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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

YEMEN

**VOCATIONAL TRAINING PROJECT
(CREDIT NO. 2793-YR)**

June 14, 2005

*Sector, Thematic and Global Evaluation Group
Operations Evaluation Department*

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = Yemeni Rial

1996	US\$1.00	YR 135
1997	US\$1.00	YR 135
1998	US\$1.00	YR 135
1999	US\$1.00	YR 147
2000	US\$1.00	YR 152
2001	US\$1.00	YR 165
2002	US\$1.00	YR 176
2003	US\$1.00	YR 178
2004	US\$1.00	YR 184

Abbreviations and Acronyms

DTCs	District Training Centers
EFA	Education for All
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GAVTT	General Authority for Vocational and Technical Training
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
ILO	International Labour Organization
LCVT	Local Council for Vocational Training
LIL	Learning and Innovation Lending
KfW	Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (German Credit Institute for Reconstruction)
MIS	management information system
MSSL	Ministry of Social Security, Social Services and Labor
MTEVT	Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDRY	Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic

Fiscal Year Government: January 1 — December 31

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OED Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation.

About this Report

The Operations Evaluation Department assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, OED annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The projects, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies.

A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by OED. To prepare PPARs, OED staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country for onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader OED studies.

Each PPAR is subject to a peer review process and OED management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the OED Rating System

The time-tested evaluation methods used by OED are suited to the broad range of the World Bank's work. The methods offer both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. OED evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (more information is available on the OED website: <http://worldbank.org/oed/eta-mainpage.html>).

Relevance of Objectives: The extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Efficacy: The extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Efficiency: The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. This rating is not generally applied to adjustment operations.

Sustainability: The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. *Possible ratings:* Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable.

Institutional Development Impact: The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Outcome: The extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project). *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

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Principal Ratings

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Institutional Development Impact	Modest	Modest	Modest
Sustainability	Likely	Likely	Likely
Bank Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory

* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible operational division of the Bank. The ICR Review is an intermediate OED product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

Key Staff Responsible

<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
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Preface

Attached is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the **Vocational Training Project** (Cr.2793-YR) in Yemen. The project was approved for a credit of US\$24.3 million equivalent in December 1995. The credit closed on December 31, 2003, after an extension of 6 months; US\$3.6 million savings resulted from a change in exchange rate and were cancelled. OPEC provided parallel financing of US\$11 million.

This project was selected for assessment in order to study the effectiveness of the Bank's vocational training strategy in a poor country with a low literacy rate that had previously implemented multiple projects with vocational training components but limited policy content.

The PPAR is based on the following sources: Project or Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs), Staff Appraisal Reports (SARs), Loan Agreements for the projects, and project files, particularly the supervision reports. An OED mission visited Yemen in December 2004 to interview officials and beneficiaries, observe instruction in schools, and collect other pertinent information. Field visits took place at the Dahaban Vocational Training Institute, Women's Vocational Center in Sana'a, Blind Women's Training Center in Sana'a, and Dhamar Vocational Training Center. The author thanks the government officials who received the mission for their extensive cooperation.

Following standard OED procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and comments but none were received.

Summary

Since 1972, Yemen has implemented 10 IDA-financed projects (including four in former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) that helped build its educational infrastructure and ability to provide vocational education. The Vocational Training Project reviewed here represented an effort to reform the policies of the sector and to reorient training so as to meet labor market demands.

The project was intended to strengthen vocational training system management, improve the quality and relevance of vocational training, and reorient adult education and training programs for women. It was to build and refurbish training centers, develop updated curricula, and train staff. It would also involving the private sector in making policy and decisions, reforming curricula, creating a revolving fund for in-service training, and helping women and unschooled people obtain basic skills.

Most planned activities were carried out, including refurbishing of vocational centers, curricular revisions, textbook production, and teacher training. However, the project proved overly ambitious and complex and could not involve the private sector to the extent expected. Changes in the priorities of donors who were to provide funds for various activities resulted in cancellations of funding and deletion of the components that were to provide literacy training and special vocational training for women. However, since the end of the project, the government has carried out extensive policy development, and more demand-driven training is likely to be provided in the future.

The outcome of the Vocational Training Project is rated *moderately unsatisfactory* because the objectives of improving subsectoral management and making training accessible to women were not fulfilled. Institutional development impact is rated *modest*. Sustainability is rated *likely* because there is steady student demand for the supported training centers and curricula they offer. Bank performance is rated *unsatisfactory* because the Bank overestimated government capacity to implement, and quality at entry was unsatisfactory. Borrower performance is also rated *unsatisfactory* because of limited activity and initial lack of commitment.

Experience with the assessed project confirms a number of OED lessons from the vocational-technical education subsector:

- Establishment of functional training facilities is necessary but not sufficient for producing skilled workers. The facilities must be financially viable over the long term in order to hire the necessary instructors and renew their equipment and buildings. Publicly financed vocational training centers are only viable when the government and the private sector establish a joint and effective strategic framework that sets priorities and allocates resources to those priorities.
- Many vocational training facilities were built when the Bank's strategy was oriented toward that subsector. Though some of these older investments continue to be used well, others have fallen into disrepair. Because of the expense involved in technological renewal, it may be cheaper to abandon or rebuild some facilities than to

rehabilitate them. If abandoned without replacement, however, training capacity (that has often been financed by donors) may drop precipitously. It may be wise for the Bank to reinvest periodically in the renewal of older facilities in order to extend the life of earlier investments.

