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| 1. CAS Data | |
| Country: Papua New Guinea | |
| CAS Year: FY08 | CAS Period: FY08 - FY12 |
| CASCR Review Period: FY08 - FY12 | Date of this review: November 27, 2012 |

2. Executive Summary

i. This review examines the implementation of the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of FY08 and the CAS Progress Report (CASPR) of FY10, and assesses the CAS Completion Report (CASCR). The strategy was jointly implemented by IBRD/IDA and IFC, and this review covers the joint program of the two institutions.

ii. The WBG sought to foster a long-term partnership with the government, people and development partners of PNG. The CAS was structured to support PNG's development plan by addressing both short-term service deficits and longer-term institutional and policy challenges. The CAS objectives were organized under two pillars: (i) *promoting and maintaining sound economic and natural resource management* through strengthening governance, maintaining sound management of the extractive industries and promoting effective and sustainable management of natural resources; and (ii) *improving livelihoods and service delivery* by supporting development of the private sector, enhancing rural livelihoods, improving local service delivery, expanding access to infrastructure services, and supporting multi-donor approaches to human development. *Improving governance and empowering women and youth* were cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed across the two pillars. The CASPR reaffirmed the relevance of these objectives, but adjusted 10 of the 17 CAS outcomes to take account of the changes in PNG's economic dynamics and the issues that arose during the initial phase of CAS implementation.

iii. IEG rates the overall outcome of the WBG assistance as *unsatisfactory*, which is below the CASCR rating of *moderately unsatisfactory*. IEG's rating is based on the results that the WBG did not achieve most of the intended outcomes. The Bank helped achieve good progress toward fiscal and macroeconomic stability and improvement in the condition of roads and bridges. IFC investments and AS support contributed to strengthening financial infrastructure and expanding telecommunication services. With other partners, the Bank also supported expanding universal basic education. However, the CAS program achieved little or no progress in all other areas, which included strengthening multi-stakeholder mechanisms to review mining policies; increasing public availability of information to monitor government performance; strengthening mining sector institutions; putting in place a program to leverage mining revenues for SME employment; adopting a strategy for disaster management and climate change; strengthening the business environment; expanding PPPs; increasing sustainable agriculture and small-scale mining; testing local service delivery arrangements through partnerships with CSOs; developing a strategic framework for investments in efficient electricity; expanding rural access to telecommunication services; increasing resources, enrollment and retention in primary education; improving the evidence base used in health policies; and enhancing the effectiveness of the HIV/AIDS response.

iv. IEG concurs with the lessons outlined in the CASCR, and would like to underscore four points. First, re-engagement in a country needs to be based on realistic objectives backed by a full assessment of CAS implementation risks, including country capacity to process the expected additions to the portfolio. In PNG these risks materialized without an adequate strategy to address them. Second,

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a realistic assessment of government commitment in the proposed areas of intervention can help select projects with a higher likelihood of moving forward. In PNG, despite formal development plans with improving governance as a central objective, there were no actions to demonstrate commitment to specific measures; in these conditions a focus on analytical and advocacy work may be in order. Third, while client engagement is a key factor in obtaining results from AAA, stronger dissemination of AAA products may help raise public awareness of issues and policy options among other stakeholders. In PNG, IDA prepared reports that are difficult to locate (e.g., an account of publicly financed health workforce). Finally, failure of the results framework to capture the links between WBG actions and CAS outcomes and strategic objectives will undermine program monitoring and mid-course corrections.

3. Assessment of WBG Strategy

Overview of CAS Relevance:

Country Context:

1. PNG has rich endowments of natural resources. Oil, mining and forestry dominate the economy. During the CPS period, PNG experienced rapid GDP growth of 7.4 percent per annum on average, compared to 3.4 percent during 2004-2007 and three successive years of contraction before that. The upturn was led by high commodity prices and new investments in the extractive industries, despite declining production from older mines. The rebound in mining, quarrying and petroleum has had considerable impact on construction, where annual expansion averaged 15.3 percent during 2007-2010. The 2009 global crisis had a transient impact on export prices and a modest impact on growth, which was attenuated by a 2009 fiscal impulse financed with past fiscal surpluses. To minimize the volatility caused by fluctuating global commodity prices, the authorities have followed prudent fiscal management and set aside funds in trust accounts for “additional priority spending” on social and infrastructure development. In addition, the overall surplus on PNG’s balance of payment has resulted in continued growth in its foreign exchange reserves. Despite sound macroeconomic management, the rapid economic expansion has led to persistent inflation pressure (8.0 percent during 2008-2011), but had little impact on poverty - 40 percent of the population lived under \$1 a day in 2009/10 (latest data available), higher than in 1996 (38 percent). PNG is also prone to natural disasters including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, cyclones, river and coastal flooding, landslides, and droughts. Its progress towards the MDGs has been disappointing and ranked the 5th lowest among 137 countries.

2. The CAS period straddled two government development plans. Priorities under the Government’s 2005-2010 strategy were: i) *good governance*, including public sector reform and enhanced political stability; ii) *export-driven economic growth*, focusing on sectors in which PNG has a comparative advantage, such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and tourism, supported by mining, petroleum, and gas; and iii) *rural development, poverty reduction, and empowerment through human resource development*. Priorities under the Government’s 2011-15 strategy focused on supply constraints and targeted: i) *fundamentals*, including fiscal and monetary stability, unlocking of land for development, law and order, and quality infrastructure to connect rural populations to markets and services; ii) *low costs*, through competition in telecommunications to facilitate economic progress and efficient delivery of services; iii) *education* at all levels, noting that higher and technical education was needed to improve productivity; and iv) *transport, public utilities of electricity, clean water and sanitation* to facilitate investment.

Objectives of the WBG Strategy:

3. The WBG sought to foster a long-term partnership with the government, people and development partners of PNG. The CAS was structured to support PNG’s development plan by addressing both short-term service deficits and longer-term institutional and policy challenges. The CAS objectives were organized under two pillars: (i) *promoting and maintaining sound economic and*

natural resource management through strengthening governance, maintaining sound management of the extractive industries and promoting effective and sustainable management of natural resources; and (ii) *improving livelihoods and service delivery* by supporting development of the private sector, enhancing rural livelihoods, improving local service delivery, expanding access to infrastructure services, and supporting multi-donor approaches to human development. *Improving governance and empowering women and youth* were cross-cutting issues to be mainstreamed across the two pillars. The CASPR reaffirmed the relevance of these objectives, but adjusted 10 of the 17 CAS outcomes to take account of the changes in PNG's economic dynamics and the issues that arose during the initial phase of CAS implementation. One of the issues was that capacity constraints proved to be greater than expected. It is unclear whether the CASPR dropped support for "improved potential in niche industries, including tourism" under Pillar II as it was excluded from the text of the CASCR (Table 1) but remained in the revised results matrix.

Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

4. **Congruence with Country Context and Country Program:** The CAS objectives focused on the more substantial development challenges facing PNG (e.g., governance and environmental institutions covered under Pillar I; social protection, human resources, and the business climate under Pillar II), as well as challenges where PNG had made progress but still merited attention (e.g., macro management). Its alignment was strong in areas where the planned country programs were clearly articulated (e.g., fiscal performance, governance, public expenditure, infrastructure, education and health), but weak where they were less specific (e.g., employment, climate change, disaster management, business environment, and public-private partnerships). However, the slow takeoff of the program indicated weak government commitment, ownership and capacity. In governance and accountability, for example, there were few indications of real efforts despite growing demand for good governance. In financial management, efforts at ensuring compliance with rules remained weak. The CASPR identified new opportunities (e.g., finance to increase SME employment, increasing scope in the energy sector), while adapting to weak government interest in governance and public financial management.

5. **Relevance of Design.** The CAS was developed at a time when the relationship between the WBG and the Government was improving after five years, during which, following the recommendation in OEG's 2000 CAE not to engage in significant additional lending, no new loans were approved. The improved relationship in 2007 may have encouraged the WBG to over-extend itself in terms of CAS objectives (the CAS's characterization of the proposed program "more as a menu of valid assistance activities than literal roadmap" notwithstanding). Although the CAS was tentative about many of the proposed projects, its design could have benefited from a more selective approach considering the small size of the IDA program and a more precise assessment of CAS implementation risks and needed mitigation measures as the Bank developed its operations anew. Nevertheless, the planned IDA product mix was well aligned with CAS objectives. It rightly eschewed fast disbursing, policy-based operations in an environment where government commitment to policy reform was uncertain. Recognizing the need for analytical work to underpin dialogue with the Government, the planned AAA covered most of the areas targeted for lending and a wide range of related issues. The IFC's program sought to support the CAS objectives under Pillar II by building financial infrastructure, improving basic infrastructure (telecommunications), improving the business environment, and supporting rural enterprises and tourism, while integrating investment and advisory services wherever possible. The synergy between IDA and IFC was strong. The results framework was clearly articulated, with the CAS objectives generally seeking modest improvements over existing conditions. However, the objectives were excessive in number and breadth for a country that was reengaging with the Bank. Moreover, the CAS design paid little attention to arrangements for monitoring outcomes. Many indicators were difficult to monitor (e.g., on availability of information to monitor government performance), as evidenced by the numerous instances in the CASCR that indicate "lack of data".

