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**PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT**

**KENYA**

**TANA RIVER PRIMATE NATIONAL RESERVE CONSERVATION PROJECT  
(TF-28500)**

**DECEMBER 8, 2005**

*Sector, Thematic and Global Evaluation Division  
Independent Evaluation Group*

## Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

*Currency Unit = Kenya Shillings (Kshs)*

1998	US\$1.00	Kshs.60.00
1999	US\$1.00	Kshs.70.00
2000	US\$1.00	Kshs.76.00
2001	US\$1.00	Kshs.78.00
2002	US\$1.00	Kshs.75.00
2003	US\$1.00	Kshs.77.00
2004	US\$1.00	Kshs.78.00

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMP	Adaptive Management Plan
CCDC	Community Conservation and Development
CD	Community Development
CWOs	Community Wildlife Officers
DDCs	District Development Committees
EAWLS	East African Wildlife Society
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GTZ	German Aid Agency
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IPR	Institute of Primate Research
JRMC	Joint Reserve Management Committee
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Service
MLS	Ministry of Lands and Settlement
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NMK	National Museums of Kenya
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
TARDA	Tana and Athi River Development Authority
TRPNR	Tana River Primate National Reserve
UNCED	United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

## Fiscal Year

Government: July 1 – June 30

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### **About this Report**

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The projects, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies.

A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by IEG. To prepare PPARs, IEG staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country for onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader IEG studies.

Each PPAR is subject to a peer review process and IEG management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

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**Efficacy:** The extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

**Efficiency:** The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. This rating is not generally applied to adjustment operations.

**Sustainability:** The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. *Possible ratings:* Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable.

**Institutional Development Impact:** The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

**Outcome:** The extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Bank Performance:** The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project). *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Borrower Performance:** The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.



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<p>This report was prepared by John R. Heath and John English, Consultant, who assessed the project in January 2005. The report was edited by William Hurlbut, and Rose Gachina provided administrative support.</p>
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## Principal Ratings

	<i>ICR</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
Outcome	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Sustainability	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely
Institutional Development Impact	Modest	Modest	Modest
Bank Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory

\* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible operational division of the Bank. The ICR Review is an intermediate Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

## Key Staff Responsible

<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
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## **Preface**

This is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the Kenya Tana River Primate National Reserve Conservation Project (TF-28500) for which a grant equivalent to US\$6.2 million from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) was approved in November 1996. The project closed on December 31, 2001 after a six month extension. An Implementation Completion Report (ICR) was submitted by the Africa Region on January 10, 2003.

This report was prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) based on the completion report, the Project Document (Report No. 15425, October 1996), the Development Credit Agreement, and a review of Bank files and related documents, and discussions with Bank and GEF staff. An IEG mission traveled to Kenya in February 2005 where it discussed the project with Bank staff, relevant current and former government officials, and non-governmental organizations, including visiting the project site. The cooperation and assistance of all stakeholders and government officials is gratefully acknowledged as is the support of the World Bank Country Office in Nairobi.

Following standard IEG procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to government officials and agencies for their review and comments. The comments which were received have been incorporated into the report and are appended as Annex C. In accordance with the Bank's disclosure policy, the final report will be available to the public following submission to the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors.



## Summary

The Kenya, Tana River Primate National Reserve Conservation Project sought to improve the conservation and management of the Tana River Primate National Reserve (TRPNR) which had been established in the 1970s to protect a unique stretch of riverine forest along the lower Tana River that is home to a number of endemic plant and animal species, most notably two species of primates. Management responsibility for the reserve was vested in the Kenya Wildlife Conservation Department, the predecessor to the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS).

The reserve is located in the upper reaches of the delta of the Tana River. Much of it is savanna and has long been used as a “fall-back” area by pastoralists during periods of drought. There are also a small number of resident communities living along the river dependent primarily on cropping. A few of the latter actually live in the area of the reserve. Increased incursions into the reserve were damaging the small area of riverine forest, reducing the food supply for the primates and others and putting the future of the endemic species at risk.

The objectives of the project were to: support the conservation of the unique biological community of the Tana River riparian forests; incorporate the results of targeted research and monitoring into the management of a fragile and complex ecosystem; and reduce identified threats to the ecological integrity and survival of the forest ecosystem.

The project was one of the first to be identified in 1991 as part of the pilot phase of the Global Environment Facility (GEF). From the beginning of the preparation process the Bank recognized that the success of any program in the reserve would be dependent on reducing human pressure on the forest.

Preparation proved to be an extended process, primarily because of difficulties in obtaining reasonable agreement with the local communities over a community development component to include assistance to at least some of the households to relocate elsewhere. In 1995 the Bank finally decided to proceed to appraisal with a community development (CD) component including illustrative micro-projects and activities based on information from its surveys and community consultations, with the actual subprojects to be defined after the project was underway.

The project, financed by the GEF grant, became effective in July 1997. While some progress has been made in the research program, and an adaptive management plan for the reserve has been prepared, basically no progress has been made on the community development side. When a relocation site was finally found, a significant number of households indicated a desire to move. This, together with the need to meet Bank resettlement guidelines, resulted in a cost for relocation substantially in excess of the modest initial provision. As a result, a reallocation of the grant proceeds was required, as well as an extension of the project closing date. The Bank requested approval from the GEF for these changes but the latter decided that they could not justify funding such a

large expenditure on resettlement or extending the closing date, and the project was therefore terminated.

Results of the CD effort on the ground were minimal and, because of the abrupt end to the operation, without any actual steps taken to help people to relocate, local frustration was great and local animosity perhaps greater than it had been before the operation started. While the **relevance** of the operation for country development strategy was *substantial*, its **efficacy** was *negligible*, i.e., principal objectives were not met because of major shortcomings. Accordingly, the overall **outcome** is rated as *unsatisfactory*.

Because of the above outcome, the **sustainability** of the operation is rated as *unlikely*, and the **institutional development impact** as *modest*. None of the parties performed well. The project was a very small part of KWS' responsibilities. Staff turnover was rapid and staffing often incomplete, a major factor in the slow progress that was achieved on the ground and of the poor relations with the local population. The Bank was perhaps over-optimistic at the outset and, while there was considerable informal contact with GEF, did not keep the latter adequately informed formally about the status and extent of the CD proposals, so that GEF felt unprepared for the action required. Both **Bank** and **Borrower performance** are rated as *unsatisfactory*. GEF's contribution was also inadequate as it was aware in general terms of the position and should have made its concerns known to the Bank earlier so that, even if the outcome could not have been changed, it could have been less abrupt.

