

1. JAS Data		
Country: The Gambia		
JAS Year: FY08	JAS Period: FY08 – FY11	
JASCR Review Period: FY08 – FY12	Date of this review: March 25, 2013	
2. Executive Summary		
<p>i. This review examines the implementation of the FY2008-2011 Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS) of The Gambia and the JAS Progress Report (JASPR) of FY 2009, and assesses the JAS Completion Report (JASCR). Although the JAS was jointly implemented by IDA and the African Development Bank (AfDB), this review covers only the program of the Bank.</p> <p>ii. Covering about the same period as the Government's PRSP II, the JAS objectives were organized under two main pillars: (i) <i>strengthening the institutional framework for economic management and public service delivery</i> by improving the transparency and accountability in the use of public resources, civil service, and public service delivery in education, health, water and sanitation, and rural electrification; and (ii) <i>enhancing productive capacity and accelerating growth and competitiveness</i> by promoting a competitive investment climate, facilitating access to financial resources by micro, small and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs), strengthening the agricultural sector, and enabling the environment for development of the energy sector. The JASPR made minor changes in the scope and content of the JAS and adjusted some outcome targets to reflect the changing circumstance and lessons learned during the initial phase of JAS implementation. It also proposed to pursue an enhanced emphasis on Pillar 2 during the remaining JAS period.</p> <p>iii. IEG rates the overall outcome of IDA assistance as <i>moderately unsatisfactory</i>, which is below the JASCR rating of <i>moderately satisfactory</i>. Under both pillars, good progress was achieved toward some objectives; but limited or no progress was made in many areas. More specifically, IDA, along with the AfDB and other development partners, contributed to The Gambia's agricultural growth, which was critical for reducing rural poverty. Bank support was effective in helping the Government improve the policies and systems for a more efficient tax administration and public resource management, although the budget process remained weak with considerable gaps between allocations and expenditures. Bank assistance also helped to strengthen the national statistical system to make data more publicly available and to improve HR management in civil service, although there is no evidence that the resultant salary increases have led to improved service quality. On the other hand, improvement in the audit function fell short of expectations and the Bank's role was secondary to that of the AfDB; the outcomes were mixed in education and health/nutrition; its support for improving investment climate and competitiveness was ineffective and The Gambia's overall business environment deteriorated even though the Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA) was able to attract new investment proposals; no concrete results were realized from the dialogue on improving the environment for electricity supply; and the Bank did not provide the expected support to expand water and sanitation services, or to facilitate access to financial resources by MSMEs.</p> <p>iv. As lessons, the JASCR points to the constraints faced by staff of the two institutions in harmonizing their operations in the absence of clear guidelines for such cooperation. It also highlights the failure to attract other development partners into the JAS process, the need to improve the programming aspect of the JAS at the design phase, and to improve the quality of the results matrix, although no clear recommendations were offered. IEG concurs, and underscores three additional points. First, guidelines pertaining to the role of partner institutions, resource requirements to facilitate</p>		
JASCR Reviewed by:	Peer Reviewed by:	JASCR Review Coordinator
James Sackey Consultant, IEGCC	Juan Jose Fernandez-Ansola Consultant, IEGCC	XiaolunSun Senior Evaluation Officer, IEGCC

the process, and procedures for interaction within and between the partner institutions need to be clarified before such collaboration is initiated. Second, harmonization in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness explicitly requires government ownership and leadership. Consequently, capacity support to the Government in this respect should be explicitly incorporated in the partnership program. Finally, the realism and relevance of the support program depend largely on the expected outcomes. Developing a practical results framework that is complemented by an implementable (i.e., supported by available data) monitoring and evaluation system is imperative for guiding program implementation .

3. Assessment of JAS

Overview of JAS Relevance:

Country Context:

1. The Gambia's economy continues to rely on agriculture (especially groundnuts), tourism and re-exports trade, as well as remittances. Despite the global financial crisis and commodity price shocks, real GDP grew by 5.4 percent per annum during 2007-2011, driven mainly by agriculture thanks to good weather conditions that prevailed until the Sahel drought in 2011. Restrained monetary policy kept inflation within the range of 2.5-7 percent during 2008-2011 even though this required, at times, extensive mopping up of liquidity generated by central bank financing of fiscal deficits, which widened substantially in 2008-2010 and increased the country's debt burden (mainly domestic). Strong tourism performance and receipts from being a regional trading hub, which was aided by liberal trade policies and an efficient port infrastructure, helped build up an ample stock of international reserves that was critical for ensuring economic stability during the crisis. The robust growth contributed to reducing the incidence of poverty from 55 percent in 2008 to 48 percent by 2010 (at \$1.25 a day PPP) and improved life expectancy (57.7 years during 2007-11 compared to 53.5 years in Sub-Saharan Africa). However, poverty remains deeper and more widespread in rural areas, and amongst households headed by women. In addition, as a small, open economy, The Gambia is subjected to substantial external shocks, including weather-related shocks.

2. The Government's long-term strategy, *Vision 2020*, is being executed through a series of medium-term development plans. The second poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP II) was the main instrument for carrying out the goals of *Vision 2020* during 2007-2011. It was based on five main objectives: (i) improving the enabling policy environment to promote growth and poverty reduction; (ii) enhancing the capacity and output of productive sectors: agriculture, fisheries, industry, trade, tourism and infrastructure, with emphasis on productive capacities of the poor and vulnerable populations; (iii) improving coverage of the basic social services and social protection needs of the poor and vulnerable; (iv) enhancing governance systems and building the capacity of local communities and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to play an active role in economic growth and poverty reduction; and (v) mainstreaming cross-cutting issues: gender, youths, population, HIV/AIDS, nutrition and environment into the development process.

Objectives of the WBG Strategy:

3. Covering about the same period as the PRSP II, the JAS objectives were organized under two main pillars: (i) *strengthening the institutional framework for economic management and public service delivery* by improving the transparency and accountability in the use of public resources, civil service, and public service delivery in education, health, water and sanitation, and rural electrification; and (ii) *enhancing productive capacity and accelerating growth and competitiveness* by promoting a competitive investment climate, facilitating access to financial resources by MSMEs, strengthening the agricultural sector, and enabling the environment for development of the energy sector. The JASPR made minor changes in the scope and content of the original strategy and adjusted some outcome targets to reflect the changing circumstance and lessons learned during the initial phase of JAS implementation. It also proposed to pursue an enhanced emphasis on Pillar 2 during the remaining JAS period.

Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

4. **Congruence with Country Context and Country Program:** The objectives of the JAS were relevant to the country's development challenges and well aligned with the Government's program as contained in the PRSP II. Its strong focus on the growth agenda reflected the Government's priorities. As the first step in an effort to harmonize donor assistance, it applied strategic selectivity by not planning to allocate resources to some key aspects of the PRSP II agenda (e.g., HIV/AIDS, nutrition, telecommunications, generation, transport) that were supported by other donors. The actual allocation of IDA resources, however, appeared to be more opportunistic than strategic and did not reflect the stated priorities. For example, a lack of IDA funding to support the general health sector plus the emergence of the Rapid Social Response Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) resulted in a shift of IDA program from general health to nutrition, an area that had been strategically left out of the JAS. Similarly, although telecommunications were not highlighted as a priority in the JAS, \$42 million (nearly 2.5 times of the JAS resource envelope of \$18 million) of a regional communications project was allocated to The Gambia.

5. **Relevance of Design:** The JAS program used appropriate instruments to support the desired outcomes, with analytical work helping to lay the foundation for policy dialogues and investment interventions. However, although the program deviations were in response to external factors (e.g., IDA allocations, food and global financial crises), they had implications for the realism of the outcomes outlined in the JAS results framework and would have required more substantial changes in the results matrix beyond those undertaken in the JASPR. In addition, the JAS did not adequately reflect the roles to be played by trust funds (TFs) and regional programs, which turned out to have substantial impact on the JAS outcomes and should have been fully incorporated in the design of the JAS. Finally, in view of the uncertainties associated with anticipated resource flows, alternative design scenarios should have been outlined in the JAS to support monitoring and evaluation.

6. **Strength of the Results Framework:** The results matrix outlined the expected results chain linking IDA/AfDB interventions to the JAS outcomes and to the country goals. However, because of the design issues identified above, the results matrix did not capture a substantial portion of IDA support (although it was appropriate not to include in the results matrix those interventions that were initiated during the JAS period, but whose results were only expected in the next strategy period). Moreover, there was a lack of baselines and targets in the results matrix, which was further aggravated after the significant modifications in the JASPR as many of the quantitative targets (e.g., timing of a reform, coverage rate) were removed. Many outcome targets required only the execution of specific actions without a clear follow-up action (e.g., creation of pesticide storage), while others depended on interventions beyond IDA's influence (e.g., number of clients of IFC microfinance program).

7. **Risk Identification and Mitigation:** The JAS identified a number of external and internal risks that could affect the successful implementation of the strategy. Among the external factors, drought and global market shocks (e.g., oil price increases) were considered the primary risks. The JAS anticipated that these risks would be mitigated via the agricultural support, fiscal prudence and economic diversification programs within the strategy. As the global food crisis unfolded, the Bank responded with the TF-financed Emergency Agricultural Development Project (FY10). With respect to internal risk factors, the JAS highlighted concerns with macroeconomic stability, especially in the context of debt management, governance and the weak capacity of the public sector. While the JAS proposed to handle these issues through enhanced financial and technical support, adjustments to the JAS program was envisioned, notably in case of significant changes in core governance areas. Although this risk was correctly identified and the Bank's response was appropriate, the risk of debt-distress persisted as a result of the Government's inability to rein in large fiscal deficits, especially after 2009.

Overview of JAS Implementation:

Lending and Investments:

8. At the start of the JAS period, five IDA projects were under implementation with a total commitment of \$51 million, plus an additional \$1.9 million in regional projects allocated to The Gambia.

During the JAS period up to FY12, IDA delivered eight new credits totaling \$80.8 million, including two regional projects with \$42 million allocated to The Gambia. Such results represent significant deviations from the JAS plan of \$18 million in five projects. Although this level of assistance was not anticipated in the JAS, the strategy stated that the actual allocations would be determined on an annual basis and depend on IDA-15. Bank support was complemented by \$60.1 million trust funds (TF) in 10 projects, the largest of which included in the education sector (\$41.8 million), and a \$7.5 million Emergency Agricultural Production project in FY12.

9. Net disbursements from IDA totaled \$71.6 million during the JAS period, compared to total net disbursements for official development assistance (ODA) of \$438.8 million during 2007-10. With about 45 development partners operating in The Gambia, the Bank's resource transfer was substantial. The performance of the portfolio improved during the JAS period, with the percentage of projects at risk reduced from 20 percent in FY08 (over 30 percent by commitment) to zero in FY10-FY11. On the other hand, of the three projects that exited the portfolio and reviewed by IEG, one was rated as *moderately satisfactory*, one as *moderately unsatisfactory*, and the third (a DPL) as *unsatisfactory* for their development outcomes, with all of them facing significant to high risk for sustaining their development outcomes. This represented a lower success rate than the average for the Africa Region (66 percent) and the Bank (74 percent).

Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

10. The Bank delivered seven of the eight economic and sector work (ESW) planned for the JAS period, plus three supplementary reports: an investment climate assessment in FY09, a follow-up to Debt Management Performance Assessment (DeMPA) in FY10, and a Medium-term Debt Management Strategies in FY12. A proposed agricultural sector note did not materialize. The completed ESWs included substantial analytic work directly related to IDA operations and facilitated the ongoing policy dialogue, especially the poverty assessment in FY09, the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) in FY09, and the public expenditure review (PER) in FY11. The JASCR reports that the analytical work was disseminated through the respective web-sites of the Bank, AfDB and the Government, as well as workshops and seminars at the country level.

Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

11. The JAS represented a concrete step towards the harmonization of development assistance between the Bank and the AfDB, although the JASCR notes the need for a formal mechanism for "closer cooperation" at the country team level. The overarching drive for the JAS was underpinned by the prospect of attracting other development partners; however, except for the EU's participation in the Gambia General Budget Support Program (GBSP), this did not happen, in part because the Government's lead role in donor coordination was weak. Although a pickup was expected in 2011, donor financial resources averaged only 2.5 percent of GDP a year during 2007-10. The IMF worked closely with the JAS partners on macroeconomic stabilization issues.

Safeguard and Fiduciary Issues

12. During the JAS period, there were no safeguards complaints brought before the Inspection Panel. INT recorded six allegations of fraud and corruption, and found sufficient basis to open two cases. Both were substantiated.

Overview of Achievement by Objective:

Pillar I: Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Economic Management and Public Service Delivery

13. This pillar included three objectives: improving the transparency and accountability in the use of public resources; improving civil service; and improving public service delivery in education, health, water and sanitation, and rural electrification.

14. **Improving the transparency and accountability in the use of public resources.** Some progress was achieved in strengthening public financial management (PFM), the national statistical system and the audit function. In PFM, several outcome targets were met, including the establishment (albeit with delays) in the Gambia Revenue Authority (GRA) of a link between activity-based budget system and revenue collection; the introduction of a new tax administration IT system for all large taxpayers; the enactment of a revised Customs and Excise Act, although it would become functional after the conclusion of the JAS period as the Customs regulations remain to be finalized; and the monthly publication of budget outturns. On the other hand, even though PRSP expenditures in education, health and social welfare were in line with the planned targets, budget execution in other critical sectors continued to deviate considerably from initial allocations, ranging from 9 percent in forestry to 47 percent in the energy for 2011. A programmatic sectoral budget was only achieved in the education sector. Despite the remaining issues with budget management, The Gambia's progress in PFM was reflected in its global rankings for use of public resources: the IDA's Resource Allocation Index suggests a positive change in the Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management area during 2008-2010; and the Global Competitiveness Report's (CGR) indicators on Diversion of Public Funds, on Favouritism in Decisions of Government Officials, and on Wastefulness of Government Spending all improved to some extent between 2008/09 and 2010/11.