6. **Risk Identification and Mitigation.** The Bank identified four risks. The risk of *declining governance* was to be addressed through support for governance improvements on mining revenues,

oversight agencies, community driven approaches, and multi-stakeholder coalitions. This risk materialized to some extent, but the intended Bank efforts on governance, beyond diagnostics, did not come to fruition. The risk of *falling commodity prices* was to be addressed through support for accumulation of reserves, lower public debt, effective use of public resources, and economic diversification. This risk materialized transitorily in 2009, with a modest effect on PNG, while the Bank's analytical work on managing volatility partially supported improvements in reserves and debt trends. IFC responded by investing in a local manufacturer (K.K. Kingston) and approved additional funding for the Bank of South Pacific (BSP) for small business lending and rural finance. The risk of *growing unemployment* was to be mitigated through Bank support for creation of productive youth employment opportunities. Outdated unemployment data indicated high youth unemployment rates but evidence on more recent trends is lacking. IDA approved a youth unemployment project at the end of 2010 that had provided 560 labor days of youth employment by mid-2012. The risks of *natural disasters* were to be addressed through support for development of a climate change strategy and PNG's participation in regional disaster risk reduction initiatives, and promotion of responsible and sustainable natural resource management practices. This risk did not materialize and the Bank made little headway in its intended mitigation measures. The CAS did not fully identify the risks of implementation delays that materialized with the increased project activities in the country. At project level, these risks were uniformly assessed to be "medium level".

Overview of CAS Implementation:

Lending and Investments:

7. Total IDA lending amounted to \$170.2 million, compared to the planned \$165.4 million for FY08-FY11. This lending supported eight investment projects covering mining (\$17.0 million), SME access to finance (\$21.9 million), agriculture (\$52.5 million), education (\$5.0 million), infrastructure (\$58.0 million), and urban youth employment (\$15.8 million). In addition, a Fast Track Initiative (FTI) grant financed a Reading Education Project (\$19.2 million). All but two of these projects, representing 74 percent of the total lending, were approved in FY11. The IDA program went through considerable adjustments during CAS implementation: 8 of the 16 projects planned in the CAS and 2 of the 3 additional projects planned in the CASPR did not materialize. Two pre-existing projects (\$102 million) that closed during the CAS period supported restoration of infrastructure services destroyed by the 1994 volcanic eruption and road maintenance/rehabilitation. Lending was back-loaded due to bureaucratic hurdles that delayed project preparation.

8. IDA's portfolio performed poorly, with 40.1 percent of the commitments (38 percent of the projects) at risk in 2012, much higher than the EAP average of 10.8 percent (19.0 percent of the projects) and the Bank average of 15.3 percent (22 percent of the projects). IEG reviewed the completion report of one project which exited during the CAS and rated its development outcome as *moderately satisfactory* and the risk to its sustainability as *significant*. Of the ten active projects, the project teams' self-ratings - *satisfactory* or *moderately satisfactory* in eight projects and *moderately unsatisfactory* in two projects - do not appear to fully reflect the significant implementation delays experienced by the projects.

9. At the inception of the CAS period, the IFC had two active investments totaling \$81 million. IFC committed another \$210 million, including \$50 million in equity from IFC Capitalization (Equity) Fund LLP, during the CAS period in eight new projects. Nearly 60 percent of the IFC portfolio was in the financial sector, with its largest investment in the Bank South Pacific (BSP), where the IFC made equity investment of \$104 million (including \$50 million from IFC Capitalization (Equity) Fund LLP), and provided a \$30 million loan for financing small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and a \$14.5 million trade finance facility. In the real sector, IFC added \$40 million to a \$80 million senior loan to Digicel (an existing client of the IFC in telecommunication) that was approved in FY05, and invested in light manufacturing through \$4 million equity in a local company that provides significant employment and livelihood opportunities.

10. IEG reviewed the extended project supervision report of one project (PNG Microfinance) during the CAS period and rated its development outcome as *unsuccessful*, concurring with the self-rating by project team. For the other seven projects, the Development Outcomes Tracking System (DOTS) shows a high success rate for overall development outcome, with five rated as *successful* and two as *too early to rate*, as they were approved in FY12.

Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

11. The CAS/CASPR planned on delivery of 22 AAA, of which 6 were completed, 7 remain active, and 9 were dropped or not initiated. The completed and on-going AAA covered a wide range of issues, including macroeconomic management, governance, rural telecommunications, education, health, climate change, youth unemployment, and analysis of household surveys. Thirteen additional AAA activities were initiated; of which four have been delivered and nine remain active. These produced assessments of disaster response in the Oro province, advice on risk-based capital supervision for non-life insurers and on enhancing statistical analysis and public reporting in the Insurance Sector and an analysis of local collective action, local-level Institutions, and electoral politics. Few of the reports or outputs (other than a number of briefs disseminating some AAA findings) are readily available, although the country team considers that the inclusive process through which the AAA was produced ensured ownership and impact on the ground.

12. IFC implemented 10 advisory services (AS) projects with a total funding of \$5.8 million. The three Access to Finance (A2F) activities (\$3.1 million) provided capacity building assistance for IFC clients (BSP and PNG Microfinance). Improving the business environment, especially the simplification of business-related procedures, was another major theme for IFC AS (\$1.8 million). IEG reviewed two of the four closed AS projects, and rated the development effectiveness as *mostly unsuccessful* in one, and *cannot be verified* in the other. Among three other completed AS projects, the IFC project team rated two as *successful*, one as *unsuccessful*. The six remaining AS projects are under implementation and proceeding well based on the progress reports.

Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

13. PNG receives assistance from the UN, the ADB, the EU, the IMF, the World Bank, and several bilateral donors. Donor coordination has been anchored on government development plans and improved with the institution of annual joint Government-Donor Consultation Forums since 2005 and of a series of Thematic Working Groups. Efforts have been made at improving donor harmonization by sector and on fiduciary systems, and some donors have developed unified country strategies. IDA coordinated closely with IFC, including funding the Small and Medium Enterprise Access to Finance Project in FY11.

Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

14. The CASCR identified a need for improvement in applying the Indigenous Peoples Policy (OP 4.10) highlighted by an Inspection Panel case filed against the Smallholder Agriculture Development Project (FY08). The Panel found that (i) the consultation process had fallen short of policy requirements because Management had failed to provide relevant information prior to consultation in a culturally appropriate manner, form, and language to achieve broad community support for the project; (ii) the Bank did not comply with the Indigenous Peoples Policy which requires the Bank to ensure that the Indigenous Peoples receive social and economic benefits that are culturally appropriate and gender and inter-generationally inclusive; and (iii) concerns regarding environmental safeguards were sufficiently covered, except for palm oil mill effluent production, on which the Bank developed an action plan. No other specific safeguards-related concerns were raised during the CAS period, and INT has recorded no allegations of fraud and corruption.

Overview of Achievement by Objective:

15. The WBG articulated its strategy around two pillars: promoting and maintaining sound economic and natural resource management; and improving livelihoods and service delivery, especially for the rural poor. The first pillar aimed to consolidate improvements in economic growth and fiscal policy while increasing transparency and accountability in the management of public finances and natural resources. The second pillar of the CAS aimed to encourage broad-based economic growth and wider participation in economic development through expanded opportunities for income generation and improved services, especially for the rural poor.

Pillar I: Promoting and maintaining sound economic and natural resource management

16. Under this pillar, the WBG was to help maintain fiscal discipline and a stable macroeconomic environment; expand and strengthen multi-stakeholder mechanisms to review mining sector policymaking; increase public availability of information to monitor government performance; strengthen mining sector institutions, leverage mining revenues for broader SME employment; and develop a strategic framework for disaster risk management and climate change adaptation with support of an investment program by partners.

17. **Government of PNG shows continued awareness of the importance of maintaining fiscal discipline and a stable macroeconomic environment.** The Government demonstrated commitment to fiscal sustainability. It achieved positive overall fiscal balances during the CAS period except in 2009, when mineral revenues were adversely affected by the global crisis. Furthermore, PNG strengthened its fiscal institutions and natural resource management with the passage of the Organic Law on the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to protect government expenditures and public investments from revenue swings. Thanks to increased government assets, including those in the SWF, net public debt declined from 39.8 to 18.9 percent in 2007-2011, while high export revenues and foreign investment helped increase international reserves from \$2.1 to \$4.3 billion. PNG has also gradually strengthened banking and insurance supervision. On the less positive side, despite the prudent fiscal stance, domestic and external price pressures raised the average annual inflation from 1.8 percent during 2004-2007 to 8.0 percent during 2008-2011, missing the CAS target of “lower single digits”.