Two major lessons may be drawn from the experience of this project:

- Uncertainty must be removed from core components before implementation begins. The fact that in this case the program for relocation of those willing to move from the reserve was not agreed before the project became effective was a handicap to implementation of the whole community development component. Unless local communities believe that their interests are central to project design, they are unlikely to actively support implementation
- When a relatively small, stand alone objective, such as conserving the unique biodiversity of the TRPNR, is considered as the basis for a project, the design must look beyond the immediate area linked to project operations, and must take into account those conditions in the wider region that can have a crucial impact on its success or failure.

Vinod Thomas  
Director-General  
Evaluation

# 1. Background

## THE TANA RIVER PRIMATE NATIONAL RESERVE (TRPNR)

1.1 The Tana River is the largest river in Kenya, rising on the slopes of Mt. Kenya and flowing east and southeast to the Indian Ocean through the predominantly arid east and northeast region of the country. It has an extensive delta that is located in a predominantly arid region historically dominated by pastoralists. During dry seasons, and especially during prolonged drought periods, these groups have used the delta as a “fall-back” reserve for their herds, when soil water and river levels fall, and the area is more accessible. A few groups of slash and burn agriculturalists have also traditionally lived in the area close to the river.

1.2 Most of the upper reaches of the delta, about 75 km from the ocean, are characterized by shallow soils underlain by a hard pan that restricts water movement, and that is covered by semi-arid savanna vegetation. A small area, primarily close to the river, and consisting of old levees, has deeper soils and adequate soil water. This area is covered by a unique tropical forest, which in many respects is more similar to the tropical forests of West Africa, than to the rainforests of East Africa. This forest is believed to be the remnant of a forest that stretched across Africa in the Tertiary period.<sup>1</sup> Not surprisingly, this riverine forest is home to a number of endemic plant and animal species, the most notable of which are two primates (the Tana River Red Colobus and the Tana River Crested Mangabey), about 1200 – 1400 of which remained in the reserve and its immediate surroundings at the inception of the project.

1.3 By the 1970s, increasing pressure on the forested area, especially an increase in slash and burn agriculture, had resulted in the effective destruction of about half the forested area, putting the endemic species at risk. This pressure was exacerbated by a number of factors. Development experience in the Tana River valley has not been good. In the mid-1970s the Kenya Government undertook two irrigation schemes based on flows in the River Tana, at Bura and Hola (about 80km and 50km upstream of the TRPNR, respectively). Neither of them was completed and, by the mid 1980s, both had failed, with water no longer being delivered to farmers’ plots. A number of the Pokomo tribe, who had been resident near the reserve, had gone to the schemes and, after their failure, had returned, embittered, to their own homes and plots. Some of the other settlers, who had come from other parts of Kenya, stayed on in the region in poverty. Then, in the late 1980s, as the turmoil and lawlessness in nearby Somalia grew (later to be aggravated by drought-induced famine) the problems spilled over the Kenyan border in the form of banditry, that further increased local tensions.

1.4 In 1976 about 169 km<sup>2</sup> of the upper delta, incorporating the forested area of about 11 km<sup>2</sup>, was incorporated into the Tana River Primate National Reserve (TRPNR), which was initially established as a County Council Game Reserve in 1976. As a County Council Reserve, the TRPNR was to be administered by the local authorities in a way that benefited local communities, as well as conserving the natural ecosystem and

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1. That is, about 25 to 65 million years ago.

threatened species. The local council soon realized that it did not have adequate resources to do this and, in 1983, an agreement was reached with the national government to transfer management responsibility to the Kenya Wildlife Conservation Department, the predecessor to the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS).<sup>2</sup>

### **THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (GEF)**

1.5 During the 1980s the increasing concern over international environmental issues that was to culminate in the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 (held in Rio de Janeiro), also led to pressure for the establishment of a mechanism to fund activities in low income countries directed to addressing global environmental problems. In 1990, after extended discussions between potential donor countries and other interested parties, it was agreed to create a pilot financing facility (known as the GEF) to operate for an initial period of three years with a fund of SDR1.0 billion (almost US\$1.5 billion), contributed by most high income countries.

1.6 The initial GEF mandate was to develop a work program that would explore in practice how global environmental programs could be effectively addressed. Four focal areas were selected: climate change, biodiversity, ozone, and international waters. Management was entrusted to a collective of three international organizations: the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Bank. At the outset the parties to the initial funding agreement did not provide detailed guidance on how this group should operate, leaving it to the parties themselves to develop mechanisms, but indicating a preference for an action oriented arrangement that did not entail a new bureaucracy.

1.7 When the pilot GEF was established in 1991 the three collaborating agencies immediately looked for potential operations to support. When Dr. Richard Leakey, then head of KWS, suggested on behalf of the National Museum of Kenya (NMK) and the Institute for Primate Research (IPR), who had jointly been carrying out research on the endemic primates, that an effort be launched with GEF support to upgrade the management of the reserve and extend the research being undertaken there, the idea was quickly embraced. Under the GEF agreement NGOs had been given the right to propose projects and to be appointed to review proposals. A proposal coming from a non-governmental group for support of a small threatened ecosystem with a high degree of endemism, was very attractive.

1.8 In addition, the TRNPR project was identified, and its general form accepted, before the GEF had any policies in place on issues such as financing of settlement activity. However, in 1995 GEF prepared Project Cycle Guidelines, which included provisions for 'resettlement plans' where necessary. These could have been applied when the project was appraised and approved. As will be seen, both of these facts were to have significant consequences for the project.

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2. The KWS was established as a state corporation in 1989.

## 2. Project Design and Implementation

### PROJECT DESIGN

2.1 The overall goal of the project was to improve the conservation and management of the TRPNR with the participation of, and increase socio-economic benefits for, local communities. The objectives of the project were to: support the conservation of the unique biological community of the Tana River riparian forests; (ii) incorporate the results of targeted research and monitoring into the management of a fragile and complex ecosystem; and (iii) reduce identified threats to the ecological integrity and survival of the forest ecosystem.