15. The results were more mixed with regard to improvement in national statistical system and the audit function: while the national accounts data was disseminated as planned, key findings from the 2010 Integrated Household Survey have not yet been made publicly available through the Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBOS) website; although the 8-year backlog of unaudited public accounts was cleared, the delay in auditing public accounts and disseminating audit reports continued to exceed the one year benchmark.

16. IDA, along with AfDB, supported the public resource management objective through a combination of budget support, lending operations and AAA. The Public Sector Reform and Growth Grant (F09), which carried forward the budget support for policy and institutional reforms that had been provided by the AfDB's Poverty Reduction Budget Support (closed in FY09), was rated as *unsatisfactory* by IEG for its design weakness which resulted in non-achievement of two out of three project objectives. The Capacity Building for Economic Management project and additional financing (FY02 and FY08) was rated by IEG as *moderately satisfactory* for helping the Government improve economic management through the development a statistical database and an integrated financial management information systems (IFMIS), and revenue administration reforms, but it failed to make progress in facilitating private sector development. The Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) project (FY10) was expected to enhance the sustainability of the IFMIS by providing further development, maintenance and capacity building. The Bank delivered a large number of AAA to support the budget reforms, including the Country Financial Accountability Assessment (FY09), the Poverty Assessment (FY09), the Public Expenditure Review (FY11) and the Procurement TA (FY11). In addition, the Bank supported the strengthening the national statistical system through the trust-funded Transformation of the Central Statistics Department into the Gambia Bureau of Statistics (GBOS) project (FY10). While the AfDB's project support was the main vehicle for capacity building in the audit institutions, the Bank provided assistance through a ROSC Accounting and Auditing TA (FY09).

17. **Improving civil service.** Progress in civil service was sought through the use of enhanced human resource (HR) management policies and performance appraisal tools in public administration. Of the three JAS outcome targets, one was met (a pay reform strategy was adopted and began to be implemented, resulting in salary increases of 40 percent during 2008-2011); while the other two (integration of HR and payroll systems and the development of performance appraisal tools) were underway but incomplete. These improvements have not led to appreciable change in the performance of civil service. The Bureaucracy Quality indicator (measuring the strength and expertise of a bureaucracy to govern) of the Political Risk Services Group remained stable at 2 (over 4) during the JAS period; the World Bank governance indicator on Government Effectiveness did not change; although the percentile ranking of The Gambia with respect to the Control of Corruption improved from 22.8 in 2007 to 34 in 2010; the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index showed significant improvement during 2008-2011.

18. IDA support included a Civil Service Study (FY08, undertaken with the AfDB and DFID), which complemented the earlier AfDB study on Governance Profile and formed the basis of the Government's Civil Service Reform Strategy. The Public Sector Reform and Growth Grant (FY09), however, did not lead to measurable change in civil service capacity as there was no indication that the wage and salary increases were linked to higher share of professional staff or that reforms had been undertaken in terms of institutional capacity, civil service management and decentralization. IDA also delivered a Pay and Employment Model TA (FY11) and an Institutional Development Fund for Civil Service Reform (FY11) that focused on analyzing the fiscal impact of pay and employment structures and on wage bill management.

19. **Improving public service delivery in education, health, water and sanitation, and rural electrification.** Social indicators in The Gambia, while low relative to the rest of the world, tend to be comparable to or better than those of Sub-Saharan-Africa. In education, the JAS targets of achieving 100 percent gross primary enrolment and 90 percent primary completion were missed as, including Madrassas, the enrolment rate remained at 90 percent during 2008- 2012, while the completion rate rose from 65 to 72.4 percent. (However, WDI data showed a declining rate from 84.2 to 82.5 percent for primary enrolment and from 77.8 to 70.5 percent for primary completion during 2008-2010). There is no information on the percentage of teachers obtaining West African Senior School Certificate Examination (WASSCE) credits in English and math, a JAS target for education quality, but the JASCR estimates that this was not achieved. (Data made available in February 2013 indicate that 53 percent of the teachers who sat the WASSCE received credits, exceeding the JAS target of 30 percent). The Gambia's GCR rankings for Quality of Primary Education – the 46th among 133 economies in 2010/11 vis-à-vis the 32nd among 144 economies in 2012/13 - suggest a relative improvement. Gender parity also improved in basic education. In health, despite the fact that nutrition was cited as one of the key aspects of the PRSP-II agenda where the JAS would strategically not allocate resources, the JASPR shifted the focus from access to basic health services to the policy framework for nutrition programs. The JAS target of adopting a new nutrition policy was achieved in 2011, in a context of declining ratio of malnourished population in the proceeding period (from 21 to 19 during 2000-2009). There is no data to assess the impact of the new policy on national nutritional status. In water and sanitation, the JASPR expanded the scope of support from the Greater Banjul Area (GBA) to the whole country because the efforts of both institutions were broader than the GBA. However, the JASCR reports that neither institution had any direct investment in this area, and the target of 100,000 people benefiting from additional water and sanitation connections was thus not met. Finally, the JAS outcome on increased access to electricity was dropped at JASPR.

20. IDA's support to the education sector was provided through Education III (FY06 and FY10), although the additional financing focused on higher education, and the associated trust funds (TFs). By far the single most important support was the TF-financed Bank-supervised Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (FY10), which focused on access and quality of basic education. IDA also delivered a Multi-Grade Reading Initiative TA (FY09) and a Study on Reaching Out-of-School Children and Building Skills (FY10). IDA had little direct support to the general health sector beyond a TA to the National Nutrition Agency for the formulation and costing of a national nutrition strategy for 2010-2020, and a Rapid Response Nutrition Security Improvement TF project (FY11) to improve nutritional standards. The Bank had no direct involvement in the water and sanitation sector.

21. IEG rates the outcome of IDA assistance under Pillar I as *moderately satisfactory*. Bank support helped the Government improve the policies and systems for increased efficiency in tax administration and PFM, although budget management remained weak and only in the education sector was the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework fully implemented. The Bank helped strengthen the national statistical system and make data more publicly available. The audit function improved, although the production and dissemination of audit reports continued to experience delay. Bank assistance on civil service reforms led to increased civil service salaries and performance appraisal tools being piloted, which may have contributed to the control of corruption in civil service, but did not lead to appreciable improvement in civil service quality. Some progress was made in education, but progress was limited in health, and there was no Bank support in the water and sanitation sector.