- Governments may view vocational training as a means of helping school dropouts get jobs and alleviate their poverty. However, vocational training centers may select the better-educated students who are ultimately less likely to perform the type of tasks for which they were trained. Admission criteria might be adapted to suit the needs of less educated persons, who may have limited training opportunities.
- Vocational training courses often require full-time attendance over one or more years. Such courses may be unsuitable to the most needy and less educated persons who need to work. A series of shorter courses taught in the evenings or weekends may be more suitable to the work schedules of the poor.
- For vocational education projects to succeed, potential trainees and the private sector must be consulted on project components, outcomes, and targets. A dialogue held exclusively with governments risks creating projects for which there is relatively limited demand and commitment.
- The complexities of projects must be commensurate with implementation capacity. The implementing agencies must have procurement prerequisites ready if the project is to be implemented within the envisaged timeline.
- Management information systems and tracer studies are important tools to monitor the needs of beneficiaries. These activities must be given priority in programming project activities.

Ajay Chhibber
Acting Director-General
Operations Evaluation

1. Background

1.1 Yemen is a low-income country (annual per capita GDP of US\$510), with a high rate of illiteracy (about 50 percent) and population increase (2.9 percent annually). It remains largely an agricultural country, with few industrial centers, notably Taiz and Hodeida; nevertheless, its traditional agricultural base is gradually being replaced by industry and services (which respectively accounted for 41.6 percent and 47.6 percent of GDP in 2003).¹ Unification in 1990 with the People's Democratic Republic (PDRY) increased the country's industrial base by incorporating the port of Aden.

1.2 The increasing importance of industry and commerce in the economy has created a need for suitably trained human resources for those sectors. In 1993/94, when the Vocational Training Project was appraised, about 50,000 people were employed in industrial and commercial firms. Another 100,000 workers were employed in small-scale production and service industries. Assuming an annual attrition rate of 3 percent, there would be a need for about 4,500 new skilled workers per year. Also, about 1,200 new industrial projects were being licensed by the government, with investments totaling US\$2 billion, that would generate about 28,000 new jobs in the following 3 to 5 years. Most of the workers needed to fill the new openings would require vocational training suited to the specific demands of local and regional labor markets. However, fewer than 6,000 students were enrolled in vocational training centers at that time.² About 4,900 of these were trained for employment in industry and commerce programs that produced only about 2,100 graduates annually.

1.3 The project was to increase the output of workers skilled for industrial and commercial needs. During appraisal, it was estimated that when fully operational, investments from the proposed project would provide annual outputs of about 6,900 graduates; 3,200 from vocational training centers, 1,000 from enterprise-based programs, 2,000 from continuing education centers, 100 from high-tech programs, and 1,000 from programs for the handicapped.

1.4 The optimistic expectations were somewhat justified. Yemen had developed a solid record of success with educational projects both in the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and PDRY. But there were also reasons for caution. With vocational training split across multiple ministries, subsector management was fragmented. Vocational training centers managed by public agencies had virtually no inputs from the private sector or local communities. They operated under severe financial constraints, with outdated curricula and shortages of instructional materials, equipment, and trained teachers. There were considerable regional imbalances and women's participation was very low.

Bank Sector Strategy

1.5 Since 1972, IDA has implemented 19 projects in the education sector, of which 16 have been completed (Figure 1, Annex 1 Table A.1). The first 10 projects had supported various vocational education training centers in north (YAR) as well as south Yemen (PDRY). Their

1. Atlas method for the computation of the GDP (gross domestic product). World Bank: Country at a Glance 2003.


2. By comparison, about 100,000 students were registered for teacher training and higher education.

general objectives were to (a) alleviate acute shortages of skilled manpower; (b) train local instructors; (c) increase the numbers of student places available; and (d) improve curricula. They supported centers that offered two-year programs for primary school graduates (Grades 1-6) in trades such as mechanics, automotive repair, electricity, and carpentry, as well as adult training centers that taught a mix of vocational skills and literacy (Annex Table A.2). These projects, which largely involved civil works and technical assistance, were completed satisfactorily. As the technical training needs of Yemen increased, a dedicated technical education project was launched (Cr. 1645-YAR), but it had severe implementation problems and an unsatisfactory outcome. Also, the Education Sector Investment Project (Cr.2570-YEM) included a component designed to establish two-year, post-secondary technical training programs oriented toward the labor market. A second vocational training project is under preparation in 2005, aimed at strengthening subsectoral management.

1.6 At the time the assessed project was appraised in 1995, there were 22 vocational training centers offering pre-employment programs in industrial skills (13), commerce (2), agriculture (1) and health (6). About 19 of these centers provided had some handicapped trainees, though the training was not specifically directed at persons with disabilities. Adult education was provided at about 40 literacy centers through NGOs, private-sector facilities, the Ministries of education, health, as well as social services, and labor. Only four public sector corporations and four private companies offered inservice programs to their employees at that time. All these facilities operated through public funding, and coordination among them was limited. The assessed project represented a shift from the supply-driven civil-works oriented lending to a more demand-driven sector strategy that would give control of training to those who needed its resultant skills. The project was to establish a new governance structure and financing mechanisms with majority representation to the private sector

1.7 *Donor Involvement.* Since the 1970s, Germany (including former German Democratic Republic) has been extensively involved in vocational-technical training in north and south Yemen. Other donors also indicated interest in this sector. The assessed project was to receive donor financing covering US\$16 million through EU (US\$8 million), Japan (US\$3.29 million), Netherlands (US\$4.70 million) at government request. The OPEC fund also was to contribute US\$11 million. The efforts of all the donors were to be coordinated through financing project components in parallel. (See Section 2).

Figure 1: IDA Investments in the Education Sector of Yemen



Objectives of the Vocational Training Project

1.8 The project was to help strengthen Yemen's capacity to train skilled labor in line with the emerging demands in the economy. The objectives were to: (a) strengthen vocational training system management by providing a major role to the private sector in policy-making, management, and financing of the sector; (b) improve the quality and relevance of vocational training through the enhancement of programs in existing centers and expansion of two new vocational training centers and two pilot centers; and (c) reorient, through participation of communities, adult education and training programs for women to improve the relevance of training for the labor market.

