Project Performance Assessment Report
Haiti
Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction

(TF 99644)
March 27, 2019

Financial, Private Sector, and Sustainable Development
Independent Evaluation Group
**Abbreviations and Acronyms**

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMPAD</td>
<td>Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Programs (Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d’Aide au Développement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>disaster risk management</td>
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<td>EPPLS</td>
<td>Entreprise Publique de Promotion de Logements Sociaux</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<td>IEG</td>
<td>Independent Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>IFC</td>
<td>International Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>PDO</td>
<td>Project Development Objective</td>
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<td>PPAR</td>
<td>Project Performance Assessment Report</td>
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<td>PREKAD</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRODEPUR</td>
<td>Urban Community-Driven Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>RSCG</td>
<td>rental support cash grant</td>
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<td>UCLBP</td>
<td>Building Unit for Public Housing and Buildings - Office of the Prime Minister (Unité de Construction de Logements et de Bâtiments Publics)</td>
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This report was prepared by Stephen Hutton who assessed the project in July 2018. Joseph Irvins Denis and Roseline Neree Desauguste provided technical assistance as local consultants. Murielle Simon provided interpretation. The report was peer reviewed by Sheila Kamunyori and panel reviewed by April Conelly. Jean-Jacques Ahouansou and Richard Kraus provided administrative support.
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Preface

This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group on the Haiti Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (P125805), known as PREKAD. The project was selected for a PPAR at the request of the Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice to draw lessons from a flagship disaster risk management project, to contribute to IEG’s Urban Resilience evaluation, and as part IEG’s evaluation of disaster risk management projects. The project was implemented jointly with additional financing for the Haiti Urban Community-Driven Development Project (PRODEPUR), known as PRODEPUR Habitat. PRODEPUR is not covered in this evaluation since it included a range of community-driven development work prior to the 2010 earthquake unrelated to disaster risk management. However, many of the report findings are also relevant to the PRODEPUR Habitat Project.

The project was approved by the World Bank Regional Vice President on April 4, 2011 and closed on December 31, 2018, 18 months after the expected closing date. A significant restructuring was approved by the World Bank Board in October 2012. The project was financed with US$ 65 million from the Haiti Reconstruction Fund, a financial intermediary fund where the World Bank is trustee and one of three implementers. The Haiti Reconstruction Fund was established with contributions from bilateral donors.

This PPAR presents its findings and conclusions based on a review of the World Bank’s project documentation, combined with a field mission to Haiti carried out in July 2018. IEG conducted interviews with a range of different stakeholders linked to the program including government officials, implementing agencies, World Bank staff, other development partners, and civil society. IEG’s field mission was disrupted by civil unrest following the announcement of fuel price increases on July 6, 2018 (see Appendix E).

This report is a pilot effort to reform the structure of the PPAR. The pilot simplifies the main text by focusing on messages of what worked and what did not, by covering other issues in main text only if they were significant in this project, and by emphasizing the learning function of the report rather than project ratings. However, accountability elements are retained: project ratings and their justification are still present in the Appendix, and these ratings are still based as in past on the IEG/OPCS harmonized project evaluation guidelines, based on assessment against project objectives.

Following standard IEG procedure, copies of the draft PPAR was shared with relevant Government officials for their review and comment, but no comments were received.
Summary

Project background and description

Haiti is one of the poorest countries worldwide, and it has suffered from a long history of natural disasters, compounded with high poverty, weak institutions, and political instability. A major earthquake struck Haiti in January 2010, centered near the capital Port-au-Prince. About 220,000 people were killed and 300,000 wounded. Damage to buildings and infrastructure was estimated at US$ 7.8 billion, exceeding 100% of the country’s GDP. Over a million people were displaced and settled in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Already weak government capacity was further overwhelmed with the deaths of 16,000 staff members.

The international community provided financial and technical assistance for emergency response. A humanitarian response was carried out, but the transition from an initial shelter approach to recovery faltered, exacerbating an already substantial housing deficit.

The World Bank prepared the Haiti Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (known in Haiti as PREKAD) in response to requests from the Government of Haiti and the United States government, who funded the project through the Haitian Reconstruction Facility. Channeling funds through the Bank offered several advantages, including the ability to build on an existing Bank-financed urban community-driven development project, the Bank’s prior engagements in Haiti on disaster risk management, and the Bank’s role as the coordinating donor for the urban sector, including housing.

The original project objective was “to help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and improving basic community service infrastructure”. The project development objectives and design were later altered to add and/or return to improved housing conditions to the statement, accompanied by the addition of a rental cash grant program.

The project was financed with US$ 65 million from the Haitian Reconstruction Fund, and included support for debris removal and housing repair and reconstruction, the housing rental cash grant, community infrastructure repair and improvements, and institutional capacity support and studies.

What worked, and why?

The project design and implementation included several successful features. The project approach was relevant, as there was a critical need for interventions to support durable housing solutions for displaced people. The project design was realistic given the extreme context, and wisely included an integrated neighborhood approach combining support for both housing and neighborhood infrastructure. The project’s implementation approach, combining oversight through a government agency with on the ground implementation by NGOs, was a realistic and effective way of delivering results in a challenging environment. Government agencies were
unlikely to have sufficient capacity to directly implement large scale public works in the aftermath of the earthquake, while NGOs had significant experience and capacity. However, the direct costs of the implementation model were high, and there were some long-run tradeoffs from the NGO model in terms of missing opportunities for building government capacity and legitimacy. Community outreach efforts were critical for supporting effective implementation. The project adapted to changing circumstances and priorities to introduce a new mechanism, the rental support cash grant. Project restructurings also made substantial progress in addressing weaknesses in initial project design in a timely manner.

The project achieved several positive results. Rubble clearance carried out by the project was necessary to enable further reconstruction within the scope of the project. Interviews with project stakeholders suggest that neighborhood infrastructure works are likely to have induced private investment in housing and commercial activities in neighborhoods, though there is no quantitative evidence on the effects or positive spillovers from infrastructure. The rental support cash grant program assisted in moving people out of displaced persons camps and into residential housing, though many beneficiaries could not maintain the basic housing standards after the grant expired. Capacity building for a national housing policy agency contributed to filling an important institutional gap.

**What didn’t work, and why?**

There were several weaknesses in the project preparation and design. Project preparation was insufficient, due to the emergency situation, lack of existing data, and the compressed project preparation period. The initial project design was overly focused on house construction, as compared to community infrastructure or support for renters. Housing construction proved to be much more difficult to implement than anticipated. Private and informal self-reconstruction proceeded faster than expected. Land issues posed the most significant challenge to implementation because of the lack of land register or clear title.

There were some shortcomings and limitations in project results. The project did not measure its objective directly, relying instead on output measures. Works produced were sometimes of low quality due to low capacity in the construction sector. Maintenance of assets constructed under the project has been weak, largely because of chronic and systemic factors of insufficient funding for maintenance. Planning and housing studies supported by the project had little impact. The project is not likely to have made much impact on reducing disaster vulnerability – though this was not a formal project objective. Activities on repairing existing housing did little to improve structural resilience. Evidence suggests that the project had only modest spillover effects beyond its direct construction works. The project was only partially successful in demonstrating viability of a social housing model because of a heavily subsidized approach that is difficult to replicate.

IEG project ratings are described in Appendix A.
Lessons

This assessment offers the following lessons:

- **In the case of catastrophic disasters or in fragile settings, the need to address humanitarian needs and disaster recovery may preclude significant impact on disaster vulnerability reduction.** The project was most effective in reducing disaster vulnerability through housing construction works carried out directly under the project, where improved structural standards could be monitored and implemented. Yet, those works were the least effective in supporting the return of the population to their communities; they concentrated substantial resources in supporting a relatively small number of households; they were challenging and slow to implement; and they were unable to meet the urgent housing needs of the displaced population. The public was able to construct housing at much higher quantities and speed than donor projects – but they did so without reducing their disaster vulnerability, because of limits in their financial resources, access to quality materials, and technical knowledge.

- **International NGOs can be effective project implementers in an emergency context where government capacity has been weakened.** In Haiti, the earthquake further undermined already weak government capacity. International NGOs implemented construction works more rapidly than would have been possible in a government project. They may have technical expertise, community trust, and financial management capacity. However, the organizations also brought high costs, and missed opportunities for building government capacity and fostering government legitimacy. In this case, the benefits outweighed the drawbacks.

- **Investments in infrastructure can have a larger impact on neighborhood recovery than those from direct housing reconstruction.** In Haiti, qualitative evidence suggested that infrastructure works especially roads helped to catalyze investment in housing and businesses. In contrast, direct housing reconstruction was difficult to implement and had only a moderate effect on neighborhoods, as most housing reconstruction was private and especially informal self-reconstruction. There was still a case for an integrated approach that included some housing support to signal good practice design and construction.

- **Disaster preparedness is critical and requires upfront investment in disaster risk management capacity and in relevant data and analytics, including geospatial data.** The lack of available data in Haiti weakened response and reconstruction capacity in several ways. A lack of knowledge about housing ownership status contributed to an initial project response that did not do enough to support renters and landlords. The lack of an adequate land registry made it difficult to implement works, as it was difficult to identify legitimate owners. Lack of hazard maps and geotechnical data made it
challenging to site new works. These kinds of data gaps were challenging to fill after the disaster had struck.

- **Projects seeking to support durable responses to crises in FCV countries may need a combination of transitional measures and durable measures targeting vulnerable households.** The initial project design was focused on durable development support: housing and infrastructure (as compared to humanitarian or transitional assistance). During implementation, it was recognized that many IDPs in temporary shelters constructed as humanitarian support were not sufficiently supported by the project approach, and a rental grant was added as a transitional measure. The project experience showed that cash grants for housing rental can be an effective approach for supporting internally displaced persons to rapidly transition from post-disaster camps to regular housing. The use of a rental support cash grant played a major role in allowing camps to be wound down and closed. However, it did not provide durable housing solutions. More than half of supported households were unable to sustain themselves in their new housing. This suggests that such programs must be complemented by other programs that support economic and social development efforts for displaced households.

- **Pilot efforts may have limited impact if they are not based on a replicable model.** Under the project, social housing pilots with joint ownership were generally implemented successfully. But achieving widespread results (for housing provision, increased density, or housing for the vulnerable) would require a model that could be scaled up. The pilots applied an almost fully subsidized rent to own model, where beneficiaries made only modest payments for a single year before gaining title. This meant that the model was heavily reliant on international donor grant funding. Consequently, there has been no replication of the model, and planned future multi-unit housing in Haiti are limited in scale and are not targeted towards vulnerable households.

José Carbajo Martínez
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Independent Evaluation Group
Résumé

Contexte et description du projet

Haïti compte parmi les pays les plus pauvres au monde et depuis longtemps, subit des catastrophes naturelles, aggravées par une grande pauvreté, des institutions faibles et une instabilité politique. En janvier 2010, un séisme dévastateur dont l’épicentre fut localisé près de la capitale, Port-au-Prince, frappa le pays. Près de 220,000 personnes périrent et 300,000 autres furent blessées. Les dommages causés aux immeubles et infrastructures furent estimés à 7,8 milliards de dollars US, dépassant les 100% du PIB du pays. Plus d’un million d’individus furent déplacés et installés dans des camps de réfugiés. De plus, les capacités du gouvernement, déjà faibles, furent encore affaiblies par la perte de 16,000 de ses employés.

La communauté internationale fournit une assistance financière et technique dans le cadre des interventions d’urgence. Une réponse humanitaire fut mise en place. L’approche utilisée dès le début - installation d’abris temporaires pour aboutir à des solutions plus durables – ne donna pas les résultats escomptés. Ce qui exacerba encore plus le déficit en matière de logements.

La Banque Mondiale prépara Le Projet de Reconstruction de Logements en Haïti (connu sous le nom PREKAD) en réponse aux demandes du Gouvernement d’Haïti et de celui des États-Unis d’Amérique. La Banque Mondiale finança le projet à travers le Mécanisme pour la Reconstruction d’Haïti. La canalisation des fonds via la banque offrit les avantages suivants: la possibilité de s’appuyer sur un projet de développement urbain et communautaire déjà financé par la Banque, de pouvoir bénéficier des engagements déjà pris par la Banque dans le cadre de la gestion des risques et désastres en Haïti, et du rôle de la Banque en tant que bailleur coordonnateur pour le secteur urbain, y compris les logements.

L’objectif du projet initial était « d’aider les résidents durement frappés par le séisme et vivant dans les quartiers sélectionnés de Port-au-Prince à retourner dans leurs communautés, en les accompagnant lors de la réparation et/ou de la reconstruction de leurs maisons tout en améliorant les services de base ». Les objectifs de ce projet furent modifiés afin d’ajouter et/ou de revenir aux meilleures conditions de logements à travers un programme de subventions en espèces pour la location de maisons. Le projet fut financé par le Fonds de Reconstruction d’Haïti à hauteur de $65 millions de dollars US et comprenait un appui pour : l’enlèvement des débris, la réparation et la construction de logements, l’octroi de subventions pour la location de maisons, la réparation et l’amélioration des infrastructures communautaires, le renforcement des capacités institutionnelles ainsi que les études.
Qu’est ce qui a marché, et pourquoi?

