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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT



CAMBODIA

Demand for Good Governance Project

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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

Cambodia

DEMAND FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE

(IDA-H4410)

June 26, 2017

Financial, Private Sector, and Sustainable Development

Independent Evaluation Group

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = Cambodian riel (CR)

2008	US\$1.00	CR 3,944.93
2009	US\$1.00	CR 4,115.06
2010	US\$1.00	CR 4,183.93
2011	US\$1.00	CR 4,034.02
2012	US\$1.00	CR 4,068.02
2013	US\$1.00	CR 3,978.04
2014	US\$1.00	CR 4,000.00

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CAS	country assistance strategy	NCDD	National Committee for Democratic Development
CPP	Cambodia People's Party	NGO	nongovernmental organization
DFGG	demand for good governance (Demand for Good Governance Project)	OWSO	one window service office
EIRR	economic internal rate of return	PCO	project coordinating office
GDP	gross domestic product	PDO	project development objective
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report	PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
IDA	International Development Association	PRIA	Society for Participatory Research
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group	RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
IMF	International Monetary Fund	RNK	Radio National of Kampuchea
I-SAF	implementation of the Social Accountability Framework	SAF	Social Accountability Framework
M&E	monitoring and evaluation	SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
MEF	Ministry of Economy and Finance	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
MOI	Ministry of Interior	USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
MONASRI	Ministry of National Assembly–Senate Relations and Inspection		

All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated.

Fiscal Year

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Principal Ratings

	ICR*	ICR Review*	PPAR
Outcome	Moderately satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Substantial	Significant	Moderate
Bank Performance	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory

* The Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) Report is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank global practice. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEG product that seeks to independently validate the findings of the ICR.

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IEG Mission: Improving World Bank Group development results through excellence in independent evaluation.

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the World Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20-25 percent of the World Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or World Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate, and apply other evaluative methods as needed.

Each PPAR is subject to technical peer review, internal IEG Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank country management unit. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both World Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEG Rating System for Public Sector Evaluations

IEG's use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: <http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org>).

Outcome: The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, and Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension is not applied to development policy operations, which provide general budget support. *Possible ratings for Outcome:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High, Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

World Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Preface

This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) Project, which was approved by the Board on December 2, 2008, became effective on June 24, 2009, and closed on September 30, 2014, for a total project cost of \$21.42 million. The project's development objective was to enhance the demand for good governance in Cambodia in priority reform areas by strengthening institutions, supporting partnerships, and sharing lessons.

The report presents findings based on the review of World Bank project files; project-related reporting documents and evaluations, including data provided by the World Bank team and DFGG Project staff during the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) mission; studies produced by the government and other development partners; and relevant research literature. In addition to project documents, information for this assessment was obtained from semi-structured interviews conducted during an IEG mission in Cambodia in October and November of 2016. The mission included visits to Phnom Penh, Siam Reap, Battambang, Takhmao (Kandal), and Chhbar Mon (Kampon Speu). The mission also reviewed documents and interviewed stakeholders related to the implementation of the Social Accountability Framework, endorsed by the Royal Government of Cambodia in July 2013. The list of persons met is included in appendix D.

The report presents a detailed assessment of this operation using standard methodology that verifies whether the operation achieved its intended outcomes, and if these outcomes have been sustained over time. The report also draws lessons that will contribute to IEG's forthcoming evaluation, *Engaging Citizens for Better Development Results*.

Following standard IEG procedures, a copy of the draft PPAR will be sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and feedback. Borrower comments will be attached as Appendix F.

Summary

This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) Project, which was approved by the Board on December 2, 2008, became effective on June 24, 2009, and closed on September 30, 2014, for a total project cost of \$21.42 million.

The project development objective (PDO) was to enhance DFGG in priority reform areas by strengthening institutions, supporting partnerships, and sharing lessons. Enhancing the DFGG Project was further unpacked in the project results framework into four specific objectives: (i) promote, (ii) mediate, (iii) respond to, or (iv) monitor to inform DFGG.

These four objectives were to be supported in four priority reform areas identified in the government's Rectangular Strategy and included in the governance pillar of the country assistance strategy—that is, private sector development, management of natural resources, public financial management, and decentralization and citizens' partnerships for better governance. The project was restructured five times. The first restructuring accounts for the cancelation of performance-based incentives in state institutions supported by the DFGG Project. The second restructuring responded to the project mid-term recommendations by simplifying the results framework and dropping two nonperforming subcomponents and reallocating those resources. The third restructuring allowed for repaying project preparation costs of another project (Livelihood Enhancement and Associations Project, or LEAP), and reallocated proceeds across components. The last two restructurings extended the grant closing date to complete planned activities and transition arrangements, strengthen lesson learning, and align project activities with the new Social Accountability Framework (SAF).

The review finds that the **PDO was highly relevant** at the time of both appraisal and closing. Both the PDO and its associated outcomes were highly relevant to country priorities as identified in the 2005–08 country assistance strategy (World Bank 2005), which was extended to 2011. The PDO and the underlying causal chain of working with both state and non-state actors to address governance issues was also closely linked with government plans and strategies that highlight the importance of partnering with civil society to strengthen governance. The changing environment regarding decentralization made some of the activities supported by the project even more relevant, because local government officials did not always have the experience, capacity, or funding to take on some of the responsibilities assigned to them.

The **relevance of design** is rated *modest*, due to the project's overambitious objectives, lack of a clear results chain for each of the priority areas, and serious shortcomings in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and capacity-building. The project goal of working in several priority areas resulted in a complicated underlying causal chain that proved difficult to translate into an effective results framework. Project design included six separate implementing agencies, with an M&E plan for each one. A separate M&E plan was useful to the Project Coordinating Office in tracking progress, but the overall results framework resulted in a long list of more than 90 indicators (many of them composites) that added complexity to the design. The key principle of a constructive engagement between civil society organizations and state institutions was realistic, given the country

context and background, but that requirement limited the overall potential impact of the project.

The project contributed to enhancing DFGG in the priority areas where the majority of project resources were allocated—decentralization and citizen partnerships and private sector development. Key results are summarized below. Outcomes associated with the other two priority areas were negligible.

Private Sector Development: the DFGG Project contributed to advancing the country’s governance environment by supporting a well-functioning labor arbitration system. This was achieved by promoting awareness of the Labor Law and the arbitration process, mediating labor disputes between employers and employees, and responding to demands for better enforcement and adherence to the Labor Law. DFGG Project support contributed to: (i) strengthened and sustained workers’ and employers’ confidence in the arbitration system; (ii) increased reach of Arbitration Council services; (iii) improved AC success rate; (iv) guaranteed fairness, consistency, and transparency in the arbitration process; and (v) making the institution more sustainable.

Decentralization and Citizen Partnerships: the DFGG Project contributed to strengthening accountability at the local level through its scaling up the one-window service offices (OWSOs) model. The project helped promote demand through outreach efforts and the disclosure of information regarding service fees and standards. Awareness of corruption is increasing. The project helped mediate demand by creating and strengthening formal avenues for consultation, feedback, and dispute resolution between citizens and public officials through the district ombudsman. The district ombudsman has helped to enforce posted fees and service standards promulgated by OWSOs and to manage a complaints system that citizens consider independent, credible, and effective. OWSOs helped respond to demand, confirmed by high stakeholder satisfaction, and reduced the time and cost of processing transactions and the number of ministries and functions delegated.

In addition, the DFGG Project contributed to **strengthening accountability at the local level** through its support to the monitoring role of non-state actors in local service delivery. Under this component, communes, districts, health centers, schools, and OWSOs had their performance monitored through social accountability activities. This independent monitoring led to concrete changes in policies and practices that, in turn, paved the way to a new framework for social accountability in Cambodia.

Finally, learning from the DFGG Project influenced important changes in social accountability through the **development and implementation of the SAF**. The project helped to create an avenue for (ongoing) conversations between civil society and the Royal Government of Cambodia on good governance, now formalized through the establishment of a joint National Committee for Democratic Development (NCDD)-CSO social accountability steering committee. Project experience with different social accountability instruments informed the design of the ongoing SAF implementation plan (I-SAF). Materials, processes, and guidelines developed by the project are currently being used in the I-SAF. Tools and mechanisms included in the I-SAF (information for citizens,

community scorecards, and joint accountability action plans) were fine-tuned, based on the results of the experience with the DFGG Project.

Taking all these aspects into account, the four objectives identified under the PDO are rated as follows:

- *Promoting DFGG in priority reform areas* is rated **modest**, based on the mixed reliability of the evidence on outcomes related to improved awareness of stakeholders of the AC and the OWSO/district ombudsman, and the project contribution to the design and implementation plan of the Strategic Accountability Framework through the non-state actors' component.
- *Mediating DFGG in priority reform areas* is rated **substantial** because of the outcomes arising from the work of the AC and the district ombudsmen.
- *Responding to DFGG in priority reform areas* is rated **high** because of the achievements of the Arbitration Council and OWSO and the important changes in policy and practice.
- *Monitoring to inform DFGG in priority reform areas* is rated **modest** because of the limited scale of the work done through the non-state actors component on public service providers' performance.

The **overall efficacy** rating is reduced to **moderately satisfactory** because decentralization and citizen partnerships and private sector development were only two of the four priority areas originally slated for project impact. This rating is consistent with the self-assessment rating given by the project team at completion.

The **efficiency** of the project is rated **substantial**. There is evidence that reforms supported by the project have reduced costs and improved service standards. For example, OWSO and Arbitration Council services were provided for less cost and in less time than was previously the case. The Memorandum of Understanding for Binding Arbitration, signed by employers and unions, helped avoid otherwise costly strikes. Based on the results of the independent monitoring of commune, health, and education services funded by the DFGG Project, efficiency gains are expected to continue with the I-SAF.

Given the substantial rating for relevance of objectives, a modest rating for relevance of design, the ratings for the four sub objectives (modest, substantial, high, and modest), and the substantial rating for efficiency, the **overall outcome** of the project is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

Based on the degree of institutionalization of some of the key components, the adoption and ongoing implementation of the Strategic Accountability Framework, and the strong reliance on donor funding for this agenda, the **risk to development outcome** is rated **moderate**.

Bank performance is rated **moderately satisfactory** due to a modest rating for quality at entry and a satisfactory rating for World Bank supervision. Project components were relevant to achievement of the PDO but, while it was plausible to expect that the four sub objectives of promoting, mediating, responding, and monitoring were needed to achieve

DFGG, aiming to do all of these in four priority areas was overly ambitious and unrealistic. Project resources were used to support the design and implementation plans of the SAF, showing the World Bank team's adaptability to a changing environment. Sustainability strategies for each component were developed well before project closure, helping to ensure sustained results and continuous progress toward the PDO.

Due to some variation in the performance of the different implementing agencies and the mixed evidence on the government's commitment to the principles of the DFGG Project, the **overall borrower performance** is rated *moderately satisfactory*. Government commitment is supported by its reaction to noncompliant state institutions, its willingness to continue to engage with non-state actors through the adoption of the SAF, and the school of governance plans. Yet limited government resources allocated to this agenda and the increasing restrictions on non-state actors question this commitment. In addition, there are combative relationships among powerful bureaucratic factions in different central ministries, including the Ministry of Interior, that can adversely affect performance.

Despite important shortcomings in the design, **M&E** is rated *substantial* thanks to changes during implementation and utilization. The initial results framework was overly complex (90 indicators, many not measurable, without baselines, and composite) and under-resourced. It was simplified after the Midterm Review, and greater resources were provided, including those needed for high-quality, independent assessments of key components. These improvements contributed to important changes in policy and practice based on M&E feedback, changes that have been sustained, as verified by the IEG mission. The strengthened results framework and M&E processes after the second restructuring enabled the use of results in the decision to drop two underperforming subcomponents and deal with issues concerning gender participation.

The review finds three key lessons:

First, *timely identification of key changes in policy during project implementation can substantially impact project results*. The World Bank project team reacted promptly to changes in government commitment to DFGG work in public financial management and natural resource management. More importantly, the project team was strategic in using the opportunity to influence the design of the Strategic Accountability Framework through the learning from experience of civil society organizations and implementing agencies. This, in turn, significantly increased the outreach, focus, and impact of project-funded activities.

Second, *the additional resources and time needed for the direct support to non-state actors to be effective should not be underestimated*. Many governance projects recognize the importance of working with both state (supply side of governance) and non-state actors (demand side of governance) to make sustained governance changes. Yet projects need to be more realistic about what this entails, considering the limited capacity and experience of both the World Bank and the CSOs in this area and the multiplicity of actors involved.

Third, *projects aiming at strengthening accountability should pay more attention to the political economy*. The DFGG Project used political economy analysis at entry to identify the leaders and state institutions that were likely to support social accountability approaches in the government. This was—to some extent—an effective approach. Yet the focus of the political-economy analysis needs to be broader. A better understanding of the underlying structures of power, interests, incentives, and institutions that could enable or prevent changes is needed. For example, the Ministry of Finance’s support to the decentralization agenda, or Ministry of Labor incentives regarding the sustainability of the Arbitration Council, or the Ministry of Interior incentives regarding strong, independent monitoring by civil society organizations, could have helped to set more realistic and strategic objectives and to define more concrete risk-mitigation measures.