1.9 Components were:

- **Management and Financing of Vocational Training** (US\$3.2 million at appraisal, US\$2.7 million final) for technical assistance to the government's General Authority for Vocational and Technical Training (GAVTT) to establish a system for sector planning, policy-making, organizational development, a management information system (MIS) under separate German government (GTZ) assistance. This component would support the creation of a Skills Development Fund (SDF) to enhance training opportunities for private-sector employees financed through a wage tax.
- **Quality Improvement** (US\$42.3 million at appraisal, US\$30.82 million final) to improve the quality and relevance of pre-employment training offered by vocational training centers and to ensure sustained in-service training of the existing workforce through: (i) strengthening institutional capacity for curricula development (US\$1.7m); (ii) developing a system of in-service training of trainers (US\$2.2m); (iii) developing a system of continuing education for employees of business and industry, as well as vocational training center instructors and graduates (US\$3.5m); (iv) strengthening selected vocational training centers (US\$28.9m); (v) strengthening programs for the physically handicapped (US\$1.3m); and (vi) selective expansion through establishment of two pilot training centers (US\$4.7m).
- **Adult Education and Training for Females** (US\$6.0 million at appraisal) to improve community ownership of adult education and training programs consisting of (i) institutional development, including support for new curricula, training of instructors, and workshops on participatory approaches, and (ii) an adult education project funding facility for the financing of infrastructure rehabilitation, equipment, and instructional materials to support programs which meet agreed criteria and to refine existing practices in marketing and access to credit alternatives.

1.10 Because of the complexity and extensive work that was to be done, the project was to be implemented over a period of eight years rather than the usual five.

2. Implementation and Results of the Assessed Project

2.1 The project involved multiple ministries and components with few linkages among them. The Ministry of Education was to implement adult literacy and the Ministry of Social Security, Social Services and Labor (MSSL) was to implement the vocational components.³ Although Yemen had proven capacity to build and equip training centers, its capacity to bring about systemic reform that the project aimed for had been clearly limited. Thus, the project proved overly ambitious and complex.

2.2 From the start, the project faced considerable delays and obstacles. The project implementation unit (PIU) had limited procurement knowledge, and few activities were carried out during the first two years. The government did not ask for the committed Dutch and Japanese funds on time, and the donors applied them elsewhere. The Netherlands

3. Since 2000, a separate Ministry for Vocational and Technical Training has been established.

transferred funds initially earmarked for this project to other projects benefiting women, the poor, and Education for All. Japan changed its sector strategy following debt relief to Yemen and cancelled the proposed cofinancing and plans to build a high-tech vocational training center. The European Union funds became available only as the project was coming to a close and were channeled through a separate PIU.⁴ Ultimately, only OPEC funds were available. Lacking funds, the project was restructured in October 2000. The adult education objective was deleted as well as the two pilot vocational centers. (See Annex 1 Table A.3 for details of project components.)

2.3 Results were as follows:

2.4 *Quality improvement of training system.* Many of the older IDA-financed vocational training centers were already in bad physical condition due to vandalism and a lack of maintenance, with little and outdated equipment. Thus, much of the training capacity established earlier had been lost, and considerable effort was spent refurbishing 20 vocational training centers. In retrospect, PIU staff considered that it might have been preferable to build entirely new centers and abandon some old buildings.

2.5 Through the earlier projects, technical consultants had provided uncoordinated inputs from different parts of the world. Staff had been trained in many countries, such as China, the Soviet Union, East and West Germany, and had introduced different and disparate curricula and materials. In response, the Curriculum Department of the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training created unified curricula for various specialties. A competency-based approach was adopted, and a total of 2500 modules were developed in 13 subjects and 185 groups (including electricity, electronics, car mechanics, welding, carpentry, building, air conditioning, agricultural machines). Master craftsmen were invited to specify competencies and then develop examinations. Accreditation guidelines were also developed. The department developed loose-leaf textbooks, which the Ministry of Education printed. To improve curriculum delivery, training center managers were trained through courses as well as study tours in Morocco and other countries. Since 2003, the government also operated a parallel nonformal system of brief courses that may lead to a diploma for the students willing to study for exams on their own.

2.6 A skills evaluation survey showed that 75-70 percent of graduates attained a 'middle' skills level, 13-16 percent had a 'high' skills level and 17-19 percent were considered 'weak'. Despite weaknesses, the objective of improving educational quality was achieved.

2.7 *Reorienting management and financing of vocational training.* Some enterprises were consulted during appraisal, and the expectation arose, according to project documents, that local vocational training councils would be easily set up to manage the project jointly with the government. However, there was little trust between the business community and the government at that time. The PIU succeeded in establishing a national council and viable local training councils and committees in the industrial cities of Hodeida and Taiz, but in less industrial areas like Aden, Sana'a, and Hadramaut employers showed limited interest, and

4. GTZ. Private Sector Project. Final examinations and practical work in 2003/04 from vocational institutions (Final report). Sana'a 2004 (Arabic). The report attributes the modest results to limited teacher knowledge and limited contacts with the job market and equipment used in the workplace.

there was little demand for training of existing employees or new hires. However, no clear mechanisms were set up to ensure private sector involvement in all policy and operational matters. The national council of vocational training remained dormant. A management information system was to be developed that would help obtain clear data on enrollments and demand for various specialties, but the software could not be completed. Much of the activity of the Skills Development Fund revolved around the collection of training funds from companies with more than 10 employees. Overall, in-service training activities have been limited, though they increased in the last year of implementation; in 2003, 4,310 workers participated in 192 training programs for 376 private and public enterprises. Thus, the management improvement objective was only partly achieved.

2.8 *Adult education and training for females.* No activities were realized to meet the objective of teaching literacy and reorienting vocational education for greater relevance to women's needs, and it was not achieved.