Pillar II: Enhancing Productive Capacity and Accelerating Growth and Competitiveness

22. Under this pillar, the Bank aimed to support the acceleration of growth and poverty reduction by pursuing four objectives: promoting a competitive investment climate/growth and competitiveness; facilitating access to financial resources by MSMEs; strengthening the agricultural and rural development sector; and enabling the environment for development of the energy sector.

23. **Promoting a competitive investment climate/growth and competitiveness.** The JASPR replaced the three JAS outcome indicators with two new ones. For the monetary value of new private investment attracted through the GIEPA, the JASCR reports a mixture of actual investment (\$30 million in 2008) and investment proposals (valued at \$30 and \$60 million in 2010 and 2011, respectively). It is not possible to assess whether this result represents satisfactory progress as there was no baseline or target defined in the JASPR (the JASCR cites *ex-post* a target of \$55 million). On the time and cost for new company registration (JAS indicators), the Doing Business data show mixed results - the time required to start a business remained unchanged at 27 days since 2006, but the cost was halved. Overall, however, the investment climate in The Gambia worsened as the country's Ease of Doing Business ranking was on a continuous slide during the JAS period, while its GCI score also declined.

24. IDA's support for this objective was provided mainly through the Growth and Competitiveness Project (FY09), focusing on business registration and tax administration reforms, and promoting competitiveness in key sectors. The Bank also delivered an Investment Climate Assessment (FY09) and a TF-financed Promotion of Improved Biomass Vesto Stoves (FY11) that aimed to create small enterprises in the fuel efficient stoves and biomass briquettes markets.

25. **Facilitating access to financial resources by MSMEs.** The JASCR notes limited progress in microfinance and no progress in SME finance. The JAS target was a project level output (10,000 direct clients served through the microfinance component of the AfDB's Entrepreneurship Promotion and Microfinance Development Project (EPMDP). The AfDB and IFC (TA) targets were not met as the only measurable result was 567 farmers receiving micro-credits through the EPMDP, plus 3,939 clients served by five AfDB projects, including EPMDP. There was no IDA support for this objective.

26. **Strengthening the agricultural and rural development sector.** The poverty reduction objectives in the PRSP II depended largely on the growth of agriculture and the rural sector. A simulation exercise by the Bank suggests that rural poverty declined during 2008-2010, which could be attributed to the 18 percent annual growth in agriculture during this time. The JASCR reports that between 2008 and 2010, rice and groundnuts yields increased, fishery output grew, but there was limited progress in livestock and forestry. However, as the JAS or JASPR did not provide any target, it is not possible to assess the status of these achievements. The JASCR also reports on the number of farmers receiving seeds, fertilizer and farm machineries, but again, without a pre-defined target, it is difficult to draw conclusions from these numbers. As a prevention measure against locust, pesticide storage was put in place and the response time to locust early warning was reduced from 30 to one day.

27. The AfDB had a strong and sustained program in the agricultural sector throughout the JAS period (e.g., Rice Irrigation, NERICA Rice, Peri-Urban Agriculture project, Artisanal Fisheries Development, Livestock and Horticulture Development, Sustainable Land Management, etc.) Bank assistance focused on empowerment of rural communities through the Community Driven Development Project (FY07) and access to agricultural inputs and post-harvest storage capacity for targeted farmers through the Emergency Agriculture Production Project (FY10). The Bank's West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (FY11) aimed at providing agricultural extension services at the regional level, while the Africa Emergency Locust Project (FY04) helped establish early warning facilities. Overall, while the impressive agricultural growth was a result of favourable weather conditions, the support provided by AfDB, the Bank and other development partners was timely and substantial.

28. **Enabling the environment for development of the energy sector.** The scope of the JAS objective was modest and limited to agreeing with the Government on future interventions for reforming the electricity sector. While necessary, this would represent just a first step toward creating an enabling policy and institutional environment to support electricity service expansion leading to improved industrial growth. Nevertheless, this modest goal was not fully achieved as although an Electricity Sector Reform Note was completed, there was no agreement with the relevant authorities on reform steps. The Bank support was provided through an Energy Sector Policy Note (FY11).

29. IEG rates the outcome of Bank support under Pillar II as *moderately unsatisfactory*. The Bank, along with the AfDB and other development partners, contributed to the strong performance in the agricultural sector. However, amid worsening business environment and declining competitiveness, there is no evidence that the Bank's support was effective in promoting a competitive investment climate or in increasing access to financial resources by MSMEs. There were also no concrete results realized from the dialogue on improving the environment for electricity supply.

Objectives	JASCR Rating	IEG Rating
Pillar I: Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Economic Management and Public Service Delivery.	<i>Satisfactory</i>	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i>
Pillar II: Enhancing Productive Capacity and Accelerating Growth and Competitiveness.	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i>	<i>Moderately Unsatisfactory</i>

4. Overall IEG Assessment

	JASCR Rating	IEG Rating
Overall Outcome:	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i>	<i>Moderately Unsatisfactory</i>
IDA Performance:	<i>Satisfactory</i>	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i>

Overall outcome:

30. IEG rates the overall outcome of IDA assistance as *moderately unsatisfactory*, which is below the JASCR rating of *moderately satisfactory*. Under both pillars, good progress was achieved toward some objectives; but limited or no progress was made in many areas. Given the greater emphasis of the growth agenda in both the JAS and JASPR, the outcome of Pillar II carried more weight in IEG's overall outcome rating.

31. Under both pillars, good progress was achieved toward some objectives; but limited or no progress was made in many areas. More specifically, IDA, along with the AfDB and other development partners, contributed to The Gambia's agricultural growth, which was critical for reducing rural poverty. Bank support was effective in helping the Government improve the policies and systems for a more efficient tax administration and public resource management, although the budget process remained weak with considerable gaps between allocations and expenditures. Bank assistance also helped to strengthen the national statistical system to make data more publicly available and to improve HR management in civil service, although there is no evidence that the resultant salary increases have led to improved service quality. On the other hand, improvement in the audit function fell short of expectations and the Bank's role was secondary to that of the AfDB; the outcomes were mixed in education and health/nutrition; its support for improving investment climate and competitiveness was ineffective and The Gambia's overall business environment deteriorated even though the GIEPA was able to attract new investment proposals; no concrete results were realized from the dialogue on improving the environment for electricity supply; and the Bank did not provide the expected support to expand water and sanitation services, or to facilitate access to financial resources by MSMEs.