2.2 From the beginning, the Bank recognized that the success of any program in the reserve would be dependent on the extent to which pressure on the riverine forest areas could be reduced and that this was dependent on development of a *modus vivendi* with the local population. At the outset the Bank was optimistic, with the project brief venturing the view that “in addition to representing a high priority for the conservation of biodiversity, the Reserve has the potential to become an international model project for the integration of conservation and traditional human activities”.

2.3 Following a workshop on the biological issues underlying the preparation of a management plan, the Bank sent a sociologist in late 1991 to investigate the social issues and to prepare terms of reference for detailed preparation studies of the community development (CD) elements of the project. In her report she noted that an effort to persuade some of those currently living in the area to relocate elsewhere would be required for successful conservation. She volunteered the view that “full resettlement requirements would be limited to Baomo village, and in the extreme case the small number of Makere farmers living on the northern edge of the reserve. A very preliminary estimate of the numbers of people involved would be about 100 households or 500 to 600 people.”

2.4 Project preparation was a lengthy process, primarily because of difficulties over the CD component. There were people living along the river (primarily upstream from the main forested area). At the same time the delta was an important grazing resource after annual floods subsided, especially during drought periods. Conflict between the pastoral groups (who normally used grazing areas fairly near the reserve in the dry season, and others including Somali who came less frequently when their normal grazing areas were depleted due to drought) is common in such areas, but the pattern of use here meant that the potential for conflict was greatest during droughts, when both the pastoralist and agriculturalist groups were under increased stress.

2.5 Efforts to draw up an agreed proposal continued through 1994, without success<sup>3</sup>. The Bank finally decided to proceed to appraisal with a community component including illustrative micro-projects and activities based on information from its surveys and community consultations, with actual proposals to be finalized later on the basis of participatory rural appraisals to be carried out in each community during the first year of the project. This was the position reflected in the appraisal documents approved by the Boards of the Bank and the GEF Council in 1996.

### Project Content

2.6 The project, to be implemented over a five year period, was formulated with four components:

2.7 **Research and Monitoring** (planned expenditure of US\$1.5 million; actual of US\$0.36 million). The research program was to address five priority areas: (a) monitoring of primate populations, genetics and habitat parameters; (b) baseline and monitoring surveys of fauna and flora; (c) studies and monitoring of the Tana River hydrological system and its ecological effects; (d) resource utilization for humans (to establish sustainable use levels for forest products); and (e) prospects and methods for promoting and facilitating community-based conservation of remaining forest patches outside the reserve boundaries.

2.8 **Reserve Management** (planned expenditure of US\$1.46 million; actual of US\$0.46 million). This included: (a) measures to enhance security within the reserve and adjacent areas; (b) measures to reduce poaching and agricultural encroachment in the reserve; (c) improvement of physical facilities for reserve management, research and monitoring; (d) establishment of consultative and advisory bodies, such as the Joint Reserve Management Committee(JRMC), to involve local communities in the planning and management of project activities; and (e) preparation and implementation of an Adaptive Management Plan (AMP) for the reserve.

2.9 **Community Conservation and Development (CCDC)** (planned expenditure US\$2.43 million; actual of US\$0.37 million). The CCDC was aimed at building support among local communities and reducing pressure on the reserve's resources by: (a) supporting alternative livelihoods through the implementation of micro-projects and

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3. The frustration engendered on all sides is well captured by the following paragraph from Annex 5 of the appraisal document headed "The "Catch-22 of Participatory Project Preparation": "Finally, it is worth noting that KWS' efforts to encourage the community itself to identify specific projects and activities to be funded under the Community Development component were largely unsuccessful, despite extensive efforts on the part of successive CWOs and the consultant appointed by KWS to prepare the component. The problem was complicated by the fact that when some leaders did put proposals to KWS, these actually amounted to wish-lists that were both unrealistic in scope and often seemed to reflect the priorities of those individuals rather than the broader community. KWS could not accept these, fueling the conviction that the "participatory approach" was a sham. From the perspective of project preparation, the situation represented something of a "catch-22": the Bank insisted the project could not be appraised unless KWS could demonstrate that the community had participated in its preparation, while the community declined to participate until KWS could confirm that the money was available (i.e. the project was already approved)."

income generating activities, based on the sustainable use of resources within and outside the reserve; and (b) encouraging voluntary relocation of communities farming in the reserve, by identifying and acquiring alternative land, and increasing its productivity.

**2.10 Project Management** (planned expenditure US\$0.39 million; actual expenditure US\$0.72 million). The project was managed by the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) through its regular line management. The component covered KWS' project-specific expenditure and costs of the Project Steering Committee and other advisory and co-ordination committees (see para 3.15).

## **IMPLEMENTATION**

### Project Implementation

**2.11 Research and Monitoring.** An overall plan for research and monitoring was developed soon after project effectiveness, to be carried out and coordinated by NMK (in collaboration with the Institute for Primate Research - IPR), under a contract with KWS. But there were delays in reaching an agreement between the two parties and in subsequently setting up adequate procedures for financial management, so that activities were delayed. Work was also hindered by unusual flooding in 1998, but ten of the 13 planned studies were completed. Studies on the hydrology of the project zone and of the potential for natural or managed regeneration of the forests were not undertaken. The results of the completed studies provided input to the AMP, but its efficacy was reduced by the fact that there was inadequate collaboration between the parties so that the individual studies did not adequately answer issues related to the rates and causes of forest cover and habitat loss, and there remains a lack of consensus on the vulnerability of the remaining primate population.

**2.12 Reserve Management.** In both 1997 and 1998 there were abnormal floods in the area that disrupted work and, in the case of the 1998 'El Nino' flood, facilities were damaged. It was decided to relocate the reserve headquarters to a site that was both closer to the main Garissa – Mombasa road, and less subject to flooding. KWS also experienced delays in procuring vehicles and equipment, partly because of unfamiliarity with Bank procedures. The JRMC was established, but its effective operation has been fitful and it was replaced by a Community Advisory Committee that also has had limited effectiveness (see below). As well as relocating and upgrading reserve headquarters, KWS reconstructed the research/visitor camp and improved the general infrastructure. It improved security in and around the reserve and reduced the incidence of poaching, cattle rustling and other problems. KWS prepared an AMP and was following it when the project was terminated.