18. Most dialogue on fiscal issues was conducted in the context of IMF Article IV discussions. Nevertheless, together with the IMF, the Bank provided input into the design of the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in 2010, including a report on management of resource-induced volatility in PNG and support for a study tour to Chile on Sovereign Wealth Fund. The Bank also provided training on debt management and contributed to a Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) that assessed financial sector related macroeconomic risks. Bank support under the Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening Initiative (FIRST) contributed to improving the capital regime for non-life insurers. The Bank also supported the execution and analysis of a household income and expenditure survey that helped to update macroeconomic indicators.

19. **Expanded and strengthened multi-stakeholder mechanisms to review overall policymaking and extractive industries.** The CAS target of the Government forming multi-stakeholder structures for PNG to join and implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was not achieved. Progress was limited to the formation in early 2012 of a State Working Group on EITI, with the Government inviting industry and civil society to join the dialogue.

20. The Bank provided advice to the government in its efforts towards becoming an EITI candidate country.

21. **Increased public availability of accessible information to support monitoring of government performance.** The CAS target of the media and civil society having access to factual information from audit reports and budget documents was not achieved. PNG's Open Budget Index by International Budget Partnership improved from 51 percent in 2006 to 60 percent in 2008, and then deteriorated to 57 percent in 2010. These scores place PNG among the countries that provide "some" information on the budget. While revenue statistics are generally accurate and timely, nontax revenue and public expenditure data are deficient. Reforms of state-owned enterprises and the approval of a Sovereign Wealth Fund for mineral revenues this year were designed to improve transparency, but are too recent to result in actual improvements in transparency.
22. None of the intended IDA support for this objective came to fruition: the Strengthening Institutions of Oversight and Accountability project did not materialize due to lack of government support; and the Government had limited interest in a proposed new public expenditure review (PER), a follow up to the 2004 PER conducted in collaboration with the ADB and the USAID, or a proposed new Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS), a follow up to a 2002 tracking survey.
23. **Strengthened institutional structures in the mining sector, emphasizing transparent management and resource distribution.** PNG has taken some steps towards stronger mining institutions, thus achieving some aspects of the CAS targets. Both the mining code reform to address distribution issues and the governance improvements through PNG's participation in EITI are being considered, but neither has materialized so far. The Wealth Fund reflecting Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (the GAPP or "Santiago Principles") was approved in 2012. Activities conducted by the Mineral Resources Authority (created in 2005) suggest only incipient improvements in its capacity.
24. The CASCR notes that engagement in the oil and gas sector has been modest and slow to translate into concrete activities. IDA's Second Mining Sector Institutional Strengthening TA (FY08) is providing support for improvements in mining sector policy, governance, and revenue as well as for mining communities. The Bank also provided TA on identifying governance challenges and developing an anticorruption plan for the mining sector. There is no indication that it has translated into actual governance actions or outcomes.
25. **Program in place to leverage extractive industry and enclave project revenues for broader SME employment.** There is no such program in place, and no information on the availability of credit for SMEs (CAS outcome indicator). SME or SME employment statistics are not available; and there has been no analysis of how extractive sector revenues leverage into SME employment. The overall employment to population ratio has remained unchanged at around 70.7 percent since 2000, with employment in the mining sector expanding slightly faster than overall employment despite stagnant production of the major mining commodities.
26. IDA is supporting SMEs and SME employment creation through a Small and Medium Enterprise Access to Finance Project approved in FY11. It bears no relation to extractive industry or enclave project revenues and is only at the beginning stages of implementation with no results so far. In addition, an IDA-IFC Risk-Sharing Facility (guarantee) was approved in Q4 of FY11 to increase SME access to finance through the banking system. It is much too early to see whether this risk sharing facility will increase lending to SMEs - thus far, the BSP is the only participant in this initiative, while two foreign banks have opted out of the program.
27. **Strategic framework for disaster risk management and climate change adaptation and mitigation adopted by Government of PNG, and investment program supported by partners.** Though not formally adopted and far from mainstreamed, PNG has a draft disaster risk management (DRM) action plan for 2005-15 that provides guidance for specific DRM interventions. PNG is only beginning to develop a climate change policy under its new climate change agency (Office of Climate

Change and Development). There is no indication of significant progress toward the CAS target of developing improved warning systems and information base consistent with a climate-change disaster risk management strategy.

28. IDA Support to PNG on disaster risk management has come primarily from the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery and included studies for the creation of a Pacific Islands regional catastrophe risk pool. The Bank focused on the climate change dimension of the objective and worked with the Government on a report to develop a climate change strategy. These efforts have been primarily diagnostic in nature and yet to translate into the adoption of a PNG strategy in these two related areas.

29. IEG rates the outcome of the WBG assistance under Pillar I as *unsatisfactory*. WBG support contributed to PNG's achieving good progress toward fiscal and macroeconomic stability, but there is little or no progress in the other areas. Limited government interest and/or commitment have led to cancellation of some planned IDA interventions and delays in others. In this context, the Bank's AAA, which underpinned the WBG support for the objectives under this pillar, has not been able to translate into concrete results on the ground.

Pillar II: Improving livelihoods and service delivery, especially for the rural poor

30. Under this pillar, the WBG was to help strengthen the business enabling environment; increase the number of public-private partnership (PPP) in infrastructure; increase sustainable commercial agriculture production and artisanal and small-scale mining; test models for improved local service delivery through partnerships with civil society; improve roads and bridges; launch an energy sector strategy; expand access to rural telecommunications services; increase resources in support of higher primary school participation and grade retention; improve the evidence base for health sector policies; and improve the effectiveness of the national HIV/AIDS response.

31. ***Stronger business enabling environment, with improved financial infrastructure.***
During the CPS period, PNG's Ease of Doing Business (DB) ranking was on a downward slide, from the 89th among 181 economies in 2008 to the 104th out of 185 economies in 2013. COFACE, a credit insurance institution that rates the business climate in many countries, assigns PNG its lowest rating for the 'very difficult' business environment. The CASCR reports that changes have been introduced to both business registration and licensing procedures, resulting in a reduction in the number of days for business registration from 56 days in 2007 to 51 days in 2012, although the DB database shows that Starting a Business required 6 different procedures and 51 days throughout the period 2004-13. Nevertheless, the macroeconomic and banking environment, including access to credit, has improved. This is reflected in the substantial improvement in PNG's DB ranking for Getting Credit (from 97th in 2012 to 83rd in 2013). The ratio of credit to GDP increased from 77.6 percent in 2007 to 117.2 percent in 2011. Total investment hovered around 16.1 percent of GDP during 2007-11. There is no data on private investment, but the aggregate total and central government investment data suggest that private investment to GDP ratio have largely remained stable. There is no data on the number of active registered micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) paying taxes, which was the CAS outcome indicator for measuring growth of formal MSMEs businesses.

32. IFC provided AS to the Investment Promotion Authority (IPA) through the PNG Regulatory Simplification and Investment Policy and Promotion Project (FY09), which aimed to improve the speed and ease with which businesses can be registered. So far, however, little success has been achieved in this regard, with PNG's DB ranking deteriorating for business/property registration, licensing/permitting, and paying taxes. IFC helped improve access to finance through technical assistance to Credit and Data Bureau, which led to a six-fold increase in credit inquiries. Its large equity investment in BSP, the largest private bank in PNG accounting for 50 percent of the banking system, helped strengthen BSP's capital base and enable it to carry out its primary banking function during the global financial crisis. IFC AS in BSP included targeted support for SMEs in urban and rural

areas, who remain excluded or underserved by the banking sector that is dominated by foreign banks catering primarily to corporate and high-end consumers. On the other hand, IFC's equity investment in and AS support for PNG Microfinance Ltd. (the largest IFC AS intervention in PNG at \$1.8 million) have been unsuccessful.

33. **Greater number of public-private partnerships in infrastructure.** PNG did not develop any PPPs during the CAS period. An assessment by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2011 ranks PNG's PPP environment the lowest among Asian-Pacific countries.

34. The PPP work planned for several sectors (fisheries, petroleum, and aviation) did not materialize. Instead, in response to the request for policy support for Special Economic Zones (SEZ), IFC provided the Department of Commerce and Industry with detailed recommendations on the SEZ legislation in FY11, although the second part of the SEZ project had to be dropped for lack of government ownership.

35. **Sustainable increases in commercial agriculture production and artisanal and small-scale mining.** During 2007-2012, agriculture expanded at a faster pace (3.7 percent per annum) than the previous four years (2.9 percent), although most other sectors accelerated more. Total mining output declined at a faster rate during 2007-11 than during 2003-07. There is no separate data on small-scale mining production. On environmental sustainability, seven million hectares of forests have been cleared or degraded since independence through logging, commercial agriculture, shifting cultivation and mining, and petroleum activities. Mercury poisoning among small gold miners and mercury release into the environment also appear to be issues, although the government has made some efforts at introducing safer practices. Neither of the CAS outcome targets has been achieved.

