



1. CAS Data		
Country: Democratic Republic of Congo		
CAS Year: FY13	CAS Period: FY13 – FY17	
CLR Period: FY13 – FY20	Date of this review: February 11, 2022	
2. Ratings		
	CLR Rating	IEG Rating
Development Outcome:	<i>Not Rated</i>	<i>Not Rated</i>
WBG Performance:	<i>Not Rated</i>	<i>Not Rated</i>
3. Executive Summary		
<p>i. This is a validation of the Completion and Learning Review (CLR) for the World Bank Group’s (WBG) engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) covering the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) FY13-FY17. For completeness and learning purposes, and while the CAS formally expired in FY17, IEG has elected to examine the period FY18-FY21 as well, where data are available, as no CPF was in place to replace the CAS. Owing to data limitations and in line with the Working Arrangements between the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) and WBG, IEG’s review does not rate the CAS’s overall development outcome or the WBG’s performance.</p> <p>ii. The CAS was congruent with country development challenges and the country’s second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-II). It aimed to address the major binding constraints, rooted in conflict and fragility, that had prevented DRC from translating a recent track record of economic growth into poverty reduction: ongoing conflict, poor governance, highly limited capacity, and lack of employment opportunities. The program contained four focus areas: (i) increasing state effectiveness and improving good governance; (ii) boosting competitiveness to accelerate private-sector-led growth and job creation; (iii) improving social services delivery and increasing human development indicators; and (iv) addressing fragility and conflict in the Eastern provinces. Gender and climate change were defined as cross-cutting themes.</p> <p>iii. The objectives under the CAS were supported by a mix of WBG lending operations and advisory services and analytics (ASA). Within each focus area, the interventions were logically mapped toward achievement of the program’s objectives and the country’s development goals. IFC’s investments were appropriately concentrated under the second focus area. However, program design relied heavily on several key assumptions that did not turn out to be valid: that the government, at all levels, would demonstrate sustained commitment and political will toward difficult reforms, especially of state-owned enterprises</p>		
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(SOEs); that interventions aimed at community development would produce effective bottom-up demand for better governance; that requisite capacity at all levels could be built quickly and sustainably; and that planned surveys and statistical capacity development would be adequate to overcome shortages in agricultural, industrial, and population data. The program was complex, ambitious, and insufficiently selective, given the fragility, conflict and violence (FCV) dynamic and existing capacity challenges that were well understood at the time of CAS preparation, and it became even less selective during implementation.

- iv. The FY13-FY17 CAS expired without a new WBG strategy in place and with no decision taken to extend either the strategy or the results framework, creating an extended period of time with no clear framework for accountability. The delay in preparing a new strategy stemmed from delays in presidential elections that stalled the formation of a new government for several years, as well as two geographically separate Ebola outbreaks. It is not clear why the existing strategy was not extended through engagement with the government in place. Without a CAS framework, between FY18 and FY21, the WBG continued to support an active program of investment lending.
- v. In terms of development outcomes, WBG made significant contributions to improving the business environment, especially the establishment of a modern payments system; access to telecommunications services and household broadband penetration; renewable energy generation; agricultural productivity; and access to potable water, basic education, and some health services. Achievements of IFC and MIGA supported DRC's goal of promoting private sector development, are consistent with the CAS Focus Area 2, and exceeded the scope of the results framework. In conflict-affected areas, the Bank's interventions improved access to agricultural extension services and cash-for-work programs (mainly in the post-CAS period) and services for sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) survivors who accessed project-supported facilities, and the embedding of conflict mediation activities across community-based sub-projects contributed to increased social cohesion. Bank ASA and IFC advisory services supported creation of a one-stop shop model for business services that produced efficiencies in starting a business, import and export processes, and access to credit. IFC and MIGA's interventions in the mobile telecom towers subsector expanded mobile infrastructure and enhanced access to telecom services for low-income communities. However, for many objectives and outcomes, progress was stalled, or there was insufficient data to assess outcomes. There is little to no evidence of positive outcomes on transparency and efficiency in public financial management, stewardship of the country's vast natural resource wealth, governance and operational performance of state-owned enterprises (reform of the key mining SOE was dropped from the program), private sector-led growth or job creation, or access to some key health and social protection services.
- vi. Strong in-country presence of WBG staff enabled continuous implementation support, especially to improve the quality of compliance with safeguards policies, though there is one unresolved Inspection Panel case that involved gender-based violence under a roads project. Collaboration with development partners facilitated progress in some sectors. Mid-course adjustments at the time of the PLR, however, were inadequate, and the PLR appears to have been a missed opportunity: the CAS period was extended by only one year, and rather than consolidating interventions and adding strategic focus, the program continued implementing a large number of planned deliverables and added new ones, including scaled-up investments in public sector management, human development, infrastructure, and initiatives to foster regional integration. Parts of the portfolio continued to perform well following the PLR, but others deteriorated. Implementation progress could not escape the negative effects of strong vested interests, frequent changes in government ministers, low capacity across both the private and public sectors, lack of government commitment to SOE reform, flare-ups of insecurity, and the ongoing political crisis. IEG did not find strong evidence of effective follow-through in WBG collaboration initiatives beyond IFC-MIGA



collaboration in a financial institution focused on small and micro enterprises and in the telecoms sector.

- vii. As a whole, the program made limited inroads in addressing the systemic challenges that lie at the heart of DRC's persistent poverty and inequality. Poor governance, including poor management of public finances and human capital, remains at the root of DRC's development challenges, making the first focus area foundational to progress in the other three. Overall, there is limited evidence that the program enabled DRC to overcome key governance constraints, including of SOEs, standing in the way of effective management of public finances, revenue mobilization, infrastructure development, and job creation that might have converted economic growth into sustained poverty reduction. No evidence is presented that either decentralization or engagement with citizens and/or civil society organizations contributed to enhanced transparency and accountability that might have exerted pressure for governance reforms and reduced potential for conflict. Persistent conflict limited the utility of regional approaches to address the roots of insecurity.
- viii. The CLR's lessons evolved markedly from those presented in the PLR, suggesting that the ground shifted considerably during the CAS period. Overall, the CLR's lessons reflect a more narrow and realistic level of ambition and scope compared with those in the PLR. For example, the first lesson in the PLR focuses on the importance of long-term institution building, while the analogous lesson in the CLR stresses the more immediate need for up-front capacity development. The evidence and analysis underpinning the lessons is not always well established in the CLR, although the lessons appear to be reasonable based on country context. Spreading the messages quite thinly among multiple lessons may dilute their impact. IEG has identified the following lessons, many of which concur with and expand on those in the CLR. These lessons cover three broad areas:

Focus and targeting:

- a. In a large, complex country with lingering governance challenges, political volatility, and conflict, a focus on partnership with decentralized entities may be appropriate, but the expected benefits of a decentralized approach should be realistically assessed for each specific intervention. The CLR does not demonstrate that the program's projects that targeted specific provinces performed better than others, or that they effectively captured the energy and insight of civil society at local levels.
- b. The CLR recommends that each project have some capacity building activities. IEG emphasizes that capacity-building should not be conceived as a broad, blanket instrument, but instead one that is carefully targeted toward people and institutions where it is likely to have the most sustained impact.

Flexibility and adjustment:

- c. Annual Country Portfolio Performance Reviews and the PLR are important opportunities to assess and adjust to changes in country and local contexts; here, they might have more strongly flagged the potential impact of DRC's political fragility and weak government commitment to reform in key areas, the need for more focused capacity development, and issues with data availability and the results framework.
- d. WBG collaboration at the country level should be developed on the ground, demand-driven, and results-oriented. The IDA-IFC Joint Implementation Plan (JIP) in agribusiness was a corporate initiative and became the centerpiece of WBG collaboration up to the PLR stage. However, lack of clarity about the on-the-ground need to work together in this space led it to fall apart.



- e. More formal arrangements are needed to maintain accountability during gaps between country strategies and partnership frameworks.

Fragility, Conflict and Violence

- f. Segregating FCV factors under a single pillar, as was the case in this program's design, risks marginalizing explicit consideration of these issues throughout the rest of the program. It was important to acknowledge that the entire country remained fragile and conflict-affected, with deep-seated issues around political economy and governance, and to incorporate those risks into the design of the entire program, its indicators, its data collection strategies, and its provisions for adaptive management.
- g. Additionally, the country's fragility and conflict environment impacted progress in important and profound ways. More nuanced and sophisticated understandings of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) have been gained since the FY13-16 CAS was designed and implemented, including through the World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020-2025 and IEG's World Bank Engagement in Situations of Conflict: An Evaluation of FY10-20 Experience (which included an explicit discussion of the Bank's inadequate analysis of conflict drivers in DRC and what this implied for operations on the ground). Taking these analyses into account, IEG has included some brief observations that may be useful in applying an FCV lens to the design of the next country program in Annex 2 to this CLRR.

4. Strategic Focus

Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

1. **Congruence with Country Context and Country Program.** The development context in DRC is deeply shaped by its history of political fragility and conflict. Each of the country's economic challenges is both driven and exacerbated by the continued impact of these factors.¹ DRC is still recovering from a series of conflicts dating back to the 1990s. At the time of CAS preparation, while most of the country had returned to peace following the cessation of conflict in 2002, Eastern DRC remained unstable. Fragility rooted in structural political economy factors continued to affect the entire country. DRC also fought separate Ebola epidemics in several parts of the country beginning in 2018. The outbreaks lasted through May 2021.

2. Over the last decade, DRC has experienced significant economic growth. Annual real GDP growth averaged 6.2 percent in the 2013-17 CAS period, reaching 4.4% in 2018 and 5.8% in 2019, though it contracted by 1.7% in 2020 as a result of the coronavirus pandemic.² Paradoxically, the country has not found a way to translate its strengths—a young population, abundant low-cost labor, and significant natural resource wealth—into sustained poverty reduction. Its GNI per capita of US\$856 (average 2013-17) in PPP current dollars is low, compared with an average per capita GNI of US\$3,549 for Sub-Saharan African countries. The proportion of people living below the poverty line declined from 69.3 percent in 2005 to 64 percent in 2012, but the number of poor increased by 7

¹ After several postponements of presidential elections, the son of the country's long-standing opposition leader won the presidency in December 2018. Félix Tshisekedi succeeded Joseph Kabila, who had been in power for 18 years. Many of the drivers of continued violence have a regional dimension covering all countries of the Great Lakes region in general, and specifically Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. The CAS acknowledged that peace and stability in DRC could not take place without addressing the social, economic, and political roots of the conflict. It also noted that the persistent instability in the East was a clear manifestation of crumbling state institutions.

² International Monetary Fund Country Report No. 20/146, Democratic Republic of Congo, May 2020; African Development Bank Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Outlook, 2021.



million.³ DRC's value on the Human Development Index improved slightly from 0.435 in 2010 to 0.480 in 2019 but remains low compared to the world score of 0.737 and the overall score of 0.538 for least developed countries. In 2020, only 43 percent of households had access to safe drinking water, 20 percent had access to sanitation, and 43 percent of children were malnourished. Poverty is highly gender biased. Four times more women than men lack education, and both workforce participation and same job/same pay are highly biased against women. The lack of comprehensive and up-to-date poverty data is a major concern.⁴

3. DRC's main development challenges include poor governance and highly limited capacity, evidenced by mismanagement of extractives, elite capture, and weak institutions.⁵ Political instability, the informal sector, and corruption were three of the top five business obstacles for firms identified in the 2013 Enterprise Survey.⁶ DRC slipped on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index from 154th place in 2013 (score=22⁷) to 161th in 2017 (score=21) and 170th in 2020 (score=18). Further key development constraints lie in the areas of revenue mobilization and infrastructure. An unfinished decentralization agenda aimed at reducing tensions between central and provincial authorities continues to hamper the delivery of services in health, primary and secondary education, and agriculture. Lack of employment opportunities, especially in the private sector, is a persistent challenge; the economy is heavily reliant on mining exports with little local content or in-country transformation.

4. To address these challenges, the government prepared a second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-2) in 2011 built on four pillars: (i) strengthening governance and consolidating peace; (ii) diversifying the economy to accelerate growth and create employment; (iii) improving access to basic social services and enhancing human capital; and (iv) protecting the environment and fighting climate change. A post-election Cabinet Development Program 2012-2016 provided a comprehensive implementation plan for the PRSP-2. As part of this plan, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were to be transformed into commercial entities; an Economic Governance Matrix was adopted to improve governance including transparency, accountability, and effectiveness in the management of natural resources; and a comprehensive Public Financial Management Reform Strategy 2011-2018 was adopted. Regional integration was defined as a key opportunity to boost economic growth and create jobs.

5. The WBG's CAS was congruent with country development challenges (discussed in paragraph 3 above) and the PRSP-2. It contained four focus areas: (i) increasing state effectiveness and improving good governance, which supported the first pillar of the PRSP-2; (ii) boosting competitiveness to accelerate private-sector-led growth and job creation, which supported the second and fourth pillars of the PRSP-2; (iii) improving social services delivery and increasing human development indicators, which supported the third pillar of the PRSP-2; and (iv) addressing fragility and conflict in the Eastern provinces, which again supported the first PRSP-2 pillar. Gender and climate change were defined as cross-cutting themes.

6. The FY13-FY17 CAS expired without a new WBG strategy in place, despite an extension of the original CAS by one year in anticipation of a new Country Partnership Framework. The CLR attributes this to a delay in presidential elections (initially planned for November 2016), until December 2018, and two geographically separate Ebola outbreaks in 2018. However, these reasons are not convincing for not having a strategy in place for 2018-2020, or at least formally extending the original CAS strategy over that period to provide a framework for accountability. During this time, the WBG remained engaged by addressing ongoing challenges in human development, covering health, education, social protection and livelihoods, and support for those affected by conflict and violence.

³ World Bank, Democratic Republic of Congo: Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD), "Policy Priorities for Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity in a Post-Conflict Country and Fragile State," March 2018, p. 12.

⁴ The most recent poverty data currently in the World Development Indicators database is for 2012.

⁵ World Bank, Democratic Republic of Congo: Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD), "Policy Priorities for Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity in a Post-Conflict Country and Fragile State," March 2018.

⁶ World Bank, Enterprise Surveys: Democratic Republic of Congo, 2013-2014, www.enterprisesurveys.org.

⁷ The maximum (best) score is 100.



However, the results framework of the program was not extended beyond the CAS period, and there was no explicit articulation of the strategy, priorities or framework that underpinned Bank Group engagement over FY18-21.

7. **Relevance of Design.** The objectives under the CAS were supported by a mix of WBG lending operations and ASA, with knowledge services underpinning the projects and operations. The FY13-17 program was complex and ambitious, with four focus areas, 14 objectives, and 38 outcome indicators. Within each focus area, the interventions were mapped toward achievement of the program's objectives and the country's development goals. The fourth focus area, addressing fragility and conflict in the East, echoed several of the activities and outcomes contained in the other three focus areas, but with a focus in the conflict-affected Eastern provinces. An effective geographic division of labor was arranged with development partners in several sectors. However, program design relied heavily on several key assumptions that did not turn out to be true: that the government, at all levels, would demonstrate sustained commitment and political will toward difficult reforms, especially of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); that interventions aimed at community development would produce effective bottom-up demand for better governance; that requisite capacity at all levels could be built quickly and sustainably; and that planned surveys and statistical capacity development would be adequate to overcome shortages in agricultural, industrial, and population data.

8. IFC's investments and MIGA's guarantees in the country were mapped under the second focus area -- boosting competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation. At the time of the CAS preparation in 2012, IFC's priority areas in DRC were investment climate, high growth sectors (such as agribusiness and infrastructure), and the small and medium enterprise (SME) segment. These priorities remained central to IFC interventions during the CAS period. The CAS responded to the goal of modernizing information, communication, and telecoms (ICT) infrastructure to attract private sector investment by developing separate but related Bank, IFC and MIGA interventions in different segments of ICT in line with their respective comparative advantage.

Selectivity

9. The program was insufficiently selective, given capacity challenges that were well understood at the time of CAS preparation. Key lessons from the previous CAS called for the portfolio to be consolidated, with limited IDA resources allocated strategically and with greater focus to maximize development outcomes in priority areas. Strengthened coordination with international partners did enable the Bank to be more selective in some areas, including water, health, and public sector management, than it had been the past. However, there was limited focus. Highly underdeveloped public sector capacity was stretched across a large number of geographic regions (interventions covered eleven different provinces spanning all areas of the country) and a wide range of ministries and sectors at the national and local levels. Initial intentions to deliver demonstrable, short-term quick wins to the population to help the government secure peace and restore confidence and credibility were not realized, nor were plans to more deliberately sequence policy interventions (focusing first on public financial management and domestic revenue mobilization).

10. The program became even less selective during implementation. At the PLR stage, net IDA commitments had grown from US\$ 1.87 billion at end-2012 to US\$ 2.25 billion. The expansion was due to demand from government for unanticipated initiatives that the WBG considered important for development and security, and extension of the CAS closing date. As a result, rather than consolidation of the portfolio as envisioned, the number of national IDA projects increased from 15 to 21. The PLR recommended achieving consolidation through providing additional financing only to projects that were performing well; combining national and regional initiatives into single projects in order to leverage resources and implementation efforts; closing projects on time, with justified exceptions; and using trust fund resources to support the environmental agenda. However, consolidation did not occur.



Alignment

11. All four of the CAS focus areas were linked in principle to the corporate goals of poverty reduction and shared prosperity, and the program was broadly aligned with the country's poverty reduction strategy. However, the lack of selectivity translated into a lack of practical focus on poverty reduction, reflected in the absence of a coherent anti-poverty thread connecting the multiple focus areas, objectives, and interventions, and a fundamental lack of poverty data, a major shortcoming in a highly poor country. The program's investments in agriculture, health, education, social protection, and socio-economic opportunity specifically in poorer and conflict-affected areas responded appropriately to the country's relatively higher incidence of poverty in rural than urban areas, as well as variance in levels of poverty by province; however, persistently high rates of youth unemployment and underemployment indicate that the growth of recent years has not been sufficiently inclusive.

5. Development Outcome

Overview of Achievement by Objective:

Focus Area I: Increase State Effectiveness and Improve Good Governance

12. Focus Area I had three objectives: (i) increased transparency and efficiency in the management of public finances at the central level and in the provinces of Bandundu, Katanga, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, South Kivu, North Kivu, Kinshasa, and Equateur, (ii) increase transparency and effectiveness in the management of financial resources from the forest, oil and mining industries, and (iii) enhance governance of mining sector SOEs and increase the operational performance of other SOEs.