**2.13 Community Conservation and Development.** Frustrations in the community development work continued. It became apparent that just over half of those farming in the reserve were interested in resettling if a suitable site could be found. As a result, there was little interest in the communities discussing in-situ micro-projects until the relocation issue could be settled, and the CD component was essentially put on hold for almost two years as the search for a site and the necessary steps to ensure that it could be made available for settlers took a significant amount of time. An acceptable site was

identified at Witu, about 50 km from the reserve towards the Indian Ocean. A plan was drawn up for resettlement, and a six month extension of the project period to the end of 2001 was agreed to accommodate the additional work.

2.14 Because of the increase of numbers likely to be involved over that assumed at the outset, and also partly because of requirements imposed by the Bank's resettlement guidelines, it became clear, as the plan for voluntary resettlement was elaborated, that the resulting overall costs for the CD component would exceed the amount allocated under the project. Grant funds would need to be reallocated from the research and reserve management components into the CD component, as well as a further extension of the closing date. GEF approval would be required for the change, in addition to the normal agreement between the Bank and the borrower. The Bank had apparently assumed that approval would be a formality but when the final proposal was put to GEF for approval, GEF was unwilling to agree on the grounds that it had no policy permitting its funds to be used to finance resettlement. In addition, there was a belief among some GEF staff that it might be preferable to terminate the project since little progress had been made in achieving its biodiversity objectives. Given the unwillingness of GEF to finance the resettlement program, the Bank looked for alternatives but, because its lending activity in Kenya was frozen as a result of country relations issues, it was unable to do so. The project was, therefore, terminated. Other than one community level project, constructing a school building, essentially nothing was achieved by the community development component.

#### Post Termination Situation

2.15 The termination was devastating for all the parties on the ground, especially the families who had agreed, and fully expected to move to the new site. Without project funds KWS scaled back activities at the reserve but has continued to protect and manage the site and to work as feasible with the local communities. Research work under the coordination of NMK came to a halt and minimal work has been undertaken since. Researchers and KWS staff reported to the assessment that the condition of the forested area of the reserve has improved. The numbers of primates have increased since the low point at around the time of project termination, when environmental conditions were at their worst, so that now there are about as many as there were at the beginning of the project. In addition to the improved climatic conditions over the past few years, impact from local people is also reported to have been reduced, perhaps as they see that they may have missed an opportunity and that further degradation of the reserve is not in their interest.

2.16 The plots at the Witu site remain allocated to the families, and KWS and district authorities advised the assessment team that most of them remain interested in moving, provided that they can be given some assistance to do so. The Tana River District Steering Group (the grouping of district level line departments, administrative chiefs and other relevant local actors) was to meet just after the visit of the assessment mission and invited KWS to attend to discuss whether arrangements could be made to provide some assistance, specifically through micro-projects to be undertaken jointly by the settling families and the government, at the settlement site (e.g. for basic infrastructure,

classrooms etc.) during the next financial year, beginning July 1st, 2005. Thus, as of mid-2005, there is some prospect of progress in relocation over the next year or so.<sup>4</sup>

2.17 Because of the sensitivity of the current situation, including the residue of hostility following project termination, it was decided that the communities would not be visited as part of the assessment. It was judged that a visit might have created misunderstandings about the status of the GEF funding and suggested to some, at least, that the earlier proposal was still on the table, so that there was a risk that a visit would undermine the current work to promote a collaborative effort to assist those families wishing to move to do so, but with less support than earlier proposed.

2.18 The Project Document noted that the “project should be seen as an experiment being undertaken in very difficult circumstances.” The report noted three risks. First, that the population of the endangered primates, and perhaps the entire forest ecosystem, may already have been too reduced to be viable. Second, that the community, despite receiving project benefits, would fail to support the project’s conservation objectives, but would continue to press demands for land and resources that would eventually overwhelm the government’s will and/or KWS’ capacity to maintain or protect the reserve. The third risk was that KWS, faced with competing demands on its limited resources, would be unable to maintain a sufficient level of management and oversight during the project or to sustain the project benefits after its closure.

2.19 Events during project implementation showed that these concerns were justified, although none proved to be critical. The status of the forest ecosystem did not improve during implementation, partly because of external factors, although the present conditions may be a bit more hopeful. The community received few benefits from the project, but it is not clear that the pressure on the reserve has increased and the present position is more of a stalemate with a significant part of the community still hoping for some assistance to establish themselves at the site that was designated and allocated. And, while KWS did not implement the project effectively, it is guarding the reserve, and maintaining the infrastructure and the overall status quo in the reserve.

### **3. Analysis**

#### **RELEVANCE**

3.1 Project relevance is rated as *substantial*. The principal elements of Kenya’s development objectives are to strengthen economic growth, enhance equity, and reduce poverty. Tourism in its widest sense makes a significant contribution to Kenya’s economy, and wildlife-related tourism provides significant employment in low income

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4. The Borrower has updated this information in comments on the report: “The 247 families that had volunteered for resettlement at Witu were moved to the new site by KWS in June 2005 and were issued with letters of allotment. The title deeds for the same have been signed and are being handed over to the allottees on 17<sup>th</sup> November 2005 by the Minister of Lands. The remaining families have requested for relocation but the logistics have yet to be worked out”.

rural areas. In addition, wildlife plays a significant role in developing the image on which the country's tourism is based, and is significant in creating positive views of the country's efforts to conserve wildlife and to generate support for these efforts. However, in the long run, support for environmental efforts will not depend solely on public interest in the 'game park' aspects of wildlife conservation, but also on Kenya's ability to maintain and strengthen links with the conservation and biological science community as a whole.

