.2	3.4	1	10	1.2	4.1
Satisfactory performance per health sector review	4	7	4.7	2.2	4	7	4.9	2.9
Nutrition	4	6	4.7	1.9	3	6	3.7	2.5
Increased sectoral spending	8	3	9.3	0.9	8	3	9.9	1.2
Legislation/regulation	0	3	0.0	0.9	0	3	0.0	1.2
Other	11	49	12.8	15.2	10	23	12.3	9.4
TOTAL	86	322	100	100	81	244	100.0	100.0
2. Education Sector Conditions								
Sectoral budget formulation/execution/ allocation	15	43	14.3	17.9	14	30	14.6	16.1
Sectoral monitoring, publication of monitoring results	6	25	5.7	10.4	3	14	3.1	7.5
Education subsidies & inclusion of underserved students	12	21	11.4	8.8	12	20	12.5	10.8
Teacher recruitment, deployment and remuneration plans	17	19	16.2	7.9	15	13	15.6	7.0
Vocational Training and Education	10	18	9.5	7.5	9	13	9.4	7.0
Sectoral management and ministerial organization	2	14	1.9	5.8	2	9	2.1	4.8
Sectoral management and ministerial organization	2	10	1.9	4.2	2	7	2.1	3.8
Measure to improve quality	6	9	5.7	3.8	6	9	6.3	4.8
Curriculum reform	1	8	1.0	3.3	1	8	1.0	4.3
Higher education reform	1	8	1.0	3.3	1	6	1.0	3.2
Expansion of education facilities	0	7	0.0	2.9	0	7	0.0	3.8
Increase sectoral spending	6	6	5.7	2.5	6	6	6.3	3.2
Learning assessment	3	6	2.9	2.5	3	6	3.1	3.2
Reforms to improve efficiency	3	5	2.9	2.1	3	5	3.1	2.7
Satisfactory implementation of sector program	2	4	1.9	1.7	2	4	2.1	2.2
School based management/community involvement	4	4	3.8	1.7	3	4	3.1	2.2
Early childhood education	0	4	0.0	1.7	0	4	0.0	2.2
Satisfactory progress on Education For All	6	3	5.7	1.3	6	3	6.3	1.6
Other	9	26	8.6	10.8	8	18	8.3	9.7
TOTAL	105	240	100	100	96	186	100.0	100.0
3. Water Supply and Sanitation Conditions								
Implementation of sector strategy review recommendation	8	5	22.2	3.5	8	5	22.9	4.4
Budget formulation/execution/investment planning	2	10	5.6	7.0	2	10	5.7	8.8
Inst. reforms pvt. sector participation, perf. contracting	6	20	16.7	14.0	5	15	14.3	13.3
Action plan, strategy, studies	1	20	2.8	14.0	1	12	2.9	10.6
Water supply expansion	0	7	0.0	4.9	0	7	0.0	6.2
Sectoral management and governance	2	12	5.6	8.4	2	10	5.7	8.8
Sectoral monitoring systems and publication of results	0	7	0.0	4.9	0	6	0.0	5.3
Legislation/regulation	5	9	13.9	6.3	5	9	14.3	8.0
Measure to move towards SWAP	0	3	0.0	2.1	0	3	0.0	2.7
Staffing/HR management	4	6	11.1	4.2	4	6	11.4	5.3
Tariffs and pricing policy	3	6	8.3	4.2	3	6	8.6	5.3
Other	5	38	13.9	26.6	5	24	14.3	21.2
TOTAL	36	143	100	100	35	113	100	100

Source: T. Haq, "Social Sectors In PRSCs" IEG Background Paper, Dec 2008

Appendix Table A6.10 Poverty Reducing Expenditures of PRSC and HIPC Countries, 2001-2007 (US m)

COUNTRY		2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Benin	% of Gov't Revenues	41.8	35.4	25.3	24.9	28.7	22.2	21.5
	% of GDP	6.4	5.8	4.3	4.1	4.5	3.9	4.7
Burkina Faso	% of Gov't Revenues	35.4	39.0	35.6	39.0	46.5	40.5	39.0
	% of GDP	3.9	4.8	4.6	5.5	5.7	5.5	5.6
Ethiopia	% of Gov't Revenues	47.8	58.9	54.7	56.8	69.5	75.4	73.9
	% of GDP	9.0	11.3	11.7	11.7	13.2	13.9	13.1
Ghana	% of Gov't Revenues	25.1	26.5	31.1	34.5	32.9	48.7	42.8
	% of GDP	4.5	4.8	6.5	7.7	8.5	10.6	9.3
Guyana	% of Gov't Revenues	62.5	65.0	61.6	53.7	57.2	56.8	0.0
	% of GDP	20.7	20.9	21.4	20.0	21.1	21.1	
Honduras	% of Gov't Revenues	48.4	40.9	40.5	42.8	46.7	30.4	33.9
	% of GDP	7.5	6.3	6.4	7.0	7.7	7.0	7.8
Madagascar	% of Gov't Revenues	41.8	54.3	35.4	25.6	104.0	102.6	92.0
	% of GDP	4.2	4.2	3.7	3.1	10.5	10.9	10.5
Malawi	% of Gov't Revenues	56.0	63.0	52.3	37.3	43.2	49.9	57.7
	% of GDP	9.4	7.1	7.5	6.3	7.6	8.5	10.9
Mali	% of Gov't Revenues	39.5	33.5	42.0	42.7	41.3	42.0	44.1
	% of GDP	5.1	5.7	7.3	7.0	7.4	7.2	8.1
Mozambique	% of Gov't Revenues	145.5	127.1	123.3	113.0	101.6	109.5	102.0
	% of GDP	14.5	15.3	16.3	17.7	13.7	16.1	18.0
Nicaragua	% of Gov't Revenues	47.4	54.4	56.0	54.0	55.4	49.4	51.1
	% of GDP	8.8	10.2	11.4	12.0	12.7	12.0	12.9
Rwanda	% of Gov't Revenues	48.1	54.8	53.9	52.8	66.5	72.3	84.2
	% of GDP	5.4	6.6	6.5	6.9	9.1	9.6	11.7
Senegal	% of Gov't Revenues	37.0	30.4	33.8	40.9	46.0	41.0	40.7
	% of GDP	6.2	5.9	6.6	8.1	8.4	8.6	9.0
Tanzania	% of Gov't Revenues	53.7	73.0	80.0	76.3	81.0	100.3	115.3
	% of GDP	5.3	7.4	8.1	8.8	9.3	11.9	16.8
Uganda	% of Gov't Revenues	36.0	48.1	47.9	40.5	40.1	39.0	36.6
	% of GDP	4.2	4.8	5.5	5.2	4.9	4.8	5.2
PRSC Countries ²	% of Gov't Revenue	51.1	53.6	51.6	49.0	57.4	58.7	55.7
	% of GDP	7.7	8.1	8.5	8.7	9.6	10.1	10.3
Select PRSC Countries ³	% of Gov't Revenue	53.4	57.3	54.1	50.8	62.7	66.9	66.7
	% of GDP	6.1	6.8	6.9	7.4	8.3	9.2	10.2
HIPC (non PRSC) Countries ⁴	% of Gov't Revenue	42.9	49.3	49.2	47.1	46.6	41.9	40.6
	% of GDP	7.9	8.0	8.4	8.4	7.8	8.2	8.3
Interim HIPC Countries ⁵	% of Gov't Revenue	33.2	27.7	27.8	26.5	35.5	34.4	34.1
	% of GDP	4.13	3.6	4.1	4.15	4.6	5.6	6.1
All HIPC Countries ⁶	% of Gov't Revenue	46.1	47.7	45.9	43.7	49.5	48.7	46.4
	% of GDP	7.2	7.3	7.6	7.7	8.0	8.5	8.6

¹The coverage of poverty-reducing expenditures varies across countries, but is generally consistent with the definition in the PRSP and the budget of each HIPC. In some countries, the definition of poverty-reducing expenditures has evolved over time to include more sectors; therefore, some of the increase in such spending over the 2000-2003 period may reflect changes in the definition. In the majority of countries expenditures on health and education are included but beyond that there are wide variations in the sectoral spending included.

²PRSC countries in this sample: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda.

³Select PRSC countries are a subset of the same countries, consisting of those countries with the longest PRSC series: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

⁴HIPC (non-PRSC) countries are: Bolivia, Cameroon, The Gambia, Mauritania, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe and Sierra Leone.

⁵Interim HIPC countries are: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.

⁶All HIPC countries include all of the above mentioned countries combined.

Source: IDA and IMF (2008) Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and MDRI Initiative. Status of Implementation. September.

Annex 1. Bank Guidance to Staff: Adjustment Lending, PRSCs and DPLs

The PRSC emphasized *support to the country's medium term program* as an objective, as elaborated in the country's own Poverty Reduction Strategy paper (PRSP). Earlier guidelines for adjustment lending (1992), in contrast, emphasized stabilization as an objective, although they also described the need for structural changes to enhance efficiency, growth and reductions in poverty. Structural changes were described largely in terms of market deregulation, trade liberalization and factor mobility. Development Policy loan (DPL) guidelines of 2004, like PRSCs, emphasize the importance of country ownership and a broad based consultative process underpinning a program of structural reform.

The PRSC is described in its Guidelines as an instrument designed to support IDA countries implement their *poverty reduction* reform programs. The focus of 1992 guidelines was largely on macro, trade and regulatory areas and did not include pro-poor service delivery. However, they mention that sustainable reduction of poverty is the overarching objective of the Bank's country assistance strategies. Adjustment operations may include the direct reduction of poverty through a reorientation of public expenses.

Even in 1992, guidelines urged that *conditionality* should be limited to key areas of policy and institutional reforms. Staff should be 'as economical as possible' in deciding on the number of conditions. The PRSC 'Interim guidelines' do not refer to conditionality. They describe the need for a set of 'prior actions' critical for the success of the medium term program, to be completed before negotiations, as well as an articulation in each operation of the 'triggers' for the next one. Subsequent DPL guidelines refer to the need to identify critical conditions and disburse against these as well as an overall program, and the need to harmonize conditionality with other partners. An accompanying memorandum advised staff to specify no more than ten conditions and/or triggers.

On the *number of tranches*, 1992 guidelines had already introduced the possibility of single tranching when the borrower completed relevant reforms prior to loan effectiveness, to foster political acceptability. In 2000, programmatic loan guidelines reintroduced the idea of a series of operations to gradually support country capacity. PRSC guidelines build upon these, and state that single as well as multi-tranche operations were possible. The time horizon of the PRSC series ideally corresponds to the PRSP and CAS periods. DPL guidelines of 2004 also clearly spell out the programmatic approach with single tranche operations.

In terms of *country eligibility*, the 'Interim guidelines' suggest that PRSCs would support low-income countries with a clearly articulated Poverty Reduction strategy, 'relatively strong programs,' commitment to change, capacity and readiness to improve public financial management arrangements. DPL guidelines extend the broad principles of commitment, institutions, governance, natural resource management and CPIA performance to all borrowers. In practice, PRSCs became increasingly regarded as an instrument for the highest performing clients. This was explicitly spelled out in only one region, Africa, in the region's 'Strategic Framework for IDA Assistance' (2003).

The notion that the PRSC would provide a focal point for *donor harmonization*, articulated in the 'Interim Guidelines' was a new element in Bank guidelines. PRSC guidelines also em-

phasized the importance of *results-focused indicators* and harmonized *monitoring and evaluation*. These changes reflected evolving thinking under the Comprehensive Development Framework and the Emerging Partnership model.

Sources: World Bank - Operational Manual Operational Directive OD8.60, 'Adjustment Lending'. December 1992; 'Guidelines for Programmatic Adjustment Loans / Credits', February 11, 2000, 'Interim Guidelines for Poverty Reduction Support Credits', Memo to staff, March 21, 2001; OP and BP 8.60, 'Development Policy Lending' August 2004.; Conditionality Note (James W. Adams) September 14, 2004.

Annex 2. Parallel Shifts in External and Internal Aid Paradigms

Early assessments of adjustment lending undertaken at the Bank were largely positive, finding improvements in performance with respect to growth and macro indicators, as embodied in three Reports on Adjustment Lending (World Bank 1988, 1990 and 1992), also endorsed by the Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (1986). External critics in the 1990s found less evidence for positive links between structural adjustment programs and economic growth (Mosely, Harrigan and Toye 1991) and pointed out that without *country ownership* of the reform program, there would be little sustained progress (Killick 1996, Collier et al., 1997, Killick et. al., 1998). Conditionality on its own could hamper the reform agenda (Gilbert, Powell, Vines 1999). The message that emerged (e.g. Dollar and Pritchard 1998, Dollar and Svensson 2000), was that aid supports growth-enhancing economic reforms when the government is willing and able to put into place the appropriate policy environment.

That domestic *governance and institutions* lies at the heart of the success or failure of structural reforms was further emphasized by research which reformulated the modeling of endogenous determinants of growth to include the quality of institutions and showed this to have a strong effect (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997; Barro 1998). Research also showed negative implications for growth of weak institutions and corruption (Mauro 1995). The 1997 World Development Report on "The State in a Changing World" reflects these changes in emphasis, which were incorporated into a new effort to build to capacity of public institutions, curb corruption, and better measure and design public financial management systems.