13. **Objective 1: Increase transparency and efficiency in the management of public finances at the central level and in the provinces of Bandundu, Katanga, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, South Kivu, North Kivu, Kinshasa, and Equateur.** This objective was supported by the Enhancing Governance Capacity Project (FY08), the Strengthening Public Financial Management (PFM) and Accountability Project (FY14) and its additional financing (FY17), the Capacity for Core Public Management Project (FY11), and the following ASAs: PEFA Assessment (FY14), two Economic Updates (FY14 and FY16), Kinshasa Annual Forum (FY14), Coordinated PFM Reform Assistance (FY14) Debt Management Reform Plan TA (FY14), Use of Country System TA (FY15), and Enhancing Public Sector Efficiency and Effectiveness for Growth and Development (FY15, FY16). Early in the CAS, investments focused on strengthening intergovernmental fiscal relations; building budget and other public management capacity in Bandundu, Katanga, South Kivu, and Kasai Occidental provinces; and introducing results-based management through performance contracting in key ministries. Later in the CAS period, there were additional interventions on supporting domestic revenue mobilization and expenditure management, strengthening budget oversight and improving transparency, and establishing public financial management systems in Equateur, Kasai Oriental, and North Kivu provinces. ASA provided guidance on sequencing and prioritization of PFM reforms, decentralization, public sector wage reform, strategies for donor coordination, and drafting of regulations, among other activities. Objective 1 had three indicators:

- Increase the percentage of national revenue transferred to targeted provinces from 31.5 percent in 2011 to 35 percent in 2017. IEG could not validate the degree of progress on this indicator. While there is evidence that 46 percent of domestic revenues were transferred directly to provinces as of December 2015, there is no information on the share of transfers to the provinces that were targeted by the objective and included in the baseline for this indicator. No verifiable evidence is available from 2016 forward.
- Reduce the discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures in the four targeted provinces from 51 percent in 2011 to 30 percent in 2017; the PLR revised the target to 10



percent. IEG validated that the discrepancy was 63 percent as of December 2015. Thus, the discrepancy worsened during the CAS period, according to available data. No verifiable evidence is available from 2016 forward.

- Increase the percentage of public contracts awarded through open competitive bidding in selected ministries and provinces from 0 in 2012 to 75 percent of large contracts in 2017; the PLR revised the target to 50 percent. There may have been progress in this area, but IEG could not validate the degree of progress on this specific indicator. There is evidence that 80 percent of public contracts over US\$ 200,000 followed a competitive bidding process as of December 2015, but there is no specification of whether that 80 percent covered both national and provincial government procurements, and no disaggregated information to verify that it covered the selected ministries and provinces in the indicator.

14. There is no clear evidence of any progress under this objective, and available evidence points to serious shortcomings in transparency and efficiency in the management of public finances as a continued development constraint. The CAS program related to this objective sought to instill a results-oriented culture and enhance efficiency. The decentralization process should have provided significant scope for enhancing transparency and accountability at the local level. However, results on revenue transfers from the central to provincial levels were inconclusive, and budget variances in targeted provinces grew rather than decreased. The CLR reports that budget execution was generally more challenging at the provincial than central level, because of both low and unreliable central government transfers, and limited revenue forecasting ability at the provincial level. Data on procurement transparency is inconclusive.

15. **Objective 2: Increase transparency and effectiveness in the management of financial resources from the forest, oil and mining industries.** This objective was supported by the Forestry and Nature Conservation Project (FY09), the Growth and Governance in the Mineral Sector Project (FY11), and the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project (FY04), and the following ASAs: Oil and Gas Advisory TA (FY15), Forest Governance Assessment (FY15), Review of the Forest Sector of the DRC TA (FY16), Congo Basin Timber (FY16), and DRC Spatial Development (FY16). Investments supported the installation of a specialized forest management system, but activities related to forest sustainability were delayed, in part due to security problems in targeted areas. Technical assistance was provided to help draft a framework oil concession contract and prepare a diagnostic for the sector. Mining sector investments followed the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) value chain framework, with activities focused on ensuring access to resources, building sector management capacity, enhancing transparency and accountability, and building up sustainable development settings. Objective 2 had three indicators:

- Increase the area of forest concessions with signed social responsibility contracts from 2M Ha in 2011 to 4M Ha in 2015; the PLR revised the target to 10.7M Ha in 2017. IEG could not verify the CLR's claim that 10.7 M Ha were covered by concessions with social responsibility contracts as of FY17. The ICRR of the Forestry and Nature Conservation project (FY09) reports that 75 forest concessions with social responsibility contracts (signed between industrial concession holders and local communities) in 57 forest concessions were signed as of June 2015; however, the ICRR also reports that no information is available on the area of forest these contracts covered, per the indicator. The African Development Bank's report "Strategic Regional Report on the Integrated Development of the Sustainable Wood Sector in the Congo Basin" (2019) reports on 57 concession areas that cover 10.7M Ha, but no information is provided on social responsibility contracts.
- Increase the percentage of revenue from the mining sector in total fiscal revenue from 2 percent of GDP in 2011 to 4 percent of GDP in 2015; the PLR revised the target to 2.7 percent of GDP in 2017. The EITI reports that the mining sector and mining industries generated revenues of US\$ 1.682 billion in 2017 (4.4 percent of GDP). The ICRR of the



Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector project (FY11) states that fiscal revenue from the mining sector was US\$ 1.56 billion in 2018 (3.3 percent of GDP). Thus, the target was achieved in both 2017 and 2018.

- Increase the percentage of oil petroleum permits competitively auctioned from 0 (no year provided) to 90 percent in 2015; the PLR revised the target to 100 percent in 2017. The CLR reports that no petroleum concession contracts have occurred since the promulgation in August 2015 of a law on hydrocarbons that provides for competition in issuing exploration permits. IEG confirmed that this law was passed, but could not verify whether any permits were auctioned during FY18-FY20.

16. There was progress in increasing the area of forest concessions with social responsibility contracts, an important step toward improved transparency and effectiveness in management of the sector. Some progress was made in increasing revenues from the mining sector, but there is no evidence that transparency has improved in the oil or mining industries. The overarching goal of this objective was to improve governance so that the population could benefit from the country's vast natural resources wealth, including demand-side monitoring and multi-stakeholder engagement. The EITI process, supported under the CAS, helped shed light on revenues from the mining sector, and the EITI Secretariat declared that DRC was compliant in July 2014. Growth in revenues was impacted by changes in international commodity prices; a focus on volumes would have more accurately measured progress. A new mining code signed in March 2018 and supported by the Bank was intended to rebalance a law that had been overly generous to foreign investors, increasing government mining revenues; however, there is lack of clarity in many of the code's provisions, still unresolved even after a "Revised and Annotated Mining Code" was published in July 2020.⁸

17. **Objective 3: Enhance governance of mining sector SOEs and increase the operational performance of other SOEs.** This objective was supported by the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project (FY04). Investments supported measures to set up and/or strengthen regulatory authorities in the telecommunications, transport, and energy sectors; facilitate government divestiture from public enterprises in the telecommunications, transport, energy, financial, and mining sectors; and facilitate staff severance processes and retrenchment plans for the National Railway Company (SNCC) and other SOEs. Objective 3 had one indicator:

- Increase the efficiency of SOEs that deliver key public services (SNCC, SNEL, SCTP, RVA, RVF, REGIDESO) through PPP or management-performance contracts. The number of SOEs with some private sector involvement was to increase from 3 in 2013 to 6 in 2017. There is evidence that 5 SOEs have some private sector involvement through public/private partnership, management contract, or other arrangement as of June 2014, with SNEL and REGIDESO occurring after 2013. However, there is no evidence that their efficiency has increased.

18. There is little evidence of progress under this objective (and significant shortcomings in the indicator chosen) or of improved SOE governance, efficiency, or performance. SOEs were plagued with excessive indebtedness, deficient title to property and assets, unfinished separation of regulatory versus operating functions, and weak management know-how and discipline.⁹ The CAS defined seven SOEs as "of paramount importance": SNEL (energy), SNCC (railways), REGIDESO (water supply), SCTP (river transport, railways, and ports), RVF (river management and hydrology in support of river transport), RVA (airports authority and operator), and Gecamines (mines), and aimed to increase their efficiency through public-private partnerships or management contracts. Some reforms preceded the CAS period, as three SOEs—SNCC, SCTP, and RVA—already had management contracts, and the CLR notes that these three were able to produce reliable financial

⁸ Mining Review Africa, September 1, 2020, <https://www.miningreview.com/gold/unpacking-the-revised-and-annotated-drc-mining-code/>.

⁹ CAS, p. 28.



statements. However, importantly, the mining SOE and related milestones were dropped due to poor performance and lack of government commitment, with significant negative effects on achievement of the objective. Furthermore, the PLR stated that an ambitious, full-fledged public-private partnership approach had to be modified to a service contract model due to lack of interest from the private sector. The CLR focuses on the failure of both the government and the SOEs to honor their obligations under these contracts. It cites inadequate government commitment to reforms, with lack of support from key ministries, and low motivation to improve management practices as the key factors undercutting success. The outcome indicator was flawed, as mere signing of a management contract does not translate into enhanced governance, increased efficiency, or improved operational performance, and no data on governance or operational performance – the focus of the objectives – was tracked.

19. Overall, this Focus Area performed poorly, with little progress under the first and third objectives, and only some progress in increasing revenues in the mining sector under the second objective. The Focus Area was ambitious, aiming to cover the central government, eight provincial governments, three extractive industries, and six major SOEs. While there was improved visibility into the operations of the extractive industries, including through the Bank-supported EITI process, as well as greater clarity in the financial operations of SOEs, significant governance and capacity challenges remain, and reform of Gecamines was abandoned. The PLR reported that the government has a framework to improve PFM and public procurement and that reporting on public finances became more transparent and timelier, despite slow rates of budget execution; however, IEG could not validate this claim. The Secretariat of the EITI declared that DRC was compliant in July 2014, and a revised Petroleum Code was approved in September 2015. However, although SOE debt was restructured and service contractors were recruited for SNEL, REGIDESO, and SNCC, positive cash flows were not achieved. The CLR provides little information on the role of citizens and CSOs in holding the public sector accountable.

20. **Focus Area II: Boost Competitiveness to Accelerate Private Sector-Led Growth and Job Creation**

21. Focus Area II had five objectives: (i) enhanced business environment for private sector development; (ii) improved connectivity and access to transport infrastructure; (iii) improved access to quality broadband network and services at reduced cost; (iv) increased generation of electricity and improved access to energy; and (v) boosted agriculture production and increased access to markets. The thrust of the WBG program in this area was to design and implement growth pole programs in two of the five priority economic zones defined in the PRSP-2: Western and Southeastern DRC. As the WBG institutions focused on private sector development, IFC's and MIGA's engagement in DRC was central to this Focus Area. The single largest IFC Advisory Services spend, representing a third of the total, went to investment climate reforms at the national and provincial levels. As planned, IFC engaged in investment climate reforms and focused on investments in agribusiness, infrastructure, and cement sectors. IFC also helped increase access to finance to SMEs through financial markets investments and advisory interventions. MIGA, for its part, provided guaranty support for access to finance and for critical telecoms infrastructure to increase connectivity.

22. **Objective 4: Enhanced business environment for private sector development.** This objective was supported by the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project (FY04), Western Growth Poles Project (FY13), Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Program (FY16), and Financial Infrastructure and Markets Project (FY14); IFC AS SME V – CASF & ARF; and the following ASAs: FSAP (FY15), Strengthening Payment System (FY15), Investment Climate Strategy EW (FY16), Spatial Development TA (FY16) Doing Business Reforms Coordination (FY17), and the IFC AS DRC Investment Climate. Interventions early in the CAS period strengthened payments systems and simplified business registration and licensing, including through a “one-stop shop” model that streamlined submission of documents and payment of fees to start a business. These interventions were later augmented with activities aimed at supporting the business environment in targeted value



chains and poles (food and export crops and agro-processing in Bas Congo province and Kinshasa/Maluku) and supporting small-scale and women traders in borderlands areas with Rwanda and Uganda. The IFC and MIGA interventions helped increase access to finance for MSMEs. IFC had a program that provided risk capital and advisory services to financial institutions focused on MSMEs. MIGA supported a financial institution with a guaranty to reduce its risk weighting for mandatory reserves held at the central bank, enabling it to increase its lending to small and micro enterprises. Some key outcomes resulting from the activities later in the CAS period were not captured in the CAS indicators. Objective 4 had five indicators:

- Decrease the number of days to register a business from 58 in 2012 to 30 in 2015; the PLR revised the target to 10 in 2017. There is evidence that the number of days to register a business was 16 as of 2014. The 2018 Doing Business report stated that it took 7 days to start a business as of June 2017, and the 2020 Doing Business report stated the same as of May 2019.
- Decrease the number of days to obtain a construction permit from 119 days in 2015 to 94 days in 2017. The number of days to obtain a construction permit remained at 122 days in Doing Business 2020, the level achieved in 2017.
- Decrease the number of days to import from 63 days in 2015 to 57 days in 2017, and the number of days to export from 44 days in 2015 to 40 days in 2017. There is evidence that it took 44 days to export as of May 2017. The Doing Business results from 2016 forward are not compatible with the CLR's baseline and target because of a change in methodology starting with the 2016 Doing Business report. Doing Business 2016 showed that, as of June 2015, exports took 1,213 hours or 50 days for both document compliance and border compliance; and imports took a total of 804 hours or 33 days. Doing Business 2020 showed that, as of May 2019, it took 20 days to export and 21 days to import, an indication of significant progress since the CAS period.
- Put in place by 2015 a fully functioning modern payment system providing electronic (cashless) funds transfer with real-time clearing and settlement of account, and interconnectivity with other payments systems in the region; the PLR revised the target year to 2017. There is evidence that the Real Time Gross Settlements and Automated Clearing House were operational as of June 2017, and that a multi-currency automated transfer system and a central securities depository were operational for national currency in September 2017 and for foreign currency in March 2019.
- Increase the number of SMEs with increased access to credit from 0 (2012) to 10 (2017) through IFC fund providing risk capital and advisory to SMEs, and providing micro-financing to local banks and MFIs. IFC exceeded its target of at least 10 SMEs. It is unclear why IFC chose a relatively low target given its heavy engagement in the SME finance segment. IFC's combined SME-focused investment projects in financial institutions and advisory services provided financing and technical assistance to more than 10 SMEs in a number of sectors including telecoms, healthcare, education, and manufacturing. For example, IFC's SME Ventures Program, which provides risk capital and technical assistance, has supported 28 SMEs through the Central Africa SME Fund for DRC between 2012 and 2017. In addition, based on IFC's internal DOTS data, IFC's SME-focused investments in financial institutions provided thousands of SME loans during the CAS period. In 2017, one IFC investment in a financial institution had over 7,000 outstanding loans to MSMEs. MIGA, for its part, supported an IFC financial institution investee company focused on micro and small enterprises to increase its lending. MIGA's support was by way of a guarantee against the risk of expropriation of funds for mandatory reserves in the central bank. According to an IFC internal data base, the IFC project supported by MIGA increased its outstanding SME loan



portfolio from US\$33.9 million at the time of MIGA transaction in 2010 to US\$142.5 million in 2018.

23. There was progress under this objective. Some elements of the business environment, including the number of days to register a business and to import/export, were improved. A modern payment system is now in place, as envisaged. Methodological changes in the Doing Business analysis make it difficult to assess progress across the CAS period on some indicators, and in general, reliance on Doing Business indicators does not necessarily equate to a focus on the most important constraints to the business environment. With hindsight and given the issues that have subsequently emerged around the Doing Business report, additional indicators of improvements in the business environment would have been useful. IFC and MIGA supported DRC's goal of promoting private sector development, particularly through increased access to finance, and achievements went beyond the indicators and targets of the results framework. The reported progress in access to credit is particularly important, as this was the second-most cited business obstacle for firms reported in the 2013 Enterprise Survey. However, the WBG missed the opportunity to address other major business constraints such as access to electricity, which was identified as the biggest business obstacle in that 2013 survey.

24. **Objective 5: Improve connectivity and access to transport infrastructure.** This objective was supported by the Multimodal Transport Project (FY10) and the High Priority Reopening & Maintenance Project (FY08), and the following ASAs: River and Urban Transport Review EW (FY15), Spatial Development TA (FY16), and Urbanization Review (FY17). Interventions focused on road rehabilitation and maintenance in four provinces (Orientale, Katanga, South Kivu, and Equateur). Planned support for reform of SOEs across all other transport subsectors (railways, inland waterways, ports, and aviation) failed due to low capacity and lack of government commitment. Objective 5 had two indicators:

- Decrease the average transit time between copper belt and Zambian border from 17 days (2011) to 5 days (2016); the PLR revised the target year to 2017. The CLR reports that this indicator cannot be measured because mining companies have switched from rail to road transportation. The supporting Multimodal Transport Project achieved no outcomes and did not monitor this indicator.
- Decrease the number of days per year that roads are not passable by 4X2 vehicles in project areas (Province Orientale, Katanga, Equateur, and South Kivu) from 80 days in 2011 to 60 days in 2016; the PLR revised the target to 90 days in 2011, and the target was revised to 100 days in 2017, with the target higher because new road sections were added under project additional financing. The December 2017 and December 2019 ISRs of the High Priority Reopening & Maintenance Project reported the same number of days per year with roads not passable by 4X2 vehicles on reopened sections in project areas, most recently as of June 2019 (according to the December 2019 ISR): 5 for Kisangani-Beni; 20 for Akula-Gemena-Libenge-Zongo; 0 for Uvira-Kasaomeno; 10 for Uvira-Bunduki; and 30 for Komanda-Bunia-Goli. The total for these five sections, 65 days, is more than the original target of 60 days but less than the revised target of 100 days.

25. Program investments in reopening and rehabilitation of roads modestly improved passability. However, most areas of progress under this objective cannot be assessed with available evidence. When mining companies switched to maintaining relevant sections of roads themselves, through public-private partnership arrangements, it would have been preferable for the program to introduce alternate indicators, and also to indicate whether the change in transportation arrangements was attributable in any way to the WBG program, and whether it improved connectivity. The ICR of the Multimodal Transport Project indicates that the Bank's interventions lacked focus and overestimated government commitment and capacity. The CLR reports that the Bank program invested in the rehabilitation of railway wagons and tracks outside the copper belt, a relevant investment given the



existence of communities for which rail is the only form of connectivity, but impact is not captured by any outcome indicators.