La conception du projet ainsi que son implémentation comprenaient plusieurs éléments qui furent un succès. L’approche du projet fut pertinente étant donné qu’il existait un besoin urgent pour des interventions relatives à la mise en place de logements durables pour les populations déplacées. La conception du projet fut réalisée par rapport au contexte difficile dans lequel elle évoluait et comprenait une approche intégrée de la population tout en appuyant la mise en place de logements et d’infrastructures. L’approche intégrée du projet qui incluait une supervision faite par une agence gouvernementale travaillant déjà sur place avec des ONG, permit d’obtenir des résultats dans un environnement difficile. Il est certain que les agences gouvernementales n’avaient pas les capacités requises pour mettre en place des travaux à grande échelle suite au séisme, tandis que les ONG avaient l’expérience ainsi que l’expertise. Cependant, les coûts directs du modèle mis en place par les ONG étaient élevés et ne prenaient pas en compte des besoins de renforcement des capacités du gouvernement et sa légitimité. Il était essentiel de sensibiliser les communautés dans le processus d’implémentation. Le projet dû s’adapter à l’évolution des changements et priorités et introduisit un nouveau mécanisme : la subvention en espèces pour la location de logements. Dans un délai raisonnable, le projet fut restructuré, les faiblesses du projet initial furent prises en compte et des progrès furent accomplis.

Le projet a obtenu des résultats positifs. Le déblaiement des débris effectué par le projet fut nécessaire et permit de reconstruire au sein même du projet. Des interviews faites avec les parties prenantes ont montré que les travaux d’infrastructure réalisés avec la participation des membres de la communauté ont encouragé des investissements privés au niveau des logements et des activités commerciales bien qu’il n’y ait aucune preuve quantitative pouvant étayer les retombées positives liées à ces travaux. Le programme de subventions en espèces en appui à la location permit de déplacer les gens vivant dans des camps tout en leur offrant des logements résidentiels. Malheureusement, beaucoup de ces bénéficiaires ne purent respecter les normes de base en matière de logements après l’expiration de cette subvention. Cependant, le renforcement des capacités d’une agence capable de mettre en place une politique nationale de logements permit de combler ce vide institutionnel.

Qu’est ce qui n’a pas marché, et pourquoi?

Il existait plusieurs faiblesses au niveau de la préparation et de la conception du projet : insuffisance de préparation due à la situation d’urgence, manque de données existantes ainsi que manque de temps pour accomplir le travail. La conception du projet initial se focalisait surtout sur la construction de maisons, et non sur des infrastructures communautaires ou sur un appui aux locataires. Elle fut difficile à mettre en place par rapport à ce qui avait été prévu. Les problèmes fonciers posèrent un défi majeur à cause d’un cadastre inexistant ou de la présentation de titres de propriété non fiables.

Il eut des manquements et limites au niveau des résultats du projet qui n’avait pas évalué directement ses objectifs, comptant sur des mesures extérieures. Les travaux exécutés étaient
Cette Leçons parfois vulnérabilité L’entretien une réparation chroniques L’évaluation démontré logements

- approche évaluation a sur d’énormes

Cependant, standards humanitaires capacités contexte, La femme, le monde, et les femmes les plus vulnérables, ont eu investissement... Les ONG internationales peuvent être des agences d’implémentation efficaces dans un contexte d’urgence où les capacités du gouvernement ont été affaiblies. Le séisme subi par Haïti a affaibli encore plus les capacités du gouvernement. Les ONG internationales ont mis en place des travaux de construction beaucoup plus rapidement que ceux qui auraient été réalisés à travers un projet du gouvernement. Ils avaient l’expertise technique, la confiance de la population et les capacités en matière de gestion financière. Cependant, ces organisations ont augmenté les coûts et n’ont pas su renforcer les capacités du gouvernement et encourager leur légitimité. Cependant et dans ce contexte, les bénéfices tirés furent supérieurs aux inconvénients.

- Les investissements au niveau des infrastructures peuvent avoir un plus grand impact sur la reprise des activités d’une communauté que ceux provenant de la reconstruction directe des logements. En Haïti, il a été démontré que les travaux d’infrastructure et
particulièrement les routes aident à promouvoir les investissements au niveau des logements et des affaires. Par contraste, la reconstruction de logements a été difficile à implémenter et a eu un faible impact sur les quartiers étant donné que la plupart des maisons ont été reconstruites par des privés et de manière informelle. Cependant, on aurait pu mettre en place une approche intégrée comprenant un appui pour la construction de logements ce qui aurait permis de montrer les bonnes pratiques à utiliser au niveau de la construction et du design.

- La préparation aux désastres est essentielle et exige des investissements préalables en matière de gestion des risques de catastrophes et du renforcement des capacités ainsi qu’en données et analyses fiables, y compris les données géo spatiales. Le manque de données fiables a été un handicap pour répondre efficacement aux besoins du secteur de la reconstruction. Le manque d’informations sur le statut des propriétés nous a empêchés de soutenir de manière efficace les locataires ainsi que les propriétaires. L’inexistence d’un cadastre fiable ne nous a pas permis d’exécuter certains travaux car il était difficile d’identifier les vrais propriétaires. De plus, le manque de cartes permettant d’identifier les zones de risque et les données géotechniques représentent un défi majeur pour implémerter de nouveaux sites de travaux de construction. N’ayant pas accès à ces données, il nous fut extrêmement difficile de faire face à ces défis après que la catastrophe ait frappé.

- Les projets visant à appuyer des réponses durables dans les pays fragiles, affectés par la violence et les conflits (FCV) devraient inclure des mesures transitoires ainsi que des mesures durables ciblant des ménages vulnérables. La conception du projet initial s’est concentrée sur un appui au développement durable : logement et infrastructure (comparée à une Assistance humanitaire ou à une aide temporaire). Durant la mise en œuvre, il a été reconnu que plusieurs personnes déplacées (IDP) et installées dans des abris temporaires construits en tant qu’appui humanitaire, n’ont pas été suffisamment appuyés au niveau de l’approche du projet. De plus, une subvention pour la location de logements a été ajoutée en tant que mesure temporaire. En se basant sur l’expérience du projet, il a été prouvé que l’octroi de subventions en espèces pour la location de logements peut être une approche adéquate afin d’aider les personnes déplacées de passer rapidement des camps post-désastres à un logement plus stable. Aussi, cette subvention joua un rôle important et permit aux camps d’être éliminés. Cependant, cela n’apporta pas de solutions durables au niveau du logement. Plus de la moitié des ménages assistés ne purent subvenir à leurs besoins dans leur nouveau logement. Ce qui prouve que ce type de programme devrait être appuyé par d’autres programmes permettant de soutenir les efforts de développement économique et social des ménages déplacés.

- Les programmes pilotes peuvent avoir un impact limité s’ils ne sont pas basés sur des modèles pouvant être reproduits. Dans le cadre de ce projet, les logements sociaux
pilotes en copropriétés ont été implémentés avec succès. Cependant, pour pouvoir obtenir des résultats plus importants, (octroi de logements, accroissement de la densité, logements pour les plus vulnérables) il faudrait un modèle mieux adapté aux besoins de la population. Les programmes pilotes ont utilisés pour l’acquisition d’un logement, un système de location presque qu’entièrement subventionné. En contrepartie, les bénéficiaires ont versé, durant une année, des sommes modestes et ont obtenu par la suite leurs titres de propriété. Ce qui prouve que ce modèle est lourdement tributaire du financement des bailleurs internationaux. En conséquence, il n’y a pas eu de duplication. Les travaux de construction de complexe d’habitations se feront sur une petite échelle et ne cibleront pas les ménages vulnérables.

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1. Project Background and Context

1.1 Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere, and one of the poorest countries in the world. It has suffered from a long history of natural disasters, compounded with high poverty, weak institutions, and political instability. At the start of 2010, Haiti faced many development challenges including weak government capacity, low perceived government legitimacy, uncontrolled and unplanned urban development, inadequate housing, pervasive homelessness, rapid population growth, and others.

1.2 An earthquake of magnitude 7.3 struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, with an epicenter just southwest of Port-au-Prince. 220,000 people were killed and 300,000 wounded. Damage to buildings and infrastructure was estimated at US$ 7.8 billion, exceeding 100% of GDP. Over a million people were displaced and settled in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, with at their peak roughly 1.5 million people in over 1,500 camps. Government buildings were destroyed including health and education structures, as well as parliament, the courts, and 19 of 20 government ministries. Already weak government capacity was further overwhelmed, with the deaths of 16,000 staff members.

1.3 The international community mobilized to provide financial and technical assistance for emergency response. An initial humanitarian response was carried out led by the United Nations, coordinated through an Inter Agency Steering Committee and an associated cluster system. Over time, the transition from an initial shelter approach to recovery faltered, as the cluster system had no mandate for housing recovery or reconstruction, and as humanitarian shelter approaches and a reconstruction approach were not jointly planned (World Bank 2015). Large scale temporary shelter programs (which supported property owners as it required land) absorbed a large portion of available international funding support, at the expense of support for solutions that assisted renters or landlords, and without supporting permanent solutions. The earthquake had dramatically exacerbated already existing weaknesses in the housing sector (inadequate housing supply, homelessness, low quality housing, and others), and a huge deficit emerged for permanent housing to absorb the IDP population.

1.4 This is the context in which the Haiti Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project (known in Haiti as PREKAD) was prepared. The World Bank Group sought to provide a comprehensive post-earthquake response. The Bank Group mobilized US$ 479 million in new and existing funding during FY10 for earthquake response in Haiti. In the urban sector, the Bank was already implementing an IDA-financed urban community-driven development program, PRODEPUR. This program already had implementation models working on the ground, and relationships with communities in some parts of Port-au-Prince, and the Bank was adding additional financing to this program (through additional financing called PRODEPUR Habitat) to support earthquake reconstruction. The Bank was
engaged already on disaster risk management in Haiti, and it became the coordinating donor for the urban sector and housing. The United States was the largest contributor to the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (a financial intermediary fund established to support response to the earthquake), and based on these features of comparative advantage for the Bank, the US requested that a portion of their contribution be used to support housing reconstruction and urban upgrading. The Bank then prepared PREKAD as one development partner working as part of a larger international reconstruction effort, including major support from the United Nations, European Union, United States Agency for International Development, and others.

Project design and financing

1.5 The original project objective was “to help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and improving basic community service infrastructure”.

1.6 The project was restructured in 2012, adding in a housing rental voucher aimed at helping people in displaced persons camps leave the camps and return to regular housing. The situation in internally IDP camps had worsened, especially following the outbreak of a cholera epidemic and widespread flooding following Hurricane Isaac, and so there was recognition of greater needs for supporting the majority of occupants in the camps who were not landowners. The project objectives were revised, “to help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and/or return to improved housing conditions and improving basic community service infrastructure” (italics added). Improved housing conditions was interpreted to mean an improvement to people from living in rented housing as compared to the displaced persons camp.

1.7 The project included four components:

- Component 1 initially supported debris removal, demolition, housing repair, and housing reconstruction in selected neighborhoods. After project restructuring, the component also supported cash vouchers for housing to enable residents of displaced persons camps to return to neighborhoods.

- Component 2 supported community service infrastructure repair, improvement, and extension in selected neighborhoods. This included: reconstruction of roads, along with repair or construction of other services including walkways, lighting, water supply, sanitation, and electricity.
- Component 3 supported development of neighborhood-level urban restructuring plans and natural hazard risk maps, preparation of housing studies and strategies, and capacity building for national government agencies and municipalities.

- Component 4 supported project management.

1.8 The project theory of change included multiple pathways and outcomes. Neighborhood infrastructure would encourage private investment in neighborhoods and improved services. Housing repair and reconstruction with improve housing. Both of these would encourage return of residents to neighborhoods. Debris removal was a necessity for carrying out infrastructure or housing reconstruction, but also could help to stimulate private investment by opening access. The housing rental support grant encouraged supported renters in IDP camps to return to neighborhoods, and encouraged landlords to make some investments in housing. Capacity building and planning studies were not specifically connected to the neighborhood works.

Figure 1. PREKAD Simplified Theory of Change

1.9 The project was financed by US$ 65 million from the Haiti Reconstruction Fund, a multi-donor trust fund established after the 2010 earthquake.
Table 1.1. World Bank Financing by Component, in millions of US$

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Debris Removal and Housing Repair and Reconstruction, and housing rental voucher</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Service Infrastructure Repair, Improvement and Extension</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Capacity Support and Studies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Management</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Contingencies</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
<td><strong>64.9</strong></td>
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Note that neither the World Bank ICR nor the borrower’s completion report provided a separate breakdown of expenditure for each component. This is because components 1 and 2 were implemented by 6 NGO implementers and were assigned activities in both components 1 and 2 by area, while components 3 and 4 were carried out directly by the project coordination unit. Within component 1, US$ 16.1 million was the actual cost for the rental support voucher program, while US$ 43.7 million was the actual cost for other activities. (BMPAD 2016).