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1. Background and Context

Country Background

1.1 The Paris Peace Agreement of 1992 and the internationally organized elections of 1993 followed a dark period in Cambodia that started in the 1970s, when between a quarter and a third of the population died due to civil conflict and misrule. Most educated people, who were systematically targeted as a threat to the regime, were killed or forced to resettle. A United Nations peacekeeping operation during 1992–93 took over state administration, ran an election, and safeguarded human rights. A large presence of civil society organizations started to take hold and continues to the present.

1.2 The newly elected government that took power in 1993 brought together the two main political parties in a coalition government brokered by King Sihanouk, with two prime ministers and two ministers for each government ministry, representing the two major parties. This lasted until 1997, when military action by forces loyal to Second Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodia People's Party (CPP) ousted the First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh and his Funcinpec loyalists from power. The CPP has remained in power since then, and Hun Sen is the longest-serving prime minister in Southeast Asia, in part through his ability to strike a balance among the differing views of key allies within the CPP. Cambodia allows multiparty elections, and the CPP has not always prevailed among voters in Phnom Penh. The CPP's electoral strength is in rural areas, where a network of village, district, and commune chiefs maintains support for the party and allows the CPP to prevail, with a large majority of seats in the National Assembly and Senate (Ear 2007).

1.3 The regime relies on networks, or *khsae*, that link private businesses to the state and party. Businesspeople can obtain an important honorary title, *Oknha*, which affirms their contribution to national development. This practice has been going on since ancient times, and it has been reinvented by the current leadership to serve modern needs, allowing businesses, the armed forces, and other state institutions to obtain resources through partnerships, including swaps of ministerial buildings and access to the most lucrative sectors of the economy. Strong channels, in turn, allow *Oknha* to interact with state officials and to help them to deliver voluntary contributions such as schools, roads, pagodas, irrigation systems, and hospitals that can be presented as gifts from the prime minister to the nation (Scopis 2011).

1.4 The return to political stability and location in a dynamic neighborhood have enabled rapid economic growth. Starting in 1994, Cambodia entered an era of 7 percent average annual real gross domestic product (GDP) growth, with gross national income per capita increasing more than threefold by 2015. There was also a sharp reduction in poverty, which allowed Cambodia to achieve the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty in 2009. There have also been significant improvements in literacy, life expectancy, and access to water and sanitation, and decreases in maternal mortality. Cambodia was reclassified in 2015 as a medium human development country, with a human development ranking similar to that of Ghana and neighboring Lao People's Democratic Republic (UNDP 2015, p. 210). Cambodia's rapid economic growth depends

on tourism and other services, construction, industry such as export-oriented textile and shoe factories, and agriculture. There are also prospects for exploiting bauxite, gold, iron, gems, and offshore oil and gas. Although economic growth continued to be strong in 2016, many citizens who have recently escaped poverty are at risk of dropping back into poverty should there be an economic setback. Critical public services and public investments are held back by weaknesses in public administration and service delivery and challenges in land and natural resource management.

1.5 Cambodia's strongest rating on the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann and Kraay 2015) is for political stability, and weakest for control of corruption. Rule of law and voice and accountability are also relatively weak (appendix E, table E.1). There was no statistically significant change in those indicators over the period 2005–15, which is normally the case over such a short period. Measuring the quality of governance is exceptionally difficult, and these indicators have well-known challenges of interpretation (see Kurtz and Schrank 2007). The challenges are particularly strong in Cambodia, which, like its neighbors China and Vietnam, has not followed the path of international good practice in many respects, yet has delivered impressive results in economic development and poverty reduction.

1.6 However, there are signs that some perceptions are starting to change. For example, a 2010 survey by Private Agencies Collaborating Together, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) contracted by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), found that Cambodians believed that corruption is a normal way of life, while a 2013 survey reported that Cambodians now believed that corruption is the biggest problem. A 2016 survey (Transparency International Cambodia 2017) underlines deep citizen awareness of corruption: 44 percent think most or all government officials are corrupt, and 30 percent of service users paid a bribe in the last 12 months for an identity document, voter's card, or permit from government. While 57 percent believe that the government fight against corruption is going badly (35 percent think it is going well), 73 percent believe that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption.

Project Context

1.7 Four recent developments are particularly important in understanding the project context: the changing composition of growth, electoral politics, government reforms in response, and the relationship between the government and the World Bank.

1.8 Growth continues to be robust, driven by strong garments exports, real estate, and construction, and weaker growth in agriculture and tourism. The growth is underpinned by a strong macrofiscal framework, including a sharp increase in tax collection (from 10 percent of GDP in 2011 to an estimated 15 percent of GDP in 2016), which also, in turn, helped to reduce the fiscal deficit to 1.6 percent of GDP for 2015, below the budget target. The strong growth rate is enabled by one of the fastest private sector credit growth rates in any nation's history. This credit growth, combined with foreign direct investment from China (over 50 percent of the total) and other countries in the region is financing a construction boom in Phnom Penh that will double office space and increase the number of condominiums sixfold by 2018. This, in turn, is increasing pressure for wage hikes,

which risk a loss of competitiveness if productivity increases do not keep up (IMF 2016, pp. 3–6, 13). This rapid growth is heightening concerns of inequality and unfairness, particularly in Phnom Penh, which contributed to a strong opposition showing in the 2013 election.

1.9 Reforms in recent years have included an increase in the civil servant minimum wage from \$90 in 2008, to \$100 in 2013/14, to \$150 in 2016, with a goal of reaching \$250 by 2018, thus matching the opposition's campaign promise in 2013. The increased revenue mentioned above is helping to finance this. Although there have been reforms to monitor attendance and service standards, and to pay through bank accounts, the rapid wage rises are still crowding out nonwage expenditure, thus reducing productivity. Other actions have included a recently adopted law requiring the 5,000 NGOs in Cambodia to register, and to report their finances and activities. The law also allows the government to de-register NGOs if they are thought to endanger security, stability, or Cambodian culture. In addition, the Trade Union Law limits the number of unions that can file complaints with the Ministry of Labor and the Arbitration Council.

1.10 The decentralization policy continues to evolve, pulled between centralizing forces at the national level on the one hand, and a combination of grassroots and bureaucratic support for decentralization going back to the first round of commune decentralization in 2001 on the other. The 2005 Strategic Framework for Decentralization and Deconcentration Reforms (Cambodia, RGC 2005) sets out a framework for indirectly electing district and provincial representatives to oversee subnational administrations. Two organic laws¹ approved in 2008 outline a process that could be followed to assign functions and allocate personnel and resources, including provision for an interministerial body to operationalize the strategy and laws: The National Committee for Democratic Development at the Sub-National Level (NCDD). The NCDD Secretariat's 500 staff coordinate the donor-funded project implementation units supporting decentralization and deconcentration reforms.² Fiscal decentralization is not complete. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) provides budgetary resources to support these reforms, although the resources are not yet sufficient to sustain the process without ample donor support. The design and implementation of the Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) Project had to fit into the evolving nature of decentralization and to a varying array of donor support.

1.11 Another important feature of the context is the relationship between the government and the World Bank. Differences between the World Bank and the government over the findings of the World Bank's Inspection Panel on the application of safeguards in the International Development Association (IDA)-supported Land Management and Administration Project resulted in a pause in financing. The World Bank suspended new lending but maintained an active presence through the implementation of the existing IDA portfolio, trust fund-financed knowledge products, IFC advisory services, and private sector financing. The suspension of disbursements was lifted after government followed the recommendations of a fiduciary review, and an independent procurement agency was put in place for most procurement under IDA-funded projects (World Bank 2016a). Lending recommenced in fiscal 2016, based on the Country Engagement Note for 2016–17, for one year. A Systematic Country Diagnostic is under way in anticipation of a full Country Partnership Framework when the Country

Engagement Note expires. However, it remains to be seen whether this renewed relationship will endure and lead to full engagement.

1.12 Recognizing the important role of a strong civil society in improving governance, the World Bank built up its work in this area prior to approval of the DFGG Project. World Bank support to non-state actors was informed by a civil society assessment and included an additional \$1 million civil society financing component for the Rural Infrastructure and Local Governance Project, grants to NGOs under the Small Grants Program, and a \$2 million Program to Enhance Capacity in Social Accountability for non-state actors (World Bank 2008c (p.4, 19, 26, 47–48, Attachment 1 to Annex 4).

1.13 All of these contextual features informed the World Bank approach and the emergence of the DFGG model. The rapid growth and political challenges arising focused attention on providing better services to the CPP's core constituency in rural areas. The DFGG Project's approach to constructive engagement with civil society has avoided some of the challenges stemming from the new NGO law. Higher salaries benefited subnational counterparts, but reduced nonwage budgets have hampered service delivery, and improvements are needed. The new Trade Union Law has reduced the case flow to the Arbitration Council, though it is too new to know the real impact going forward. The limiting of governance supports to narrowly targeted areas where the government is willing to engage helped to define a space where the World Bank and government could work together.

2. Objectives, Design, and their Relevance

Project Development Objectives

2.1 Approved in December 2008, the project development objective (PDO) of the DFGG Project was “*to enhance the demand for good governance (DFGG) in priority reform areas by strengthening institutions, supporting partnerships, and sharing lessons*” (World Bank 2008c, p. viii). The project unpacks the PDO into four objectives, clearly stated in the results framework: promoting, mediating, responding to, and monitoring to inform DFGG in priority areas (World Bank 2008c, p. 54). Achievement under these four objectives will be assessed in section 3 of this report.

2.2 The project would (i) promote demand by disclosing, demystifying, and disseminating key information on government policies, programs, and budgets to citizens and enhancing their capacity to act on this information; (ii) mediate demand by creating and strengthening formal and informal avenues for consultation, feedback, and dispute resolution between citizens and public officials; (iii) respond to demand by developing programs and initiatives that answer to the demand for services; and (iv) promote monitoring and oversight of the public sector by independent actors (World Bank 2008c, p. 4).

2.3 The DFGG Project was the World Bank’s first, unique, self-standing project focused exclusively on demand for good governance. A more common approach in Cambodia and other countries is integration of DFGG components into projects that have broader objectives (see Chase and Anjum 2008). DFGG is understood as the extent and

ability of citizens, civil society organizations, and other non-state actors to hold the state accountable and to make it responsive to their needs.

2.4 The project aimed to support state and non-state institutions and to foster partnerships between them that promote, mediate, respond to, or monitor to inform DFGG in four priority reform areas. These areas were identified in the governance pillar of the country assistance strategy (see World Bank 2005, 2008a)—private sector development, management of natural resources, public financial management, and decentralization and citizens’ partnerships for better governance.

Relevance of Objectives

2.5 Considering the country priorities, the relevance of project objectives is rated **substantial**. The PDO and intermediate outcomes were highly relevant to country priorities as identified in the 2005–08 country assistance strategy (CAS) (World Bank 2005). The importance of strengthening governance and partnering with civil society is highlighted in several government plans and strategies: the Rectangular Strategies for 2004–08 and 2008, the Decentralization and Deconcentration Strategic Framework, and the government’s National Strategic Development Plan 2006–10 and its 2009–13 update, as well as in the National Strategic Development Plan for 2014–18.³ The changing environment regarding decentralization made some of the activities supported by the project even more relevant, because local government officials did not necessarily have the experience, the capacity, or the funding to take on some of the responsibilities assigned to them.

2.6 Governance issues were identified as the primary obstacle to sustainable poverty reduction in the CAS. Pillar 1 (of 2) in the CAS aimed at removing governance constraints to attain the Millennium Development Goals. Strengthening local governance and increasing social accountability was a CAS intermediate objective (World Bank 2005, p. 31). Objectives remained relevant throughout the project implementation period (the CAS was extended to 2011). Support to non-state and state actors provided through the DFGG Project was intended to help them tackle governance challenges and to advance reforms (World Bank 2008a, box 3).

2.7 State actors were selected based on their commitment or demonstrated success in fulfilling one or more of the objectives of promoting, mediating, responding, and monitoring DFGG. By expanding and consolidating existing “islands of good governance,” the DFGG Project could help increase voice, transparency, accountability, and responsiveness.

2.8 There was strong alignment between the state actors that the project would support and the country’s Rectangular Strategy and CAS objectives. Strengthening the media and scaling up one-window service offices (OWSOs) throughout the country would contribute to the objectives of supporting decentralization and promoting citizen’s partnerships. Supporting a credible and fair AC for resolving disputes between employers and employees would contribute to the objective of promoting private sector development. Strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of National Assembly–Senate Relations and Inspection (MONASRI) to inform citizens of their rights under the Land

Law and provide an effective channel for expressing complaints and concerns would contribute to the objectives of improving natural resources management and the rule of law.

2.9 The support of non-state actors was considered essential in the underlying project causal chain to enhance credibility and sustainability. The CAS notes that a broader-based demand for reforms is required as a complementary force to drive and sustain the governance reform process in Cambodia (World Bank 2005, p. 64). Non-state actors were to support good governance by promoting awareness, enhancing transparency of state institutions, and making them more responsive to the needs of citizens—all central objectives to the achievement of the PDO.