26. **Objective 6: Improve access to quality broadband network and services at reduced cost.** This objective was supported by the Central African Backbone SOP5 (FY15) and the ASA ICT Regulatory Services TA (FY14). Interventions included technical assistance for the construction and rehabilitation of fiber optic networks and for the design and implementation of regulatory and management instruments. Both IFC and MIGA supported related ICT infrastructure leading to increased voice and SMS telecoms coverage. Objective 6 had two indicators:

- Increase total broadband penetration from 0.1 percent of the household population in 2011 to 2.5 percent in 2016; the PLR revised the target year to 2017. IEG could not verify the CLR's report that the broadband penetration rate of the household population in 2017 was 2.8 percent. There is evidence that the number of internet service subscribers per 100 people was 3.23 as of June 2016, increased to 20 as of December 2020.
- Increase international Internet bandwidth from less than 14 Bitps per capita in 2011 to 25 Bitps per capita in 2016; the PLR revised the target to 50 Bitps per capita in 2017. IEG could not verify the CLR's report that bandwidth was 411 Bitps per capita as of 2017, and the Central African Backbone SOP5 does not monitor this indicator.

27. The rate of internet service subscription increased significantly, though no information was provided on internet service costs per the objective. Both IFC and MIGA contributed to this objective beyond the scope of the results indicators. IFC and MIGA had active interventions in the telecoms sector during the CAS period that resulted in positive development outcomes overall. These interventions were in the mobile telecom towers subsector but had no direct contributions to the quality and cost of broadband network tracked in the results framework. Based on IEG-validated internal IFC and MIGA evaluations, they helped increased telecoms connectivity by expanding mobile infrastructure and providing additional services to low-income communities. For example, one investee company increased its number of subscribers to 3.8 million at completion, despite stiff competition, from 1.5 million at the start of the project. These projects also helped introduce customers to data and other relevant products, while offering affordable rates for SMS and voice calls.

28. **Objective 7: Increased generation of electricity and improved access to energy.** This objective was supported by the Regional Southern Africa Power Market APL I (FY07), Southern African Power Market APL I (FY04), and Inga 3 and Mid-size Hydropower Development Project (FY14). The program's investments in this area consisted mainly of rehabilitating power production, transmission, and distribution infrastructure, as well as capacity building for the power utility, SNEL. Specific interventions included technical assistance to support system control software and restoration of the 4,000-km transmission line from the Inga Hydropower Plant to Katanga. Planned subsequent development for Inga 3 and selected mid-size hydropower projects failed due to inadequate coordination with development partners, political inference with private concessionaire selection, and the selection of a country-specific lending instrument for a project that had regional implications. Objective 7 had three indicators:

- Increase the quantity of energy delivered to Katanga Region from 2,540 GWh in 2011 to 5,515 GWh in 2015; the PLR revised the target year to 2017. There is evidence that 4,812 GWh of energy were delivered to the Katanga Region as of September 2016, approaching the target.
- Increase the quantity of renewable energy generated at Inga from 4,809 GWh in 2010 to 9,039 GWh in 2016; the PLR revised the target year to 2017. There is evidence that 6,008 GWh of renewable energy was generated at Inga as of December 2016, not achieving the



target during the CAS period. However, the project ICRR reported that 9,801 GWh of renewable energy had been generated at Inga 3 by project close in June 2018.

- Increase access to electricity services in targeted areas including Kinshasa by connecting 35,000 additional households from 2007 through 2017. There is evidence of 12,301 new household connections by December 2016, not meeting the CAS target. The project ICRR reported that there were 22,900 new household connections by project close in June 2018, still less than 65 percent of the targeted increase.

29. Electricity generation increased and access improved modestly. Targets for quantity of energy delivered to the Katanga were not met during the CAS period, but they have since been exceeded; likewise, with the quantity of renewable energy generated at Inga. New household connections remain significantly below what was anticipated. Low capacity and poor governance remain as key constraints.

30. **Objective 8: Boost agriculture production and increase access to markets.** This objective was supported by the Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery Support Project (FY10) and the Western Growth Poles Project (FY13), as well as the ASA Promoting Investments in Agriculture (FY16). Interventions included production and distribution of commercial seeds to smallholder farmers and rural road and storage facility rehabilitation in the Equateur province, and capacity development for the Ministry of Agriculture at national and provincial levels. The Western Growth Poles project focused on value chain development for palm oil, cassava, and rice, as well as rural infrastructure development in the Bas Congo province. Objective 8 had one indicator:

- Increase yields of primary crops in targeted areas in the Equateur province, including increasing the yield from maize from less than 1 t/ha in 2012 to 1.5t/ha in 2015; from cassava from 7 t/ha in 2012 to 12 t/ha in 2015; and from rice from 1 t/ha in 2012 to 2 t/ha in 2015. The PLR revised the targets: from maize, to 2 t/ha in 2017; and from cassava, to 15 t/ha in 2017. The target for rice was not revised. There is evidence that, as of June 2017, yields were 1.6 t/ha for maize and 20 t/ha for cassava; no information was available for rice. The August 2020 ISR for the agriculture project reports the same yields for maize and cassava as of January 2020, adding a yield for rice of 1.66 t/ha as of January 2020.

31. Agriculture productivity targets for this objective were mostly achieved, and this is one of the few objectives for which gender-disaggregated results are reported in the CLR: under the Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery Support project, 49 percent of beneficiaries were women, against a target of 60 percent. No information was provided on production itself or access to markets, and there were no indicators to capture outcomes under the Western Growth Poles project.

32. Overall, for this Focus Area, there were improvements in some Doing Business indicators, though reliance on those indicators did not guarantee focus on the most important constraints to doing business in the country. The 2013 Enterprise Survey identified electricity and access to finance as the top-ranked business environment obstacles for firms; IFC was heavily engaged in the SME finance segment, but access to electricity for businesses was a missed opportunity. Progress was also made on road connectivity, household broadband penetration and telecoms connectivity, and agricultural productivity in program areas. Power generation fell short of targets but met targets after the CAS period. Household electricity access also fell short of targets. Other notable areas of WBG collaboration included the investment climate and MSME access to ICT. There is little sense of aggregate, synergistic impact stemming from the growth pole approach. There were no outcome indicators to measure actual private sector led growth or job creation.

33. **Focus Area III: Improve Social Services Delivery and Increase Human Development Indicators**



34. Focus Area III had four objectives: (i) increase access to clean water and sanitation; (ii) improve access to health services in targeted areas; (iii) improve access to basic education; and (iv) strengthen the social protection system. The Bank's engagement was intended to emphasize both financing of essential services and strengthening service delivery in education, health, nutrition, and social protection, incorporating multi-sectoral approaches where synergies were possible. Gender inclusion and inequity received focus in all social sectors. Most interventions focused on poor and vulnerable communities across the country and on urban areas (particularly Kinshasa), though as the CAS period evolved, the balance of interventions shifted to conflict-affected areas in the East.

35. **Objective 9: Increase access to clean water and sanitation.** This objective was supported by the Eastern Recovery Project (FY14), the Emergency Social Action Project (FY05), the Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project (FY07), and the Urban Water Supply Project (FY09). Early in the CAS period, the interventions financed development of socio-economic infrastructure and labor-intensive public works in targeted poor communities in provinces across the country. As the CAS period evolved, interventions became more focused on efforts toward resilience in the conflict-affected areas in the East, combining infrastructure development at the community level with participatory processes and local conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. Parallel interventions focused on strengthening urban water supplies in select urban areas through capacity building for the national water utility and infrastructure improvement. Objective 9 had two indicators:

- Increase the percentage of population in the targeted areas with access to potable water from 43 percent in 2011 to 53 percent in 2015; the PLR revised the target to 55 percent in 2017. IEG could not verify the CLR's report that 58 percent of the population in targeted areas had access to potable water at the end of the CAS period. There is evidence that 54 percent of the population had access to potable water as of December 2016 in the areas covered by the Eastern Recovery Project. The February 2020 ISR of that project reported that access to potable water had declined to 24.5 percent as of December 2019.
- Increase the number of people provided with access to improved water sources in project areas from 221,148 in March 2010 to 420,180 in March 2013; the PLR revised the baseline to 5.292 million in March 2010, and the target to 6.494 million in 2017. There is evidence that, across the three projects that provided residents with access to improved water sources, 2.504 million people had new access during the CAS period, and 2.593 million people during and after the CAS period as of January 2020. This more than doubles the CAS target of 1.202 million additional people.

36. There was important progress under this objective, part of which was reversed in the post-CAS period. Although targets for the number of people with access to improved water sources in both urban areas and the East were exceeded during and after the program period, the percentage of the population with access to potable water in targeted areas in the East has declined significantly in the post-CAS period due to ongoing conflict.

37. **Objective 10: Improve access to health services in targeted areas.** This objective was supported by the Health Sector Rehabilitation and Support Project (FY06), Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project (FY07), Great Lakes Emergency Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) & Women's Health Project (FY14), and Gender Based Violence Prevention and Response Project (FY19), and the following ASAs: Health Systems and Financing (FY14) and Social Sector Public Expenditure Review (FY16). The interventions financed NGOs to deliver basic health services, including malaria control and basic immunization, in areas where provision of those services had been low or non-existent, and supported both government health facilities and community-based providers to provide specialized services to SGBV survivors in North and South Kivu. ASA guided the selection of interventions and intervention areas, as well as coordination of SGBV interventions with Rwanda and Burundi. Objective 10 had five indicators:



- Increase the rate of DPT immunization from 85 percent in 2011 to 90 percent in 2014; the PLR revised the target year to 2017. There is evidence that 90 percent of children ages 0-11 months had received the DPT vaccination as of March 2014.
- Increase the percentage of deliveries assisted by qualified personnel from 80 percent in 2011 to 85 percent in 2014; the PLR revised the target year to 2017. IEG could not verify the CLR's report that the share of assisted deliveries was 79 percent in 2014, but it could validate that 75 percent of deliveries in project areas were assisted by qualified personnel as of March 2014.
- Increase the number of women ages 15-49 who are new users of family planning from 6 percent in 2011 to 11 percent in 2014; the PLR revised the target to maintaining the baseline level of 6 percent in 2017. There is evidence that 2 percent of women ages 15-49 were new users of family planning as of March 2014.
- Increase the percentage of children under 5 sleeping under LLINs (mosquito nets) in targeted areas from 35 percent in 2011 to 80 percent in 2014; the PLR revised the target to 70 percent in 2017. There is evidence that 65 percent of children in Kinshasa and 20 percent in Bandundu slept under LLINs as of July 2012, and that in November 2012, the percentage remained the same in Kinshasa and increased to 91 percent in Bandundu. The 2013-2014 Demographic and Health Survey found household access to bed nets in Bandundu to be 62.6%, higher than any other province in the country (national average 47%).¹⁰
- Increase the percentage of reported cases of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) who receive PEP kits within 72 hours from 25 percent in 2014 to 50 percent in 2017. There is evidence that 92 percent of reported cases of SGBV received post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) kits within 72 hours as of November 2016; 71 percent of eligible cases had received the kits as of December 2019, and 100 percent of eligible cases had received the kits within 72 hours as of May 2020.

38. There was some important progress under this objective. Coverage of reported cases of SGBV with PEP kits within 72 hours of reaching a service center increased significantly during the CAS period and reached full coverage by 2020. This result is significant because PEP is effective only if taken within 72 hours, but the indicator does not provide information about the period of time between the actual experience of sexual violence and a woman's arrival at a service provider, the extent to which survivors are actually reporting their experiences and coming to service providers, or the project's contribution to dealing with the underlying cultural and other factors shaping the use of services. Vaccination rates increased, in part due to the provision of almost all health zones with vaccine storage and cold-chain equipment. Program targets were met or exceeded for malaria prevention (children sleeping under bed nets). However, there was regression in achievement of assisted deliveries and uptake of family planning, largely due to the volatility of the security situation and difficulties in physical access to services.

39. **Objective 11: Improve access to basic education.** This objective was supported by the Education Sector Project (FY07), the Human Development Systems Strengthening Project (FY15), and the Eastern Recovery Project (FY14), and the following ASA: Operationalizing Higher Education TA (FY14), Mainstreaming Gender TA (FY16), and Skills Development Study (FY15). The interventions, guided by ASA on financial and gender-based barriers to access, upgraded primary-level classrooms, procured textbooks, trained teachers and administrators, put in place learning

¹⁰ L. Levitz, et. al., "Effect of Individual and Community-Level Bed Net Usage on Malaria Prevalence among Under Fives in Democratic Republic of Congo," *Malaria Journal*, vol. 17, January 2018.



assessments, strengthened information systems, and developed sector-wide norms and guidelines. Objective 11 had two indicators:

- Increase the primary gross enrollment ratio from 89.7 percent in 2011 to 105.8 percent in 2015, with a female share increasing from 47 percent in 2011 to 50 percent in 2015; the PLR revised the baseline to 92.7 percent in 2011, and the target to 132.3 percent with a 1:1 male-female ratio in 2017. There is evidence that the primary gross enrollment rate was 117 percent as of October 2014, with a 98 percent girl-to-boy ratio. The World Development Indicators (WDI) report that the primary school gross enrollment rate in 2015 was 107.97 percent, improving to 118.46 percent in 2018, and that the primary school gross enrollment parity index was 0.99 in 2015 and 0.939 in 2018; it is not clear that the WDI indicator is defined in the same way as the CAS male-female ratio indicator.
- Increase the completion rate in primary education from 59 percent in 2011 to 75 percent in 2016, with a female share increasing from 51 percent in 2011 to 65 percent in 2016; the PLR revised the target to 97.8 percent in 2017, and the female share to a baseline of 44 percent in 2011 and target of 48 percent in 2017. It is unclear whether the indicator refers to the share of females among those who completed primary school, or the completion rate for females. There is evidence that the primary completion rate was 80 percent as of October 2014. The education sector project did not monitor the gender component of the indicator, and IEG could not validate more recent progress. WDI reports that, as of 2015, the primary completion rate was 70 percent overall, and 69.5 percent for boys and 70.3 percent for girls.

40. Education outcomes in terms of overall enrollment and completion rates, while improved, fell short of expectations, and gender-disaggregated data are inconclusive. Although education spending increased over the CAS period, it did not keep pace with GDP growth, and access to education was hindered by school fees that were unaffordable to many poor families.¹¹

41. **Objective 12: Strengthen the social protection system.** This objective was supported by the Street Children Project (FY10), Emergency Social Action Project (FY05), and Eastern Recovery Project (FY14), and the following ASAs: Support to Social Protection System (FY14), National Social Protection Strategy (FY15), 1-2-3 Household Survey, Social Accounting Matrix, and Poverty Analysis (FY14), and Poverty Assessment (FY16). Interventions early in the CAS period focused on child protection and support services for at-risk children in Kinshasa, and on the financing of labor-intensive public works (LIPW) for poor communities across the country. Later in the CAS period, focus shifted to LIPW (road maintenance and rehabilitation) and a Livelihood Innovation Fund to strengthen agricultural value chains in the conflict-affected East. ASA supported targeting and the selection of project modalities. Objective 12 had two indicators:

- Establish and regularly maintain a comprehensive database of safety net beneficiaries, improving from a baseline of the dataset containing information only on street children in Kinshasa in 2012, to the dataset including beneficiaries of other safety net programs, e.g. labor-intensive public works, and being updated at least every six months with input from provinces by 2015; the PLR revised the target date to 2018. There is evidence that a database on children's rights interventions and beneficiaries has been established, but IEG could not verify whether that database is being updated or whether the dataset includes other safety net program beneficiaries.
- Increase the number of beneficiaries of labor-intensive public works from 3,192 (30 percent female) in 2012 to 18,000 (35 percent female) in 2016; the PLR revised the target date to 2017. There is evidence that that 3,385 persons, of whom 22 percent were female, benefited

¹¹ Project Appraisal Document, Emergency Equity and System Strengthening in Education Project, World Bank, May 12, 2020.



from public works programs as of June 2013; that 830 persons (49 percent of whom were female) benefited from cash-for-work, food-for-work, and public works programs as of November 2016; and that 21,159 persons (47 percent of whom were female) benefited from cash-for-work programs as of June 2020.

42. Progress under this objective was minimal during the CAS period, but some progress on public works programs was made after the end of the CAS period. Expansion of the dataset containing information on street children in Kinshasa to include beneficiaries of other safety net programs did not take place, and the CLR reports that even the existing database on street children has not been updated regularly or reliably, due to instability of leadership in the Ministry of Social Affairs, lack of coordination with provinces, and lack of systematic collection and/or communication of data by the non-governmental and faith-based organizations that provide the bulk of social protection services. Although the expected volume of work was not generated by public works programs during the CAS period, gender targets were exceeded, and the cash-for-work program has expanded since the CAS expired.

43. Overall, in this Focus Area, there were improvements in access to clean water and immunization rates, and support to survivors of SGBV who sought services exceeded targets, but education and social protection investments did not produce intended results during the CAS period. Participation in work programs and support for SGBV survivors continued to improve following the CAS period. However, after the CAS period, due to ongoing conflict, there was reversal of gains in access to clean water and some basic health services. The CLR reports that, with Bank support, the government has adopted the country's first-ever comprehensive social protection strategy and action plan, and that there have been investment allocations in the national budget for social protection services since the adoption of that strategy. In September 2019, the government began rolling out a program of free primary schooling, though implementation of that strategy has been disrupted by COVID-19.

44. **Focus Area IV: Address Fragility and Conflict in the Eastern Provinces**

45. Focus Area IV had two objectives: (i) improve management of public finances and accountability in targeted conflict-affected areas; and (ii) increase socio-economic opportunities in targeted conflict-affected areas. Support for stabilization and peace consolidation efforts in Eastern DRC were defined as part of the broader development agenda, following two main directions: leveraging national policy dialogue to support peace consolidation, and strengthening resilience, peace consolidation, and sustainable development in the East. The key interventions were employment generation and support for improved local governance and participatory governance processes. Efforts were coordinated with WBG programs in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.

46. **Objective 13: Improve management of public finances and accountability in targeted conflict-affected areas.** This objective was supported by the Enhancing Governance Capacity Project (FY08), the Eastern Recovery Project (FY14), and the Strengthening Public Financial Management and Accountability Project (FY14). Interventions included support for public administration and financial management systems at the central level and in specific provinces that included North Kivu and South Kivu, and community participation processes in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Oriental provinces. Objective 13 had three indicators:

- Increase budget retrocession to the Eastern conflict-affected province of South Kivu from 10-20 percent of revenue from retrocessions¹² (baseline year not specified) to 30 percent in 2015; the PLR revised the target to 35 percent in 2017. There is evidence that 46 percent of overall domestic revenue was transferred directly to provinces, as well as salary payments to

¹² Retrocessions are revenue transfers from the central to provincial/local governments.



provincial civil servants and provincial capital investments, as of December 2015. IEG could not verify the share of transfers specifically to South Kivu, as per the indicator.