2. What worked, and Why?

Design and Preparation

2.1 The project approach met a critical need for interventions to support permanent solutions for displaced people. Port-au-Prince was the economic and political center of Haiti. The severe earthquake was devastating for the city because of the poor structural quality of buildings, substantial poverty, and vulnerable topography. The internally displaced population had been supported in temporary conditions and transitional shelters, especially in IDP camps, but under poor conditions. A reconstruction response was needed to allow and encourage people to return to communities.

2.2 The project design included an integrated neighborhood approach combining both housing support and neighborhood infrastructure. There was a clear comparative advantage for donor projects to support community assets and infrastructure, where there were economies of scale, and where a coordinated and professional approach were needed. The government or private sector would have been unable to provide restoration and expansion of services at anything like the same scale or pace in the absence of a specific donor-financed project. Housing-only efforts (as carried out by some other donors and by many NGOs) proved to be less effective. Some projects by other development agencies sought to carry out greenfields housing construction, as this was easier to implement because of clear land title. But by building only where it was easy to get land, constructed
houses from other donors were not necessarily where people wanted to live (i.e. where connected to jobs, services, etc.) and sometimes became unoccupied white elephants. However, including some direct housing reconstruction was worth including to develop and signal good design practice and construction.

2.3 The project design was realistic given the extreme context. Some stakeholders in hindsight argued that the project approach and design missed opportunities, either to: a) promote decentralization in Haiti by encouraging construction and relocation of people out of Port-au-Prince; b) realign or restructure neighborhoods with better urban planning, or c) reduce neighborhood density and over-crowding. But this needs to be set against what was feasible in a post-earthquake context in which government capacity was already overstretched. These approaches would involve major changes for citizens. They would require the mustering of political support, outreach and consultation, and wide-spread buy-in. This was unrealistic in the wake of the earthquake, with a government whose limited capacity was already overstretched by the level of need, and where the degree of legitimacy and public trust in government was low.

Implementation and Supervision

2.4 The project’s implementation approach of combining oversight through a government agency with on the ground implementation by NGOs was a realistic and effective way of delivering results in a challenging environment. While the formal project implementing agency was the Bureau of Monetization of Development Aid Programs (BMPAD) operating under authority of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the project works were implemented through six largely international non-governmental organizations (NGOS) which then in turn managed the tendering of construction works, mostly to small local construction firms. This approach was adapted from the existing PRODEPUR, but expanded to cover additional implementing NGOs. The NGO implementation model offered several important advantages over a typical fully government approach.

2.5 Government agencies lacked the capacity to directly implement large scale public works in the aftermath of the earthquake. Government capacity had been limited even prior to the earthquake but was substantially weakened by the destruction and deaths from the quake (government buildings were destroyed, many government officials were dead or displaced), even as the demands on government were heightened by the crisis. Most stakeholders interviewed by IEG argued it would have been unrealistic to expect the government at the time to have been able to implement the project, or that the NGO model allowed for much faster implementation than would have been possible from government.

2.6 NGOs had significant experience and capacity. NGOs had prior implementation experience from donor projects. They had a degree of trust from government, as many NGO staff were former government officials, and as government was already working with
NGOs for implementation of donor support. NGOs had some capacity to carry out financial management and reporting, and a reputation for transparency. NGOs were able to offer multidisciplinary teams, with technical expertise (e.g. architects, engineers, sociologists, etc.). Two of the NGOs were already implementing PRODEPUR for the Bank, and had experience in working with Bank procedures. The NGOs had, in most cases, experience in working with the specific local communities covered by the project. This had generated a degree of trust with the communities which enabled them to operate in environments with significant insecurity; in many of these communities trust in government was low. Some NGOs had good linkages and experience with construction sector, with whom all the NGOs contracted to undertake the works.

2.7 Overall, the NGO implementation model was a key factor behind the broadly successful implementation of project works. The more successful programs by other donors also used NGO implementation models. Donors that sought to work directly with contractors typically encountered greater implementation problems.

2.8 However, there were also some tradeoffs and disadvantages from the NGO model. There was variation in performance across the NGOs; some were higher capacity than others, and this showed up in the quality of works and in cost. NGOs that had been more service providers and lacked construction experience struggled more on implementation and quality, as well as on timely financial reporting. Late reporting by some NGOs slowed disbursements by the Bank. Variability in approaches and across NGOs made it difficult to get uniformity in results or to or to manage expectations. For example, some NGOs built larger/higher standard housing which was higher cost, so produced fewer units.

2.9 The direct costs of the implementation model were high. Of the nearly US$ 60 million disbursed to the NGOs for implementing components 1 and 2, 25% of these costs ($15 million) were consumed by operating costs of the NGOs (BMPAD 2016, page 24). This is in addition to the costs of overall project management for BMPAD in component 4.4

2.10 There were also long-run tradeoffs from the NGO model. First, implementing the project through NGOs meant that capacity and experience in project implementation was not being built within the government. Supporting NGOs risks a form of brain drain, as higher salaries in NGOs are able to attract the most capable professional staff away from government ministries. Second, communities often saw the works as being provided by the NGO, not by the government. This meant that the approach didn’t build community faith in government as a service provider, which would be important in contributing to the perceived legitimacy of the government of Haiti.

2.11 Community outreach efforts were critical for supporting effective implementation. The implementing NGOs reported an initially high degree of suspicion and reluctance from residents for starting the project. The project and implementing NGOs
made major efforts through community meetings to solicit ideas from communities about redevelopment, and to incorporate these in approaches. This helped to develop buy-in and social acceptability in the neighborhoods, without which it would not have been possible to implement the project, especially in areas facing significant insecurity and violence. In one neighborhood, gang activity was such that envisioned works were not completed, but elsewhere the project was successful in carrying out activities despite challenging circumstances. Community planning models used in the project have the potential for replication in similar contexts.

2.12 The project was able to adapt to changing circumstances and priorities to introduce a new mechanism, the rental support cash grant. The international earthquake response had been quick to support large numbers of transitional shelters and IDP camps, but slow to provide permanent housing. The hope had been that camps would be temporary and that people would depart as conditions outside the camps improved. But large populations remained resident in the camps for a sustained period. Over time, the situation in the camps worsened. A cholera epidemic broke out in late 2010, eventually infecting as many as 800,000 throughout Haiti. Hurricane Isaac in 2012 caused widespread flooding and worsened the conditions for IDPs. Insecurity, violence, and public health risks were common. Closing the camps and relocating the population became a top government priority.

2.13 The government (with donor support) began programs of rental support cash grants (RSCG) in October 2010, with 14,000 families supported in leaving camps through this mechanism by 2012 (Fitzgerald 2012). The government asked the World Bank and other donors to support this effort, and so in 2012 PREKAD was restructured, shifting resources out of housing construction and adding a RSCG subcomponent similar to those RSCG projects already in operation, aiming to support the departure of IDPs from camps and to return to neighborhoods. The effort was also an attempt to benefit renters, who did not otherwise benefit directly from housing reconstruction and repair efforts. Renting was the realistic option given the limited resources of IDPs and the lack of access to land. Under PREKAD, the project rental grant design included the core $500 rental voucher as in other programs, and an additional $150 grant for transport and family support, along with livelihood programs provided by the implementing NGOs.

2.14 The RSCG was not intended to provide permanent or other durable housing solutions but had the limited aim of ending the immediate displacement and helping families move out of the camps. The limited scope of the rental support grant cash grant programs should not be seen as a negative. Other programs including the rest of PREKAD were more effective means of supporting repair and reconstruction of housing, infrastructure, and economic development in neighborhoods. These programs were more efficient and effective means of providing livelihood support than were early iterations of
the RSCG which tried to bundle this support directly (World Bank 2014). It was not realistic to see the RSCG program as a means of providing durable housing, given the scale of displacement and the housing gap.

Results

2.15 Rubble clearance carried out by the project was a basic necessity for enabling further reconstruction within the scope of the project. After the earthquake, rubble from destroyed buildings was present throughout Port-au-Prince, hampering mobility and all response and reconstruction efforts. Though most public areas in the PREKAD neighborhoods had been cleared of rubble by the time the project began (BMPAD 2016), significant rubble remained on private land.

2.16 It made sense for the project to undertake rubble clearance. Centralized rubble clearance offered several advantages; economies of scale, efficiency, and a reduced risk of dumping of waste outside of the designated part of the main PAP dumpsite. It was difficult for the project to develop detailed plans for the rubble clearance activities in advance; for example, it was hard to set targets or cost estimates upfront as there was no prior experience or basis for making estimates, and little idea of the quantity of rubble to be removed. The solution was area-based contracts with the NGOs, who then contracted small local firms.

2.17 Rubble clearance facilitated implementation of the PREKAD subprojects works, but likely had little effect on broader reconstruction. The project carried out removal of roughly 2,400 cubic meters of rubble. Some owners of destroyed buildings refused demolition and the removal of rubble for fear that the plots would be occupied by squatters. Rubble clearance was largely limited to clearing plots that were about to undertake a reconstruction subproject, due to fears that otherwise uncontrolled reconstruction might take place on cleared plots (BMPAD 2016). However, some stakeholders argued that rubble clearance also offered important psychological benefits for a public traumatized by the scale of the disaster; removing rubble contributed to a feeling of progress and moving on from the tragedy.

2.18 Interviews with project stakeholders suggest that neighborhood infrastructure works are likely to have induced private investment in housing and commercial activities in neighborhoods. Prior to the project (and prior to the earthquake), basic infrastructure and services were lacking in the project neighborhoods. Under the project, 288 infrastructure subprojects were carried out that significantly expanded these. Roads were widened and paved and bridges added, and walkways and stairways were added or improved, improving mobility. Street lighting was installed, improving safety and allowing for more night-time activity. Drainage was improved, communal latrines were constructed, reportedly leading to improvements in public health.
2.19 Qualitative evidence provides evidence that infrastructure investments supported community development and the return of residents to neighborhoods. There is no quantitative data on the effects or positive spillovers from infrastructure. Project measurement systems tracked only project outputs and did not assess access to services or effects on investments. Stakeholders interviewed by IEG were unanimous in suggesting that neighborhood infrastructure had been a major driver of private reconstruction and investment, in formal or informal housing, and in private commercial activities including schools. They argued that neighborhoods where infrastructure construction took place saw much faster recovery than other neighborhoods and much greater access to services. A European Union-financed program with similar approaches to integrated neighborhood reconstruction concluded that the approach had led to investments in commercial development. Other reported benefits included reduced flooding, creation of local markets, and potentially increases in land and housing values. These findings are consistent with international experience on slum upgrading projects.

2.20 Many stakeholders saw this community infrastructure as the most important and successful feature of PREKAD. The case for infrastructure works was much stronger than that for housing construction, as infrastructure was more difficult for communities or land owners to carry out by themselves. Infrastructure benefits were also much more widely spread than some other project outputs; housing construction and repairs supported a small number of beneficiaries with a large benefit, while infrastructure provided benefits to a larger community. Even implementing housing works within the project were dependent on infrastructure investment, as it was difficult to convince households to participate in house repair and reconstruction prior to repair of the communal infrastructure (World Bank 2017).

2.21 In a beneficiary survey carried out by the project jointly for PREKAD and PRODEPUR-Habitat, beneficiaries reported satisfaction with the results of the projects (BMPAD 2016). On average across neighborhoods, 33% of respondents say the results are very good, 25% good and 34% acceptable. Results were most positive for road construction works, where 48% say they are satisfied and 19% very satisfied. Focus groups for the project’s self-assessment also generated positive feedback.

2.22 In interviews with IEG, some stakeholders complained that the selection of neighborhoods led to some neighborhoods receiving significant investments while others were marginalized. This raises the possibility that investment induced in these neighborhoods may not be fully additional, but in part may be at the expense of potential investment in nearby areas that did not receive project support. Some stakeholders argue that neighborhood recovery might have been stimulated further if public funds had been used more explicitly to leverage private investment, including co-financing with households, neighborhood groups, NGOs, or the private sector (see also World Bank 2016).
Some stakeholders were disappointed that there was no replication or follow-up beyond the project; the project effect was largely limited to the neighborhoods covered. However, these neighborhoods collectively represented a substantial population (75,000 households), and many other areas were covered by projects from other donors.

2.23 The rental support cash grant program assisted in moving people out of displaced persons camps and into residential housing, though most beneficiaries could not maintain the basic housing standards after the grant expired. Under PREKAD, roughly 14,000 households received the rental support cash grants, and moved from IDP camps to rental housing. Without the program, these households would likely have remained in hazardous and challenging conditions in IDP camps for a substantially longer period. This had significant short term benefits in terms of avoided disease and insecurity. Together with RSCG programs from other donors, these contributed to the closure of IDP camps.

