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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT



COLOMBIA

Peace and Development Project

Report No. 127212

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Report No.: 127212

PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

Republic of Colombia

**Peace and Development Project
(IBRD-72320 AND IBRD-77810)**

June 25, 2018

*Financial, Private Sector, and Sustainable Development
Independent Evaluation Group*

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = Colombian Peso

2004	US\$1.00	Col\$2,789.32
2005	US\$1.00	Col \$2,420.02
2006	US\$1.00	Col \$2,283.37
2007	US\$1.00	Col \$2,226.48
2008	US\$1.00	Col \$1,990.41
2009	US\$1.00	Col \$2,168.02
2010	US\$1.00	Col \$2,042.98
2011	US\$1.00	Col \$1,924.89
2012	US\$1.00	Col \$1,938.51
2013	US\$1.00	Col \$1,767.00
2014	US\$1.00	Col \$1,930.02

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CDPMM	Consortium for Development and Peace Magdalena Medio
CDD	community-driven development
DD	Difference in Difference
DNP	National Planning Department
EU	European Union
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
ISR	Implementation and Supervision Report
LIL	Learning and Innovation Loan
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
RSS	Social Solidarity Network
ICO	Organizational Capacity Index (<i>Índice de Capacidad Organizacional</i>)
ICP	Index of Programmatic Capacity
IDP	internally displaced person
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objective
PDPMM	Peace and Development Program Magdalena Medio Region
PCU	project coordination unit
PDP	Peace and Development Project
SNAIPD	National System for Integrated Services for Displaced Populations

Fiscal Year

Government:

January 1 – December 31

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Principal Ratings

	ICR*	ICR Review*	PPAR
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Moderate	Significant	Significant
World Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

* The Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) report is a self-evaluation by the responsible World Bank global practice. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEG product that seeks to independently validate the findings of the ICR.

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IEG Mission: Improving World Bank Group development results through excellence in independent evaluation.

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the World Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the World Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20-25 percent of the World Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or World Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, interview World Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate, and apply other evaluative methods as needed.

Each PPAR is subject to technical peer review, internal IEG Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible World Bank country management unit. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both World Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEG Rating System for Public Sector Evaluations

IEG's use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: <http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org>).

Outcome: The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current World Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, and Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension is not applied to development policy operations, which provide general budget support. *Possible ratings for Outcome:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High, Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

World Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the World Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for World Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Preface

This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) of the Peace and Development Project (PDP) in the Republic of Colombia. The project development objective was “to assist vulnerable, low-income, and displaced populations in rural and urban communities in the conflict-affected regions in order to reduce the risk of their exposure to conflict and mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects.” The PDP was approved in June 2004 (FY04) for US\$30.00 million with an original closing date envisaged for March 2008 (FY08). In August 2009, the project sought additional financing for US\$7.81 million to expand territorial coverage and requested an extension of the closing date by about four years from March 15, 2008 to September 15, 2012.

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) undertook a mission to the Republic of Colombia in February 2018 where it interviewed former World Bank staff and government officials who were involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of the PDP. In addition, IEG also talked to beneficiaries and civil society organizations that implemented the project on the ground. Finally, IEG also interviewed academics and current World Bank staff and government officials with relevant expertise in conflict, violence, and displacement.

The assessment used a mixed-methods approach that included a desk review of documentation (appraisal, supervision, and completion reports, mid-term review, and two evaluation studies), a literature review, site visits, and interviews with key project stakeholders (see Appendix B for PPAR Purpose and Methodology).

IEG thanks the current and former Government of Colombia officials and World Bank staff involved in the PDP for sharing their experience in designing, implementing, and self-evaluating the project. IEG also thanks the civil society organizations who implemented the project on the ground for facilitating the fieldwork and the time and attention devoted to this review. IEG also received excellent administrative and coordination support from the World Bank Country Office in Bogotá.

Following standard IEG procedures, a copy of the draft PPAR was sent to the relevant government officials and its agencies for their review and feedback. The Borrower did not have any comments on the report.

Summary

Colombia has experienced internal armed conflict for the last 50 years. The conflict has been waged primarily in rural areas and over control of territory, particularly in regions characterized by weak institutions and, in many cases, corruption and cronyism, impunity, expansion of illicit crop cultivation, and weak civil society links to state institutions owing to lack of opportunities for participation (World Bank 2013:1). Over time, the conflict has spawned a complex array of non-state actors who have waged terror as a weapon of war. Specifically, their modus operandi has included systematic large-scale human rights violations, such as public executions, disappearances, massacres, town take-overs, extortions, assassinations, kidnappings, and forced recruitment of children.

The internal armed conflict has had a negative impact on the social and economic development of the country. Armed conflict has disrupted the productive use of assets and work; it has hindered legal economic activity; and propelled families into limited employment and poverty (World Bank 2015). Conflict has generated millions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). According to estimates from the Unit for the Assistance and Comprehensive Reparations to Victims, over 7 million people had been registered as IDPs in Colombia as of March 2018—amounting to 15 percent of the population. IDPs have lower standards of living compared to those who have not been displaced (World Bank 2015).

Against this backdrop of conflict and violence, the World Bank provided support through the Peace and Development Project (PDP) “to assist vulnerable, low-income and displaced populations in rural and urban communities in the conflict-affected regions to reduce the risk of their exposure to conflict and mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects.” The PDP design included four main outcome areas based on assumptions that were required to achieve the Project Development Objective (PDO).

These outcome areas were:

- Outcome Area #1/Assumption: Achieving socioeconomic stabilization of vulnerable and displaced populations. The project understood socioeconomic stabilization as developing social, economic, and environmental assets through a community-driven approach and it assumed that these assets can “mitigate the negative effects of conflict.
- Outcome Area #2/Assumption: Strengthening institutions and organizations at the territorial level as a precondition for carrying out a community-driven approach to development.
- Outcome Area #3/Assumption: Fostering new relationship patterns based on positive values such as trust, reciprocity, and collective action, among others through community-driven development (CDD).
- Outcome Area #4/Assumption: Protecting individuals from conflict. The theory of change assumed that the “risk of exposure to conflict” can be reduced through the increased social cohesion generated by a community-driven approach to development.
- Woven throughout the project’s theory of change is also the assumption that increased social cohesion paired with socioeconomic stabilization can play a role in deterring displacement.

To achieve its PDO, the PDP financed small-scale subprojects and capacity building activities to ensure that subprojects were selected, designed, and implemented through a community-driven approach. Overall, the PDP and its additional financing targeted six regions comprising a total of nine departments and 117 municipalities.

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) assessed the project's performance in the following way:

Relevance of Objective. The PDO was highly relevant to the country priorities and to the World Bank country strategies at both the appraisal and closing stages. However, the formulation of the PDO lacked clarity and was not logically sequenced. Specifically, the PDO formulation “jumps” from the aim of “assist[ing]” vulnerable groups and IDPs to reducing their risk of conflict exposure, without indicating “how” this would be achieved. This lack of clarity in the formulation of the PDO affected the clarity of the project's logical frame. Overall, considering that the PDO was highly relevant to country priorities and World Bank strategies, the relevance of the PDO is rated **substantial**.

Relevance of Design. Subproject activities aimed at improving local livelihoods and living conditions were relevant for “mitigating the negative impact of conflict.” In turn, the project financed activities to build capacity of organizations on the ground to enable the implementation of a CDD approach that could plausibly generate new relationship patterns, increase social cohesion and, thus, “reduce the risk of exposure to conflict.” Project activities could also, in principle, affect displacement rates since there is evidence that socioeconomic stabilization paired with strengthened social cohesion can deter displacement (Adhikari 2013; Engel and Ibanez 2007). However, deterring displacement can either increase or reduce the risk of exposure to conflict. Despite the complex link between deterring displacement and “reducing the risk of exposure to conflict,” the relevance of design is rated **substantial**.

Efficacy. The discussion of PDO efficacy is organized around two sub-objectives: (i) “mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects” and (ii) “reduce risk of exposure to conflict.” The objective of “mitigate the negative impact of conflict” is rated **substantial** since the PDP contributed to socioeconomic stabilization through an increase in household assets and a positive, albeit not sustained, effect on food consumption.

Regarding the aim to “reduce the risk of exposure to conflict,” there is evidence that the PDP strengthened local institutions and organizations; increased beneficiary participation in formal and informal organizations as well as their participation in social networks that can provide economic, emergency, and legal support; and increased their likelihood of becoming leaders. However, the available evidence regarding protection against conflict is mixed. Overall, the “reduce the risk of exposure to conflict” objective is rated **substantial**.

Efficiency. Although implementation efficiency was substantial; the project lacked an adequate economic and financial analysis. At appraisal, the project did not attempt to calculate an ex-ante economic rate of return for the overall project given the demand

driven nature of the activities. Instead, the project estimated the internal rate of return for a purposive sample of subprojects that was deemed to be representative of the subprojects to be financed under the PDP. At closing, the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) did not refer nor follow up on the exercise conducted at appraisal and, thus, did not discuss the extent to which the sampled subprojects at appraisal were representative of the subprojects financed under the PDP. Instead, the ICR conducted a cost analysis in which they compared the cost per beneficiary family between the PDP and the EU funded Peace Laboratory II (World Bank 2013). The analysis concluded that the PDP project has a lower cost per beneficiary family. However, it is not possible to say whether these two programs are exactly comparable and the chosen efficiency metric (i.e. cost per family) is not precise enough since demand-driven subprojects are so different from one another. Comparing the PDP costs in terms of assets built, benefits provided, or financial viability of subprojects would have been a more sensible approach. Overall, considering these shortcomings, efficiency is rated **modest**.

The ratings for relevance, efficacy, and efficiency result in an overall outcome rating of **moderately satisfactory**. Regarding risk to development outcomes, the continued violence poses a threat to the sustainability of community participation in local governance. Moreover, the sustainability of socioeconomic outcomes is also frail since evaluation studies reveal that some of the positive socioeconomic effects disappear over time. Considering these threats, the risk to development outcome is rated **substantial**.

The World Bank's performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated **satisfactory**. The PDP had an adequate technical design, reflecting learning from operations in Colombia and elsewhere and close coordination with other development partners. The project paid adequate attention to fiduciary and safeguards issues at entry. The project also adequately assessed risks, though there were some shortcomings in the risk mitigation measures regarding protocols to ensure the security of community leaders. Likewise, World Bank supervision performance is also rated **satisfactory** since, during implementation, it proactively changed project design to maximize development impact and effectively addressed implementation bottlenecks such as the slow start of the additional financing. Overall, World Bank performance is rated **satisfactory**.

Government performance is rated **moderately satisfactory** given their commitment during preparation and the initial years of implementation. However, government commitment wavered at the additional financing stage. The performance of the implementing agency is rated **satisfactory** since it effectively complied with fiduciary and safeguards requirements and flexibly adapted to changing circumstances on the ground to ensure continued implementation in a high-risk environment. Overall, the borrower performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

The M&E design included a results framework that was, on its own, inadequate for measuring the achievement of the PDO. Despite this shortcoming, the overall M&E design included two thorough evaluation studies led by the National Planning Department (*DNP – Departamento Nacional de Planeación*) that made up for the deficiencies in the results framework. Despite some shortcomings, implementation was satisfactory and there is some evidence that the M&E information was used to steer implementation. Overall, the quality of M&E is rated **substantial**.

The findings from the performance assessment of the PDP suggest the following lessons:

- **Identifying and supporting activities that create lasting shared interest among community members is a critical building block for generating a community response to conflict.** In terms of project design, this finding calls for CDD projects that support an open menu of subprojects, and which rely on extensive consultations with beneficiaries to identify subprojects that “glue” communities together.
- **Having separate but similar activities for IDPs and host communities is not advisable in a CDD project since such separation deters social cohesion via competition for resources.** Findings from the mid-term review carried out in May 2007 revealed that the original design of having similar but separate components for IDPs and host communities was generating tensions and animosity between them. In response to this problem, the World Bank team restructured the project by merging the component supporting host communities (component A) and the component supporting IDPs (component B) into one single component at the additional financing stage.
- **The support of a respected and “neutral” third party organization can be key for the successful implementation of a CDD project in a conflict-affected area.** When the project was approved, the intensity of the conflict was high and, thus, the presence of government and project workers on the ground would have been risky since they were perceived as a party in the conflict. In the case of the PDP, partner organizations played a critical role since they brought deep contextual knowledge of social and conflict dynamics and the legitimacy and impartiality needed for maneuvering amidst armed groups.
- **Projects that seek to “deter displacement” may not necessarily reduce exposure to conflict since displacement can sometimes be the only option for citizens whose lives or livelihoods are severely threatened.** Woven throughout the PDP theory of change is the assumption that increased social cohesion paired with socioeconomic stabilization can play a role in deterring displacement leading to a “reduced risk of exposure to conflict.” However, the connection between deterred displacement and reduced risk of exposure to conflict is not straightforward.
- **Socioeconomic stabilization and a strengthened social fabric can deter preventive displacement but both are insufficient to deter reactive displacement which is driven by direct threats.** IEG fieldwork and interviews with program staff confirm that the project could not deter displacement driven by direct threats (reactive displacement). However, the fieldwork indicates that the project played a role in deterring preventive displacement which is driven by loss of livelihoods, the collapse of institutions and basic services, and the break down in social ties. Altogether, these latter factors trigger displacement at lower levels of personal risk (preventive displacement).
- **Projects with participatory approaches implemented in conflict-affected situations that elevate the role of community members can put them in harm’s**

way and, for this reason, must include protocols to mitigate the risk of leaders suffering victimization acts. IEG did not find evidence of beneficiaries suffering victimization acts that can be directly attributed to project participation. However, fieldwork evidence indicates that project participation can raise the visibility of community members, and thus, make them more likely to suffer victimizations acts. Moreover, evaluation findings indicate that participation can also lower risk perceptions by beneficiaries. The IEG mission could not find evidence of standardized procedures for dealing with this potential risk.