3.2 The TRNPR is one of the few sites in Kenya with a high level of endemism, and the project responded to the scientific rather than tourism aspects of the country's biodiversity. It attempted to demonstrate the use of applied research to help preserve and maintain this very complex and vulnerable ecosystem and two highly endangered species, and to manage the reserve with the participation of local stakeholders in a disadvantaged region of Kenya. Without external input of the sort provided by GEF, Kenya is only able, through KWS, to maintain a minimal level of reserve protection and management which may not be sufficient to ensure the project's global environmental benefits on a sustainable basis. However, as discussed below, although local and international NGOs indicated interest in the project at the outset, this was not maintained and, in the event, the project has not served to strengthen links between Kenya and international environmental community.

#### **EFFICACY**

3.3 The overall goal of the project was to improve the conservation and management of the TRPNR with participation and increased benefits for local communities. The specific objectives were to: (i) support the conservation of the unique biological community of the Tana River riparian forests; (ii) incorporate the results of targeted research and monitoring into the management of a fragile and complex ecosystem; and (iii) reduce identified threats to the ecological integrity and survival of the forest ecosystem.

3.4 In relation to these objectives, the project's efficacy may be summarized as follows:

- (a) In support of conservation, the infrastructure of the reserve was upgraded and the continued presence of KWS staff increased security in the area and, while the combination of human pressure and adverse climatic conditions led to a decline in the habitat in the reserve and some decline in the primate population, KWS has, by securing the area and working with the local communities, helped ensure some recovery in the quality of the habitat and in the number and conditions of the primates. As of the time of the assessment mission the situation still remains tenuous, however, and the efficacy of this effort was *modest*.
- (b) A significant program of research and monitoring work was undertaken after the initial start-up delays, although some elements of the work program were not completed and mostly remain in abeyance after the abrupt termination of project activities. The available research results were taken into account in

the preparation of the adaptive management plan but again, with the abrupt termination of funding, this plan has been heavily scaled-back. Overall, the efficacy of the effort to incorporate the results of research into the management of the area was *modest*.

- (c) Finally, for the various reasons outlined earlier, the project ended without any significant progress in achieving the community development objectives, in that there was no improvement in the relationship between the reserve and the local communities. In fact, local communities were embittered by the experience. As noted, KWS by securing the area and working with the local population since completion has helped to secure some improvement, but, the project itself was unable to reduce the principal threat to the integrity and survival of the ecosystem, the pressure of population, and the efficacy of this effort was *negligible*.

Overall, given the crucial impact of the CD component, the efficacy of the project outcome is rated as *negligible*, i.e. the objectives were not met due to major shortcomings.

#### **EFFICIENCY**

3.5 Because of the nature of the project, no attempt was made to assess a rate of return to the expenditures in either the appraisal or completion reports. Actual expenditure, at US\$1.9 million, was less than one-third of the appraisal estimate of US\$6.2 million. Expenditure on the research and monitoring and reserve management components was only 28 percent of the appraisal estimate, US\$0.82 million, compared to US\$0.93 million. Although there were shortfalls in these components, the expenditure figures indicate that they were carried out in a reasonably cost-effective manner.

#### **OUTCOME**

3.6 The project clearly failed to achieve most of its objectives and produced only limited benefits, mostly in improving facilities and protection in the reserve, while its development impact was negligible and it is, therefore, rated as *unsatisfactory*.

#### **INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT**

3.7 The institutional development impact of the project was *modest*. Whatever the demands of its activities elsewhere in the country, implementation of the Tana River project required KWS to build up its skills in managing dialogue with local communities, and in designing a research agenda for adaptive management and incorporating the results into the planning and management of a reserve. The sudden termination of funding meant that KWS has not been able to fully follow through to implement the plan. On the community dialogue side they were thrust into a very difficult situation and the results of their efforts in the project area were meager in terms of the objective of moving to collaborative management with the local population.

## SUSTAINABILITY

3.8 Normally, a project is expected to result in a set of conditions that represent an improvement over those in the pre-project period. The sustainability issue is whether the conditions created by the project will ensure that this improvement is maintained in the face of normal variation in underlying circumstances. However, in this case, there was minimal net improvement over the pre-project condition. While there was improvement in the reserve infrastructure, the relationship with local communities deteriorated. Also, partly because of adverse natural conditions, the condition of the ecosystem in the reserve showed some deterioration during the project period, including a decline in the number of the two key primate species. Since the termination of the project, under improved climatic conditions, there has been some improvement in the environmental status of the reserve, and the overall situation is much as it was before the project was undertaken. Overall, because the project did not reduce the pressures on the reserve or improve the resilience of its ecosystem to changes in the climatic and economic environment impinging on it, the sustainability rating must be *unlikely*.

## PERFORMANCE OF PARTICIPATING PARTIES

3.9 The PPAR, as the ICR, normally assesses the performance of the Bank and the Borrower. In this case, the assessment believes that this review should be extended to assess the roles of the GEF and the NGOs. The Bank was responsible for the day to day management of the project and normally GEF plays a passive role in the operation of a project. In this case, however, its actions and decisions had a critical impact on the outcome of the project. NGOs also had a critical role in the outcome in this case.

## BORROWER PERFORMANCE

3.10 **Kenya Wildlife Service.** The project was implemented by the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) with a limited role for other Government agencies. The overwhelming majority of KWS' activities relate to the major tourist oriented parks and reserves featuring the major mammalian species, and it is from these parks that they generate most of their income. The TRPNR, however, is of only limited tourist interest, and has minimal income potential. Partly because it presented different problems than their mainstream activities, and also because of its separate funding, KWS initially managed the Tana River Reserve separately from their mainline operations.

3.11 Consistent with this separation, KWS initially recruited outside the agency for several of the project positions at the reserve. This took time and the project was slow to get underway. There were additional problems. The significant physical and social differences between the Tana River district and the highlands of Kenya from where almost all the staff came, meant that these staff will have been unfamiliar with the tribal groups with whom they had to deal, of the detail of their circumstances, and of the principal problems they faced. This undoubtedly contributed to misunderstandings with local groups and complicated the process of reaching agreement with them over the nature of project assistance and of their future role, if any, in the reserve.