Critics of adjustment lending also found that traditional structural adjustment was not helpful to *poverty reduction* (Stewart, 1991, Jayarajah, Branson and Sen 1996, Killick, 1999.), and may have hurt the poor or contributed to inequality. Disagreements among researchers over the linkages between economic policies, growth and poverty reduction (e.g. Dollar and Kraay 2002, Ravallion and Datt 2002) pointed to the need for a more pragmatic approach towards understanding the linkages between these elements. Meanwhile a multi-dimensional, microeconomic approach towards poverty reduction developed through the adoption of the Human Development Index, (Sen, 1985,1999, Dasgupta 1995, Bourgignon and Chakravarty 1999), which was reflected in the adoption of the micro level target specific International Development Goals (later, the Millennium Development Goals) as a global development objective. These studies also articulated the need for greater support to service delivery sectors for poverty reduction. Research indicated that properly targeted public expenditures could help promote economic growth (Devarajan, Swarup and Zou 1996).

Reflecting the new thinking, the World Bank introduced its *Comprehensive Development Framework* (CDF) in 1999 as an approach towards development assistance. It emphasized a long-term and holistic vision of development, focused on poverty reduction, based on country ownership and partnership, with a focus on results contributing towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The *Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative* (PRS) was launched in tandem with the CDF to put its key principles into practice. Countries articulated their medium term vision of pro-poor development in a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which then served as a blueprint for a country led global development part-

nership, serving as a focal point for donor initiatives. The PRSP was also intended to provide the basis for support to Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (the HIPC program) and subsequent Multi-donor Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).

Independent evaluations of the PRSP approach (Joint WB-IMF reports, 2002 and 2005 and OED PRS Evaluation 2003) found early PRSPs to be of varying quality regarding strategic prioritization, ease of operationalization and civil society participation. *Poverty Reduction Support Credits* were introduced in 2001 to aid the operationalization of the PRSPs, providing financing in the form of general budget support to promote the reform effort. PRSCs were intended to accompany the IMF's PRGF (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility), which focused on macro adjustment. The PRSC would provide the focus on structural change in parallel.

The design of the PRSCs included a role for *increased coordination of Bank assistance with donors*. At that time, within the broader development community, donors had begun to move away from project-based assistance in favor of aid that more intensively used country systems by disbursing aid directly into the budget. This approach was motivated by a greater appreciation for the fungibility of aid (Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou 1999), and also from a realization of the importance of building and using country systems and of the role of priority sector spending in reducing poverty via improved service delivery (Koeberle 2003, White and Dijkstra 2003, Morrissey 2004). From as early as 2000, efforts were being made by many in the international aid community to coordinate program-based aid using what has come to be known as *partnership-based general budget support* (OECD, 2006).

There was increasing acknowledgement that development assistance, often based on donor foreign policies and political considerations, could be highly unpredictable in timing or volume (Alesina and Dollar 2000). The potentially damaging effects of *aid volatility* became an increasing concern as research pointed out adverse macroeconomic consequences; for example, recipients recourse to short term borrowing to cover lapses in aid, with negative growth impacts (Lensick and Morrissey 2000, Bulir and Hamann 2003, Chauvet and Guilamont, 2007). The need for predictable, non-volatile support, with disbursements timed to recipient country budget cycles for effective medium-term expenditure budgeting (Eifert and Gelb 2006; Celasun and Walliser, 2007) was recognized.

Yet today, broad based concerns about aid remain, for example, that aid may not have any observable association with growth and that the aid growth relationship is no better even in environments with sound policies (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). Concerns have also been voiced that aid, like 'dutch disease', can lead to loose economic management, 'crowd out' local initiatives (Moyo 2009) or simply be wasted (Calderisi 2006). The debate about budget-based aid also continues, in some cases due to concerns about ownership and remaining excessive conditionality (Wood 2005), in others due to concerns about fiduciary aspects of recipient budget systems (Alexander, 2008), and potential for leakage into unintended areas such as patronage or military expenditure (Collier, 2007; 2009). Today there is an increased focus on measuring results through aid, reflected in the Paris Declaration. Better monitoring and capacity building were mainstreamed into the IDA15 replenishment process. And the need to evaluate 'vertical' aid systems in parallel to budget support is proposed for the follow up to the Paris Declaration evaluation (Paris Declaration International Working Group 2009).

Annex 3. Methodology and Data Sources

METHODOLOGY

Wherever possible, data permitting, the evaluation seeks to (i) compare the performance of PRSC beneficiaries before and after engagement in the PRSC program, as well as to (ii) compare potential changes in outcomes to those experienced by IDA countries that have not benefited from PRSCs. Such analyses are applied to the evaluation of differences in PRSC design and process as well as to the assessment of PRSC outcomes.

It is recognized that ‘before’ and ‘after’ comparisons of outcomes are limited by problems of identification due to the endogeneity of policy responses within each country (Box 1). A series of changes in economic policies and aid parameters were taking place in any given country, over its PRSC period, which affected outcomes achieved. ‘With’ and ‘without’ comparisons of different groups of IDA countries may permit better identification of the counterfactual, provided controls are applied for other factors which may affect the relation between the two groups of countries. In the present case, a further filter has therefore been applied in many areas of the analysis to restrict the comparison group of PRSC countries to those other IDA countries which also meet the general criterion of good performance that has been expected in PRSC countries. This helps to better isolate the extent the PRSC instrument itself has contributed to development outcomes.

Nevertheless, caveats apply to the interpretation of the analysis. It is recognized, first, that the period of the PRSC investigated here, 2001 to 2008, was also a period of changes affecting all Bank development policy lending. Second, the PRSC is only often one part of a larger basket of donor funded general budget support and only one of several instruments used by the Bank or by other donor partners to support country development programs. These factors imply that results cannot be ascribed uniquely to the PRSC instrument.

Third, it is recognized that Bank policies and practices towards the PRSC as well as towards other policy based lending evolved over the period 2001 to 2008, especially after the introduction of new guidelines for development policy lending introduced in August 2004. Whenever data are available, the analysis has therefore attempted to further filter results obtained for PRSC countries into two sub-periods, 2001 to 2004 and 2005 to 2008, to investigate possible differences in results obtained for PRSC countries across the two periods.

COMPLEMENTARITY WITH OTHER EVALUATIONS

The PRSC evaluation complements other recent reviews and evaluations of budget support in three distinct ways: (i) it has a greatly expanded country coverage, at 27 countries, compared to the 8 country coverage of, e.g., the OECD DAC study, or the five country coverage of the USAID study; (ii) it focuses on the development effectiveness of the *Bank's* engagement through budget support within the framework of the PRSC and (iii) it looks further in-

to the effectiveness of PRSCs as a vehicle to support sectoral development, particularly in the service delivery sectors.¹

The PRSC evaluation builds upon previous IEG evaluations of Bank operations, notably, the Poverty Reduction Strategy and HIPC initiative evaluations (OED 2003 and IEG 2006 update). It has also been conducted in coordination with the ongoing IEG evaluation of Bank Support for Public Sector Reform and of Bank Support to the Health Sector. Coordination has also been maintained with working groups outside IEG who have been undertaking analyses of service delivery sectors, notably, the Water Supply and Sanitation program.

Box 1. Evaluating Program Based Budget Support: Evolution of Methodology

Early evaluations of policy based lending at the World Bank focused largely on macroeconomic and structural impacts of adjustment/stabilization programs (World Bank, 1989, 1998, 1990, OED 1988), basic approaches (described in Haque & Kahn 1998) comparing conditions before and after a program in a given country (Reichmann and Stillson 1978); comparing countries with and without a program (Donovan (1981, 1982)), adjusting if possible for differences in initial conditions or in exogenous variables, or simulating outcomes based on sample selection. (Goldstein & Montiel 1986). These approaches encounter problems of endogeneity as well as selection problems.

By the late 1990s, there was growing dissatisfaction with the cross-country comparison approach to evaluating aid, especially at the macroeconomic level results were shown to be highly dependent on sample selection and model specification (Easterly et al. 2003, Roodman 2004, Rajan & Subramanian 2005, Rodrik 2005, Doucouliagos & Paldam 2005). This coincided with a more multidimensional approach to understanding poverty and a growing consensus on role of institutions in development. There was a parallel change in aid evaluation techniques with a greater focus on mixed methods and understanding qualitative process of institutional change (Picciotto & Wiesner 1998; OED 2000).

A more pragmatic logical framework approach to evaluation began to be used, linking inputs (financial resources technical advice and policy dialogue) to outputs and then to desired outcomes and finally to overall program impact. An adaptation of the log-frame approach to program aid evaluation was developed by Lawson and Booth (2004) for particular application to general budget support, in the context of a seven country case study for the OECD/ DfID. Donor inputs in the form of aid, budget support and policies led to outputs in the form of institutional changes, and thence to outcomes as in public sector (empowerment of poor, increase in incomes). This basic framework has remained in use, as in a recent ODI evaluation of budget support to Ghana, albeit with some added variants (e.g. the inclusion of gender issues in evaluation design). The present evaluation follows a similar approach.

The debate on the best approach to program aid evaluation remains. Elbers, Gunning and de Hoop (2009) develop an approach which disaggregates program aid to its component sector-wide interventions (e.g. the education sector in Zambia) where it gauges the impact of specific interventions using a variant of difference-in-difference estimation.

DATA SOURCES

In terms of data sources, the evaluation is based upon the following five major building blocks as follows:

¹ Recent evaluations of general budget support include the Joint DAC and Partners Evaluation of General Budget Support, 1994-2004 and a USAID study on general budget support (Development Information Services, 2005), as referred to in Koeberle, Stavroski and Walliser (2006)

Comprehensive Desk Review of the PRSC Portfolio

This takes stock, in particular, of PRSC design and implementation features, with particular focus on country specificity, to capture standardized results across all operations for specific questions. The desk review examines in particular: (i) the relationship of PRSCs to Poverty Reduction Strategies; (ii) the quality of the results framework for PRSC operations and how effectively PRSCs have helped operationalize country PRSs and bolster their results orientation; (iii) PRSC design in terms of conditionality and flexibility, including exit strategies for PRSCs that were terminated early; (iv) the sectoral content of PRSCs, with a special focus on pro-poor service delivery sub-sectors: health, education and water supply and sanitation and the approach taken by the PRSC towards these sectors; (v) the substitutability or complementarity of the PRSCs sectoral components to other Bank sectoral operations; i.e., where and under what conditions PRSCs were the Bank's sole vehicle to provide support, and whether the PRSCs attempted to and succeeded in replacing sectoral lending; (vi) the achievement, in PRSC countries, of overall CAS country program outcomes, and how PRSCs may have contributed to the achievement of these objectives; and finally, (vii) the portfolio review provides information as available on questions such as the role of donors in specific countries, the use of a joint performance matrix, the nature of PRSC disbursement patterns in specific country contexts, and exit related issues in the context of PRSCs which terminated earlier than foreseen.

The desk review covers not only the program documents and accompanying Credit Agreements for PRSCs, but also associated loan documents for pre-PRSC policy based loans to PRSC countries, as well as a small number of available implementation completion reports (ICRs) and associated IEG ICR reviews (40) and project performance assessments (3) currently available. It also refers to country assistance strategy (CAS) documents, CAS completion reports and their IEG reviews when available as well as IEG Country Assistance Evaluations, and IEG Project Performance Assessment Reviews (PPARs), currently available for 4 PRSC countries. The small number of CAS CR reviews and PPARs limits the extent to which the portfolio review has been able to also assess country level achievements of PRSCs.²

In addition to reviewing the descriptive and evaluative materials described above the section on public financial management also includes, for each PRSC series, the Public Expenditure Review (PER), Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) for public financial management (PFM) issues and a Country Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) for procurement, or a comparable integrated report (such as the former HIPC Assessment and Action Plans (AAPs) and World Bank Public Expenditure and Financial Analysis reports (PEFAs)).

In-Depth Country Case Studies

Country Case Studies involving extensive field work were undertaken for seven countries which have completed at least one full PRSC series, to validate and supplement the findings of the portfolio reviews and other instruments described below. Country case study ques-

² As individual PRSCs typically form part of a programmatic series of two to four operations, a full ICR is only prepared at the completion of the series. Currently, IEG has only reviewed seven full ICRs for PRSCs of which three are for PRSCs which were halted in mid-course. The first two PPARs are under preparation.

tions addressed were standardized and rated on the IEG scale of 1-6, for a core set of principal questions. Further comparisons on a 1-4 scale were undertaken on an ex post basis for a number of additional questions. The seven countries were selected to reflect geographical balance as well as a spectrum of PRSC outcomes. The countries covered include: Armenia, Benin, Ghana, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Vietnam. Together, these seven countries account for 31 PRSC operations, 8 completed PRSC series, another 4 ongoing series, and 33% of total disbursements for PRSCs over the period FY01-FY08. A summary of the results obtained in respect of key questions from the seven case studies is presented in Annex 1 to this report.

Three Surveys – Bank Task Managers, Bank Team Members and Country Clients

Task Team Leader Survey: This survey attempted to cover all Task Team Leaders (TTL) of PRSCs. A total of 51 responses were received, for the 87 PRSCs undertaken through FY08. However, in many cases a PRSC TTL continued as the team leader for several PRSCs in a series. Effective coverage, via this survey, of TTLs for the 87 PRSC operations amounts to 69 operations, or 79 percent of total operations through FY08. A summary of results is presented in Annex 2 to this report.