2.10 Despite a clear alignment with governance priorities in Cambodia, there were shortcomings: project objectives were overly ambitious and unrealistic, given the project timeframe and resources. The PDO was vaguely stated and its associated outcome indicators did not clearly specify the objectives to be achieved within each priority area (this is discussed in the next section in more detail).

Project Design

2.11 The project had three components. In component 1, four state institutions were to improve and scale up programs that promote, mediate, respond to, or monitor DFGG in the CAS priority reform areas. In component 2, non-state actors were to develop their own programs to promote, mediate, respond to, or monitor DFGG in CAS priority reform areas. Some of these programs were in partnership with the four state institutions supported in component 1 (funded through partnership grants); others were independent of them (funded through thematic grants). Component 3 was to support overall project coordination and was to promote learning, awareness raising, and capacity building for demand-side approaches. This was intended to create a “ripple effect” beyond the institutions and programs supported in components 1 and 2.

2.12 The rationale for supporting both state and non-state institutions was central to the project theory of change. In the project’s rhetoric, both were needed to address key governance challenges in the Cambodian context. State capability and responsiveness were to be supported in component 1 (the supply side of good governance), while demand for greater accountability through citizen and civil society action was to be encouraged through component 2 (the demand side of good governance). Component 3 was to provide the necessary capacity building and learning.

2.13 The project design aimed to create governance changes in four challenging priority areas,⁴ which made the project objectives widespread and too ambitious for the timeframe and resources. In addition to the overall objectives, specific outcomes by subcomponent were articulated, adding complexity to the design and resulting in a long list of actions and indicators to be achieved in the project results framework.

2.14 The project was to support a wide range of state and non-state actors. State agencies included the national radio station, the national labor Arbitration Council, the OWSOs, and a ministry that investigates corruption. Non-state actors, in turn, were to be

competitively selected and were expected to include grassroots organizations, independent policy and research centers, independent media, professional associations, business associations, and trade unions.

2.15 Separate implementing agencies were identified for each element of the project, requiring intense coordination to monitor implementation and enhance synergies across the different elements. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) was the main counterpart, drawing on its mandate to promote subnational decentralization and deconcentration governance reforms, and the focal point for NGO relations. A Project Coordinating Office (PCO) within MOI carried out overall project coordination, and specific subcomponents were implemented by: (i) the Arbitration Council Foundation (labor arbitration), (ii) the National Committee for Management of Decentralization and Deconcentration Reform Secretariat (OWSOs), (iii) MONASRI (Land Law), (iv) Radio National Kampuchea (national media), and (v) the Asia Foundation (Grants to non-state actors). Continuous learning was facilitated by the PCO, including establishment of the Governance Learning Center.

Relevance of Design

2.16 The relevance of design is rated **modest**, due to the project's overly ambitious objectives, lack of a clear results chain and synergy among components, and serious shortcomings in M&E and capacity building.

2.17 Promoting, mediating, responding to, and monitoring demand for good governance were defined in very general terms, covering all priority areas. Focusing on a single sector or theme, as opposed to the four the project aimed to impact, was an alternative considered, but discarded during project design. Priority areas were seen as multiple entry points for engagement to minimize risks in case of delays or problems with subcomponents, without impacting overall project effectiveness.

2.18 By working with state and non-state institutions, the project aimed to work on both the demand and the supply side of good governance, but the contribution of these different actors was not equally well articulated within the underlying causal chain in each priority area. Actions needed by state institutions to achieve the objectives were clearly defined, but the expected contribution of non-state actors was much less clear.

2.19 Strategic alignment between the two main components was weak. Limited provisions were included to ensure a coordinated effort among and between state and non-state actors. While non-state actors were to work in priority areas, there was no further requirement of alignment with the specific work or mandate of selected state institutions. Partnerships between state and non-state actors were not required, except to access specific grants.

2.20 The key principle of a constructive engagement between civil society organizations and state institutions was realistic, given the country context and background, but that requirement also limited the overall potential impact of the project. As a result, the majority of the grants were small in scale, thematic, and did not foster strategic partnerships with key state institutions (for a list of grantees, see appendix E).⁵

2.21 Having four objectives in three priority areas resulted in an intricate results framework. Expected outcomes in each priority area were not clearly articulated. Outcome indicators were too general to capture project results (such as level of awareness among targeted stakeholders, percentage of disputes that are adequately resolved, and the like). With six implementing agencies spread around five ministries (some with no prior experience with donor financing), having separate M&E for each implementing agency was essential for the PCO to track progress. Yet, the overall results framework resulted in a long list of more than 90 indicators (many of them composite) that were needed to inform the design.

2.22 DFGG Project resources generally focused on the area of decentralization and citizen partnerships (70 percent of the appraised budget, 77 percent of the actual budget). This differential allocation of resources was not discussed in project design documents, but was confirmed during the IEG mission and corresponds to the mandate of the main implementing agency.

2.23 Capacity- and awareness-building activities were identified as a project outcome to be achieved, but also as a necessary condition for the project to achieve its intended results. This dual purpose was not adequately accounted for either in terms of resources or in the M&E. Resources dedicated to these activities were limited, and there was no provision for evaluating their results. All components built in some resources for capacity building, but because of the wide scope of the project development objective and the broad priority governance areas the project was expected to impact, resources proved insufficient early in project implementation.

3. Implementation

3.1 The project was approved in December 2008, and became effective three months later than planned, in June 2009, with an originally expected closing date of March 31, 2013. The project mid-term review took place in June 2011, with 34 percent of the funds disbursed. Project implementation lasted five and a half years, 18 months longer than originally budgeted.

3.2 The project was restructured five times (all level 2), twice beyond the project's control (World Bank 2015a, pp. 4-5). The first restructuring took place in December 2010 to account for the cancellation of performance-based incentives in state institutions supported by the DFGG Project.⁶ The second restructuring, in October 2011, responded to the project midterm recommendations by simplifying the results framework and dropping two nonperforming subcomponents and reallocating their resources (World Bank 2011 p.4; Plummer 2011 p.9). The third restructuring (June 2012) allowed for repaying project preparation costs of another project (Livelihood Enhancement and Associations Project, or LEAP), and reallocated proceeds across components. The last two restructurings (in January 2013 and February 2014) extended the grant closing date to complete planned activities and transition arrangements, strengthen lesson learning, and align project activities with the new Social Accountability Framework (SAF).

3.3 Neither the PDO nor the key associated outcome targets were changed during project restructurings. The PDO did not change because the objectives were defined in

rather general terms (to promote, mediate, respond to, and monitor DFGG in priority reform areas). Since the PDO did not change, there was no need for a split evaluation.

3.4 After the mid-term review, and as a result of the second restructuring, the project became more manageable and its focus improved. At that time, it became clear that the project, which originally aimed to promote, mediate, respond to, and monitor to inform DFGG in four priority areas, could effectively work in only two of these areas. A counterpart was not found in public financial management, so this priority area had no associated subcomponent or specific activities at appraisal. The subcomponent associated with the priority area of natural resource management was dropped during the second restructuring due to changes in government commitment within MONARSI.

Compliance with World Bank Policies

SAFEGUARDS

3.5 The project was classified as category B (World Bank 2008c, p. 41). The main trigger for the environmental assessment was the need to increase the power of Radio National of Kampuchea's main transmitter (dropped during the second restructuring). The Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) states that the project was compliant with the safety measures in place for the civil works associated with the renovation and construction of OWSOs and the Governance Resource and Learning Center, and that no safeguard issues arose during project implementation (World Bank 2015a, p. 11).

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND PROCUREMENT

3.6 Financial performance improved from moderately satisfactory to satisfactory in 2013. There were unqualified audits for financial statements through fiscal 2015. There were no complaints about late payments until early 2014, and these were resolved. Two issues arose during implementation: an exchange loss of \$312,000 that led to funding shortfalls, and slow disbursements during the project's initial two years.

3.7 The final audited financial statements and management letters for the period of January to the end of September 2014 were received nine months late by the Bank, on 2 September 2015. The auditors' opinion of the financial statements is unmodified. There were a few management-letter points for the PCO and the Arbitration Council Foundation, which the IEG mission was told had been followed up, and none for the OWSO or the Asia Foundation. Procurement improved from moderately satisfactory to satisfactory from 2011. A national procurement consultant was hired for each Implementing Agency. There were particular concerns about noncompliance with the Radio National of Kampuchea subcomponent before it was canceled, but this was resolved with good government support. An independent procurement agent was used for large procurements, as was standard practice in the country. The need to competitively contract with NGOs as if they were private firms was a challenge, since it hindered the partnership development needed to achieve constructive engagement with government and, in turn, contribute to the PDO. Fiduciary issues were facilitated with the help of the Good Governance Framework (World Bank 2008c, p. 190; 2015, p. 11), which was used

to track and act on challenges as they arose, including problems arising from the Radio National of Kampuchea component.

4. Achievement of the Objectives

4.1 Efficacy is discussed below under the four objectives in the results framework that contributed to the PDO, with indications of the priority reform areas addressed and the main outcomes achieved (appendix B, table B.1). Summary project logic identifies the priority areas and the objectives for each outcome, as well as how the components were meant to contribute to the achievement of outcomes, and which key performance indicators were used to monitor progress and assess efficacy. Key outputs that contributed to each of the four objectives are also examined.

Objective 1: Promoting DFGG in Priority Reform Areas

4.2 DFGG awareness and understanding were key outcomes of this objective. Project-supported activities promoted DFGG by disclosing, demystifying, and disseminating information on government policies, programs, and budgets to citizens and by enhancing their capacity to act on this information through grants to non-state actors and a broad learning program. Key results are summarized below by priority area.

4.3 In the priority area of decentralization and citizen partnerships, increased awareness of services provided by OWSOs ranged from 57 to 98 percent, as reported in four surveys carried out in 2013–14 (PRIA, India, and SILAKA, Cambodia, 2013). Citizen awareness was reported higher for OWSO services than for the functions of the district ombudsman. Awareness of the district ombudsman increased from a baseline of 4 percent in 2011 to a range of 31–86 percent in 2014. The final evaluation of this component provides little detail on the methodology used to capture this information; IEG was thus unable to fully validate it.

4.4 Citizen understanding of the services provided by OWSOs and district ombudsmen was measured in different ways over the years, reducing the reliability of the estimates. The IEG team found that there is a need for better understanding of the role and mandate of the district ombudsman, as many interviewees, including some district ombudsmen themselves, believe their role is only to accept complaints about the OWSO. This issue is not new; it was raised in the mid- and end-term evaluation of this component.

4.5 In the priority area of private sector development, improved awareness of the Arbitration Council and the labor arbitration process among unions and employers was notable. Arbitration Council awareness rose from 41 percent in mid-2012 to 74 percent in 2014 (against an original target of 61 percent, as assessed by the Arbitration Council Unions and Employer Survey; World Bank 2015a, p. 58). The IEG team checked the data sources and methodology used to support this information and found it credible.⁷ While awareness was not measured after project completion, all stakeholders interviewed during the IEG mission suggested that awareness continued to grow after project closure. In terms of reach, and despite the low level of unionization among workers,⁸ some incipient diversification is observed: from a stable percentage of around 10 percent of cases

coming from industries other than garment and footwear during 2003–13, to 15 percent and 22 percent in 2014 and 2015, respectively (Cambodia, RGC 2016). And, while at the beginning of its operation almost all cases brought to the Arbitration Council came from Phnom Penh, 52 percent of the total cases received by the AC since its inception have been from other provinces (Cambodia, RGC 2016).

4.6 All grants awarded by the non-state actors component included some elements of awareness and information, but information about results is only available for grants surveyed in the second round.⁹ According to the non-state actors' end-term evaluation,¹⁰ 78 percent (target, 70 percent) of the citizens consulted in focus group discussions were aware of and understood facilitation of social accountability by non-state actors. This result is not surprising, since all grantees in the second round conducted some form of structured monitoring of services.

4.7 The non-state actors' component produced 20 DFGG Learning Notes¹¹ or case studies on citizen engagement, monitoring, and other topics relevant to social accountability. This component also produced additional knowledge outputs (policy notes, draft guidelines, tools, operational manuals, notes, and training packages) for the implementation of the SAF. Although such documents are potentially an important resource, it remains to be seen if they will have a substantial impact on the way government operates.

4.8 The Governance Resource Learning Center financed by the project has hosted many learning events based on the knowledge products produced, and there are plans to use the center as a school of governance for subnational officials and non-state actors, with support from Transparency International (see section 6). More than 100,000 citizens were educated about their right to hold the government accountable.¹² The project website has received more than 2 million visitors (up to February 2017).¹³

4.9 For the OWSO, the evidence suggests that involving NGOs in information dissemination was more effective in increasing awareness among citizens than using standard government outreach techniques (Weiser and Pak 2014, p.19). Citizen awareness of OWSOs and district ombudsmen was promoted through government efforts, including street parades, public forums, mass media campaigns, and monthly "citizen hours" that bring together 20–30 citizens and the district or municipal governor. In 2011 and again in 2013, the DFGG Project supported NGO outreach and awareness work in selected districts to increase awareness of both OWSOs and district ombudsmen.