36. IDA approved two projects that aimed to improve palm oil, cocoa and coffee production, but both became effective in early 2011 and do not report any results yet. A small TA grant provided some guidance and training for small miners.

37. **Models for improved local service delivery tested through partnerships between government and civil society, and within and across communities.** A number of models have been tested. For example, AusAID engaged with the government and CSOs to support the National Strategic Plan on HIV. Other examples of civil society engagements include rural health services operated by Church Health Services and civil society involvement in the PNG "Stop TB Strategy". The CAS target of increasing local service delivery was not achieved.

38. Bank efforts to develop partnership between the government and the private sector have not produced significant outcomes yet. IDA's Urban Youth Employment Project (FY10) draws upon the implementation capacity of public and private agencies and CSOs to execute subprojects and training activities. The project began to be implemented in late 2011 and has had some modest initial youth employment results thus far. The CASCR reports that the participants in the Women in Mining project (FY11) have engaged in new income generating activities. The CASCR also reports on the Bank's partnership with the private sector to support youth, communities and local service delivery. However, all these were initiated at the end of the CAS period.

39. **Improved condition of roads and bridges in selected provinces.** Available data, although fragmentary, suggests an improvement in road conditions. Two of the CAS targets have been met, while there is no information on the CAS outcome indicators of decreasing annual crop losses. The CASCR reports that the percentage of roads in good and fair condition increased from 20 to 74 percent in 2002-2010, while that of private sector contracting for road maintenance grew from 40 to 95 percent. The Bank's index of the quality of trade and transport related infrastructure (1=low to 5=high) reports a modest improvement from 2.0 in 2007 to 2.2 in 2012.

40. IDA supported this objective through the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project (FY02 - FY12), which contributed to open markets in the specific areas it covered. Moreover, IDA provided assistance to the Oro province through the Smallholder Agriculture Development Project (FY07) to address the impact of the November 2007 tropical cyclone that devastated large parts of the province's infrastructure. Implementation of a follow up road maintenance project (FY11) is only beginning.

41. **Strategic energy sector planning launched to provide framework for investment in lower-carbon and lower-cost electricity in rural centers and urban concentrations.** There is no CAS outcome indicator defined for this objective. The government is presently developing a framework, including possible PPPs in electricity generation.

42. In early 2012, the Bank mobilized a grant from the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) to support the energy regulator in developing a strategy for ownership, financing, and financial benefits-sharing in new medium and large hydropower projects. Two GEF-funded projects did not succeed in increasing use of renewable energy sources through incentives for buyers to borrow.

43. **Expanded access to affordable and reliable telecommunications services in rural areas and outside Port Moresby.** PNG's telecommunications continued to expand rapidly. Telephone lines per 100 people doubled from 0.9 in 2007 to 1.8 in 2010, and mobile cellular subscriptions rose from 4.7 to 27.8 per 100 people, with mobile teledensity estimated at 16 percent now (compared to overall teledensity of 3 percent in 2007). A rural-urban breakdown of this progress is not available, and there is no data on the CAS outcome indicators of average user cost of basic telecom services and existence of one public payphone per 500 people.

44. IDA's Rural Communications Project (FY11) is in the early stages of implementation to support access to telecommunications among 420,000 rural residents in the provinces of Chimbu and East Sepik, and to facilitate public Internet access in 60 district centers. Following the \$80 million investment in FY05, IFC made an additional investment of \$40 million in FY10 in the private operator Digicel, which contributed to a rapid expansion in the mobile telephony market and into the more remote and poorer areas of the country. It also enabled the introduction of mobile banking by BSP. In addition, IFC's Business Edge AS program trained 130 Digicel distributors in good business practice and accredited four national trainers.

45. **Increased resources supporting higher primary school participation and grade retention.** In 2009, the government launched its Universal Basic Education (UBE) Plan for 2010-2019, with fees for primary education eliminated in 2010. Data on government expenditure on primary education, enrollment or grade retention trends are not available, although the CASCR reports that the Government allocated a K300 million supplementary budget for UBE in 20011 and another K600 million for 2012. Since there was no baseline data in the results matrix, it is unclear whether the CAS target of increased budget allocation has been achieved.

46. IDA was one of PNG's partners to provide input to the Universal Basic Education Plan. It is also supporting improvements in reading scores through the Reading Education Project (FY11, Catalytic Fund Grant) and in retention rates through the Flexible and Open Distance Education Project (FY11). Both are only beginning to be implemented, with no outcomes thus far.

47. **Improved evidence base for health sector policies and plans.** It is unclear what the improvement was in this area. As in the past, the Department of Health used evidence to formulate a national health plan and budget proposals for the 2012 budget. There is no indication that the evidence base of the new plan was better or worse than in previous plans, and no information on the success of the new budget submission in leveraging increased resources in recurrent budget (CAS outcome indicator).

48. The Bank provided support through the Health Human Resources Review (FY11). The report, not yet finalized, was shared through the sectoral coordination group and may help the Government with its health budget projections.

49. **More effective national HIV/AIDS response through evidence-based policy and interventions.** The CAS target of making HIV/AIDS information available to support the Government and donor interventions was not met. However, the Government developed National Strategic Plans on HIV for 2006-10 and 2011-15. An increase in antiretroviral therapy coverage among people with advanced HIV infection from 21 percent in 2007 to 52 percent in 2010 suggests increased effectiveness. There is no evidence available on the impact of preventive policies.

50. With significant delay, the Integrated Bio Behavioural Survey (IBBS) was initiated early this year by the Bank and other development partners (AusAID, NZAID, ADB) to gain a comprehensive picture of the status of HIV and the major behavioural determinants of HIV transmission in PNG in order to strengthen the focus of HIV/AIDS response policies. It has not had an impact on policies.

51. IEG rates the outcome of the WBG assistance under Pillar II as *unsatisfactory*. The Bank helped PNG achieve progress toward improving the condition of roads and bridges, and expanding access to credit and telecommunication in general. But there is little evidence of progress on strengthening the business environment and promoting MSME growth, increasing the number of PPPs, increasing sustainable agriculture and small-scale mining, testing local service delivery arrangements through partnerships with CSOs, developing a framework for investments in electricity, expanding rural access to telecommunication services, increasing resources, enrollment and retention in primary education, improving the evidence base used in health policies, or enhancing the effectiveness of the HIV/AIDS response.

| Objectives | CASCR Rating | IEG Rating |
|---|--------------|-----------------------|
| Pillar I: Promoting and maintaining sound economic and natural resource management | NA | <i>Unsatisfactory</i> |
| Pillar II: Improving livelihoods and service delivery, especially for the rural poor | NA | <i>Unsatisfactory</i> |

4. Overall IEG Assessment

| | CASCR Rating | IEG Rating |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Overall Outcome: | <i>Moderately Unsatisfactory</i> | <i>Unsatisfactory</i> |
| IBRD/IDA Performance: | <i>Moderately Unsatisfactory</i> | <i>Moderately Unsatisfactory</i> |
| IFC Performance: | | <i>Satisfactory</i> |

Overall outcome:

52. IEG rates the overall outcome of the CAS as *unsatisfactory*, which is below the CASCR rating of *moderately unsatisfactory*. IEG's rating is based on the results that the WBG did not achieve most of the intended outcomes. The Bank helped achieve good progress toward fiscal and macroeconomic stability and improvement in the condition of roads and bridges. IFC investments and AS support contributed to strengthening financial infrastructure and expanding telecommunication services. With other partners, the Bank also supported expanding universal basic education. However, the CAS program achieved little or no progress in all other areas, which included strengthening multi-stakeholder mechanisms to review mining policies; increasing public availability of information to monitor government performance; strengthening mining sector institutions; putting in place a program to leverage mining revenues for SME employment; adopting a strategy for disaster management and

climate change; strengthening the business environment; expanding PPPs; increasing sustainable agriculture and small-scale mining; testing local service delivery arrangements through partnerships with CSOs; developing a strategic framework for investments in efficient electricity; expanding rural access to telecommunication services; increasing resources, enrollment and retention in primary education; improving the evidence base used in health policies; and enhancing the effectiveness of the HIV/AIDS response.

IBRD/IDA Performance:

53. IEG rates IDA performance as *moderately unsatisfactory*, concurring with the CASCR rating. IDA's strategy benefited from its congruence with country development challenges and government plans, but was compromised by uncertain government commitment with regard to key objectives underlying those plans. CAS objectives were clearly articulated and generally sought realistic improvements over existing conditions. However, they were overly ambitious in number and breadth for a country that was reengaging with the Bank and where the small IDA program demanded more selectivity. Furthermore, the Bank did not design an adequate arrangement to monitor outcomes. In a large number of cases, the indicators were difficult to monitor. Planned IDA interventions were appropriate by focusing on investment loans instead of adjustment loans in an environment of uncertain government commitment to policy reforms. IDA also demonstrated considerable flexibility and responsiveness by adjusting its lending program to account for new realities. Nevertheless, IDA would have benefited from better up-front diagnosis of project implementation risks, including shortfalls in country capacity, and corresponding mitigation strategies to address those risks. Many of the planned AAA, which was appropriate for a country with significant development challenges and reengaging with the Bank after a period of strained relationship, did not materialize, reflecting the weaknesses in the engagement with the counterparts. The portfolio performed poorly and one intervention suffered from fiduciary issues. There was good coordination with other development partners.