Mission Observations

2.9 The OED mission visited the Dahaban Vocational Center in Sana'a and the Vocational Training Center of Dhamar that had been refurbished by the project. Visits were also made to the Women's Vocational Training Center, and the Blind Women's Center in Sana'a that have received support from the project. Six groups of 8-25 students were interviewed in the Women's center, Dhamar, and Dahaban institutes and were asked about current work, job prospects, and satisfaction with the course. Observations and interviews with students and instructors brought out the following issues:

Availability of women's vocational training

- Girls' attendance in vocational training has been low, but it was reported to the mission that in commercial facilities women are about 50 percent of enrollments. There are also specific institutes for women in Taiz and Hodeida. The Dahaban and Dhamar technical institutes had no women in the traditionally male skills trades (mechanics or electricity). However, there were some female instructors of computer science and communications.

Quality of the training system

- The vocational training centers are well-equipped, and most buildings are well constructed. However, the centers visited worked during one shift and were closed by 3 pm. Short courses for specific companies may be conducted in the afternoons, but rules currently prevent facilities from generating income from student fees or product sales. Thus, the installations are not used as efficiently as they could be.
- All facilities reported a shortage of local trainers. In the Dahaban and Dhamar facilities there were a total of about eight instructors who were trained in Germany through GTZ help and through the technical training project (Cr. 1645).
- Classroom observations revealed in one group considerable time wastage as students waited for their turn to use the equipment. Though classes were split into theory and practice groups for better allocation of equipment, many students were not engaged in

learning either set of skills when the OED evaluator entered the class. On the positive side, all students had loose-leaf textbooks in their possession.

- The Sana'a women's training institute, which specializes in cosmetology and other traditionally feminine skills, has received curricula and trained instructors from Jordan and other countries. Nevertheless, attracting new instructors is difficult due to the low government salaries. Thus, there is a paucity of qualified instructors. In a second-year English class the students were barely literate.

Management, demand, and industry linkages

- All students interviewed had completed at least grade 9, and most were secondary school graduates who did not enter the university. All were studying full-time. None of them worked after hours and or studied to take over a family business. None paid any tuition other than a registration fee of about US\$1.50, but clearly, they were not the poorest of the poor. Some teachers expressed the view that these students might choose not to do manual work upon graduation. Thus, these students might not become the skilled workers expected through the project (also see Annex B).
- The mechanical trades may accept students with basic education skills, but still no skills training is available for those who are non-literate or barely literate. Only one of the trainees interviewed lacked schooling, and this person was a skilled welder who was completing competency tests in order to obtain a needed diploma.
- Students overall expressed satisfaction with the quality of the programs they attended and expected that they would find satisfactory work upon graduation. A sampling of 5 classroom enrollments at the Dahaban institute revealed considerable demand for the mechanical courses, with classes subscribed beyond their capacity. However, there is also significant dropout (e.g., 12 of 35 students, 34 percent in a welding course) as students apparently found other alternatives. Thus some programs may produce significantly fewer graduates from enrolled trainees.
- Interviews with five current and potential users of some graduates revealed a problem with competencies. Many graduates are in fact not qualified to carry out the needed work, particularly in commercial and secretarial areas, and may have difficulty getting employment. For example, it is quite difficult to find vocational training graduates who can handle English correspondence, and an employer must resort to university rather than vocational graduates.
- Interviews with the directors of the training centers confirmed that linkages with the industry remain limited. Efforts are being made, but the number of enterprises willing to take trainees for internships has been limited. Only 726 trainees out of about 2800 graduates received internships in 2002 (See Table 2).

Table 2. Number of Trainees Benefiting from Business Internships in 2002

<i>Province</i>	<i>No. trainees</i>	<i>Work fields</i>	<i>No. trades</i>	<i>Implemented specialization</i>
Hodeidah	263	71	9	Electrician, mechanics, automobiles, carpentry, architecture, commerce, air condition, welding, electronics
Taiz	204	25	12	Electronics, fine arts, welding, electricity, electronic control, computer programming and maintenance, light vehicles, electrical engines, hydro pneumatic control
Aden	31	10	4	General hotel (front desk, food services, chief, room service)
Hydramaout	14	2	1	Lathing
Al Almanah	214	26	5	Petrol vehicles, diesel vehicles, sanitary installations, metal compounding, architecture
Total	726	134	31	

Source: Ministry of Technical and vocational Education⁵

2.10 The mission also interviewed government officials and donor staff involved with the project assessed in this report and obtained opinions about actions and outcomes. (See Annex B and sections on Bank and borrower performance.)

2.11 It project succeeded in initiating dialogue between the government and the private sector on reforming vocational education, developing competency-based programs, training trainers, and establishing the Skills Development Fund to augment funding for vocational training. However, the main project achievement is increased training capacity. Through refurbishment of industrial training centers, commercial institutes, and workshops for the handicapped at least 1,120 student places were created. The proportion of handicapped people receiving training increased by 22 percent during the project, and the proportion of women taking various courses (mainly commercial and women's vocational courses) increased by 23 percent. However, the number of trained workers fell short of expectations. About 6,900 were to graduate after the project from various types of training, 3,200 from vocational training centers (Annex 1 Table A.3). Only about 2,800 graduated from the centers in 2003, and other types of training have been very limited. This figure may be compared to references in the project files suggesting that about 2,100 trainees graduated per year from the various vocational training institutes before the project. Thus, the net increase of graduates may only be about 700 annually.

2.12 Because of limited data, it is unclear to what extent students get employment in their specialty. Ministry staff empirically estimate that about 75 percent of graduates in industrial areas like Hodeida are able to get jobs, but clear data are lacking.⁶

5. European Training Foundation – World Bank. Technical Education and Vocational Training in Yemen and its Relevance to the Labour Market. May 2004.

6. An internal rate of return of 16 percent was estimated during appraisal, but the documents do not describe how the figure was obtained. (Vocational Education Project, Staff Appraisal Report, 1995). However, the unemployment rate of 19-20 percent in ages 15-24 would probably bring the rate of return to less than 10 percent (Implementation Completion Report no. 28555, July 2004, p. 19).