PRSC Team Member Survey. The survey was targeted to sector specialist Bank staff and consultants who have served as members of task teams for PRSC operations. Sampled staff were identified through lists in PRSC Project Appraisal Documents. The aim of the survey was to obtain a reasonably representative sample of results, rather than to achieve complete coverage of all persons who had served as PRSC team members. This was implemented through stratified sampling designed to maximize country representation and diversified sector coverage. The final sample consists of 76 respondents in 23 of the 27 PRSC countries and broad cross-sectoral coverage. Details of the sample and its findings are presented in Table 1 below and results are described in Annex 3 to the report.

Table 1. PRSC Team Members: Sector Specialist Survey Responses

Sector	No. of respondents
Agriculture, environment, rural	16
Health, education, social protection	13
Public sector management	13
Energy, water, transport, urban, other infrastructure	15
Private sector development, finance	10
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM)	9
Total	76

Client Country Survey of Senior Government Officials engaged with PRSCs as key counterparts was carried out to gauge their perceptions of Bank support through PRSCs as opposed to other Bank instruments. The survey covered 41 clients from 24 of the 27 PRSC countries. A list of key persons was identified in consultation with task teams and country management, and these persons were contacted by phone or email initially, to seek cooperation. Responses were received in the format of a coded questionnaire as well as, in most cases, a follow up interview in person, on the phone or by videoconference. Respondents were mainly from central ministries such as economy, planning or finance, which play a coordinating role in the national development strategy (29 out of 41 or 71 percent). They also in-

cluded senior officials from the prime minister's offices (5 out of 41 or 12 percent), and from sectoral ministries such as education, health, and social protection (4 out of 41 or 10 percent). Remaining respondents were from central banks and academia (3 out of 41 or 7 percent).

Relevant Databases: Internal and External

The evaluation makes use of relevant internal Bank databases, notably the Business Warehouse database on loan approvals, commitments, amounts, etc; the ALCID database (Adjustment Lending Conditionality and Implementation database), the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) database, relevant variables from the World Development Indicator series, the POVCAL (poverty) database of the Bank, the regional Live Databases, the IMF International financial Statistics as well as internal ROSCs and PRGF reviews and IEG databases on its evaluative materials. Use has also been made of special purpose internal databases, for example the database on Results frameworks (compiled by OPCS), for 66 countries, which has also been extensively used outside the Bank for the surveillance of the Monitoring of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.

Relevant external databases have also been used, including, particularly, the 2006 and 2008 database on the Monitoring of Paris Declaration, the OECD Aid Aggregates database as well as the Worldwide governance indicators, the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International and OECD Budget and Procurement indicators

Relevant External Reviews, Evaluations, and Literature on Methodology

Finally, the report draws upon an extensive review of the literature external and internal to the Bank on a wide range of issues including, especially, the evolution in adjustment lending, recent writing on budget support, and poverty reduction strategies and their effectiveness, aid and its associations with attributes such as conditionality, predictability, growth and overall development, donor harmonization and alignment, capacity development and the use of results in managing development outcomes, public financial management, and the achievement of growth and poverty outcomes. Recent evaluative materials related to the effectiveness of general budget support, undertaken by the OECD and ODI have also provided supplemental data for the present evaluation, in respect of specific countries, and informed its methodology.

Annex 4. Analysis of Determinants of PRSC Selection 2001-4, 2005-8

The analysis below examines the relationship between key variables and the selection for a PRSC program for a group of 77 IDA-eligible countries. Using maximum likelihood estimation of the binary variable of whether a country received a PRSC, the analysis examines the determinants of selection for the periods of 2001-4 and 2005-8 separately.

The results show a statistically significant and large association of high CPIA scores with an increased likelihood of selection for a PRSC. Over 2001-4, a movement of average overall CPIA scores from 2.5 to 3.0 would increase the likelihood of selection by one-fourth. This association is largely the same regardless of whether overall, public sector average, public financial management, or corruption CPIA ratings are used, and is consistent with evidence that CPIA scores are highly correlated.

While most other results are consistent between the two periods (2001-4, 2005-8) there is evidence that for the 2005-8 period of relatively statistically significant and moderate association of greater stability of a government with increased likelihood of PRSC selection. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence about particular PRSCs, which has seemed to indicate that the Bank was slightly better at selecting countries with more sustainable reform efforts for PRSCs in later years of the program.

The relationship between the success of previous policy-based lending (as evaluated by IEG) and PRSC selection did not appear as strong, although there is some relative correlation (0.347). There is certainly a relationship between having a PRSP or comparable strategy document and selection for a PRSC, but because all PRSCs had PRSPs (or comparable) it was not easily included in our regressions, and the relationship between the two variables may be driven by underlying variables (i.e., countries that have neither PRSCs nor PRSPs tend to be extremely poorly governed or small island nations).

Inclusion of the lagged (for 2001-4) dependent variable as a determinant of 2005-8 selection for a PRSC indicated that may likely be a strong relationship between past selection for PRSC and current continuation of the program, even when CPIA scores are controlled for.

Data

The data collected came from a variety of sources. For almost all of these variables, the values were calculated separately for the cross-sectional dataset determining selection for the PRSC over 2001-2004 than the dataset for 2005-2008.

PRSC Selection - Variables on PRSC selection came from data gathered from Business Warehouse on approval and closure dates for PRSC programs. This variable is simply coded as a 1 for a country that has a PRSC program in the given years (either 2001-2004, or 2005-2008), and a 0 otherwise.

CPIA Scores - Data on the quality of country policies and institutions comes from the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). This analysis looks at average scores over each period considered for Q.13 on the Quality of Budget and Financial Management, Q.16

on the level of Transparency, Accountability, and Corruption in the Public Sector, average scores for Public Sector Q's 12-16, and overall CPIA scores (which are the average of ratings for all 16 questions). CPIA scores range from 1 (lowest institutional quality) to 6 (highest institutional quality). These variables reflect the quality of institutions and policies in sample countries as rated by Bank staff, and are meant to be a determinant (in some capacity) of the 'fitness' for policy-based lending, including PRSCs.

Average Policy Based Loan (PBL) Outcome Score - Data on the average IEG outcome score for the last 5 PBLs in a country were compiled from Business Warehouse. These values were arrived at by starting in the last year of the selection period (2004 and 2008 depending on the dataset) and then averaging the overall outcome score for the preceding 5 policy-based lending operations. Outcome scores are based on ratings from IEG Implementation Completion Report Reviews (ICR-Reviews) and from in-depth Project Performances Assessment Reports (PPARs). An ordinal ranking was given to ratings such that 1 corresponded to Highly Unsatisfactory, 2 to Unsatisfactory, 3 to Moderately Unsatisfactory, 5 to Moderately Satisfactory, 6 to Satisfactory, and 7 to Highly Satisfactory. These outcome scores are included as measure of the relative success of past policy-based lending operations, which will likely help to determine the decision to go ahead with a PRSC in a country.

Completion of a PRSP, NDS, or I-PRSP - As discussed in this evaluation in greater detail, explicit precondition for PRSC support is the completion by a country of its own Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). In several instances, however an 'adequate' National Development Strategy (NDS) or an Interim-PRSP (I-PRSP) has been enough to use. Data on PRSPs, NDSs and I-PRSPs was compiled from data in OED's 2005 evaluation of the PRS Initiative and from the PRS website.

Government Stability - Data on Government Stability come from the PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide. This dataset was originally produced by Phillip Keefer and Steven Knack³ in the 1990s as part of their inquiry into the relationship between economic growth and the quality of institutions and is still used as one of the major governance index datasets.⁴ The Government Stability variable measures "the government's ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office,"⁵ and includes three subcomponents: Government Unity, Legislative Strength, and Popular Support. The index is measured on a scale of 0 (very high risk) to 12 (very low risk), and is included because it is likely the most accurate way to capture the government in question's ability to credibly commit (both internally and externally) to the medium-term development strategy articulated in its poverty reduction strategy paper. Values were averaged for the years in each period (2001-4 and 2005-8) to arrive at the final scores. From anecdotal evidence some countries were apparently not granted PRSCs (or had PRSC programs discontinued) because the government could (or would) no longer support the PRSC. This can be because of an election causing a change in party that refuses, for whatever reason, to continue to support its predecessor's

³ Keefer, P., Knack, S., 1995. Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests using Alternative Institutional Measures. *Economics and Politics* 7, 207-227.

⁴ For example: R La Porta, A Shleifer, RW Vishny Trust in Large Organizations *The American Economic Review*, 1997, Sachs J and A Warner 1997 Fundamental Sources of Long Run Growth *The American Economic Review*, 1997, Tavares J 2003 Does Foreign Aid Corrupt? *Economic Letters*.

⁵ See "ICRG Methodology", International Country Risk Guide, PRS Group, http://www.prgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx#PolRiskRating, last accessed 5 March 2009.

reform agenda, because of a *coup d'état*, or even the erosion of popular or legislative support for a reform program. Even though the existence of a PRSP indicates that a country's government has made a good-faith effort to articulate, operationalized and start to put into motion a medium-term reform program, this does not guarantee its willingness or ability to continue to promote this program, a quality which the Government Stability is intended to capture.

1. Methodology

Given the variables stated above this analysis intends to analyze the determinants of selection for a PRSC using the following structural model (estimated separately for values over 2001-4 and 2005-8:

$$(1) \quad P(PRSC_i = 1 | x) = f(\beta_0 + \beta_1 CPIA_i + \beta_2 Outcome_i + \beta_3 PRSP_i + \beta_4 Stability_i + \varepsilon_i)$$

Where $PRSC_i$ is a binary variable for selection for a PRSC for country i , $CPIA$ reflects the country's CPIA score, $PRSP$ is a binary variable for whether the country has a PRSP, NDS, or I-PRSP, $Stability$ is the country's average Government Stability rating for the period in question, and ε is the error term.

Given the binary nature of the dependent variable and the cross-sectional nature of the data, an appropriate approach for estimating parameters for the β 's in (1) above is a probit model. Regressions using the 2005-2008 dataset will also include selection of the PRSC during the 2001-2004 period as an explanatory variable since, to some extent, *ceteris paribus*, already having a PRSC may be a plausible explanation for having one in the later period. Because the proper functional form for determining PRSC selection is only indicative, the approach taken here is to specify models from simplest to complex and let the indication of statistical significance, goodness-of-fit, and absence or lack of apparent confounding relationships (multicollinearity, omitted variables bias, reverse causality, etc.) lead specification.

Cross-sectional Probit Analysis

Table 1 below presents the results from four probit regressions to model the determinants of PRSC selection for the period of 2001-4. First, it should be mentioned that the results do not include the explanatory variable for having a PRSP because the likelihood estimation of the probit model found in all specifications including this variable (from the simplest bivariate, to more complex), that zero values of the dependent variable were perfectly predicted by zero values of the PRSP variable.⁶ The bivariate regression (1) shows that there is a positive relationship between the overall CPIA score and PRSC selection that is statistically significant to the 99% confidence level. This coefficient corresponds to a marginal effect of 0.467, indicating that at the mean (3.27), *ceteris paribus*, an increase of the CPIA by .10 increases the probability of getting a PRSC by 0.0467 (and a movement from, say 2.5 to 3.0 would increase the likelihood by one-fourth).

⁶ When a Linear Probability Model (LPM) form of this regression was run, there was a statistically significant value for this variable in most specifications. Given that having a PRSP is a prerequisite for the PRSC, it is not clear what the causal mechanism driving this close relationship is. Quite likely the existence of a PRSP is determined by underlying country conditions (e.g., commitment to reform), some of which are already measured here.

Regression (2) shows that when the score for CPIA Q.16 on Accountability, Transparency and Corruption is added, its coefficient is negative, small and not statistically significant (although the one for overall CPIA remains large, positive, and statistically significant). The negative sign on the corruption variable may be misleading given its statistical significance, but would otherwise indicate that less corruption decreases the likelihood of PRSC selection.⁷ When PRSC selection is regressed on Overall CPIA and CPIA Q. 13 on Quality of Budget and Financial Management, neither coefficient is statistically significant. These results reinforce correlation calculations between CPIA variables run prior to the regressions, which found high correlation among the three CPIA indicators. A likely result is that this high correlation is creating multicollinearity problems when more than one of these variables is included in the specification.

Regression (4) includes variables for Average PBL Outcome and Government Stability, both of which produce small, positive and not statistically significant coefficients. There is no substantive difference in the result when these variables are included separately in the regression with overall CPIA (these estimations were performed additionally, though the results are not reported here). However, when these variables are included without overall CPIA and separately, Average PBL Outcome is statistically significant and positive (this regression was run separately and is not reported here), but Government Stability is not. Also noteworthy is that fact that the coefficient for overall CPIA is much larger than those for the other specification in Table 4. This seems to be the result of the substantial decrease in sample size that occurs because of the limited coverage of the government stability variable. When the regression (1) is rerun restricted to the sample of 41 countries covered in regression (4), the magnitude of the overall CPIA coefficient is of a similar magnitude, 5.119, and highly statistically significant (this regression was run separately and is not reported here).