IFC Performance:

54. IEG rates IFC performance as *satisfactory*. The IFC program (both investment and advisory) was relevant, focusing on the objectives under Pillar II. IFC was opportunistic and bold in undertaking major investments in a relatively risky environment. IFC's investments in Digicel and BSP made a major impact in building the much-needed telecommunication infrastructure and developing access to finance for SMEs and the rural poor. IFC's value-added was its ability to identify investment opportunities and use appropriate mix of investment and AS to achieve results. It was able to mobilize additional resources through other investment vehicles such as private equity funds managed by IFC. With the exception of one project, IFC investments have performed well both financially and in contributing to the economy.

5. Assessment of CAS Completion Report

55. The CASCR provides a cogent and candid assessment, including a well organized discussion of outcomes and information on the factors that undermined the achievement of outcomes. It is consistent with the CAS objectives and results framework, focusing on outcomes, except in some areas where the focus is more on processes, intermediate outcomes or current plans than on achieved development outcomes (e.g., on strengthened institutional structures in the mining sector). The CASCR provides adequate information on IDA operations that were expected to contribute to the different outcomes and provides a well considered set of lessons. Its discussions of IFC activities, however, are scant and do not adequately capture IFC's contribution to the CAS program. It does not highlight the failure of IFC's microfinance program in PNG either.

6. Findings and Lessons

56. IEG concurs with the lessons outlined in the CASCR, and would like to underscore four points. First, re-engagement in a country needs to be based on realistic objectives backed by a full assessment of CAS implementation risks, including country capacity to process the expected additions to the portfolio. In PNG these risks materialized without an adequate strategy to address them. Second, a realistic assessment of government commitment in the proposed areas of intervention can help select projects with a higher likelihood of moving forward. In PNG, despite formal development plans with improving governance as a central objective, there were no actions to demonstrate commitment to specific measures; in these conditions a focus on analytical and advocacy work may be in order. Third, while client engagement is a key factor in obtaining results from AAA, stronger dissemination of AAA products may help raise public awareness of issues and policy options among other stakeholders. In PNG, IDA prepared reports that are difficult to locate (e.g., an account of publicly financed health workforce). Finally, failure of the results framework to capture the links between WBG actions and CAS outcomes and strategic objectives will undermine program monitoring and mid-course corrections.

- Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CAS Objectives**
- Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending, FY08-FY13 (in US\$ millions)**
- Annex Table 3: Grants and Trust Funds active in FY08-FY13 (in US\$ millions)**
- Annex Table 4: Planned and Actual Analytical and Advisory Work, FY08-FY13**
- Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Papua New Guinea, FY08-12**
- Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Papua New Guinea, FY08-11**
- Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for PNG and Comparators, FY08-12 (in US\$ million)**
- Annex Table 8: Net Disbursements and Charges Summary Report for Papua New Guinea, FY08-12 (in US\$ millions)**
- Annex Table 9: List of IFC Investment in Papua New Guinea, FY08-FY12 (in US\$ millions)**
- Annex Table 10: List of IFC Advisory Services in Papua New Guinea, FY08-FY12 (in US\$ millions)**
- Annex Table 11: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid, 2008- 2010(in US\$ million)**
- Annex Table 12: Economic and Social Indicators for Papua New Guinea and Comparators, 2008- 2011**
- Annex Table 13: Papua New Guinea - Millennium Development Goals**

Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of the CAS Objectives

| CAS 08-11: Pillar 1 PROMOTING AND MAINTAINING SOUND ECONOMIC AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT | Actual Results (as of current month year) | Comments |
|--|---|--|
| <u>Major Outcome Measures</u> | 1. GoPNG shows continued awareness of the importance of maintaining fiscal discipline and a stable macroeconomic environment | |
| Inflation in lower single digits (Baseline: 2.3% in 2006) | Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) 2008: 7.7 2009: -2.5 2010: 7.0 Estimate: 2011: 12.5 2012: 9.6 | Source: IMF |
| Increased international reserves (Baseline: US\$ 1.4 billion at end-2006) | Gross official international reserves 2007: 2,087 million 2008: 2,095 million 2009: 2,623 million Estimate: 2010: 3,092 million | Source: IMF |
| Reduced public debt burden (Baseline: 39% public debt to GDP in 2006) | Gross public debt to GDP 2007: 33.6 2008: 31.7 2009: 32.1 Estimate: 2010: 26.5 | Source: IMF |
| 2. Expanded and stronger multi stakeholder mechanisms to review overall policymaking and extractive industries | | |
| GoPNG joins with civil society and industry to form multi-stakeholder structures for PNG to join and implement EITI | | Cabinet-level discussion and adoption of discussion paper signaling GoPNG intent to join EITI Source: CASCR |
| 3. Increased public availability of accessible information to support monitoring of government performance | | |
| Media, NGOs, and CBOs are using and analyzing factual information from audit reports, sub-national and national budget documents – evidenced by press coverage | | A capacity building program for EITI audits has yet to commence. Strengthening Institutions of Oversight and Accountability project was dropped Source: CASCR |
| 4. Strengthened institutional structures in mining sector, emphasizing transparent management and resource distribution | | |
| Mineral Resources Authority operating effectively, with clearly defined governance arrangements; Bougainville Dept. of Mines operational | | Bougainville Department of Mines has been established and staff are being trained and 'twinning'. Source: CASCR |
| Increased annual spending on mining/petroleum exploration, including in Bougainville (Baseline: US\$ 50m in 2007) | No data available | |
| 3 additional tax audits of EI companies completed by Internal Revenue Commission (Baseline: 2 as of 2007) | | Additional audits have been conducted as capacity-building exercised in the IRC, and an additional \$30m in revenues was generated. Source: CASCR |
| 5. Strategic framework for disaster risk management and climate change adaptation / mitigation adopted by GoPNG, investment program supported by partners | | |
| Improved attention to disaster risk management in climate change strategy | | National Strategy on Climate Compatible Development prepared with significant analytical input drawn from climate change analytical work. DRM/CCA Program established with Office of Climate Change and |

| CAS 08-11: Pillar 1 PROMOTING AND MAINTAINING SOUND ECONOMIC AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT | Actual Results (as of current month year) | Comments |
|---|--|---|
| | | <p>Development as the coordinating agency. Program to build resilience to natural disasters and climate change in the agriculture and transport sectors launched in collaboration with Departments of Agriculture and Works. World Bank DRM/CCA Specialist hired, based in OCCD.</p> <p>Source: CASCR</p> |
| <u>6. Program in place to leverage enclave revenues for broader growth and employment</u> | | |
| Increased availability of credit for SMEs (Baseline TBD, data disaggregated by gender) | No data available | <p>The project is approved in Q4 of FY11. Loans began being issued in Feb 2012, and the targeted outreach to women begins in mid-2012</p> <p>Source: CASCR</p> |

| | CAS 08-11: Pillar 2 IMPROVING LIVELIHOODS AND SERVICE DELIVERY, ESPECIALLY FOR THE RURAL POOR | Actual Results (as of current month year) | Comments |
|-------------------------------|--|--|---|
| Major Outcome Measures | 1. Stronger business enabling environment, with improved financial infrastructure | | |
| | Business regulations simplified (Baseline: 56 days in 2007) | | |
| | Growth in number of MSMEs, as measured by active registered MSMEs paying taxes (Baseline: 12,740 in 2009) | | Changes to both business registration and licensing procedures have been introduced. The time for business registration is expected to drop considerably with the introduction of an online registration system in 2012. Source: CASCR |
| | 2. Improved potential in niche industries, including tourism | | |
| | Increased tourism measured by new investments and visitors (Baselines: investment data TBD; 17,000 visitors 2005) | No data available | Dropped in CASCR Dropped in CASCR text but included in CASCR Results Matrix. |
| | 3. Public-private partnerships supporting infrastructure | | |
| | New PPPs established (Baseline: 0 PPPs under) | | No new PPPs were established with Bank or IFC support. The PPP Policy was adopted by government in 2010, but it has yet to be applied to a specific geographic area or sector. A market demand analysis for fisheries processing economic zone, and a site assessment of possible sites, was dropped when government decided on a site and secured financing on their own. Source: CASCR |
| | 4. Sustainable increases in oil palm production and artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) | | |
| | Increased ASM employment and incomes, as measured by Small Scale Mining Association (Baseline: preliminary estimate) | | The Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining was completed early in the CAS period. Source: CASCR |
| | Increased access for urban youth to skills training and daily employment schemes (Baseline: existing (non-UYEP) public works job placements = 485 per year, 2009 data) | | Activities aimed at building skills for youth and women to participate more actively in economic and development have begun but block grants have not yet been disbursed. Source: CASCR |
| | Development Partners and GoPNG use updated data on poverty and living standards for policy and program design | No data available | Dropped in CASCR |
| | 5. Improved local service delivery partnerships between government and civil society, within and across communities | | |
| | Local service delivery in pilot areas increased, as measured by project-level indicators (e.g. infrastructure, social services) | | Domestic funding for a rural service delivery pilot has been secured, but activities have yet to begin. Source: CASCR |
| | 6. Improved condition of roads/ bridges in selected provinces | | |
| | Increased % of national roads rehabilitated and maintained to "fair" or better condition in RMRP provinces (Baseline: 20% in 2002) | The percentage of national roads in "Good" and "Fair" condition increased from 20% to 74%. | Source: CASCR |
| | Improved condition of access roads, measured by a decrease | No data available | |