José Carbajo Martínez
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1. Background and Context

Country Background

1.1 **Colombia has experienced internal armed conflict for over 50 years.** The conflict has been waged primarily in rural areas and over control of territory, particularly in regions characterized by weak institutions and, in many cases, corruption and cronyism, impunity, expansion of illicit crop cultivation, and weak civil society links to state institutions owing to lack of opportunities for participation (World Bank 2013:1). Over time, the conflict has spawned a complex array of non-state actors who have waged terror as a weapon of war. More specifically, their modus operandi has included systematic large-scale human rights violations, such as public executions, disappearances, massacres, temporary town take-overs, extortions, assassinations, kidnappings, and forced recruitment of children.

1.2 **The internal armed conflict has had a negative impact on the social and economic development of the country.** Armed conflict has disrupted the productive use of assets and work; it has hindered legal economic activity and propelled families into limited employment and poverty (World Bank 2015:10). Conflict has also generated millions of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). According to estimates from the Unit for the Assistance and Comprehensive Reparations to Victims (*UARIV- Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas*), over 7 million people had been registered as IDPs in Colombia as of March 2018—amounting to 15 percent of the country’s populationⁱ. Displacement has disproportionately affected women, children, and ethnic minority groups. Nearly 80 percent of all Colombian IDPs are women or children under the age of 18, and 49 percent of displaced households are headed by women, compared to the national average of 23 percent. In 2013, 47.7 percent of all newly displaced persons were of Afro-Colombian descent and 23.9 percent belonged to indigenous communities, while these populations respectively compose 10.6 and 3.4 percent of the national population (Ferris 2014:14). IDPs have lower standards of living as compared to those who have not been displaced (World Bank 2015).

Project Context

1.3 **The origins of the Peace and Development Project (PDP) trace back to the civic movement for peace that emerged in the Magdalena Medio Region in the mid-90s.** At that point, the region was the most violent in the countryⁱⁱ and had a weak presence of state institutions despite its economic importance as Colombia’s leading oil producing region. Against this backdrop, civil society leaders decided to act through dialogue and participation against the violence that was engulfing them and to seek opportunities to overcome vulnerability and fear. The call for action responded to their frustration with the government’s inability to guarantee their security and basic constitutional rights. The civic movement in the region was initially led by the Catholic Church, the National Oil Company, and the labor union of the oil company. In 1995, these actors led a civic movement in the formulation of what became to be known as “Programa de Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio” (PDPMM). The program arose through the converging interests of the National Oil Company, whose assets were

routinely targeted by guerrilla groups, and its labor union, many of whose members had suffered targeted killings by the paramilitaries. The participation of the Catholic Church, through the Diocese of Barrancabermeja, brought credibility to the PDPMM since it was respected by all parties in the conflict and provided the territorial presence and operational support needed for the success of the initiative.

1.4 The origins of the PDP can also be traced back to a conceptual shift in the World Bank's perception of conflict and violence. By the late 1990s, government and civil society had started to perceive conflict as Colombia's main development challenge. Because of this conceptual shift, addressing the socioeconomic determinants of violence through peace building interventions became paramount in the public agenda. Against this backdrop, the World Bank Country Assistance Strategy 1998-2002 (World Bank 1997) included "Promoting Peace and Development" as one its objectives and identified the PDPMM as a promising approach to promote peace and foster development in conflict-affected regions and supported the initiative through two learning and innovation loans (LILs)ⁱⁱⁱ totaling US\$5 million each^{iv}.

1.5 The World Bank support to the PDPMM gained national recognition as an innovative form of participatory development that could promote peace amidst conflict. The pilot experience became so successful^v that it attracted the attention of the European Union (EU), who financed the same intervention model in the Magdalena Media Region through its Peace Laboratory I (*Laboratorio de Paz I*) project for EUR 34.8 million. Colombian authorities also recognized the initiative and, eventually, the intervention model found its way into the National Development Plan of the first Uribe Administration (2002-2006), who called for this intervention model to be implemented as "Peace and Development Programs," led by civil society, or as EU funded Peace Laboratories. Given the perceived success of the intervention logic and its implementation arrangements, the government requested a new loan from the World Bank to scale up LIL experiences. The new loan materialized as the PDP and was used by the government as counterpart funds for the Peace Laboratory II (*Laboratorio de Paz II*). Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) interviews with key staff from the EU confirm that World Bank involvement played a key role in the EU's decision to support the initiative.

2. Peace and Development Project

2.1 Project Costs. According to the Project Appraisal Document (PAD), the overall project cost at appraisal was expected to be US\$30.00 million. Actual costs were US\$50.4 million including additional financing, trust fund support, and borrower contributions. The project documents do not present actual costs by components.

2.2 Financing. Of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)-72320 Loan of US\$30.00 million, US\$29.87 million was disbursed and US\$0.13 million was cancelled. Additional financing (IBRD-77810) of US\$7.81 million was approved on August 12, 2009, of which US\$7.54 million was disbursed and US\$0.27 million was cancelled. The World Bank also executed two Japanese Trust Funds totaling US\$3.06 million. The first fund in 2009 for US\$1.59 million disbursed US\$1.48 million and US\$0.11 million was cancelled. The second fund in 2010 for US\$1.73 million was

fully disbursed. In addition to project funding, there were parallel EU grants of US\$37.10 million independently managed.

2.3 Borrower contribution. Although not mentioned in the PAD, the first loan (IBRD-72320) included a borrower contribution amounting to US\$ 2.8 million^{vi}. At the time of Additional financing (IBRD-77810), the government contributed US\$7.07 million in local currency coming from a EU grant. The project fully disbursed both borrower contributions.

2.4 Dates. The project was approved in June 2004 (FY04) with an original closing date envisaged for March 2008 (FY08). In August 2009, the project sought additional financing and an extension of the closing date by about four years from March 15, 2008 to September 15, 2012. The additional financing both expanded the territorial coverage to a new region and included changes to project design and implementation arrangements.

Objective and its Relevance

2.5 The project development objective (PDO) was highly relevant to country priorities as well as to World Bank country strategies both at appraisal and closing. The PDO was “to assist vulnerable, low-income and displaced populations in rural and urban communities in the conflict affected regions in order to reduce the risk of their exposure to conflict and mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects.”^{vii} This PDO was in line with country priorities as expressed in National Development Plans and World Bank strategies. At the time of approval (June 2004), the PDO was aligned with pillar four of the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy FY03-07 (i.e. Building the Economic Foundations for Peace) (World Bank 2002) and the National Development Plan 2002-2006^{viii} that explicitly endorsed Regional Peace and Development programs as a key tool of the government policy for promoting governance, democracy, and social equity in deprived and conflict-affected regions. At the time of project closing, the PDO remained relevant to the country priorities laid out in the fourth pillar (i.e. Peace Consolidation) of the National Development Plan 2010-2014^{ix}. The PDO was also relevant to the World Bank Country Partnership Strategy’s FY12-16 first strategic theme (i.e. Expanding Opportunities for Social Prosperity), as it clearly contributed, within this theme, to the results area of “enhanced social promotion and improved citizen security” (World Bank 2011).

2.6 However, the PDO’s formulation lacked clarity. The PDO had a vague formulation and it was not logically sequenced. Specifically, the PDO formulation “jumps” from the aim of “assist[ing]” vulnerable groups to reducing their risk of conflict exposure, without indicating “how” this would be achieved. This lack of clearness in the PDO affected the clarity of the project’s logical frame. IEG interviews with World Bank staff and government officials revealed that the project goal was understood as a vehicle for (1) social network formation that could help communities protect themselves from armed groups and forces aiming to displace them; (2) the creation of a sense of belonging tied to land, that would dissuade people from becoming displaced because of indirect threats; and (3) the provision of economic assets to communities to deter economic migration while developing a subsistence economy that would enable people to survive in communities without freedom of movement because of threats from armed groups.

2.7 Overall, considering that its general intent was relevant to country priorities and World Bank strategies, the relevance of the PDO is rated **substantial**.

Design and its Relevance

Components

2.8 **Project activities.** The original project design had four components: (a) developing social, economic, and environmental assets in priority areas; (b) support for displaced families in the process of return and relocation; (c) strengthening institutions and governance at the local level, and (d) project management, monitoring, and evaluation.

2.9 **Component A:** Developing social, economic, and environmental assets in priority areas (planned: US\$10.63, actual: n/a). This component financed small-scale subprojects with the goal of improving the socioeconomic conditions of vulnerable and low-income populations in rural and urban communities. There were four categories of eligible subprojects: (i) food security; (ii) income or employment generation; (iii) social and cultural; and (iv) environmental. See Appendix E for a description of these subprojects and their eligibility requirements.

2.10 **Component B:** Support for Displaced Families in the Process of Return and Relocation (planned: US\$10.82, actual: n/a). This component financed small-scale subprojects with the aim of providing a basic temporary safety net and income generation activities for displaced populations during the initial phase of voluntary relocation into a new area, or return to their place of origin. This component had the same eligible subprojects as Component A plus housing subprojects. See Appendix E for a description of these subprojects and their eligibility requirements.

2.11 **Component C:** Strengthening Institutions and Governance at the Local Level (planned: US\$5.59 million, actual: n/a). This component aimed to develop the regional leadership capacity of the implementing agency, partner organizations, local governments, and the territorial committees of the National System for Integrated Services for Displaced Populations (*SNAIPD - Sistema Nacional de Atención Integral a la Población Desplazada*) to implement the project and promote participatory planning and decision making together with responsive public institutions.

2.12 **Component D:** Project Management, Monitoring, and Evaluation (planned: US\$1.76 million, actual: n/a). The goal of the component was to support the establishment of the project coordination unit (PCU) and the monitoring and evaluation system. More specifically, the component supported the staffing of the PCU (an 8-member team) and two people in each of the territorial agencies of the implementing agency as well as two evaluation and policy specialists in the National Planning Department (DNP) to coordinate evaluations and promote regional and national policy dialogues.

2.13 **Additional Financing.** The additional financing, approved in August 2009, (i) expanded territorial coverage, incorporating a new region (Valle del Cauca); and (ii)

combined original components A and B into a single component. See Appendix F for a detailed description of the changes introduced to implementation arrangements at the additional financing stage.

2.14 Targeting. Overall, the PDP and its additional financing targeted six regions comprising a total of nine departments and 117 municipalities (Table 2.1). The regions were selected based on high poverty rates, displacement intensity (number of expelled IDPs per 100,000 inhabitants), displacement pressure (number of received IDPs per 100,000 inhabitants), absolute number of expulsion and reception of IDPs, thematic and geographical linkages with EU funded Peace Laboratories' areas, and the presence of strong "Peace and Development Programs." Within these regions, the project targeted poor and vulnerable populations as classified by the System for Identification and Selection of Beneficiaries (*SISBEN - Sistema de Selección de Beneficiarios Para Programas Sociales*) which is the Government of Colombia's means test measure used to classify population in six strata based on their socioeconomic conditions. Within the poor and vulnerable population, the project also targeted IDPs. The project defined IDPs as those individuals who want to return or relocate voluntarily within the municipalities covered by the project as well as those individuals who may be in a displacement status outside these municipalities but who want to return or relocate into them. The project relied on the Unified Registry System (*SUR - Sistema Único de Registro*) for verifying displacement status. To have access to the SUR and thereby government programs, a displaced household must approach government offices to declare, under oath, the displacement event.