IDA Performance:

32. IEG rates the performance of IDA as *moderately satisfactory*, which is below the JASCR rating of *satisfactory*. The JAS objectives were relevant for The Gambia's development challenges and aligned to the objectives of the Government's PRSP II. However, while the strategy was flexible and mindful of internal and external shocks that The Gambia faced, the design of the JAS program did not adequately reflect the uncertainties associated with resource flows. This resulted in a varying degree of over-promise in some Bank activities and loss of strategic selectivity that the JAS made a conscious effort to achieve. The results framework suffered from important weaknesses, ranging from inadequate link between Bank interventions to the expected outcomes, to deficient indicators, and the failure to capture important interventions initiated through trust funds and regional programs. Improving portfolio performance suggests adequate supervision, although the discrepancy between the good internal ratings and poor outcome ratings by IEG raises questions over supervision quality. In addition, as noted in the JASCR, there was a certain level of ambiguities in the roles played by the Bank and AfDB and much could have been done at the onset of the JAS process to clearly define the mechanism for closer cooperation between the two banks at the country level, including the resource envelopes (in terms of staffing and supervision budgets) to support the process. Moreover, while the risk of external shocks was identified and the responses of the two institutions to crises were timely, the JAS did not clearly define the likely range of the responses and their implications for the overall JAS outcomes, and did not clarify the nature of the division of labor between the two institutions in response to the crisis. Finally, despite the substantial analytical work conducted by the Bank to underpin its policy dialogue with the Government, the link between the analytical work and the M&E system was not clear.

5. Assessment of JAS Completion Report

33. The JASCR provides a comprehensive and frank assessment of the implementation of the JAS. It follows the JAS/JASPR results matrix in the JAS, although introducing outcome targets *ex-post* is a poor practice. The JASCR could have benefitted from a better distinction between outputs and outcomes, and the relative contribution of the Bank vis-à-vis the AfDB. This would have made it easier to assess the individual contribution of the two institutions and the comparative advantage of each institution for follow-up collaboration. Similarly, a detailed explanation of the deviation between the proposed lending levels contained in the JAS/JASPR and the high levels of actual commitment of both institutions at the end of the period is necessary for assessing the realism of the original output proposals and expected outcomes. Finally, a discussion of the role played by other development partners (besides the AfDB) in the specific context of the two pillars of the JAS could benefit from assessment in the JASCR in order to highlight the Bank's leadership role in the aid alignment and harmonization process in The Gambia, especially since this was a key motivation for initiating the JAS.

6. Findings and Lessons

34. As lessons, the JASCR points to the constraints faced by staff of the two institutions in harmonizing their operations in the absence of clear guidelines for such cooperation. It also highlights the failure to attract other development partners into the JAS process, the need to improve the programming aspect of the JAS at the design phase, and to improve the quality of the results matrix, although no clear recommendations were offered. IEG concurs, and underscores three additional points. First, guidelines pertaining to the role of partner institutions, resource requirements to facilitate the process, and procedures for interaction within and between the partner institutions need to be clarified before such collaboration is initiated. Second, harmonization in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness explicitly requires government ownership and leadership. Consequently, capacity support to the Government in this respect should be explicitly incorporated in the partnership program. Finally, the realism and relevance of the support program depend largely on the expected outcomes. Developing a practical results framework that is complemented by an implementable (i.e., supported by available data) monitoring and evaluation system is imperative for guiding program implementation.

Annex Table 1:	Summary Achievements of JAS Objectives
Annex Table 2:	Actual and Planned Lending, FY08-FY12
Annex Table 3:	Grants and Trust Funds Active FY08-FY12
Annex Table 4:	Planned and Actual Analytical and Advisory Work, FY08-FY12
Annex Table 5:	IEG Project Ratings for Gambia, FY08-FY12
Annex Table 6:	IEG Project Ratings for Gambia and Comparators, FY08-FY12
Annex Table 7:	Portfolio Status for Gambia and Comparators, FY08-FY12
Annex Table 8:	IDA Net Disbursement and Charges Summary Report for Gambia (in US\$ million)
Annex Table 9:	Total Net Official Development Assistant and Official Aid, 2007-2010 (in US\$ million)
Annex Table 10:	Economic and Social Indicators for Gambia and Comparators, 2007-2010
Annex Table 11:	Gambia: Millennium Development Goals

Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of the JAS Objectives

<u>JAS 08-12: Pillar 1</u>		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
Pillar I: Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Economic Management and Public Service Delivery			
Major Outcome Measures	1. Improving the Transparency and Accountability in the Use of Public Resources		
	Link GRA (Gambia Revenue Authority) Budget with revenue collection by end 2010	The GRA activity-based budget system is linked to revenue collection (achieved, but later than 2010).	Source: JASCR
	Develop and use a new tax administration IT system for processing of all large taxpayers	A new tax administration IT system was developed and used for processing of all large taxpayers by end 2009.	Source: JASCR.
	Revise and adopt the Customs Act	The Customs Act was revised, and adopted in April 2010.	Source: JASCR.
	Publish the 2008 budget outturns of development expenditures by end 2009	Budget outturns are published on a monthly basis.	Source: JASCR
	Percent deviation between cash plan of Ministries, Departments, Agencies, and actual cash allocation	Key PRSP public expenditures (education, health & social welfare) have since 2008 been in line with the planned targets. However, there were considerable deviations in critical sectors relevant for the country's development agenda – ranging from 9 percent (forestry) to 47 percent (energy) - between initial allocations and actual expenditure for 2011.	Source: JASCR
	Disseminate key findings from national surveys within one year of data collection	The Integrated Household Survey carried out in 2010 and has so far not been made publicly available through the GBOS website.	Source: JASCR. Poverty profile and CPI indices are also planned to be disseminated by end of 2011.
	Disseminate National accounts data using new methodology by end 2010	National accounts data, using new methodology based on IFMIS and the NAO web-based information was disseminated by end of 2010.	Source: JASCR.
	Produce and disseminate audit of public accounts within one year of fiscal year	The timing of production and dissemination of audit reports has still not fully met the expectations: Government Financial Statements from 2008-2010 were submitted to the National Audit Office for auditing only by May/June 2012, which exceeds the benchmark of one year following the end of the respective fiscal year.	Source: JASCR.
	Backlog of unaudited accounts cleared by end 2010	The 8-year backlog of unaudited public accounts, which existed in 2008, was cleared	Source: JASCR
	2.Improving Civil Service		
	Prepare and begin implementing a pay reform strategy to improve civil service compensation	A pay reform strategy was prepared as planned for 2008 and salaries increased by 20% in 2008 and 2011.	Source: JASCR.
	Integrate HR information system and payroll system	Integration of the HR information system with the payroll system is underway.	Source: JASCR.
	Develop effective performance appraisal tools in key sectors	Development of effective performance appraisal tools in key sectors is delayed but ongoing. It will be piloted in The Ministries of Tourism, and Youth & Sports.	Source: JASCR.