3. Ratings

Outcome

3.1 The concept of a demand-driven, high-quality system of vocational training centers administered jointly by the government and the private sector was relevant to the needs of the country. However, it turned out to be premature in 1995, and project efficacy was modest; only one of three objectives (quality improvement) was fully achieved. Student dropout, limited use of expensive installations, and a low net number of graduates indicate that project efficiency was modest. Thus, project outcome is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

Institutional Development Impact

3.2 The risks involved in implementing a complex project in the sector were identified in the Staff Appraisal Report and ultimately expressed themselves in delays and underperformance by the project. A newly established authority proved unable to plan and implement a major reform program in the face of significant administrative and financial constraints. The appraisal documents suggest that these institutional problems would be solved through training, but this approach was ineffective. The limitations of the implementing agency were exacerbated by regulatory rigidities, such as laws limiting income generation by training centers and the procurement of materials for workshops. Nevertheless, the necessity to carry out multiple activities had a positive impact on the subsector. The project funding could solve problems in the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training, and this process enabled various activities to take place that otherwise might not have taken place. For these reasons, institutional development is rated *modest*.

Sustainability

3.3 The project components that were implemented effectively are likely offer sustained benefits that may be resilient to changing conditions. The curricula are being used, and the textbooks and equipment are available to the students. The specialties that are functional are also likely to remain in demand, partly because there is a large demand by the student population, which is likely to stimulate further development. Also, the new long-term strategy framework is likely to build on past achievements and maintain their net benefits over time. Increasingly, organized collaboration with donors is likely to maintain impetus and bring in more financing. For these reasons, sustainability is rated *likely*.

Bank Performance

3.4 Quality at entry was unsatisfactory. The multiple risks identified in the Staff Appraisal Report materialized and proved insurmountable. These included lack of trust between employers and the government, slow implementation and disbursements, limited benefits to women, and the possibility that the expected cofinancing might not materialize. However, the project documents do not show careful consideration of these possibilities or offer viable solutions. Also, the Bank was not proactive in securing the needed cofinancing, thus contributing to the loss of donor funds to build a suitable facility for women. Documents

show that supervision missions were frequent, but they focused on procurement, disbursement, and implementation rather than strategy issues. For these reasons, Bank performance is rated *unsatisfactory*.

3.5 Nevertheless, government officials and donor staff who were interviewed had positive opinions regarding the Bank's policy and implementation focus in Yemen. In particular they viewed the Bank as a well organized institution that practices evaluation, revision, monitoring, and follow up. In the opinions of staff interviewed, if this project had not existed, Yemen's capability of providing vocational-technical education would be extremely limited (Annex B). However, some officials and donor staff criticized the Bank for making loans to the sector that were too large and giving too much money to institutions of limited implementation capacity. Some donor staff were concerned that large amounts inure the government to funds that can be spent on trivia, such as new chairs for the ministry. Although the money is disbursed, the investments made with it may be questionable. Likewise, concerns were expressed to the mission that large loans may also fuel corruption.

Borrower Performance

3.6 The project set an ambitious reform agenda for vocational education and training to which the government was not sufficiently committed. However, the government proved more interested in buildings and quantitative expansion than policy reform. The procurement delays and inability to secure the needed donor financing severely limited the ability to carry out the planned program of activities. The management information system did not become functional, and lack of timely data on the status of the system made it hard to decide which skills had higher demand. Finally, the government paid only 12.5 percent of the expected counterpart funds. For these reasons, borrower performance is rated *unsatisfactory*.

4. Issues for Future Consideration

4.1 Although output targets of the assessed project were not met and few women were served, the project helped the government establish a demand-driven strategy in this education subsector. The dialogue is continuing with the formulation of a new vocational training strategy for Yemen that will attempt more systematically to integrate training institutions and industry needs through demand-based training.⁷ The government has shown commitment to this strategy. The strategy includes vocational-technical training as an important avenue for human resource development; 15 percent of students in the coming years are expected to attend this type of education. The long-term policy framework provides for flexibility that currently does not exist: cost recovery from students able to pay, evening short courses partly financed by employers, ability to hire master craftsmen to teach part-time, higher pay for instructors in courses that involve cost-recovery, so that the best professionals can be hired and students can learn the skills needed. The new parallel track of the quasi-formal system may serve the needs of dropouts who need skills more urgently than diplomas with faster and more closely targeted training.

7. Republic Of Yemen. Ministry Of Technical Education And Vocational Training. Technical Education And Vocational Training Strategic Development Plan. June 2004.

4.2 Thus, the vocational training sector may perform better in the years to come. Future performance may be reinforced by the increasing demand for the training. According to informal Ministry estimates, about 10,000 students applied in Sana'a in 2004, while capacity in all the city's training centers (about 3000) is at a maximum. The planned expansion of the system, however, raises concerns about allocation of expenditures in various education subsectors. Vocational training is expensive and already absorbs a significant share of education allocations. For example, in 1998, it absorbed 6 percent of all sectoral resources, while enrolling only 0.2 percent of total students in post-secondary education.⁸ The coverage and efficiency of the vocational training sub-sector must increase if it is to serve the country without absorbing an inordinate amount of resources.

4.3 An issue that has yet to receive much attention in vocational-technical training is instructional efficiency and use of time. This issue is particularly important given the large expenditures involved in this type of training and the limited student achievement shown in a GTZ-financed survey and during OED visits. The ministry might consider the following:

- *Train teachers to use class time better.* In principle, students should be occupied all the time in learning tasks. In-service training might focus on this concept and train teachers to observe how time in classes is currently used and activities can be restructured to use it better.
- *Organize classes to minimize unproductive time,* such as moving equipment, or allowing students to remain idle while waiting for their turn on equipment. Solutions to consider might be offering equipment practice at various hours, particularly since the vocational training centers are usually used for only one shift. This alternative is typically limited by staff availability and security concerns. However, advanced students, recent graduates, and practical craftsmen may be trained to supervise younger students. Arrangements could be made to allocate responsibilities and secure equipment.
- *Focus teachers' attention on student performance, not merely on delivering the material.* In some classes, teachers seemed to have limited interaction with students (particularly female). They must ask evaluative questions and ascertain that students actually understood and learned the skills taught to them.