2.24 The program included a number of features designed to ensure that recipients received improved housing conditions. Payments were made only on condition of a signed rental agreement, for lodging meeting some basic conditions (electricity, communal latrine or toilet, and geographic access to basic health and education services) as verified by a site inspection. Payment for the rent was made directly to the landlord, while the remaining cash was provided to the household in two installments. The program was successfully targeted towards the poorest; an evaluation found that grant recipients in general were the urban poor, earning less than $2 per day, and who were renters before the earthquake (Wolf Group 2013).

2.25 Proxy data suggests that many beneficiaries did not receive sustained access to quality housing. Little evidence is available on the specific households receiving rental grants through PREKAD, but evaluations have been carried out of larger RSCG programs carried out by the same implementers, in 2013 (Wolf Group 2013) and 2014 (Large N Analysis 2014). It is likely that the effects of the PREKAD support are substantially similar to those of the larger program, so it is justifiable to use these results as a proxy.12 Roughly 25-50% of program recipients stayed in their rental accommodation beyond the 1 year period of the grant, while the remainder moved elsewhere.13 Of those that moved, for up to 59% this was was because they could no longer afford the rent after the subsidy program ended.14 This meant that the “decent but modest” basic minimum accommodation standards could not be maintained after the program ended for many recipients.15 However, most were still likely better off than in the dangerous conditions of the IDP camps.

2.26 The program had some impact on reinforcing the housing sector by encouraging investments in expanding housing by landlords (typically, adding additional rooms or services to houses). The 2013 evaluation of the program found that 77% of landlords in a survey reported that they had made upgrades and investments in their property to meet program eligibility requirements for the grant (Wolf Group 2013). Landlords also reported
that they reinvested about 2/3 of their rental income in immediate upgrades and that they planned for similar future investments in increasing rental space. The program provided no technical support or assistance to landlords for undertaking these investments.

2.27 There is some evidence that the program had other short-term benefits for program recipients. The program approach allowed the beneficiary to keep any amount of cash lower than the rental amount that they paid, so long as they did find a rental property that met the minimum criteria. Survey data from the 2013 evaluation found that cash excess cash was put to productive uses, reportedly invested towards commerce and micro-business investment, payment of school fees, purchase of food, savings, family assistance, or debt payment (in declining order of frequency in responses).

2.28 Many stakeholders interviewed by IEG raised concerns about forms of program leakage and perverse incentives, and some NGOs did not want to become involved with the program because of these concerns. Stakeholders reported that people not resident in camps would enter the camps in order to qualify for the grant, or that families would sign up to receive the voucher multiple times from multiple sources, or that families who owned property would receive the grant by in effect renting housing from themselves. It was not possible for IEG to validate these or to determine if the scale of these were meaningful in terms of the overall size of the program. The program did set up control systems and safeguards that sought to limit access to camp-residents, and contained an appeals mechanism to manage disputes.

2.29 The most concerning claim made by stakeholders interviewed by IEG was that the RSCG programs (from PREKAD and other donor projects implementing the same government program) had stimulated expansion of informal settlement, especially tenuous construction in highly vulnerable mountain slopes, or in large uncontrolled urban development such as in Canaan. Many stakeholders interviewed by IEG raised this concern, and development partners and Bank staff argued that it was plausible. However, it is difficult to prove definitively. A 2013 evaluation of the program did not find evidence that the rental support approach was contributing to development of new informal settlements (Wolf Group, 2013), but its evaluation approach was not designed to detect this. Some stakeholders argued in interviews that some of the largest new settlement growth pre-dated the rental subsidy program and so could not be attributed to it.

2.30 Some stakeholders raised concerns that the program may have contributed to price inflation in the rental market. Limited data makes it difficult to assess this, but there is evidence suggests that rental inflation was not a major problem (World Bank 2014).16

2.31 The program was a successful response to the particular set of circumstances that existed in Haiti at the time of implementation. Most stakeholders interviewed by IEG thought it was unlikely that the rental grant system would have a long term impact, but
argued convincingly that the context was serious enough that a short-term emergency solution was needed at the time. However, future iterations of this mechanism might benefit from a more gradual phase-out, to ease reintegration and the sudden effect of grant withdrawal. They could also do more to track beneficiaries over a longer period and so to generate better evidence on program effectiveness.

2.32 **Capacity building for a national housing policy agency contributed to filling an important institutional gap.** Along with support through other World Bank Interventions, a national housing agency (the Building Unit for Public Housing and Buildings – UCLBP) was established. The initial lack of an agency to coordinate housing policy had hampered the design and implementation of housing sector recovery in the wake of the earthquake (World Bank 2015). The agency played an important role in the implementation of the rental support cash grant program, and the resettlement of internally displaced persons. Capacity building under PREKAD and other projects was critical, as the effective functioning of the agency (like many others in Haiti) is heavily reliant on resourcing from donor projects.

2.33 The newly created housing agency also developed and expanded Haiti’s first national housing policy. The policy provided clarity on the roles of institutions and actors for housing, included a technical strategy for strengthening capacity (e.g. for geotechnical surveys), a funding strategy for housing, a shift from disaster response to proactive risk reduction, and efforts to improve sector governance. While there are many challenges in implementing the policy on the ground in Haiti, the creation of the policy was an important first step towards improvement management and planning of unplanned urban growth and housing, which poses a serious threat to Haiti’s development (World Bank 2017b). However, the policy support in housing did not create an urban planning framework that could have increased the coherence of recovery projects and guided newly urbanizing areas. Recent World Bank analytical work has highlighted key elements of what this could include (World Bank 2017b).

### 3. What Didn’t Work, and Why?

#### Design and Preparation

3.1 **The project appraisal was inadequate, due to the emergency situation, lack of existing data, and the compressed preparation period.** Even prior to the earthquake, little data was available on housing or urban planning in Haiti. Following the earthquake, the situation was chaotic, due to the combination of massive destruction, a flood of poorly coordinated international assistance, and a complicated political situation. There was a lack of experience of disasters of this magnitude to draw on. The most significant comparators (the tsunami in Aceh in 2004 and the 2005 Kashmir earthquake) were different in important ways, meaning that many new approaches had to be developed from scratch. The lack of a
housing agency to coordinate made it difficult to resolve conflicts between government, donors, and other stakeholders. Housing reconstruction was difficult to plan, as there was initially no guidance on which households or types of households should be prioritized, or how. Collectively, these complicated and slowed project preparation, and led to some faulty assumptions and design decisions that took time to be corrected. For example, the project initially assumed that IDPs would want to return to their neighborhood of origin, but surveys conducted during implementation suggested that people were less concerned than expected with returning to the same neighborhood as they had lived in prior to the earthquake. The Bank made an appropriate decision to proceed with project approval despite these weaknesses given the severe emergency and consistent with the Bank’s guidance on FCV and crises.

3.2 The initial project design was overly focused on house construction, as compared to community infrastructure or support for renters. A learning report produced by the World Bank and other development partners documents this well (World Bank 2015, 2016), covering the whole shelter and housing response of which PREKAD was a subset.

3.3 The initial project design focused most project resources on direct housing reconstruction with full subsidy, with only minimal household contributions. Land titling and registration, and housing finance issues were seen as too difficult to deal with in an emergency operation. Repairing or reconstructing houses would only directly benefit those families who owned land in existing neighborhoods. Absent property records or effective land title, there was no data on the extent to which Port-au-Prince residents owned or rented housing. Yet, over time it became apparent that 80% of people who lived in seriously damaged neighborhoods were renters, so the housing construction approach would miss most of the target population.

3.4 Housing construction proved to be much more difficult to implement than anticipated. In particular, difficulties in resolving land title issues led to slow progress, and project disbursements lagged early on. Housing construction also faced difficult design disputes e.g. over the appropriate size of houses to be constructed, which led to delays. Cost estimates made for housing construction were severe underestimates. Initial estimates of $3,500 per house estimates were developed hastily in the emergency aftermath, and based on other country experiences. But the reality was that actual housing costs from donor projects were $10,000 and higher (actual unit costs for housing produced in PREKAD were not reported in project documentation). High economy-wide demand due to the public and private reconstruction efforts also drove up prices for scarce resources, such as building materials and trained construction specialists. The under-estimates meant that the existing resource envelope could not hope to match the initially projected housing quantity. Other donor housing projects suffered from similar challenges.
3.5 Private construction and in particular informal self reconstruction proceeded much more quickly than initially expected by the donor community, often funded by remittances from the Haitian diaspora. The collective housing produced by all donor projects was dwarfed by the private sector effort. Direct large-scale public housing efforts were not needed in order to generate housing units.

3.6 The initial focus on housing was due in part to political pressure. From the beginning the Bank and many practitioners knew the importance of supporting infrastructure and integrated approaches, and the Bank insisted on a project design that included community assets and reconstruction in existing neighborhoods. However, the political pressure from donors and from the Haitian government for a housing construction focus was very high. Some donors placed heavy emphasis on housing reconstruction and set their targets to focus on this. This issue went beyond the specific project and was a sector-wide strategy issue for donor reconstruction project. However, while there may have been unrealistic political expectations and a general misperception by the donor community, the Bank also bears some responsibility. The Bank was the lead agency for the housing donor working group, and had the potential to influence joint decisions.

3.7 The project made substantial progress through project restructurings to address these issues in a timely manner. Resources were transferred out of housing construction/repair and into infrastructure and the RCSG program, and indicator targets were adjusted accordingly. Initial targets for repairing 8,300 houses were revised downwards, eventually to 1,162 houses. Housing reconstruction targets were revised from an initial target 3,700 to a final target of 938. While these reallocations and lowered targets were the right decision in the context, an unfortunate consequence was that expectations that had been raised in communities (e.g. that a certain number of houses would be built) then were not met, leading to disappointment and distrust. In many areas only a small share of the promised houses were constructed. However, Government officials interviewed by IEG compared the Bank experience favorably to some other donor reconstruction programs, some of which were unwilling to reorient and remained focused on housing, which led to program failures.

Implementation and Supervision

3.8 Land issues posed the most significant challenge to implementation. It was difficult to identify land that could be built on for housing reconstruction. The project undertook a major effort to identify land owners, but the lack of documentation on land ownership and combined with the extreme density of settlement made it hard to find unoccupied land to build on. The high disaster risk facing much of the city also meant that they were not appropriate for construction (e.g. due to steep topography or flood risk). There was little willingness by government to increase urban land supply through public
acquisition of unused land. For social housing, consolidating tenure and establishing multi-unit was challenging, as land owners were initially reluctant to convert their sole ownership into joint ownership. It was hard to find packages of land where a larger development could be constructed. All of these factors served to make it difficult to deliver housing, and added to implementation delays.

**Results**

3.9 The project results framework did not properly measure the project objective. The project objective was about the return of residents to communities, yet the project indicators measured only the outputs of works produced and number of households benefiting from them. Though it would not be possible to literally measure residents in communities (no census was carried out in Haiti between 2003 and 2018), intermediate indicator proxies might have measured traffic, economic activity, revenue generation, new business creation, or other data, to give some assurance that project outputs were supporting neighborhood return. Remote sensing could have been used to compared targeted project neighborhoods to control groups. Because of this gap, only qualitative data is available on the extent to which neighborhoods receiving project supported had faster recovery and return of residents than other neighborhoods.

3.10 Works produced were sometimes of low quality, due to low capacity in the construction sector. During preparation of the project completion report in 2017, the World Bank carried out a field analysis of 10% of the completed subprojects (combined between PREKAD and PRODEPUR Habitat). This review identified that many sub-projects suffered from poor design and low quality construction. A number of the subprojects were not completed or were never commissioned. Good construction practices were not always followed. While many road projects were valuable, the World Bank review noted a number of instances where design choices were questionable. These findings (along with those below on poor maintenance) were not included in the Bank’s completion report for PREKAD. Interviews with government officials and stakeholders also reiterated concerns about construction quality. Many of the construction works were created only late in the project, so major performance problems observed shortly after closure are more likely driven by poor quality works than by inadequate maintenance.

3.11 The main causes for low quality of works were the chronic issues of low capacity in the Haitian construction sector. Projects supported by other donors suffered from similar problems. The project made efforts to support quality; a supervision firm was hired to oversee works, the national laboratory in the public works ministry carried out sample-based reviews of materials quality (e.g. for concrete). But in many cases these measures were not able to ensure adequate construction quality by contractors, as construction supervision was relatively weak. Performance was variable by the different implementing
NGOs, some of which lacked construction experience. The scale of works made it difficult for the project implementing agency to provide effective technical oversight. Some stakeholders suggested that, especially later in the project, time pressure to complete works meant that some contractors cut corners in order to meet deadlines. In a small number of cases, stakeholders reported that insecurity in the neighborhoods being worked on meant that planned work was rushed or not completed and so not implemented according to planned design standards. Stakeholders also suggested that imposing quality standards was sometimes unpopular in the neighborhoods; residents saw re-doing work that failed quality tests as wasteful of resources.