Table 2.1. PDP and AF by regions, departments, and municipalities of intervention

<i>Region of Intervention</i>	<i>Departments</i>	<i>Municipalities</i>
1. Northeastern region of Colombia	Norte de Santander	15
2. Magdalena Medio Region	Antioquia; Bolívar; Cesar; and Santander	29
3. Macizo Colombiano and Alto Patía Region	Cauca and Nariño	25
4. Montes de Maria Region	Bolívar and Sucre	17
5. East of Antioquia Region	Antioquia	23
6. Valle del Cauca Region	Valle del Cauca	8
Total	9	117

Source: Project Appraisal Document and Project Paper Additional Financing

Implementation Plans

2.15 Partnership arrangements. The PDP was implemented through a partnership between the Government of Colombia, civil society organizations (i.e. partner organizations), and the World Bank. Each of these actors brought specific value to the partnership.^x The PDP also established a close partnership with the Peace Laboratories funded by the EU as both interventions were part of the National Development Plan 2002-2006 strategy for working in conflict-affected regions. The PDP envisioned that it would work complementarily with the Peace Laboratories in at least four of its five

targeted regions. The PDP funds were considered counterpart funds for the Peace Laboratory II.

2.16 Implementation arrangements. The PDP was fulfilled through an implementation architecture involving organizations and responsibilities at the national, regional, and local levels. This implementation architecture had been piloted and proved effective under the two World Bank LILs in the Magdalena Medio Region. At the national level, the PDP chose the Social Solidarity Networks (*RSS – Red de Solidaridad Social*) as its implementing agency with overall management, coordination, and oversight responsibilities. To manage day-to-day operations, the RSS established a Project Coordination Unit.^{xi} At the regional level, the PDP chose partner organizations operating in each of the project's regions as operational arms. To formalize the relationship, the RSS entered into subsidiary agreements with these partner organizations. In addition, the implementation arrangements also stipulated that partner organizations would work in close coordination with the RSS' territorial units and the SNAIPD in the promotion of subproject activities as well as in ensuring their implementation, monitoring, and compliance with the Operations Manual. At the local level, partner organizations would be responsible for mobilizing and providing guidance and technical advice to local-level beneficiary organizations in the formulation of subprojects. To formalize this relationship, partner organizations would enter into agreements with beneficiary organizations for transferring funds as grants with the purpose of executing subprojects at the local level.

2.17 Interviews with PDP staff at the central and regional levels noted that the implementation arrangements were quite unusual since they assigned partner organizations a leadership role in the design and implementation of the program. PDP staff noted that this strategy was guided by two motives. First, by the notion that civil society organizations and citizens should be partners and equals in deciding their development. This notion contrasted with the traditional approach in which civil society organizations are contracted to implement activities conceived and designed by the government or donor agencies. Second, by the view that, this strategy was a necessary condition for effective implementation. At the time in which the project was approved, the intensity of the conflict was high and, thus, the presence of government workers on the ground would have been risky since they were perceived as a party in the conflict. In contrast, partner organizations held high credibility among all stakeholders (including armed groups) and had contextual knowledge of the socioeconomic and political dynamics in the territories that was critical for maneuvering in a conflict-affected environment.

Relevance of Design

2.18 Theory of change. To better understand the project design, IEG triangulated information from interviews, project documents, and evaluation studies to reconstruct the PDP's theory of change and to derive concrete outcome areas against which to assess the project. Overall, a review of external evaluation studies reveals that the project design was based on the idea that violence and underdevelopment in the targeted regions are a function of negative relationship patterns (distrust, clientelism, and individualism, among others). These negative patterns reinforce and reproduce violence and underdevelopment,

creating a vicious cycle. This idea assumes that new relationship patterns based on positive values (trust, reciprocity, and collective action, among others) are needed to create an environment conducive to peace and development.

2.19 Based on a reconstruction of the theory of change, the project design included four main outcome areas based on assumptions that were required to achieve the PDO. These were:

- **Outcome Area #1/Assumption:** Achieving socioeconomic stabilization of vulnerable and displaced populations living in project regions. The project understood socioeconomic stabilization as developing social, economic, and environmental assets through a community-driven approach and it assumed that these assets could mitigate the negative effects of conflict.
- **Outcome Area #2/Assumption:** Strengthening institutions and organizations at the territorial level as a precondition for carrying out a community-driven approach to development.
- **Outcome Area #3/Assumption:** Fostering new relationship patterns based on positive values such as trust, reciprocity, and collective action, among others through a community-driven development (CDD) approach.
- **Outcome Area #4/Assumption:** Protecting individuals from conflict. The theory of change assumed that the “risk of exposure to conflict” can be reduced through increased social cohesion generated by a community-driven approach to development.
- Woven throughout the project’s theory of change is also the assumption that increased social cohesion paired with socioeconomic stabilization can play a role in deterring displacement and this is equated to reduced “risk of exposure to conflict.”

2.20 The first outcome area is linked to the objective “mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects” dimension of the PDO and the other outcome areas are linked to the “reduce the risk of exposure to conflict” dimension. See Appendix C for a figure with the reconstructed theory change.

2.21 **By and large, the project’s activities were relevant for “reducing the risk of exposure to conflict” and “mitigating the negative impact of possible derived effects.”** Specifically, subproject activities aimed at improving local livelihoods and living conditions and thus achieving socioeconomic stabilization were relevant to “mitigating the negative impact of conflict.” To “reduce the risk of exposure to conflict,” the project supported new relationship patterns based on positive values through a CDD approach. Activities to build the capacity of beneficiaries, partner organizations, and the SNAIPD were relevant for achieving the objective of strengthening institutions at the local level, and thus, enabling the implementation of a CDD approach to increase social cohesion and protect communities from armed groups. Overall, the results chain is clear

and convincing, and it can be plausibly argued that the project activities and outputs could achieve the PDO.

2.22 **The project design could have, in principle, affected displacement since there is evidence that socioeconomic stabilization paired with strengthened social cohesion can deter displacement** (Adhikari 2013; Engel and Ibanez 2007). However, the impact of reduced displacement upon “reducing the risk exposure to conflict” is problematic since it can be plausibly argued that, depending on the scenario, deterring displacement could either increase or reduce exposure to conflict. To put it simply: fleeing may be the only way of reducing the risk of exposure to conflict under certain circumstances.

2.23 Despite the problematic relation between deterring displacement and “reducing the risk exposure to conflict” the relevance of design is rated **substantial**.

3. Implementation

Implementation Experience

3.1 Management Implementation and Supervision Reports (ISRs) indicate that PDP implementation progress was rated satisfactory throughout the life of the original loan (IBRD-72320). However, the implementation of the additional financing (IBRD-77810) experienced delays that led to a moderately unsatisfactory implementation rating by management (World Bank 2011a). The implementation delays were driven by the following factors: (i) the transition between the Uribe and Santos administrations that led to leadership vacuums; (ii) the borrower’s annualization of its budget when the project had three-year budgets; and (iii) institutional transformations in the implementing agency that led to staff turnover. Altogether, these factors led to government delays in the allocations of funds for the PDP.

Financial Management and Procurement

3.2 **Financial Management.** Overall, as per management assessments, financial management was satisfactory, though some challenges arose throughout implementation. First, audit reports were submitted on time except for 2006 when there was a delay in contracting the audit for FY06. The World Bank team worked proactively to solve this issue with the government and the audit report was delivered by June 2007. Second, audit reports issued clean audit opinions from 2004 to 2007 and qualified opinions from 2008 to 2011. These latter audits reported some weaknesses in the internal controls system such as delays in the justification of expenses from partner organizations. To address this issue, the World Bank worked with the implementing agency to develop an action plan to strengthen partner organizations’ capacity. Interviews with World Bank and partner organizations’ staff highlighted the satisfactory financial management as remarkable given the implementation arrangements that placed a considerable burden on partner organizations and the context of pervasive corruption in public and private spheres at the national, regional, and local levels.

3.3 **Procurement.** The project paid special attention to reinforcing procurement capacity from the onset and throughout implementation^{xiii}. Overall, compliance with

procurement procedures was adequate as evidence by management's satisfactory ISR procurement ratings throughout implementation. Moreover, the project also monitored compliance with procurement regulations in its results framework through indicator #4. Results reported indicate that the target for indicator #4 was met (i.e. all procurement audits were satisfactory and that the partner and beneficiary organizations complied with the procurement guidelines as stated in the operations manual).

Safeguards Compliance

3.4 The project triggered four of the World Bank's safeguard policies: OP/BP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment; OP/BP 4.04 on Habitats; OP/BP 4.09 on Pest Management; and OP/BP 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples. With respect to OP/BP 4.01, the project was assigned an Environmental Category B. In accordance with this policy, the team undertook an environmental assessment that subsequently was used for elaborating an environmental management framework. This framework outlined procedures for handling environmental concerns related to the triggered environmental safeguards. To ensure adequate implementation of the procedures, the environmental management framework included stipulations for enhancing the environmental management capacity of beneficiary and partner organizations. Because of this framework, no subprojects were developed in natural habitats and all subprojects underwent an environmental classification process to identify any potential negative impacts and develop appropriate mitigation measures if necessary. The environmental management framework also had procedures for addressing pest management issues through the minimal use of approved pesticides. The Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) states that all subprojects applied good practices in integrated pest management. Finally, since the project was implemented in areas that included indigenous populations, all subprojects in these areas were screened for their potential effects on indigenous peoples using an Indigenous People Development Framework. The ICR reports that the 16 subprojects involving indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations adhered to the stipulations included in the framework. Safeguards were monitored in the ISRs and safeguards compliance was confirmed in the ICR (World Bank 2013). IEG interviewed key project staff and found no other reports of issues related to safeguards.

Monitoring and Evaluation

3.5 **Design.** The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) design included a results framework that was, on its own, inadequate for measuring the achievement of the PDO. Several shortcomings can be noted. First, the PDO outcome indicator chosen (i.e. "lower annual incidence of net displacements in the regions served by the project as the share of nation-wide annual net displacements") is not an adequate measure of "reduced risk of exposure to conflict," since, as was discussed in the design section (paragraph 2.22), deterring displacement does not necessarily reduce exposure to conflict. The indicator also suffered from a measurement problem and, thus, would have not been valid for judging the impact of the project on displacement rates. At appraisal, the team planned to rely on the Information System of Displaced Persons (*SIPOID - Sistema de Información de Población Desplazada*) for measuring the PDO indicator. It was assumed that this system produced timely and reliable information on displaced populations at the local,

regional, and national levels. However, the ICR notes that this was not the case and, thus, the team was unable to accurately measure the PDO indicator (World Bank 2013). Interviews with key stakeholders confirmed that the measurement is not accurate. Second, the results framework lacked an outcome indicator for measuring the objective to “mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects.” A set of indicators to capture progress towards this objective would have been appropriate. Instead, the results framework only included output metrics such as the number of vulnerable and displaced families that benefited from subprojects.

3.6 Despite the limitations in the results framework, the overall M&E arrangements included a management and information system and two external evaluation studies (DNP 2008 and 2011) that, altogether, generated adequate information to assess the project. Although the management and information system was mainly output oriented, the two evaluation studies measured socioeconomic impacts and changes in relationship patterns, attitudes, and victimization levels through a survey and a set of experimental games and social dilemmas.

3.7 **Implementation.** The implementation of the project management and information system suffered challenges with respect to the subproject data module. The ICR (World Bank 2013) notes that challenges related mainly to a lack of information management culture and resistance to change at all levels of the system (central, regional, and local). Overall, the implementation of the monitoring and information system suffered from a low level of appropriation by partner and beneficiary organizations. To respond to this challenge, the project delivered training and technical support and this helped to partially overcome the problem. During its mission, IEG could not find an easily accessible, centralized database with subproject data, thus showing that the implementation of the subproject module had challenges. The implementation of the evaluation studies by the DNP also had some implementation challenges that limit its application for assessing project performance. See Appendix G for details on the methodology, representativeness, and limitations of the evaluation studies.

3.8 **Utilization.** IEG found some evidence of use of both the data coming from the management and information system and the evaluation studies. With the respect to the data coming from the monitoring and information system, the ISRs show that the team used these data to monitor progress towards output targets. Likewise, there is also evidence that the team used the results of the evaluation studies. For instance, in the ISR Sequence 7 (May 2008), the team discusses the results of the first evaluation study (DNP 2008) to confirm that, by and large, outcomes are moving in the expected direction. However, utilization had important shortcomings. These shortcomings may have been driven by absence of data or lack of reflection and analysis on existing data. For instance, neither the management and information system nor the evaluation studies analyze results by urban vs. rural or by type of beneficiary (e.g. vulnerable, displaced, returnee, etc.) This lack of analyses represents a missed learning opportunity.

3.9 Overall, despite the shortcomings in the results framework, the project M&E is rated **substantial**. The substantial rating is driven by the thorough and innovative evaluations carried out under the DNP’s leadership that made up for the lack of adequate indicators for measuring the PDO in the results framework.

4. Achievement of the Objectives

4.1 The efficacy discussion is organized around the objective to “mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects” and the objective to “reduce the risk of exposure to conflict.” This discussion links the two-part PDO to the IEG derived outcome areas (see paragraph 2.19). Table 4.1 below maps the PDO against the IEG derived outcome areas.