4.4 To monitor achievement and changes in the supply and demand of training, the government and the Bank have relied on occasional tracer studies and on financial indicators while building up a management information system. Surveys indicating the extent to which students have met the accreditation standards of their specialty are feasible and desirable. However, not all fields have well developed or implemented standards. Proxy variables can also be used for quality of education that actually monitor instructional delivery and information flow. These include:

- The percentage of time students are engaged in learning tasks during one instructional hour (measurable through instruments such as the classroom snapshot).

8. Lockheed, Marlaine, Regina Bendokat, and Takako Yuki. Republic of Yemen: Education Sector Assistance Strategy The World Bank, Human Development Group Middle East & North Africa MNSHD Discussion Paper Series No. 3.

- Comparison between the curricular module covered at a particular time versus the module that should be covered.
- Brief tests on the extent to which students have mastered and can demonstrate the material taught in previously completed modules.

5. Lessons

Experience with the assessed project confirms a number of OED lessons from the vocational-technical education subsector:

- Establishment of functional training facilities is necessary but not sufficient for producing skilled workers. The facilities must be financially viable over the long term in order to hire the necessary instructors and renew their equipment and buildings. Publicly financed vocational training centers are only viable when the government and the private sector establish a joint and effective strategic framework that sets priorities and allocates resources to those priorities.
- During mission interviews, concerns were raised regarding dropout and limited employment in industrial skills among the better educated students. Governments may view vocational training as a means of helping school dropouts get jobs and alleviate their poverty. However, vocational training centers may select the better-educated students who are ultimately less likely to perform the type of tasks for which they were trained. Admission criteria might be adapted to suit the needs of less educated persons, who may have limited training opportunities.
- During mission interviews, concerns were raised regarding the needs and occupational status of students. Vocational training courses often require full-time attendance over one or more years. Such courses may be unsuitable to the most needy and less educated persons who need to work. A series of shorter courses taught in the evenings or weekends may be more suitable to the work schedules of the poor.
- For vocational education projects to succeed, potential trainees and the private sector must be consulted on project components, outcomes, and targets. A dialogue held exclusively with governments risks creating projects for which there is relatively limited demand and commitment.
- Management information systems and tracer studies are important tools to monitor the needs of beneficiaries. These activities must be given priority in programming project activities.

Annex A. Project Activities

Table A.1. Bank Investments in the Education Sector of Yemen

Completed Projects	Project No.	Approval Fiscal Year	Original Closing Date	Revised Closing Date	Credit No.	Project Cost Final US\$ million	IDA Credit US\$ million
Education (Primary/Tech.-YAR)	P005757	1974	12/31/1978	12/31/1980	421	17	11
Education I (PDRY)	P005851	1975	6/30/1981	12/31/1981	494	8.77	5.4
Education II (YAR)	P005764	1976	6/30/1982	6/30/1982	611	12.8	8
Education II (PDRY)	P005859	1979	6/30/1984	12/31/1984	865	6.98	4
Education III (YAR)	P005772	1979	7/31/1988	7/31/1988	915	16.82	10
Education III (PDRY)	P005866	1982	12/31/1990	12/31/1990	1222	8.3	6
Education IV (YAR)	P005781	1982	12/31/1989	12/31/1989	1203	24.9	12
Education IV (PDRY)	P005871	1984	12/31/1992	12/31/1992	SF019	12	10.4
Education V	P005786	1983	6/30/1992	6/30/1992	1340	24.9	10
Education VI	P005790	1984	5/30/1993	5/30/1993	1470	16.26	10.9
Teacher Training	P005832	1987	3/31/1995	3/31/1995	1773	15.1	10.4
Technical Training	P005802	1986	12/31/1993	12/31/1993	1645	10.9	5.559
Secondary							
Teacher Training	P005835	1991	12/30/1999	12/31/1999	2222	35.1	19.4
Basic Education	P005904	1993	12/31/2000	12/31/2000	2412	25	19.7
Education Sector Expansion	P005911	1994	9/30/2004	9/30/2004	2570	49.7	33
Vocational Training	P005912	1996	6/30/2002	12/31/2003	2793	24.3	20.6
				Total		311.83	196.36
Active Projects							
Basic Education							
Expansion Project	P043255	2001		6/30/2006	3422	62.6	56
Higher Education	P076183	2002		12/31/2006	3674	5.5	5
Child Development	P050483	2000		12/31/2005	3326	45.34	28.9
				Active Projects		113.44	89.9
				Total			
Total – all projects						326.28	286.26

Table A.2: Completed projects in Yemen

Project	FY	Activities	Outcomes PPAR or ICR
Education(Primary/Tech.-YAR) Cr. 421		Vocational centers in Sana'a and Hodeidah, Agricultural center in Ibb, non-formal basic education center in Amran, district training centers in El Kaida and Bajil, curriculu development	Execution satisfactory
Vocational technical education Basic training scheme for grassroots development associations	1974		
Education I (PDRY) Cr. 494 Vocational and agricultural education		New farm machinery and rural skills training center, two rural development centers, new trade training center, prevocational curricula into basic education	Execution satisfactory
	1975		
Education II (YAR) Cr. 611 Continued basic training scheme for grassroots associations		Training centers in Taiz and Dhamar, for vocational training grades 7-8, nonformal evening courses upgraded; 480 annual output, capacity ; Low enrollments, primary school graduates attending secondary education	Execution satisfactory
Vocational technical education Education II (PDRY) Cr. 865	1976	Built 3 vocational training centers, two by converting secondary schools. Outputs only 31% of appraisal estimates and only 2% of the enrollments were women.	Execution satisfactory
Vocational education, first phase for a network of 14 institutions	1979	Built, equipped agricultural secondary school at Surdud, a livestock secondary school at Sana'a.	Satisfactory
Education III (YAR) Cr. 915 Agricultural education	1979		High enrollments, good quality Satisfactory
Education III (PDRY) Cr. 1222 Vocational education and teacher training for grades 9-12; Commercial and agricultural institutes Establish maintenance units	1982	Built a commercial and an agricultural technical institute, an in-service teacher training institute, a primary teachers' training institute; provision of two mobile building maintenance units; a manpower planning study and a school inventory survey	
Education IV (YAR) Cr. 1203 Vocational technical education	1982	Vocational training centers in Taiz and Hodeidah, dormitories	Satisfactory
Education IV PDRY) Cr. SF019 Vocational and technical training		Built a vocational instructor training instltute and a center for rural extension training	Satisfactory
Education V; Cr. 1340 Nonformal education for agricultural, vocational, basic literacy	1984	Built 3 district training centers in Al Turba and other areas; For 3,700 places, 2,200 output	Satisfactory
Education VI; Cr. 1470 Nonformal education for agricultural, vocational, basic literacy	1983	Built 2 district training centers and several satellite basic literacy and training centers.	Satisfactory
Technical Training; Cr. 1645 Technical-vocational education	1984	Was to build a polytechnic Institute to train technicians and instructors; a new Technical Secondary School, and the rehabilitation of an existing one, and relocating a vocational training center which had shared facilities with a technical secondary school.	Unsatisfactory Polytechnic institute not built
	1986		