Annex 4 Table 1. Probit Regressions for PRSC Selection 2001-2004

Explanatory Vars:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Dependent Variable:			
	PRSC in 01-4	PRSC in 01-4	PRSC in 01-4	PRSC in 01-4
CPIA Overall	1.799*** (0.545)	2.594*** (0.827)	1.129 (0.775)	4.798*** (1.716)
CPIA Corrupt		-0.657 (0.469)		
CPIA PFM			0.741 (0.618)	
Avg PBL Outcome				0.405 (0.438)
Gov't Stability				0.138 (0.254)
Constant	-6.811*** (1.917)	-7.558*** (2.142)	-6.996*** (2.001)	-19.64*** (6.643)
Observations	76	76	76	41

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses

⁷ This is also the case for regression of PRSC selection on the overall CPIA and the public sector average, which is reported in the Appendix Table 2 in regression (6)

Table 2 below presents selected probit regressions of the determinants of PRSC selection for the period of 2005-8. The results are largely consistent with those in Table 4 in many ways: CPIA overall always has a large, positive, statistically significant (to 99% confidence interval) coefficient. The CPIA variables indicate a large amount of multicollinearity, with only the overall variable being statistically significant when the others are added to the regression. Similarly, the existence of a PRS drops out of the probit regression because of its perfect collinearity with the dependent variable. It is noteworthy that for this period, though, when Government Stability is added to Overall CPIA, it keeps a statistically significant (to 90% confidence interval), positive, and small (although nontrivial) coefficient (the marginal effect at the sample mean is that a 1 (of 12) step increase in Government Stability increases the probability of selection by 0.75) – indicating that Government Stability may be a minor determinant for this period.

When the values of the dependent variable for the 2001-4 period are included in the regression, they take a relatively large, and very statistically significant effect when included with overall CPIA. This indicates a potentially strong relationship between past PRSC selection and current in, involvement in the operation. This relationship does not remain robust when other variables are included in the specification (regression 6), although it is noteworthy that the coefficient for Government Stability remains statistically significant and at the same magnitude. Following Wooldridge 2002 (p. 405, 483), so long as this model is correctly specified, the probit estimator does not require independence over time, and dynamic completeness implies that the parameters are serially uncorrelated across time.⁸ Additional auxiliary regressions can be provided on request.

Regression results for both periods were run with robust standard errors to control for possible heteroskedasticity, but there were no systematic differences in standard errors reported.

Annex 4 Table 2. Probit Regressions for PRSC Selection 2005-2008

Explanatory Variables:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Dependent Variable					
	PRSC in 05-8	PRSC in 05-8	PRSC in 05-8	PRSC in 05-8	PRSC in 05-8	PRSC in 05-8
CPIA Overall	2.21*** (0.591)	3.01*** (0.909)	1.84** (0.805)	4.12*** (1.306)	1.80*** (0.635)	3.66*** (1.387)
CPIA Corrupt		-0.566 (0.43)				
CPIA PFM			0.38 (0.581)			
Avg PBL Outcome				-0.209 (0.46)		-0.33 (0.488)
Gov't Stability				0.417* (0.216)		0.413* (0.223)
PRSC in 01-4					1.127*** (0.397)	0.628 (0.591)
Constant	-8.31*** (2.127)	-9.42*** (2.499)	-8.33*** (2.14)	-17.6*** (5.065)	-7.26*** (2.261)	-15.7*** (5.334)
Observations	77	77	77	42	77	42

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Standard errors in parentheses

⁸ Wooldridge, J. 2002 *Econometrics of Cross-Sectional and PanelData* MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

sons for termination.¹¹ The survey was initiated by email and in each case followed up with a detailed interview. Commentaries accompanying the scored questionnaire have been recorded and referred to in the text under relevant topics.

The aggregated table of responses is averaged by the number of individual responses. Results were also aggregated and compared with mean responses by country and were not significantly different. The country and regional distribution of task team leader respondents is given in Annex 5 Table 1.

Annex 5 Table 2. IEG Evaluation of PRSCs – Results of Task Team Leader Survey

QUESTION	RESPONSES	Nos.	%
SCREENING QUESTION			
Have you worked on other (non-PRSC) DPLs or Structural Adjustment Credits? Please check appropriate box below.	Other DPLs	21	41%
	SAC/Sector Adjustment Lending	26	51%
	PRSC Only	4	8%
	No. of responses	51	
1. PRSC DESIGN			
1.1 PRSCs Compared to Other PBLs			
Has there been a difference between PRSCs and earlier Structural Adjustment Lending?	1 substantial difference	19	70%
	2 slight difference	5	19%
	3 No difference	3	11%
	No. of responses	27	
	Mean	1.4	
Is there a difference between PRSCs and other Development Policy Lending?	1 substantial difference	8	33%
	2 slight difference	10	42%
	3 No difference	6	25%
	No. of responses	24	
	Mean	1.9	
1.2 PRSC sectoral coverage			
PRSC has been used as the Bank's main instrument for policy dialogue and support for reforms in <u>all</u> sectors covered by the PRSC	1 fully agree	22	54%
	2 partly agree	12	29%
	3 marginally agree	4	10%
	4 do not agree	3	7%
	No. of responses	41	
PRSC has mainly been used as an instrument for policy dialogue and support for reforms in sectors where the Bank has no sector specific operations	1 fully agree	8	20%
	2 partly agree	11	28%
	3 marginally agree	6	15%
	4 do not agree	15	38%
	No. of responses	40	
Mean	2.7		

¹¹ Nicaragua and Pakistan, which have since been discontinued, were not asked these questions as they were on-going at the time of interview.

QUESTION	RESPONSES	Nos.	%
PRSC has mainly been used as an instrument for policy dialogue/support for reforms on issues that can not be resolved at sectoral level	1 fully agree	15	38%
	2 partly agree	13	33%
	3 marginally agree	6	15%
	4 do not agree	6	15%
	No. of responses	40	
	Mean	2.1	
Was the PRSC expected to replace sector specific lending?	Yes	17	44%
	No	21	54%
	Partly	1	3%
	No. of responses	39	
If yes:			
[If the PRSC <u>was</u> expected to replace sector specific lending] On a scale of 1-4, where 1= very effective, 2=effective, 3=somewhat effective, 4=not effective how effective was the transition from sector specific lending to sector support through the PRSC? *	1 very effective	4	16%
	2 effective	6	24%
	3 somewhat effective	10	40%
	4 not effective	5	20%
	No. of responses	25	
	Mean	2.6	
<i>*Results from this question may be presented differently</i>			
1.3 PRSC flexibility and country program implementation			
PRSCs are expected to provide regular and predictable funding to the recipient government. To what extent has the need to ensure predictable financing resulted in pressures to move ahead with the PRSC even when there was limited program progress?	1 Was never an issue	11	28%
	2 No pressure to move ahead just to ensure regularity of financing	11	28%
	3 Some pressure	16	41%
	4 Substantial pressure	1	3%
	No of responses	39	
	Mean	2.2	
Has the PRSC amount ever been adjusted downward compared to initial notional allocations?	Yes		
	No		
	No of responses		
If yes:			
If there was downward adjustment of the amount, did the adjustment affect the relationship with the Government?	No problems		
	Affected positively		
	Affected negatively		
	No of responses		
If there was downward adjustment of the amount, did the adjustment affect the relationship with other GBS financiers?	No problems		
	Affected positively		
	Affected negatively		
	No of responses		
2. ALIGNMENT WITH COUNTRY STRATEGY AND SUPPORT TO COUNTRY SYSTEMS			
2.1 Alignment with Government PRSP/National Development Strategy			
Please indicate to what extent the PRSC has been aligned with the Poverty Reduction Strategy or its national equivalent by checking the box that applies best to the PRSC you led.	1 Full alignment	6	15%
	2 The majority of PRSC policy measures aligned	17	41%
	3 Aligned in terms of objectives and overall direction	16	39%
	4 Somewhat aligned	2	5%
	5 Not aligned	0	0%
	No. of responses	41	
Mean	2.3		

QUESTION	RESPONSES	Nos.	%
2.2 PRSCs and Bank-Country dialogue			
Which of the following statements describes most accurately in what way the PRSC supported policy measures were derived:	1 Bank team defined policy measures and then agreed with government counterparts	7	17%
	2 Agreement between Bank team and other donors, followed by agreement with government counterparts	8	20%
	3 Government proposed measures followed by agreement with Bank	7	17%
	4 Government proposed measures followed by agreement with Bank and other donors	7	17%
	5 Measures jointly derived in working	12	29%
	6 Other: specify	7	17%
	No. of responses	41*	
	*Some respondents identified more than one category		

2.3 PRSCs and Country Ownership							
Please indicate the degree to which the PRSC programs you led were owned by the following:							
	1 Very strong ownership	2 Strong ownership	3 Limited ownership	4 No ownership	Don't know	No. of responses	Mean (excluding don't know)
Ministry of Finance	27 66%	12 29%	2 5%	0 0%	0 0%	41	1.4
Council of Ministers	4 10%	14 36%	12 31%	1 3%	8 21%	39	2.3
Line agencies	6 15%	18 44%	17 41%	0 0%	0 0%	41	2.3
Parliament	0 0%	7 18%	13 34%	9 24%	9 24%	38	3.1
Civil society	0 0%	2 5%	20 54%	10 27%	5 14%	37	3.3

2.4 PRSCs and the use of country systems			
PRSC has mainly been used as an instrument to enhance the importance and effectiveness of the national budget as a tool for policy formulation and accountability			
	1 fully agree	14	36%
	2 partly agree	15	38%
	3 marginally agree	1	3%
	4 do not agree	9	23%
	No. of responses	39	
	Mean	2.1	

2.5 PRSCs and country budget formulation and execution			
Using a scale 1-4, where 1=very effective, 2=somewhat effective, 3=little effective, 4=not effective at all, please rank how effective the PRSC was at achieving the intended results in the following areas:			
Enhancing dialogue between Ministry of Finance and line agencies	1 very effective	18	45%
	2 effective	19	48%
	3 somewhat effective	3	8%
	4 not effective	0	0%
	Not applicable	0	0%
	No. of responses	40	
	Mean (excluding not applicable)	1.6	
Enhancing cross-sectoral dialogue in the country	1 very effective	7	18%
	2 effective	24	60%
	3 somewhat effective	6	15%
	4 not effective	1	3%
	Not applicable	2	5%

QUESTION	RESPONSES	Nos.	%
	No. of responses	40	
	Mean (excluding not applicable)	2.0	
Increasing the comprehensiveness of the budget	1 very effective	10	26%
	2 effective	20	51%
	3 somewhat effective	4	10%
	4 not effective	2	5%
	Not applicable	3	8%
	No. of responses	39	
	Mean (excluding not applicable)	1.9	
Raising the importance of the budget as a tool for policy formulation and accountability	1 very effective	10	26%
	2 effective	22	56%
	3 somewhat effective	6	15%
	4 not effective	1	3%
	Not applicable	0	0%
	No. of responses	39	
	Mean (excluding not applicable)	1.9	
Imparting a results focus in the country	1 very effective	10	25%
	2 effective	21	53%
	3 somewhat effective	7	18%
	4 not effective	2	5%
	Not applicable	0	0%
	No. of responses	40	
	Mean (excluding not applicable)	2.0	
Strengthening domestic accountability	1 very effective	7	18%
	2 effective	20	50%
	3 somewhat effective	8	20%
	4 not effective	3	8%
	Not applicable	2	5%
	No. of responses	40	
	Mean (excluding not applicable)	2.2	
2.6 PRSCs and Funding Predictability			
PRSC has mainly been used as an instrument to provide predictable financing for implementation of the Government's overall program rather than to further reforms in specific areas	1 fully agree	7	19%
	2 partly agree	10	28%
	3 marginally agree	10	28%
	4 do not agree	9	25%
	No. of responses	36	
	Mean	2.6	
3. PRSCS AND DONOR HARMONIZATION			
3.1 Donor role			
	Yes		
	No		
Is IDA one of several donors providing general budget support (GBS) in your PRSC country?	No. of responses		
If yes:			
How many other GBS donors were there for the most recent PRSC you led?	0-3	16	44%
	4-7	10	28%
	8-11	5	14%
	12+	5	14%
	No. of responses	36	

QUESTION	RESPONSES	Nos.	%	
	Mean			
How many GBS donors were there at the beginning of the PRSC series?	0-3	15	58%	
	4-7	8	31%	
	8-11	2	8%	
	12+	1	4%	
	No. of responses	26		
	Mean			
If no:	1 Substantially	5	50%	
	2 Somewhat	2	20%	
	3 Minimally, donor coordination occurred mainly outside PRSC	3	30%	
	4 Not at all	0	0%	
	No. of responses	10		
	Mean	1.8		
3.2 Donor harmonization: country strategy				
PRSC has mainly been used as an instrument for donor harmonization around PRS/national strategy	1 fully agree	17	46%	
	2 partly agree	12	32%	
	3 marginally agree	6	16%	
	4 do not agree	2	5%	
	No. of responses	37		
	Mean	1.8		
3.3 Donor harmonization: formal framework				
Is there a formally established framework for general budget support of which IDA through the PRSC is part? Please mark the appropriate field:	1 Yes, there is a formally established framework and the PRSC is part of it	23	59%	
	2 Yes, there is a formally established framework but the PRSC runs parallel but in coordination with the established framework	1	3%	
	3 Yes, there is a formally established framework, but the PRSC operates outside this framework	1	3%	
	4 No there is no established framework, but the PRSC team makes efforts to coordinate	9	23%	
	5 No there is no established framework and there is no coordination	1	3%	
	Does not apply	4	10%	
	No. of responses	39		
	Mean (excluding does not apply)	2.0		
	To what extent is the PRSC an integral part of a common Results Framework/Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) shared by all General Budget Support (GBS) Financiers in the country? Please mark the appropriate field.	1 The PRSC matrix and the PAF are identical	5	13%
		2 The PRSC matrix selects a sub-set of PAF measures, but all PRSC policy measures are drawn from the PAF matrix	14	37%
3 The PRSC matrix draws some policy measures from the PAF and has some of its own measures		1	3%	
4 The PRSC matrix does not draw on the PAF		1	3%	
5 There is no common PAF		13	34%	
Other		4	11%	