Table 4.1. PDO and IEG Derived Outcome Areas

<i>Project Development Objective</i>	<i>IEG Derived Outcome Areas</i>
“mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outcome Area #1: Achieving socioeconomic stabilization of vulnerable and displaced populations.
“reduce the risk of exposure to conflict”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outcome Area #2: Strengthening institutions and organizations at the territorial level. • Outcome Area #3: Improving individuals’ relationship patterns. • Outcome Area #4: Protecting individuals from conflict.

Source: IEG

4.2 **Sources.** This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) uses the following sources of information to assess efficacy: (i) the ICR (World Bank 2013); (ii) the ICR Review (World Bank 2015b); (iii) a literature review to understand displacement decisions (Appendix D); and (iv) IEG fieldwork conducted in February 2018. IEG fieldwork included site visits and interviews (See Appendix B).

4.3 In addition, the efficacy assessment relied on two evaluation studies that the DNP led in 2008 and 2011 for assessing the impact of the intervention model. The first evaluation (DNP 2008) compared beneficiaries with various levels of exposure to the PDP and was based on the hypothesis that higher levels of exposure to treatment are associated with higher impacts in the variables of interest. The results from this dosage model estimation are representative at the PDP level. In addition, the first evaluation also collected information on a sample of non-beneficiaries. The second evaluation (DNP 2011) collected information on the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries surveyed at baseline and applied a difference in difference (DD) estimation to the panel sample. In addition, the second evaluation study repeated the dosage model treatment. However, at this stage, the estimation technique compared individuals that were currently participating against individuals that had concluded participation to test sustainability of impacts. The results from these two estimations conducted at follow up are only representative at the national level and lack representativeness by program (PDP vs. Peace Laboratories), region, or broad category of subprojects financed. The discussion of results that follows triangulates, when appropriate and available, the results of the three estimations. See Appendix F for more information on the evaluation studies, their estimation methods, and limitations.

Objective 1: Mitigate the negative impact of conflict for vulnerable, low-income and displaced populations in rural and urban communities

4.4 This dimension of the PDO is linked to the outcome area of “achieving socioeconomic stabilization of vulnerable and displaced populations.”

Outputs

4.5 The PDP benefited 89,367 families through food security, income or employment generation, housing, social and cultural, and environmental subprojects. Out of these 89,367 families, 63,767 were vulnerable families and 25,600 were IDP families. Table 4.2 below displays the subproject distribution by vulnerable and IDPs families. According to these figures, the project exceeded the target that it had set itself for vulnerable families (target: 37,742) and for IDP families (target: 20,480). The ICR does not provide detailed information on the success rate of different sub-project types and the IEG mission could not find a database to conduct an analysis of the financed subprojects (World Bank 2013). Given the absence of information, this PPAR briefly discusses the characteristics of each subproject type as per the information provided in the project’s operations manual in Appendix E.

Table 4.2. Subproject Distribution by Type of Beneficiary

<i>Type</i>	<i>Vulnerable Families</i>	<i>IDP Families</i>
Income / Employment Generation	18,293	14,800
Food Security	14,485	7,500
Social and Cultural	22,988	0
Housing	4,000	3,300
Environmental	4,001	0
Total	63,767	25,600
Target	37,742	20,480

Source: ICR

Outcome Area 1: Achieving socioeconomic stabilization

4.6 The DNP evaluations (2008 and 2011) measured impacts in six domains relevant to socioeconomic conditions: (i) incomes; (ii) food consumption; (iii) housing title formalization; (iv) home improvements; (v) household assets; and (vi) savings and access to credit.

4.7 **Income.** The first evaluation (2008) found that short-term participation in the PDP does not have an impact on incomes. However, medium-term participation has a positive effect. The second evaluation (DNP 2011), through its DD and dosage model estimations, did not corroborate this positive direction and reveals no effect on incomes. Overall, there is no conclusive evidence indicating that the PDP had a positive effect on incomes.

4.8 **Food consumption.** The PDP sought to improve food consumption through its income generation and food security subprojects. The first evaluation (2008) reveals that medium-term participation is associated with a 16 percentage point increase in the share

of households where no member skipped a meal. This positive result is corroborated by the DD estimation from the second evaluation (2011) which shows that, compared to the control group, the treatment group increased by 7 percentage points the share of households where no members skipped meals. However, the dosage model estimation conducted at follow up reveals that the positive effect of the program on food consumption disappears once beneficiaries conclude participation, thus indicating that the result is not sustained over time. In summary, evidence indicates that the PDP improves food consumption for beneficiaries but that the effect disappears once participation in the program concludes.

4.9 **Housing title formalization.** The second evaluation (2011), through the dosage model estimation, reveals that the percentage of households that are undergoing formalization of their property (i.e. titling) is higher for beneficiaries that were participating in the program (35 percentage points) and lower for those that had concluded participation (20 percentage points), thus showing that results decrease over time. However, the sample included too few households that were undergoing formalization and, for this reason, the results cannot be trusted. Given this problem, the DD model could not be estimated. Overall, there is no conclusive evidence showing that the PDP has a positive effect on housing title formalization.

4.10 **Home improvements.** The first evaluation (2008) found that one additional month of participation for participants with a medium-term engagement with the PDP is associated with a 0.3 percentage point increase in the share of households that have made home improvements. However, the DD estimation conducted at follow up did not corroborate this positive effect. Overall, there is no conclusive evidence that the PDP increased the share of households with home improvements.

4.11 **Household assets.** The first evaluation (2008) found that one additional month of participation for beneficiaries with a medium-term engagement with the PDP is associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in the probability of having basic household items such as a television, cell phone, fridge, and radio. The estimations included in the second evaluation (2011) also find a positive, albeit small effect. Overall, there is evidence indicating that the PDP had a small positive impact upon household assets.

4.12 **Savings and access to credit.** The first evaluation (2008) did not find an effect on beneficiaries' savings and access to credit. On the other hand, the second evaluation (2011) through the dosage model found that there is a positive effect on savings but that it disappears once participation concludes. This dosage model finds no effect on access to credit. Finally, the DD estimation shows no effect on savings and access to credit. In summary, there is no conclusive evidence indicating that the PDP had a positive effect on savings and credit.

4.13 Overall, the objective of “mitigate the negative impact of conflict” is rated **substantial** since the PDP contributed to increased household assets and to short term economic stabilization through a positive, albeit not sustained, effect on food consumption. However, the project did not have a positive effect on other variables that

could spark medium to long term socioeconomic development such as income, housing formalization, home improvements, savings, and access to credit.

Objective 2: Reduce the risk of exposure to conflict for vulnerable, low-income and displaced populations in rural and urban communities

4.14 According to IEG’s reconstructed theory of change, risk of exposure to conflict can be reduced via increased social cohesion. Social cohesion, in turn, requires new relationship patterns based on positive values (for example, trust, reciprocity, and collective action, among others). The project used a CDD approach to create new relationships and increase social cohesion. Carrying out a CDD approach required strengthening institutions and organizations at the territorial level. In addition, the project also assumed that increased social cohesion, paired with socioeconomic assets, could play a role in deterring displacement. However, as mentioned in paragraph 2.22, the relationship between reduced displacement and “reducing the risk exposure to conflict” is problematic since it can be plausibly argued that, depending on the scenario, deterring displacement could either increase or reduce exposure to conflict. For this reason, the effect of the project on displacement rates is not considered as contributing towards this objective and it is discussed separately in Appendix D.

Outputs

4.15 The PDP strengthened the capacity of the six partner organizations to promote CDD. In turn, partner organizations provided technical assistance to 565 beneficiary organizations so that they could adopt the principles and procedures of the operations manual, including environmental and social safeguards, in the design and implementation of subprojects. This technical assistance also included the training of 682 community leaders in citizens’ participation, participatory planning, and budget accountability. In addition, the PDP also supported the strengthening of the SNAIPD at the local level. Specifically, the project reactivated 50 Municipal Councils for Internally Displaced Population’s Integral Attention through enabling the participation of beneficiary organizations’ leaders in their functioning and supporting them in the formulation of Integrated Master Plans^{xiii}.

Outcome Area 2: Strengthening institutions and organizations at the territorial level

4.16 Indicator #3 in the PDP’s results framework indicates that the capacity of the six partner organizations and the 565 beneficiary organizations increased over time. To assess capacity enhancements, the PDP developed the Organizational Capacity Index (ICO) for beneficiary organizations and the Index of Programmatic Capacity (ICP) for partner organizations. The PDP applied the ICP to the six partner organizations at three different points in time during the life of the project (2005, 2007, 2011). On average, partner organizations increased their capacity over time according to the ICR from a 5.4 to a 7.3 score (World Bank 2013: v). Likewise, the capacity of beneficiary organizations also increased over time. The PDP applied the ICO to the beneficiary organizations twice (2006 and 2010). On average, there was an increase over time in the percentage of organizations with “medium-acceptable” capacity from 49 to 54 percent and of organizations with a “high-sufficient” capacity from 12 to 25 percent. The increased

capacity is also evidenced through indicator #4 in the PDP's results framework which notes that partner organizations, except for one that stopped operating in 2010, implemented their annual operation plans as expected. The indicator also notes that partner organizations' financial and procurement audits were satisfactory and that beneficiary organizations complied with the operations manual. Finally, the PDP support to the Municipal Councils for Internally Displaced Population's Integral Attention led to the formulation of 70 Integrated Master Plans.

4.17 IEG fieldwork interviews with key stakeholders yielded additional information that confirms that the capacity of partner organizations has been strengthened and that is still sustained. Interviews with partner organizations' staff revealed that the impact of the PDP has been long lasting and that they still apply the ICP to themselves and the ICO to the community organizations with which they work. Moreover, interviews with project staff and government officials, reveal that the impact of the ICO went beyond the PDP since the Ministry of the Interior and the DNP adopted the instrument for assessing social organizations' capacities and formulating sound organizational strengthening actions for other programs.

4.18 Moreover, the two partner organizations visited during IEG's fieldwork remain at the forefront of community-based peacebuilding activities in their areas of operation. The partner organizations continue to receive funds from donors and have highly qualified leadership and staff. Interviews revealed that much of this capacity emerged from the PDP experience. The PDP also had impacts on beneficiary organizations who, through the implementation of subprojects at the community level, acquired skills in project management, conflict resolution, participatory processes, and problem identification. Finally, IEG fieldwork also confirmed the PDP's lasting impact on beneficiaries. Interviews with beneficiaries reveal widespread agreement that the skills obtained through project participation are still of use. For instance, several beneficiaries that led subprojects noted that they used these skills to later continue participating in public affairs at the local and regional level and for seeking funds from other donors and public institutions. Overall, the PDP contribution to this outcome area is rated high.

Outcome Area 3: Fostering new relationship patterns

4.19 To understand the effect of the PDP on beneficiaries' relationship patterns with the community, the evaluation studies measured changes in the following variables: (i) trust, reciprocity, and collective action; (ii) participation in formal and informal organizations; (iii) leadership; and (iv) social networks. The variables were measured through a combination of survey questions and experimental games on "trust" and "public goods."

4.20 **Trust, Reciprocity, and Collective Action.** The survey and experimental games carried out for the first evaluation (2008) found that short-term participation in the PDP is not associated with increased trust. However, survey findings reveal that one additional month of participation for medium-term participation is associated with an increase in trust. In contrast, the results from the second evaluation study (2011) do not corroborate these results. Neither the DD estimation nor the dosage model find an effect in the surveys and experimental games. Overall, the evidence indicates that the PDP did not

influence trust levels among beneficiaries. With respect to reciprocity, the first evaluation (2008) found that both short- and medium-term participation are associated with improved reciprocity behaviors in the survey and experimental games. In contrast, the second evaluation (2011) through its DD estimation did not corroborate these results and shows no effect on reciprocity behaviors. Overall, the evidence on the effect of the PDP on reciprocity behaviors is not conclusive. Finally, the second evaluation (2011), through the DD estimation, did not find a PDP effect on the propensity of beneficiaries towards collective action as measured by the “public goods game.”

4.21 **Participation.** The first evaluation (2008) found that short-term participation in the PDP increases participation in formal and informal organizations^{xiv}. This positive effect does not disappear in the medium term, albeit it decreases in magnitude. The second evaluation study (2011) corroborates this positive result. The dosage model reveals that beneficiaries increase their participation in formal and informal organizations during and after project engagement, thus showing that results are sustained over time. Finally, the DD estimation results confirm a statistically significant increase in participation vis-à-vis the control group. Overall, the evidence indicates that the PDP had a positive effect on community participation.