Table A.2. Vocational Development Project (Cr. 2793)

Components/ subcomponents	Activities	Targets to be achieved	Outputs	Outcomes
	Annual outputs when fully operational	6900 graduates: 3200 vocational training centers 1000 enterprise-based 2000 continuing ed. 100 high-tech 1000 handicapped	About 2800 from vocational training centers Other outputs limited, though unclear	The extent to which graduates are employed is uncertain; industrial areas more likely to employ them
Management and financing (US\$2.7 m)				Training programs continue to be supply driven, though situation changing
Governance structure (US\$1.3 m)	Sector planning system	TA for management capacity	45 senior staff trained locally and abroad	Vocational training centers acquired some autonomy
	MIS extension	Hardware Software	Hardware provided Software incomplete by end of project	Partial data, some tracer studies available No follow-up
Skill development fund (US\$1.9 m)	Levy 1% to businesses with 10+ employees and non-Yemeni employees	TA No specific targets	In 2003, there were 4,310 participants in 192 training programs for 376 enterprises aided by 78 trainers (organizations and individuals)	Slow start, limited activities Assessing training needs and arranging for demand-driven training.
	Local development councils	In all cities	5 established, 2 active (Taiz, Hodeida) National council for vocational training dormant	Where councils are active, they participate in decision and in assessing graduating students
Quality improvement (US\$30.82 m)				Curricula are updated and modernized, textbooks offered to students
Instructional capacity	Curricula, assessments	No targets specified	According to the ICR, 2500 modules were developed. According to curricular director, 185 modules were developed in 13 specialties About 185 modules	The new curricula are used extensively
Inservice training (US\$2.2 m)	Instructional materials Inservice training of trainers	Train all vocational ed. trainers (sufficient nos. existed) 3 master trainers in each center	Centers created in Aden, Sana'a, Taiz 140 trainers trained	Students receive loose-leaf notebooks Trainers often conduct training sessions
Continuing education (US\$3.5 m)	TA for establishing programs in training centers	No clear targets	Continuing education under development	Cost recovery not possible
Strengthening selected centers (US\$28.9 m)	Buildings	12 industrial 2 commerce 1 hotel-tourism	20 vocational training centers rehabilitated (excluding tourism) 1800 new places created	Tourism center built after the project
	Equipment and upgraded facilities to increase student places	Expected beneficiaries 4600 students female participation to increase by 26%	To 57 vocational training centers 56 new workshops At least 1120 places Female participation increased by 23%	New programs developed relevant to market need.
	New programs	1000 students	Operation started at project closing	No impact by project end
	Annual output increase	3200 from vocational training centers	From 2100 in 1995 To 2800 in 2003	Output fell below target
Handicapped rehabilitation (US\$1.3 m)	Funds available for mainstreaming handicapped	30% over base of 2000	6 centers received equipment and TA Proportion of handicapped receiving training increased by 22%	Orthopedics workshop provides training and rehabilitations
Underserved	Civil works,	Capacity 200	Deleted from project	No outcome

Components/ subcomponents	Activities	Targets to be achieved	Outputs	Outcomes
regions (US\$4.7 m)	equipment, materials 2 pilot vocational centers (1 high tech)	graduates		To be completed after the project
Adult education and training for women (US\$6 m)			Deleted from project	No outcome
Institutional development	New curricula Teacher training	literacy skills, nutrition, bookkeeping, family planning		Subsequently limited interest by the Ministry of Education
Project funding facility (US\$4.8 m)	Civil works, vehicles		Only about \$700 spent	

Annex B. Statements and Issues Raised in Mission Interviews

Interviews of staff took place individually or in small groups as the circumstances dictated. Ten professionals were interviewed:

- 4 directors in the institutions of areas visited;
- 4 government officials in the ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training.
- 2 staff members of donor agencies residing in Sana'a.