4.10 In natural resource management, activities to enhance awareness of the Land Law encountered serious implementation issues and were subsequently dropped. Important limitations were found in the efficiency and efficacy of the dissemination techniques used and in the complaint mechanisms in place, both suggesting limited government commitment to engage with civil society on this topic.

4.11 There are no outcomes that can be associated with the Radio national of Kampuchea subcomponent, which was dropped two years into implementation. A review of the project revealed that, while some important outputs were funded, DFGG principles were not followed: editorial policies were not respected; talk-back programs did not

pressure the government to become more responsive or accountable; programs on politically sensitive issues were not broadcast; and capacity building did not translate into institutional policies. Overall, promoting DFGG in priority reform areas is rated **modest**, based on the mixed reliability of the evidence on outcomes related to improved stakeholder awareness and understanding of the Arbitration Council and the OWSO or the district ombudsman, the project's efforts to increase awareness and understanding of non-state actors' facilitation of social accountability, and its contribution to the design and implementation plan of the Strategic Accountability Framework through non-state actors and learning components.

Objective 2: Mediating DFGG in Priority Reform Areas

4.12 **Increased confidence, credibility, and effectiveness** of the Arbitration Council and district ombudsmen were the key outcomes of this objective. Project activities helped mediate demand by creating and strengthening formal avenues for consultation, feedback, and dispute resolution between citizens and public officials through the Arbitration Council and, to a lesser extent, through the district ombudsman in the areas of private sector development and decentralization and citizen partnerships.

4.13 In the priority reform area of private sector development, the Arbitration Council helped mediate labor disputes between key export industries (predominantly garment) and their employees. At project completion, 93 percent of users (employers, workers, and their representatives) reported having confidence in the independence, credibility, and effectiveness of the Arbitration Council (up from 72 percent in 2010). The IEG team checked the source of this information and found it credible. An important additional signal of the confidence and trust in the role of the Arbitration Council was the Memorandum of Understanding between employers and unions, first signed in 2010, ratified again in 2012, and still valid at the time of the IEG mission. In that Memorandum, both sides agreed to use the Arbitration Council's binding arbitration procedures in disputes over rights, violations of the law, and existing collective bargaining agreements.

4.14 The Arbitration Council has been effective in solving collective labor disputes, especially considering the increasing number and complexity of cases it has handled. And this effectiveness was sustained after project completion, with 75 percent of cases resolved¹⁴ (up from 68 percent in 2009 and 56 percent in 2006). Arbitrator awards were issued in 17.5 days, on average (2.5 days more than required by law), and posted on the Arbitration Council website. The Arbitration Council handled 1,236 cases and issued 883 arbitral awards from January 2009 to August 2014. Achievements of the Arbitration Council were supported by completion and agreement on professional guidelines for arbitrators, continuous training for professional arbitrators, and outreach and dissemination activities geared to employers, unions, and employees.

4.15 Progress toward the Arbitration Council sustainability goal is discussed below, based on recommendations received in mid-term and end-term evaluations. These matters include the ability of the Arbitration Council to: (i) keep good staff and arbitrators, (ii) deliver quality arbitration, and (iii) develop strategies toward regular and assured funding in the medium term.

4.16 The ability to retain key staff and arbitrators was highlighted as one of the achievements by the stakeholders interviewed. About half of the arbitrators have been working since the Arbitration Council started operating in 2003 (arbitrators are not paid a salary but receive an honorarium).

4.17 The quality of arbitration awards issued by the Arbitration Council improved over time (as shown in information reported in baseline, mid-, and end-term legal audits available in project files). Awards are publicly disclosed on the Arbitration Council's website. During project implementation, an awards digest was also prepared annually, but this was discontinued after project closure.

4.18 Reaching financial independence and achieving financial sustainability have proven difficult for the Arbitration Council. Concerns regarding its neutrality and independence, added to the need to ensure free services to comply with Cambodian law, limits the ability of the Arbitration Council to raise money from key stakeholders. The Arbitration Council has put together a sustainability action plan based on transitional donor funding and toward a long-term bipartite funding model. The objective would be to cover annual Arbitration Council operating costs with a small annual worker contribution (of about \$0.50, or CR 2,000), matched by employers.

4.19 Limited progress has been achieved so far in achieving this. Based on IEG stakeholder interviews, there is support from the business association to match potential employers' contributions, but not all unions favor this. The government provides the Arbitration Council with a nominal contribution of 10 percent of its budget (negotiated at the time of DFGG Project closure). It also offered an office building for use by the Arbitration Council, but this is perceived as potentially raising conflicts of interest, and for this reason is unlikely to be accepted.

4.20 In the priority reform area of decentralization and citizen partnerships, district ombudsmen have helped to enforce the posted fees and service standards of OWSOs. At the time of the IEG visit, district ombudsmen were appointed in all districts. They handled a relatively low number of complaints (151), considering the large number of transactions handled by the OWSOs. This may partially reflect the Cambodian culture, but it may also be a product of the limited awareness or understanding of this function among citizens, or it may have something to do with its effectiveness. Of the complaints received, 92 percent were considered resolved, against a target of 40 percent. And five of the complaints led to the firing of staff, including a manager, sending a message that integrity was a job requirement (Weiser and Pak 2014, pp. 17–19). However, the IEG team found that the definition of "resolved" was not clearly understood by district ombudsmen interviewed.

4.21 Information regarding clients' perception of the independence, credibility, and effectiveness of the district ombudsman complaints system is very limited. Two NGOs collected survey data on this in 2013. They found that most users were confident of the complaint system's independence (57–100 percent), credibility (62–70 percent), and effectiveness (83 percent). However, the number of respondents was very small. At the time of the IEG mission, district ombudsman functions were not yet aligned with the

subnational complaints-handling system, a recommendation raised during the project mid-term review and reiterated during the end-line evaluation of this component.

4.22 Overall, mediating DFGG in priority reform areas is rated **substantial**, essentially because of the outcomes arising from the work of the Arbitration Council and, to a lesser extent, the district ombudsmen.

Objective 3: Responding to DFGG in Priority Reform Areas

4.23 A key expected result of this objective was positive change in policy and practice. The IEG team confirmed that project activities triggered important positive changes in these areas. Evidence on outcome indicators regarding client satisfaction, quality of services, and citizen reporting of positive results is available from project evaluation documents, but it is not comprehensive.

4.24 The development of the national SAF, its implementation plan (signed by the government and civil society), and its inclusion in the Five-Year National Strategic Development Plan 2014–18 is probably the biggest change in policy/practice triggered by the project. The government signed an agreement with civil society to improve social accountability in schools, health centers, and local governments. Through the SAF, the government commits to *mandate, encourage, train, and monitor local officials and service providers to engage in social accountability activities*.¹⁵ Information collected during the IEG mission indicates that the experience funded by the DFGG Project helped shape the implementation plan for the SAF. Its success will remain challenging in the Cambodian political and economic context.

4.25 In the priority reform area of decentralization and citizen partnerships, the response to the DFGG Project was confirmed by high stakeholder satisfaction, reduced time and cost of processing transactions, and the number of ministries and functions delegated to OWSOs. Information on stakeholder satisfaction is limited, but satisfaction was reportedly high: 90 percent of clients and 96 percent of elected officials were satisfied with services in new OWSOs (World Bank 2015a, p. 59, indicator 3.2). Qualitative feedback from users and citizens as reported in the final evaluation of the OWSO component suggests that the OWSO is considered an improvement over obtaining services directly from the provincial line department, primarily because of lower informal fees and more welcoming customer service.

4.26 OWSOs achieved or exceeded all planned targets, with high demand for services such as legalization of documents, family book certification (recording births, marriages, deaths), and motorcycle plates. During project implementation, 36 OWSOs were established or renovated throughout Cambodia, including the capital (24 were originally planned). These OWSOs completed 435,562 transactions while the project was ongoing, compared with an original target of 24 offices, 22,000 transactions, and a revised target of 250,000 transactions (World Bank 2015a, pp. 37–38, 58–62). Prior to the project, only two OWSOs were in operation. The IEG mission was told that part of the service fees collected by the OWSOs are used to pay incentives to staff, which average \$25 on top of a \$150 monthly salary; this is down from the reported \$70 average incentive paid during the DFGG Project. By project completion, 10 line agencies and 194 service-delivery

functions were assigned to OWSOs, meeting and exceeding targets, respectively (World Bank 2015a, p. 62, indicator IO1.3). These services are generally provided faster, at less cost, and at more service points than was the case through line ministries (see section 5).

4.27 As discussed earlier, awareness of corruption is increasing, but corrupt practices persist. In the case of OWSOs, extra payments have not been eliminated, in part because citizens may offer payments to officials without being asked as a sign of gratitude for receiving prompt service (and thus do not see the need to report them to the DO). One NGO survey in 2012 found that 19 percent of respondents had paid informal fees. However, as a result of the posting of fees and service standards, extra fees are anecdotally reported as being much less than was the case before.

4.28 In terms of sustainability, the OWSO model is institutionalized in MOI. OWSO operational costs are part of the provincial budget, a regulatory framework is in place for nine line ministries, and the MOI is following the OWSO model at the district/khan level. Over the period from April 2014 to September 2016, 22 new OWSOs were established, and nearly 329,000 non-legalization transactions took place, generating over \$7.7 million in revenue.

4.29 In the priority area of private sector development, the continuous increase in the number of cases received by the Arbitration Council throughout project implementation (except in 2010), as well as the signature and ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding between employers and employees (discussed in previous section), can be seen as a proxy for client satisfaction and quality of services. Arbitration Council award precedents and continued employee claims over time are pushing employers to create better working conditions. In terms of sustainability, concerns were raised by stakeholders interviewed due to the potential negative impact of the Trade Union Law. The law effectively limits the number of cases that can be brought to the Arbitration Council by allowing only the most representative union in each factory (as certified by the government) to bring cases to the attention of the Arbitration Council.¹⁶ While the impact of this remains to be seen, a sharp reduction in the number of cases is already evident, as shown in appendix E, figure E.2. The case load had previously been around 30 cases per month, and at the time of IEG mission was reduced to 19 on average, with only five in the two months before IEG's visit.

4.30 Individual grants and partnerships funded by the project resulted in small changes to transparency and attitudes in communes, as well as in specific changes in policy and practice at the local level (for example, community scorecards led to changes in staff communication and professionalism, and hygiene and cleanliness in health centers and schools). While it is difficult to give an aggregate measure of impact, changes are well documented in the final evaluation report (PRIA, India, and SILAKA, Cambodia, 2013, p. 30; annex 1.5), in the DFGG Learning Notes produced by the project,¹⁷ and in the project completion report. In schools, examples included implementation of codes of conduct, teacher attendance survey systems, warnings regarding informal payments, and proper treatment of children. In health centers, examples included improved management oversight, display of fees, observance of rules, and sanctions for taking informal fees (Corsel and Plummer 2013; Latif, Murphy, and Plummer 2015a, 2015b; Weiser and Plummer 2015a). Anecdotal evidence is available on improved accountable and

transparent functioning of the commune councils through the gradual opening up of monthly commune council meetings and public forums to citizens in some locations.

4.31 Changes in service practice in schools and health centers were found in grants to non-state actors where structured monitoring mechanisms were used, such as citizen report cards or community scorecards, and specific service improvement plans were developed as a result. A total of 15 of the 44 non-state actor grants implemented projects that included structured monitoring mechanisms and specific service improvement plans for state institutions and services. Positive results are more prominent in grants funded in the second round, compared with the first round.

4.32 Seventy-five percent (target, 35 percent) of the citizens consulted in focus group discussions conducted for the final evaluation of the non-state actors' component reported positive results on governance as a result of the activities supported by the project. All civil society organizations interviewed during the IEG mission verbally confirmed these positive results, but highlighted several challenges still ahead, noting the long-term agenda to which the project contributed.

4.33 Overall, responding to DFGG in priority reform areas is rated **high** because of the achievements of the Arbitration Council and OWSO and the important changes in policy and practice.

Objective 4: Monitoring to Inform DFGG in Priority Reform Areas

4.34 Monitoring of local service-delivery performance by civil society organizations was the main outcome of this objective, largely supported through grants to non-state actors.

4.35 While there are notable examples of how civil society organization monitoring impacted public service providers, and its relevance should not be underestimated, given the country context, these efforts were not systematic or at scale. All stakeholders consulted during the IEG mission agreed on the importance of having civil society and government working together. But grant-selection criteria for non-state actors could have been more strategic to maximize the impact of the operation in the state institutions supported by the project.

4.36 Under the non-state actors' component, 226 communes, 33 districts, 153 health centers, 330 schools, and nine OWSOs had their performance monitored through social accountability activities supported by the project. One-third of the 44 grants and partnerships funded included structured social accountability tools that not only facilitated citizen monitoring and feedback, but also included provisions for service response. As discussed under objective 3, positive results (of different degrees) were reported in health centers, schools, and OWSOs (Corsel and Plummer 2013; Latif, Murphy, and Plummer 2015a, 2015b; Weiser and Plummer 2015a). Information for communes and districts is limited to anecdotal evidence of gradual opening up of monthly commune council meetings and public forums to citizens.