4.22 **Leadership.** The first evaluation (2008) found, through survey results, that the short-term participation in the PDP is associated with a 13 percentage point increase in the share of beneficiaries that become leaders. This effect persists in the medium term and its magnitude increases to 19 percentage points. The second evaluation (2011) did not apply its estimation techniques to this survey question. IEG interviews with beneficiaries and staff from partner organizations corroborate these findings. For instance, IEG interviewed beneficiaries who, thanks to participating in the project, became prominent leaders in their communities. Overall, the evidence indicates that the PDP had a positive effect on leadership behaviors.

4.23 **Social networks.** The second evaluation (2011) study, through the dosage treatment model, found that participation in the program is associated with increased participation in social networks that can provide (i) economic support; (ii) legal, political, and human rights counseling; (iii) access to prominent individuals, public officials, and media; (iv) support in case of an emergency. By and large, these positive effects are sustained over time although they reduce their magnitude.

4.24 Overall, evidence indicates that the PDP increased beneficiaries’ participation in formal and informal organizations. There is also evidence indicating that the PDP increased the density of beneficiaries’ social networks and their leadership behaviors. These positive results are sustained over time. In contrast, the evidence indicates no effect on variables such as trust and collective action and is inconclusive on reciprocity behaviors. Despite the lack of effect for these latter variables, the PDP effect on generating new relationship patterns with respect to community life is overall rated substantial.

Outcome Area 4: Protecting individuals from conflict

4.25 The PDP theory of change assumed that the presence of strong social networks, and thus, improved social cohesion, can be effective instruments for protecting individuals from conflict. This section triangulates IEG fieldwork with evidence from the evaluation studies to assess whether participation in the PDP is associated with collective responses to conflict and, thus, improved protection from conflict. Finally, the section also discusses whether participation in the PDP is associated with lower victimization rates.

4.26 Overall, the IEG fieldwork found that one of the most significant outcomes of the PDP was to create community cohesion for dealing with conflict. This effect was attributed by interviewees to the PDP's focus on engaging people at the grassroots level and fostering community participation. It was also attributed to the PDP's emphasis on communities working as a whole, solving their internal conflicts, and addressing outside threats as a single unit. It was clear in some of the interviews that these mechanisms had, indeed, helped to foster community cohesion. For instance, several community group leaders discussed how being part of a community and having others to look out for your well-being reduced the overall risk of being targeted for violence, kidnapping, or disappearance at the hands of armed groups.

4.27 However, the evaluation studies do not display evidence in the same direction. To assess the extent to which the project generated new relationship patterns with respect to conflicts, the evaluation studies (2008 and 2011) used a social dilemma exercise with three possible responses: (i) community response; (ii) institutional response; (iii) individual responses. The dilemma puts beneficiaries in a situation where a hypothetical person receives the threat of an armed group. The individual option includes leaving the town (i.e. displacing) or standing alone against the armed groups. The community response involves standing up to the armed group as a community. The institutional response implies reaching out to the judiciary, police, army, or local politicians to ask for protection. The options were explored independently from each other. The results indicate that:

- (i) There is no conclusive evidence as to whether the PDP increases community responses to conflict, thus indicating that one of the causal mechanisms in the theory of change hypothesized as a “protector” from conflict is not observed. Notwithstanding this evidence of no effect, IEG fieldwork found concrete examples in which the PDP catalyzed community responses to conflict. For instance, during a group interview, representatives from a producer organization described how the project supported them in documenting their land rights. The producer organization, with a lawyer funded by the project, was able to establish the boundaries of their land holdings, and to start the formalization process of their land ownership. This process helped them work together as a community, building social cohesion. The process also helped them establish what land they owned, which encouraged people to stay to defend these assets. At the same time, the process helped the community stand up to a nearby company that was encroaching on their lands and to face the threat of displacement due to this encroachment collectively. This example suggests that identification and support for activities that create lasting shared interest among

community members, such as land rights, might be a critical building block for sustained cohesion and joint community action needed for effectively dealing collectively with conflict.

- (ii) The PDP does not have an impact on the likelihood of relying on institutional methods for solving conflicts. However, it does appear to increase the likelihood of resorting to civil society organizations such as the Church. This finding reveals that beneficiaries distrust state institutions, consider them as too involved in conflict dynamics, and, probably, see them as incapable of guaranteeing basic safety.
- (iii) Participation in the PDP is not associated with a higher likelihood of displacing in the face of a direct threat. This finding is worrisome if we assume that this sort of displacement is a sensible behavior that reduces exposure to conflict. Not displacing in such a scenario can put individuals in harm's way.
- (iv) Short-term engagement in the PDP reduces risk perception associated with leadership roles but, over the medium term, the risk perception increases. This finding is also worrisome since it indicates that participation in the PDP may lower beneficiaries risk perception, and thus, could put them in harm's way. In the long run, risk perception increases, which can be interpreted as a positive result if it is assumed that this increased risk perception reduces exposure to conflict. Two hypotheses could explain this increase. First, although short-term exposure decreases risk perception, medium-term exposure may make beneficiaries more aware of the risk of becoming leaders. Second, it could also be that, once participation in the PDP concludes, participants perceive leadership roles as more dangerous because they are no longer engaged with the PDP and, thus, lack program "protection."

4.28 Finally, the evaluation studies present evidence indicating that the PDP did not reduce self-reported victimization rates, thus suggesting that participation in the PDP is not associated with increased protection from conflict. The first evaluation (2008) found that neither short- nor medium-term participation in the PDP is associated with a decrease in the share of households that have suffered victimization acts. The second evaluation (2011), through the DD estimation, found a decreasing trend between baseline and follow up in the percentage of households that have suffered victimization acts. This decreasing trend is not statistically significant and it is also observed in the control group, thus showing that the programs did not have an impact upon the share of households suffering victimization acts. The dosage model shows that participation in the program is associated with a minor increase (2 percentage points) in the share of households that suffered victimization acts. This negative effect disappears once participation concludes. Overall, there is contradictory evidence on whether the PDP protected beneficiaries from conflict, and for this reason, this outcome area is rated modest.

4.29 In summary, there is evidence indicating that the PDP strengthened institutions and organizations at the local level (outcome area #2—High). Moreover, evidence also indicates that the PDP increased beneficiaries' participation in formal and informal organizations, the density of their social networks, and their leadership behaviors (outcome area # 3—Substantial). In contrast, the evidence with respect to protection against conflict is contradictory (outcome area #4—Modest). Considering the

performance in #2 and #3, the overall efficacy of the “reduce the risk of exposure to conflict” objective is rated **substantial**.

5. Efficiency

5.1 **Economic and financial analysis.** The project did not attempt to calculate an ex-ante estimation of cost-effectiveness or economic rate of return for the overall project given the demand driven nature of the project. Considering this constraint, the project attempted to approximate a financial analysis using its previous experience. More specifically, the project analyzed the viability of a sample of subprojects that had been financed under the two previous World Bank LILs. The LILs financed projects that were like the ones to be financed under the PDP. The sample was purposive and driven by the knowledge of World Bank and partner organizations’ staff with working experience in the Magdalena Medio region. The sample included five subprojects: palm; cocoa; yuca; pottery; and small bananas. The analysis estimated the cash flows for each subproject to obtain standard financial indicators such as internal rate of return (IRR)^{xv}. The findings of the analysis reveal that all IRRs are satisfactory and exceed the cost of capital. The project conducted sensitivity analyses under two scenarios to test subprojects’ financial robustness. Findings show that, even under these two more unfavorable scenarios, the IRRs remain satisfactory.

5.2 At closing, the ICR did not refer nor follow up on the exercise conducted at appraisal. This lack of discussion represents a missed opportunity to analyze the extent to which the sampled subprojects at appraisal (palm, cocoa, yuca, pottery, and small bananas) were representative of the subprojects financed under the PDP. Instead, the ICR conducted a cost analysis in which they compared the cost per beneficiary family between the PDP and the EU-funded Peace Laboratory II (World Bank 2013). The analysis concluded that the PDP project has a lower cost per beneficiary family. However, it is not possible to say whether these two programs are exactly comparable. Moreover, the chosen efficiency metric (i.e. cost per family) is not precise enough since demand-driven subprojects are so different from one another, and the evaluations indicate variance in how much families benefited. Comparing the PDP costs in terms of assets built, benefits provided, or financial viability of subprojects would have been a more sensible approach. Overall, the accuracy and robustness of the economic and financial analysis is weak, and, thus efficiency is rated **modest**.

5.3 **Implementation efficiency.** Two indicators reveal efficient implementation. First, the project exceeded the target that it had set itself for number of families reached by the project. Second, it is estimated that of every US\$100 of the allocated budget, only US\$7 was spent on operations, while the rest was invested in subprojects, technical assistance, and institutional strengthening. Implementation efficiency suffered owing to government delays in the allocation of resources to finance partner organizations at the additional financing stage. However, the project team proactively solved these lags and brought implementation to its normal pace. Overall, implementation efficiency is rated **substantial**.

5.4 Although implementation efficiency was substantial; on balance, efficiency is rated **modest** due to concerns about the accuracy and robustness of the economic and financial analysis.

6. Ratings

Outcome

6.1 The relevance of objectives and project design is rated **substantial**. Although it lacked clarity in its formulation, the PDO was highly relevant to country priorities as well as to World Bank country strategies at both appraisal and closing. With regards to project design, the main project activities were relevant for achieving the objectives. With respect to the achievement of objectives, efficacy is overall rated **substantial**. Finally, although implementation efficiency was substantial; on balance, efficiency is rated **modest** due to concerns about the accuracy and robustness of the economic and financial analysis. Considered altogether, these ratings lead to an overall outcome rating of **moderately satisfactory**.

Risk to Development Outcome

6.2 This assessment identified four main risks to development outcomes: (i) sustainability of institutional outcomes, (ii) sustainability of human capital gains; (iii) sustainability of community participation in local governance; (iv) sustainability of socioeconomic outcomes.

6.3 **Sustainability of institutional outcomes.** The sustainability of the project's development outcome hinges, in part, on the extent to which the capacities of organizations on the ground can be maintained over time and on the extent to which they can continue to be active in their regions. The findings of the PPAR reveal that the project successfully strengthened the capacity of partner organizations to work with conflict-affected communities, engaging them in processes to prioritize and implement subprojects to improve their socioeconomic conditions and, in turn, build social cohesion. As mentioned in the discussion of outcome area #2, IEG fieldwork confirmed that the capacity of partner organizations is still in place and that the capacities built are being used to implement peacebuilding and development projects to this day. Overall, this assessment concludes that the likelihood that this capacity will be reversed is low.

6.4 **Sustainability of human capital gains.** The project built capacity at the individual level, particularly of those beneficiaries who assumed leading roles in the formulation and implementation of subprojects. Through the project experience and training received, these individuals were taught how to prioritize development activities, how to interact with other community members and resolve conflicts, and how to manage relationships with local government, armed groups, and private sector. Overall, this assessment concludes that the likelihood that this capacity will be reversed is low.

6.5 **Sustainability of community participation in local governance.** The sustainability of community participation hinges upon the presence of a low violence environment. Although the Government of Colombia has reached an agreement with the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the presence of criminal gangs and a remaining active armed group (i.e. the National Liberation Army) indicate that violence and conflict will remain present. For instance, in March 2018, the Ombudsman's Office of Colombia drew attention to the rate at which social leaders have been assassinated in the last two years^{xvi}. Overall, this continued violence poses a significant risk to sustained community participation.

6.6 Sustainability of socioeconomic outcomes. The PDP contributed to short term economic stabilization through a positive, albeit not sustained, effect on food consumption. The evidence from the evaluation studies indicates that this outcome is not sustained over time and that the PDP did not have a positive effect on other variables that could spark medium- to long-term socioeconomic development, such as income, housing formalization, home improvements, savings, and access to credit. Overall, the evidence indicates that the risk is high.

6.7 Overall, risk to development is rated **substantial.**

World Bank Performance

Quality at Entry

6.8 The World Bank developed an adequate technical design for the PDP project, reflecting learning from operations in Colombia and elsewhere. The PAD notes that the PDP design benefited from: (i) the World Bank's considerable experience in the design and supervision of CDD projects; and (ii) the World Bank's experience with conflict and post-conflict situations in various countries, such as Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and others in Africa. In addition, the project incorporated lessons from a design that had already been tested and validated through two World Bank LILs in Colombia. These two LILs generated valuable lessons on what constitutes a viable operational model for conducting a CDD project in the middle of conflict^{xvii}.

6.9 As part of project preparation, the World Bank closely coordinated with the EU to ensure that both institutions complemented each other's efforts in supporting the overall government strategy of promoting peace and development in conflict-affected regions. The World Bank closely coordinated with the EU to ensure that the PDP had complementary features and synergies with the EU Peace Laboratory II. The complementary features were the following: i) shared regions of implementation and the same strategic partners, the Regional Development and Peace Programs; ii) both programs sought to strengthen similar elements of the agendas of the Regional Development and Peace Programs; and iii) they used the same technical unit for the national coordination of the programs.