| CAS 08-11: Pillar 2 IMPROVING LIVELIHOODS AND SERVICE DELIVERY, ESPECIALLY FOR THE RURAL POOR | Actual Results (as of current month year) | Comments |
|--|---|---|
| in annual crop losses (Baseline: 16% loss in 2006) | | |
| Increased private sector contracting of road maintenance measured by % of competitive bid contracts in RMRP provinces (Baseline: 40% 2002) | Private sector contracting of road maintenance increased from 40% to 95%. | Source: CASCR |
| <u>7. Improved availability and lower cost of electricity services in selected rural centers and towns</u> | | |
| Significant increase in share of households, schools and health services connected to the grid (Baselines: 7% in 2007, 25% in 2000, and 62% in 1999) | | Main sector investment put on hold pending government consensus on public and private roles. Government awareness of complex hydropower issues raised. Very little uptake in financing for consumer and wholesale purchase of renewable energy sources. Source: CASCR |
| <u>8. Expanded access to affordable, reliable telecommunications in rural areas and outside POM</u> | | |
| Teledensity increased by 10% (Baseline: 3% in 2007) | Telephone lines per 100 people: 2008:1 2009:1 2010:2 | Source: WDI |
| At least one public payphone per 500 people providing basic services in towns >1,000 people in targeted provinces | | The IDA project only began implementation in 2011, so the Universal Access tendering and other policy support activities have yet to launch. Source: CASCR |
| Average user cost of basic telecom services decreased by 10%, as measured by cost of 3-min local calls (mobile) and 60-min Internet access (Baselines: 3.6PGK and 15PGK, end-2009) | | |
| <u>9. Increased resources supporting higher primary school participation and grade retention</u> | | |
| Higher GoPNG budget allocations and increased multidonor support for universal basic education | No data available | The effectiveness of both Bank projects was delayed by many months primarily due to inadequate government capacity to establish the project units, with projects activities only starting in very late 2011. Source: CASCR |
| <u>10. Improved evidence base for health sector policies and plans</u> | | |
| 2011 NDoH evidence-based budget submission successfully leverages increased resources in recurrent budget | | The HR Review documented for the first time in over a decade the current stock of the publicly financed health workforce, and GoPNG is formulating actions informed by the Review. The Family Planning Constraints Assessment has helped to identify reasons why mothers do not use supervised delivery services, which in turn has informed the Maternal Mortality Task Force planning. Source: CASCR |
| <u>11. More effective national HIV/AIDS response through evidence-based policy and interventions</u> | | |
| Information on extent/nature of HIV/AIDS available to support GoPNG and donor interventions | | The survey has taken nearly three years to prepare, but is poised to produce results by end- 2012. Source: CASCR |

Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending, FY08-FY13 (in US\$ Millions)

| Project ID | Project | Proposed FY | Approval FY | Proposed Amount | Approved Amount | Outcome Rating |
|--|---|-------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <i>Planned (CAS FY08-11)</i> | | | | | | |
| P102396 | PG Second Mining Sector Inst Strengthening TA | 2008 | 2008 | 11 | 17 | LIR: MS |
| P079140 | PNG-Smallholder Agriculture Development | 2008 | 2008 | 27.5 | 27.5 | LIR: MU |
| P107782 | PG: Rural Communications Project | 2010 | 2011 | 15 | 15 | LIR: MS |
| P114042 | Urban Youth Employment Project | 2010 | 2011 | 13.5 | 15.8 | LIR: S |
| P110959 | PNG Productive Partnerships in Agriculture | 2010 | 2011 | 25 | 25 | LIR: MS |
| P116521 | Flexible and Open Distance Education Project | 2011 | 2011 | 5 | 5 | LIR: MU |
| P120707 | PNG - Small and Medium Enterprise Access to Finance Project | 2011 | 2011 | 20.5 | 21.9 | LIR: S |
| P119471 | Transport Sector Project (RMRP II)* | 2011 | 2011 | 25 | 43 | LIR: S |
| <i>Total Programmed projects CAS FY08-11</i> | | | | | 170.2 | |
| <i>Ongoing projects</i> | | | | | | |
| Project ID | Project | | Approval FY | Closed FY | Approved Amount | |
| P054238 | Second Gazelle Restoration Project | | 2000 | 2008 | 25.3 | |
| P004397 | Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project | | 2002 | 2012 | 40 | LIR: S |
| P102792 | Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project (Supplemental) | | 2007 | N/A | 37.3 | |
| <i>Total ongoing projects CAS FY08-11</i> | | | | | 102.6 | |
| <i>Total</i> | | | | | 272.8 | |

Source: Papua New Guinea FY08-11 CAS and CASPR

* LIR: Latest internal rating. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory.

Annex Table 3: Grants and Trust Funds active in FY08-FY13 (in US\$ million)

| Project ID | Project | TF ID | Approved Amount | Approval FY | Closing |
|------------|--|----------|-----------------|-------------|---------|
| P126996 | PNG Disaster Risk Management Program | TF 10109 | 1.7 | 2012 | Active |
| P129215 | PNG: Enhanced Legal Administration of Petroleum License Database Management System | TF 12014 | 0.5 | 2012 | Active |
| P129322 | PNG: Building a More Disaster and Climate Resilient Transport Sector | TF 11267 | 2.7 | 2012 | Active |
| P114042 | Urban Youth Employment Project | TF 94791 | 0.6 | 2010 | 2012 |
| P105897 | READ PNG | TF 98729 | 19.2 | 2011 | Active |
| P107782 | PG: Rural Communications Project | TF 93106 | 0.4 | 2009 | 2011 |
| P125101 | Inclusive Development in Post-Conflict Bougainville | TF 98558 | 2.5 | 2011 | Active |
| P110959 | PNG Productive Partnerships in Agriculture | TF 93093 | 0.8 | 2009 | 2010 |
| P122779 | PNG-Financial Competency Study | TF 98127 | 0.2 | 2011 | 2012 |
| P115518 | PNG Statistics Development | TF 95972 | 1.2 | 2010 | 2011 |
| P079140 | PNG-Smallholder Agriculture Development | TF 52416 | 0.4 | 2004 | 2008 |
| P060330 | PG-Mining Sector Inst. Strengthening TA | TF 55412 | 0.6 | 2006 | 2010 |
| P060330 | PG-Mining Sector Inst. Strengthening TA | TF 50523 | 0.5 | 2004 | 2008 |
| | Total | | 31.3 | | |

Source: Client connection Papua New Guinea FY08-FY11 as of 10/04/2012

Annex Table 4: Planned and Actual Analytical and Advisory Work, FY08-FY13

| | AAA ID | Proposed FY | Delivered to Client FY | Output Type |
|---|---------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Economic and Sector Work | | | | |
| <i>Planned (CAS FY08-11)</i> | | | | |
| PG Communications Sector Review | P101189 | FY08 | FY08 | Report |
| PNG Economic Report | P085010 | FY08 | Active | Report |
| Development of an approach to governance in PNG under the new CAS | P108658 | FY08 | FY09 | Policy Note |
| Achieving sustainable economic growth by managing resource-induced volatility | P102834 | FY10 | FY10 | Report |
| Human Resources for Health in PNG - Operational Review | P119460 | FY10 | FY11 | Report |
| Resource Distribution and Benefit Sharing Research | P117730 | FY11 | Active | Report |
| PNG Community Dev. Stocktaking | P090499 | FY08 | Active | |
| Costs of Crime and Violence in PNG | P129246 | FY10 | Dropped | |
| | AAA ID | Proposed FY | Delivered to Client FY | Output Type |
| Economic and Sector Work | | | | |
| <i>Non-planned</i> | | | | |
| PNG Political Economy Note | P079801 | | Active | Policy Note |
| PG Post CAS AAA | P096945 | | FY08 | Policy Note |
| Rural Development Strategy II | P075273 | | FY09 | Policy Note |
| Technical Assistance | | | | |
| <i>Planned (CAS FY08-12)</i> | | | | |
| PG - Climate Change Strategy | P110151 | FY10 | Active | "How-To" Guidance |
| Urban Youth Empowerment Studies | P113966 | FY10 | FY10 | Model/Survey |
| Public Expenditure Review and Rationalization | P092163 | FY09 | FY09 | Institutional Development Plan |
| Dev't of a Comprehensive Framework to Address EI Governance in Papua New Guinea | P110036 | FY10 | FY10 | "How-To" Guidance |
| PNG - HIV/AIDS Survey | P109084 | FY07 | Active | Advisory Services Document |
| <i>Non-planned</i> | | | | |
| PNG Oro Province Disaster Response | P110796 | | FY09 | "How-To" Guidance |
| PNG Disaster Risk Management Program | P126999 | | Active | |
| PNG Household Income and Expenditure Survey | P092714 | Predecessor to P131668 | Active | Advisory Services Document |
| PNG -Measuring Financial Competency | P122646 | | Active | Advisory Services Document |
| FIRST: PNG Risk based capital supervision for non-life insurers | P105509 | | FY09 | "How-To" Guidance |
| Papua New Guinea: Enhancing Statistical Analysis and Public Reporting in the Insurance Sector | P113730 | | FY10 | "How-To" Guidance |