QUESTION	RESPONSES	Nos.	%
	No. of responses	38	
	Mean (excluding other)	3.1	
3.4 Donor harmonization: effectiveness			
Using a scale 1-4, where 1=very effective, 2=somewhat effective, 3=little effective, 4=not effective at all, please rank how effective the PRSC was at achieving the intended results in the following areas:			
Improving predictability of aid flows	1 very effective	12	32%
	2 effective	12	32%
	3 somewhat effective	8	21%
	4 not effective	3	8%
	Not applicable	3	8%
	No. of responses	38	
	Mean (excluding not applicable)	2.1	
Harmonizing donor support around a common framework	1 very effective	19	48%
	2 effective	15	38%
	3 somewhat effective	5	13%
	4 not effective	0	0%
	Not applicable	1	3%
	No. of responses	40	
	Mean (excluding not applicable)	1.6	
3.5 Donor harmonization: transaction costs			
Donor coordination can affect transaction costs for various parties involved. In the case of the PRSC you have led, what effect has donor harmonization of the PRSC had on transaction costs for:			
You as TTL	1 substantially decreased transaction costs	0	0%
	2 somewhat decreased transaction costs	0	0%
	3 no significant impact on transaction costs	6	16%
	4 somewhat increased transaction costs	13	35%
	5 substantially increased transaction costs	18	49%
	No. of responses	37	
	Mean	4.3	
Other Bank PRSC team members	1 substantially decreased transaction costs	0	0%
	2 somewhat decreased transaction costs	1	3%
	3 no significant impact on transaction costs	11	31%
	4 somewhat increased transaction costs	17	47%
	5 substantially increased transaction costs	7	19%
	No. of responses	36	
	Mean	3.8	
Government counterparts	1 substantially decreased transaction costs	10	30%
	2 somewhat decreased transaction costs	9	27%
	3 no significant impact on transaction costs	6	18%
	4 somewhat increased transaction costs	8	24%
	5 substantially increased transaction costs	0	0%
	No. of responses	33	
	Mean	2.4	
Using a scale 1-3 where 1=fully recognizes, 2=partly recognizes 3= doesn't recognize at all indicate to what extent you feel that Bank management recognizes and rewards	1. fully recognizes/rewards	4	11%
	2. partly recognizes/rewards	16	42%
	3. doesn't recognize/reward at all	16	42%

QUESTION	RESPONSES	Nos.	%
the efforts involved in ensuring harmonization of the PRSC with other GBS support.	does not apply	2	5%
	No. of responses	38	
	Mean (excluding does not apply)	2.3	

4. PRSC OUTCOMES

Using a scale 1-4, where 1=very effective, 2=somewhat effective, 3=little effective, 4=not effective at all, please rank how effective the PRSC was at achieving the intended results in the following areas:

	1 very effective	2 effective	3 somewhat effective	4 not effective	Not applica- ble	No. of res- ponses	Mean (excluding not applicable)
Health	5 15%	18 53%	4 12%	2 6%	5 15%	34	2.1
Education	13 37%	14 40%	5 14%	0 0%	3 9%	35	1.8
Social protection system	8 23%	10 29%	2 6%	0 0%	15 43%	35	1.7
Energy	7 21%	9 26%	4 12%	1 3%	13 38%	34	2.0
Water and sanitation	4 12%	11 32%	5 15%	1 3%	13 38%	34	2.1
Transportation	4 13%	9 28%	4 13%	1 3%	14 44%	32	2.1
Agriculture/rural develop- ment	4 13%	9 28%	7 22%	4 13%	8 25%	32	2.5
Environment/natural re- source management	1 3%	10 31%	6 19%	1 3%	14 44%	32	2.4
Financial sector	2 6%	6 19%	8 26%	0 0%	15 48%	31	2.4
Creating favorable busi- ness environment	7 23%	11 35%	7 23%	1 3%	5 16%	31	2.1
Improving PFM system	18 51%	15 43%	0 0%	1 3%	1 3%	35	1.5
Procurement	12 35%	13 38%	2 6%	2 6%	5 15%	34	1.8
Tax reforms	4 14%	4 14%	3 10%	0 0%	18 62%	29	1.9
Public enterprise reform/privatization	1 3%	7 23%	2 7%	3 10%	17 57%	30	2.5
Civil service reform	4 12%	12 36%	3 9%	4 12%	10 30%	33	2.3
Decentralization	3 8%	15 42%	5 14%	3 8%	10 28%	36	2.3
Economic management	13 43%	12 40%	3 10%	0 0%	2 7%	30	1.6
Formulation and imple- mentation of a pro-poor growth strategy	8 27%	14 47%	4 13%	1 3%	3 10%	30	1.9
Improving poverty focus of	12	13	6	0	1	32	1.8

4. PRSC OUTCOMES

Using a scale 1-4, where 1=very effective, 2=somewhat effective, 3=little effective, 4=not effective at all, please rank how effective the PRSC was at achieving the intended results in the following areas:

	1 very effective	2 effective	3 somewhat effective	4 not effective	Not applica- ble	No. of res- ponses	Mean (excluding not applicable)
public expenditures	38%	41%	19%	0%	3%		
Improving quality of ser- vice delivery	3 9%	19 56%	8 24%	0 0%	4 12%	34	2.2
Improving access to basic services	4 12%	20 59%	4 12%	0 0%	6 18%	34	2.0
Reducing fiduciary risk	3 9%	17 53%	5 16%	0 0%	7 22%	32	2.1

5. PRSCs AND BANK TEAMS

5.1 Ownership and incentives

On a scale of 1-4 where 1=fully applies, 2=partly applies, 3= marginally applies, 4=doesn't apply, please indicate to what extent the following statements apply to the Bank team members of the PRSCs you have led.

	1 fully agree	2 partly agree	3 marginally agree	4 do not agree	No. of res- ponses	Mean
There was strong ownership of the PRSC by all Bank PRSC team members	17 44%	19 49%	3 8%	0 0%	39	1.6
PRSC team members had the right skills to make effective use of the PRSC in their sectors	14 36%	21 54%	4 10%	0 0%	39	1.7
PRSC team members have sufficient incentives to contribute their best to the PRSC	4 10%	16 40%	15 38%	5 13%	40	2.5
PRSC team members cross-subsidized their contributions to the PRSC with sector budgets (BB)	6 16%	18 47%	4 11%	10 26%	38	2.5
PRSC team members' contributions to PRSCs are adequately acknowledged and rewarded by their managers	4 11%	11 31%	11 31%	9 26%	35	2.7
PRSC team members have the skills to help make effective use of the country's sector budget as a policy tool	5 14%	15 42%	13 36%	3 8%	36	2.4
PRSC team members have actively worked with their country sector counterparts to help them use the budget as an effective instrument for dialogue with the Ministry of Finance	5 13%	21 54%	11 28%	2 5%	39	2.3

5.2 Cross-sectoral collaboration

Using a scale 1-4, where 1=very effective, 2=somewhat effective, 3=little effective, 4=not effective at all, please rank how effective the PRSC was at achieving the intended results in the following areas:

Strengthening cross-sectoral collaboration within the Bank team	1 very effective	18	46%
	2 effective	16	41%
	3 somewhat effective	4	10%
	4 not effective	1	3%
	Not applicable	0	0%
	No. of responses	39	
	Mean (excluding not applicable)	1.7	

5.3 TTL Time Utilization

How do you rate the amount of time you spend on donor harmonization, interaction with government, interaction with Bank PRSC team members, Bank internal processes

	1 Far too	2 Too little	3 About right	4 Too much	5 Far too	No of res-	Mean
Donor harmonization/ meetings with donors	0 0%	0 0%	17 47%	15 42%	4 11%	36	3.6
Interactions with government counterparts	0 0%	8 22%	27 75%	1 3%	0 0%	36	2.8
Interaction with Bank PRSC task team	0 0%	4 11%	29 83%	2 6%	0 0%	35	2.9
Bank internal processes	0 0%	0 0%	16 43%	17 46%	4 11%	37	3.7

6. OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

6.1 Most Successful Aspects of PRSC:

	Freq.	%
Ownership/Participation/Bank-Gov't Dial	15	20
Greater PFMP orientation	14	18.67
Progress in sector reforms and sector outcomes	14	18.67
Better donor harmonization	11	14.67
Better operational design to optimize Bank performance	7	9.33
Better alignment to country systems and operationalization of PRS	5	6.67
Greater and more effective intersector dialogue	3	4
Reduced transaction costs for government	3	4
Greater predictability of aid to government	2	2.67
Other	1	1.33

6.2 Aspects to be Changed

Issue	Freq.	%
Improved World Bank incentives to staff (recognition to sector staff and use of budget)	17	22.67
Better balance between country ownership & rigor of reform effort	12	16
Adjusted conditionality design (various suggestions – no conditions, no non-core conditions)	8	10.67
Recognize demands of donor harmonization	6	8
Improve process of identification and selection of sectors for inclusion in PRSCs	6	8
Need to foster greater domestic Ownership/Accountability/Participation	5	6.67
Need to strengthen results orientation	4	5.33
Build and use better domestic M&E systems	2	2.67
More and better targeted technical assistance and capacity building	2	2.67
Greater depth of engagement with different levels of government	1	1.33
Other	12	16.0

6.3 Benefits from Donor Harmonization

Issue	Freq.	%
Reduced Transaction costs to government	7	11.67
Better Donor-country dialogue	6	10
Achievement of Economies of Scale	6	10
Strengthened role of budget	6	10
Improved dialogue among donors	5	8.33
Leveraging reform effort through harmonized framework	5	8.33
Improved government ownership	4	6.67
Strengthening of PAF/Matrix	4	6.67
Better interministerial dialogue	3	5
Better results orientation	3	5
More efficient sectoral coverage ¹	2	3.33

Alignment with country systems/cycles	1	1.67
Greater flexibility to government to fulfill long term results instead of immediate policy conditions	1	1.67
Predictability	1	1.67
Other	6	10

Note: ¹ Incorporation of aid on-budget; better focus of sectoral dialog

6.4 Challenges from Donor Harmonization		
Issue	Freq.	%
Conflict between Bank and donors over aid modality	8	11.27
Challenge of harmonizing different aid systems	7	9.86
Conflict between Bank and donors over inclusion of particular sectors/issues	7	9.86
Conflict between Bank operational rules and donor harmonization needs	4	5.63
Deterioration of Donor-Country Dialogue	4	5.63
Reduced depth of Bank engagement	4	5.63
Opposition to Bank approach/leadership	4	5.63
PAF/Policy Matrix	4	5.63
Reduced reform effort	3	4.23
Inadequate guidance from OPCS/Management	3	4.23
Poorer alignment with country systems and cycles	2	2.82
Limited Bank resources for Harmonization	2	2.82
Differences among donors in approach to nature of conditionality/policy actions	2	2.82
Challenge of implementing an adequate results framework	2	2.82
Differing aid systems between donors	1	1.41
Increase in number of policy actions	1	1.41
Reduced government ownership	1	1.41
Other	12	16.9

Annex 6. Survey of PRSC Sector Team Members

METHODOLOGY

The survey was targeted to Bank staff and consultants who served as members of task teams for PRSC operations, representing sectors of activity, including agriculture, health, education, social protection, infrastructure, urban and rural development, private sector development and the environment, as well as public sector governance.

Sampled staff were identified through lists in PRSC Project Appraisal Documents, which typically include a list of project team participants and occasionally detail their roles in projects. An overall list for all PRSC operations was assembled and then narrowed down to exclude current or former PRSC task team leaders; persons who are currently manager-level or above; junior analyst-level or below, non-professional staff no longer employed at the Bank; persons currently mapped to the PREM Network; and persons mapped to professional support units such as legal and procurement.

The survey, conducted over November 2008 to January 2009, was initiated via an email sent to 460 identified staff, and followed with a personally addressed email and phone call. The aim of the survey was to obtain a reasonably representative sample of results, rather than to achieve complete coverage of all persons who had served as PRSC team members. Priority in targeting follow up was therefore designed to maximize the numbers of PRSC countries represented in the sample, and to achieve diversified sector coverage with significant numbers of respondents from those sectors emphasized in PRSC operations.

The final sample whose responses are analyzed here consists of 76 respondents from a broad cross-section of sectors, and 23 of the 27 countries that have had a PRSC operation to date, as shown below (Appendix 3 Table 1) Nine team members mapped to PREM responded to the survey; presumably due to sectoral responsibilities in a PRSC team. Their responses have however been tabulated separately, to explore differences in opinions between PREM and sectoral staff at the Bank. Of the follow up recipients, 34 were identified as no longer working at the Bank, or with a non-relevant role in the PRSC.