4.37 The results of this monitoring, albeit limited, were useful to inform the definition and implementation plan of the SAF. Grants funded through the non-state actors' component became more targeted toward improvements in service delivery in education and health over time. The SAF builds on the experience with community scorecards funded through these non-state actor grants and adds joint-accountability action plans to the process.

4.38 In the priority reform area of decentralization and citizen partnerships, the design provided for the district ombudsman to monitor the operations of the OWSO and accept feedback and complaints on the performance of the district administration. Independent monitoring of OWSO performance by non-state actors in cooperation with the district ombudsman, district, or commune council was limited (Plummer and Rojvanit 2015). Five NGO partnerships promoted and monitored performance in 17 OWSOs and, as a result of this monitoring, various actions were taken to improve performance: removal of staff, posting of informal payment signs, sanctions against lateness, and the like. Improper payments for services have been reduced, but persist (Dolk and Plummer 2015a; Weiser and Plummer 2015b).

4.39 Capacity building for both government officials and civil society organizations was considered central to the achievement of project objectives, but the budget allocated proved insufficient, and there is no evidence of efforts to trace the impact of the training (for example, see Latif, Murphy, and Plummer 2015b; Weiser and Plummer 2015a). The learning program that was conducted at the Governance Resource and Learning Center included 15 training events to strengthen the role of state and non-state actors. Satisfaction surveys were conducted at exit, and the ICR reports high satisfaction rates among beneficiaries (63–100 percent). Training materials were posted on the project website, and they remain available for public access. During the last two years of implementation, DFGG Learning Notes were produced in a collaborative way with civil society organizations to help document lessons, which in turn contributed to the design and preparation of implementation of the SAF (I-SAF) (World Bank 2015a, p. 64). Interviews with key stakeholders suggest that capacity building continues to be an issue for I-SAF.

4.40 Overall, monitoring to inform DFGG in priority reform areas is rated **modest** because of the limited scale of the work done through the non-state actors' component on public service providers' performance.

5. Efficiency

5.1 There is evidence that reforms supported by the project have reduced costs and improved service standards, contributing to a **substantial** efficiency rating.

5.2 For example, OWSO services were provided for less cost and in less time than was the case previously.¹⁸ OWSOs had an average cost recovery ratio of 273 percent, and an economic internal rate of return (EIRR) of 258 percent (World Bank 2015a, pp. 18, 52–55). While the IEG mission found anecdotal evidence that these cost and time savings were continuing, it was not possible to validate the methodology of these estimates. In visits to selected OWSOs, IEG was told that OWSO budgets are not kept separate from

budgets for overall municipal and district administration. Further, there is evidence that in some sectors, new regulations (prakas) require that line departments post fees and service standards like the OWSOs do. For example, the provincial offices of Ministry of Public Works and Transport may now—in some cases— complete motorcycle registration faster than OWSOs because of greater economies of scale, although the actual posting of fees and service standards depends on the willingness of the provincial governor to enforce the new rules. This is an overall efficiency gain for the country, and attributable in part to the example set by the OWSOs that were supported by the project.

5.3 The Arbitration Council told the IEG mission that since the DFGG Project, it has continued to receive adequate funding, including support from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) (\$1.2 million) and USAID (\$700,000). Both will continue support through 2018, which will help to cover an annual budget of \$800,000. The average cost of a 10-day strike in Cambodia was estimated at \$500,000 in 2014, so avoiding one strike would almost cover the annual running costs of the Arbitration Council. In 2016 it received a contribution of \$80,000 from the Ministry of Labor. Its EIRR during the project was 95 percent (World Bank 2015a, pp. 52–55), and its cost of arbitrating a labor dispute has dropped continuously since project implementation, from \$2,095 in 2008 to \$892 in 2014 (World Bank 2015a, p. 18).¹⁹

5.4 For the non-state actors' component, the implementation of the SAF is expected to lead to greater efficiency in use of public resources through citizen report card feedback on public service performance in health centers (longer opening hours, more reliable emergency response, more availability of medicines), in schools (improved teacher attendance and timeliness, communication with parents, cleanliness), and in needs-based allocation of commune resources. An impact evaluation is being planned for 2018 to assess this aspect as part of the Voice and Action: Social Accountability for Improved Service Delivery Project.

5.5 There are ways that the project's efficiency could have been improved. In the case of OWSOs, some of the steps and supporting documents are not delegated to OWSOs, causing delays. Many of the licenses, permits, and registrations issued are overlapping or burdensome, and could be streamlined. Also, many back-office staff have little or no work, and their numbers could be reduced by training staff to perform multiple functions (Weiser and Plummer 2015c). In the case of the AC, the adoption of the Trade Union Law in September 2016 could lessen efficiency by reducing the number of cases brought forward, but it is too early to tell if this case reduction will continue.

6. Ratings

Outcome

6.1 The overall outcome rating for the project is **moderately satisfactory**. Relevance of objectives is rated substantial because the PDO was highly relevant to the country priorities and the governance priorities identified in the Cambodia CAS. The relevance of design is rated modest due to the project's overly ambitious objectives, lack of clear causal chain and synergy among components, and serious shortcomings in M&E and capacity building. As for the four objectives identified under the PDO: (i) Promoting

DFGG in priority reform areas is rated modest, based on the mixed reliability of the evidence on outcomes related to improved awareness of stakeholders of the Arbitration Council and the OWSO or the district ombudsman, and the project's contribution to the design and implementation plan of the Strategic Accountability Framework through the non-state actors' component; (ii) Mediating DFGG in priority reform areas is rated substantial because of the outcomes arising from the work of the Arbitration Council and district ombudsman; (iii) Responding to DFGG in priority reform areas is rated high because of the achievements of the Arbitration Council and OWSO and the important changes in policy and practice documented and discussed in section 3; and (iv) Monitoring to inform DFGG in priority reform areas is rated modest because of the limited scale of the work done through the non-state actors' component on public service providers' performance and lack of evidence of the impact of training. Efficiency is rated substantial.

Risk to Development Outcome

6.2 Based on the degree of institutionalization of some of the key components, the adoption and ongoing implementation of the Strategic Accountability Framework, and the strong reliance on donor funding for this agenda, as confirmed by the IEG mission, the risk to development outcome is rated **moderate**. The OWSOs and district ombudsmen are now being financed by government and user fees, although the IEG mission was told that since project closure, incentive payments to staff had been reduced, and funding for some maintenance costs was uncertain, because office buildings and equipment provided by the project have started to age. The Arbitration Council is financed by government and other development partners, although the source of funding after 2018 is not yet known. Follow-on work by non-state actors continues to support the implementation of the Strategic Accountability Framework with funds from the Voice and Action: Social Accountability for Improved Service Delivery Project, USAID, and other development partners.

6.3 There is a mixture of risks and opportunities stemming from the political economy context. As outlined in section 1, rapid growth is heightening concerns about inequality and unfairness, contributing to increasing opposition support, and steps have been taken by the ruling party to restrict political space for civil society and trade unions. This could constrain the work of the Arbitration Council, and possibly limit the government's appetite for engaging with non-state actors. At the same time, the regime's core constituency is in rural areas, so it is motivated to expand popular OWSOs and other processes supported by DFGG in the run-up to the next elections in 2017–18.

6.4 The preparation process identified several risks to achieving project goals, and the mitigating measures proposed were of varying effectiveness. Measures to ensure the credibility and integrity of grants to non-state actors and the Arbitration Council were very effective; no major concerns or complaints were raised during project implementation. Similarly, measures to minimize the risk of patronage or corruption are widely supported. However, activities to ensure political support were too reliant on stakeholder buy-in, which proved to be more challenging than anticipated (as in the case of the Radio National of Kampuchea and MONASRI and the inability of the government to sustain incentive payments). Likewise, measures to address the limited institutional

capacity among state and non-state actors were insufficient, in terms of both technical assistance and budget.

World Bank Performance

6.5 Based on a moderately satisfactory rating for quality at entry and a satisfactory rating for project supervision, World Bank performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

QUALITY AT ENTRY

6.6 Quality at entry is rated **moderately satisfactory**. To identify the state institutions that the project would support, project design benefited from a participatory project preparation process that included stakeholder consultations, existing social accountability and institutional assessments, and a political economy analysis. Criteria to select the state institutions also included a mapping of their main functions to the four outcomes of interest related to DFGG (promotion, mediation, response, and monitoring) and its potential impact. Having committed leadership or a reform champion in an institution was considered essential. Specific sustainability mechanisms were embedded in each component (World Bank 2008c, p. 26).

6.7 Providing direct support to non-state actors through a World Bank project was highly innovative. The design of the component built on the experience of the previous Project to Enhance Capacity in Social Accountability, a two-year capacity-building program for non-state actors in social accountability. It also benefited from a comprehensive civil society assessment conducted during project preparation. This allowed the planners to understand the factors that influence civic engagement in the Cambodian context—social accountability in particular—and the relationship between citizens and the state. Requiring civil society organizations to have a constructive engagement aimed at fostering partnerships with state institutions was identified in component 1.

6.8 Project components were relevant to achievement of the PDO. However, although it was plausible to expect that the four outcomes—promoting, mediating, responding, and monitoring—were all needed to achieve DFGG, as discussed previously, planning to do all these things in four priority areas was overly ambitious and unrealistic. This proved true in the early stages of implementation, and led to high coordination and implementation costs. As recognized by the ICR (World Bank 2015a, pp.6–7) and confirmed during the IEG mission, the intention of including activities around the dissemination of a controversial Land Law and aiming to promote social accountability through the national radio in the context of severe governance challenges was overly ambitious and risky. More explicit consideration of the fractious nature of political and bureaucratic differences on decentralization, and of how DFGG related to the wide-ranging support from other donors, might have led to design features that avoided some of the shortcomings mentioned above.

QUALITY OF SUPERVISION

6.9 The quality of World Bank supervision is rated **satisfactory**. Several examples of good supervision are discussed in the ICR (such as the use of a Good Governance Framework to manage and resolve project risks; intensive support in a challenging project context; thoroughness and candor of the ISRs; prompt action to deal with issues found in the Midterm Review, and the like). All stakeholders contacted during the IEG mission, including government officials, implementing agencies, and donor partners, agreed on the performance of the Bank team supervising the project in resolving key design challenges. The World Bank team conducted regular annual supervision missions throughout project implementation, and its supervision reports were comprehensive, candid, and detailed. Highly experienced staff supported implementation in the country office. The team received the World Bank's East Asia and the Pacific Turn-around Award for Project Supervision in 2012. Several measures were taken after the Midterm Review to improve project cohesion and to strengthen its results focus, including (i) limiting the number and type of social accountability activities funded, (ii) utilizing the learning program to bring all activities together and help identify the lessons to contribute to the implementation of the SAF, and (iii) allocating strategic funding for medium-to-large-scale grants to enhance impact. In addition, project resources were used to support the design and implementation plans of the SAF, demonstrating the Bank team's adaptability to a changing environment. Sustainability strategies for each component were developed well before project closure, which helped to ensure sustained results and continuous progress toward the PDO.

Borrower Performance

6.10 Due to some variation in the performance of the different implementing agencies and the government commitment to the principles of the DFGG Project, the overall borrower performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

6.11 Mixed evidence is available regarding government commitment to the objectives of the DFGG Project. On the one hand, government commitment is supported by its reaction to noncompliant state institutions, its willingness to continue to engage with non-state actors through the adoption of the SAF, and the School of Governance plans. On the other hand, limited government resources allocated to this agenda and the increasing restrictions on non-state actors question this commitment. Government performance is rated **satisfactory**.

6.12 Although it was implemented during a difficult period, the government gave clear signals of its commitment to the objectives of the DFGG Project during implementation. Government took effective steps to address issues arising during implementation, such as a five-month delay in project effectiveness, cancellation of the merit-based pay initiative, the dropping of two implementing agencies due to fiduciary issues, and changes made after the Midterm Review to streamline processes for more effective implementation. The adoption of the SAF, incorporated into the new National Strategic Development Plan, is

another signal of government commitment (World Bank 2015a, pp. 16, 25–6; Dolk and Plummer 2015b; Plummer 2015).

6.13 During the IEG field visit, the team found additional evidence supporting government commitment to the DFGG agenda. Expansion to new districts and replication of the OWSO and district ombudsman model continued, partnerships with non-state actors through the implementation of the Strategic Accountability Framework proceeded, and cooperation with the AC is ongoing, including a nominal budget allocation from the Ministry of Labor in 2016. Some provincial governors are implementing new regulations (prakas) requiring that line departments such as the Ministry of Public Works and Transport post fees and service standards, following the example of OWSOs, and are reportedly providing some services faster. The Governance Learning Center created with Bank support has partnered with Transparency International Cambodia to host a School of Governance, with the intention of training local officials on the principles of the DFGG Project.

6.14 However, there are concerns over factors not controlled by the MOI. For instance, there are increasing restrictions on non-state actors, including potentially criminalizing normal work of non-state actors, such as election monitoring, and the recent execution of the head of a grassroots advocacy group was of grave concern. Also, the newly adopted trade union and CSO laws may restrict the DFGG objective going forward.