6.10 The project paid adequate attention to financial management, procurement, and safeguards issues as at entry. With respect to financial management, the project carried an assessment to verify that partner organizations had reasonable capacity to manage funds and included mechanisms for ensuring oversight by the implementing agency. Likewise, the project conducted a procurement assessment and ensured capacity from the onset. Finally, the project also adequately managed environmental safeguards at

entry through the preparation of an environmental assessment followed by an environmental management framework that covered OP/BP 4.01, OP/BP 4.04, and OP/BP 4.09. The project also prepared an Indigenous Peoples Development Framework to comply with OP/BP 4.10.

6.11 The project adequately assessed risks, though there were some shortcomings in mitigation measures, particularly with respect to including protocols for the security of community leaders. The project acknowledged that it would be carried out in a context of unpredictable ongoing conflict where the security of project staff and community leaders could be at stake. As a mitigation measure, the operations manual contained a scheme^{xviii} with guidelines to ensure the security of project staff. However, an IEG review of the operations manual did not find any guidelines with respect to how to ensure the security of beneficiaries, particularly of those who would rise to leadership positions by participating in the project. Becoming a leader in an environment marked by conflict and violence is not without risks and, in many cases, it may result in being targeted for assassination by armed groups. While interviewing staff from partner organizations, IEG asked whether there had been cases of community members who received leadership training from the project and who later suffered violence from armed groups. Staff from partner organizations reported that there were instances in which this happened, but they attributed this to the risks of being a community leader in Colombia and not something that can be directly attributed to participation in the project. In these interviews, IEG also asked whether the project had procedures (such as a manual) for mitigating the risks to community leaders, but responses were negative. Despite this shortcoming, quality at entry is rated **satisfactory**.

Quality of Supervision

6.12 By and large, the World Bank proactively changed project design to maximize development impact. Findings from the mid-term review carried out in May 2007 as well as from progress reports and supervision missions, revealed that the original design of having similar but separate components for vulnerable and displaced populations was counterproductive because it could generate tensions and animosity between IDPs and host communities when, in fact, both populations had a natural tendency to work together since they all lived in the same communities or municipalities and, thus, were all being affected by the same social, economic, and conflict dynamics. In response to these findings, the team restructured the project by merging original components A and B into one single component at the additional financing stage. Perhaps the only shortcoming occurred in the supervision of the M&E system. As mentioned in the M&E section, the PDO indicator suffered from a measurement problem that should have been spotted and rectified at the initial stages of implementation. Yet, the World Bank never addressed the problem.

6.13 World Bank staff effectively addressed the slow start of the additional financing and managed to improve its implementation pace. The World Bank team took several proactive actions to improve implementation pace. First, the World Bank intensified supervision through bimonthly supervision meetings with the implementing agency and kept close communication with partner organizations. Second, the World Bank also strengthened its communication with the DNP to share concerns about the

administrative constraints that were affecting implementation pace. Interviews with staff from the project implementation unit and from partner organizations highlighted the proactive role of the World Bank, particularly with respect to liaising with the implementing agency and the DNP to accelerate budget allocations. Third, the World Bank facilitated the dialogue and the transition between project coordinators in the implementing agency. Overall, the improvement in implementation pace is documented in management's ISR Sequence 13 where the implementation rating is upgraded from moderately unsatisfactory to moderately satisfactory (World Bank 2011c). IEG rates quality of supervision as **satisfactory**.

6.14 Overall, World Bank performance is rated **satisfactory**.

Borrower Performance

Government Performance

6.15 **The government showed commitment to the project development objectives during preparation and in the initial years of implementation.** Several examples illustrate this point. For instance, the government provided gap financing to facilitate the transition between the second LIL and the PDP. The project used this financing to cover the operating costs of the partner organizations and the implementing agency staff in the period between PDP loan approval and effectiveness. Later in the project's life, around 2007, the government provided counterpart funds to help mitigate the strong revaluation of the peso in 2007 that reduced the amount of funds available in the World Bank loan.

6.16 **Ownership and commitment wavered at the additional financing stage.** This period was characterized by the transition between the Uribe and Santos administrations and the institutional transformation of the implementing agency from RSS to *Acción Social*. Overall, these two factors resulted in a high turnover of directive and technical personnel that led to a decreased trust between partner organizations and the government. More importantly, they led to important administrative and operational weaknesses. Altogether, these weaknesses led to government delays in the allocation of budgetary resources for the project. In turn, the absence of allocations, refrained the signature of 2011 subsidiary agreements between the implementing agency and the partner organizations. This absence of subsidiary interrupted the flow of funds from implementing agency to partner organizations. Given these shortcomings, government performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

Implementing Agency Performance

6.17 **The project relied on an innovative implementation mechanism involving several agencies that performed adequately.** The arrangement involved agencies located both at the government and civil society levels. At the government level, the project established a PCU responsible for the project's overall management and oversight. At the civil society level, the project relied on partner organizations for implementing the project in the regions. Evidence indicates that, by and large, the implementing agencies complied with financial, procurement, and safeguards requirements, thus showing adequate performance.

6.18 **Moreover, the implementing agency effectively addressed bottlenecks to ensure continued implementation.** For instance, the PCU effectively dealt with the cancelling of the subsidiary agreement with one partner organization that stopped operating in 2010 (Asopatia-CRIC) for reasons unrelated to the PDP. To allow for the continued implementation of the project in the region where the partner organization had stopped operating, the PCU tackled the issue by directly working with the beneficiary organizations. This option required providing direct assistance and supervision to beneficiary organizations and seeking approval for transferring funds directly from the PCU to these organizations when needed. The original implementation arrangements did not envisage these provisions and, for this reason, these efforts represent a flexible adaptation to changing circumstances on the ground. Finally, the implementing agencies, particularly the partner organizations, effectively implemented the project in a high-risk environment. Interviews with key program staff highlight their deep contextual knowledge of the regions and conflict dynamics as well as their high credibility among all stakeholders (including the illegally armed organizations) as the key factors that explain this successful implementation. Given these positive findings, IEG rates implementing agency performance as **satisfactory**.

6.19 Overall borrower performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

7. Lessons

- **Identifying and supporting activities that create lasting shared interest among community members is a critical building block for generating a community response to conflict.** In terms of project design, this finding calls for CDD projects that include an open menu of subprojects to be supported, and reliance on extensive consultations with beneficiaries to help identify those subprojects that “glue” communities together.
- **Having separate but similar activities for IDPs and host communities is not advisable in a CDD project since such separation deters social cohesion via competition for resources.** Findings from the mid-term review carried out in May 2007 revealed that the original design of having similar but separate components for IDPs and host communities was generating tensions and animosity between them. In response to this problem, the World Bank team restructured the project by merging the component supporting host communities (component A) and the component supporting IDPs (component B) into one single component at the additional financing stage.
- **The support of a respected and “neutral” third party organization can be key for the successful implementation of a CDD project in a conflict-affected area.** When the project was approved, the intensity of the conflict was high and, thus, the presence of government and project workers on the ground would have been risky since they were perceived as a party in the conflict. In the case of the PDP, partner organizations played a critical role since they brought deep contextual knowledge of social and conflict dynamics and the legitimacy and impartiality needed for maneuvering amidst armed groups.

- **Projects that seek to “deter displacement” may not necessarily reduce exposure to conflict since displacement can sometimes be the only option for citizens whose lives or livelihoods are severely threatened.** Woven throughout the PDP theory of change is the assumption that increased social cohesion paired with socioeconomic stabilization can play a role in deterring displacement leading to a “reduced risk of exposure to conflict.” However, the connection between deterred displacement and reduced risk of exposure to conflict is not straightforward.
- **Socioeconomic stabilization and a strengthened social fabric can deter preventive displacement, but both are insufficient to deter reactive displacement which is driven by direct threats.** IEG fieldwork and interviews with program staff confirm that the project could not deter displacement driven by direct threats (reactive displacement). However, the fieldwork indicates that the project played a role in deterring preventive displacement, which is driven by loss of livelihoods, the collapse of institutions and basic services, and the breakdown in social ties. Altogether, these latter factors trigger displacement at lower levels of personal risk (preventive displacement).
- **Projects with participatory approaches implemented in conflict-affected situations that elevate the role of community members can put them in harm’s way and, for this reason, must include protocols to mitigate the risk of leaders suffering victimization acts.** IEG did not find evidence of beneficiaries suffering victimization acts that can be directly attributed to project participation. However, fieldwork evidence indicates that project participation can raise the visibility of community members, and thus, make them more likely to suffer victimizations acts. Moreover, evaluation findings indicate that participation can also lower risk perceptions by beneficiaries. The IEG mission could not find evidence of standardized procedures for dealing with this potential risk.

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ⁱ Data extracted from UARIV database: <https://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/>

ⁱⁱ The homicide rate for the region's main city, Barrancabermeja, reached 250 per 100,000 in year 2000 according to figures from the "Observatorio Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario".

ⁱⁱⁱ The Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) was a lending instruments designed by the World Bank to try out experimental approaches to poverty reduction. The instrument no longer exists.

^{iv} The LILs' key learning objective was to test and refine a participatory methodology and operational approach for realizing the PDPMM objectives. It aimed to: (i) develop the capacity of the Consortium for the Development and Peace Magdalena Medio (CDPMM) to operate as a change agent and program manager, (ii) strengthen the citizens' network as a vehicle for building

social capital and managing the program, (iii) provide technical support and funding to community organizations to develop and implement specific projects identified by citizens as a priority.

^v In December 2001, the Program received Colombia's National Peace Prize. The Prize is an instrument to promote peace, humanitarian values, solidarity and understanding among Colombians.

^{vi} Source: Interview and document provided by Project Financial Specialist.

^{vii} The legal objective of the PDP is the same objective as the one in the Project Appraisal Document.

^{viii} Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2002 – 2006. Hacia un Estado Comunitario.

^{ix} Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2010-2014. Prosperidad para Todos.

^x The government contributed with policy directing, resources, and monitoring and supervision of operation. The partner organizations provided the need operational arm through their presence the regions. In addition, they also brought deep local contextual knowledge of social and conflict dynamics as well as the legitimacy and impartiality reputation needed for maneuvering amidst armed groups. Finally, the World Bank brought to bear its global knowledge in community-driven development and social interventions in conflict and post-conflict situations as well as its experience in project design, implementation and supervision.

^{xi} The PCU main functions were to (i) consolidate, follow-up on, and assess the Annual Operation Plans; (ii) ensure that the Operational and Subproject manuals are being applied accordingly by the implementing agencies at the territorial level; (iii) arrange for all contractual agreements to be entered between the RSS and the partners organizations for the execution of the Project at the (iv) present physical and financial progress reports; and (v) maintain permanent and close coordination and articulation of Project activities with the Peace Laboratories at the national level. The RSS had presence in the territories through its territorial units (TUs). In addition to the PCU, the arrangements also established a National Technical Committee (NTC) composed by the RSS, the DNP, and one representative of the partner organizations implementing PDPs. The RSS presided the NTC whereas the DNP was responsible for its Technical Secretariat, thus playing a key role coordinating the Project's evaluations and overseeing the Project's overall performance among other initiatives being implemented at the territorial level.

^{xii} The procurement arrangements had several layers of responsibility. At the central level, a PCU located in the RSS would be responsible for procuring some central activities, namely goods, evaluation, and audits, as well as its own staffing. At the regional level, procurement would be carried out by partner organizations that would enter into subsidiary agreements with the RSS. Finally, procurement under community subprojects would be carried out by beneficiary organizations following the guidelines of the operations manual and under the guidance and supervision of the partner organizations.

^{xiii} Integrated Master Plans (PIU) are implemented by municipal government and their purpose is to create a participatory space for dialogue between IDPs and public, private, and or community entities, so that IDPs can access the rights articulated for them by Law 387 of 1997.

^{xiv} Formal organizations refer to legally constituted entities whereas informal organizations refer to more lax entities based on social networks, shared interested and personal relationships.

^{xv} Whenever available, the analysis used actual cost and production figures. Whenever data was not available, the analysis relied on estimates that were validated by technicians and PDPMM personnel that had direct involved in the subprojects.

^{xvi} The Ombudsman reported that 282 leaders have been killed between January 1st, 2016 and February 27th, 2018. Source: <http://www.elpais.com.co/colombia/282-lideres-sociales-han-sido-asesinados-en-los-ultimos-dos-anos-defensoria.html>

^{xvii} Perhaps the main lesson that the project incorporated from this experience and, that it can also be applied elsewhere, is that an operational model in the middle of conflict is more likely to be sustained through a change agent with territorial presence and high credibility among all stakeholders. The incorporation of this lesson explains why the PDP project chose to continue working with the partner organizations that had high credibility among all stakeholders.