3.12 Maintenance of assets constructed under the project has been weak, largely because of chronic and systemic factors. The World Bank’s unpublished 2017 field analysis found lack of maintenance for 40-45% of subprojects. Many infrastructure assets were constructed and operated for a short period of time, but the lack of maintenance budget meant that they were soon falling into disrepair. For example, none of the sampled investments for access to treated water were operational in 2017. Housing projects were better off than other types of works, but 2 of 6 sites covered by the 2017 review had significant issues, mostly relating to provision of water. The government agency that took over the social housing facilities after construction reported serious maintenance issues for electric, water, and sanitation facilities in roughly half of the completed units, largely stemming from inadequate construction and materials quality. Community organizations set up in some areas under this project (or the sister project PRODEPUR) and transformed after the project end did not seem capable of providing adequate maintenance. The project planned for homeowner associations to be formed for co-owned social housing units to collect fees and be responsible for maintenance, but fees were not collected and so the association was not operational.

3.13 The main cause for poor maintenance is the chronic lack of funds for maintenance for infrastructure in Haiti. The project clearly assigned institutional responsibilities for maintenance: core assets were transferred after their completion to relevant utilities (water, power, etc.) or agencies (social housing) or to the municipality, and those agencies were to be responsible for maintenance (at least initially). In practice, this was insufficient to ensure adequate maintenance, yet it is difficult to imagine a model that would be highly successful given the country context and weak institutional capacity. As the project supported a wide range of infrastructure assets, the number of assets supported in a particular class were relatively small, so the project had little leverage with those utilities to encourage support maintenance of project-finance assets. And even if it had such leverage, it would make little sense overall for utilities to prioritize maintaining assets which happened to be produced under a specific project financed by an influential donor, as compared to the rest of the network. Addressing maintenance issues in utilities sector would likely require a specific sectoral intervention (as the Bank has sought to do with inter-city roads) and would not be
possible within the scope of an emergency reconstruction project. However, it may have been possible to carry out a limited degree of capacity building for maintenance within for example the municipalities covered by the project, to support road maintenance. Greater capacity building efforts for supporting maintenance for social housing might have been feasible. Some stakeholders also suggested that Bank task teams may have lacked the detailed sectoral expertise in water, power, and sanitation needed to provide appropriate expert advice on maintenance. Another option suggested was that the project could have partnered more directly with water and sanitation utilities during implementation, rather than constructing assets separately through the NGOs and then seeking to transfer them after completion (BMPAD 2016).

3.14 **Planning and housing studies supported under the project appear to have had little impact.** The project supported the development of neighborhood-level urban restructuring plans and hazard risk maps, as well as preparation of housing studies and strategies. Many of these emphasized risk and vulnerability reduction lenses. However, IEG found little evidence that these were being implemented or are likely to be. Experts interviewed by IEG complained of a donor culture that focused on development of plans and studies, disconnected from the reality of the extremely limited government capacity (especially at sub-national level) to implement them. Plan use is largely limited to informing specific donor projects, if they happen to take place in an area covered by a plan. Some experts contrasted the project approach to those of UNDP, which accompanied hazard mapping work with intensive training programs for municipalities and civil society organizations. Hazard maps were also of less value in areas that were already built on, as preventative resettlement is likely to be unrealistic and risk of re-encroachment very high given the severe pressure on land. Informal settlement has grown rapidly, regardless of risk mapping, as government lacks the capacity to prevent them.

3.15 **The project is not likely to have made much impact on reducing disaster vulnerability – though this was not a formal project objective.** Efforts were made to improve structural resilience in housing directly constructed under the project. Designs for newly created housing sought to balance building standards, affordability, and feasibility of construction with local materials and construction capacity. Plans for works were approved by the government housing agency, and structural designs and building standard were created under the project reviewed and approved by external engineers (Mimoto) and the government building agency within the ministry of public works (BTB). Materials used were reviewed by the national laboratory. The final technical audit of the project concluded that housing reconstruction and social housing construction activities were conducted according to para seismic and building code standards (BMPAD 2016). Setting the design standards at the level where they were generated pushback from government officials, who raised concerns that the housing designs couldn’t be replicated if they were too expensive for the Haitian context. However, the 944 housing units produced under the project were
small in number compared to total housing reconstruction occurring in the neighborhoods, so made little difference to aggregate disaster vulnerability.

3.16 Activities on repairing existing housing were not designed to improve structural resilience. The project emphasis was on basic repairs (plastering and roof repairs), not retrofits to make buildings structurally safe. This occurred due to resource constraints (the project had a fixed funding envelope and sought to cover repairs for a large number of structures), and from the need for repairs to be carried out rapidly so that people could move back into housing. In many cases, retrofits would not have been realistic; weaknesses in foundations posed risks to stability that could not be addressed without expensive demolition and reconstruction. The project adjusted its initial design during implementation, to have repairs carried out by workers under supervision from the project, to improve technical quality of works.

3.17 Site visits and stakeholder interviews suggest that the project had only modest spillover effects beyond the works directly constructed under the project. There were some efforts to generate these effects. Guidance resources were provided by the project on safe design standards and materials. The project ran training sessions for masons and building owners, to explain safer construction techniques.

3.18 Yet, it was common for private and especially self-construction to not follow these standards. The IEG mission saw many construction examples in neighborhoods where basic design features recommended by these standards were not in use (for example, to strengthen brick wall construction with regular placement of beams), and stakeholders interviewed by IEG reported that there had been little change in building standards in most private construction. Owners were constrained primarily by limited financial capacity and relatively high costs for quality materials, in addition to limited knowledge. There was little willingness by the public to undertake construction approaches that would mean higher upfront costs. Guidelines were not widely distributed, and little effort was made to require production of the quality materials that the guidelines called for (World Bank 2015, 2016). Stakeholders interviewed by IEG highlighted a lack of awareness by the public on the importance of materials quality and construction practices in reducing risk, and that government efforts to promote this through radio had been insufficient. Self-reconstruction projects rarely drew on the expertise of the trained masons, which meant their skills were not applied in supporting construction techniques that would support resilience. Collectively, these mean that housing remains highly vulnerable to natural disasters, and another major earthquake would be likely to be devastating.

3.19 What might the project have done differently to try to avoid this? A higher degree of institutional support for disaster risk management was not needed within the project; the Bank sought to provide this through other projects, including non-emergency operations, and those were better suited to supporting institutional and policy change. It would have
been difficult for the project to provide much direct support for self-construction efforts given the lack of land title, and so difficulty of verifying that builders being supported had the legal right to construct. However, greater efforts could have been made to communicate disaster risk reduction efforts, to regulate the quality of construction inputs, and to promote practice of safe building practices at the household level (World Bank 2015, 2016). These would have required a coordinated donor-supported effort, beyond the scope of a single project.

3.20 The project was only partially successful in demonstrating a social housing model, because of approaches that are difficult to replicate. One innovative aspect of the project was to produce a small number of multi-unit social housing with joint ownership and shared grounds and common areas. This was unusual for Haiti, where sole ownership of land and individual housing was the norm. Multi-unit housing was seen as desirable as a way of increasing density and reducing urban sprawl25, but there were expectations that joint ownership would face challenges including cultural resistance, lower social cohesion in urban areas, mistrust of state actors and weak land-tenure systems. Social housing was not part of the original design or an explicit part of project objectives, but rather was an opportunity that arose during implementation.

3.21 The project was generally successful in delivering multi-unit housing pilots. According to the social housing agency, a total of 167 units were constructed, across PREKAD and PRODEPUR Habitat. The units were targeted towards poor and vulnerable households, especially those facing disabilities or single women. The project showed the potential for social acceptability of multi-unit housing. Beneficiaries were reportedly satisfied with the housing, seeing it as a significant improvement over their previous circumstances. Implementing NGOs reported significant additional interest from neighborhood residents who would like similar housing – at least under the heavily subsidized terms of the project. Perhaps most importantly, the project provided some support for the creation of a co-ownership law establishing the legal framework under which future joint housing could be possible. An important caveat is that an issue of commercial space attached to some units remained unresolved at the time of the IEG mission, years after completion of housing units.26 Another drawback was that one model of housing that was constructed layered apartment buildings was unpopular with residents, and NGOs suggested should not be replicated in Haiti.

3.22 But the model is not easily replicable as a form of social housing for the vulnerable. The model required intensive (and expensive) outreach work with the community for sensitization.27 The model required heavy subsidization from grant financing: beneficiaries were required to make only modest contributions over a year, after which they were granted ownership of the property.28 Because of this, further replication through this model would require substantial donor grants, which have not been available in the years since the
project. Absent replication, the impact of the social housing is small, due to the limited number of units produced.

3.23 What other models might be possible? In many countries social housing is provided by government on a rental basis rather than a rent to own basis. However, housing experts interviewed by IEG suggested rental models were unlikely to be successful in Haiti, raising concerns that residents would stop paying rent, but it would be difficult and seen as socially and politically infeasible to carry out evictions from public housing. Nonetheless, rent to own models over a much longer period (perhaps 10-20 years) were suggested as still being feasible and desirable as compared to the single year transfer model under the project, and these have been carried out elsewhere in Haiti. These models might be financially more viable.

3.24 Partial replication of multi-unit housing is being considered and undertaken in Haiti – but on a PPP model aimed at middle-class residents (such as civil servants) who have reliable income streams. Such a model still faces challenges, as financial institutions are reluctant to lend even for middle class housing. The model is likely more realistic in terms of financing construction – but it does not help the most vulnerable. There remains a tension between these goals, and so challenges in balancing them in future housing policy.

4. Lessons

4.1 In the case of catastrophic disasters or in fragile settings, the need to address humanitarian needs and disaster recovery may preclude significant impact on disaster vulnerability reduction. The project was most effective in reducing disaster vulnerability through housing construction works carried out directly under the project, where improved structural standards could be monitored and implemented. Yet, these works were the least effective in supporting the return of the population to their communities; they concentrated substantial resources in supporting a relatively small number of households, they were challenging and slow to implement, and they were unable to meet the urgent housing needs of the displaced population. The general public was able to construct housing at much higher quantities and speed than donor projects – but they did so without reducing their disaster vulnerability, because of limits in their financial resources, access to quality materials, and technical knowledge.

4.2 International NGOs can be effective project implementers in an emergency context where government capacity has been weakened. In Haiti, the earthquake further undermined already weak government capacity. International NGOs were able to implement construction works more rapidly than would have been possible in a government project. They may have technical expertise, community trust, and financial management capacity. However, the organizations also brought high costs, and missed
opportunities for building government capacity and fostering government legitimacy. In this case, the benefits outweighed the drawbacks.

4.3 **Investments in infrastructure can have a larger impact on neighborhood recovery than those from direct housing reconstruction.** In Haiti, qualitative evidence suggested that infrastructure works especially roads helped to catalyze investment in housing and businesses. In contrast, direct housing reconstruction was difficult to implement and had only a moderate effect on neighborhoods, as most housing reconstruction was private and especially informal self-reconstruction. There was still a case for an integrated approach that included some housing support to signal good practice design and construction.

4.4 **Disaster preparedness is critical and requires upfront investment in disaster risk management capacity and in relevant data and analytics, including geospatial data.** The lack of available data in Haiti weakened response and reconstruction capacity in several ways. A lack of knowledge about housing ownership status contributed to an initial project response that did not do enough to support renters and landlords. The lack of an adequate land registry made it difficult to implement works, as it was difficult to identify legitimate owners. Lack of hazard maps and geotechnical data made it challenging to site new works. These kinds of data gaps were challenging to fill after the disaster had struck.

4.5 **Projects seeking to support durable responses to crises in FCV countries may still need to include transitional measures, and to target durable measures towards vulnerable households.** The initial project design was focused on durable development support: housing and infrastructure (as compared to humanitarian or transitional assistance). During implementation it was recognized that many IDPs in temporary shelters constructed as humanitarian support were not sufficiently supported by the project approach, and a rental grant was added as a transitional measure. The project showed that cash grants for housing rental can be an effective approach for supporting internally displaced persons to rapidly transition from post-disaster camps to regular housing. The use of a rental support cash grant played a major role in allowing for camps to be wound down and closed. However, it did not provide durable housing solutions, and more than half of supported households were unable to sustain themselves in their new housing. This suggests that such programs must be complemented by other programs that support economic and social development efforts for displaced households.

4.6 **Pilot efforts may have limited impact if they are not able to demonstrate a replicable model.** Under the project, social housing pilots with joint ownership were generally implemented successfully. But achieving widespread results (for housing provision, increased density, or housing for the vulnerable) would require a model that could be scaled up. The pilots applied an almost fully subsidized rent to own model, where beneficiaries made only modest payments for a single year before gaining title. This meant that the model was heavily reliant on international donor grant funding. Consequently,
there has been no replication of the model, and planned future multi-unit housing in Haiti are limited in scale and are not targeted towards vulnerable households.