<u>JAS 08-12: Pillar 1</u> Pillar I: Strengthening the Institutional Framework for Economic Management and Public Service Delivery		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
2. <u>Improving Public Service Delivery in Education, Health, Water and Sanitation, and Rural Electrification</u>			
Increase in the gross primary enrolment rate	Gross primary enrolment rate decreased from 86.0 in 2007 to 82.6 in 2010.	Source: WDI.	
Increase the primary completion rate	The primary completion rate decreased from 77.8 in 2008 to 70.51 in 2010.	Source: (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics.	
Increase the percentage of targeted teachers obtaining West African Senior School Certificate Examination (WASSCE) credits in English and Math	No information available yet.	Source: ISR Third Education Project - Phase II P077903 and JASCR This output is based on one of the targets of the project Third Education Project - Phase II. The project aims to reach 30% in December 2012 (baseline 0% in May 2010). The results of WASSCE of the first group of targeted teachers (beneficiaries of in-service training) will become available only in February 2013. However, the percentage of beneficiaries eligible for taking the exams amongst the overall group of beneficiaries is less than 30%, hence the ambitious target cannot be achieved as envisaged.	
Adoption of a new Nutrition Policy including a national Action Plan on nutrition	A new Nutritional Policy (2010-2020) was formulated and validated in January 2011, and a costed Strategy Plan for Nutrition (2011-2015) was elaborated.	Source: JASCR.	
Number of people benefiting from additional water and sanitation connections	There has been no direct investment in the sector by either institution during the JAS period.	Source: JASCR.	

JAS 08-12: Pillar 2		Actual Results	Comments
Enhancing Productive Capacity and Accelerating Growth and Competitiveness		(as of current month year)	
Major Outcome Measures	1. Promoting a Competitive Investment Climate/Growth and Competitiveness		
	Increase the monetary value of new private investment attracted during JAS (2008-2011) through Gambia Investment Promotion and Free Zones Agency (GIPZA) and Gambia Investment and Export Promotion Agency (GIEPA)	In addition to investments of US\$ 30 million in 2008, GIEPA received in 2010 seven new private sector investment proposals with a total proposed value of about US\$30.4 million. Corresponding figures for 2011 were 13 investment proposals with a value of US\$60 million.	Source: JASCR. GIEPA operations were temporarily suspended in 2009 because of institutional changes.
	Reduce time and cost of new company registration	-Number of procedures required to start a business: from 9 to 8 in 2013 -Time required to start a business: from 32 in 2008 to 27 in 2013. -Cost required to complete each procedure to start a business (% of income per capita): from 279% to 158.7% in 2013.	Source: Doing Business
	2. Facilitating Access to Financial Resources by Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)		
	Increase the number of direct clients served through micro-finance component of EPMDP and IFC	No information available	Source: JASCR The EPMD over 2009-2011 provided about 2.0 GMD million (US\$ 68,000) to 567 farmers in micro-credits. The AfDB over 2008-2011 through 5 projects (AFDP, CSIP, PRP, PSIP, and EPMDP) extended micro-credits to 3,939 clients amounting to GMD 22.7 million (US\$ 0.8 million). Direct impact of IFC support could not be assessed.
	3. Strengthening the Agricultural and Rural Development Sector		
	Increase the number of farmers that receive agricultural inputs (tools, fertilizers, pesticides)	The Emergency Agriculture Production project distributed improved seed and recommended fertilizers to 60 039 farmers by February 2011. The project also distributed farm machinery to 870 farmer groups by February 2011.	Source: ISR Emergency Agriculture Production project P119892
Increased yields in targeted crops (rice, horticulture) in selected areas (AfDB outcome indicator)	Paddy rice increased from 11,400 MT in 2008 to 61,000 MT in 2010. Groundnuts output increased from 110,000 MT in 2008 to 122,000 MT and 138,000 Mt in the subsequent two years.	Source: JASCR.	
Increase fish catches (AfDB outcome indicator)	Fisheries output (industrial and artisanal) increased from 46,000 tons in 2008 to an estimated 40,000 tons	Source: JASCR. No IDA contribution.	

<u>JAS 08-12: Pillar 2</u> Enhancing Productive Capacity and Accelerating Growth and Competitiveness		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
		and 50,000 tons respectively in the subsequent two years.	
	Create a pesticide storage	A central pesticide store constructed and equipped.	Source: ICR Regional: Africa Emergency Locust Project P092473.
	Reduce response time to locust early warning	Response time to locust early warning has been reduced from 30 to one day.	Source: ICR Regional: Africa Emergency Locust Project P092473
4. <u>Enabling the Environment for Development of the Energy Sector</u>			
	Complete and discuss an Electricity Policy Note and agree on next steps with relevant government authorities	<p>-An Energy Sector Note has been completed.</p> <p>-The draft report was provided to the Government during the 2010 Annual Meetings, which was subsequently finalized after discussions with the GoRG and other entities involved in the power sector in Banjul. The team also discussed the report with the National Water and Electricity Company (NAWEC) and the Public Utility Regulatory Authority (PURA).</p> <p>-The Bank team has requested the Government to propose a list of priority activities that could potentially be considered for Bank support. The Bank would evaluate the request when it receives this list and in cooperation with the Government, will develop a program that would help support the Nation's energy development objectives.</p>	Source: Energy Sector Policy Note (ESW) P108438

Annex Table 2: Actual and Planned Lending, FY08-FY12

Project	Approval FY	Proposed Amount	Approved Amount	Project ID	Outcome Rating
<i>Programmed projects</i>					
Public Sector Reform and Growth Grant (Budget Support)	2009	7.0	7.0	P107398	IEG rating: U
Growth & Competitiveness	2011	8.0	12.0	P114240	LIR: MS
<i>Total programmed projects JAS FY08-12</i>			19.0		
<i>Non-programmed projects</i>					
The Gambia Integrated Financial Management Information Systems Project	2010		5.3	P117275	LIR: S
Third Education – Addl. Fin	2010		5.5	P120783	LIR: MS
Regional: W. Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (APL)	2011		7.0**	P122065	LIR: S
Regional: W. Africa Regional Communications Infrastructure Project (APL)	2011		35.0**	P122402	LIR: S
GM-Budget Support -DPL	2012		6.0	P123679	NA
<i>Total non-programmed projects</i>			19.8		
<i>Total projects JAS FY08-12</i>			35.8		
<i>On Going Projects</i>					
	Approval FY	Closed FY	Approved Amount	Project ID	
Capacity Building for Economic Management project	2002	2009	15.0	P057995	IEG rating: MS
Gateway project	2002	2010	16.0	P057394	IEG rating: MU
Regional: Africa Emergency Locust Project	2004	2010	1.9*	P092473	LIR: MS
Third Education Project - Phase II	2006	Active	8.0	P077903	LIR: MS
Community-Driven Development Project	2007	Active	12.0	P082969	LIR: S
Additional Financial CBEMP	2008	2009	3.0	P105866	IEG rating: MS
<i>Total On Going Projects</i>			54.0		

* LIR: Latest internal rating. U: Unsatisfactory. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory.