^{xviii} The scheme's backbone would be the Interinstitutional Early Warning Committee (Comite Interinstitucional de Alerta Temprana) that continuously collect, analyzes, and disseminates data on the risk of violence by municipality. In the event of a declaration of a high alert by this Committee or threats to the staff, the project implementation unit would undertake measures such as temporary suspension of project activities and / or evacuation of project staff and their families to a safe place.

Appendix A. Basic Data Sheet

Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	51	50.4	98.82
IBRD 72320	30	29.87	99.57
IBRD 77810	7.81	7.54	96.6
Borrower Contribution IBRD 72320	2.8	2.8	100
Borrower Contribution IBRD 77810	7.07	7.07	100
TF 91174	1.59	1.48	93
TF 93141	1.73	1.73	100

Sources: PDP Project Appraisal Document; PDP Implementation Completion and Results Report

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (IBRD 72320 and IBRD 77810)

	<i>FY04</i>	<i>FY05</i>	<i>FY06</i>	<i>FY07</i>	<i>FY08</i>	<i>FY09</i>	<i>FY10</i>	<i>FY11</i>	<i>FY12</i>	<i>FY13</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	0	7.62	18.82	30	30	30	33.51	37.31	37.81	37.81
Actual (US\$M)	0	1.1	8.95	16.24	29.81	30	31.6	33.99	37.61	37.41
Actual as % of appraisal	N/A	14	47	54	99	100	94	91	99	98
Date of final disbursement:										06/19/2012

Sources: PDP Project Appraisal Document; PDP Implementation Completion and Results Report

Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Initiating memorandum	10/16/2003	10/16/2003
Negotiations	04/22/2004	05/03/2004
Board approval	06/19/2004	06/10/2004
Signing	9/27/2004	9/27/2004
Effectiveness	12/23/2004	12/23/2004
Closing date	03/15/2018	09/15/2012

Sources: PDP Project Appraisal Document; PDP Implementation Completion and Results Report

Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (World Bank budget only)	
	<i>Staff Weeks (number)</i>	<i>US\$ 000s (including travel and consultant costs)</i>
Lending		
FY03	18.03	47.16
FY04	36.63	94.01
Total:	54.66	141.17
Supervision/ICR		
FY05	27.98	49.02
FY06	35.00	63.83
FY07	25.28	51.28
FY08	23.06	79.83
FY09	17.76	70.63
FY10	15.95	28.84
FY11	9.98	33.70
FY12	3.78	11.79
Total:	158.79	388.92

Sources: PDP Implementation Completion and Results Report

Other Project Data

Borrower / Executing Agency: Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional - Accion Social

Follow-on Operations

<i>Operation</i>	<i>Credit no.</i>	<i>Amount (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Board date</i>
P101277	IBRD-7781	7.812	September 10, 2009

Task Team Members

<i>Name</i>	<i>Title (at time of appraisal and closure, respectively)</i>	<i>Unit</i>
Lending		
Jairo A. Arboleda	Consultant	LCSSO
Daniel J. Boyce	Lead Financial Management Specialist	LCSFM
Jose Maria Caballero	Lead Agricultural Economist	LCSAR
Elena Correa	Consultant	LCSSO
Beatriz Elena Franco	Program Assistant	LCC1A
Ann Jeannette Glauber	Senior Environmental Specialist	AFTN3
Natalia Gomez	Senior Rural Development Specialist	LCSAR
Daniel R. Gross	Consultant	AFTSG
Steven P. Maber	Senior Environmental Specialist	EASER
Hideki Mori	Program Manager	HDNSP
Marcelo Amador Osorio	Consultant	LCSTP
Supervision/ICR		
Yamil Abdala Mesa	Consultant	LCSSO
Jairo A. Arboleda	Consultant	LCSSO
Daniel J. Boyce	Lead Financial Management Specialist	LCSFM
Suzanne Casolaro	Consultant	LCSHH
Jeannette Estupinan	Senior Financial Management Specialist	LCSFM
Beatriz Elena Franco	Program Assistant	LCC1A
Natalia Gómez	Senior Rural Development Specialist	LCSAR
Laura Kullenberg	Country Manager	AFMJB
Miguel A. Lopez	Chief Administrative Officer	SARRM
Jose M. Martinez	Senior Procurement Specialist	ECSO2
Diomedes Berroa	Senior Operations Officer	LCSTP
Andrew Morrison	Lead Economist	PRMGE
Francisco J. Pichon	Senior Natural Resources Management Specialist	AFTA1
David N. Sislen	Sector Leader	AFTSN
Daniel M. Sellen	Sector Leader	LCSSD
Karina M. Kashiwamoto	Language Program Assistant	LCC1C
Luis Daniel Santos Pinzón	Consultant	LCSSO

Sources: PDP Project Appraisal Document; PDP Implementation Completion and Results Report

Appendix B. PPAR Purpose and Methodology

Purpose. IEG conducted a mission to the Republic of Colombia for two weeks during February 2018 including four days in the field. The mission had four objectives:

- The first objective was to better understand the PDO and the theory of change from the perspective of key stakeholders since its formulation was not clearly articulated in project documents.
- The second objective focused on testing the project's key causal mechanism through qualitative discussions with staff from partner organizations and members of beneficiary organizations.
- The third objective focused on validating the sustainability of capacity building efforts through interviews with key staff from selected partner organizations and members of beneficiary organizations.
- Finally, the fourth objective focused on discussing project unintended effects with key stakeholders as well as with staff from partner organizations and members of beneficiary organizations.

To meet the first objective, IEG relied on a desk review of documents and interviews key stakeholders. These are defined as the World Bank staff and government officials that were involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of the project at the central level. The IEG reconstructed theory of change can be found in Appendix C.

To meet the second objective, IEG relied on fieldwork and a sampling approach to identify partner and beneficiary organizations. Fieldwork is discussed in the next section within this Appendix. Finally, IEG used a combination of fieldwork and key stakeholder interviews for meeting the third and fourth objectives.

Fieldwork and Sampling approach. The PDP relied on partner organizations at the regional level for implementing the project. According to the project implementation arrangements, the project implementation unit at the central level signed subsidiary agreements with these partner organizations who then, in turn, entered into agreements with beneficiary organizations for transferring funds as grants with the purpose of executing subprojects at the local level. The PDP and its additional financing area of influence included 6 regions comprising a total of 9 departments and 117 municipalities. With support from the PDP, 565 beneficiary organizations carried out 718 subprojects that reached 63,767 vulnerable families and 25,600 IDP families. Table 1 below summarizes the PDP list partners organizations, region and departments of interventions and number of municipalities covered.

Table C.1: PDP Partner Organizations and Areas of Influence

<i>Partner Organization</i>	<i>Region of Intervention</i>	<i>Departments</i>	<i>Number of municipalities covered by the partner organizations</i>
CONSORNOC – Corporación Nueva Sociedad de la Region Nororiental de Colombia	Northeastern region of Colombia	Norte de Santander	15
CDPMM – Corporación de Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio	Magdalena Medio Region	Antioquia Bolívar Cesar Santander	29
ASOPATIA – CRIC Asociación de Municipios del Patía – Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca	Macizo Colombiano and Alto Patía Region	Cauca Nariño	25
Fundación Red Desarrollo y Paz de Montes de Maria	Montes de Maria Region	Bolívar Sucre	17
PRODEPAZ – Corporación Programa Desarrollo para la Paz	East of Antioquia Region	Antioquia	23
VALLENPAZ	Valle del Cauca Region	Valle del Cauca	8
Total	6	9	117

Source: Project Appraisal Document and Project Paper Additional Financing

The first step in the sampling approach consisted on choosing the partner organizations to visit. Owing to time and logistical constraints, IEG chose to only visit the CDPMM and PRODEPAZ. As indicated in the table above, the CDPMM area of influence covered 4 Departments and 29 Municipalities whereas the PRODEPAZ covered one Department and 23 municipalities. IEG interviewed the program staff from these two organizations.

The second step in the sampling approach consisted on selecting a pool of beneficiary organizations who would be used to test key project assumptions through qualitative discussion. More specifically, IEG envisaged these qualitative discussions as a mean to test the assumption that building social, economic, and environmental assets contributed to increased protection from conflict and reduced the likelihood of displacement. IEG had originally envisaged a stratified random sampling approach that would select based on type of subproject (e.g. income generation vs. housing), type of beneficiaries (vulnerable and displaced), and geographical location (rural vs. urban). Unfortunately, IEG could not reconstruct such sampling frame since the ICR lacked information on type of subprojects^{xix}. Moreover, security risks paired with logistical and time constraints would have also prevented a stratified random sampling approach. Considering these constraints, IEG carried out a purposive sampling approach to select beneficiary organizations under the of influence of the CDPMM. This purposive approach selection benefited from the support of the CDPMM. The support from the CDPMM was essential since IEG did not have communication channels with beneficiary organizations. The purposive sampling approach was driven by two criteria.

- Criteria 1: Rural and Urban. IEG ensured representation of both organizations with an eminently rural and urban influence.
- Criteria 2: Vulnerable and Displaced. Beneficiary organizations can fall into two broad categories: IDP oriented mission vs. Vulnerable population oriented mission. IEG ensured representation of both in the purposive sample.

Based on the above selection criteria, IEG chose 12 organizations. Table below provides the breakdown. IEG had originally intended to visit these 12 organization but security concerns required canceling those plans and convening their members to Barrancabermeja^{xx}, main urban center of the Magdalena Medio Region. Under these new scenario, IEG arranged the participation of 24 individuals representing these organizations. Unfortunately, unforeseen circumstances led to a lower attendance rate. While on mission in Barrancabermeja, one of the National Liberation Army (ELN - Ejército de Liberación Nacional)^{xxi} carried out a three-day armed strike in areas under its control that prevented many participants from reaching Barrancabermeja. Because of these events, IEG was only able to meet with 10 members of beneficiary organizations representing 6 organizations. Table 2 below contrasts the original sampling plan as opposed to the actual owing to these unforeseen events. For each organization, IEG employed individual and groups interviews as appropriate.

Table C.2: Beneficiary Organizations: Original vs Actual Sampling Plan

<i>Type of Population</i>	<i>Urban</i>		<i>Rural</i>	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Vulnerable	1	1	5	1
Displaced	3	2	3	2
<i>Total</i>	4	3	8	3


Source: IEG

^{xix} The ICR provided information on the number of families that benefited from different types of subprojects but there was no breakdown of subprojects.

^{xx} Barrancabermeja had 191,704 inhabitants as of 2016 and it is known as the oil capital of Colombia.

^{xxi} The ELN leaders called a strike to protest the government's decision to suspend peace negotiations on January 10, 2018.

Appendix C. IEG Reconstructed Theory of Change



Appendix D. IEG Analysis of PDP Effects on Displacement

7.1 The PDP theory of change stated that displacement can be reduced via socioeconomic stabilization, new relationship patterns, and increased social cohesion. The PDP results framework included a PDO outcome indicator on displacement that was formulated as “Lower annual incidence of net displacement in the regions served by the project as the share of nationwide-annual net displacement.” However, as mentioned in M&E Section of the PPAR, the measurement of the indicator was not valid and cannot be used to assess the effect of the project on displacement rates. In the absence of quantitative information to gauge the effect on displacement rates, IEG focused on assessing whether it can be plausibly argued that the project influenced displacement rates via a validation of the theory of change. The validation exercise involved two steps. First, confirming that the project achieved socioeconomic stabilization and a strengthened social fabric. This is confirmed, to a certain extent, by the discussion of efficacy (See PPAR’s Section 4: Achievement of Objectives). Second, validating the causal mechanism (i.e. that socioeconomic stabilization and a strengthened social fabric can influence displacement rates). IEG validated the causal mechanism through a two-pronged approach: (i) literature review; and (ii) fieldwork research.

7.2 **Literature review.** Evidence from the literature indicates that improved socioeconomic conditions and strengthened social networks can play a role in reducing displacement driven by a threat of violence (preventive displacement) but that they cannot deter displacement driven by actual violence (reactive displacement). Threat of violence is different from actual violence in that the former represents a perceived threat created by conflict, whereas the latter expresses whether an individual experienced an actual human rights abuse. Engel and Ibanez (2007) used household survey data to analyze the determinants of receiving direct threats and displacement. With respect to the former, the authors find that the number of organizations a household belongs to (proxy for social networks) has a negative impact on threats. The authors hypothesize that social networks may be helpful in protecting its members to some degree, reducing the probability of threats. With respect to the determinants of displacement, the authors find that households are less likely to opt for displacement when they have access to social services and connection to public utilities. Adhikari (2013) used primary data from a survey to study displacement in Nepal and finds that social networks deter displacement. The author explains that the causal mechanism could be twofold. First, the presence of social networks can prevent the seizure and destruction of private property and community infrastructure. Second, the presence of strong community organizations creates a web that links individuals together and works as an effective instrument for protecting them against armed groups. Finally, the author also finds evidence indicating that several socioeconomic factors such as loss of livelihood and housing are positively associated with the likelihood of displacement.