- Increase the number of communities benefiting from participatory budget planning processes from 4 districts in South Kivu (baseline year not specified) to all districts in conflict-affected provinces in North Kivu and South Kivu by 2015; the PLR revised the target to 8 districts, including 4 additional districts in North Kivu, by 2017. IEG could not verify the CLR's report that 16 communities benefited from participatory budget planning processes.
- Reduce the discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures in the conflict-affected province of South Kivu from 51 percent in 2011 to 10 percent in 2016; the PLR revised the target to 30 percent in 2017. There is evidence that the discrepancy between project and actual expenditures for the pilot provinces of Bandundu, Katanga, Kasai Occidental, and South Kivu was 63 percent as of December 2015. IEG could not verify the discrepancy for South Kivu, as per the indicator.

47. There is insufficient information to assess achievement of this objective. There was progress in budget transfers to the provinces covered by the Enhancing Governance Capacity Project, but not all of those provinces were in Eastern conflicted-affected areas. Similarly, budget variance among the project provinces worsened, but no information was provided specifically for the conflict-affected provinces. Data limitations preclude assessment of achievements specific to the conflict-affected target areas of North Kivu and South Kivu. It is also unclear why the CPF and, by extension, the CLR are silent on the WBG's approaches in addressing fragility through private sector interventions.

48. **Objective 14: Increase socio-economic opportunities in targeted conflict-affected areas.** This objective was supported by the Eastern Recovery Project (FY14), Second AF to the Eastern Recovery Project (FY20), Urban Development Project (FY13), Great Lakes Emergency Sexual and Gender Based Violence & Women's Health Project (FY14), and the Gender Based Violence Prevention and Response Project (FY19), and the following ASAs: Promoting Peace & Stability in the Great Lakes Region: Support for Conflict-Sensitive Program Design and Risk Management (FY17), DDR III Project Paper (FY15), Great Lakes Region Study (FY17), Support to the Land Sector Review (FY16), Strengthening the World Bank Engagement and Partnership with the United Nations in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo Engagement in DRC (FY16), and Urbanization Review (FY17). Activities targeted areas in provinces covered by the government's Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern DRC (STAREC) and complemented efforts under the Southeastern DRC Agriculture-based Growth Pole. Many of the interventions also contributed to outcomes under Objective 12. They included community infrastructure and cash-for-work programs in targeted poor areas around the country (including conflict-affected provinces), supplemented in the post-CAS period with additional support to mitigate the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19 and Ebola and to support the government's new social protection strategy. SGBV activities pursued a multi-sectoral approach, integrating prevention, treatment, and front-line services at the community level. Objective 14 had four indicators:

- Increase the number of person-days of employment created in conflict-affected areas from 0 at baseline to 226,000 person-days by 2016; the PLR revised the target to 400,000 person-days by 2017. IEG could not verify the CLR's report of 62,000 person-days of work having been created in the conflict-affected area of Bukavu. There is evidence that the Eastern Recovery project produced 73,040 person-days of work, and that the Urban Development project produced 436,641 person-days of work as of June 2017, and in the post-CAS 559,434 person-days as of February 2020, but these figures include person-days from non-conflict areas.
- Increase the number of persons in conflict-affected areas with access to agricultural extension services and improved agricultural inputs from 0 at baseline to 10,000 in 2017.



The CLR reported that the Eastern Recovery project supporting this indicator was delayed and extended with AF. There is evidence that no farmers had adopted improved agricultural technology as of December 2016. Following the CAS period, however, 43,200 clients had adopted improved agricultural technologies as of December 2019, far exceeding the CAS target.

- Increase the percentage of reported cases of SGVB who receive at least two services as needed (economic support, psychosocial, legal, medical) from 50 percent in 2014 to 60 percent in 2017. There is evidence that 90 percent of reported cases of SGBV received at least two services as needed as of November 2016. During the post-CAS period, this result declined to 51 percent as of November 2019, but then recovered to 82 percent as of May 2020.
- Increase the percentage of people in conflict-affected communities who report an increase in inter-community cohesion and decrease in livelihoods-related tensions from 0 at baseline to 20 percent in 2017. During the CAS period, there is evidence that 11 percent of beneficiaries of community subprojects reported improvement in social cohesion as of December 2016. Following the CAS period, 19.5 percent of beneficiaries noted improvement in social cohesion, almost meeting the CAS target.

49. Employment generation and extension services to alleviate the drivers of conflict did not meet expectations during the CAS period, but there is some evidence of progress since 2017. The CLR describes conflict mediation and transformation activities embedded in community sub-projects, and IEG has validated improvements in social cohesion indicators in the post-CAS period. The reported provision of services to survivors of SGVB, driven by support to two key service providers, has varied during and since the CAS period but has far exceeded targets.

50. Overall, for this Focus Area, the WBG's multi-pronged interventions under the CAS had varied capacity and impact in addressing the multiple, complex underlying issues driving conflict. There was impressive progress in provision of services for survivors of SGBV whose cases were reported, though the CAS indicators did not capture process in preventing gender-based violence or encouraging survivors to report their experiences and seek services. Public works and agricultural extension programs produced limited results during the CAS period, but gains have been significant in the post-CAS period, and these gains have been matched with reported improvements in social cohesion. There is limited information, however, on improved public management and community participation processes specific to conflict-affected areas. The CLR points out that sporadic flare-ups of conflict and violence had an adverse impact on program activities.

Overall Assessment

51. The Bank made significant contributions to improving the business climate, though reliance on those indicators did not guarantee focus on the most important constraints to doing business in the country, and the program was only partly responsive to the main obstacles for business identified in the 2013 Enterprise Survey. Key areas of progress included the establishment of a modern payments system; access to telecommunications services and household broadband penetration; renewable energy generation; agricultural productivity; and access to potable water, basic education, and some health services. In conflict-affected areas, the Bank's interventions improved access to agricultural extension services and cash-for-work programs (mainly in the post-CAS period) and services for SGBV survivors who accessed project-supported facilities, and its embedding of conflict mediation activities across community-based sub-projects contributed to perceptions of increased social cohesion. IFC advisory services and the program-supported creation of a one-stop shop model for business services produced efficiencies in starting a business, import and export processes, payment systems, and access to credit. IFC and MIGA's interventions in the mobile telecom towers subsector expanded mobile infrastructure and enhanced access to telecom services for low-income



communities. Provision of seeds, planting materials, and advisory services has boosted yields for maize, rice, and cassava.

52. For some objectives and outcomes, there was evidence of limited progress or insufficient evidence to assess progress. The program made limited inroads in addressing the systemic challenges that lie at the heart of DRC's persistent poverty and inequality. Poor governance, including poor management of public finances and human capital, remains at the root of DRC's development challenges, making the first Focus Area foundational to progress in the other three. Overall, there is limited evidence that the program enabled DRC to overcome key governance constraints, including of SOEs, standing in the way of effective management of public finances, revenue mobilization, infrastructure development, and job creation that might have converted economic growth into sustained poverty reduction. No evidence is presented that either decentralization or engagement with citizens and/or civil society organizations contributed to enhanced transparency and accountability that might have exerted pressure for governance reforms. Persistent conflict limited the utility of regional approaches to address the roots of insecurity.

6. WBG Performance

Lending and Investments

53. The existing portfolio when the CAS was approved comprised 21 IPF operations committed during FY04-FY11 (including seven operations with additional financing) amounting to US\$ 1.794 billion. Just over half of the existing portfolio (US\$931.8 million) were projects in Focus Area III for health, education, and social development, while two-fifths (US\$718.3 million) was in Focus Area II to boost competitiveness and job creation, and less than ten percent (US\$143.9) was in public sector governance. During the CAS period, new IDA commitments totaled US\$2.513 billion, comprising 28 IPF operations which included 11 additional financing operations. About 44 percent of the investment lending (US\$1.111 billion) during the CAS period supported Focus Area II for transport, energy, and agriculture; one-third (US\$829 million) went to Focus Area III for health, education, and water; and just over 10 percent each supported Focus Area I (US\$289 million) for public sector reform and statistics development, and Focus Area IV (US\$284 million) for urban development, economic recovery, and re-integration of ex-combatants. ASA supported objectives across the four focus areas. Although the CAS advised that development policy operations should be considered as part of the menu of instruments that could be used to address critical reforms, especially in the area of public financial management, none were used.

54. IDA approved amounts (US\$2.2 billion) were significantly higher than proposed (US\$1.2 billion) over the CAS period. Most of the change represented new projects or Additional Financing in areas that were performing relatively well, including agriculture, health, roads, and electricity. The additional projects and financing were in line with CAS objectives and did not fundamentally change the orientation of the program.

55. During the CAS period, 26 trust-funded operations, amounting to US\$383.7 million, supported activities mostly in Focus Area III. Over 80 percent of the volume supported projects on education (US\$200 million), maternal and child health (US\$51 million), forest landscape management (US\$55.9 million), and public financial management (US\$17 million).

56. DRC's portfolio performance at exit, measured by outcomes rated Moderately Satisfactory (MS) or better by IEG, was better than its comparators, a remarkable finding given the relatively poor performance of the program against the CAS objectives. A total of 11 operations were closed and reviewed by IEG during the period FY13-FY17. Of these, nine (81.8 percent) were rated MS or better on a binary scale, significantly above the Bank-wide performance (71.7 percent) and the Africa region performance (64.8 percent). The discrepancy between project performance and CAS development outcomes appears to be largely due to data limitations on the indicators used to



measure CAS performance, as there are several indicators that were not adequate measures of achievement of program objectives, and even more where adequate data were not available to measure progress on indicators. After the CAS period, three additional projects were closed and reviewed by IEG in FY18 and FY19, with only one of those three rated MS or better.

57. DRC's active portfolio performed less impressively. The share of projects at risk (by number of projects) averaged 59.6 percent during FY13-FY17, significantly higher than for the Africa region (26.0 percent) and the world (24.2 percent). The share of commitments at risk for DRC (70.5 percent) was also markedly higher than in the Africa region (32.7 percent) and the world (22.6 percent). This performance deterioration appears to be due to ongoing conflict, political instability, persistent or worsening governance challenges, the unfinished decentralization agenda, and the failure to consolidate and prioritize the portfolio as planned at the PLR stage.

58. IFC had a disbursed outstanding portfolio of US\$62.3 million for its own account in six projects at the start of the CAS period. During the FY13-17 CAS period, IFC made a total of US\$192.8 million long-term finance net investment commitments in eight projects. IFC also mobilized an additional US\$28 million from other financiers. Commitments made prior to FY17 that remained active in the CAS period totaled US\$5.4 million. Three investments representing 61 percent of the total commitments made during the CAS period, or US\$117 million, went to three cement projects. One investment representing 24 percent of total was made in a copper mining project. There was one investment in agribusiness (9 percent of volume) and three investments in the financial sector (7 percent of total). IFC investments were in line with the CAS's Strategic Objective of boosting competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation. At the end of the CPF period (June 30, 2017), IFC had a disbursed outstanding portfolio of US\$138.9 million.

59. One investment project in the telecom sector was covered under the IFC XPSR self-evaluation framework and validated by IEG during the CAS period. IEG confirmed the project's development outcome rating of Successful, the second highest rating in a 6-point rating scale. The project contributed to the modernization of the telecom sector in the DRC, promoting new technologies, including mobile money and 3G, and expanded the competitive environment. It helped increase access to mobile telephony and improved service quality while making it more affordable.

60. Five IFC client companies in DRC have Development Outcome ratings in IFC's internal Development Outcome Tracking System (DOTS) during the CAS period. Four out of the five companies had Development Outcome ratings of Mostly Successful or better. Strong and committed sponsors and close IFC project supervision proved crucial especially in high-risk FCV environments such as the DRC.

61. MIGA issued four guarantees in infrastructure, services, and financial sectors for a total exposure of US\$178.0 million. Two guarantees were issued in FY14 and FY15 to one infrastructure company representing 70 percent of total (US\$124.8 million). The project involved the construction, expansion, and operation of a telecom tower network. A political risk coverage for \$50 million (29 percent of the total) was issued to support an industrial heavy equipment services company in FY16. In the financial sector, MIGA issued a guarantee of US\$3.7 million in favor of a financial institution focused on small and micro enterprises to cover the risk of expropriation of funds for mandatory reserves in the central bank. This project helped the financial institution reduce its risk weighting for mandatory reserves held at the central bank, enabling it to increase its lending activities. The project was the result of IFC-MIGA collaboration. IFC had an existing investment in the subject financial institution and IFC originated the MIGA transaction. Between FY18 to FY21, MIGA made one multi country I transaction which includes a US\$6.1 million component for DRC to support off-grid electricity and LPG services. .

62. MIGA had no self-evaluation of DRC projects within the PER framework during the CAS period. In FY19, MIGA self-evaluated one project in the telecom infrastructure sector which was



active during the CAS period. Based on IEG's independent validation, the project achieved a Satisfactory Development Outcome rating, equivalent to the second highest rating in a 4-point rating scale. The project helped expand telecom coverage in rural areas and increased operating efficiencies.

63. The FY13-FY17 CAS expired without a new WBG strategy in place and with no decision taken to extend either the strategy or the results framework, creating an extended period of time with no clear framework for accountability. The CLR cites two main factors for the delay in preparing a new strategy: (i) a delay in presidential elections (planned for November 2016) until the end of December 2018 (with the exception of some provinces in the East due to an Ebola outbreak), requiring a precautionary evacuation of WBG country office staff for one month in December 2018. Because the results of the presidential elections were contested, a new government was not formed until the end of August 2019; and (ii) two geographically separate Ebola outbreaks: one in Equateur Province in May – July 2018, and another in Eastern DRC in August 2018 that was not declared over until November 2020. However, given the timing of these factors, it is not clear why the existing strategy was not extended through engagement with the government in place.

64. Without a CAS framework, between FY18 and FY21, the WBG continued to support an active program of investment lending. Nine new projects were approved in FY18-FY21 totaling US\$2.504 billion, including US\$47.2 million to support the response to COVID-19. For its part, IFC made two long-term finance commitments totaling US\$1.8 million. Primarily supporting Focus Area III, the new investments covered projects in health and nutrition (US\$859.2 million), education (US\$800 million), access to livelihoods and socio-economic infrastructure (US\$445 million), and building of social safety nets (US\$200 million). The remainder went to projects on gender-based violence (US\$100 million) and SME development and growth (US\$100 million).

Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

65. Bank work in DRC had a significant and wide-ranging ASA component that provided a foundation for the investment lending program. Its products influenced policy dialogue and decisions, helped with implementation of reforms, and deepened understanding of the ongoing conflict. For example, World Bank teams worked closely with the United Nations Mission for DRC in drafting the National Program for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR III), which was endorsed by the International Community in July 2014 and was the foundational document for the Bank's ongoing work in conflict-affected areas. Annual Economic Updates highlighted development challenges while reinforcing sound macroeconomic policies. Other sector work focused on governance, public financial management, sectoral studies, skills development, and poverty diagnostics/assessments. For example, ASA on strengthening payment systems contributed to capacity building in operations and oversight of the national payments system, including for the relevant department in the Central Bank of Congo. Technical assistance contributed to program priorities related to education, transport, social protection, energy, and gender. In the period following the CAS (FY18-FY21), there were 33 new ASA tasks. This work remained broad in scope but consistent with the CAS, with continued work on education and governance, and additional focus in, among other areas, sub-national governance and development, forestry, public procurement, gender, and the financial sector. This analytical work contributed to the Systematic Country Diagnostic prepared in 2017-2018 and informed the post-CAS lending program.

66. IFC started implementation of four advisory services projects with a total IFC funding of US\$6.2 million. All advisory services activities were in support of the financial sector, except for a US\$2.1 million project aimed at improving investment climate. These AS were in addition to a US\$1.3 million existing advisory project at the start of the CAS period. In the FY18-FY21 period, IFC engaged in 3 additional advisory services with a total IFC funding of US\$1.5 million.



67. IFC self-evaluated an Access to Finance advisory under its PCR evaluation framework. IEG rated the Development Effectiveness of this project Mostly Unsuccessful. The advisory was a technical assistance to support the establishment and expansion of a commercially viable microfinance (MF) bank that will provide sustained access to credit and other financial services to urban MSMEs. The technical assistance was provided, but the MFI ran into several operating problems including unexpected changes in banking regulations and its inability to positively adapt to these changes. While the project contributed to increasing access to finance, the development impacts were less than expected.

Results Framework

68. The results framework reflected reasonably well the links between the PRSP-II, the CAS outcomes, and the supporting WBG interventions. However, there were shortcomings, particularly related to the complexity of the program and to the measurement of the program's intended results and outcomes. A number of indicators were not related to their associated objectives or measured outcomes that could not be attributed to CAS-supported activities, and in some cases the indicators taken together under an objective or Focus Area did not fully capture progress toward their achievement. For example, none of the indicators under Focus Area II, boosting competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation, actually measured growth or job creation. Similarly, the single indicator under the third objective—the number of SOEs with PPP or management performance contracts—did not measure the objective of enhanced governance and operational performance, and the single indicator under Objective 8—increased crop yield—did not measure the objective of increased production and market access. With four focus areas, 14 objectives, and 38 indicators, the results framework was overly complex for a country with limited administrative capacity. For several objectives under the first, third, and fourth focus areas, targets were made less ambitious, or the target year was extended without a change in the target, suggesting a weakening of the targeted objective.

69. The results framework missed opportunities to include indicators with significant IFC and MIGA contributions beyond three of the 38 outcome indicators, to measure progress on the program's cross-cutting themes, and to capture the contribution of the growth poles approach. For example, Objective 6 (increased access to quality broad band network and services at reduced cost) could have had an outcome indicator from IFC investments and MIGA guaranty in mobile telephony infrastructure. Few CAS outcome indicators were disaggregated by gender, and there was only one outcome indicator related to climate (renewable energy generated at Inga). Among the objectives that contained province-specific interventions, there were only four provinces for which more than one type of intervention had results specified with outcome targets.

Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

70. The WBG CAS was prepared jointly with other development partners, including the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Commission (EC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was also intended to align with the overall framework for donor coordination, the Country Assistance Framework, jointly chaired by the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. The division of labor with other donors was largely geographic. For example, the CAS supported public sector and financial management strengthening in a limited number of provinces, while the EC, UNDP, and USAID supported similar activities in other provinces; similarly, the CAS adopted a growth pole approach to acceleration of private-sector-led growth in two priority economic zones identified in the PRSP-2, while AfDB supported a growth pole in other provinces. Water supply interventions were also geographically coordinated, with WBG together with the Japan International Cooperation Agency and Chinese Cooperation operating in urban areas, and AfDB, Belgian Technical Cooperation, and UNICEF focusing on the semi-urban and rural sectors. Coordination and reduction of duplicative systems was a particular focus of health interventions, as DRC was chosen as a pilot country for a WBG/USAID initiative to develop stronger coordination



between the two agencies. Investments in the East prioritized collaboration within the framework of the government's STAREC program and the United Nations International Security Stabilization and Support Strategy. Through leadership (together with the UN) of the Donor Coordination Group (DCG), the Bank was to articulate closer coordination between humanitarian and development efforts in Eastern DRC; this took place through the Bank's leadership in development of the Global Plan on DDR III (2014). The PLR cited continued building of partnerships through the DCG in a range of areas including energy, health, child protection, urban development, PFM, and forestry, and through the Great Lakes Initiative, a regional agreement launched in 2013 to coordinate efforts toward peace, security, and development. The CLR does not provide evidence that DCG partnerships impacted the effectiveness of the program.

71. The SCD identified support for inclusive institutions and organizations, including cooperatives and non-governmental organizations, as well as empowerment of poor and vulnerable populations, as key to strengthening governance and promoting transparency and accountability. According to the PLR, the WBG created participatory governance programs in the education and health sectors, and in the pilot project on participatory budgeting in the East, but there is limited information on the extent of the commitment to citizen engagement across other sectors.

Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

72. The CLR does not discuss the Bank's portfolio compliance with safeguards, although the results matrix shows early lessons learned from ongoing project implementation. These include the importance of timely monitoring of safeguard issues and constant capacity building of local staff, as keys to avoid noncompliance.

73. Fourteen projects were closed and validated by IEG during and after the CAS implementation period, in the social protection, urban development, finance, education, health, energy, and transport sectors. The ICRRs report that planning and supervision of safeguard activities were hampered by insufficient budget to execute safeguard requirements, including the payment of compensation for people affected. This caused delays in the beginning of works and staffing of local teams. As a consequence, local teams had difficulties complying with Bank requirements. Despite these challenges, the ICRRs indicate that all environmental and social challenges were adequately addressed, and the projects achieved satisfactory compliance. This was made possible because the Bank provided support with staffing and capacity building of local staff to help improve the quality of the safeguards instruments. The Bank put additional efforts on supervision with dedicated staff at multiple project sites to ensure compliance with requirements.

74. On August 3, 2017, the Inspection Panel received a Request for Inspection related to the Second Additional Financing for the High-Priority Roads Reopening and Maintenance Project (Pro-Routes), for alleged harm on community members living in the vicinity of the project area. After registering and investigating the case, the panel validated the claims on the basis of explicit evidence of non-compliance with the Bank's environmental and social policies, with negative impacts on people's livelihoods. In addition, the investigation report highlighted infringement of the Bank's health and safety guidelines and directives on gender-based violence, with confirmed cases of sexual abuse, rape and sexual exploitation. The Bank's management admitted the failure of the project in this area and committed to take measures to prevent it from happening in the future. The panel approved the Bank's action plan to mitigate the negative impacts suffered by local communities and to build the capacity of all the stakeholders involved in the project. In the first progress report (September 2018-March 2019), the Panel noted considerable improvement by the Bank's management to resolve the non-compliances. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the Bank's and Government's travel restrictions and work rearrangements, the case status remains ongoing until the next progress report becomes available.



Ownership and Flexibility

75. Government capacity and ownership was irregular, at best. Commitment to tackling governance challenges, and particularly to reform SOEs, was never fully secured. A key capacity development strategy envisioned in the CAS was implementation of projects through government institutions and phasing out of project implementing units (PIUs). The CAS noted that, under this strategy, the Bank would need to be prepared for higher supervision budgets to finance longer periods in the field working directly with government counterparts; similarly, higher project overhead and administrative costs were anticipated to ensure that government units had the capacity for smooth project administration. However, given mixed performance, the PLR raised questions about the viability of that strategy, and it was eventually abandoned for a return to the PIU model.

76. The program was explicitly designed to be flexible, but for the most part, this intention went unrealized. Instead, disbursement performance lagged toward the end of the CAS period, bogged down by inadequate development of capacity at the provincial level, continued political fragility, and ongoing conflict. At the PLR stage, the term of the CAS was extended for one year, from FY16 to FY 17; the mining SOE and related milestones were dropped from the SOE objective under the first focus area; investments in human development in the East were increased; and adjustments were made to other outcomes, indicators, and milestones. More specifically, most target years were adjusted to 2017, and several outcome targets were made more ambitious under the second focus area; under the other focus areas, some outcome targets were adjusted upward and others downward. These changes were made to accommodate progress that had been achieved, as well as uncertainties created by elections then planned for 2016, the creation of new provinces, and economic fluctuations created by plunging global prices and demand for raw materials.

WBG Internal Cooperation

77. WBG collaboration was centered on working under joint global advisory units, in parallel or in sequence, on common goals in ICT infrastructure, investment climate and access to finance (Focus Area 2). The Bank, IFC, and MIGA all engaged in the ICT sector, with the Bank promoting policy reforms and public investment in fiber-optic line between Inga and the Zambian border, while IFC and MIGA supported private sector investments in telecoms. There was also evidence of ad-hoc WBG internal collaboration between two institutions, Bank and IFC, and IFC and MIGA. Both the Bank and IFC worked on improving investment climate and increasing access to finance by MSMEs, with the Bank helping to establish dispute resolution mechanisms and strengthen the legal environment for commercial activity, while IFC provided advisory services in both investment climate and MSME access to finance and supported MSME-focused financial institutions with investment services. With respect to IFC and MIGA, the collaboration was more structured and synergistic. IFC referred an existing FI client focused on small and micro enterprises to MIGA. With MIGA's guaranty, the FI was able to expand its lending operations. IFC and MIGA also collaborated in the telecoms sector through an investment and guaranty in affiliated companies made around the same time. Among others, IFC and MIGA realized operating efficiencies in project supervision, especially in environmental and social compliance. IFC's and MIGA's synergistic interventions achieved strong development results beyond the CAS results framework, including expanded mobile infrastructure and enhanced access to telecom services for low-income communities. At the PLR stage, the WBG was also in the process of developing a Joint Implementation Plan (JIP) in agribusiness. The JIP was a newly-developed tool for collaboration in select sectors towards a common goal.

78. Only three of the 38 CAS outcome indicators are associated with IFC, and only one of those three is solely attributable to IFC. This implies that IFC's engagement is not materially relevant to the achievement of the CAS objectives. For example, the cement sector represented nearly two thirds of IFC's total investment commitments yet no indicator from these projects were included in the CAS. These investments helped make crucial construction materials available to support transport infrastructure development, a CAS outcome area. IFC's contributions to the CAS outcomes could



have been more visible and probably made a difference in the ratings if additional IFC indicators were included in the results framework. Based on an internal IEG-validated evaluation, an IFC investment in the telecom sector increased connectivity and geographical coverage. This is in line with Focus Area 2. These two examples suggest that IFC's impact on DRC went beyond what were measured in the results framework. The PLR which was prepared in the penultimate year of the CAS period presented a missed opportunity to put additional IFC indicators.

Risk Identification and Mitigation

79. Risks were adequately identified, but mitigation strategies were inadequate. The CAS specified risks related both to domestic factors—political, security, deteriorating fiscal position, opposition to reforms and transparency by deeply entrenched vested interests, corruption, low implementation capacity, lack of civil society engagement, and high unmet expectations for improved living standards, access to information, and good governance— and external factors, mainly external shocks (demand for minerals, oil and food prices) in an uncertain global environment. Lack of reliable data and the weakness of the country's statistical systems were also cited as important risks. The CMU was to launch a holistic country and operational risk analysis in order to formulate a flexible and viable menu of alternative engagement scenarios, but there is no evidence that this was done. Risk assessment could have taken conflict drivers more explicitly into account; there was no discussion of the risk that Bank-financed interventions could unintentionally exacerbate ethnic and other group-based tensions by advantaging some groups over others, and there was minimal acknowledgement of the risks related to the potential for violence or disputes over the outcome of future elections. A more explicit conflict lens, for example, might have highlighted the potential for revenue sharing to improve local service delivery and therefore increase the perception of legitimacy of local governments, reducing the potential for conflict. The PLR confirmed that political and governance risks remained high.

80. Many of the identified risks materialized. The primary risk mitigation strategy was an intended focus on governance as the building block on which other elements of progress—state effectiveness, service delivery, and improved business climate—would depend. Specific measures included maintaining dialogue around a Governance Matrix, as well as a deliberate decision to use government structures to implement Bank-financed projects that support state effectiveness and capacity building, and to support staff strengthening efforts toward this goal. Overall, however, risk mitigation approaches described in the CAS were rather perfunctory and generic: focus on the most critical programs for service delivery and social protection; be prepared to access the Crisis Response Window in the event of external shocks; promote early success and broad ownership and accountability for reforms to undermine the resistance and position of vested interests; enhance project oversight to combat corruption; and make concerted efforts to strengthen CSO capacity and directly involve beneficiaries in the design and implementation of interventions. Few of the proposed measures effectively abated the impact of continued governance and capacity shortcomings. Decentralization intensified capacity challenges, and eventually a decision was made to return to reliance on PIUs; moving away from PIUs had been a risky strategy, given ongoing struggles with poor governance. Narrow fiscal space, exacerbated by fluctuating international commodity prices, continued to undermine the program.

Overall Assessment and Rating

Design

81. The CAS objectives were well aligned with DRC's development goals and addressed the broad range of development constraints. Program design involved extensive consultations across a range of stakeholders. There was consistency between financing and ASA; the investments supporting all program objectives were underpinned by analytic work delivered across the CAS period. However, there was insufficient consideration of some of the key lessons from prior



experience that were cited in the CAS: the need for strategic focus and prioritization; use of local knowledge to better understand political economy issues; proactive and frequent beneficiary and civil society involvement; and a focus on implementation readiness in order to achieve bold, transformational results quickly as a strategy to build support for reform. Furthermore, these lessons and the overall country context were not viewed explicitly through a fragility and conflict lens. As a result, there were significant shortcomings in program design: over-ambition, particularly for a fragile, low-capacity country experiencing continued conflict; unwarranted optimism about government commitment and buy-in in key areas, leading to continued corruption, unresolved governance issues, and insufficient capacity at all levels; lack of systematic engagement with civil society in a way that would produce sustained and effective demand for better governance; lack of recognition of the limits of WB instruments to address fragility in the East and deep-seated issues of political economy and governance; and inadequate availability of data to measure progress on achievement of many individual indicators and objectives, as well as overall progress in reducing poverty. Any tradeoffs between risk and development impact were not explicitly assessed, and inadequate risk mitigation precluded the realization of payoffs from high-risk investments.

Implementation

82. Strong in-country presence of WBG staff enabled continuous implementation support, especially to improve the quality of compliance with safeguards policies, though there is one unresolved Inspection Panel case that involved gender-based violence under a roads project. Collaboration with development partners facilitated progress in some sectors. Mid-course adjustments at the time of the PLR, however, were inadequate, and the PLR appears to have been a missed opportunity: the CAS period was extended by only one year, and rather than consolidating interventions and adding strategic focus, the program continued implementing a large number of remaining planned deliverables and added new ones as well, including scaled-up investments in public sector management, human development, infrastructure, and initiatives to foster regional integration. Parts of the portfolio continued to perform well following the PLR, but others deteriorated. Implementation progress could not escape the negative effects of strong vested interests, frequent changes in government ministers, low capacity across both the private and public sectors, lack of government commitment to SOE reform, flare-ups of insecurity, and the ongoing political crisis. More systematic adaptation of an FCV perspective to these issues could have facilitated more adaptive management.

83. IEG did not find strong evidence of effective follow through in WBG collaboration initiatives beyond the IFC-MIGA collaboration in a financial institution focused on small and micro enterprises and in the telecoms sector. There was a tone of excitement at the CAS and at the PLR in the drafting of an IDA-IFC Joint Implementation Plan (JIP) for Agribusiness. However, the CLR's silence on the progress of this initiative suggest that this JIP did not go beyond the drafting stage. The JIP is defined in the WBG's Country Engagement approach as a mechanism for enhanced WBG collaboration in implementing in key sectors where the different WBG institutions expect to have complementary and extensive interventions toward a common goal. Outside the JIP and the aforementioned IFC-MIGA collaboration, IEG did not find other formal structured WBG collaboration beyond working under joint global advisory units, in parallel, or in sequence" on common goals in investment climate and access to finance (Focus Area 2).

7. Assessment of CLR Completion Report

84. Due to the lapse in time since the end of the CAS period (June 2017), the CLR is deliberately and explicitly a qualitative CLR, focusing on retrospective learning, rather than a typical CLR with a key focus on ratings. Its presentation of the objectives and results framework is consistent with the CAS. It reports on specific indicators but does not convey a coherent sense of the program's broader storyline, including its successes and shortcomings. Importantly, it does not provide a sense of how the program contextualized fragility or conflict and how the program's sequencing or prioritization



were driven by FCV concerns. Treatment of WBG internal cooperation is minimal, with little reporting of IFC or MIGA results and outcomes. IFC's contributions to the CAS outcomes could have been more visible and probably made a difference in the ratings if additional IFC indicators were included in the results framework. For example, based on an internal IEG-validated evaluation, an IFC investment in the telecom sector increased connectivity and geographical coverage. This is in line with Focus Area 2. The cement sector represented nearly two thirds of IFC's total investment commitments, yet no indicator from these projects were included in the CAS. The PLR which was prepared in the penultimate year of the CAS period, presented a missed opportunity to put additional IFC indicators. The CLR is silent on how the WBG dealt with safeguard issues. Its lessons do not systematically emerge from the data and analysis presented in the document.

8. Findings and Lessons

85. The CLR's lessons evolved markedly from those presented in the PLR, suggesting that the ground shifted considerably during the CAS period. Overall, the CLR's lessons reflect a more narrow and realistic level of ambition and scope compared with those in the PLR. For example, the first lesson in the PLR focuses on the importance of long-term institution building, while the analogous lesson in the CLR stresses the more immediate need for up-front capacity development. The evidence and analysis underpinning the lessons is not always well established in the CLR, although the lessons appear to be reasonable based on country context. Spreading the messages quite thinly among multiple lessons may dilute their impact. IEG finds three broad areas of useful lessons: focus and targeting; flexibility and adjustment; and fragility, conflict and violence.

86. **Focus and targeting.** One of the CLR's lessons suggests that the timing is right to capitalize on ongoing decentralization processes with support for local governments, who have a greater sense of accountability stemming from proximity to the populations they serve, and who are less likely than the central government to be impacted by turnover. IEG finds that *in a large, complex country with lingering governance challenges, political volatility, and conflict, a focus on partnership with decentralized entities may be appropriate, but these partnerships must be carefully chosen and designed.* In-depth political economy and institutional capacity analysis is required to implement another related lesson from the CLR: that local capacity development should start small, in areas where there is strong commitment to reform. Furthermore, a decentralized approach would position the Bank well to capture the insights and energies of civil society at the local level.

87. The CLR recommends that each project have some capacity building activities. IEG emphasizes that capacity-building should not be conceived as a broad, blanket instrument, but instead one that is *carefully targeted toward people and institutions where it is likely to have the most sustained impact.* It is necessary to invest up-front in processes for wise selection and development of champions, committed people and institutions who are likely to grow into sustained, effective proponents of reform, whether in the public sector, private sector, or civil society. In particular, if there is to be a shift away from the PIU model, the Bank will need to deliberately and systematically develop local capacities at the central and provincial levels.

88. **Flexibility and adjustment.** The CLR notes that Annual Country Portfolio Performance Reviews and the PLR are important opportunities to assess and adjust to changes in country and local contexts, and to review the results framework for issues of relevance and attribution. IEG concurs. The annual reviews and PLR exercise might have more strongly flagged the potential impact of DRC's political fragility and weak government commitment to reform in key areas, the need for more focused capacity development, the mismatch between key outcome indicators and available data, and the need to adjust some indicators to more fully reflect progress toward achievement of the objectives.

89. The CLR notes that the forthcoming CPF should reflect a realistic level of ambition, given the degree of government capacity and demonstrated commitment to necessary reforms. IEG expands



on this lesson, stressing that *a program's ambition must be continually assessed for its congruence with capacity and commitment*. This lesson emerges from the program's experience across objectives and sectors. It is reflected, for example, in the objective on SOE reform, where an initial aim to enhance operational performance of a long list of SOEs fell victim to private sector disinterest and low government motivation and commitment; thorough and ongoing political economy analysis may have more productively identified a smaller number of SOEs on which to focus, where early successes might have provided a demonstration effect.

90. The CLR's lessons are silent on WBG collaboration. IEG notes that WBG collaboration at the country level should be developed on the ground, demand driven, and results-oriented. The IDA-IFC JIP in agribusiness was a corporate initiative and became the centerpiece of WBG collaboration up to the PLR stage. This JIP was developed in response to WBG senior management's call for enhanced WBG collaboration at the country level across the board. However, lack of clarity about the on-the-ground need to work together led the JIP to fall apart. No IDA or IFC project resulted from this JIP.

91. More formal arrangements are needed to *maintain accountability during gaps between country strategies and partnership frameworks*. These gaps may be unpredictable and unavoidable, particularly in low-capacity and conflict environments, but a framework is required to guide investment and ensure accountability.

92. **Fragility, conflict and violence.** The CAS contained a fourth pillar focused on the institutional and economic drivers of conflict. Having a dedicated pillar on fragility, rather than including fragility as a cross-cutting theme, was a major innovation at the time the CAS was designed. The CLRR does not offer analysis or lessons emerging from this approach. IEG notes that segregating FCV factors under a single pillar risks marginalizing explicit consideration of these issues throughout the rest of the program. It was important to acknowledge that the entire country remained fragile and conflict-affected, with deep-seated issues around political economy and governance, and to incorporate those risks the design of the entire program, its indicators, its data collection strategies, and its provisions for adaptive management.

Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CPS Objectives

Annex 2: FCV Lens for DRC CLRR

Annex Table 3: Planned and Actual Lending

Annex Table 4: Analytical and Advisory Work

Annex Table 5: Trust Funds

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for the Democratic Republic of Congo and Comparators

Annex Table 8: Economic and Social Indicators

Annex Table 9: List of IFC Investments

Annex Table 10: List of IFC Advisory Services

Annex Table 11: List of MIGA Projects

Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CPS Objectives – The Democratic Republic of Congo

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area I: Increase state effectiveness and improve good governance	Actual Results	IEG Comments
1. CPS Objective: Increased transparency and efficiency in the management of public finances at the central level and in the provinces of Bandundu, Katanga, Kasai Occidental, Kasai Oriental, South Kivu, North Kivu, Kinshasa, Equateur.		
<p>Indicator 1: Percentage of national revenue transferred to targeted provinces</p> <p>Baseline: 31.5% (end-2011) Target: 35% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that from the 2015 Reddition des Comptes, 22% of the central government's revenues were transferred to provinces. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The IEG ICRR of P104041 reports that 46% of domestic revenue were transferred directly to provinces as well as the salary payments to provincial civil servants and the provincial capital investments as of December 2015. There is no information on the share of transfers to the targeted provinces of the objective.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Enhancing Governance Capacity project (P104041, FY08) and the following ASAs: PEFA Assessment (P131609, FY14), Economic Update (P133727, FY14; P151615, FY16; P156429), Kinshasa Annual Forum (P145874, FY14), Coordinated PFM Reform Assistance (P113619, FY14), Debt Management Reform Plan TA (P130862, FY14), Use of Country System TA (P144456, FY15), and Enhancing Public Sector Efficiency and Effectiveness for Growth and Development (P147410, FY15; P156672, FY16).</p>
<p>Indicator 2: Reduced discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures in the 4 targeted provinces (Bandundu, Katanga Kasai Occidental and South-Kivu)</p> <p>Baseline: 51% (end-2011) Target: 30% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The IEG ICRR of P104041 reports that discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures was 63%% (for the pilot provinces of Bandundu, Katanga Kasai Occidental and South-Kivu) as of December 2015.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Enhancing Governance Capacity project (P104041, FY08), Strengthening PFM and Accountability project (P145747, FY14) and its additional financing (P159160, FY17).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Target: 10% (2016)</i></p>
<p>Indicator 3: Percentage of public contracts awarded through open competitive bidding in selected ministries and provinces.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 (2012)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that 58% of contracts were awarded through open competitive bidding in 2015. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The IEG ICRR of P104041 reports that 80 percent of contracts over US\$200,000</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Enhancing Governance Capacity project (P104041, FY08), Capacity for Core Public Management project</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area I: Increase state effectiveness and improve good governance	Actual Results	IEG Comments
<p>Target: 75% of large contracts (FY17)</p>	<p>followed a competitive bidding process as of December 2015. However, there is no disaggregated information by ministry and province to validate the results as per the indicator.</p> <p>The IEG ICRR of P117382 reports that 100% of public contracts above an agreed threshold were awarded through open competitive bidding processes in participating ministries at the central level as of December 2013. This indicator was dropped after project restructuring and there is no data available at the provincial level (ICR).</p>	<p>(P117382, FY11), Strengthening PFM and Accountability project (P145747, FY14) and its additional financing (P159160, FY17).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Target: 50% (2016)</i></p> <p>The indicator is not clear on which ministries and provinces were selected for the indicator.</p>
<p>2. CPS Objective: Increased transparency and effectiveness in the management of financial resources from the forest, oil and mining industries</p>		
<p>Indicator 1: Area of forest concessions with signed social responsibility contracts</p> <p>Baseline: 2M Ha (end-2011) Target: 10.7M ha (FY17) (target achieved in FY15)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that 10.7 million hectares were covered by concessions with social responsibility contracts. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The IEG ICRR of P100620 reports that 75 forest concessions with social responsibility contracts in 57 forest concessions were signed as of June 2015. However, the ICRR also reports that no information is available on the area of forest these contracts were applied to as per the indicator.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The AfDB reports that the 57 concession areas cover 10.7 million ha. (Regional Strategic Report - Integrated and sustainable development of the timber industry in the Congo Basin 2019). However, IEG could not verify the date for reported area coverage and whether these are the same forest concession areas supported by P100620.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Forestry and Nature Conservation project (P100620, FY09; P111621, FY09) and the following ASAs: Oil and Gas Advisory TA (P127283, FY15), Forest Governance Assessment TA (P154671, FY15), Review of the Forest Sector of the DRC TA (P152956, FY16), Congo Basin Timber (P153586, FY16), and DRC Spatial Development (P145907, FY16).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Target: 4M Ha (mid-2015)</i></p>
<p>Indicator 2: Percentage increase in revenue from mining sector in total fiscal revenue</p> <p>Baseline: 2% of GDP (end-2011) Target: 27% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The October 2017 ISR of P106982 reports that fiscal revenue from the mining sector as \$1.348 billion as of March 2017. However, it is unclear from project documents if this is the cumulative fiscal revenue since the start of the project or if this is annual revenue. Given the timing of the data, it would be difficult to calculate the percentage to GDP.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Growth with Governance in the Mineral Sector project (P106982, FY11).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original:</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area I: Increase state effectiveness and improve good governance	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>The EITI reports the mining sector generated revenues of US\$ 1.145 billion in 2016 and US\$1.682 billion in 2017. With a GDP of US\$37.135 billion in 2016 and US\$38.019 billion in 2017 (WDI), this represents a share of GDP of 3.1% in 2016 and 4.4% in 2017.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The IEG ICRR of P106982 reports that fiscal revenues from the mining sector was US\$ 1.56 billion as of December 2018. The WDI reports that GDP in 2018 was US\$ 46.831 billion which implies that the fiscal revenue was 3.3% of GDP.</p>	<p><i>Target: 4% of GDP (2015)</i></p> <p>The indicator is unclear whether it is referring to percentage increase in revenue or the actual level of the share to GDP or mining revenues as per the indicator.</p> <p>The CLR also reports that there was a typographical error in the PLR and the target should be 2.7%.</p>
<p>Indicator 3: Percentage of oil petroleum permits competitively auctioned</p> <p>Baseline: 0% Target: 100% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that no petroleum concession transactions have occurred since the promulgation of the law on Hydrocarbons in August 2015.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> IEG could not verify if any permits were auctioned during FY18-20.</p>	<p>The project supporting the objective was dropped.</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Target: 90% (2015)</i></p> <p>The indicator has no baseline year</p>
3. CPS Objective: Enhance governance and increasing the operational performance of SOEs		
<p>Indicator 1: Increased efficiency of SOEs that deliver key public services (SNCC, SNEL, SCTP, RVA, RVF, REGIDESO) through Public-Private Partnership (PPP) or management performance contracts</p> <p>Baseline: 3 (2013) Target: 6 (Service contract concluded for REGIDESO) (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The IEG ICRR of P071144 reports that 5 SOEs have some private sector involvement either through public/private partnership, management contract or other arrangement as of June 2014, of which the following occurred after 2013:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SNEL • REGIDESO 	<p>The objective was supported by the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness project (P071144, FY04).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target year was revised.</p>
<hr/>		
CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area II: To boost competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation	Actual Results	IEG Comments
4. CPS Objective: Enhance business environment for private sector development		
<p>Indicator 1: Time to register a business is decreased by half</p> <p>Baseline: 58 days (2012) Target: 10 (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The IEG ICRR of P071144 reports that the number of days to register a business was 16 days as of 2014.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness project (P071144, FY04), and the following ASAs:</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area II: To boost competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>The 2018 Doing Business Report show that it takes 7 days to start a business as of June 2017.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The 2020 Doing Business Report show that it takes 7 days to start a business as of May 2019.</p>	<p>FSAP (P144434, FY15), Strengthening Payment System (P132451, FY15), Investment Climate Strategy EW (P143263, FY16), Spatial Development TA (P145907, FY16), Doing Business Reforms Coordination (P156593, FY17), and the IFC AS DRC Inv Climate (600085).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Target: 30 days (2015)</i></p>
<p>Indicator 2: Number of days to obtain a construction permit:</p> <p>Baseline: 119 days (2015) Target: 94 days (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The supporting project P071144 does not monitor this indicator.</p> <p>The 2018 Doing Business Report show that it takes 122 days to obtain a construction permit as of June 2017.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The 2020 Doing Business Report show that it takes 122 days to obtain a construction permit as of May 2019.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness project (P071144, FY04).</p> <p>The baseline in the PLR is different from what is reported in the CLR.</p>
<p>Indicator 3: Number of days to import and export:</p> <p>Baseline: Import: 63 days (2015) Export: 44 days (2015) Target: Import: 57 days (FY17) Export: 40 days (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The December 2017 ISR of P124720 reports that it takes 44 days to export as of May 2017.</p> <p>The supporting P151083 does not monitor this indicator.</p> <p>The 2018 Doing Business Report show that as of June 2017, it takes the following hours to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Export: 698 hours (document compliance) and 515 hours (border compliance) – Total of 1,213 hours or 50 days • Imports: 216 hours (document compliance) and 588 hours (border compliance) – Total of 804 hours or 33 days 	<p>The objective was supported by the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness project (P071144, FY04), Western Growth Poles project (P124720, FY13), Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Program (P151083, FY16).</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area II: To boost competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>The results of the 2018 Doing Business report are not comparable to the indicator's baseline and target as there was a change in methodology starting with the 2016 Doing Business report.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The 2020 Doing Business Report show that as of May 2019, it take the following hours to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Export: 192 hours (document compliance) and 296 hours (border compliance) – Total of 488 hours or 20 days • Imports: 174 hours (document compliance) and 336 hours (border compliance) – Total of 510 hours or 21 days 	
<p>Indicator 4: A fully functioning, modern payment system providing electronic (cashless) funds transfer with real-time clearing and settlement of accounts, and interconnectivity with other payments systems in the region in place by 2015</p> <p>Baseline: System not in place Target: Payment system in place (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The January 2018 ISR of P145554 reports that the Real Time Gross Settlements (RTGS) and the Automated Clearing House (ACH) was operational as of June 2017.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The June 2020 ISR of P145554 reports that the multi-currency automated transfer system (ATS) and a central securities depository (CSD) were operational for national currency on September 2017 and foreign currency on March 2019.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Financial Infrastructure and Markets project (P145554, FY14).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target year was revised.</p>
<p>Indicator 5: IFC fund providing risk capital and advisory to SMEs; and providing SME and micro finance to local banks and MFIs, with the objective of increased access to credit for SMEs.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 (2012) Target: 10 SMEs (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that 10 SMEs were supported by IFC by proving risk capital and advisory services: Hospital, Call Center, Mobile Internet, Private School in Lubumbashi, Dry Port, Generic Pharmaceutical Manufacturer, Fluvial Transport, Coffee Roaster, Road Transporter, Private school in Kinshasa. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The IFC AS 600585 reports that by 2014, the CASF has supported 24 SMEs. In addition, a Jobs Study in 2017 on the Central Africa SME Fund (CASF) supported 28 SMEs, suggesting 4 more SMEs were added between 2014 and 2017.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by IFC AS SME V – CASF & ARF (600585) and advisory projects.</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area II: To boost competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation	Actual Results	IEG Comments
5. CPS Objective: Improved connectivity and access to transport infrastructure		
<p>Indicator 1: Average transit time between copper belt and Zambian border</p> <p>Baseline: 17 days (2011) Target: 5 days (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that this indicator cannot be measured since the mining companies have switched from rail to road transportation.</p> <p>The supporting project P092537 does not monitor this indicator.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Multi-modal Transport project (P092537, FY10) and the following ASAs: River and Urban Transport Review EW (P144128, FY15), Spatial Development TA (P145907, FY16), and Urbanization Review (P156796, FY17).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target year was revised.</p>
<p>Indicator 2: Number of days/year with roads not passable by 4x2 in project areas (Province Orientale, Katanga, Equateur and South Kivu)</p> <p>Baseline: total of 90 days (2011) Target: 100 days (including the AF2 new road sections) (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that there were 50 days per year with roads not possible by 4x2 in projects areas as of FY17. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The December 2017 ISR of P101745 reports that the number of days per year with roads not passable by 4x2 vehicles on reopened sections in the project areas are (as of December 2016):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kisangani-Beni: 5 days • Akula-Gemena-Libenge-Zongo: 20 days • Uvira – Kasaomeno: 0 days • Uvira – Bunduki: 10 days • Komanda-Bunia-Goli: 30 days <p>Total: 65 days.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The December 2019 ISR of P101745 reports that the number of days per year with roads not passable by 4x2 vehicles on reopened sections in the project areas are (as of June 2019):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kisangani-Beni: 5 days • Akula-Gemena-Libenge-Zongo: 20 days • Uvira – Kasaomeno: 0 days • Uvira – Bunduki: 10 days • Komanda-Bunia-Goli: 30 days 	<p>The objective was supported by the High Priority Reopening & Maintenance project (P101745, FY08).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the baseline and target were revised from the original: <i>Baseline: Total of 80 days (2011)</i> <i>Target: 60 days (2016)</i></p> <p>The indicator target is higher than the baseline, indicating a worse outcome.</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area II: To boost competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	Total: 65 days.	
6. CPS Objective: Improved access to quality broadband network and services at reduced cost		
<p>Indicator 1: Increased total broadband penetration (household population)</p> <p>Baseline: 0.1% (12/2011) Target: 2.5% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that the broadband penetration (household population) rate was 2.8% as of FY17. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The November 2017 ISR of P132821 reports that the penetration rate per 100 people was 3.23% as of June 2016.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The September 2020 ISR of P132821 reports that the penetration rate per 100 people was 17% as of November 2019.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Central African Backbone SOP5 (P132821, FY15) and the ASA ICT Regulatory Advisory Services TA (P132812, FY14).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target year was revised.</p>
<p>Indicator 2: Increased international Internet Bandwidth (Bits per capita)</p> <p>Baseline: <14 (12/2011) Target: 50 (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that the bandwidth was 411 bits per capita as of FY17. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The supporting project P132821 does not monitor this indicator.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The supporting project P132821 does not monitor this indicator.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Central African Backbone SOP5 (P132821, FY15).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: 25 (2016)</p>
7. CPS Objective: Increase in generation of electricity and improved access to energy		
<p>Indicator 1: Quantity of energy delivered to Katanga Region</p> <p>Baseline: 2,540 GWh (end-2011) Target: 5,515 GWh (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The October 2017 ISR of P097201 reports that 2,013 GWh of renewable energy was delivered to the Katanga Region as of December 2016.</p> <p>The IEG ICRR of P069258 reports that 4,812 of energy were delivered to the Katanga region as of September 2016.</p> <p>In total, 6,825 GWh of energy was delivered during the CPS period.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The July 2018 ISR of P097201 reports that 2,362 GWh of renewable energy were delivered as of June 2018.</p> <p>In total, 7,174 GWh of energy was delivered during and after the CPS period.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Regional Southern Africa Power Market APL1 (P097201, FY07), Southern African Power Market APL1 (P069258, FY04).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target year was revised.</p>
<p>Indicator 2: Quantity of renewable energy generated at Inga (GWh)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u></p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Inga3</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area II: To boost competitiveness to accelerate private sector-led growth and job creation	Actual Results	IEG Comments
<p>Baseline: 4,809 GWh (end-2010) Target: 9,039 GWh (FY17)</p>	<p>The October 2017 ISR of P097201 reports that 6,008 GWh of renewable energy was generated at Inga as of December 2016.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The IEG ICRR of P097201 reports that 9,801 GWh of renewable energy was generated at Inga by project close (June 2018).</p>	<p>and Mid-size Hydropower Development project (P131027, FY14), Regional Southern Africa Power Market APL1 (P097201, FY07).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target year was revised.</p>
<p>Indicator 3: Increased access to electricity services in targeted areas including Kinshasa (number of additional households connected since 2007)</p> <p>Baseline: 0 (2007) Target: 35,000 households (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The October 2017 ISR of P097201 reports that there were 12,301 household connections as of December 2016.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The IEG ICRR of P097201 reports that there were 22,900 household connections by project close (June 2018).</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Inga3 and Mid-size Hydropower Development (project P131027, FY14), Regional Southern Africa Power Market APL1 project (P097201, FY07).</p>
<p>8. CPS Objective: Boost agriculture production and increase access to markets</p>		
<p>Indicator 1: Increased yields of primary crops in targeted areas in the Equateur province</p> <p>Baseline: Increase crop yields from 2012 to 2015: Maize (1.5t/ha from less than 1t/ha); Cassava (12t/ha from 7t/ha); Rice (2.0t/ha from 1t/ha) Target: Maize: 2t/ha (FY17) Cassava: 15t/ha (FY17) Rice: 2t/ha (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The January 2018 ISR of P092724 reports the yields of the following crops as of June 2017:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maize: 1.6 t/ha • Cassava: 20 t/ha • Rice: not available <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The August 2020 ISR of P092724 reports the yields of the following crops as of January 2020:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maize: 1.6 t/ha • Cassava: 20 t/ha • Rice: 1.66 t/ha 	<p>The objective was supported by the Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery Support project (P092724, FY10), and the ASA Promoting Investments in Agriculture (P156592, FY16).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target and target year was revised from the original: <i>Maize: 1.5t/ha (2015)</i> <i>Cassava: 12t/ha (2015)</i></p>
CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area III: Improve social services delivery and increase human development indicators	Actual Results	IEG Comments
<p>9. CPS Objective: Increase access to clean water and sanitation</p>		
<p>Indicator 1: Percentage of population in the targeted areas with access to potable water</p> <p>Baseline: 43% (end-2011) Target: 55% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that 58% of the population in targeted areas had access to potable water. IEG Could not verify this information.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Eastern Recovery project (P145196, FY14).</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area III: Improve social services delivery and increase human development indicators	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>The April 2018 ISR of P145196 reports that access to potable water was 54% as of December 2016.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The February 2020 ISR of P145196 reports that access to potable water was 24.5% as of December 2019.</p>	<p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: 53% (end-2015)</p>
<p>Indicator 2: Number of people provided with access to improved water sources in project areas</p> <p>Baseline: 5, 292,000 (03/2010) Target: 6,494,000 (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The IEG ICRR of P086874 reports that 483,585 people were provided with access to potable water for the first time (improved water access) as of June 2013.</p> <p>The IEG ICRR of P104497 reports that 216,000 urban residents were provided with access to improved water supply as of May 2013, from a baseline 89,000 (127,000 additional beneficiaries).</p> <p>The January 2018 ISR of P091092 reports that an additional 1,893,630 people had access to improved water sources as of April 2017.</p> <p>The total number of additional people with access to improved water was 2,504,215 during the CPS period.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The August 2020 ISR of P091092 reports that an additional 2,238.670 people had access to improved water sources as of January 2020.</p> <p>The total number of additional people with access to improved water was 2,593,215 during and after the CPS period.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Emergency Social Action project (P086874, FY05), Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation project (P104497, FY07), and Urban Water Supply project (P091092, FY09).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the baseline and target were revised from the original: <i>Baseline:</i> 221,148 (03/2010) <i>Target:</i> 420,180 (02/2013)</p>
10. CPS Objective: Improved access to health services in targeted areas		
<p>Indicator 1: Rate of DPT3 immunization</p> <p>Baseline: 85% (end-2011) Target: 90% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The IEG ICRR of P088751 reports that 90% of children aged 0-11 months received the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT3) vaccination as of March 2014.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Health Sector Rehabilitation and Support project (P088751, FY06) and the following ASAs: Health Systems and Financing (P116349, FY14), and Social Sector Public Expenditure Review (P147553, FY16).</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area III: Improve social services delivery and increase human development indicators	Actual Results	IEG Comments
		At the PLR stage, the target year was revised.
<p>Indicator 2: Percentage of deliveries assisted by qualified personnel</p> <p>Baseline: 80% (end-2011) Target: 85% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that nationwide, the share of deliveries assisted by qualified personnel was 80% in 2014 (WDI)</p> <p>The IEG ICRR of P088751 reports that 75% of deliveries in the project area was assisted by qualified personnel as of March 2014. The ICR reports the following provincial breakdown:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kinshasa: 97% • Bandundu: 83% • Equateur: 64% • Maniema: 87% • Katanga: 64% 	<p>The objective was supported by the Health Sector Rehabilitation and Support project (P088751, FY06).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target year was revised.</p>
<p>Indicator 3: Number of women 15-49 new users of family planning</p> <p>Baseline: 6% (end-2011) Target: 6% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The IEG ICRR of P088751 reports that 2% of women 15-49 new users of family planning as of March 2014.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Health Sector Rehabilitation and Support project (P088751, FY06).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>11% (end-2014)</i></p>
<p>Indicator 4: Percentage of children under 5 sleeping under LLINs (mosquito nets) in targeted areas</p> <p>Baseline: 35% (end-2011) Target: 70% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The July 2012 ISR of P104497 reports that 65% of children under five in Kinshasa and 20% in Bandundu (distribution of nets were still underway) slept under anti-malaria bed nets as of July 2012. By project close in November 2012, the percentage remained the same in Kinshasa and increased to 91% in Bandundu (IEG ICRR).</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation project (P104497, FY07).</p> <p>The WDI reports that 55.8% of the under-5 population use insecticide-treated bed nets in 2014 in the country.</p>
<p>Indicator 5: Percentage of reported cases of SGBV who receive PEP kits within 72 hours</p> <p>Baseline: 25% (2014) Target: 50% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The January 2018 ISR of P147489 reports that 92% of reported cases of SGBV received emergency kits (PEP) within 72 hours as of November 2016.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The ICR of P147489 reports that 71% of eligible cases of SGBV received emergency</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the - Great Lakes Emergency Sexual and Gender Based Violence & Women's Health Project (P147489, FY14) and the Gender Based Violence Prevention and</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area III: Improve social services delivery and increase human development indicators	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>kits (PEP) within 72 hours as of December 2019.</p> <p>The June 2020 ISR of P166763 reports that 100% of eligible reported cases of eligible GBV who receive Post Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) Treatment within 72 hours as of May 2020.</p>	<p>Response Project (P166763, FY19).</p>
11. CPS Objective: Improved access to basic education		
<p>Indicator 1: Increased primary gross enrollment ratio</p> <p>Baseline: 92.7 % (end-2011) Target: 132.3% (as projected in the Sector Program) (FY17)</p> <p>Share of female</p> <p>Baseline: 46% (end-2011) Target: 1:1 (2016-2017)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The IEG ICRR of P086294 reports that the primary gross enrollment rate was 117% as of October 2014. In addition, the girl-to-boy ratio was 98%.</p> <p>The WDI reports that the primary school gross enrollment rate was 107.97% in 2015.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The WDI reports that the primary school gross enrollment rate was 118.46% in 2018.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Education Sector Project (P086294, FY07)</p> <p>The WDI reports that the primary school gross enrollment parity index was 0.99 in 2015 and 0.939 in 2018.</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Primary gross enrollment ration: 105.8% (end-2015)</i> <i>Female share: 50% (nd-2015)</i></p>
<p>Indicator 2: Increased completion rate in primary</p> <p>Baseline: 59% (end 2011) Target: 97.8% (2016-2017) as projected in Sector Strategy</p> <p>Share of female</p> <p>Baseline: 44% (end-2011) Target: 48% (2014-2015) [Target adjusted to take into account the revised baseline] Target: 48% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that the completion rate for girls is 65% and 75% for boys. IEG could not verify this.</p> <p>The IEG ICRR of P086294 reports that the primary completion rate was 80% as of October 2014. The project does not monitor the gender component of the indicator.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Education Sector Project (P086294, FY07).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Primary gross enrollment ration: 75% (end-2016)</i> <i>Female share: 65% (nd-2016)</i></p> <p>The WDI reports that in 2015, the primary completion rate was 69.5% for boys and 70.3% for girls.</p> <p>The indicator is unclear if it refers to the share of</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area III: Improve social services delivery and increase human development indicators	Actual Results	IEG Comments
		females who completed primary school or the completion rate for females.
12. CPS Objective: Strengthen social protection system		
<p>Indicator 1: Comprehensive database of safety net beneficiaries established and regularly maintained</p> <p>Baseline: Dataset only contains information on street children in Kinshasa (2012)</p> <p>Target: Dataset includes beneficiaries of other safety net programs, e.g., labor intensive public works, and is updated at least every six months with input from provinces (2018)</p> <p>Target: N/A (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The ICR of P115318 reports that a database on children rights intervention and beneficiaries was established and managed by the Direction des Interventions Sociales pour la Protection de l'Enfant (DISPE) with the support of the Direction d'Etudes et de Planification (DEP) as of August 2015. There is no information in the ICR on the frequency of the updating of the database.</p> <p>IEG could not verify if the dataset includes other safety net program beneficiaries and is updated every 6 months.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> IEG could not verify if additional information from other safety nets programs was included in the database.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Street Children project (FY10, P115318) and the following ASAs: Support to Social Protection System (P150462, FY14), National Social Protection Strategy (P150433, FY15), 1-2-3 Household Survey, Social Accounting Matrix, and Poverty Analysis (P147171, FY14), and Poverty Assessment (P149583, FY16).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised and is not available.</p>
<p>Indicator 2: Number of beneficiaries of labor-intensive public works (share of female)</p> <p>Baseline: 3,192 (30% female; 2012)</p> <p>Target: N/A (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The June 2012 ISR of P086874 reports that 3,546 (of which 173 was under the TF financing) people benefitted of public works program as of March 2012 (no information on female share). By June 2013, the final reported number of beneficiaries was 3,385 persons (22% female) (IEG ICRR).</p> <p>The June 2017 ISR of P145196 reports that 830 people (49% female) benefited from Safety Nets programs: Cash-for-work, food-for-work and public works (as of November 2016).</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The October 2020 ISR of P145196 reports that 21,159 people (47% female) benefited from Cash-for-work programs as of June 2020.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Emergency Social Action project (P086874, FY05), and Eastern Recovery project (P145196, FY14).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised and is not available.</p> <p>The indicator has no target.</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area IV: Addressing fragility and conflict in the Eastern provinces	Actual Results	IEG Comments
13. CPS Objective: Improved management of public finances and accountability in targeted conflict-affected areas		
<p>Indicator 1: Increased budget retrocession to Eastern conflict-affected province of South-Kivu</p> <p>Baseline: currently receiving 10-20% of its revenues as retrocessions</p> <p>Target: 35% (FY17)</p>	<p>Status as of FY17:</p> <p>The IEG ICRR of P104041 reports that 46% of domestic revenue were transferred directly to provinces as well as the salary payments to provincial civil servants and the provincial capital investments as of December 2015. There is no information on the share of transfers to South Kivu as per the indicator.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Enhancing Governance Capacity project (P104041, FY08).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Target: 30% by 2015</i></p>
<p>Indicator 2: Number of communities benefitting from participatory budget planning processes</p> <p>Baseline: 4 districts in South-Kivu</p> <p>Target: 8 districts (including 4 additional districts in North Kivu) (FY17)</p>	<p>Status as of FY17:</p> <p>The CLR reports that 16 communities benefited from participatory budget planning processes. IEG could not verify this information.</p>	<p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Target: all districts in conflict-affected provinces of North-Kivu and Sud-Kivu, by 2015</i></p>
<p>Indicator 3: Reduced discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures in conflicted-affected province of South-Kivu</p> <p>Baseline: 51% (end-2011)</p> <p>Target: 30% (FY17)</p>	<p>Status as of FY17:</p> <p>The IEG ICRR of P104041 reports that discrepancy between projected and actual expenditures was 63%% (for the pilot provinces of Bandundu, Katanga Kasai Occidental and South-Kivu) as of December 2015. However, there is no information on the discrepancy for South Kivu as per the indicator.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Enhancing Governance Capacity project (P104041, FY08).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Target: 10% (2016)</i></p>
14. CPS Objective: Increased socioeconomic opportunities in targeted conflict-affected areas		
<p>Indicator 1: Increased number of person-days of employment created in conflict-affected areas</p> <p>Baseline: 0</p> <p>Target: 400,000 (FY17)</p>	<p>Status as of FY17:</p> <p>The CLR reports that 62,000 person-days were created in the conflict-afflicted area of Bakuvu (P129713). IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The June 2017 ISR of P145196 reports that 830 people benefited from Safety Nets programs: Cash-for-work, food-for-work and public works as of December 2016. The PAD uses a the following formula to calculate person-days created (p. 34): (4 months at 20 days/month). This results in 73,040 person-days created for the project.</p> <p>The December 2017 ISR of P129713 reports that 436,641 of person-days were created as of June 2017. However, this figure includes</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Eastern Recovery project (P145196, FY14), Urban Development project (P129713, FY13) and the following ASAs: Promoting Peace & Stability in the Great Lakes Region: Support for Conflict-sensitive Program Design and Risk Management (P148907, FY17), DDR III Project Paper (P150893, FY15), Great Lakes Region Study (P149503, FY17),</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area IV: Addressing fragility and conflict in the Eastern provinces	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>person-days from non-conflict areas. There is no information for person-days created in Bukavu.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The July 2020 ISR of P129713 reports that 559,434 of person-days were created as of February 2020. However, this figure includes person-days from non-conflict areas. There is no information for person-days created in Bukavu.</p>	<p>Support to the Land Sector Review (P152207, FY16), and Strengthening the World Bank Engagement and Partnership with the United Nations in Eastern Democratic republic of Congo Engagement in DRC (P148720, FY16), and Urbanization Review (P156796, FY17).</p> <p>At the PLR stage, the target was revised from the original: <i>Target: 226,000 person-days by 2016</i></p>
<p>Indicator 2: Number of persons in conflict-affected areas with access to agricultural extension services and improved agricultural inputs</p> <p>Baseline: 0 Target: 10,000 (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that the project supporting the objective is delayed (extension of P145196 through the AF P171821).</p> <p>The June 2017 ISR of P145196 reports that 0 farmers adopted improved agricultural technology as of December 2016.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The February 2020 ISR of P145196 reports that 43,200 clients have adopted an improved agricultural technology promoted by the project as of December 2019. P145196 discontinued monitoring this indicator after the AF.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the DRC Eastern Recovery Project (P145196, FY14) and the Second AF to the Eastern Recovery Project (P171821, FY20).</p>
<p>Indicator 3: Percentage of reported cases of SGVB who receive at least 2 services as needed (economic support, psychosocial, legal, medical)</p> <p>Baseline: 50% (mid-2014) Target: 60% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The January 2018 ISR of P147489 reports that 90% of reported cases of SGVB who receive at least 2 services as needed (economic support, psychosocial, legal, medical) as of November 2016.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The ICR of P147489 reports that 51% of reported cases of SGVB who receive at least 2 services as needed (economic support, psychosocial, legal, medical) as of November 2016.</p> <p>The June 2020 ISR of P166763 reports that 82% of reported cases who receive access to multidisciplinary services, defined as at least</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the - Great Lakes Emergency Sexual and Gender Based Violence & Women's Health project (P147489, FY14) and and the Gender Based Violence Prevention and Response Project (P166763, FY19).</p>