**Amount of the regional project allocated to Gambia.

Source: Gambia JAS and WB Business Warehouse Tables 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as 09/06/2012

Annex Table 3: Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY08-FY12

Project	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount	TF ID	Project ID
Integrated Coastal and Marine Biodiversity Management Project	2003	2008	1.0	TF 51106	P064891
Third Education Project – Phase II	2006	2009	9.4	TF 56177	P077903
	2007	2011	3.0	TF 56906	
	2009	Active	1.4	TF 93722	
Community-Driven Development Project	2007	Active	4.8	TF 55124	P082969
Transformation of the Central Statistical Department into the Gambia Bureau of Statistics	2008	2010	0.2	TF 90674	P112474
Support of NGO Network TANGO	2009	Active	0.2	TF 91829	P122285
Gambia Emergency Agriculture Production Project	2010	2012	7.5	TF 96106	P119892
The Gambia Education for All -Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Fund 2009-2011	2010	Active	28.0	TF 94961	P115427
Strengthening Integrated Biodiversity Management	2010	2011	0.1	TF 96239	P115585
	2011	Active	1.0	TF 98110	
BEIA- Promotion of Improved Biomass Vesto Stoves in Gambia	2011	Active	0.2	TF 96655	P120024
Gambia Rapid Response Nutrition Security Improvement Project	2011	Active	3.0	TF 97662	P121509
Total FY08-12			60.1		

Source: Gambia JAS, JASPR and WB business Warehouse Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 5/08/2012

Annex Table 4: Planned and Actual Analytical and Advisory Work, FY08-FY12

	Project ID	Proposed FY	Delivery to Client FY	Output Type
Economic and Sector Work				
<i>Planned</i>				
Civil Service Study/Governance Profile (ESW)	P102265		2008	Report
Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) (ESW)	P108529		2009	Report
Poverty Assessment (ESW)	P083793		2009	Report
Public Expenditure Review (PER) (ESW)	P117272		2011	Report
Study on Reaching out-of-School Children and Building Skills (ESW)	P108648	2011	2010	Report
Energy Sector Policy Note (ESW)	P108438	2011	2011	Policy Note
Education Country Status Report light (CSR) (ESW)	P121079	2011	2011	Policy Note
<i>Non-planned</i>				
The Gambia: Investment Climate Assessment (ESW)	P102239		2009	Report
DeMPA Assessment Follow Up - Gambia (ESW)	P120562		2010	Report
Medium term debt management strategies (MTDS) Gambia (ESW)	P126900		2012	Report
Technical Assistant				
<i>Planned</i>				
Support to Impact Evaluation of The Gambia CDDP (TA)	P111794	2011	2011	Client Document Review
<i>Non-planned</i>				
Multi-Grade Reading Initiative (TA)	P101091		2009	"How-To" Guidance
Gambia ROSC Accounting & Auditing (TA)	P113824		2010	Report
PRTSR-Gambia-Review of Poverty Reduction and Transport Strategies (TA)	P105530		2009	Client Document Review
Gambia Reform Plan (TA)	P124965		2011	Model/Survey
Gambia - Technical Assistance to Support Gambia Connectivity (TA)	P122621		2011	"How-To" Guidance
The Gambia: # 10011 Strengthening the Framework of Accounting & Auditing (TA)	P122155		2012	Advisory Services Document

Source: Gambia JAS and WB Business Tables 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as 09/06/2012

Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Gambia, FY08-FY12

Exit FY	Project Name	Project ID	Total Evaluated (US\$M)	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to Development Outcome*
2009	GM-Econ Mgmt Cap Bldg SIL (FY02)	P057995	19.5	Moderately Satisfactory	Significant
2010	GM-Gateway SIL (FY02)	P057394	18.4	Moderately Unsatisfactory	High
2010	GM-Budget Support -DPL	P107398	7.0	Unsatisfactory	Significant

Source: WB Warehouse Table 4a.6 as of as 09/06/2012

*With IEG new methodology for evaluation projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Gambia and Comparators, FY08-FY12

Region	Total Evaluated (\$M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (\$)	Outcome % Sat (No)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (\$)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (No)*
Gambia	44.8	3	43.4	33.3	0.0	0.0
Africa	10,393.2	194	77.5	66.3	37.6	38.9
World	59,625.7	775	84.8	73.5	68.0	56.1

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 4a.5 as of as 09/06/2012

*With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Gambia and Comparators, FY08-FY12

Fiscal year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Gambia					
# Proj	4	4	3	3	4
# Proj At Risk	1	1	0	0	0
% Proj At Risk	25.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Net Comm Amt	54.0	43.0	30.8	30.8	36.8
Comm At Risk	16.0	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
% Commit at Risk	29.6	37.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Africa					
# Proj	419	440	454	470	452
# Proj At Risk	94	131	137	117	108
% Proj At Risk	22.4	29.8	30.2	24.9	23.9
Net Comm Amt	23,306.8	28,177.8	34,188.5	37,466.4	38,962.9
Comm At Risk	5,890.2	6,950.5	9,494.2	7,949.7	6,299.8
% Commit at Risk	25.3	24.7	27.8	21.2	16.2
World					
# Proj	1,525	1,552	1,590	1,595	1,500
# Proj At Risk	276	344	366	337	333
% Proj At Risk	18.1	22.2	23.0	21.1	22.2
Net Comm Amt	106,761.7	131,076.4	158,287.4	168,248.7	168,407.7
Comm At Risk	18,428.2	19,929.9	28,186.1	22,978.5	23,723.1
% Commit at Risk	17.3	15.2	17.8	13.7	14.1

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 3a.4 as of 09/06/2012.

Annex Table 8: IDA Net Disbursement and Charges Summary Report for Gambia (in US\$ million)

FY	Disb. Amt.	Repay Amt.	Net Amt.	Charges	Fees	Net Transfer
2008	8.4	2.5	5.9	1.0	0.3	4.7
2009	7.4	0.2	7.1	0.0	0.4	6.7
2010	17.8	0.3	17.5	0.0	0.5	17.0
2011	8.9	0.4	8.5	0.0	0.4	8.1
2012	29.0	1.0	28.0	0.0	0.5	27.5
Total (2008-2012)	71.6	4.5	67.1	1.0	2.1	64.0

Source: WB Loan Kiosk, net Disbursement and Charges Report as of 09/06/2012

Annex Table 9: Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid, 2007- 2010 (in \$ million)