Annex 6 Table 1. PRSC Team Members – Sectoral Survey Responses

Sector	No. of respondents
Agriculture, environment, rural	16
Health, education, social protection	13
Public sector management	13
Energy, water, transport, urban, other infrastructure	15
Private sector development, finance	10
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM)	9
Total	76

Annex 6 Table 2. Survey of Sector Participants

I. Background information			
Which sector do you primarily represent?	Agriculture, environment, rural	16	21%
	Energy, water, transport, urban, other infrastructure	15	20%
	PSD, finance	10	13%
	Health, education, social protection	13	17%
	Public sector	13	17%
	PREM	9	12%
	No. of responses	76	
In which countries have you contributed to a PRSC operation?		(23 of 27 relevant countries are represented in the survey)	
Please answer the following questions regarding the composition of the Bank's lending program in your sector, in those countries you have worked in, which have a PRSC.			
Is there currently a free-standing Bank investment lending program in the sector in which you operate?	Yes	68	71%
	No	26	27%
	Don't know	2	2%
	No. of responses	96	
If yes, approximately what percentage of the Bank's total sector lending is delivered through free-standing projects (as opposed to PRSC or other development policy operations)?	0%-25%	8	13%
	26%-50%	8	13%
	51%-75%	9	14%
	76%-100%	19	30%
	Don't know / NA	19	30%
	No. of responses	63	
	Mean	61%	
To what extent do you feel that in your sector, the government has a detailed sectoral strategy towards its development goals?	0=There is no strategy	5	6%
	1=There is a strategy without detail	14	17%
	2=There is a strategy with some detail	40	48%
	3=There is a detailed strategy	25	30%
	No. of responses	84	
	Mean	2.0	
In your opinion, what would be the ideal approach to deliver support in your sector of operations?	General budget support through the government's overall budget	16	22%
	Sector-wide budget support (SWAps)	21	29%
	Project Support (free-standing investment operations, by WB or other donors)	20	27%
	Other (specify)	16	22%
	No. of responses	72	

II. PRSC and country sector engagement – potential added value

Some say that the PRSC has improved country sector engagement in several respects. How best do the following statements capture your overall experiences with the role of the PRSC for sectoral operations in the countries and sector in which you operate?

		0=Not at all True	1=Only Partly True	2=Significantly True	3=Entirely True	Mean	No. of responses
The PRSC instrument opened up new opportunities for sectoral engagement , where little or none may have existed prior to the PRSC.	All	19 24%	27 35%	19 24%	13 17%	1.3	78
	Non-PREM	19 28%	24 35%	16 23%	10 14%	1.2	69
There were accomplishments through the PRSC which could not have been realized through a free-standing sector operation .	All	14 18%	20 26%	27 35%	16 21%	1.6	77
	Non-PREM	14 21%	18 26%	23 34%	13 19%	1.5	68
The triggers of the PRSC were based on relevant and identified priorities.	All	2 3%	19 25%	35 45%	21 27%	2.0	77
	Non-PREM	2 3%	18 26%	33 49%	15 22%	1.9	68
The macro approach of the PRSC helps address critical constraints to sectoral performance that are beyond the mandate or scope of individual sectors to address, due to high level dialogue with counterparts.	All	4 5%	21 27%	35 44%	19 24%	1.9	79
	Non-PREM	4 6%	21 30%	28 40%	17 24%	1.8	70
The PRSC has led to an increase in the level of Bank / IDA financing in your sector .	All	35 46%	29 38%	7 9%	5 7%	0.8	76
	Non-PREM	34 50%	26 38%	6 9%	2 3%	0.6	68
The PRSC is a good instrument for the Bank and other donors for increasing the efficiency and transparency of sectoral financing and enabling easier monitoring.	All	15 19%	34 44%	21 27%	7 9%	1.3	77
	Non-PREM	15 22%	32 47%	15 22%	6 9%	1.2	68
The PRSC allows line agencies to improve the timeliness and predictability of budget allocations to meet their program needs.	All	17 22%	37 49%	18 24%	4 5%	1.1	76
	Non-PREM	16 24%	34 51%	13 19%	4 6%	1.1	67
The PRSC helps donor dialogue for line agencies, to reach agreement upon sector priorities with different donors .	All	4 5%	35 46%	31 41%	6 8%	1.5	76
	Non-PREM	4 6%	33 49%	25 37%	5 7%	1.5	67
The PRSC has strengthened the results framework for sectoral outcomes.	All	11 15%	35 48%	23 32%	4 5%	1.3	73
	Non-PREM	10 16%	33 52%	18 28%	3 5%	1.2	64
The PRSC is a good vehicle for all operations (lending / advisory) in your sector , and could effectively be the only vehicle for engagement with your sector.	All	48 64%	18 24%	8 11%	1 1%	0.5	75
	Non-PREM	46 70%	13 20%	6 9%	1 2%	0.4	66

III. PRSC and country sector engagement – potential limitations

Others say that the PRSC has detracted from country sector engagement. How best do the following statements capture your overall experiences with the role of the PRSC for sectoral operations in the countries and sector in which you operate?

		0=Not at all True	1=Only Partly True	2=Significantly True	3=Entirely True	Mean	No. of responses
The PRSC closed off opportunities for sectoral engagement , where they may have existed previously.	All	46 62%	20 27%	7 9%	1 1%	0.5	74
	Non-PREM	39 60%	18 28%	7 11%	1 2%	0.5	65
There were policy, development, or capacity issues that needed attention which could not be covered by the PRSC framework.	All	12 16%	19 26%	27 36%	16 22%	1.6	74
	Non-PREM	10 15%	14 22%	26 40%	15 23%	1.7	65
There is some loss in depth / detail of sectoral engagement (policy dialogue / lending / advisory work) with the Bank, in PRSC operations, due to reduced ownership by country counterparts , compared to a dedicated sector operation.	All	22 30%	28 38%	12 16%	12 16%	1.2	74
	Non-PREM	16 25%	26 40%	12 18%	11 17%	1.3	65
There is some loss in depth / detail of sectoral engagement (policy dialogue / lending / advisory work) with the Bank, in PRSC operations, due to the need to harmonize with other donors .	All	28 39%	30 42%	9 13%	5 7%	0.9	72
	Non-PREM	22 35%	28 44%	9 14%	4 6%	0.9	63
There is some loss in depth / detail of sectoral technical dialogue with the Bank, in PRSC operations, due to focus on the budget as the primary instrument .	All	23 31%	27 36%	12 16%	12 16%	1.2	74
	Non-PREM	15 23%	26 40%	12 18%	12 18%	1.3	65
Guiding principles for limiting the number of conditions can limit the extent to which detailed sectoral goals can be achieved .	All	9 13%	31 43%	23 32%	9 13%	1.4	72
	Non-PREM	6 10%	27 43%	21 33%	9 14%	1.5	63
Sectoral ministries / agencies would prefer to not harmonize the positions of different donors and would prefer to allocate donors to specific sectors.	All	22 31%	37 51%	10 14%	3 4%	0.9	72
	Non-PREM	17 27%	34 54%	9 14%	3 5%	1.0	63

Annex 7. Survey of PRSC Country Clients

A survey seeking the views of PRSC client stakeholders was sent to clients in all PRSC countries. Individuals selected to receive questionnaires were pre-identified persons who were integrally engaged in the PRSC process, at the time of its implementation. Both core and line ministry respondents were solicited, in conjunction with the Bank's country program staff. Recipients who agreed to provide feedback followed up on the questionnaire, in most cases with interviews in person or by telephone or videoconference. Responses were received from 41 stakeholders from 24 countries, and 36 out of 41 were available for interviews. Between 1 and 4 stakeholders per country responded to the survey. The sample covers virtually all of the 27 PRSC countries (Table 1) and illustrates their geographic diversity (Table 2).

Annex 7 Table 1. Client Survey Respondents by Country

Country	Responses	Country	Responses	Country	Responses
Albania	4	Ghana	2	Nepal	3
Armenia	2	Honduras	1	Nicaragua	1
Azerbaijan	1	Laos	2	Pakistan	1
Benin	1	Madagascar	2	Rwanda	2
Burkina Faso	1	Malawi	1	Senegal	2
Cape Verde	2	Mali	2	Sri Lanka	1
Ethiopia	1	Moldova	1	Uganda	1
Georgia	2	Mozambique	2	Vietnam	3
Total No of Countries			24		
Total No of Responses			41		

Respondents were senior officials from prime minister's offices (5 out of 41 or 12 percent) or from central ministries (29 out of 41 or 71 percent), that is, finance, economy, and planning ministries with a coordinating role in the national development strategy. Some were from sectoral ministries (4 out of 41 or 10 percent), that is, education, health, and social protection. Finally, the remaining respondents were from central banks and academia (3 out of 41 or 7 percent). Thus views obtained are largely from the central government and core ministries.

Annex 7 Table 2. Client Survey Respondents by Region and Agency

Sample by Region			Sample by Agency				
Region	No of Resp.	%	No of Resp.	%	Agency	No of Resp.	%
AFR	19	46	12	50	Prime Minister Office	5	12
EAP	5	12	2	8	Central Ministry (Finance, Plan, Econ Dev't)	29	71
ECA	10	24	5	21	Sectoral Ministry (Health & Education)	4	10
LAC	2	5	2	8	Central Bank	2	5
SA	5	12	3	13	Other (Think-Tank)	1	2

Source: IEG Client Survey

Annex 7 Table 3. Client Survey Part 1 – Design and Conditionality

Question	Response	Frequencies		Mean Response	
		Nos	%	mid-pt=0.5	mid-pt=1.5
PART 1: DESIGN AND CONDITIONALITY					
Design - Policy Implementation					
Policy measures in the PRSC program help implement our government's medium-term program in a timely fashion	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.17	
	1 Disagree	1	2.5		
	2 Agree	31	77.5		
	3 Strongly agree	8	20		
		40	100		
Design - Critical Actions					
The PRSC program has helped our government focus on critical actions necessary to achieve well specified objectives and results	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.27	
	1 Disagree	1	2.5		
	2 Agree	27	67.5		
	3 Strongly agree	12	30		
		40	100		
Design - Identification of Policy Constraints					
The PRSC program matrix only contains actions critical to achieving progress in our government's program	0 Strongly disagree	1	3	2.01	
	1 Disagree	7	18		
	2 Agree	20	51		
	3 Strongly agree	11	28		
		39	100		
Design - Number of Actions					
The PRSC program matrix contains too many policy actions	0 Strongly disagree	1	3	1.76	
	1 Disagree	14	37		
	2 Agree	16	42		
	3 Strongly agree	7	18		
		38	100		
Design - Political Constraints					
The PRSC program has taken into consideration political constraints we face in our country	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	1.79	
	1 Disagree	10	29		
	2 Agree	21	62		
	3 Strongly agree	3	9		
		34	100		
Design - Implementation Constraints					
The PRSC program has accommodated implementation constraints we have faced by allowing prior actions to be adjusted to country realities as the program has evolved	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2	
	1 Disagree	9	23		
	2 Agree	21	54		
	3 Strongly agree	9	23		
		39	100		
Conditionality - Triggers					
Since the introduction of PRSC-supported programs, have you noticed a marked improvement in the PRSC's conditionality and triggers?	1 Yes	23	79	0.79	
	0 No	6	21		
		29	100		
Conditionality - Triggers & Benchmarks					
In the PRSC program, triggers/prior actions are treated differently from benchmarks by my government	0 Strongly disagree	3	8	1.31	
	1 Disagree	20	56		
	2 Agree	12	33		
	3 Strongly agree	1	3		
		36	100		
Conditionality - Triggers & Benchmarks					
In the PRSC program, triggers/prior actions are treated differently from benchmarks by the World Bank	0 Strongly disagree	4	12	1.33	
	1 Disagree	16	48		
	2 Agree	11	33		
	3 Strongly agree	2	6		
		33	100		
Sectoral Focus					
Since the introduction of PRSC-supported programs, have you noticed a marked improvement in the PRSC sectoral focus?	1 Yes	24	83	0.83	
	0 No	5	17		
		29	100		

Annex 7 Table 3. Client Survey Part 2a – Alignment With Country Strategy

(p2 of 8)

Question	Response	Frequencies		Mean Response	
		Nos	%	mid-pt=0.5	mid-pt=1.5
PART 2: ALIGNMENT, OWNERSHIP, PROCESS AND M&E					
Alignment with Country Strategy					
The content of the PRSC supported program has been well aligned with our government's medium-term development strategy	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.59	
	1 Disagree	0	0		
	2 Agree	17	41		
	3 Strongly agree	24	59		
		41	100		
Alignment - Formulation of Country Strategy					
The PRSC program has supported the formulation of our country's medium-term development strategy through policy dialogue and analytical work	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.3	
	1 Disagree	1	3		
	2 Agree	26	65		
	3 Strongly agree	13	33		
		40	100		
Alignment with Country Strategy					
The PRSC program has helped focus on policy actions that support the implementation of our country's medium-term development strategy	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.49	
	1 Disagree	1	2		
	2 Agree	19	46		
	3 Strongly agree	21	51		
		41	100		
Alignment with Country Priorities Over Time					
Since the introduction of PRSC-supported programs, have you noticed a marked improvement in the PRSC's own alignment with the country's	1 Yes	28	93	0.93	
	0 No	2	7		
		30	100		
Alignment with Budget					
To what extent is the timing, process, and content of the PRSC aligned with your country's budget cycle?	0 Not aligned at all	1	3	1.82	
	1 Partially aligned	11	28		
	2 Well aligned	22	55		
	3 Very well aligned	6	15		
		40	100		
Alignment - Predictability					
How predictable has the budget support through the PRSC been?	0 Not predictable at all	0	0	2.3	
	1 Not very predictable	3	8		
	2 Fairly Predictable	22	55		
	3 Very Predictable	15	38		
		40	100		
Ownership - Core Ministries					
The PRSC program has enjoyed strong ownership in our country by the core ministry/ies (e.g., Finance, Planning, Economy)	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.48	
	1 Disagree	3	8		
	2 Agree	14	36		
	3 Strongly agree	22	56		
		39	100		