3.12 Staff turnover was a problem at the reserve from the outset and several of the initial officers did not stay long. For example, Bank supervision reports indicated that there were major shortfalls in the management team of the reserve between mid 1998 and early 2000. A report in mid-2000 noted that in order to address the issue KWS had decided to recruit for the vacant positions from its own ranks, partly also to help to integrate the reserve operations more closely into the overall organization. The scale of the problem is shown by the fact that “the following positions have now been filled by KWS staff: Project Coordinator; Project Scientist; Field Activities Coordinator; and Accountant. The positions of Agro-forester, Restoration Forester and Data Analyst are still vacant.” This is not to suggest that the positions were vacant for the whole period, but the list itself indicates the scale of the turnover problem.

3.13 KWS is also a military style organization, complete with military style uniforms and vehicles, and weapons. This reflects the overall focus of the agency as a protective force geared to protecting of the major mammalian species (especially elephants) from poaching. Organizations of this type tend to operate independently and to have a distinct culture. One cannot know whether this military style was a discouragement to Kenyans with community development experience joining the organization, thus reducing KWS’ ability to recruit suitable staff for the social aspects of the project. In addition the military style can create an atmosphere of intimidation when dealing with local people. All of this will not have helped improve relations between KWS and the local community.

3.14 As well as the problematic relationship with local communities, the staff discontinuity and shortfalls also affected the dialogue with the local authorities. Lack of senior project staff meant that the project often could not be represented at local meetings, reducing the pressure on local authorities to identify possible sites for resettlement and suggesting a lack of interest on the part of KWS.

3.15 These problems of continuity are illustrated by the performance of three committees created to foster coordination with other agencies and groups at the central and local levels:

- *The Steering Committee* chaired by the Director of KWS, included representatives of relevant national groups such as the NMK, the Tana River Development Authority (TARDA), East African Wildlife Society (EAWLS) and senior staff of the reserve. It is reported that the committee only met once and the desired consensus among the various parties was not developed. However, this was a small, highly localized project, and the issues to be addressed nationally among agencies would have been few.
- *The Joint Reserve Management Committee (JRMC)* comprising the senior staff of the reserve, local administrators and councilors and representatives of local communities. This was constituted in 1995 but stopped meeting in 1998. Formally, it had 35 members, many of whom were essentially political figures. It was too unwieldy to be useful as a forum to discuss ideas in detail and, after only a few meetings, KWS let it fall into abeyance. Local level

coordination was the real problem for the project and another attempt was made to develop a local group.

- *The Community Advisory Committee.* In 2000 KWS invited a number of local groups, including NGOs to a meeting of a new body to take over the role of the JRMC and improve consultation with local groups. Apparently nobody came and the effort was abandoned. This may just be an indication that local groups had given up on the project by that time and saw no point to more meetings.

3.16 Minutes were not kept at most of these meetings and, because of the rapid turnover of KWS staff it is perhaps not surprising that they were not productive. But their sputtering performance also suggests KWS' difficulties in working effectively with outside groups.

3.17 Since the project was terminated, KWS has continued activities in the reserve but the scale has been cut back with the reduction of funding.<sup>5</sup>

3.18 **Other Government.** There were difficulties in collaboration between the reserve management and the local authorities, as discussed above. As a result, there were some delays in the response of district officials to the question of allocation of land for settlement by those moving from the reserve or the adjacent villages. Once central government agencies, especially the Ministry of Lands and Settlement (MLS) became involved, however, reasonable progress was made. A site about 50 km from the reserve was identified and the MLS took a number of steps to make the arrangements as flexible as possible. Administrative fees, normally requested from settlers, were to be waived and, rather than 10 acres normally allocated in its resettlement schemes, 15 acre plots were authorized in view of the fact that the settlers were giving up rights to land resources in a national reserve to reduce pressure on natural habitat and it was reasonable to provide some compensation. Government also involved the German aid agency (GTZ), which was supporting other settlement activities, to assist with planning and potentially with implementation.

3.19 In summary, KWS never really got to grips with the project. The latter was not central to KWS' mission and it was not familiar with working with local communities in the way required by the project. Overall, although performance of the other agencies was satisfactory, overall Borrower performance was *unsatisfactory*.

## **BANK PERFORMANCE**

3.20 The Bank devoted considerable resources to the project over more than ten years. The ICR does not provide an estimate of the resources used prior to appraisal, but they

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5. In commenting on the report, Kenya Wildlife Service noted some steps that they have taken since the mission's visit to strengthen security at the reserve and augment research: "Posting of more Rangers to enhance security and to stop encroachment and destruction of vegetation. Research on: (i) Primate population especially Tana Mangabey and Red Colobus in relation to reserve fragmentation; (ii) Impacts on grazing on riparian vegetation and mitigation mechanisms; and (iii) Amphibian and fish diversity".

must have been substantial since preparation covered five and a half years. Through that period both the Bank and KWS persisted in attempting to pursue an agreement with local communities through a participatory approach. However, this approach was stymied by local conditions. The major question is whether, given the extended preparation period and the risks identified, the Bank and GEF should have stopped the project prior to appraisal, given the local hostility to the project. It is clear that the Bank staff directly involved with the project considered that the effort to maintain the unique ecosystem was urgent and important. But the five year preparation period was unusually long, by any standard, and key issues remained unresolved. The Bank recognized the general riskiness of the enterprise and the experimental nature of the project (see para. 2.5). But what seems not to have been adequately considered was that, if the experiment were to fail, as it did, the consequences would fall most heavily on the local people who were already the most dubious about its potential benefit to them. It was hoped that the fact that the project was underway would convince the local community to come to an agreement. In retrospect, however, that only postponed the inevitable and the project's *quality at entry* must be rated as *unsatisfactory*.

3.21 The project was supervised from the Nairobi office and there was regular contact between Bank staff and the implementing agencies. The major issue on supervision is the failure in communication between the Bank and GEF that was eventually to lead to its failure. While it was not unreasonable for Bank staff to assume that the GEF was familiar with the project, because of the prolonged difficulties in drawing up a proposal for relocation, and especially since some GEF staff had paid a brief visit to the site while in Kenya, the Bank was ultimately responsible for informing GEF and for ensuring that they were in agreement with the outline of the expected proposal. However, this did not happen. Overall Bank performance is rated as *unsatisfactory*.

#### **GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY**

3.22 Although PPARs normally confine themselves to assessing the performance of the Bank and Borrower, in this case GEF played a central role in the project, in particular, in terminating it.