Source: Papua New Guinea CAS/CASPR as of 10/04/201

Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Papua New Guinea, FY08-12

| Exit FY | Project ID | Project Name | Total Evaluated (US\$M) | IEG Outcome | IEG Risk to Development Outcome |
|---------|------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 2008 | P054238 | PNG-GAZELLE Restoration II | 25.3 | Moderately Satisfactory | Significant |

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 4a.5 and 4a.6 as of as of 09/14/2012.

* With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Papua New Guinea, FY08-11

| | Total Evaluated (\$M) | Total Evaluated (No) | Outcome % Sat (\$) | Outcome % Sat (No) | RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (\$) * | RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (No)* |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Papua New Guinea | 25.3 | 1 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 |
| East Asia and Pacific | 9,116.3 | 99 | 95.8 | 82.8 | 93.3 | 71.7 |
| World | 59,838.4 | 778 | 84.7 | 73.4 | 68.5 | 56.4 |

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 4a.5 and 4a.6 as of as of 10/04/2012.

* With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for PNG and Comparators, FY08-12 (in US\$ million)

| Fiscal year | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 |
|-------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Papua New Guinea | | | | | |
| # Proj | 3 | 3 | 4 | 9 | 8 |
| # Proj At Risk | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| % At Risk | 33 | 33 | 25 | 33 | 38 |
| Net Comm Amt | 121.8 | 121.8 | 146.8 | 247.5 | 170.2 |
| Comm At Risk | 77.3 | 17.0 | 27.5 | 69.5 | 68.3 |
| % Commit at Risk | 63.5 | 14.0 | 18.7 | 28.1 | 40.1 |
| EAP | | | | | |
| # Proj | 207 | 222 | 230 | 239 | 233 |
| # Proj At Risk | 26 | 36 | 38 | 41 | 45 |
| % At Risk | 12.6 | 16.2 | 16.5 | 17.2 | 19.3 |
| Net Comm Amt | 18,670.6 | 23,882.7 | 26,741.2 | 28,424.3 | 28,721.0 |
| Comm At Risk | 1,707.5 | 2,122.0 | 2,406.9 | 3,217.6 | 3,110.2 |
| % Commit at Risk | 9.1 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 11.3 | 10.8 |
| World | | | | | |
| # Proj | 1,384 | 1,408 | 1,449 | 1,454 | 1,371 |
| # Proj At Risk | 250 | 310 | 328 | 302 | 304 |
| % At Risk | 18 | 22 | 23 | 21 | 22 |
| Net Comm Amt | 104,145.2 | 128,471.6 | 155,683.9 | 165,792.3 | 166,208.1 |
| Comm At Risk | 18,179.3 | 19,539.0 | 27,683.8 | 22,573.0 | 23,324.5 |
| % Commit at Risk | 17.5 | 15.2 | 17.8 | 13.6 | 14.0 |

Source: WB Business Warehouse as of 10/04/2012.

Annex Table 8: Net Disbursements and Charges Summary Report for Papua New Guinea, FY08-12 (in US\$ million)

| FY | Disb. Amt. | Repay Amt. | Net Amt. | Charges | Fees | Net Transfer |
|------------------------|------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|------------|---------------|
| 2008 | 1.4 | 77.6 | -76.2 | 13.2 | 1.2 | -90.6 |
| 2009 | 11.8 | 31.7 | -19.9 | 6.1 | 0.8 | -26.8 |
| 2010 | 14.6 | 14.5 | 0.2 | 2.1 | 0.6 | -2.5 |
| 2011 | 11.1 | 15.4 | -4.3 | 1.2 | 0.6 | -6.1 |
| 2012 | 25.9 | 16.2 | 9.8 | 1 | 0.7 | 8.1 |
| Total 2008-2012 | 65 | 155.4 | -90.4 | 23.6 | 3.9 | -117.9 |

Source: WB Loan Kiosk, Net Disbursement and Charges Report as of 09/14/2012.

**Annex Table 9: List of IFC Investment in Papua New Guinea, FY08-FY12 (in US\$ million)
List of IFC's Investments Approved During the CAS Period (FY08-12)**

| Project ID | Approval FY | Project Status | Closing FY | Cluster Dept | LN Net Cmt | EQ Net Cmt | Total Net Cmt |
|------------------|-------------|----------------|------------|--------------|-------------|------------|---------------|
| 26295 | 2008 | Closed | 2010 | INFRA | 40 | 0 | 40 |
| 28852 | 2010 | Active | | FM | 0 | 53.9 | 53.9 |
| 30907 | 2012 | Active | | FM | 30 | 0 | 30 |
| 27386 | 2009 | Active | | FM | 0 | 4 | 4 |
| 29230 | 2011 | Active | | FM | 10.7 | 0 | 10.7 |
| 31579 | 2012 | Active | | FM | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 28111 | 2010 | Active | | MAS | 0 | 3.9 | 3.9 |
| 26186 | 2011 | Active | | FM | 14.5 | 0 | 14.5 |
| 31367 | 2012 | Active | | FM | 2.9 | 0 | 2.9 |
| 28844 | 2010 | Active | | FM | 0 | 0.2 | 0.2 |
| Subtotal: | | | | | 98.2 | 62 | 160.2 |

List of IFC's Investments Approved in the Pre-CAS Period and Active during the CAS Period (FY08-12)

| Project ID | Approval FY | Project Status | Closing FY | Cluster Dept | LN Net Cmt | EQ Net Cmt | Total Net Cmt |
|------------------|-------------|----------------|------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|
| 28398 | 2005 | Active | | INFRA | 80 | 0 | 80 |
| 23626 | 2005 | Active | | FM | 0 | 1.2 | 1.2 |
| Subtotal: | | | | | 80 | 1.2 | 81.2 |
| Total: | | | | | 178.2 | 63.2 | 241.4 |

Source: IFC MIS as of June 2012.

**Annex Table 10: List of IFC Advisory Services in Papua New Guinea, FY08-FY12
(in US\$ million)**

| Project ID | Status | Business Line | Start FY | Close FY | Total Funds Managed by IFC as of Oct 31, 2012 |
|---------------|--------|-------------------------------|----------|----------|--|
| 537012 | Closed | Access To Finance | 2008 | 2012 | 1.8 |
| 582448 | Active | Access To Finance | 2011 | | 1.3 |
| 567987 | Active | Investment Climate | 2009 | | 1.2 |
| 578727 | Active | Sustainable Business Advisory | 2011 | | 0.4 |
| 564427 | Active | Investment Climate | 2009 | | 0.3 |
| 549468 | Closed | Investment Climate | 2007 | 2009 | 0.2 |
| 577787 | Closed | Sustainable Business Advisory | 2011 | 2012 | 0.3 |
| 541824 | Closed | Sustainable Business Advisory | 2007 | 2009 | 0.1 |
| 550573 | Closed | Sustainable Business Advisory | 2007 | 2008 | 0 |
| 562753 | Closed | Access To Finance | 2008 | 2009 | 0 |
| Total: | | | | | 5.6 |

Source: IFC Advisory services database as of 10/31/2012

Annex Table 11: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid, 2008- 2010 (in US\$ million)

| Development Partners | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|--|----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Bilaterals | | | |
| France | -0.3 | 0 | 0 |
| Germany | -2.19 | -1.11 | -1.19 |
| Japan | -92.66 | -16.64 | -19.18 |
| Korea | -0.5 | -0.44 | -0.01 |
| United Kingdom | 0.37 | 0.53 | 0.93 |
| DAC Countries, Total | -95.28 | -17.66 | -19.45 |
| Kuwait (KFAED) | -0.7 | .. | .. |
| Non-DAC Countries, Total | -0.7 | .. | 0 |
| Multilaterals | | | |
| AsDB Special Funds | -7.58 | -9.2 | -5.49 |
| Global Fund | 0 | 0 | -0.83 |
| IDA | -1.67 | 10.52 | 4.62 |
| IFAD | -0.37 | -0.37 | -0.36 |
| UNDP | 0 | 0 | -0.04 |
| UNFPA | -0.04 | 0 | -0.05 |
| UNICEF | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0 |
| Multilateral Agencies, Total | -9.67 | 0.93 | -2.15 |
| All Development Partners, Total | -105.65 | -16.73 | -21.6 |

Source: OECD DAC Online database, Table 2a. Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid - disbursements, as of 09/17/2012.