1 A post disaster needs assessment estimated that 105,000 buildings were destroyed and 208,000 were damaged.

2 The “cluster approach” is a standard part of the United Nations humanitarian response system adopted in 2005. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action, e.g. water, health and logistics. They are designated by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and have clear responsibilities for coordination.

3 The 6 NGOs implementing the project were: PADF, IOM, GC, HFH, CECI, and J/P HRO.

4 BMPAD’s project management costs were not separately reported; US$ 4.6 was disbursed to BMPAD for both project management but also implementation of institutional capacity building and support studies.

5 As many as 500,000 people were relocated by various RSCG programs by 2014 (World Bank 2014).

6 In retrospect, it might have been wiser to create a separate component for the rental grant. This would have helped with transparency in tracking the project.

7 The project developed control systems for rubble removal processes in order to reduce the risk of uncontrolled dumping of rubble. However, the location of the debris transfer remained poorly documented (World Bank 2017a).

8 The World Bank’s ex post economic assessment was based on output data combined with modeling and benefit estimates based on other contexts. For example, estimates of land value increases were based on benefit transfer from other countries, and so do not reflect the Haitian context or potential weaknesses in works quality or maintenance. This was a reasonable approach for an economic analysis, which is aimed at providing a rough estimate of project economic effects, but does not constitute quantitative data on impact.


10 According to the self-evaluation report, focus groups reported that road repairs and construction, the installation of streetlights, the construction of drainage canals and the development of public spaces have made a significant contribution to improving the access and quality of certain essential services. This progress has resulted in an improvement in the quality of motorized and pedestrian traffic; improved access for local residents to certain suppliers of local goods and services; improved access to the drinking water supply service; improved access to health services; an improvement in the leisure activities of all the inhabitants of the neighborhoods; an improvement in security at the level of the different neighborhoods (BMPAD 2016).

11 No evidence was available on the impact of selection or exclusion criteria within neighborhoods or whether the project created or eliminated differentiations within neighborhoods.
The 2013 evaluation did not find any significant difference in results for those grantees receiving additional benefits beyond the housing voucher: supplemental grants, micro-insurance or training, which were provided by different implementers.

The 2014 evaluation found that 49% of renters moved after the grant expired while 51% stayed in their accommodation. The 2013 evaluation found that 25% of renters had renewed their contracts after the grant expired, but estimated that due to sampling bias the true result might be up to 40% of renters.

The 2013 evaluation estimated that 59% of recipients would not have sufficient savings to pay for a second year of rent, and found that lack of ability to pay rent was the main reason why tenants would not stay in their lodging. Landlords did not think their tenants would be able to pay a second year’s rent (58%, vs 13% who thought their tenant would be able to pay). The 2014 study did not specifically ask about affordability, but it did find that the price of the rental was the most common reason for moving, as cited by 20% of recipients.

Those that moved also reported slightly more crowded living conditions and slightly higher local criminality after the grant expiry. The 2014 evaluation noted that program recipients found housing that they believed to be safe and secure as compared to situations in the IDP camps. A minority of recipients (10%) found their accommodation to be more safe and secure than prior to the earthquake. The evaluation also found a disconnect between positive findings on socio-economic well-being and economic outlook based on reported survey results, but no significant change as compared to pre-earthquake levels as based on objective data.

The concern was that substantially increasing demand and ability to pay for housing into neighborhoods with fixed housing stock and shortages was likely to lead to rental inflation, harming those not receiving vouchers, and largely benefiting landlords. Data collected by the CCCM/Shelter Cluster tracked rental payments being made, and did not find evidence that voucher holders were unable to find housing or that rents were rising above the voucher amount (World Bank 2014).

In both prior cases, the disasters affected a part of a larger and still functioning country, whereas Port-au-Prince was the capital and main government center for Haiti. Prior data existed in Kashmir; in Aceh destruction was geographically limited and the total destruction in that zone allowed for greenfields solutions.

Other initial projects from other donors that sought to engage on housing finance were unable to make progress. However, as the recovery phase dragged on and direct housing reconstruction projects proved unable to contribute a substantial portion of need, the need for efforts on housing finance interventions became more apparent (Hoek-Smit 2013).

Some stakeholders favored larger but more expensive designs, of which not as many could be produced with available funding. There were variations across the implementing NGOs within the project, but even larger variations between the project and other NGO construction efforts outside of the project. This variation contributed to community expectations that could be difficult to meet, and sometimes made beneficiaries reluctant to commit to accept a project-supplied house, as they hoped to get a better deal for a larger house from another source.
20 In contrast, some government efforts and other donor projects supported greenfield housing construction on urban fringes, where land is easier to acquire, but where there are few connections to jobs, services, transport, etc.

21 The data collected did not allow clear separation between PRODEPUR Habitat and PREKAD. PREKAD did include road construction, 1 of 3 water kiosks (according to BMPAD 2016), and others.

22 The project’s own final technical audit came to a different conclusion, that urban infrastructure reconstruction works were in general of good quality (BMPAD 2016).

23 The unpublished World Bank review noted that in one area, a 500 m long road was constructed to the only building in the area – a church. In another example, a road was constructed which ended in a ravine – another development partner had promised to provide a bridge, but it was never constructed. One road resurfacing had the adverse consequence of increasing flooding in the area which affects a couple of houses with periodic flooding. One of the road resurfacing projects seem to have improved road access to a wealthier neighborhood with large houses.

24 One water kiosk contained a reverse osmosis plant which after a short period of time had fallen into disrepair as the filters needed replacing. On one other site, a water kiosk was completed but never connected to DINEPA’s water supply system. At another water access installation, the borehole pump failed and was replaced by a community member with a makeshift pump. Here, it appeared that the water point was taken into ownership by a community member who subsequently charged for water. Another water installation was never completed.

25 The government housing policy agency sees multi-unit housing as something desperately needed in high population Port-au-Prince, as low-density contributes to sprawl, difficulty in providing services, and high transport costs. The need for increasing density was flagged by government housing sector strategies developed under the project.

26 One of the social housing sites was built as a two-level structure where the upper level was housing and the lower level was intended to be commercial space. The project intention was that housing owners would use the commercial space themselves. But a dispute with the municipality over the commercial spaces has meant that these facilities were still vacant in 2018 even years after construction. Some stakeholders interviewed by IEG also questioned this as a design approach: socially vulnerable people in need of housing support might not need direct commercial space that they use themselves, and might benefit more from the ability to rent these out to commercial tenants.

27 Community mobilization efforts played a critical role in developing consent, with active participation of community members and landowners with architects.

28 The ownership provided is not quite full ownership. The occupant has only a partial ability to sell the property: they can sell it only to someone else who meets the vulnerability criteria and passes a criminal background check, but the owner and their family can remain in the housing indefinitely regardless of whether they meet the vulnerability criteria.
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Appendix A: Project ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ICR*</th>
<th>ICR Review*</th>
<th>PPAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk to Development</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Performance</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrower Performance</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank global practice. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEG product that seeks to independently validate the findings of the ICR.

Relevance of objectives and design:

Objectives:

The original Project Development Objective (PDO) was “To help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and improving basic community service infrastructure.”

In 2012, the objectives were restructured, the revised Project Development Objective was “To help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and/or return to improved housing conditions and improving basic community service infrastructure.” [Italics added]

The objective change represents a significant material change in design, and as such, this report conducts a split evaluation.

Following IEG’s evaluation methodology, the mechanisms for achieving the objective (“by supporting.....”) are mechanisms and are part of project design, and not the objective to be evaluated against.

Relevance of objectives:

The need for Port-au-Prince residents to receive support for returning to their neighborhoods following the earthquake was apparent, with over a million people displaced and a clear need to support permanent housing solutions (see para 1.2, para 2.1). The objective to help residents return to communities did not address any outcomes for the residents or any of the fundamental challenges of the urban sector. However, it was still relatively ambitious for Haiti given the scale of displacement and the difficulty involved in the fragile, poor, and low capacity environment.
The objectives were broadly in line with the “Neighborhood Return and Housing Reconstruction Framework” prepared jointly by the government of Haiti and the donor community’s Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) which set out basic principles of earthquake reconstruction. The objectives were reasonably consistent with the IDA and IFC Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Haiti (CY 2012), which included a framework for sustainable reconstruction in post-earthquake Haiti with a focus on upgrading neighborhoods, housing repair, and transferring services from camps to communities to encourage people to return. However, the strategy also had an explicit focus on reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience, which did not appear in the project objectives.

The objective could have more clearly focused on the goal to be achieved, rather than by the means through which the goal would be pursued. A highly relevant objective might have been something like “To ensure that residents of selected Port-au-Prince neighborhoods severely affected by the earthquake achieve sustained safe and resilient housing”.

The objectives as written also were framed in terms of helping residents to return to their communities, i.e. to encourage people to return to where they came from. This could have been framed differently, to avoid the implication that displaced residents were not free to move where they chose, but in practice this issue was semantic, as the actual project design and approach did not act in this way.

As the goal part of the PDO was the same across both objective statements, **the relevance of objectives is rated the same for both, Substantial.**

**Relevance of Design:**

The design approach included positive features. Rubble clearance was necessary for carrying out housing reconstruction or infrastructure works (para 2.16). An integrated approach including community infrastructure was a positive design choice, and supported the objective of helping residents to return by supporting economic development in neighborhoods (para 2.2). The implementation approach for this also included participatory approaches by households, neighborhood development committees, community organizations, municipalities, contractors, government agencies, and other entities (para 2.11). Capacity building for government agencies especially for housing filled an important institutional gap (para 2.32).

However, the original design approach was overly focused on reconstruction and repair of housing, which did not directly benefit the large portion of residents who were renters (para 3.2). Studies and plans included in the design were not likely to be used given the weak capacity of subnational government (para 3.14).

**The relevance of the original design is rated Modest.**
After restructuring, the design reduced the project emphasis on housing reconstruction and repair. The revised design recognized the need to support renters by introducing support for a cash grant for renters (para 2.12) to enable them to leave IDP camps and move into housing. The revised design also increased support for community assets and infrastructure, which was likely to be effective at encouraging investment and private reconstruction in neighborhoods (para 2.20).

Both of these additions improved design relevance, by addressing the large portion of the population who did not own property and supporting them in returning to neighborhoods.

The relevance of the revised design is rated Substantial.

Efficacy:

Achievement of original objective and design: “To help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and improving basic community service infrastructure.”

The project did not measure the return of residents to communities (Para 3.9) beyond households directly supported through housing reconstruction or repair, and did not capture the indirect effects of infrastructure subprojects on encouraging return of residents to neighborhoods. It did however provide data on a number of important output measures. Combined with qualitative evidence and data from other literature, there is still sufficient evidence to draw conclusions about achievement of objectives.

Initial targets were available only for some of the project outputs, which in term provided some contribution towards the project objectives.
Table A1: Key output indicators and targets for PREKAD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity type</th>
<th>Original target (July 2011)</th>
<th>Final target (February 2015)</th>
<th>Actual delivery (December 2016)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rubble removal</td>
<td>None provided</td>
<td>1,154 cubic meters</td>
<td>2,504 cubic meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing repair</td>
<td>8,300 houses</td>
<td>1,162 houses</td>
<td>1,134 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing reconstruction</td>
<td>3,700 units</td>
<td>938 units</td>
<td>944 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure subprojects</td>
<td>None provided</td>
<td>277 subprojects</td>
<td>288 subprojects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Final targets were set in February 2015, after most project activities had been carried out. Hence, some of them appear to have been set deliberately so that they would be exceeded by final delivery.

The project did not achieve its housing targets for reconstruction or repair (Table A1). This was because housing construction costs were dramatically higher than expected (at least 3 times as high) (para 3.4), because of challenges in implementing housing reconstruction (para 3.4), and because the project restructuring wisely redirected resources away from housing and towards infrastructure and rental subsidies (para 3.7). Hence, housing reconstruction and repair provided only a modest contribution towards supporting return of residents to neighborhoods.

Qualitative evidence suggested that infrastructure subprojects played a significant role in encouraging investment in communities (para 2.19), and thus in encouraging return of residents to neighborhoods. However, quantitative evidence on this is lacking. A significant number of subprojects were produced, but the lack of initial targets makes it difficult to assess performance against expectations (Table A1). 75,000 households live in neighborhood where at least some works were carried out.

Beneficiaries reported satisfaction with project works (Para 2.21).

Rubble clearance carried out under the project was important largely for enabling other project activities (para 2.16).

Weak construction quality and inadequate maintenance also threaten the benefits of these works over time (para 3.10, para 3.12), though not in terms of their narrow effects in achieving the objective of supporting the return of residents to their neighborhoods.

Capacity building of government agencies was useful, however with benefits beyond the project objectives, and also helping to enable project implementation (para 2.32). Studies conducted under the project appeared to have little impact due to the lack of capacity in local government (para 3.14.2.24).
Achievement of original objectives and design is rated modest, because of the lack of evidence, and because of the lack of support for renters who made up the majority of the urban poor.