3.23 The project was proposed almost immediately after the pilot phase of the GEF was funded. At the time, GEF had virtually no staff and no agreed guidelines for reviewing proposals. These were received by the three collaborating agencies and, after an initial review by them with the assistance, as necessary, of environmental and scientific experts, they were forwarded to GEF. The countries providing the funds for GEF had agreed that they should be used to support efforts directed to addressing internationally significant environmental issues. At the time, priority was also given to undertaking operations that could help guide the evolution of the portfolio, assuming that GEF became permanent. The Tana River project, with its unique ecosystem, the need to deal with a situation where communities lived within a protected area, and the fact that it had been proposed by some of the NGO community, was clearly the type of operation being sought for GEF support.

3.24 By the time that the project was appraised in 1996 the GEF had been fully established as an institution. However, there is no evidence that, during the five year

period, it considered abandoning support for the project, even when no agreement could be reached with the local communities. As implementation proceeded into 2000, developments in the project were evolving, but neither GEF nor the Bank kept the other adequately in the picture. Although the Bank was reporting to GEF on progress and forwarding supervision reports, GEF was not formally apprised of the likely scale of the adjustment to the community development component that would be required to facilitate resettlement. As a result, when the detailed proposal was presented it was a surprise.

3.25 But, it should not have been. From the outset the major issues in preparation and implementation were related to the community development component, in particular to the question of possible resettlement. As the ICR points out the references to “relocation assistance” in the Project Document were vague and not entirely consistent. But in the early stages of preparation KWS was assured that resettlement could be funded through a GEF grant. While the Bank and GEF were not in weekly, or even monthly, contact over the project, it is difficult to understand how GEF appears not to have anticipated that, given the problems there were over resolving the issue, the project would eventually have to allocate greater funds to support the relocation of those families willing to move. The two organizations are housed in adjacent buildings and informal communication between them occurs all the time. In fact, Bank staff believe that in just such informal communications they were given no red or even amber lights on the issue. The final proposal should not have been a surprise and if GEF had serious concerns, it should have expressed them to the Bank earlier.

## **THE NGOS**

3.26 NGOs played a limited, but in some respects critical, role in the project and some comment appears justified.

3.27 It has been noted that the initial project proposal came through the National Museum of Kenya and the related Primate Research Institute with considerable support from international environmental NGOs. There is an active NGO community in Kenya and they soon became interested in the project. While some, primarily the environmental /conservation groups were supportive, their support went only so far. The AMP called for the use of an NGO collaborative agreement to implement the community management of priority forests. However, searches for an NGO willing to collaborate were unsuccessful. There was also an undercurrent of criticism from other NGOs and from elsewhere, that was often aired in the local media and that exacerbated existing tensions in and around the reserve.

3.28 The international conservation NGOs were broadly supportive of the project but, during the implementation period some were lobbying the GEF to concentrate its limited funding and not to use them to support more general development activities, even if they did assist conservation efforts. This undoubtedly was a factor in GEF’s final decision not to support the proposed reallocation and extension.

3.29 It should also be noted that, although international conservation NGOs had stressed the importance of the threatened ecosystem in their initial support for GEF funding for the project, and that the decision to terminate and not get involved in an

expensive resettlement effort responded to their concerns about needing to use funds for research, etc., none of them has since come forward to provide any funding to support continuation of even a limited program of research at the site. Overall, the interventions of NGOs did not have a positive impact on the outcome of the project.

## 4. Conclusion

4.1 The primary reason for failure of the TRPNR project was that it was over ambitious. In addition to improving the management of the reserve and supporting a focused program of research, it aimed to assist the people living in, or adjacent to the reserve to improve their livelihoods in ways that would reduce the pressure that they had been placing on the critical parts of the reserve. There were a number of social reasons why it was difficult for the KWS to work with these groups to successfully achieve this objective. In addition, however, conditions in the wider region around the reserve conspired against the project, amplifying these local problems.

4.2 With hindsight, there is a real question as to whether the project should have been attempted with the situation in Tana River District as it was. The area was poor and had a history of failed development efforts. No development activity of significance was going on at the time and, therefore, the project was more prominent locally than it would have under more 'normal' conditions. As a result, when local benefits from the research and reserve management activities were slow to materialize, considerable tensions were created with the wider local population.

4.3 What would have been better was a wider development project that included as one of its objectives the conservation of a unique and diverse biological community in the reserve. Such an approach would have required project planning to look at the development prospects of the wider area and see what could be done to promote them in such a way as to benefit the 'target group' in particular, and to reduce the pressure on the biological resource. In other words, it would be a rural development project with a significant biodiversity conservation component, rather than a biodiversity conservation project with a dominant community development component.

4.4 Given the conditions in the local region it might not have been possible to devise an economically justifiable project. However, in any case, such a project was not a feasible option since the proposal was for a stand-alone operation with funding from the GEF, so that it had to centrally focus on biodiversity conservation. Also, since it was identified in the first months of the GEF pilot period, the emphasis then was on building up GEF's portfolio, for which this operation seemed ideally suited. The belated proposal to increase the share of community development funding to significantly over 50 percent was what caused the GEF to end its support. Whether a collaborative effort with the Bank (i.e. an IDA funded rural development project with GEF co-financing the biodiversity conservation components) would have been acceptable, is unknowable.

## 5. Lessons

5.1 Two major lessons may be drawn from the experience of this project:

- The fact that the program for relocation of those willing to move from the reserve was not agreed before the project became effective was a handicap to implementation of the whole community development component. Unless local communities believe that their interests are at the heart of project design, they are unlikely to actively support project implementation. Uncertainty must be removed from the core components of a project before implementation begins.
- When a relatively small, stand alone objective, such as conserving the unique biodiversity of the TRPNR is considered as the basis for a project, the design must look beyond the immediately adjoining area that is impacting it, but must take into account conditions in the wider region, since they can have a crucial impact on the success or failure of the project.