CPS FY13-FY17: Focus Area IV: Addressing fragility and conflict in the Eastern provinces	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	two of the following (medical, psychosocial, security, legal support and livelihoods support as of May 2020).	
<p>Indicator 4: Percentage of people in conflict-affected communities who report an increase in inter-community cohesion and decrease in livelihoods-related tensions.</p> <p>Baseline: 0 (start 2015) Target: 20% (FY17)</p>	<p><u>Status as of FY17:</u> The CLR reports that the project supporting the objective started after the CPS period.</p> <p>The June 2017 ISR of P145196 reports that improvement in social cohesion among beneficiaries of community subprojects was 11% among respondents as of December 2016.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY18-20:</u> The February 2020 ISR of P145196 reports that improvement in social cohesion among beneficiaries of community subprojects was 19.5% among respondents as of December 2019. P145196 discontinued monitoring this indicator after the AF.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the DRC Eastern Recovery Project (P145196, FY14) and the Second AF to the Eastern Recovery Project (P171821, FY20).</p>

Annex 2: FCV Lens for DRC CLRR

In preparing the CLRR for the DRC FY13-16 CLR, IEG noted that the country's fragility and conflict environment impacted progress in important and profound ways. Taking into account more nuanced and sophisticated understandings of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) that have been gained since the FY13-16 CAS was designed and implemented, including through the *World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020-2025* and IEG's *World Bank Engagement in Situations of Conflict: An Evaluation of FY10-20 Experience*, IEG offers some brief observations that may be useful in applying an FCV lens to the design of the next country program.

- The CAS contained a fourth pillar focused on the institutional and economic drivers of conflict. Having a dedicated pillar on fragility, rather than including fragility as a cross-cutting theme, was a major innovation at the time the CAS was designed. The CLRR does not offer analysis or lessons emerging from this approach. For example, did this pillar focus adequately on the political and social drivers of conflict: tensions between ethnic groups, lack of conflict resolution mechanisms, links between elites and armed groups, lack of conflict resolution mechanisms, slow disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration? Did the pillar's objectives, which echoed some of the other CAS objectives but applied them specifically to the conflict-affected Eastern provinces, acknowledge that the entire country was fragile and experiencing conflict, with deep-seated issues around political economy and governance? Did segregating FCV issues into a single pillar side-step fundamental fragility concerns related to governance and a predatory state (that go deeper than the business climate reforms addressed by the CAS), and the limitations of instruments available to the Bank to address them?
- The lack of data in the CLRR on achievement of objectives under the fourth pillar is noteworthy. Through an FCV lens, these were important objectives. The focus on accountability gets to the heart of grievances and could have been effectively tied to issues of service delivery. More could have been said about what allocations were shifted as a result of participatory budgeting, and how these processes affected perceptions of governance and legitimacy. Similarly, the focus on increasing socio-economic opportunities could have been tied to perceptions of legitimacy, and to what was gained from the labor activities from a peace and conflict perspective. In this instance, mobilization of both quantitative and qualitative data would be appropriate, even beyond the Results Framework indicators. In particular, perception surveys, stakeholder interviews, and beneficiary feedback could provide insight on the contribution of the program to outcomes related to the FCV environment.
- Risk stemming from the FCV environment drove several of the CAS' programmatic priorities: risks related to governance and state capture both justified focus on some areas and raised cautionary flags about the difficulties of working in those same areas. The risk environment prompted the pursuit of flexible implementation mechanisms, piloting some activities and programs, and pooling risk by coordinating and collaborating with other donors and NGOs. However, risk assessment could have taken conflict drivers more explicitly into account. There was no discussion of the risk that Bank-financed interventions could unintentionally exacerbate ethnic and other group-based tensions by advantaging some groups over others. There was also minimal acknowledgment of the risks related to the potential for violence or disputes over the outcome of future elections, and to the presence and activities of armed groups.
- The CAS discusses three areas in which adaptive management would be used to respond to the FCV environment: (i) the use of a holistic country and operational risk analysis to generate flexible and viable alternative engagement scenarios, including the identification of the types of projects to be frozen or scaled up in the event of shocks or expansion of conflict; (ii) use of flexible procurement procedures; and (iii) use of multiple and differentiated approaches to respond to specific situations, including additional financing and project restructuring, third-party agents to augment and strengthen supervision, use of mobile phone-based technologies to gain insight into project implementation, and relying on partnerships with UN agencies, NGOs, and



community groups. The CLR, however, does not follow up with information on how these strategies were used. Instead, it focuses on slackened disbursement performance due to political fragility and weak capacity. From an FCV perspective, it is important to focus not only on disbursement performance, but also on options to freeze, delay, slow down, or restructure projects where this is the right response to the fragility environment.