Achievement of revised objective and design: “To help residents of selected Port-au-Prince Neighborhoods severely affected by the Earthquake return to their communities by supporting them to repair and/or reconstruct their houses and/or return to improved housing conditions and improving basic community service infrastructure”

After project restructuring, the original outputs and results remained relevant but in addition there was the introduction of the rental support cash grant program.

This program saw 14,021 households relocated through grants (as compared to targets of 12,000 and then later 13,900), out of camps and into housing that met basic minimum standards. This led to achievement of project objective, in terms of moving people out of unsafe conditions in camps and into safer housing (para 2.23). The project did not specifically track outcomes for those households receiving grants under the program. However, based on evaluations of the wider rental grant programs to which the project contributed, most beneficiaries did not sustain the level of housing, as they could not afford rental payments after a year once the grant was withdrawn (para 2.25). Those evaluations also found that the programs encouraged some investments in expanding housing supply (Para 2.26), and that they provided other short-term benefits for program recipients (Para 2.27). These evaluations are useful as a proxy as the underlying rental grant program was broadly similar in its approach and implementation, and as the evaluations did not find significant variation in results across the slight differences in implementation approach that were used (Wolf Group 2013).

The revised design also placed greater emphasis on community infrastructure, which likely made significant contributions to project objectives. However, it is difficult to determine how much additional support was provided as initial targets were lacking and reporting was unclear on actual financing for infrastructure investments.

Achievement under the revised objective and design is rated substantial. Achievements under the original objective and design remained relevant, and there is reasonable evidence that the RSCG programs to which the project contributed assisted households to depart from IDP camps without returning, as seen by the eventual closure of all IDP camps, and given the absence of other programs directly assisting IDPs to relocate.

Efficiency:

It is difficult to measure the cost-effectiveness of the project. The project did not report on unit costs for different types of works in a way that would allow comparison to
benchmarks, and the initial estimates were based on insufficient data to serve as a fair target. The BMPAD completion report provides a detailed list of outputs from each implementing NGO, and a detailed list of disbursements to each NGO, but not a breakdown of cost between them (BMPAD 2016). The report also does not separate the costs of BMPAD project management from the costs of capacity building and studies.

As a benchmark: housing costs provided by other donors ranged from $12,000 to $40,000 per unit (Hoek-Smit 2013). However, PREKAD housing costs per unit were not available, so conclusions on the cost-effectiveness of PREKAD implementation are difficult to make. The project completion report conducted an economic analysis, based on estimates projecting the value from 5 benefits:

- Cholera avoided due to the return of over 16,000 displaced households (equivalent to over 75,000 people) in reconstructed/repaird/rental houses.
- Land value appreciation associated with the road and pathway construction, as well as the construction of small bridges.
- Drainage and other improvements for up to 12,000 beneficiaries.
- Houses repaired, retrofitted and constructed as additional “economic” rent collected and considered proxies for renters and homeowners living in their houses.
- Construction of 367 latrines in houses (World Bank 2017a)

Based on this, the analysis concluded that project was economically viable with a net present value (NPV) of US$7.3 million, with an economic rate of return (ERR) of 19%, and a Present Value of benefit over cost ratio of 1.1. It is plausible that economic benefits flowed from these 5 categories. The assumptions behind the analysis are not provided in the Bank’s completion report, and so could not be validated; it also isn’t clear the extent to which calculations are based on observed data on outcomes (e.g. from reduced disease incidence, land value changes, rental values, etc.) rather than projections combined with output data. This makes it difficult to place much emphasis on the estimated economic return. More importantly, the analysis does not capture concerns about sometimes poor construction quality or in particular insufficient maintenance, which may reduce the benefits over time as works become non-functional.

In terms of administrative efficiency, the project had high costs and significant delays. The costs of implementing the program (25% of the works components, plus the costs of BMPAD project management) were high, though these may have been realistic given the challenging operating environment. A project self-evaluation reports that consulting firms would have cost 10% rather than 25% (BMPAD 2016), but those firms may have been unable
to operate in the project neighborhoods effectively or to achieve the same results, or to have provided the same degree of service delivery or community outreach.

The high costs of administering the RSCG program were also flagged in an evaluation (Wolf Group 2013) as the main barrier to improving the project rate of return, but the main cost drivers were from the governance checks involved in the program, from conducting on-site reviews of rental accommodation, and these checks also were important for ensuring that rental properties met adequate basic standards. The study estimated a social return on investment for the overall rental voucher program as $1.8 received per $1 invested.

Efficiency of the project is rated Modest, due largely to the lack of data on unit costs and lack of confidence in economic returns given construction quality and maintenance concerns.

Outcome:

A split rating is applied. For the original project objectives and design, substantial relevance of objectives, modest relevance of design, modest efficacy, and modest efficiency lead to an outcome of unsatisfactory (2 out of 6). For the revised project objectives and design, substantial relevance of objectives, substantial relevance of design, substantial efficacy, and modest efficiency lead to an outcome of moderately satisfactory (4 out of 6).

The project’s proactive and early restructuring helped to achieve a positive outcome. 10% of the project disbursements were made before the project restructuring and redesign, and 90% of disbursements were made afterwards, so project ratings are weighted accordingly (2*0.1 + 4*0.9 = 3.8 which rounds to 4, or Moderately Satisfactory).

Together, these mean the overall Outcome rating is Moderately Satisfactory.

Risk to development outcome:

The narrow project objective of return to neighborhoods is not at risk – IDP camps have all been closed, and the conditions of the housing sector are chronic rather than an emergency result from the earthquake. However, sustainability of project works faces significant threat, because of poor quality construction (para 3.10) and inadequate resources for maintenance (para 3.12). The project cleared assigned responsibilities for maintenance, but it was not realistic that a multi-sector emergency reconstruction project would be able to solve chronic maintenance problems (para 3.13). Little is known about the medium-term results of those who received housing vouchers under the project. However, evidence from the broader RSCG programs suggest that for many beneficiaries, their access to safe and adequate quality housing was lost after the grant ended, and a large majority were left with conditions no better off than before the earthquake (para 2.25).
Risk to development outcome is rated *Substantial*.

**Bank performance:**

**Quality at entry**

Bank staff prepared project in extremely difficult circumstances. Bank missions arrived soon after the earthquake, operating in difficult and dangerous conditions and without functioning government counterparts. Regular appraisal was impossible. The Bank sought to bring international experience to bear, though other contexts were different in important ways (para 3.1). The choice of implementing model through international NGOs was a good choice given the shortage of government capacity and the challenging environment (para 2.4), though it included tradeoffs and disadvantages such as high cost and limited government capacity building (para 2.8).

There were a number of weaknesses in preparation and design, leading to some misdiagnoses, and inaccurate projections and estimates. These included lack of knowledge about the characteristics and preference of the displaced population, lack of data on housing and urban planning, lack of data on land ownership, weak forecasting of housing construction or rubble clearance costs, and insufficient recognition of the feasibility of private and particularly self-reconstruction (para 3.1, para 2.16, para 3.3, para 3.4). These were generally the result of the gaps in pre-existing knowledge base, the severity of the earthquake, and the disorganization of the government response, rather than by weak performance by the Bank (para 3.1). Political pressure from donors and the government also played a role in the initial excessive focus on housing (para 3.6), but the Bank also had the ability to influence donor strategy and to resist this pressure.

There were weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation design, with output-oriented indicators, some not very meaningful, and which would not be sufficient to measure the project objective.

Some stakeholders reported an inadequate degree of consultation and involvement with the municipalities and mayor’s offices; mayors reportedly felt that the model was imposed on them with little discussion or negotiation. But IEG was not able to validate this finding one way or the other.

Quality at entry is rated *Moderately Unsatisfactory*

**Quality of supervision**

The Bank team provided a substantial degree of implementation and advisory support, which was critical given the general weaknesses in government capacity. Supervision included 13 full support missions including site visits, as well as regular support and site
visits from the in-country team, often weekly or bi-weekly. This intensive support is likely to have made a major difference in achieving the project results. Significant support was also provided on financial management and procurement, though it was unable to fully compensate for weaknesses in reporting by the NGOs, but this is not uncommon in a crisis environment.

During supervision, the Bank worked well and quickly to correct the gaps in appraisal (para 2.12, para 3.7). As the context and knowledge change, the Bank restructured the project, including changing objectives and indicator targets based on ongoing analysis of the situation. By restructuring the project early to address the gap in supporting renters (only 18 months into implementation and well before midterm review), the Bank demonstrated flexibility and proactivity in making early and effective course correction.

The Bank worked effectively with government to develop agreement to create a housing agency and to create operational guidance for housing construction (para 2.32).

Recognizing the need for housing credit options and the lack of willingness by financial institutions to invest in housing, the Bank explored credit schemes during supervision. These did not go very far and were not incorporated into the project. But to make significant progress on private housing finance would have required major reforms in banking, tax and tenant law, as well as strengthening the insurance market – which would have been unrealistic to address as part of this emergency operation.

The Bank developed a toolkit to help with allowing the rental subsidy approach to be applied and adapted to other contexts (World Bank 2014), and carried out an intensive learning exercise to draw lessons from the experience of the first two years in Haiti (World Bank 2015, 2016).

Quality of supervision is rated Satisfactory.

These lead to an overall Bank Performance rating of Moderately satisfactory.

**Borrower performance**

**Government performance**

The disorganization of government in the wake of the earthquake made it difficult for the government to provide effective leadership. The government was not successful in adopting a national reconstruction policy containing standards with regard to eligibility for reconstruction support, the standard size of reconstructed houses, or a unified mechanism for the delivery of subsidies to home owners for reconstruction (World Bank 2017a). This led to variation in approaches across donors and across implementing NGOs.
The initial lack of a leading agency for reconstruction, the fragmented government institutional framework, the difficulty in getting government to make decisions, and the lack of clear rules or consensus on where and how to rebuild made project design and implementation more difficult (World Bank 2016). However, the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications did become the lead agency for many reconstruction and disaster risk management activities including building safety assessment, debris clearance, and public infrastructure reconstruction. This Ministry implemented a number of programs on its own which supported the reconstruction effort, including the assessment of damaged buildings, awareness raising and communications programs, and others. Ministry programs created standard practices and de facto policies, which laid the ground for the consolidation of the 2012 national building code.

Frequent turnover in government officials further contributed to difficulty in getting government to make decisions, as did limited willingness by government to make public land available for construction (para 3.8).

Poor communication from government led to unmeetable expectations, particularly in creating the impression that everyone (even renters) would be able to get a new house from a donor-funded project.

The government did work well with the Bank to support establishment of a housing policy agency, the UCLBP, which played an important role in implementing the RSCG (para 2.33).

**Government performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory**, but it should be kept in mind that government was facing extreme disruption and challenges.

**Implementing agency performance**

The project implementing agency was BMPAD which provided overall project management and implemented capacity building and works, while 6 NGOs directly implemented project works and activities in the neighborhoods. Overall, this approach was sufficient for results to be achieved, in a challenging environment (para 2.4). BMPAD was committed to the project and provided effective project management. Implementers generally worked well in their assigned neighborhoods, working together with neighborhood development councils and community reconstruction centers.

However, several weaknesses were observed:

- A significant problem in monitoring implementation was the lack of consistency between the activity reports and the financial reports prepared by the implementing NGOs. This made it difficult to establish the costs or cost-effectiveness of individual activities. This was partially due to the fact that these reports did not have the same
deadline (some were monthly, others quarterly) and were managed by two different departments of BMPAD.

- BMPAD had technical engineering and social expertise but lacked expertise in architecture or urban planning (BMPAD 2016).

- BMPAD was concerned that NGO implementers sometimes lacked sufficient skills or expertise on technical issues, leading to delays in the production of technical reports and studies. They were also concerned by the high operating costs of the model. (BMPAD 2016). They noted the challenges of systematic delays in the submission of technical and financial reports from the implementing NGOs.

- The implementing NGOs reported frustration with the lack of guidance from BMPAD and frequent changes in procedures and orientation to be followed. (BMPAD 2016). NGOs also noted that heavy turnover in management in BMPAD made things difficult, as many discussions were then reset as new management had to be sensitized.

- Quality and regularity of reporting was not sufficient early in the project, though it improved over time.

- There were procurement and safeguard delays until after the 2014 midterm review.

Implementing agency performance is rated *moderately satisfactory*.

Together, and with the moderately satisfactory outcome rating, these lead to a borrower performance rating of *Moderately satisfactory*.

**Quality of monitoring and evaluation**

**Design:**

The project’s monitoring and evaluation system was largely limited to tracking of indicators in the results framework, collected by the implementing NGOs, reported to BMPAD for aggregation, and then reported in turn to the World Bank as part of supervision. Reporting was carried out jointly with PRODEPUR Habitat, which was managed jointly – this decision made sense from an operational perspective, but did have the side-effect of making it more difficult to separate messages and findings across the two projects. The monitoring and evaluation system did also include a series of performance audits, collecting qualitative information to inform project management. A beneficiary survey was carried out. BMPAD produced a completion report (BMPAD 2016), and the Bank produced a self-
evaluation Implementation Completion and Results report (World Bank 2017). The system did not include impact evaluation or formal studies of impact.