## Annex A. Performance Indicators.

Outcome / Impact Indicators: Indicator	Target	Actual at Completion	Actual at Assessment
1. Ecological integrity of the TRNPR and forest habitats increased as reflected by increase in quality, quantity and connectivity of habitats and stability of primate populations and social structure.	Decline in habitat quality and quantity slowed or eliminated and vulnerability of primate populations reduced. A measurable reduction in pressure on critical habitats achieved.	Habitat quality and quantity has slightly declined and vulnerability of primate populations has slightly increased. Primate habitat quantity has declined by at least 5 percent both inside and outside of the Reserve. Human pressure and competition with target species for forest resources have not decreased within the project zone.	Habitat has largely recovered to pre-project situation as the ecosystem has recovered from the effects of major floods and drought during project period and due to KWS surveillance. Primate population has also recovered as food supply etc. has improved
2. A viable basis for cooperative management of the TRNPR and critical habitats within the project zone has been established.	KWS capacity for implementing a cooperative reserve management regime increased and community participation strengthened significantly. An adaptive management system based on knowledge of ecological processes and resources developed and draft plan submitted. A functional reserve management unit in place.	KWS capacity for managing community dialogue has increased, but - following cancellation of resettlement plan – community resentment makes ongoing dialogue difficult. Cooperative management has only partially been implemented. A draft adaptive management plan has been developed reflecting interim research results. The joint reserve management committee is not functional at project closure.	The Adaptive Management Plan is being partially followed, given budgetary constraints. Relations between the reserve and local communities are still difficult.
3. Physical security and economic well being of residents in and around the reserve increased	Insecurity in TRPNR mitigated through KWS presence. Community welfare increased through improved sustainable livelihoods in and around the reserve, and through successful voluntary relocation to lands with secure tenure rights.	Security has increased due to KWS presence. Alternative livelihood options have not been realized. Access to alternative land resources has been partially achieved, but successful relocation of all participants in the resettlement program is not guaranteed.	KWS has continued to assist with security, but conditions of local population unchanged. KWS working with district officials to provide some assistance to communities to reestablish themselves at the new site. But no agreement has yet been reached with authorities or population.
.4. Resettlement of about 60% of families utilizing reserve's natural resources)	Same.	Resettlement plans were completed. Compensation halted. Titling of land and preparation land title deeds was in progress. Issuance of titles will proceed with support from Government	Land for resettlement is still available with plots demarcated, but no relocation has occurred.



## Annex B. Basic Data Sheet

### TANA RIVER PRIMATE NATIONAL RESERVE CONSERVATION PROJECT (TF-28500)

#### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal Estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
IDA Credit	6.2	1.36	21.9
Government	0.94	0.19	20.2
Cofinancing	-	-	-
Total project cost	7.14	1.55	21.7

#### Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Appraisal		May 22, 1995
Board approval		November 21, 1996
Effectiveness		July 1, 1997
Mid Term Review		January 17, 2000
Closing date	June 30, 2001	December 31, 2001

#### Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	<i>Actual/Latest Estimate</i>	
	<i>N° Staff weeks</i>	<i>US\$US\$('000)</i>
Identification/Preparation	21.5	85.1
Supervision	114.5	145.3
ICR	12.2	14.7
Total	175.5	289.2

#### Mission Data

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	
				<i>Implementation status</i>	<i>Development objectives</i>
<b>Appraisal/ Negotiation</b>	1995	5	Ecologist, Anthropologist, Research Specialist, Protected Areas Specialist, Management Specialist		
<b>Supervision</b>					
Supervision 1	1997	2	National Resource Management Specialist, Ecologist	S	S
Supervision 2	1998	6	National Resource Management Specialist, NGO Specialist, Sociologist, Research Management Consultant, Financial Management Specialist, Procurement Specialist	U	U
Supervision 3	1999	6	National Resource Management Specialist, Resettlement Specialist, Ecologist, Park Management Specialist, Financial Management	U	U

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	
				Implementation status	Development objectives
Supervision 4	2000	7	Specialist, Procurement Specialist National Resource Management Specialist, Ecologist, EIA Specialist, Resettlement Specialist, Sociologist, Financial Management Specialist, Procurement Specialist	U	U
Supervision 5	2001	3	National Resource Management Specialist, Ecologist, Social Development Specialist	S	U
	2002	3	National Resource Economist, Biodiversity Specialist, Environmental Specialist	U	U

Performance Rating: S:Satisfactory; U: Unsatisfactory.

## Annex C. Borrower Comments

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA  
MINISTRY OF FINANCE**



Telegraphic Address: 22921  
FINANCE - NAIROBI  
Telephone: 252299  
When replying please quote

**THE TREASURY  
P.O. Box 30007  
NAIROBI  
KENYA**

Ref. No. EA/FA 63/127/02/C(23)  
and date

23<sup>rd</sup> November, 2005

**Mr. Colin Bruce**  
Country Director  
World Bank Country Offices  
NAIROBI

**RE: KENYA – TANA RIVER PRIMATE NATIONAL RESERVE CONSERVATION PROJECT  
(TF – 28500)  
DRAFT PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT**

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Reference is made to your letter dated 25<sup>th</sup> October 2005 on the above subject.

The Government of Kenya through the Kenya Wildlife Service have studied the report by the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank and found it well balanced. However there is need to update the report on the following aspects that touch on the Post Termination Situation:-

### 1. Resettlement Programme

- The 247 families that had volunteered for resettlement at Witu were moved to the new site by KWS in June 2005 and were issued with letters of allotment. The Title Deeds for the same have been signed and were handed over to the allottees on 17<sup>th</sup> November 2005 by the Minister of Lands.
- The remaining families have requested for relocation but the logistics have yet to be worked out.

### 2. Reserve Management

This has been strengthened through:-


- Posting of a more effective Warden
- Posting of more Rangers to enhance security and to stop encroachment and destruction of vegetation
- Research on:-

**THE WORLD BANK**  
RECEIVED IN CD'S OFFICE  
D. A.

- (i) Primate population especially Tana Mangabey and Colobus in relation to reserve fragmentation.
- (ii) Impacts of grazing on riparian vegetation and mitigation mechanisms.
- (iii) Amphibian and fish diversity.

Please take into account the above comments while finalizing the draft Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) to be distributed to the World Bank Board of Executive Directors.

The purpose of this letter is to send to the Bank the Government of Kenya comments which we hope will be incorporated in the final report.



Jackson Kinjorjui

For: PERMANENT SECRETARY/TREASURY