6.15 In addition, there are combative relationships between powerful bureaucratic factions in different central ministries, including the MOI, that can adversely affect performance. For example, there is concern that the recent increases in government salaries have taken place without change in subnational budget allocations (2.8 percent for communes, 1 percent for districts), leading to a reduction in essential funds for operations and maintenance. The IEG mission was repeatedly told that the strong commitment to decentralization from the MOI was not matched by a commensurate funding commitment from the MEF. And slow advances were indeed observed in the 10-year program of decentralization and deconcentration reforms (except in the education sector). The heavy and continuous reliance on donor funding for this agenda is also a concern, and it adds to the coordination challenges.

IMPLEMENTING AGENCY PERFORMANCE

6.16 Due to the performance of the Arbitration Council, the OWSO, the Asia Foundation, and the MOI, and despite the noncompliance of MONASRI and the RNK, implementing agency performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**. The AC was well staffed, and effectively drew on a group of lawyers from local private law firms as arbitrators; half represented employers and half represented unions. These arbitrators covered more cases than originally planned, despite industrial unrest after the 2013 election. Both staff and arbitrators benefited from overseas training. The performance of the Arbitration Council was rated highly satisfactory by the ICR (World Bank 2015a, p. 26). The IEG mission was told by the Arbitration Council Foundation, arbitrators, and cooperating donors that the caseload and high standards of performance had continued after project completion. Although the caseload dropped after the adoption of the

restrictive Trade Union Law in September 2016, the AC and other stakeholders are working to address this issue.

6.17 The OWSO District Support Office met or exceeded all targets set for providing services in less time, for less cost, with reasonable cost recovery, and with high citizen awareness and satisfaction. Performance was rated satisfactory by the ICR. The IEG mission found that new OWSOs were opening, and service standards were being maintained. However, greater efficiency could be achieved by streamlining back-office work, and the tightening subnational budget allocations for subnational work is a concern.

6.18 The non-state actors' component supported constructive engagement with government authorities, despite the challenges of political unrest and a tightening of restrictions. The Asia Foundation maintained a cooperative relationship with government, non-state actors, and the World Bank, and the ICR rated its performance as satisfactory. The IEG mission found continuing evidence of such constructive engagement, through documentation and interviews with grantees, concerning the World Bank's Voice and Action: Social Accountability for Improved Service Delivery Project, and in the partnership between the MOI and Transparency International to launch the School of Governance, using the facility provided by DFGG Project funds and financing from the European Union and SIDA.

6.19 The MONASRI and Radio National of Kampuchea subcomponents were dropped because of noncompliance with the principles of the DFGG Project, suggesting limited government commitment to engage with civil society in those areas (see section 3). Both had moderately unsatisfactory ratings when they were discontinued, and were dropped to avoid an unsatisfactory rating (World Bank 2015a, p. 26). Thus, despite the noncompliance of the individual implementing agencies, prompt reaction from the MOI helped minimize the impact.

6.20 The PCO facilitated strong commitment from MOI leadership, responsiveness to unexpected issues such as the need to shut down two components and reallocate funds, compliance with governance and fiduciary standards, and adaptiveness in addressing initial challenges with the learning program. The ICR rates PCO performance as moderately satisfactory. The IEG mission noted that firm plans to launch the School of Governance are an important step in sustaining the learning culture built during the DFGG Project.

Monitoring and Evaluation

6.21 Despite the important shortcomings in the design, M&E is rated **substantial** due to the changes made during implementation and the utilization of M&E.

DESIGN

6.22 The initial results framework included 90 indicators that lacked baselines; many were not measurable, and some combined indicators that were not comparable. This had to do with the difficult nature of the concepts that had to be measured (trust, partnership,

lessons), but also with the broad scope of the project. The four outcomes—of promoting, mediating, responding to, and monitoring DFGG—were originally articulated in the project’s results framework as indicators, while the means to achieve them (partnerships, capacity building, and lesson learning) were articulated as intermediate outcomes.

6.23 The design called for each implementing agency to have its own M&E system, managed by dedicated internal units. To aggregate results across the diverse components, the design provided for composite indicators. For example, the indicator "number of disputes and instances of feedback identified and/or mediated through relevant DFGG programs" aggregated labor and land law disputes, complaints received by the district ombudsman, disputes identified by non-state actors, and feedback received through talk-back radio programs (World Bank 2008c, pp. 57–58). Different stakeholders had differing interpretations of indicators, and thus its aggregation was problematic.

6.24 M&E requirements were not appropriate, given the low local capacity. Some indicators required surveys—in a country where there is limited expertise in survey methodology. Indicators had high error margins, larger in some cases than the change being measured. Key concepts such as activities, output, outcome, and impact do not have words in Khmer, and were difficult to grasp for the Cambodians staffing M&E units. The M&E training provided was too theoretical, and M&E budgets were inadequate. To address these constraints, the M&E systems should have been as simple as possible.

IMPLEMENTATION

6.25 Although M&E design was initially overly complex and under-resourced, the results framework was simplified after the Midterm Review, and greater resources provided, including support for high-quality, independent assessments of key components. The review yielded concrete suggestions for improvement that were adopted by the project team. The emphasis on assessing progress based on the interaction between citizens and the state—and not only on processes—is commendable, despite the poor manifestation of this in the long list of composite indicators included in the original results framework.

6.26 Following the MTR and second restructuring, the results framework was simplified with fewer, more easily measured indicators. Composite indicators were removed, and more adequate budgets were provided for M&E, drawing on resources freed up by the two cancelled components. Provision was made for independent evaluations of the Arbitration Council, OWSO, PCO, and non-state actor components that were contracted and completed prior to project completion. Results of these evaluations were published in summary form in DFGG Learning Notes, and were reviewed in detail by the IEG mission. For example, the OWSO and district ombudsman evaluation was based on a range of evidence, including data analysis, key informant interviews using semi-structured questionnaires (provided in the evaluation report), direct observation, and a survey of elected officials.²⁰

6.27 The Good Governance Framework used by the project served as an additional management tool to help monitor progress, and track and flag issues as they arose. The

Good Governance Framework monitored not only procurement and financial management issues, but also the role of civil society, complaints and remedies, code of ethical conduct, and sanctions. Quarterly progress reports were produced by each implementing agency, tracking progress toward outputs. The PCO used these reports to keep track of implementation and to prepare consolidated annual progress reports.

UTILIZATION

6.28 The IEG mission review of mid-term and end-line independent evaluations for all components found changes in policy and practice based on M&E feedback. For instance, of the 11 recommendations in the Weiser and Pak 2014 report, five had been addressed in whole or part by 2013. A new regulation (praka) required that fees and processing times be posted, and official MEF receipts be provided not only in OWSOs, but in all service-delivery points, including line departments and subnational authorities. MOI also negotiated with MEF to streamline the process for verifying customs receipts for motorcycles to reduce delays and demands for informal payments. Signs stating: “no demand for informal fees” were also posted in OWSOs, based on feedback from surveys, as verified by the IEG mission during field visits. Another praka provided a monthly stipend for the district ombudsman that was the equivalent of that provided to a district councilor. Telephone numbers for the district governor, OWSO chief, and district ombudsman were also posted in the OWSO, a measure based on survey feedback, as verified by the IEG mission. The strengthened results framework and M&E processes after the second restructuring enabled the use of results in the decision to drop two weakly performing subcomponents, and in resolving issues concerning participation by women (World Bank 2015a, pp. 10–11).

6.29 The IEG mission found that continuing M&E performance is uneven across implementing agencies. As indicated in section 4, the Arbitration Council was able to provide detailed monitoring data beyond September/October 2016 on key indicators from the DFGG results framework, including number of cases handled, percent of disputes resolved, percent of awards issued in 15 days, and revenue-generation as a percentage of operating costs. However, the OWSO/ district ombudsman District Support Unit could only provide anecdotal evidence, and was not able to provide comprehensive data to the mission.

7. Lessons

There are three key lessons:

7.1 **First, timely identification of key changes in policy during implementation can substantially impact project results.** The World Bank project team reacted promptly to changes in government commitment to DFGG work in public financial management, natural resource management, and with MONASRI and Radio National of Kampuchea. More important, the project team was strategic in using the opportunity to influence the design of the Strategic Accountability Framework through the learning from experience of civil society organizations and implementing agencies. This, in turn, significantly increased the outreach, focus, and impact of project-funded activities.

7.2 **Second, the additional resources and time needed for direct support to non-state actors to be effective should not be underestimated.** Many governance projects recognize the importance of working with both state (supply side of governance) and non-state actors (demand side of governance) to make sustained governance changes in the performance of an individual agency. Yet projects need to be more realistic about what this entails, considering the limited capacity and experience of both the Bank and the civil society organizations in this area and the multiplicity of actors involved.

7.3 **Third, projects aiming to strengthen accountability should pay more attention to the political economy.** The DFGG Project used political economy analysis at entry to identify the leaders and state institutions that were likely to support social accountability approaches in the government. And, to some extent, this was an effective approach. But the focus of the political economy analysis needs to be broader. Better understanding of the underlying structures of power, interests, incentives, and institutions that could enable or prevent changes (for example, MEF support for the decentralization agenda; Ministry of Labor incentives with regard to the sustainability of the Arbitration Council; MOI incentives with regard to strong independent monitoring by civil society organizations) could have helped set more realistic and strategic objectives and define more concrete risk-mitigation measures.

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¹ Law on Administrative Management of the Capital, Provinces, Municipalities, Districts and Khans, and Law on Elections of Phnom Penh Capital Council, Provincial Council, Municipal Council, District Council and Khan Council.

² <http://www.ncdd.gov.kh/en>.

³ According to the Ministry of Planning, “the National Strategic Development Plan is the single, overarching, guiding and reference document of the RGC and the “blue print for further progress” in building a new Cambodia. Government and external development partners are expected to strictly adhere to the priorities set out in the Plan. <http://www.mop.gov.kh/> (accessed February 2017)

⁴ The project supported state institutions in only three of the four priority areas: private sector development, decentralization and citizen partnerships and natural resource management. A counterpart was not found in public financial management, and thus there was no corresponding subcomponent. But appraisal documents retained this reference, and non-state actors could thus technically apply for grants in this area.

⁵ Thematic grants to non-state actors had the purpose of mainstreaming DFGG in priority sectors. Partnership grants were intended to promote collaboration and dialogue with state institutions, including independent monitoring and assessments of state institutions’ activities.

⁶ The government canceled the Merit-Based Pay Initiative that the project was counting on to reward state institutions committed to the principles of the DFGG Project.

⁷ The ACF tracks awareness of AC services through surveys and interviews conducted at baseline, mid-line, and end-line by a leading research institute in Cambodia.

⁸ Only an estimated 1 percent of the total workforce in Cambodia is organized into unions or associations. The garment sector is an outlier, with 60 percent of its workers registered in unions; other sectors have much lower registration (ILO 2014, p. 65).

⁹ On average, grants in the second round are larger than those in the first round. In addition, all recipients are repeated grantees.

¹⁰ Mid- and end-line evaluations of this component were conducted by the Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA), India, and SILAKA, Cambodia. Eighteen focus group discussions were held in eight districts of five provinces. Focus group participants included community-mobilizing committee members, citizens who had attended a public forum or service-scoring meeting, and users of health services monitored by nonstate actors.

¹¹ Appendix E lists learning notes and relevant links.

¹² According to the Asia Foundation, more than 100,000 citizens have participated in public forums and meetings with government officials to increase understanding of rights and demand greater accountability of government service.

¹³ http://dfggmoi.gov.kh/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=80&Itemid=204&lang=en

¹⁴ As reported by the Arbitration Council Foundation. A successful outcome is one where the Arbitration Council has (1) facilitated an agreement between the parties to settle the dispute; (2) issued an award that (even if it was opposed) has been fully or substantially implemented to resolve the dispute; or (3) issued an award that (although it was opposed) has formed the basis for a post-award settlement between the parties and has resolved the dispute.

¹⁵ As reported in World Bank 2015b, p. 4.

¹⁶ Each factory is allowed to have only one most representative union.

¹⁷ The DFGG Learning Notes produced by the project are listed in appendix E.

¹⁸ PRIA, India, and SILAKA, Cambodia, 2013 provided a range of estimates for different types of services. These data are presented inconsistently in the ICR, (World Bank 2015a, pp. vii, 39, 62).

¹⁹ The average cost per case was \$1,056 in 2013 and \$1,231 in 2012.

²⁰ The evaluators pointed out that it would have been better to carry out an impact evaluation including a counterfactual that compared results from areas served by one-window service offices (OWSOs) with areas without OWSOs; however, this would have driven up costs beyond the DFGG resources provided for the independent evaluation. A challenge faced by the OWSO/district ombudsman evaluation was the partial availability of baseline data. For example, in the case of baseline data on satisfaction with services of line departments, the various nongovernmental organizations collecting data used different methods of sample selection, survey instruments, and treatment of nonresponses. The results reported in the results framework are for different sites. For this reason, the evaluators presented ranges of findings for the best possible reflection of evidence.