Annex Table 3: Democratic Republic of Congo Planned and Actual Lending, FY13-FY17

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved IDA Amount	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
Project Planned Under CPS/PLR FY13-17							
P122229	Public Sector Reform and Rejuvenation	2013	2014	2022	77		
P126115	Additional Financing to Governance Project	2013	2013	2016	66.95		
P129713	Urban Development Project	2013	2013	2022	100		
P124720	Western DRC Agriculture-based Growth Pole	2013	2013	2021	110		
P129594	Additional Financing to MULTIMODAL	2013	2013	2018	180		
P145554	New Financial Sector Project	2014	2014	2021	30		
DROPPED	Additional Financing to PROMINES	2014					
P145196	Eastern DRC Economic Recovery Project	2014	2014	2024	79.1		
P145965	New Multi-Sector HD Technical Assistance	2014	2014	2021	15		
	Eastern DRC Economic Recovery Project	2014					
DROPPED	Southeastern DRC Agriculture-based Growth Pole	2015					
P147555	New Health Systems and Results Project	2015	2015	2022	220		
P149233	Post-Basic Education and Training	2015	2015	2022	200		
P131027	Share of regional Inga3 Feasibility Studies (ZR-Inga 3 and Mid-Size Hydro Dev. TA)	2013	2014	2017	73.1	HU	#
P132821	CAB Project	2014					
P150148	Statistics Development	2016	2016	2021	45		
P155266	AF Urban Water Supply	2016	2016	2021	166		
P156421	AF Human Development Systems Strengthening Project	2016	2016	2017	30		
P153836	AF High Priority Roads Reopening and Maintenance (national with GLI regional	2016	2016	2020	125		
P145196	AF for Eastern Recovery (national with GLI regional	2016					
P143307	Great Lakes Agricultural Program (GLI regional with	2016					
P151083	Great Lakes Trade Facilitation Program-phase 1	2016					
P149049)	Forest Dependent Communities Support (FIP)	2016					
P156208	Scaling Up Electricity Access	2017	2017	2023	145		
P160612	AF Public Sector Reform and Rejuvenation	2017	2017	2022	45		
P157114	AF Urban Development Project	2017	2017	2022	90		

P159037	AF Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery	2017	2017	2021	75		
P157864	AF Health Project	2017	2017	2022	120		
P159160	AF PFMA	2017	2017	2022	50		
<i>Pipeline</i>	Inga 3 BC development	2017					
<i>Pipeline</i>	Great Lakes SGBV- Phase 2	2017					
<i>Pipeline</i>	Great Lakes Trade -Facilitation Program - Phase 2	2017					
<i>Pipeline</i>	GLI Ruzizi Power Project	2017					
<i>Pipeline</i>	AF Basic Education Program	2017					
Total Planned					2,042.15		
Additional Projects Approved During the CPS Period			Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved IBRD Amount	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
P126088	ZR-Primary Hlth Care - 3rd AddFin (FY12)		2013	2015	75		
P145747	DRC: Strengthening PFMA		2014	2022	5		
P083813	GEF Financing for DRC PREPAN		2014	2020	3		
P153085	DRC-Goma Airport Project		2015	2021	52		
P152903	Reinsertion and Reintegration Project		2015	2020	15		
Total Additional					150.00		
On-going Projects during the CPS/PLR Period			Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved IBRD Amount	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
P071144	DRC Priv Sec Dev Competitiveness		2004	2014	120	MS	S
P086874	DRC Emerg Soc Action (FY05)		2005	2013	60	MS	S
P088751	ZR-Health Sec Rehab Supt (FY06)		2006	2015	150	MS	S
P104497	DRC Em. Urban & Social Rehab ERL (FY07)		2007	2013	180	S	S
P086294	DRC-Education Sector Project (FY07)		2007	2015	150	MS	S
P090872	DRC Priv Sec Dev & Compet Addl Financing		2008	2014	60		
P104041	DRC-Enhancing Governance Capacity (FY08)		2008	2016	50	MS	S
P101745	High Priority Reopening & Maintenance		2008	2020	50		
P100620	DRC- Forest and Nature Conserv. - PFCN		2009	2015	64	U	H
P091092	DRC Urban Water Supply Project (FY09)		2009	2021	190		
P092724	DRC Ag Rehab & Recovery SIL (FY10)		2010	2021	120		
P120898	DRC PURUS Additional Financing		2010	2013	40		
P092537	DRC-Multi-Modal Transp		2010	2018	255		
P115318	DRC-Street Children Project (FY10)		2010	2016	10	MS	S
P118658	DRC: Emergency Social Action Project AF		2010	2013	35		
P120709	DRC Pro-Routes - Additional Financing		2011	2020	63.3		

P106982	DRC-Growth w/ Gov in Mineral Sector		2011	2019	50		
P117382	DRC: Capacity for Core Public Management		2011	2017	29.9	MS	S
P126683	DRC: Emergency Social Action Project AF2		2011	2013	6.8		
P122251	ZR-Malaria Control Add Fin (FY11)		2011	2015	80		
P125677	ZR-Polio Control - Add Fin (FY11)		2011	2015	30		
Total On-going					1,794.00		

Source: DRC CPS and PLR, WB BI as of 9/15/2020

Annex Table 4: Analytical and Advisory Work for the Democratic Republic of Congo, FY13-FY17

Proj ID	Project Name	Fiscal year	Product Line	Practice
P123977	DRC GAC work empowering citizens	2013	TE	Governance
P133727	DRC Economic Update	2014	EW	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P132812	DRC ICT Regulatory Advisory Svcs	2014	TA	Transport
P128640	DRC-TA Higher Education Strategy	2014	TA	Education
P113619	DRC: COORD. PFM REFORM ASSISTANCE	2014	TA	Governance
P145874	Kinshasa Annual Forum	2014	TA	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P146211	NRA DRC	2014	TA	Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation
P131609	PEFA Assessment	2014	EW	Governance
P130862	Reform Plan-Democratic Republic of Congo	2014	TA	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P147171	TA:DRC Survey & Poverty Analysis	2014	TA	Poverty and Equity
P116349	ZR-Health Systems and Financing (FY12)	2014	EW	Health, Nutrition & Population
P147917	AML/CFT Assessment of the DRC	2015	EW	Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation
P150893	DRC - DDR III Project Paper	2015	TA	Urban, Resilience and Land
P127283	DRC Oil & Gas Advisory and TA	2015	TA	Energy & Extractives
P132451	DR Congo #10211 Strength Payment System	2015	TA	Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation
P144434	FSAP Democratic Republic of Congo	2015	EW	Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation
P150433	National Social Protection Strategy	2015	TA	Social Protection & Jobs
P147410	PEMFAR	2015	EW	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P144128	River and Urban Transport Review	2015	EW	Transport
P154504	Support DRC Gov in the Procurement-UCS	2015	TA	Governance
P144456	Use of Country System DRC	2015	TA	Governance
P123857	ZR-Skills Development Study	2015	EW	Education
P159344	Comments on the DRC Mining Code	2016	EW	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P156456	DRC DeMPA follow up	2016	TA	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P156429	DRC Economic Update	2016	EW	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment

P151615	DRC Economic Update - FY15	2016	PA	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P156672	DRC PEMFAR - Dissemination & Macro Model	2016	EW	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P145907	DRC Spatial Development	2016	TA	Environment, Natural Resources & the Blue Economy
P151614	DRC Sub-National Economic Analysis	2016	EW	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P149583	DRC- Poverty Assessment	2016	EW	Poverty and Equity
P109868	DRC-Mainstreaming Gender (FY10)	2016	TA	Urban, Resilience and Land
P156406	First Dissemination	2016	EW	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P143263	Investment Climate Strategy	2016	EW	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P156407	Preparing the Third Edition of the EU	2016	EW	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P156592	Promoting Investments in Agriculture	2016	EW	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment
P152956	Review of the Forest Sector of the DRC	2016	EW	Environment, Natural Resources & the Blue Economy
P153289	Skills for Agriculture and Mining	2016	EW	Education
P147553	Social Sector PER	2016	EW	Health, Nutrition & Population
P150462	Support to Social Protection System	2016	TA	Social Protection & Jobs
P152207	Support to the Land Sector Review	2016	EW	Urban, Resilience and Land
P154368	Poverty Diagnostic for WASH	2017	EW	Water
P156593	DRC-Doing Business Reforms Coordination	2017	TA	Other
P156796	DRC Urbanization Review	2017	EW	Urban, Resilience and Land
P157708	DRC -Analytical work on Jobs	2017	EW	Social Protection & Jobs
P160638	Agriculture Sector Review	2017	EW	Agriculture and Food
P161840	DRC: ECONOMIC POLICY INTELLIGENCE UNIT (Ministry of Finance)	2017	AA	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment

Source: Business Intelligence and Standard Reports as of 9/15/2020

Annex Table 5: Trust Funds Active for Democratic Republic of Congo, FY13-17

Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount (US\$, Million)
P128887	DRC Improved Forested Landscape Management Project	TF A5081	2017	2023	18.2
P128887	DRC Improved Forested Landscape Management Project	TF 16869	2015	2020	36.9
P128887	DRC Improved Forested Landscape Management Project	TF 11253	2013	2015	0.8
P159217	Strengthening Hydro-Meteorological and Climate Services	TF A4390	2017	2022	5.3
P159217	Strengthening Hydro-Meteorological and Climate Services	TF A4389	2017	2021	2.7
P159037	DRC Agriculture Rehabilitation and Recovery AF	TF A4870	2017	2021	3.6
P157922	DR Congo - Education Quality Improvement Project (EQUIP)	TF A3052	2017	2023	100.0
P149049	Forest Dependent Communities Support Project	TF A0924	2016	2022	6.0

P147555	Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project (PDSS)	TF A5096	2017	2019	3.5
P147555	Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project (PDSS)	TF A4579	2017	2022	40.0
P147555	Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project (PDSS)	TF 18375	2015	2022	6.5
P147555	Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project (PDSS)	TF A2391	2016	2017	0.6
P147555	Health System Strengthening for Better Maternal and Child Health Results Project (PDSS)	TF 18022	2015	2016	0.4
P152903	DRC Reinsertion and Reintegration Project	TF A0087	2015	2017	6.5
P153085	DRC - Goma Airport Safety Improvement Project	TF A1623	2016	2021	1.8
P145965	DRC Human Development Systems Strengthening	TF A1960	2016	2021	10.0
P145965	DRC Human Development Systems Strengthening	TF A2421	2016	2021	1.1
P125509	DRC Catalytic Project to Strengthen the INS	TF 16628	2014	2019	11.8
P150651	DRC: Prevention and Mitigation of SGBV in North and South Kivu	TF 18380	2015	2017	4.0
P150874	Reinforcing SAcc of health services by supporting health committees and the community diagnosis in Bas Congo and South Kivu	TF 18164	2015	2019	0.8
P145196	DRC Eastern Recovery Project	TF 16616	2014	2016	4.9
P145747	DRC: Strengthening PFM and Accountability	TF 17290	2014	2019	17.0
P130499	Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project	TF 14018	2014	2017	0.4
P113977	DRC Phase II: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	TF 13846	2013	2016	0.8
P131120	ZR Support to Basic Education Program	TF 14358	2013	2017	93.6
P131120	ZR Support to Basic Education Program	TF 14253	2013	2016	6.4
Total					383.7

Source: Client Connection as of 9/16/2020

** IEG Validates RETF that are 5M and above

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Democratic Republic of Congo, FY13-17 (US\$, millions)

Exit FY	Proj ID	Project name	Total Evaluated (\$M) *	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
2013	P086874	DRC Emerg Soc Action (FY05)	103.9	MS	S
2013	P104497	DRC Em. Urban & Social Rehab ERL (FY07)	200.5	S	S
2014	P071144	DRC Priv Sec Dev Competitiveness	176.3	MS	S
2015	P086294	DRC-Education Sector Project (FY07)	151.9	MS	S
2015	P088751	ZR-Health Sec Rehab Supt (FY06)	332.3	MS	S
2015	P100620	DRC- Forest and Nature Conserv. - PFCN	64.0	U	H
2016	P104041	DRC-Enhancing Governance Capacity (FY08)	107.1	MS	S
2016	P115318	DRC-Street Children Project (FY10)	9.6	MS	S
2017	P117382	DRC: Capacity for Core Public Management	26.5	MS	S
2017	P131027	ZR-Inga 3 and Mid-Size Hydro Dev. TA	3.1	HU	#
2017	P131120	ZR Support to Basic Education Program	100.0	MS	M
Total			1,275.1		

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for the Democratic Republic of Congo and Comparators, FY13-FY17

Fiscal year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Ave FY13-17
DRC						
# Proj	14	20	21	20	19	18.8
# Proj At Risk	8	11	11	13	13	11.2
% Proj At Risk	57	55	52	65	68	59.6
Net Comm Amt	2,004.2	2,104.5	2,044.4	2,333.4	2,755.4	2,248.4
Comm At Risk	1,587.3	1,414.2	1,137.1	1,858.2	1,950.1	1,589.4
% Commit at Risk	79.2	67.2	55.6	79.6	70.8	70.5
AFR						
# Proj	403	438	458	474	502	455.0
# Proj At Risk	106	115	111	124	135	118.2
% Proj At Risk	26	26	24	26	27	26.0
Net Comm Amt	40,799.0	46,621.7	51,993.5	56,089.8	61,022.2	51,305.2
Comm At Risk	13,938.0	16,171.5	15,372.2	18,235.0	19,934.3	16,730.2
% Commit at Risk	34.2	34.7	29.6	32.5	32.7	32.7
World						
# Proj	1,337	1,386	1,402	1,398	1,459	1,396.4
# Proj At Risk	339	329	339	336	344	337.4
% Proj At Risk	25	24	24	24	24	24.2
Net Comm Amt	169,430.6	183,153.9	191,907.8	207,350.0	212,502.9	192,869.0
Comm At Risk	39,638.0	39,748.6	44,430.7	42,715.1	50,837.9	43,474.1
% Commit at Risk	23.4	21.7	23.2	20.6	23.9	22.6

Source: Business Intelligence (BI) as of 9/16/2020

Note: Only IBRD and IDA Agreement Type are included

Annex Table 8: Economic and Social Indicators for the Democratic Republic of Congo, FY13-FY17

Series Name						DRC	SSA**	World
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Average 2013-2017		
Growth and Inflation								
GDP growth (annual %)	8.5	9.5	6.9	2.4	3.7	6.2	3.3	2.8
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	4.9	5.9	3.4	-0.9	0.4	2.8	0.5	1.7
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	690.0	780.0	840.0	940.0	1,030.0	856.0	3,549.4	15,298.6
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$) (Millions)	410.0	440.0	460.0	470.0	460.0	448.0	1,674.4	10,690.4
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	0.8	1.2	0.7	2.9	..	1.4	4.7	2.0
Composition of GDP (%)								
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	19.3	18.6	18.4	18.6	19.7	18.9	15.1	3.5
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	41.3	43.0	41.7	41.2	42.2	41.9	26.3	25.8
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	32.3	31.7	33.1	33.8	33.8	32.9	52.3	64.7
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	21.7	23.1	18.3	36.8	24.8	24.9	21.3	23.4
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)
External Accounts								
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	36.4	36.8	27.7	24.0	35.3	32.0	25.4	29.5
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	41.0	41.9	31.6	32.0	39.0	37.1	28.3	28.8
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-9.5	-4.8	-3.9	-4.1	-3.3	-5.1		
External debt stocks (% of GNI)	20.7	16.8	15.3	13.9	13.9	16.1		
Total debt service (% of GNI)	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.2	2.4	
Total reserves in months of imports	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.6	0.6	0.9	5.2	13.0
Fiscal Accounts*								
General government revenue (% of GDP)
General government total expenditure (% of GDP)
General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	1.9	0.0	-0.4	-0.5	1.4	0.5	-19.7	
General government gross debt (% of GDP)								
Health								
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	58.4	58.8	59.3	59.7	60.0	59.2	59.9	71.9
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	68.0	68.0	63.0	57.0	57.0	62.6	71.2	85.1

People using safely managed sanitation services (% of population)	42.7
People using safely managed drinking water services (% of population)	41.2	41.8	42.4	43.0	43.2		59.1	88.7
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	77.7	75.7	73.8	71.8	69.8	73.8	57.2	31.6
Education								
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	4.0	4.2	4.4	4.2	29.3	47.9
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	106.6	110.2	108.0	108.2	98.6	103.4
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	42.9	45.5	46.2	44.9	43.6	75.3
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)	6.9	6.6	..	6.8	9.1	36.3
Population								
Population, total	71,358,807.0	73,767,447.0	76,244,544.0	78,789,127.0	81,398,764.0	76,311,738	996,027,909.6	7,339,236,334.4
Population growth (annual %)	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3	2.7	1.2
Urban population (% of total population)	41.6	42.2	42.7	43.3	43.9	43	38.6	53.9
Rural population (% of total population)	58.4	57.8	57.3	56.7	56.1	57	61.4	46.1
Poverty								
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of pop)	10.6
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of pop)
Rural poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of rural pop)
Urban poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of urban pop)
GINI index (World Bank estimate)

Source: World bank Databank as of 9/8/2020

*International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2020

** SSA = IDA and IBRD countries only

**Annex Table 9: List of IFC Investments in Democratic Republic of Congo (US\$, millions)
Investments Committed in FY13-FY17**

Project ID	Cmt FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Orig Cmt-IFC Bal	Net Commitment (LN)	Net Commitment (EQ)	Total Net Commitment (LN+EQ)
35524	2016	Active	Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	1.2	1.2	-	1.2
36313	2016	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	45.5	40.5	5.0	45.5
36898	2016	Active	Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	22.0	-	19.8	19.8
34135	2015	Active	Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	67.3	54.5	11.2	65.7
34623	2015	Active	Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	30.0	30.0	-	30.0
36238	2015	Active	Finance & Insurance	2.5	1.0	-	1.0
33740	2014	Active	Finance & Insurance	12.9	8.6	-	8.6
34451	2014	Active	Agriculture and Forestry	18.0	17.0	-	17.0
33775	2013	Closed	Finance & Insurance	4.0	4.0	-	4.0
Sub-Total				203.4	156.7	36.0	192.8

Investments Committed pre-FY13 but active during FY13-FY17

Project ID	CMT FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Orig Cmt-IFC Bal	Net Commitment (LN)	Net Commitment (EQ)	Total Net Commitment (LN+EQ)
31021	2012	Active	Finance & Insurance	0.5	-	0.5	0.5
28713	2010	Active	Finance & Insurance	0.3	-	0.3	0.3
29000	2010	Active	Finance & Insurance	1.1	-	1.1	1.1
29931	2010	Active	Finance & Insurance	0.5	-	0.5	0.5
26407	2008	Active	Finance & Insurance	3.1	2.0	1.1	3.1
23563	2005	Active	Finance & Insurance	0.5	-	0.5	0.5
Sub-Total				5.4	2.0	3.4	5.4
TOTAL				208.8	158.7	39.4	198.2

Source: IFC-MIS Extract as of 3/25/2020

**Annex Table 10: List of IFC Advisory Services in Democratic Republic of Congo (US\$, millions)
Advisory Services Approved in FY13-17**

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Area	Total Funds Managed by IFC
600585	SME Ventures CASF & ARF	2017	2022	ACTIVE	CTT	1.45
601566	FINCA DRC MCF II	2017	2019	CLOSED	FIG	0.99
600085	Improving DRC's Investment Climate at National and Provincial Levels	2016	2021	ACTIVE	EFI	2.06
599276	FINCA DRC MCF TA	2013	2018	CLOSED	FIG	1.74
	Sub-Total					6.24

Advisory Services Approved pre-FY13 but active during FY13-17

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Area	Total Funds Managed by IFC
553347	AMSMETA Rawbank	2009	2013	CLOSED	FAM	1.26
	Sub-Total					1.26
	TOTAL					7.5

Source: IFC AS Portal Data as of 6/30/2020

Annex Table 11: List of MIGA Projects Active Democratic Republic of Congo, FY13-17 (US\$, millions)

Project ID	Project Title	Project Status	Fiscal Year	Sector	Max Gross Issuance
11804	Helios Towers DRC Infraco SPRL	Active	FY14	Infrastructure	94,571,340
9189	Insurance of Mandatory Reserve at the Central Bank of Democratic Republic of Congo	Active	FY15	Financial	3,680,880
11804	Helios Towers DRC Infraco SPRL	Active	FY15	Infrastructure	30,216,747
7147	Bartrac Equipment	Active	FY16	Services	49,550,000
	Total				178,018,967

Source: Business intelligence MIGA as of 9/18/2020