Annex 7 Table 3. Client Survey Part 2b – Alignment With Country Strategy

(p3 of 8)

Question	Response	Frequencies		Mean Response	
		Nos	%	mid-pt=0.5	mid-pt=1.5
PART 2: ALIGNMENT, OWNERSHIP, PROCESS AND M&E (cont'd)					
Ownership - Sector Ministries					
The PRSC program has enjoyed strong ownership in our country by ministries in priority sectors (e.g., Health, Education, Water)	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.07	
	1 Disagree	7	18		
	2 Agree	23	58		
	3 Strongly agree	10	25		
		40	100		
Ownership - Legislative					
The PRSC program has enjoyed strong ownership in our country by the main legislative body/ies	0 Strongly disagree	2	6	1.66	
	1 Disagree	12	34		
	2 Agree	17	49		
	3 Strongly agree	4	11		
		35	100		
Ownership - Civil Society					
The PRSC program has enjoyed strong ownership in our country by civil society	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	1.72	
	1 Disagree	15	47		
	2 Agree	11	34		
	3 Strongly agree	6	19		
		32	100		
Ownership - Government Role in Formulation					
The policy actions in the PRSC program were proposed and agreed upon by our government rather than the World Bank PRSC team	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	1.74	
	1 Disagree	13	34		
	2 Agree	22	58		
	3 Strongly agree	3	8		
		38	100		
Ownership - World Bank Role in Formulation					
The policy actions in the PRSC program were introduced by the World Bank PRSC team and agreed upon by our government	0 Strongly disagree	2	5	1.38	
	1 Disagree	22	56		
	2 Agree	13	33		
	3 Strongly agree	2	5		
		39	100		
Ownership - Design Change					
The PRSC program has introduced new elements that were not originally part of our Government's medium-term development strategy	0 Strongly disagree	2	5	1.57	
	1 Disagree	15	41		
	2 Agree	17	46		
	3 Strongly agree	3	8		
		37	100		
Ownership - Design Change					
Additional elements introduced under the PRSC program have positively contributed to the overall implementation of our country's development strategy	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.22	
	1 Disagree	3	9		
	2 Agree	19	59		
	3 Strongly agree	10	31		
		32	100		
Ownership - Bank-Country Dialogue					
Our interaction with World Bank staff during the PRSC was primarily focused on what steps need to be undertaken to achieve well specified outcomes	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.07	
	1 Disagree	6	15		
	2 Agree	25	63		
	3 Strongly agree	9	23		
		40	100		
Ownership - Bank-Country Dialogue					
Our interaction with World Bank staff during the PRSC was primarily focused on whether triggers and prior actions have been completed rather than whether intended results have been achieved	0 Strongly disagree	2	5	1.18	
	1 Disagree	28	74		
	2 Agree	7	18		
	3 Strongly agree	1	3		
		38	100		

Annex 7 Table 3. Client Survey Part 2c – Alignment With Country Strategy

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Question	Response	Frequencies		Mean Response	
		Nos	%	mid-pt=0.5	mid-pt=1.5
PART 2: ALIGNMENT, OWNERSHIP, PROCESS AND M&E (cont'd)					
Alignment - Budget Plan Priorities					
The PRSC process has facilitated the alignment of public expenditures with priorities outlined in our medium-term development program	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.22	
	1 Disagree	3	8		
	2 Agree	25	63		
	3 Strongly agree	12	30		
		40	100		
Process - Internal Dialogue					
The PRSC process has helped strengthen the dialogue between the Ministry of Finance and line agencies involved in the PRSC	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.34	
	1 Disagree	3	7		
	2 Agree	21	51		
	3 Strongly agree	17	41		
		41	100		
Process - Sectoral Dialogue					
The PRSC process has helped strengthen our country's medium-term development program because it has facilitated a dialogue across different sectors	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.37	
	1 Disagree	1	3		
	2 Agree	23	58		
	3 Strongly agree	16	40		
		40	100		
Process - Budget and Policy Links					
The PRSC process has helped make the budget a more important tool for policy formulation and implementation	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.29	
	1 Disagree	5	13		
	2 Agree	17	45		
	3 Strongly agree	16	42		
		38	100		
Process - Budget and Accountability					
The PRSC process has increased the role of the budget as a vehicle to increase accountability of line ministries (i.e., health, educ., etc.)	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.21	
	1 Disagree	4	10		
	2 Agree	23	59		
	3 Strongly agree	12	31		
		39	100		
Strategy Review - PRSC Alignment with PRS					
To what extent is the timing, process, and content of the PRSC aligned with progress reviews of your country's Poverty Reduction Strategy and/or National Development Strategy?	0 Not aligned at all	2	5	1.87	
	1 Partially aligned	7	18		
	2 Well aligned	25	63		
	3 Very well aligned	6	15		
		40	100		
M&E - Role of PRSC					
The PRSC program has helped our government consistently monitor and evaluate how we are progressing towards achieving our medium-term development goals	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.17	
	1 Disagree	2	5		
	2 Agree	30	73		
	3 Strongly agree	9	22		
		41	100		
M&E - Alignment					
The information required by the World Bank to monitor progress under the PRSC is also utilized by our government to review progress under our national development strategy	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.2	
	1 Disagree	1	2		
	2 Agree	31	76		
	3 Strongly agree	9	22		
		41	100		

Annex 7 Table 3. Client Survey Part 3 – Country Ownership

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Question	Response	Frequencies		Mean Response	
		Nos	%	mid-pt=0.5	mid-pt=1.5
PART 3: DONOR HARMONIZATION					
Donor Harmonization - Joint Performance Assessment Framework					
Is there a joint performance assessment framework or unified matrix that is shared by all development partners providing general budget support?	1 Yes	25	63	0.62	
	0 No	15	38		
		40	100		
Donor Harmonization - PRSC and PAF					
If yes, does the PRSC program matrix only contain policy measures that are also in the unified matrix?	1 Yes	20	87	0.87	
	0 No	3	13		
		23	100		
Donor Coordination - PRSC Timing and Other Donors					
To what extent is the timing, process, and content of the PRSC aligned with General Budget Support provided by other development partners?	0 Not aligned at all	0	0	1.63	
	1 Partially aligned	13	43		
	2 Well aligned	15	50		
	3 Very well aligned	2	7		
		30	100		
Donor Coordination - PRSC and World Bank Role					
The World Bank team has made strong efforts to facilitate coordination between the PRSC and general budget support provided by other development partners	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.44	
	1 Disagree	1	3		
	2 Agree	16	50		
	3 Strongly agree	15	47		
		32	100		
Donor Coordination - Program Scope/Alignment Over Time					
Since the introduction of PRSC-supported programs, have you noticed a marked improvement in the Bank's alignment with other donors?	1 Yes	22	92	0.92	
	0 No	2	8		
		24	100		
Donor Coordination - Scope of Policy Actions					
The alignment of the PRSC with other budget support has significantly increased the number of policy actions our government has had to undertake in order to obtain World Bank support under the	0 Strongly disagree	3	10	1.8	
	1 Disagree	10	32		
	2 Agree	8	26		
	3 Strongly agree	10	32		
		31	100		
Donor Coordination - Scope of Policy Actions					
Overall Joint Donor Budget Support Matrix contains too many actions	0 Strongly disagree	1	4	1.81	
	1 Disagree	8	30		
	2 Agree	13	48		
	3 Strongly agree	5	19		
		27	100		
Donor Coordination - Predictability					
How predictable has the budget support through the PRSC been compared to that of other development partners providing general budget support?	0 A lot less predictable	0	0	2.6	
	1 Slightly less predictable	1	3		
	2 Slightly more predictable	10	33		
	3 Significantly more predictable	19	63		
		30	100		
Donor Coordination - Reporting Requirements					
Procedural and temporal alignment of the PRSC with other budget support has reduced reporting requirements for budget support	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.1	
	1 Disagree	7	23		
	2 Agree	13	43		
	3 Strongly agree	10	33		
		30	100		
Donor Coordination - Transaction Costs					
The alignment of the PRSC with other budget support has reduced transaction costs (i.e., processing steps, duplication of efforts between different donors for reviews, and overall amount of time spent in preparation) of agreeing on a program with all donors providing budget support	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.1	
	1 Disagree	7	23		
	2 Agree	13	43		
	3 Strongly agree	10	33		
		30	100		

Annex 7 Table 3. Client Survey Part 4 – Sector Dialog, Budget Process and Monitoring and Evaluation
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PART 4: ACHIEVING RESULTS							
Results Framework							
Since the introduction of PRSC-supported programs, have you noticed a marked improvement in the PRSC results framework?		1 Yes	26	90	0.9		
		0 No	3	10			
			29	100			
		0=Not at all effective	1=Little effectiveness	2=Somewhat effective	3=Very effective	Tot. Responses	Mean Response (mid point=1.5)
Achieving Outcomes							
How effective has the PRSC process been in helping your country to formulate and implement measures that:							
Support economic	(Nos)	0	4	24	11	39	2.18
	(%)	0	10	62	28	100	
Support economic growth that benefits the	(Nos)	0	4	23	12	39	2.21
	(%)	0	10	59	31	100	
Improve service delivery in the health sector	(Nos)	1	1	19	17	38	2.37
	(%)	3	3	50	45	100	
Improve service delivery in the education sector	(Nos)	0	2	18	18	38	2.42
	(%)	0	5	47	47	100	
Improve service delivery in water and sanitation	(Nos)	1	6	14	10	31	2.06
	(%)	3	19	45	32	100	
Strengthen the public financial management	(Nos)	0	1	18	20	39	2.49
	(%)	0	3	46	51	100	
Maintain macro-economic stability	(Nos)	0	3	15	20	38	2.45
	(%)	0	8	39	53	100	
Improve the investment/business	(Nos)	2	9	13	14	38	2
	(%)	5	24	34	37	100	
Support infrastructure development	(Nos)	0	7	16	10	33	2.09
	(%)	0	21	48	30	100	
Strengthen financial sector performance	(Nos)	0	7	16	10	33	2.09
	(%)	0	21	48	30	100	
Support environmental sustainability	(Nos)	0	8	18	4	30	1.87
	(%)	0	27	60	13	100	
Support rural development	(Nos)	0	7	21	9	37	2.05
	(%)	0	19	57	24	100	
Strengthen the performance of the public sector	(Nos)	0	8	18	13	39	2.13
	(%)	0	21	46	33	100	
Reduce poverty	(Nos)	0	3	21	14	38	2.29
	(%)	0	8	55	37	100	

Annex 7 Table 3. Client Survey Part 5 – Donor Harmonization

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PART 3: DONOR HARMONIZATION					
Question	Response	Frequencies		Mean	
		Nos	%	mid-pt=0.5	mid-pt=1.5
Donor Harmonization - Joint Performance Assessment Framework					
Is there a joint performance assessment framework or unified matrix that is shared by all development partners providing general budget support?	1 Yes	25	63	0.62	
	0 No	15	38		
		40	100		
Donor Harmonization - PRSC and PAF					
If yes, does the PRSC program matrix only contain policy measures that are also in the unified matrix?	1 Yes	20	87	0.87	
	0 No	3	13		
		23	100		
Donor Coordination - PRSC Timing and Other Donors					
To what extent is the timing, process, and content of the PRSC aligned with General Budget Support provided by other development partners?	0 Not aligned at all	0	0	1.63	
	1 Partially aligned	13	43		
	2 Well aligned	15	50		
	3 Very well aligned	2	7		
		30	100		
Donor Coordination - PRSC and World Bank Role					
The World Bank team has made strong efforts to facilitate coordination between the PRSC and general budget support provided by other development partners	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.44	
	1 Disagree	1	3		
	2 Agree	16	50		
	3 Strongly agree	15	47		
		32	100		
Donor Coordination - Program Scope/Alignment Over Time					
Since the introduction of PRSC-supported programs, have you noticed a marked improvement in the Bank's alignment with other donors?	1 Yes	22	92	0.92	
	0 No	2	8		
		24	100		
Donor Coordination - Scope of Policy Actions					
The alignment of the PRSC with other budget support has significantly increased the number of policy actions our government has had to undertake in order to obtain World Bank support under the	0 Strongly disagree	3	10	1.8	
	1 Disagree	10	32		
	2 Agree	8	26		
	3 Strongly agree	10	32		
		31	100		
Donor Coordination - Scope of Policy Actions					
Overall Joint Donor Budget Support Matrix contains too many actions	0 Strongly disagree	1	4	1.81	
	1 Disagree	8	30		
	2 Agree	13	48		
	3 Strongly agree	5	19		
		27	100		
Donor Coordination - Predictability					
How predictable has the budget support through the PRSC been compared to that of other development partners providing general budget support?	0 A lot less predictable	0	0	2.6	
	1 Slightly less predictable	1	3		
	2 Slightly more predictab	10	33		
	3 Significantly more pred	19	63		
		30	100		
Donor Coordination - Reporting Requirements					
Procedural and temporal alignment of the PRSC with other budget support has reduced reporting requirements for budget support	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.1	
	1 Disagree	7	23		
	2 Agree	13	43		
	3 Strongly agree	10	33		
		30	100		
Donor Coordination - Transaction Costs					
The alignment of the PRSC with other budget support has reduced transaction costs (i.e., processing steps, duplication of efforts between different donors for reviews, and overall amount of time spent in preparation) of agreeing on a program with all dono	0 Strongly disagree	0	0	2.1	
	1 Disagree	7	23		
	2 Agree	13	43		
	3 Strongly agree	10	33		
		30	100		