Appendix A. Basic Data Sheet

DEMAND FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE PROJECT (P101156)

Key Project Data (amounts in \$ million)

	Appraisal estimate	Actual or current estimate	Actual as % of appraisal estimate
Total project costs	20.00	21.42	107.1
Loan amount	20.00	19.54	97.7
Cofinancing	3.42	1.53	45
Cancellation			

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15
Appraisal estimate (\$ million)	7.7	7.7	12.31	16.58	20.00	20.00	20.00
Actual (\$ million)	0	3.152	6.54	11.16	16.93	19.03	19.54
Actual as % of appraisal	0	40.9	53.1	67.3	84.6	95.5	97.7
Date of final disbursement:06/14/2015							

Note: FY = fiscal year.

Project Dates

	Original	Actual
Initiating memorandum	06/26/2006	06/26/2006
Negotiations	03/13/2008	03/13/2008
Board approval	12/02/2008	12/02/2008
Signing	01/14/2009	01/14/2009
Effectiveness	06/24/2009	06/24/2009
Closing date	03/31/2013	09/30/2014

Staff Time and Cost

Staff time and cost (Bank budget only)		
Stage of project cycle	Staff weeks (number)	US\$, thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY07	34.85	192.44
FY08	40.69	198.65
FY09	31.63	150.20
Total:		541.29
Supervision/ICR		
FY09	9.31	37.80
FY10	18.51	75.70
FY11	36.91	120.82
FY12	39.43	94.73
FY13	39.69	131.20
FY14	37.23	148.42
FY15	12.45	46.53
Total:		655.20

Task Team Members

Name	Title	Unit
Lending		
Bhuvan Bhatnagar	Lead Social Development Specialist	GWASP TTL
Sladjana Cosic	Social Development Specialist	GSURR
Anju Sachdeva	Senior Executive Assistant	GSURR
Janmejay Singh	Senior Strategy and Operations Officer	MNAVP
Daniel Adler	Governance Specialist	CCAVP
Path Heang	Program Officer	EASSO
Dan S.A. Biller	Sector Manager	MIGEC
John D. Clark	Lead Social Scientist	
Vanna Nil	Social Development Specialist	EASTS Social SG
Kunthary de Gaiffier	Operations Analyst	EAPCO
Leonora Aquino Gonzales	Sr. Communications Officer	EAPEC
Bunlong Leng Environmental	Specialist GENDR Environmental	SG
Roch Levesque	Senior Counsel	LEGAM
Anthony G. Toft	Deputy Gen. Counsel, Operations	LEGVP
Vinay K. Bhargava	Senior Adviser	PA9SS
Raul Gonzales	ST Consultant	EASTS
Sopheak Ok Serei	ST Consultant	EASTS
Warren A. Van Wicklin	ST Consultant	EASTS
Maria Teresa Serra	ST Consultant	EASTS

Name	Title	Unit
Supervision/ICR		
Janelle Plummer	Senior Governance Specialist	GSURR TTL 2010-2014
Janmejaya Singh	Senior Strategy and Operations Officer	MNAVPP TTL 2009-2010
Masud Mozammel	Sr. Communications Officer	ECRGP
Ahsan Ali	Lead Procurement Specialist	GGODR
Vinay K. Bhargava	Senior Adviser	PA9SS
Saroeun Bou	Communications Officer	EAPEC
Diana Ya-Wai Chung	Senior Communications Officer	EAPEC
Sladjana Cosic	Social Development Specialist	GSURR
Kannathee Danaisawat	Financial Management Specialist	EASFM
Markus Kostner	Practice Manager	GSURR
Linna Ky	Team Assistant	EACSF
Bunlong Leng	Environmental Specialist	GENDR
Roch Levesque	Senior Counsel	LEGAM
Oithip Mongkolsawat	Senior Procurement Specialist	EASRP
Vanna Nil	Social Development Specialist	EASTS
Sothea Phan	ET Consultant	EASTS
Sreng Sok	Procurement Specialist	GGODR
Daniel Adler	Governance Specialist	CCAVP
Munichan Kung	Rural Development Officer	GSURR
Rawong Rojvanit	Operations Officer	EACTF
Peng Seng Tan	Program Assistant	EACSF
Darachan Heng	Program Assistant	EACSF
Joanne S. Nickerson	Operations Officer	GPSOS
Satoshi Ishihara	Sr. Social Development Specialist	GSURR
Sopha Chhay	Consultant	ECRGP
Samnang Hir	ST Consultant	GEDDR
Seida Heng	ST Consultant	GFADR
Latharo Lor	Procurement Specialist	GGODR
Sirirat Sirijaratwong	Procurement Specialist	GGODR
Reaksmey Keo Sok	Financial Management Specialist	GGODR
Jeeva Perumalpillai-Essex	Sector Manager	CASDR 2010-2011
Julia Fraser	Sector Manager	CASDR 2011- 2014
Jan Weetjens	Practice Manager	GSURR 2014-2015
Joel Turkewitz	Lead Public Sector Specialist	GGODR ICR
Raja Iyer	Adviser	GPSOS ICR

Appendix B. Summary Project Logic

Table B.1. Summary Project Logic

<i>PDO: to enhance the demand for good governance (DFGG) in priority reform areas by strengthening institutions, supporting partnerships, and sharing lessons</i>				
<i>Outcomes</i>	<i>Promoting DFGG (awareness and understanding)</i>	<i>Mediating DFGG (Confidence, credibility and effectiveness of AC and DO)</i>	<i>Responding to DFGG (Client satisfaction; quality of services; citizens report positive results; project activities trigger changes in policy/practice)</i>	<i>Monitoring DFGG (AC and OWSO-DO performance; state institutions and local service delivery performance monitored by CSO)</i>
<i>Priority area</i>	ALL (private sector development, management of natural resources, public financial management, and decentralization and citizens' partnerships)	Private sector development; decentralization and citizens' partnerships	Private sector development; decentralization and citizens' partnerships	Private sector development; decentralization and citizens' partnerships
<i>PDO-level indicators (restructuring paper, Oct. 2011)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AC and labor arbitration process awareness • awareness of and understanding services provided by OWSO and DO • citizen awareness of and understanding of non-state actors' facilitation of social accountability • citizens reporting positive results on governance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cases handled by AC • Cases resolved by AC • Confidence in AC independence, credibility, and effectiveness • Disputes/complaints received and mediated by DOs • Disputes solved by DOs • Confidence in district complaints handling system's independence, credibility and effectiveness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transactions completed in OWSOs • Clients/local elected officials satisfied with quality of services provided at OWSOs • Project activities trigger changes in policy or practice that enhance transparency, accountability, and civil society partnerships 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local authorities and service delivery agencies' performance monitored through social accountability activities • Monitoring has a positive impact on local authorities/service delivery agencies' performance • OWSO and AC clients report paying unofficial fees
<i>Components</i>	Support to state institutions; support to non-state institutions; coordination and learning	Support to state institutions (AC and OWSO-DO)	Support to state institutions; support to non-state institutions; coordination and learning	Support to state institutions (AC and OWSO-DO); non-state institutions; coordination and learning

Source: IEG based on project appraisal documents and restructuring paper.

Appendix C. Methodology

The IEG evaluation team benefited from extensive documentation in project files obtained during the field visit. All components have had independent mid-term and end-term evaluations commissioned by the project that the IEG team reviewed to validate results reported in the ICR. In addition, all components prepared sustainability strategies that the IEG team reviewed to contextualize the additional information obtained during the field visit. To complement this information and assess the sustainability of the results, the team visited OWSO and DO in Phnom Penh, Siam Reap, Battambang, Takhmao (Kandal), and Chhbar Mon (Kampon Speu) and conducted semi-structured interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, including several of the grantees that received medium-size and large grants.

Appendix D. List of Persons Met

Name	Title/ Organization
Government Officials	
Boun Chom Roeun	OWSO Unit, Director of Department, General Department of Administration, Department of Function and Resources, Ministry of Interior
Bun Sophorn	Admin Chief, Chhbar Mon, Kampon Speu Province
Buon Heng	OWSO District Support Team Director, Director of Department, NCDD
Chan Sothea	Deputy Head of NCDD Secretariat
Chea Sarom	District Ombudsman, Chhbar Mon, Kampon Speu Province
Cheam Pe A	Deputy Director General of General Department of Administration, NCDD Secretariat
Daniel Kobb	Policy Advisor, NCDD Secretariat
Dy Sovan Rotanak	OWSO Chief, Khan Toul Kork, Phnom Penh
Ek Khundoeun	Governor, Khan Toul Kork, Phnom Penh
Hok Marady	Deputy Governor, Chhbar Mon, Kampon Speu Province
Ith Chum Nith	Admin Director, OWSO, Khan Toul Kork, Phnom Penh
Khem Sopheap	Chief OWSO Takhmao, Kandal Province
Long Soung Sopheap	Advisor, NCDD Secretariat
May Sikhengrandy	Deputy General Director, General Department of Internal Audit, Ministry of Interior
Men Kim En	District Ombudsman, Khan Toul Kork, Phnom Penh
Muth Sothra	Chief, OWSO Chhbar Mon, Kampon Speu Province
Ngay Chanphal	Secretary of State and former DFGG PCU Manager, Ministry of Interior
Nov Sovannara	Deputy Governor, Takhmao, Kandal Province
Por Phak	Secretary General, Vice Chief Cabinet, Ministry of Interior
Ruy Chhunly	District Ombudsman,
Sak Setha	Secretary of State, Ministry of Interior
Sorn Sunsopheap	Chief of Monitoring and Evaluation Office, NCDD Secretariat
Tat Bunheng	OWSO District Support Team, Director of Department, General Department of Administration, Department of Function and Resources, Ministry of Interior
Teav Som Oeun	Deputy Governor, Khan Toul Kork, Phnom Penh
Vissoth	Director General, MEF


Pen Saryo	Deputy Governor of Battambang Municipality
So Platong	Governor, Siem Reap City. Ministry of Interior
Min Sitha	Deputy Director, Ministry of Interior
World Bank	
Erik Johnson	Senior Social Development Specialist, TTL Voice and Action: Social Accountability for Improved Service Delivery (P146160)
Inguna Dobraja	Country Manager
Janelle Plummer	Third TTL, DFGG
Janmejay SIngh	Second TTL, DFGG
Joel Turkewitz	Lead Public Sector Specialist, ICR author, DFGG team member
Miguel Eduardo Sanchez Martin	Country Economist
Mudita Chamroeun	Acting Country Manager
Sokbunthoeun So	Public Sector Management Specialist
Vinay Bhargava	Senior Advisor, DFGG
Daniel Adler	Governance Specialist, former team member
Carmen Malena	Consultant, Voice and Action: Social Accountability for Improved Service Delivery (former consultant to DFGG)
Development Partners	
Adam Schumacher	Director, Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID
Anna Guittet	Counsellor – Governance/Environment, Embassy of Sweden
Benita Sommerville	First Secretary, Development Cooperation, Australian Embassy
Noeun Bou	Program Officer, European Commission
Chamroen Ouch	Governance Officer, ADB
Javier Castillo-Alvarez	Attache, Aid Effectiveness, Budget Support and Public Finance Management, European Commission
Maraile Goergen	Program Manager, Decentralization and Administrative Reform Program, GIZ
OK Malika	National Program Officer on Social Protection, ILO
Phea Sat	Civil Society/Human Rights Program Specialist, USAID
Premprey Suos	Senior Program Manager, Development Cooperation, Australian Embassy
Sophorn Tun	National Coordinator for Cambodia, ILO
Yong Zarah Zhou	Resident Representative, IMF
Non-state actors	
Men Makara	Director of Kandal Province, AD HOC

Sin Kimsean	East West Management Institute, Cambodian Civil Society Strengthening Project, Arbitrator
Molly Jordan	Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, RACHA
Hun Chenda	Monitoring and Evaluation Manager, Arbitration Council Foundation
Men Nimmith	Executive Director, Arbitration Council Foundation
Chhor Jan Sophal	Decentralization and Governance Director, PACT Cambodia
Neb Sinthay	Director, Advocacy and Policy Institute
Chy Terith	Program Director, The Asia Foundation
Silas Everett	Country Representative, The Asia Foundation
Chhent Makara	Finance, Grants and Admin Manager, The Asia Foundation
Netra Eng	Head of Governance, Cambodia Development Research Institute
Sek Barisoth	Technical Advisor, Advocacy and Policy Institute
Phan Phorp Barmey	Access Information Programme Manager, Advocacy and Policy Institute
Emerson Mar	Deputy Chief of Party Empowering Communities for Health (ECH) Project Reproductive and Child Health Alliance (RACHA)
Prak Sokhan	Executive Director, Cambodia Civil Society Partnership
Lor Sok	Managing Director Sok Xing and Hwang (former arbitrator)
Preap Kol	Executive Director, Transparency International Cambodia
Eric Bergthold	DAI Washington (formerly PACT, then USAID Cambodia)
Ho Bunthoeun	Operation Manager, World Vision
Chan Setha	Senior Manager - ISAF (Social Accountability Framework), World Vision
Steve Cooke	Advocacy Manager, World Vision

Note: All in Cambodia unless otherwise noted


Appendix E. Tables

Figure E.1. Worldwide Governance Indicators



Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010). *The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues*. The Worldwide Governance Indicators are available at: www.govindicators.org

Note: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.

Figure E.2. Arbitration Council Cases Received Annually

Source: Arbitration Council.