The indicator design tracked project outputs, but did not track the actual project objective, which was framed in terms of the return of residents to neighborhoods (para 3.9). By the time of project closure, the results framework included 4 PDO indicators and 8 intermediate indicators.

A number of the output indicators (number of houses reconstructed, number of houses repaired, households receiving rental grants) were useful core indicators for tracking delivery, which was important given the complex implementing structure and the challenge in providing oversight. A positive feature of the housing indicators was their reference to specific quality standards, though the reporting could have been clearer in how these standards were verified.

Other indicators tracking overall numbers of people were less useful. An indicator on number of households benefiting from community-wide upgrading was not very useful. This measured the number of people living in an area where some infrastructure works were carried out; it did not measure anything about the degree to which these people benefited. Thus, regardless of how well the project performed in that neighborhood, the indicator result would be the same – only by adding infrastructure for additional neighborhoods would the indicator be changed.

An indicator (and its gender-based counterpart) on total project beneficiaries was not very meaningful, as it aggregated across targeted measures with very significant benefits for an individual beneficiary (housing), measures with moderate benefits for an individual beneficiary (voucher), and measures with modest benefits for an individual beneficiary (being present in an area where community infrastructure was constructed).

A number of important indicators lacked targets until 4 years into the project, most importantly for community infrastructure works. And the output measure used for infrastructure (number of subproject contracts) did little to assess the scale or impact of the works. Targets for housing construction indicators were set based on inadequate information (para 3.4). Indicators for housing were repeatedly revised downwards, which was useful for setting expectations, but does mean that project claims of exceeding targets was not very substantive for accountability purposes.

The M&E design lacked indicators to capture capacity building or institutional work supported by the project. They also did not cover the quality or sustainability of infrastructure.
Implementation:

Data on project outputs was collected and reported regularly by BMPAD.

Performance audits were carried out during implementation, providing qualitative evidence on problems arising during implementation and recommending solutions. These were used to make recommendations and to support course corrections.

Beneficiary surveys were carried out jointly for works covered by PREKAD and PRODEPUR-Habitat.

However, systematic qualitative assessments of works quality were not carried out until project closure\(^{29}\), and then data from that assessment was not published in completion reports.

Utilization:

Slow progress on implementing housing works was useful in informing project restructuring decisions. Otherwise, the most valuable monitoring evaluation came from qualitative assessments, rather than from the project results framework.

The Bank also invested significantly in supporting evaluative learning outside the project scope through two approaches: a major learning report on the housing and response experience in Haiti, and a handbook developed to help apply the rental voucher program to other contexts. The 2016 “what have we learned” report and its 2015 summary are particularly impressive. This work provided a candid and useful assessment of the strategic problems underpinning the whole response and recovery effort. The manner in which they were developed – jointly with other development partners – also represents best practice for generating buy-in and uptake. The rental voucher toolkit is also valuable and well-written, supporting learning and replication by providing a candid assessment of the advantages and limitations of the program.

Quality of monitoring and evaluation is rated *Modest*, as the project indicators did not assess outcomes or demonstrate achievement of project objectives, and this information was also not gathered by the project through other methods.

\(^{29}\) Site visits were carried out by the project team during implementation.
Appendix B: Fiduciary and Safeguards Aspects

Financial Management

The project suffered from financial management issues during implementation. In particular, there were delays in submitting financial reports and audit reports to the Bank, delays in submitting disbursement reports while advances were made without documentation, and delays in submitting withdrawal applications to document advances made to the designated accounts. Throughout the life of the project, delays between the provision of advances and the full accounting of spending prevented accurate readings of project financial status. The Bank stated that the quality of the audits was acceptable, but did not formally comment on whether audits were unqualified or if qualifications were addressed. All suppliers were paid by April 30, 2017 for services provided. All advances to the designated accounts were fully documented by mid-May 2017.

Procurement

Throughout project implementation, procurement management remained weak due to: (i) high staff turn-over and lack of qualified procurement staff; (ii) long delays in the procurement of works, goods and services; and (iii) contract management characterized by multiple contract amendments and cost overruns.

Environmental and social safeguards

The project was classified as an environmental Category B at appraisal and triggered OP/BP 4.01 Environmental Assessment, OP/BP 4.11 Physical Cultural Resources, and OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement (for dwellers living in areas that needed to be reconstructed but not applicable to IDPs per World Bank Policy). The project was processed under OP 8.00 Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies, and an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) were developed, consulted and disclosed within the first year of project implementation.

The project funded neighborhood reconstruction activities (which led to some impacts under OP 4.12) and a number of people were relocated for the period of time while their houses and neighborhoods were rehabilitated. Affected people received compensation according to OP 4.12, which covered loss of assets, moving expenses, and economic losses. A resettlement audit at the end of the project confirmed that the compensation was provided before the start of works. The resettlement audit noted that the resettlement could have been handled better, including (i) project-affected persons to retain the geographical advantages that they had prior to resettlement (ii) paying compensation for moving expenses based on the size of the household, rather than on a standard basis. The Bank
assigned a Satisfactory rating for social safeguards in its supervision reports, indicating that the Bank concluded that the resettlement policies had been complied with. The Bank also emphasized that people receiving rental grants were not covered under the resettlement policy, as they were displaced by the earthquake, not by the project.

The BMPAD completion report also noted that people with reduced mobility should have been better considered in the construction of both neighborhood and social housing construction (BMPAD). The earthquake had left many people with physical disabilities who needed to be reintegrated and included in society, and construction standards could have more systematically facilitated access for disabled people.
Appendix C: Basic Project Information

Project cost: Actual project cost for World Bank financed activities: US$ 64,871,115 vs appraisal cost of $65,000,000. In effect, all project resources were disbursed, as the scope of the project was set by the available funding.

There was no Borrower contribution expected or provided.

World Bank Project Financing:

Country – Haiti

Project Name – Port-au-Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction Project

Project ID – P125805

ICR Date – October 31, 2017

Original Commitment – US$ 65 million

Actual Amount Disbursed/ or Final – US$ 64.9 million

Financial source: Haiti Reconstruction Fund

Environmental Assessment Category – B.

Dates

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<tr>
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<th>Expected</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 28, 2011</td>
</tr>
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<td>October 11, 2012</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>February 12, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>May 20, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midterm review</td>
<td>July 15, 2013</td>
<td>June 30 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing</td>
<td>June 30, 2015</td>
<td>December 31, 2016</td>
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The project was restructured three times:

- The first restructuring (Level 1) was on October 11, 2012 when the amount disbursed equaled to US$4.98 million. The restructuring was initiated in response to a request from the Government of Haiti to accelerate the return of people to safe
neighborhoods by introducing new support mechanisms in the form of Return Cash Grants. The first restructuring had two objectives: accelerated return of the population home from camps and increased infrastructure rebuilding.

In relation to the former, the PDO was amended. To accomplish the latter, some of the funds in Component 3 (Institutional Support and Studies) and 4 (Project Management), as well as contingencies, were moved to Component 2 (Repair and Improvement of Community Infrastructure). As a result, Component 2 gained US$4.6 million. Also, the target value of one key indicator was increased: the number of displaced households who have returned to neighborhoods upon housing reconstruction was changed from 12,000 to 16,000. In addition, a new intermediate indicator was added: Indicator 8: Number of households provided with Return Cash Grants.

- The second restructuring (Level 2) was on February 12, 2015 when the amount disbursed was US$49.04 million. It included a further increase in the emphasis on infrastructure (by re-allocating funds to Component 2) and an extension of the project closing date from June 30, 2015 to June 30, 2016.

The extension was due to delayed implementation progress due to the challenge of working in the post-earthquake environment and the extremely limited capacity in the country and by social unrest and tense political circumstances. Target values for a number of intermediary indicators were adjusted: some were increased, some reduced, and some defined to replace the “TBD” label.

- The third restructuring (Level 2) was on May 20, 2016 when the amount disbursed was US$62.86 million. It was needed to extend the project closing date from June 30, 2016 to December 31, 2016. This extension was needed to accommodate delays caused by the political situation related to the postponed presidential run-off.

Key Staff Responsible

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Task Manager/Leader</th>
<th>Sector director/Global Practice Senior Director</th>
<th>Country Director</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appraisal</td>
<td>Sylvie Debomy</td>
<td>Laura Tuck</td>
<td>Alexandre Abrantes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion</td>
<td>Jonas Ingemann Parby</td>
<td>Ede Ijiasz-Vasquez</td>
<td>Anabela Abreu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: PPAR Overview

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank’s self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank’s work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20-25 percent of the Bank’s lending operations through fieldwork. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents; visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate, as well as using other evaluative methods when needed.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEG peer review, panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank country director. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrowers’ comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEG Rating System for World Bank Evaluations

IEG’s use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org).

Outcome: The extent to which the operation’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. Relevance includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project’s objectives are consistent with the country’s current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Relevance of design is
the extent to which the project’s design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. Possible ratings for Outcome: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Risk to Development Outcome:** The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome: High, Significant, Moderate, Low, Not Evaluable.

**Bank Performance:** The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. Possible ratings for Bank Performance: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Borrower Performance:** The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. Possible ratings for Borrower Performance: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.
Appendix E: Methods and Evidence

This evaluation is based largely on a) interviews with project stakeholders in Port-au-Prince in July 2018, b) interviews with World Bank staff, and c) review of project documents, and d) review of reports published by the World Bank or other development partners.

The mission also included interviews with other stakeholders related to a case study for IEG’s Urban Resilience major evaluation.

Of the planned two week mission, only one week was carried out, due to civil disturbances following the announcement of fuel price increases, and subsequently the departure of the mission team. Consequently, not all stakeholders were consulted, nor was a planned beneficiary survey carried out due to insecurity in the neighborhoods. Important stakeholders not interviewed included the current management of the executing agency BMPAD, and the municipalities of the targeted neighborhoods.

Site visits were carried out in Delmas 32, but other planned field work (a survey with randomly selected commercial operations along roads in project-affected neighborhoods) was cancelled because of insecurity.

Stakeholder interviews focused on generating lessons from the program, and on specific questions around: a) the project implementation model, b) the decision to move away from housing and towards community infrastructure, and the likely effects of community infrastructure, c) effects of the project on disaster vulnerability, d) the effects of the cash rental grant program, and e) effects of the social housing pilots.

Some aspects of the project were not able to be adequately triangulated, and so the report does not draw significant conclusions on those factors. These include the project’s community engagement approaches and operating model, and the relationship of the project with municipalities.
Appendix F: List of Persons Interviewed

World Bank:
Anabela Abreu, Country Director
Michelle Keane, Country Manager
Pierre Bonneau, Program Lead
Sylvie Debomy, Lead Urban Development Specialist
Jonas Parby, Senior Urban Development Specialist
Roland Bradshaw, Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist
Ali Alwahti, former Senior Urban Development Specialist
Claudia Soto, Disaster Risk Management Specialist

Government of Haiti:
Carmel Béliard, former PIU Coordinator in BMPAD
Alix Nicolas, former Deputy Director BPMAD
Charles Edouard, Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement (DINEPA), former technical director for PREKAD in BMPAD
Odnell David, UCLBP, Head of Housing Unit
Jacques Bien Aime, UCLBP, Former Project coordinator in BMPAD
Yvon Buisereth, Entreprise Publique de Promotion de Logements Sociaux (EPPLS), Director General
William Edouard Jn Philippe, EPPLS, Director of Planning
Jean Joseph Pierre, EPPLS, Operations Director
Regine Benoit, EPPLS Technical Officer
Michèle Oriol, Executive Secretary, Comite Interministeriel d’Amenagement du Territoire
Rosemay Guignard, Urban Planner, Comite Interministeriel d’Amenagement du Territoire

Non-governmental organizations:
Jacquelin Eugene, Project Director, Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI)
Innocent Richard, Deputy Project Director, CECI
Nadi Cherrouk, Pan American Development Foundation (PADF), Country Director
Kerline Rock, PADF, Project Director
Jean Erick Deryce, PADF, Project Director
Margaret Viel Lubin, J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P HRO), Country Director
Jean Roveau Elysee, J/P HRO
Jean Frevel Tham, Habitat for Humanity Haiti, Country Director
Barthelmy Leon, Habitat for Humanity Haiti, Project Director
Olivia Caldwell, Affordable Housing Institute (AHI)

**Development partners:**
Marcia Glenn, USAID
Fabien Sambussy, International Organization of Migration (IOM), Chief of Mission
Adeline Carrier, UNDP, Chief of Resilience unit (and other colleagues)
European Union, Sylvanie Jardinet