PART 4: ACHIEVING RESULTS							
Results Framework - Summary Question:							
Since the introduction of PRSC-supported programs, have you noticed a marked improvement in the PRSC results framework?		1 Yes	26	90	0.9		
		0 No	3	10			
			29	100			
		0=Not at all effective	1=Little effectiveness	2=Somewhat effective	3=Very effective	Tot. Responses	Mean Response (mid point=1.5)
Achieving Outcomes - Sectoral Scores:							
How effective has the PRSC process been in helping your country to formulate and implement measures							
Support economic	(Nos)	0	4	24	11	39	2.18
	(%)	0	10	62	28	100	
Support economic growth that benefits the	(Nos)	0	4	23	12	39	2.21
	(%)	0	10	59	31	100	
Improve service delivery in the health sector	(Nos)	1	1	19	17	38	2.37
	(%)	3	3	50	45	100	
Improve service delivery in the education sector	(Nos)	0	2	18	18	38	2.42
	(%)	0	5	47	47	100	
Improve service delivery in water and sanitation	(Nos)	1	6	14	10	31	2.06
	(%)	3	19	45	32	100	
Strengthen the public financial management	(Nos)	0	1	18	20	39	2.49
	(%)	0	3	46	51	100	
Maintain macro-economic stability	(Nos)	0	3	15	20	38	2.45
	(%)	0	8	39	53	100	
Improve the investment/business	(Nos)	2	9	13	14	38	2
	(%)	5	24	34	37	100	
Support infrastructure development	(Nos)	0	7	16	10	33	2.09
	(%)	0	21	48	30	100	
Strengthen financial sector performance	(Nos)	0	7	16	10	33	2.09
	(%)	0	21	48	30	100	
Support environmental sustainability	(Nos)	0	8	18	4	30	1.87
	(%)	0	27	60	13	100	
Support rural development	(Nos)	0	7	21	9	37	2.05
	(%)	0	19	57	24	100	
Strengthen the performance of the public sector	(Nos)	0	8	18	13	39	2.13
	(%)	0	21	46	33	100	
Reduce poverty	(Nos)	0	3	21	14	38	2.29
	(%)	0	8	55	37	100	

Annex 8. The 'Pro-Poor' Growth Debate and PRSC design

PRSCs reflected the Millennium Development Goals and Comprehensive Development Framework's emphasis on poverty reduction by a direct increase in access of the poor to basic services. Later research found that standard pro-growth macroeconomic policies raised the income of the poor as much as other persons (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). Some growth promoting measures were "super pro-poor", accelerating growth and also improving income distribution. And some "pro-poor" measures (growth in primary education, health/education spending, productivity) did not seem to benefit the poor. Although the findings were disputed, they influenced the reintroduction of a growth focus in development strategies, for long run poverty alleviation.

A later survey of econometric studies covering the period 1960-1996 returned the emphasis to certain pro-poor services. Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (1994) identify 18 factors important for growth. Policy variables among these include the primary schooling enrollment rate, price of investment goods (e.g. investment climate), health variables such as malaria prevalence and life expectancy, as well as the degree of trade openness and share of government consumption. Surprisingly unimportant in this study are political stability and the rate of inflation. A subsequent large scale review of 34 studies on economic growth across a number of countries (Perry et al, 2005) concluded that progress in certain policy areas: education, governance, infrastructure and macroeconomic stability, both increased growth and reduced inequality. Other policy areas, good for growth, had more mixed results for poverty: financial sector reforms, openness to international trade, and the size of government. Additional recent studies reinforce the importance of these factors, suggest some others, and also cast doubt on the ability of economists to correctly identify a unique set of explanatory variables (Durlauf, Kourtellos and Tan, 2008), Ciccone and Jarocinski (June 2008).

Recently, the World Bank's Growth Commission, which undertook intensive case studies of 13 developing countries also concluded that a number of factors affect growth, including a high level of investment in infrastructure, health and education; technology transfer and foreign investment; competition, well functioning labor markets, domestic savings, export promotion, openness to capital inflows, undistorted exchange rates, financial sector development, effective government, macro-stability, equity and equality of opportunity, urbanization and rural investment. Each country's situation lends priority to differing factors.

A related question is the extent to which aid or capital flows contribute to either growth or poverty reduction. The debate on "aid effectiveness" in most cases finds little or no correlation between aid flows and growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Roodman, 2007). There are mixed motives for giving aid and mixed modalities for providing it (projects, technical assistance, food aid, budget support). Recipient countries with good (pro-growth) policies, however, benefited from aid. While also controversial (Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004), this approach provided impetus to linking aid to results. The PRSC program, although older, followed the same concept of providing general budget support for a program of policies that would accelerate growth and/or reduce poverty, with a strong focus on a results focus and pro-poor service delivery.

Annex 9. PRSCs and Health Service Delivery: Examples

Armenia provides an example of a country where budget rationalization was effectively used for increased efficiency in the health sector and greater service availability for the poor, although their reflection in overall health outcomes is not yet evident. Rationalization of the hospital structure was induced by shifting the basis of payments to hospitals to patients treated and type of treatment, and not the cost of running the facility. This resulted in the closing of redundant facilities and the reduction in redundant staff. The savings were shifted toward the expansion of the polyclinic system (out-patient services) which provides free and/or highly subsidized services to poor families. Fees for primary health care have been abolished, salaries raised, and the quality of care has improved, with greater emphasis on preventive services. PRSC involvement paralleled two health modernization projects. The PRSC provided support for the policy dialogue and focused on overarching issues, while the projects provided technical support for the reforms. Results are somewhat mixed. Overall expenditures on health rose from 1.2 percent of GDP in 2002 to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2006, but are below the target set in PRSC-II of 1.9 percent (for 2007). The share for primary health care has also risen from 33 percent to 36 percent, but is somewhat below the expected target of 39 percent for 2007. In terms of enhancing accessibility and quality, overall utilization of clinics and hospitals has increased, though there has been no increase in utilization by the lower two quintiles. Utilization of polyclinics by the bottom two quintiles is substantially below the target set in PRSC-IV (3.5 percent vs. 10 percent), and about the same as it was in 2003. Vaccination coverage of children has declined. Indicators such as infant and maternal mortality appear to have risen since 2003.

Ghana, in contrast to Armenia, did not bring the administration of health services effectively into the budget, and health outcomes are also disappointing. Strategic directions for the health sector were prepared via Health SWAp programs. PRSC policy measures focused on increasing fee elimination for the poorest and the strengthening of the National Health Insurance Project, in line with the poverty focus of the PRSC. The PRSC matrix seemed to have been well used to support progress on reducing regional inequities and helping to provide health services to the poor. However, the focus may have been too narrow. It did not look at the sustainability of the health financing system as a whole or the use of the budget as a tool to fund, direct and monitor expenditures to the sector. Donors and the health ministry seem content with the system of a special health fund, which shields the ministry (and the donors) from the demands of a parliamentary approval and budgetary oversight. It was only with PRSC 5 that “increased allocations to the health sector to compensate for reductions of donor funding to the Health Fund” was made a trigger condition. Major donors stand ready to replenish the Health Fund and thus perpetuate the existing fragmented system by continuing to provide important sources outside regular budgetary processes.

Broader health outcomes in Ghana however appear lower than expected. Ghana began the PRSC period in 2004 with relatively favourable health indicators and appeared well positioned to meet all but one MDG target but progress has been less than expected in several MDG targets. Sectors which have performed best (communicable diseases, HIV/AIDS) reflect the emphasis donors have put on dealing with these diseases with some consequent resource diversion. And health outcomes can be influenced by other sectors. In Ghana, the Health Ministry argues that the poor conditions in rural water supply and sanitation are important reason for the high under five child mortality rates.

In Nicaragua, PRSCs failed to support a strategy to deal with a sector with severe problems that is crucial for poverty reduction. The PRSC did not support any specific action in health but still had one expected result, in terms of maternal mortality. This was an extremely narrow target given the gravity and variety of the problems affecting the delivery of health services in the country, well-described in the 2007 Poverty Assessment.

In Benin and Lao PDR the achievement of health sector efficiencies was hampered by continuing weaknesses in budgetary processes. Benin introduced a number of budget management measures to strengthen sector management, for example, budget transfers to districts, the introduction of management and performance contracts for health districts and hospitals, etc. Although health outcomes improved (health service visits for children, mid-wife services, better vaccination rates, etc), the sector continues to suffer from inefficiencies of budget processes which have limited implementation – for example the failure to make timely budget payments to workers in needy zones. In Benin, as elsewhere, parallel sector projects existed and ministries raised some concerns about resources under PRSCs compared to free standing donor-financed projects. In Lao, too, the PRSC's role was effectively to support sectoral projects by increasing budget resources allocated to health and to strengthen staff incentives, particularly for work in remote areas with timely payment of salaries. Yet weak public financial management systems limited the achievement of sector goals, especially better service delivery to the poor.

Mozambique, like Ghana, shows how the achievement of sector results can be limited in a multi-donor context: While the PRSC was originally expected to become the Bank's only vehicle of support to the health sector (in addition to a multi-sector HIV/AIDS project), the Bank decided to renew its support to the health sector through a sector investment project and no longer use the PRSC to pursue specific sector goals. The development and pilot testing of a new basic health service delivery model in disadvantaged provinces was judged to require more dedicated sector support than what sector dialogue through the GBS/PRSC structure could offer. The need to limit the PRSC to a small number of key policy actions or indicators does not provide depth on sector specific issues. The PRSC has also been unable to make the budget process a tool for effective sector policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. The main benefits of the PRSC lie in higher sector spending rather than sector specific measures. And **Vietnam** despite achievements, has also encountered difficulties in building consensus among key stakeholders in the health service area.

Source: PRSC Case Studies

Annex 10. PRSCs and Education Service Delivery: Examples

As in health, **Armenia** provides an example of a well implemented education reform which has made more resources available for education, but where indicators of results are ambivalent. Total school enrollments expanded since 1999, from about 56 percent to 72 percent in 2006. However, primary enrollments stagnated at their 2003 level (93 percent). Data on primary school completion show that rates have stagnated at about 90 percent, but the data do not go beyond 2005. There is no data on secondary school completion. There is no evidence of an increase in early childhood education. There are no results indicators for achievement scores, and so it is difficult to judge if the quality of education has risen.

Benin by contrast provides an example of a country where education was an important part of the PRSC agenda and where many PRSC targets were met though reform implementation was slow due to capacity limitations. Primary completion rates and secondary enrollment rate targets were met or largely met. There was good progress with hiring and training of teachers. Notable as a pro poverty measure was the abolition of primary school fees in 2006. However areas of weakness include the reduction of geographical disparities and improvement in the quality of teaching. Overall, however, the PRSC program worked moderately well in the PRSC period although performance could have been better and structural reforms could have been implemented more rapidly.

Ghana's education sector PRSC components performed well in many respects. Clear priorities were laid out in GPRS I and II. Resources directed towards the education sector increased significantly. In terms of pro-poor outcomes, there were very significant enrolment gains during the PRSC years, partly prompted by the elimination of school fees. Good progress was made in catching up in deprived districts and some progress was made towards establishing gender equity. However the share of basic education declined from 62 percent in 2003 to 50 percent in 2006, with a corresponding increase in secondary and tertiary education, in line with growth objectives.

But the PRSC program did not operate strategically in helping to build financial and budgetary management processes at the Ministry level. There is no cross-collaboration between the education sector working group and the PFM group. The budget as a crucial instrument for planning, resource allocation, investment programming has not been developed. Donor coordination issues however were not an impediment in education. The active education donor group used the PRSC as a platform where measures which needed priority attention were placed and where consensus from other ministries (especially the Ministry of Finance) for reforms could be obtained

Concerns about deteriorating quality have also been raised by some major donors including USAID, with high drop-out and low completion rates at junior secondary levels. These may weaknesses in learning achievements at the primary level due to rapid expansion of student intake. cursory attention to quality issues in basic education under the PRSCs might be considered a weakness of the PRSC program, or it could point towards the limitations of the PRSC instrument. The limited numbers of measures which the PRSC instrument is designed to focus on do not lend themselves to multiple measures in one sector.

Not all countries included education in their PRSC designs, and not all PRSC countries' interventions in the education sector were pro-poor. In **Mozambique**, Bank support to educa-

tion took place largely outside the PRSC and General Budget support working groups, and was focused largely on secondary and higher education. Yet in **Vietnam**, the education strategy was clearly linked to Vietnam's Education for All goals, with a focus on funding, poverty alleviation and the use of the budget as a tool to achieve better results. In this case, there was good coordination among donors. In this case too, however, the education sector no longer directly figures in the PRSC.

In **Nicaragua** the scope of education issues addressed in the PRSC was very limited, compared to needs assessed in the 2007 Poverty Assessment, addressing an important project concerning school management - the Autonomous Schools Project. But the focus was too narrow to be the basis for a strategic approach to educational reform for the PRSCs. That is, even if the PRSCs supported a seemingly worthy project, they failed to support a strategy to deal with a sector with severe problems that is crucial for poverty reduction.

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