BOX E.1. Demand for Good Governance Project, Learning Notes

Holding government to account or helping government out?

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/318371468232481940/pdf/921690BRI038530odia0Learning0Note01.pdf>

Obstacles for service delivery organizations as implementers of social accountability activities

Establishing Grant Making Committees: What works, what doesn't work, and why?

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/485801468229492234/pdf/921700BRI038530odia0Learning0Note02.pdf>

Beneficiary and Third Party Monitoring of District Services:

Enhancing the performance of One Window Service Offices through monitoring and awareness building

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/393741468229491723/pdf/921910BRI038530odia0Learning0Note03.pdf>

Gender Balance and Bias: An initial analysis of gender disaggregated data in social accountability activities

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/940621468225599669/pdf/921800BRI038530odia0Learning0Note04.pdf>

Enhancing Service Delivery through Community Monitoring: Lesson from the Field

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/137081468225598885/pdf/921810BRI038530odia0Learning0Note05.pdf>

Issues and Options for Staffing Citizen Service Centers: Lessons from the One Window Service Office initiative in

Cambodia <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/589841468229491982/pdf/921820BRI038530dia0Learning0Note006.pdf>

Why Lesson Learning is Not So Easy:

Disincentives and recommendations for implementing agencies to learn and document lessons

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/263721468020363336/pdf/921830BRI038530odia0Learning0Note07.pdf>

Project Disclosure: Lessons from an implementing agency in Cambodia

<http://dfggmoi.gov.kh/images/document/8-project-disclosure.compressed.pdf>

Delegating Functions to Citizen Service Centers: Lessons from Once Window Service Offices in Cambodia

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/600011468020363563/pdf/921850BRI038530dia0Learning0Note009.pdf>

Embracing Principles of Good Governance

Guiding principles of the Arbitration Council are key to achieving standards and results

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/988351468016434897/pdf/921860BRI038530dia0Learning0Note010.pdf>

Partnership for Financial Sustainability; Efforts to ensure the sustainability of the Arbitration Council in Cambodia

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/948081468213570208/pdf/921870BRI038530dia0Learning0Note011.pdf>

A Window On Transparency: The efforts of the Once Window Service Office to establish transparency in administrative

services <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/174351468020363105/pdf/921920BRI038530dia0Learning0Note012.pdf>

Citizen Service Centers-System and Processes: Lessons from the Implementation of One Window Service Offices in

Cambodia <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/441141468232482542/pdf/921930BRI038530dia0Learning0Note013.pdf>

Are women benefiting and are women engaged? Reflecting on the gender results of the Arbitration Council

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/727311468225599406/pdf/921960BRI038530dia0Learning0Note014.pdf>

Partnership I: State – Non-state Partnership in Cambodia: An initial overview

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/185821468225600201/pdf/922030BRI038530dia0Learning0Note015.pdf>

Partnerships II: Partnership Typologies; Considering partnerships in Cambodia based on a typology of form and function

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/288981468021266083/pdf/922050BRI038530dia0Learning0Note016.pdf>

Partnerships III: Empowering Local Actors: Lessons from the Field

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/212581468015850979/pdf/922060BRI038530dia0Learning0Note017.pdf>

Changing Attitudes: The key to improved service delivery in citizen service centers in Cambodia

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/798751468225599134/pdf/922070BRI038530dia0Learning0Note018.pdf>

Citizen Outreach for Citizen Service Centers: Lessons from the Once Window Service Office initiative in Cambodia

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/819801468017945203/pdf/922080BRI038530dia0Learning0Note019.pdf>

Can Multi-Stakeholder Committees Create Accountability?

Lessons from Community Scorecards in Local Health Services

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/115911468020040760/pdf/922090BRI038530dia0Learning0Note020.pdf>

The Strategic Plan for Social Accountability in Sub-National Democratic Development:

A policy framework for social accountability at the local level in Cambodia

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/944981468229740141/pdf/921790BRI00Box0RINTEd0NO0PROJECT0ID.pdf>

An Implementation Plan for Subnational Social Accountability in Cambodia: Moving from Policy to Implementation

I-SAF Policy Note

<http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/113591434986528228/Cambodia-ISAF-Policy-Note-2-Final.pdf>

Table E.1. List of Grantees, Non-state Actors

Organization	Priority area	Project name	Grant type	Coverage	Funds awarded
Small grants round					
Buddhism and Society Development Association (BSDA)	D&D/CP	Strengthening the Social Accountability Initiative to Improve National and Commune-Level Development	Citizen report cards	15 communes	\$13,899
Buddhism For Development (BFD)	D&D/CP	Social Accountability Watch at Commune Level	Information awareness, promote citizen participation	13 communes	\$15,000
Cambodia Community Development (CCD-Kratie)	NRM	Empowering Indigenous Community Network and Influence the Local Governance in Natural Resource Management	Citizen report card	6 communes	\$13,929
Cambodia Institute for Media Studies (CIMS)	D&D/CP	Strengthening investigative journalism to enhance capacity for social change	Investigative journalism	5 provinces	\$14,492
Cambodian Organization for Women Support (COWS)	D&D/CP	Promoting Democratic Participation in Governance	Information awareness, promote citizen participation	2 communes	\$14,990
Khmer Association for Development of Countryside Cambodia (KAFDOC)	D&D/CP	Citizen's Rating Report (CRR)	Citizen report card	5 communes	\$13,639
Open Forum of Cambodia (OFC)	D&D/CP	Community Information for local Government	Information awareness, promote citizen participation	9 communes	\$13,010
Peace and Development Aid Organization (PDAO)	D&D/CP	Supporting the Citizen Engagement with Local Government	Information awareness, participatory planning	6 communes	\$14,439
Phnom Srey Organization for Development (PSOD)	D&D/CP	Improvement Good Governance Implementation at Rural Level (IGIR)	Information awareness, monitoring committees	46 communes	\$14,995
Ponleu Kumar (PK)	D&D/CP	Strengthen the Engagement of Citizen with Local Government (SEC)	Public forum	4 communes	\$14,958
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)	NRM	Sustainable Community-based Rattan Management	Information Awareness, promote citizen participation	1 commune	\$14,700
Medium-size and large grants round 1 – Thematic					
Amara: Cambodian Women's Network for Development	D&D/CP education	Community scorecards and action plans in schools	Citizen report card, community scorecards	18 communes	\$56,710

Culture and Environment Preservation Association (CEPA)	NRM	Advocacy for sustainable water resource management project (ASWRMP)	Multi-stakeholder dialogue, participatory research	11 communes	\$85,733
Cambodia Center for Independent Media (CCIM)	Multi-sectoral	Community Voice on-Air: Improving Local Governance through Public Dialogue On-air	Information awareness (radio)	12 provinces	\$148,829
Farmer Livelihood Development (FLD)	NRM	Farmer Opportunity	Information awareness, promote citizen participation	51 communes	\$150,000
Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT)	NRM	Promoting good governance in fishing community in coastal provinces	Information awareness, promote citizen participation, participatory research	12 communes	\$55,057
Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia (HRVC)	NRM	Land Distribution for Sustainable Livelihood	Information awareness, promote citizen participation	3 communes	\$80,784
Khmer Institute of Democracy (KID)	Multi-sectoral	The Citizens Advisors Conciliate for People's Rights in Rural Community	Conflict resolution mediators	25 communes	\$129,000
Minority Organization for Development of Economy (MODE)	D&D/CP	Civil Society and Local Good Govern	Information awareness	3 communes	\$19,254
National Association for Prosperity (NAPA)	D&D/CP	Citizens' Rating Report	Citizen report card	15 communes	\$53,599
People Center for Development and Peace (PDP)	D&D/CP	Better Civic Engagement for Community Development	Information awareness, promote citizen participation	6 communes	\$49,945
Phnom Srey Organization for Development (PSOD)	D&D/CP	Strengthening for local good governance project (SLGG)	Citizen report card	10 communes	\$49,999
Ponleur Kumar (PK)	D&D/CP	social audit, public forum, citizen report card	Public forum and citizen report card	11 communes	\$146,851
Rural Community and Environment Development Organization (RCEDO)	D&D/CP	Civic Engagement for Good Local Governance in Banteay Meanchey Province	Citizen report card	4 communes	\$67,533
Rain Water Cambodia (RWC)	NRM	Supporting Local Authorities for Enhancing Access to Sanitation and Hygiene in Prey Veng Province	Promote citizen participation	1 commune	\$40,207.66
WATHNAKPHEAP (WP)	D&D/CP	Closing the Gap Between Citizens and Authorities (CGBCA)	Public Forum	16 communes	\$75,400
Women's Media Centre of Cambodia (WMC)	D&D/CP	Citizen Engagement Campaign	Citizen report card	4 communes	\$149,989

Youth Resource Development Program (YRDP)	D&D/CP	Young Leaders for Social Accountability	Public forum	2 communes	\$66,169
Democracy Resource Center for National Development (DND)	D&D/CP	Citizens' Engagement for Local Good Governance	Community Scorecards	15 communes	\$98,567
Integrating Human to Quality (IHQ)	PSD	Strengthen Workplace Relations	Built capacity of union officials and employers on dispute resolution mechanism	ACF	\$60,161
Pact Institute (PACT)	D&D/CP media	Good Governance in Battambang province	Radio talk-back programs	RNK	\$149,995
Medium-size and large grants round 2 – Thematic					
Cambodian Women's Network for Development (Amara)	D&D/CP	Support for Local Good Governance (SLGG)	Community scorecard (CSC), participatory planning	25 communes	\$69,983
Buddhism for Development (BFD)	D&D/CP	People's Action on Social Accountability (PASA)	Promote citizen participation and social audit	45 communes	\$145,258
Buddhism for Health (BFH)	D&D/CP health	Adding Community Scorecards for Health Services to existing Social Health Protection Schemes to enhance good governance in Kirivong	Community scorecards	31 communes	\$53,085
Cambodian Civil Society Partnership (CCSP)	D&D/CP health	Better Public Health Services Through Social Accountability	Citizen report card	30 communes	\$153,291
Khmer Association for Development of Country-Side, Cambodia & Community Economic Development (KAFDOC-CED)	D&D/CP	Minority Voice for Good Governance (MVGG)	Citizen report card, public dialogue	15 communes	\$68,003
Peace and Development Organization (PDAO)	D&D/CP education	Bridging the Engagement between Citizens, Civil Societies and Duty Bearers in Public Health and Education (BEC-PHEA)	Community scorecard and public forum	9 communes	\$57,391
Reproductive and Child Health Alliance (RACHA)	D&D/CP health	Community Scorecard for Health	Community scorecards	28 communes	\$40,605

Reproductive Health Association of Cambodia (RHAC)	D&D/CP health	Good Governance for Health (GGH)	Community scorecards	51 communes	\$69,817
Wathnakpheap (WP)	D&D/CP health and education	Strengthening Good Governance in Education and Health Service Delivery (SGGEHSD)	Community scorecards, participatory planning	30 communes	\$205,893
Medium-size and large grants round 2 – Partnership					
Advocacy and Policy Institute (API)	D&D/CP	Enhancing People’s Participation in One Window Service	Citizen report card, public forum, awareness raising	OWSO 3 districts	\$64,718
Democracy Resource Centre for National Development (DND)	D&D/CP	Partnership for One Window Service Office (OWSO) Enhancement	Public forum and community scorecards	OWSO 6 districts	\$193,176
Pact Institute (Pact)	D&D/CP	Learning from Improved Good Governance Practices at District and Commune Council Levels	Participatory planning and budgeting, public forum	9 communes	\$149,999
STAR Kampuchea (SK)	D&D/CP	Translating Reform Commitments into Better Civic Engagement	Public forum, information awareness, promote citizen participation	27 communes	\$158,883

Source: World Bank 2015a.

Note: D&D = decentralization and deconcentration; CP = citizen partnerships.

Appendix F. Borrower Comments

From: Ngan Chamroeun [<mailto:ngan.chamroeun@ncdd.gov.kh>]

Sent: Friday, June 16, 2017 12:47 AM

To: Midori Makino <mmakino@worldbank.org>; Gisela M. Garcia <ggarcia3@worldbank.org>

Cc: sethamoi@yahoo.com (sethamoi@yahoo.com) <sethamoi@yahoo.com>; NGY CHANPHAL (mrdngycp@forum.org.kh) <mrdngycp@forum.org.kh>; 'porphek_31@yahoo.com' <porphek_31@yahoo.com>

Subject: Comment on the World Bank Project Performance Assessment Review (PPAR) of the DFGG from NCDDS in Cambodia

Dear Midori and Gisela,

The NCDDS has reviewed the World Bank's Project Performance Assessment Review (PPAR) on the DFGG report.

The report provides a fair and informed assessment. In our view, some of the assessments of "moderately satisfactory" reflect an over-ambitious program design rather than a weaknesses in terms of implementation. It should be noted that differing assessments were provided in the ICR, ICR Review, and PPAR (page vii) and that it is challenging to evaluate a governance project as complex as the DFGG.

There is a minor error on page 22 stating that the Communes are allocated 2.4%; the correct figure is 2.8%.

With my best regards,

Ngan Chamroeun

Under Secretary of State of Mol

Deputy Executive Head of NCDD secretariat