The table below reflects the number of respondents who indicated a view on each question; persons could raise one or more issues but an opinion brought up repeatedly by the same person counted as one comment. Not all staff had opinions about all questions and sometimes only one person in a group expressed opinions, so reply statistics are approximate. Teachers were only asked questions regarding inputs and effectiveness, since most did not know who had paid for the inputs they had received. The questions posed to respondents were:

- What were the benefits of the project in your school, geographic or sectoral area?
- What problems did you face in implementing the project? What were its disadvantages?
- Which components worked best in bringing about results, which did not? (some persons interviewed were asked about specific components, as appropriate).
- How effective were the Bank staff or consultants who worked on the project?
- What training did you receive through the project? Did it teach you what it was supposed to?
- What would be different in the education sector if the project had not existed?
- Other issues and observations

Table B.1

Issue	Frequency of responses
Project benefits	
- Cash infusion to the ministry, which had no other funds; ability to buy small items needed.	1
-Project laid the foundation for future strategy.	1
-Project helped the Ministry improve implementation capacity.	3
- Training centers benefited from repairs and equipment	4
Most and least effective components	
- Developed modular curricula effectively.	4
- Involved craftsmen in establishing standards.	2
- Established the skills development fund (to become more effective later)	1
Effectiveness of Bank staff, Bank policies	
- The Bank offered excellent follow-up and support.	3
- The Bank did not emphasize quality of education in vocational education,	3
- The Bank gives too much money, both the new and the old projects were huge. The Ministry will spend the money, but it may be spent on trivia and gifts.	3
Counterfactual — if project had not existed	
-If the project had not existed, the state of the vocational training centers would be very bad [but then mostly OPEC financed civil works], particularly because there were buildings destroyed from the 1994 civil war.	1
-The project was invaluable, without it little would have been accomplished	4
Issues and observations	
- There are difficulties in generalizing project effects, but it is expected they will be overcome.	4
- Vocational education is not crowding out primary education, because donors finance both.	1
- Vocational education upgrading may be used as another pretext for corruption. The government wants to formalize apprenticeships and regulate them, thus may get money under the table for allowing non-compliance.	2
- Reliable people matter a lot and there are not many among local staff. The project really needs expatriate administrators.	1
- The OPEC management was very poor and caused a great deal of needless work to the project. It disbursed after lengthy delays, had unreasonable demands for procurement, repeatedly changed its mind, and does not harmonize its procedures with other donors.	1
- Councils may make decisions but are not really responsible. So people who show up twice a year may make decisions on unknown basis for which they have no consequences.	1
- Training centers choose the best and brightest students, not those who are more likely later to do manual work. The students who can afford to spend 2-3 years in training may not later work on what jobs are available.	2
The NGOs that run training programs are often not qualified and may be fake. They may tell an inspector to wait while they gather in the room any women from the street to make believe training is going on.	1
Training councils may make decisions but are not really responsible. So people who show up twice a year and make decisions are not accountable for the consequences.	1
Total number of comments received from 10 persons	44

Annex C. Basic Data Sheet

VOCATIONAL TRAINING PROJECT (CREDIT 2793-YR)

Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal Estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
IDA Credit	24.3	20.6	85
Cofinancing	26.0	11.0	42
Government	9.5	4.6	48
Total project costs	59.8	36.2	61

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US\$ million)

	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	FY03	FY03
Appraisal estimate	0.31	2.33	4.70	10.20	12.53	14.14	14.920	15.38	15.69
Actual	0.00	0.36	1.66	2.53	3.70	10.43	12.93	14.05	15.26
Actual as % of estimate	0.0	15.45	35.3	24.8	29.5	73.8	86.7	91.4	97.3
Date of final disbursement: April 30, 2004									

Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Identification	December 6, 1993	
Appraisal	March 15, 1995	March 15, 1995
Approval	December 12, 1995	December 12, 1995
Effectiveness	April 7, 1996	August 7, 1996
Mid Term Review	November 30, 1999	June 30, 2000
Credit closing	June 30, 2003	December 31, 2003

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	<i>US\$ (000)</i>
Identification/Preparation	122,000
Appraisal/Negotiation	120,000
Supervision	476,000
ICR	30,000
Total	748,000

Mission Data

	Date (month/year)	No. of persons	Specializations represented	Performance rating	
				Implement ation status	Development objectives
Identification/ Preparation	01/28/1994	5	Sr. Educator, Operations Officer, Sr. Implementation Specialist, Financial Analyst, Sr. Education Specialist		
	03/27/1994	4	Sr. Education Specialist, Operations Officer, Sr. Economist, Financial Analyst		
	10/08/1994	6	Sr. Education Specialist, Economist, Financial Analyst, Implementation Specialist, Labor Market Specialist, VTE Specialist		
Appraisal/ Negotiation	12/16/1994	4	Sr. Education Specialist, Education Specialist, Implementation Specialist, Gender Specialist		
	03/15/1995	8	Sr. Education Specialist, Education Specialist, Financial Analyst, Implementation Specialist, Gender Specialist, Labor Market Specialist, VTE Specialist (2)		
Supervision 1	03/13/1996	5	Education Specialist, Sr. Educator, Operations Officer, Sr. Implementation Specialist, Sr. Education Specialist	S	S
Supervision 2	06/17/1996	3	Education Specialist, Implementation Specialist, Operations Officer	S	S
Supervision 3	11/04/1996	3	Operations Officer, Sr. Implementation Specialist, Education Specialist	S	S
Supervision 4	04/17/1997	1	Sr. Implementation Specialist	S	S
Supervision 5	12/06/1997	1	Sr. Implementation Specialist	S	S
Supervision 6	05/21/1998	1	Sr. Implementation Specialist	S	S
Supervision 7	10/09/1998	3	Sr. Implementation Specialist, Technical Educator, Financial Analyst	S	S
Supervision 8	11/15/1999	3	Economist, Sector Manager, Operations Officer	U	S
Supervision 9	06/30/2000	7	Operations Officer, VTE Specialist, Research Analyst, Labor Market Specialist, Sr. Economist, Financial Management Specialist, Employment Program Specialist	U	S
Supervision 10	05/13/2001	3	Economist, Implementation Specialist, Operations Officer	S	S
Supervision 11	05/06/2002	3	Operations Officer, VTE Specialist, Program Assistant	S	S
Supervision 12	08/01/2002	2	Sr. Operations Officer, VTE Specialist	S	S
Supervision 13	10/01/2003	3	Sr. Operations Officer, VTE Specialist, Operations Analyst	U	S
ICR	01/18/2004	3	Sr. Operations Officer, VTE Specialist, Operations Analyst	S	S

Sr: Senior; VTE: Vocational and Technical Education.

Performance ratings: S: Satisfactory; U: Unsatisfactory.