7.3 **Fieldwork.** Interviews with key program staff highlight that the PDP could deter preventive displacement but that it could not do much to halt reactive displacement. In the Colombian context, interviewees noted, displacement occurs not only because of direct threats of violence, or because of violent removal from a location, but also because of perceived threats, rumors, and because of the broader impacts of conflict on local economies. Interviews with beneficiaries reveal that project activities encouraged people to stay in the territories through increasing their assets (people would choose to stay both because they wanted to protect their

assets, and because having assets would protect them against economic decline), and through increased social cohesion (which would help communities face threats collectively, therefore reducing risks to individuals). Overall, it is difficult to assess with certainty the degree that the project directly affected individuals' choices to stay in their communities, since it is impossible to disaggregate the effect of the project from other specific factors in the areas where the project was operating that may also led to decreased displacement.

7.4 In summary, although this PPAR cannot quantify the impact of the project upon displacement rates, it is reasonable to conclude based on the literature and the fieldwork, that the project may have contributed to reducing preventive displacement. However, as mentioned in the Relevance of Design section, reduced displacement does not necessarily mean reduced risk of exposure to conflict.

Appendix E. PDP by Type of Subprojects

The project financed small-scale subprojects with the aim of improving the socioeconomic conditions of vulnerable and low-income populations in rural and urban communities.

Eligible subprojects included five categories: (i) food security; (ii) income / employment generation; (iii) social and cultural; (iv) housing; and (v) environmental.

- (i) **Food security** subprojects promoted the production of basic staple food crops for self-consumption. The operations manual notes that these subprojects were envisaged as a basic and initial response to the condition of vulnerable individuals or displaced individuals that are in the process of returning or relocating. The goal of these subprojects was to improve nutrition levels but also to increase savings and promote local circuits of food exchange. These projects had a financing ceiling of US\$ 100 thousand and an estimated duration of 6 to 12 months.
- (ii) **Income generation** subprojects provided support for the development of productive activities both in urban and rural areas.^{xxiii} Eligible subprojects included two types within this category: pre-investment and investment. The former finance the formulation of subprojects profiles to carry out productive activities whereas the latter covers all the other activities that do not belong to the pre-investment phase and that are needed for achieving a subproject objective. Income generation subprojects had a financing ceiling of US\$ 100 thousand and an estimated duration of 12 to 24 months.
- (iii) **Social and cultural** subprojects supported activities in four areas: (i) education; (ii) health; (iii) cultural; (iv) psychotherapy; (iv) governance and community participation. Education and health subprojects facilitated access and appropriation of legally entitled basic services in health and education and could also finance small improvements in already existing infrastructure. Cultural subprojects included activities to promote peaceful co-existence, reduce domestic violence, and increase sense of belonging and social appropriation of the territories. Psychotherapy subprojects provided displaced individuals and communities with mourning and grief counseling and other actions needed for reintegration into community life. Governance and community participation subprojects financed activities that enable community participatory planning processes. Social and cultural subprojects had a financing ceiling of US\$ 80 thousand and an estimated duration of 6 to 24 months.
- (iv) **Housing** subprojects supported betterment of housing conditions to meet basic hygiene and safety standards. Eligible individuals for these subprojects included IDP households that are returning or relocating and poor and vulnerable households. The number of households covered by each subproject ranged from 10 to 100. House improvement subprojects had a financing ceiling of US\$ 75 thousand and an estimated duration of 1 to 6 months.
- (v) **Environmental** subprojects financed activities to rehabilitate, protect, and ensure sustainable management of landscapes and natural resources. The subprojects also financed environmental education activities. Overall, these subprojects were

complementary to the other subprojects types and included concrete activities such as protection and rehabilitation of micro watersheds. Environmental subprojects had a financing ceiling of US\$ 70 thousand and an estimated duration of 6 to 24 months.

The project established eligibility requirements for community-led subprojects under Components A and B. These requirements included: (i) subproject proposals arise from participatory processes agreed upon at the local level; (ii) proposed subprojects are linked to either Integrated Master Plans, Municipal Development Plans, or Indigenous Life Plans when appropriate; (iii) subproject implementation is the responsibility of a community organization or association of producers; (iv) subprojects meet technical, environmental and financial feasibility criteria; (v) community organizations contribute in cash or in-kind to co-finance the subprojects; (vi) subproject proposal present a description of gender issues; (vii) community organizations or association of producers demonstrate budget transparency and accountability in the use of funds.

^{xxii} The PAD (p.32) notes that it was expected that a significant share of this type of subprojects would finance pre-investment activities leading to financing proposals for the considerations of public and private financiers.

Appendix F. PDP Additional Financing

Revised Component A: Developing Social, Economic and Environmental Assets and Community Support for Displaced and Vulnerable Families in the Priority Areas of the Conflict Affected Regions through Strategic Territorial Development Processes (planned: US\$4.43 million, actual: US\$4.28 million). The merger was driven by findings of the mid-term review carried out in May 2007 as well as from progress reports and supervision missions which revealed that having similar but separate components could generate tensions and animosity between IDPs and host communities when, in fact, both populations had a natural tendency to work together since they all lived in the same communities or municipalities, thus were all being affected by the same social, economic, and conflict dynamics. These findings were confirmed by IEG fieldwork evidence who reviewed the subproject records of Consortium for the Development and Peace Magdalena Medio (CDPMM) (N=85) and found that 93 percent of the subprojects had at least some IDPs participation. Out of the 85 projects, 26 percent had an IDPs participation that was above 50 percent (i.e. more than half of the subproject participants were IDPs).

Revised Component B: Strengthening Institutions and Governance at the Local Level (planned: US\$1.3 million, actual: US\$0.86 million). This component remained largely the same as Component C under the PDP except for one change. Throughout implementation of the PDP, the project learned that activities under this component were best carried out through a subproject approach. For this reason, the additional financing structured the capacity building activities under component B through “Institutional Strengthening” subprojects as this modality was expected to facilitate project implementation and avoid atomization of activities that had taken place during the implementation of the PDP. These institutional strengthening subprojects under component B were implemented in the same manner as investment subprojects under component A, namely through partner organizations and beneficiary organizations as the final recipients and executors.

Revised Component C: Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation (planned: US\$2.08 million, actual: US\$2.39 million). This component (former component D under the PDP) remained largely unchanged and financed incremental cost directly related to project management, monitoring and evaluation. The only change was that, under the additional financing, it included financing for activities aimed at strengthening the project management, monitoring and evaluation capacities of partner organizations. Former component D did not include this provision.

Appendix G. DNP Evaluation Studies

The DNP carried out two evaluation studies (2008 and 2011) that measured socioeconomic impacts and changes in relationship patterns, attitudes, and victimization levels through a survey and a set of experimental games and social dilemmas.

First Evaluation Study (2008)

For the first evaluation study (2008), the DNP collected data on an “intervened” baseline for a sample of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. The baseline had already been “intervened” in the sense that an important part of the sampled beneficiaries was already receiving treatment. To choose the samples, the DNP relied on a non-experimental approach; thus, there was no random assignment to program (beneficiaries) and control (non-beneficiaries). The treatment group included adults that participated in at least one of the subprojects financed by the PDP or Peace Laboratories. In contrast, the control group included adult individuals who resided in the same municipalities as the treatment group and that were participating in similar civil society organization as the ones that that were implementing the PDP and Peace Laboratories. The fact that individuals in the treatment group belong to community organizations eliminated, by design, the self-selection bias inherent in the fact that the treatment group chose to participate in community organizations under the PDP. At baseline, sample sizes were designed to be representative at the program level (PDP vs. Peace Laboratories). With this baseline data, the DNP estimated preliminary impacts using a dosage treatment model that compared beneficiaries with various levels of exposure to the PDP. This estimation technique relied on a comparison of beneficiary individuals that had various levels of exposure to the program and it is based on the hypothesis that higher levels of exposure to treatment are associated with higher impacts in the outcome variables of interest. This approach has the advantage of reducing self-selection bias since individuals compared belong to the treatment group (i.e. within comparison). However, it is not possible to assert that individuals with various levels of exposure are entirely comparable since it can be entirely plausible that the order in which municipalities, community organizations and households received the treatment is determined by observable and non-observable factors that are related to the quantitative indicators measuring the variables of interest.

Second Evaluation Study (2011)

For the second evaluation study (2011), the DNP collected information on the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries surveyed at baseline. To estimate results, the DNP team applied a difference in difference (DD) model to the panel sample. The estimation is not without limitations. The sample panel included beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries surveyed at baseline (2006/2007) and follow up (2010). The sample size at baseline was 851 beneficiaries (treatment) and 955 non-beneficiaries (control). At the follow up stage, the DNP team surveyed 916 individuals with a 50.1 percent and 47.9 percent attrition in the treatment and control groups. This sample attrition means that the results from the DD and the re-estimated dosage treatment models are only representative at the national level and that, thus, lack representativeness by program (PDP vs. Peace Laboratories), region, or broad category of subprojects financed.

In addition, the second study re-estimated the dosage treatment model using a sample of beneficiaries that included the panel treatment group and a sample of beneficiaries only surveyed

at follow up to increase variability. The estimation technique compared individuals that were currently participating against individuals that had concluded participation. The purpose of the estimation was to address the question of sustainability of impacts, and, thus it can be interpreted that results are sustained over time when effects occur both in beneficiaries that are currently participating and those that have concluded. The estimation is not representative at the program level, thus meaning that results are only representative at the national level and for both PDP and Peace Laboratories beneficiaries.

Appendix H. List of Persons Met

Name	Role	Organization
World Bank Group		
Jairo Arboleda	Former TTL, PDP	World Bank, retired staff
Natalia Gomez	Former TTL, PDP	World Bank, retired staff
Victoria Stanley	Sr Land Administration Specialist	World Bank Washington DC
Marcelo Jorge Fabre	Senior Social Development Specialist	World Bank Bogota Office
Ivonne Moreno	Sr Land Administration Specialist	World Bank Bogota Office
Luz A. Zeron	Sr Financial Management Specialist	World Bank Tegucigalpa Office
Jeannette Estupinan	Sr Financial Management Specialist	World Bank Bogota Office
Implementing Agency – National Level		
Everardo Murillo Sanchez	Project Coordinator	Red de Solidaridad Social / Acción Social
Luis Daniel Santos Pinzon	Technical Coordinator	Red de Solidaridad Social / Acción Social
Hugo Navarro	Impact Evaluation Team	National Planning Department, former staff
Sergio Guarín	Impact Evaluation Team	National Planning Department, former staff
Arturo Garcia	Impact Evaluation Team	Firma Econometría
Luca Pellerano	Impact Evaluation Team	National Planning Department, former staff
Andres Dávila Ladrón de Guevara	Director, Security and Justice Group	National Planning Department, former staff
Partners Organizations – Regional Level		
Ubencel Duque	Director	Corporación Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio (CDPMM)
Santiago Camargo	Deputy Director	Corporación Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio (CDPMM)
Jose Alberto Santos Duran	Manager, Operations and Finance	Corporación Desarrollo y Paz del Magdalena Medio (CDPMM)
Jorge Tovar	Executive Director	RED PRODEPAZ
Oscar David Maya Montoya	Executive Director	Corporación PRODEPAZ
Gladys Arboleda Orozco	Territorial Coordinator	Corporación PRODEPAZ

Luz Elena Villada	Coordinator, Operations and Finance	Corporación PRODEPAZ
Victoria Alexandra Vahos Puerta	Former Territorial Coordinator	Corporación PRODEPAZ
Government of Colombia		
Yolanda Pinto	Director	Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas
Lucas Urdaneta	Advisor, Director	Unidad de Restitución de Tierras
Andres Uribe Orozco	Director, Official and Private Sector Development Aid	Agencia Presidencial para la Cooperación Internacional
Alejandro José Anaya Sedán	Coordinator, Grupo Paz, Desarrollo y Estabilización	Departamento para la Prosperidad Social
Academia		
Ana Maria Ibañez Londoño	Professor	University of Los Andes
Miguel Barreto Henriques	Professor	Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
Development Partners		
Debora Hines	Representative	World Food Program
Marcela Chavez	Development Specialist	USAID, Office of Rural and Economic Development
Adriana Velez Gomez	Director	Land and Rural Development Program, USAID contractor
Fernando Calado	Head of Programs	International Organization for Migration (OIM)
Max Bonnel	Deputy Head of Office	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Maria Delussu	Program Assistant	European Commission, Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
Alba Lucía Zuluaga	Leader, Land Restitution Component	Land and Rural Development Program, USAID contractor
Yamil Abdala	Cooperation Officer	European Union (EU)
Catalina Hoyos	National Program Officer	SIDA, Embassy of Sweden