Annex Table 12: Economic and Social Indicators for Papua New Guinea and Comparators, 2008- 2011

| Series Name | Papua New Guinea | | | | Papua New Guinea | East Asia and Pacific | World |
|--|------------------|--------|--------|--------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------|
| | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Average 2008-2011 | | |
| Growth and Inflation | | | | | | | |
| GDP growth (annual %) | 6.7 | 5.5 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 7.3 | 3.1 | 1.5 |
| GDP per capita growth (annual %) | 4.2 | 3.1 | 5.6 | 6.6 | 4.9 | 2.4 | 0.4 |
| GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$) | 2190.0 | 2290.0 | 2400.0 | 2590.0 | 2367.5 | 9401.7 | 10935.6 |
| GNI, Atlas method (current US mil. \$) | 7,192 | 7,964 | 8,935 | 10,387 | 8,619 | 14,974,669 | 61,583,607 |
| Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) | 10.8 | 6.9 | 6.0 | 8.4 | 8.0 | | |
| Composition of GDP (%) | | | | | | | |
| Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) | 33.6 | 35.9 | 35.8 | 35.9 | 35.3 | 3.4 | 2.8 |
| Industry, value added (% of GDP) | 47.9 | 44.5 | 44.8 | 44.6 | 45.5 | 30.9 | 26.2 |
| Services, etc., value added (% of GDP) | 18.4 | 19.6 | 19.5 | 19.5 | 19.3 | 65.7 | 71.0 |
| Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) | 18.6 | 18.5 | 16.7 | 14.8 | 17.1 | 25.5 | 20.1 |
| Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) | 32.7 | 20.7 | 20.6 | 18.5 | 23.1 | 28.1 | 20.1 |
| External Accounts | | | | | | | |
| Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) | 74.6 | 57.8 | 55.9 | 51.0 | 59.8 | 32.1 | 27.6 |
| Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) | 61.8 | 57.0 | 53.1 | 48.1 | 55.0 | 29.7 | 27.9 |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | 8.8 | -7.4 | -6.7 | .. | -1.7 | .. | .. |
| External debt stocks (% of GNI) | 17.9 | 20.0 | 62.9 | .. | 33.6 | .. | .. |
| Total debt service (% of GNI) | 12.3 | 6.9 | 8.8 | .. | 9.3 | .. | .. |
| Total reserves in months of imports | 4.2 | 5.9 | 5.4 | .. | 5.2 | 16.2 | 13.4 |
| Fiscal Accounts¹ | | | | | | | |
| Revenue (% of GDP) | 28 | 23.5 | 27 | .. | 26.2 | .. | .. |
| Total Expenditure (% of GDP) | 30.1 | 37.1 | 32.8 | .. | 33.3 | .. | .. |
| Overall Balance Including Grants (% of GDP) | 2.5 | -9.6 | -0.3 | .. | -2.5 | .. | .. |
| Public Sector Debt (% of GDP) | 31.7 | 32.1 | 26.5 | 21.9 | 28.1 | .. | .. |
| Social Indicators | | | | | | | |
| Health | | | | | | | |
| Life expectancy at birth, total (years) | 61.7 | 62.1 | 62.4 | .. | 62.1 | 73.0 | 69.4 |
| Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months) | 52.0 | 62.0 | 56.0 | .. | 56.7 | 93.7 | 84.4 |
| Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) | 45.0 | 45.0 | 45.0 | .. | 45.0 | 67.7 | 62.0 |
| Improved water source (% of population with access) | 40.0 | 40.0 | 40.0 | .. | 40.0 | 90.0 | 87.9 |
| Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) | 48.5 | 47.7 | 46.9 | .. | 47.7 | 19.7 | 42.0 |
| Population | | | | | | | |
| Population, total (in million) | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 2,195 | 6,855 |
| Population growth (annual %) | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 0.7 | 1.2 |
| Urban population (% of total) | .. | .. | 12.5 | .. | 12.5 | 48.0 | 50.3 |
| Education | | | | | | | |
| School enrollment, preprimary (% gross) | 99.8 | .. | .. | .. | 99.8 | 53.8 | 46.8 |
| School enrollment, primary (% gross) | 60.1 | .. | .. | .. | 60.1 | 109.7 | 106.2 |
| School enrollment, secondary (% gross) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 79.0 | 69.3 |

Source: IMF. Article IV Consultations and The Economist Intelligence Unit database as of 09/17/2012.

Annex Table 13: Papua New Guinea - Millennium Development Goals

| | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|
| Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger | | | | | - |
| Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) | 70 | 69 | 70 | 71 | 71 |
| Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, total (%) | 57 | 53 | 56 | 57 | 54 |
| GDP per person employed (constant 1990 PPP \$) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Income share held by lowest 20% | .. | 5.0 | .. | .. | .. |
| Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5) | .. | .. | .. | 18 | .. |
| Poverty gap at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (%) | .. | 12 | .. | .. | .. |
| Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population) | .. | 36 | .. | .. | .. |
| Vulnerable employment, total (% of total employment) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education | | | | | - |
| Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24) | .. | .. | 64 | .. | 70 |
| Literacy rate, youth male (% of males ages 15-24) | .. | .. | 69 | .. | 65 |
| Persistence to last grade of primary, total (% of cohort) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) | 48 | 52 | 55 | .. | .. |
| Total enrollment, primary (% net) | 65 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women | | | | | - |
| Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Ratio of female to male primary enrollment (%) | 84 | 87 | 86 | 85 | 89 |
| Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment (%) | 60 | 67 | 70 | .. | .. |
| Ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment (%) | .. | 43 | 57 | .. | .. |
| Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of total nonagricultural employment) | 27.9 | .. | 32.1 | .. | .. |
| Goal 4: Reduce child mortality | | | | | - |
| Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months) | 67 | 42 | 62 | 63 | 55 |
| Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) | 65 | 60 | 55 | 51 | 47 |
| Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) | 90 | 81 | 74 | 67 | 61 |
| Goal 5: Improve maternal health | | | | | - |
| Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19) | .. | 76 | 73 | 69 | 64 |
| Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total) | .. | 42 | 41 | 53 | .. |
| Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49) | .. | 26 | .. | 32 | .. |
| Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) | 390 | 330 | 310 | 270 | 230 |
| Pregnant women receiving prenatal care (%) | .. | 77 | .. | 79 | .. |
| Unmet need for contraception (% of married women ages 15-49) | .. | 46 | .. | .. | .. |
| Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases | | | | | - |
| Children with fever receiving antimalarial drugs (% of children under age 5 with fever) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Condom use, population ages 15-24, female (% of females ages 15-24) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Condom use, population ages 15-24, male (% of males ages 15-24) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
| Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) | 303 | 303 | 303 | 303 | 303 |
| Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24) | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 |
| Prevalence of HIV, male (% ages 15-24) | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0 |
| Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.9 |

| | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Tuberculosis case detection rate (all forms) | 20 | 56 | 65 | 68 | 70 |
| Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability | | | | | - |
| CO2 emissions (kg per PPP \$ of GDP) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) | 1.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.0 |
| Forest area (% of land area) | 70 | .. | 67 | 65 | 63 |
| Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) | 47 | 47 | 46 | 46 | 45 |
| Improved water source (% of population with access) | 41 | 40 | 39 | 40 | 40 |
| Marine protected areas (% of total surface area) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net ODA received per capita (current US\$) | 99.0 | 79.0 | 51.0 | 44.0 | 75.0 |
| Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development | | | | | - |
| Debt service (PPG and IMF only, % of exports, excluding workers' remittances) | 18 | 10 | 8 | 6 | 1 |
| Internet users (per 100 people) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 1.3 |
| Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 28 |
| Telephone lines (per 100 people) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Other | | | | | - |
| Fertility rate, total (births per woman) | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$) | 820 | 1,040 | 620 | 680 | 1,300 |
| GNI, Atlas method (current US\$) (billions) | 3.4 | 4.9 | 3.3 | 4.2 | 8.9 |
| Gross capital formation (% of GDP) | 24.4 | 21.9 | 21.9 | 19.8 | 17.8 |
| Life expectancy at birth, total (years) | 56 | 57 | 59 | 61 | 62 |
| Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) | .. | .. | 57 | .. | 60 |
| Population, total (millions) | 4,158 | 4,716 | 5,379 | 6,095 | 6,858 |
| Trade (% of GDP) | 89.6 | 104.7 | 115.4 | 137.7 | 108.9 |

Source: World Development Indicators database as of 09/17/2012