Development Partners	2007	2008	2009	2010	2007-2010
<i>Bilaterals</i>					
Austria	-0.72	-0.78	-7.53	..	-9.03
Belgium	1.29	0.53	0.54	0.41	2.77
Canada	1.54	0.77	1.23	0.46	4
Denmark	0.3	0.26	0.34	0.36	1.26
Finland	0.05	0.16	0.16	0.18	0.55
France	0.74	0.46	0.34	0.35	1.89
Germany	0.9	0.81	0.33	0.6	2.64
Greece	0.01	0.09	0.02	0.02	0.14
Ireland	0.09	0.07	0.23	0.05	0.44
Italy	..	1.44	1.39	..	2.83
Japan	6.39	1.08	11.39	17.22	36.08
Korea	0.1	0.03	0.02	0.11	0.26
Luxembourg	0.12	0.12
Netherlands	10.07	3.89	0.71	..	14.67
New Zealand	..	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.1
Norway	0.12	0.07	0.11	0.13	0.43
Spain	4.81	2.2	2.98	3.97	13.96
Sweden	0.83	0.93	0.92	0.85	3.53
United Kingdom	5.03	3.77	3.73	1.98	14.51
United States	1.66	12.04	4.95	6.49	25.14
<i>DAC Countries, Total</i>	33.21	27.85	21.89	33.34	116.29
Cyprus	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.13
Czech Republic	0.01	..	0.01	0.02	0.04
Estonia	0.01	0.01
Israel	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.07
Kuwait	2.7	4.26	0.73	0.95	8.64
Poland	0.02	0.02
Thailand	..	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.09
Turkey	0.06	0.02	0.18	0.27	0.53
United Arab Emirates	0.08	0.11	0.09	0.1	0.38
<i>Non-DAC Countries, Total</i>	2.91	4.47	1.09	1.44	9.91
<i>Multilaterals</i>					
AfDF	35.18	10.91	14.65	5.36	66.1
BADEA	3.41	4.07	4.46	2.18	14.12
EU Institutions	9.2	9.89	15.24	22.68	57.01
GAVI	1.2	0.99	0.82	1.73	4.74
GEF	..	0.54	3.7	1	5.24
Global Fund	10.2	9.37	12.81	18.6	50.98
IDA	3.36	8.09	16.31	11.44	39.2
IFAD	0.97	2.03	2.34	2.13	7.47
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	-11.95	6.32	15.76	3.04	13.17
Isl.Dev Bank	2.06	2.12	8.83	9.79	22.8
OFID	-0.42	0.13	3.85	1.12	4.68
UNAIDS	0.2	0.17	0.08	0.21	0.66
UNDP	2.06	2.81	2.89	2.98	10.74
UNFPA	0.71	1.17	0.98	1.31	4.17
UNHCR	0.12	0.04	0.03	..	0.19
UNICEF	1.48	1.16	1.39	1.48	5.51
UNTA	1.52	0.26	1.78
WFP	1.78	1.56	0.36	0.37	4.07
<i>Multilateral, Total</i>	61.08	61.63	104.5	85.42	312.63
All Development Partners Total	97.2	93.95	127.48	120.2	438.83

Source: OECD DAC Online database, Table 2a. Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid - Disbursements, as of 05/08/2012.

Annex Table 10: Economic and Social Indicators for Gambia and Comparators, 2007- 2011

Series Name	Gambia					Gambia	Sub-Saharan Africa	World
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Average 2007-2011		
Growth and Inflation								
GDP growth (annual %)	5.2	5.4	6.2	5.0	5.0	5.4	4.5	2.0
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	2.3	2.6	3.3	2.1	2.2	2.5	2.0	0.9
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	1,140.0	1,230.0	1,290.0	1,300.0	2,060.0	1,404.0	2,137.4	10,906.5
GNI, Atlas method (billions current US\$)	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.1	0.8	985.5	59,467.0
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	5.4	4.5	4.6	5.0	4.8	4.8
Composition of GDP (%)								
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	28.7	28.5	27.5	26.9	29.9	28.3	13.1	2.8
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	14.8	15.1	15.5	15.7	12.0	14.6	31.1	26.8
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	56.5	56.4	57.1	57.3	58.1	57.1	55.8	70.4
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	22.9	24.7	25.9	25.9	17.5	23.4	21.1	20.9
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	6.6	6.1	6.3	6.5	-1.6	4.8	16.4	20.7
External Accounts								
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	32.9	29.6	30.4	29.3	21.8	28.8	32.7	27.9
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	49.2	48.3	50.1	48.7	41.0	47.5	34.9	28.0
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-9.0	1.3	8.6	6.5	6.0	2.7
External debt, total (% of GNI)	116.0	47.0	66.6	63.3	..	73.2
Total debt service (% of GNI)	5.6	2.2	2.7	2.6	..	3.3	1.6	..
Total reserves in months of imports	4.1	3.4	7.4	7.3	6.8	5.8	6.4	13.0
Fiscal Accounts ¹								
Revenue and Grants (% of GDP)	17.8	17.4	20.3	18.7	..	18.6
Total Expenditure (and net lending, % of GDP)	17.7	18.0	22.0	24.1	..	20.5
Overall Balance (% of GDP)	0.4	-1.8	-2.0	-1.1
Public Sector Gross Debt (% of GDP)	58.3	51.6	53.8	54.6
Social Indicators								
Health								
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	57.2	57.5	57.8	58.2	..	57.7	53.5	69.2
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	95.0	97.0	99.0	98.0	..	97.3	73.3	83.8
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	68.0	..	68.0	30.6	62.5
Improved water source (% of population with access)	89.0	..	89.0	61.1	88.3
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	59.4	58.6	57.8	56.9	..	58.2	79.0	42.5
Population								
Population, total (in million)	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.7	853.4	6,857.6
Population growth (annual %)	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.5	1.2
Urban population (% of total)	55.6	56.4	57.3	58.1	..	56.8	36.7	50.1
Education								
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	21.2	30.4	..	25.8	16.5	47.3
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	86.0	84.2	87.3	82.6	..	85.1	98.6	106.6
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	..	54.1	55.2	54.1	..	54.4	34.7	67.4

Source: WB World Development Indicators (09/06/2012) for all indicators excluding those noted.
1/ IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Annex Table 11: Gambia - Millennium Development Goals

	1990	1995	2000	2009
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger				
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%)	71	71	71	72
Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, total (%)	58	57	57	56
Income share held by lowest 20%	4.0	..
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)	..	23.2	15.4	..
Poverty gap at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (%)	34	..
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)	66	..
Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)	14	23	27	19
Vulnerable employment, total (% of total employment)
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education				
Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24)	41	60
Literacy rate, youth male (% of males ages 15-24)	64	71
Persistence to last grade of primary, total (% of cohort)	73	..
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	46	45	67	76
Total enrollment, primary (% net)	51	64	68	74
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women				
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)	8	..	2	9
Ratio of female to male primary enrollment (%)	63	74	87	104
Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment (%)	47	55	..	95
Ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment (%)	..	55	27	..
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of total nonagricultural employment)	37.7	..
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality				
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)	86	91	89	99
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	78	72	66	58
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)	165	145	128	101
Goal 5: Improve maternal health				
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	..	137	114	73
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	44	..	55	57
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)	12	..	10	..
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	750	690	560	400
Pregnant women receiving prenatal care (%)	91	98
Unmet need for contraception (% of married women ages 15-49)
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases				
Children with fever receiving antimalarial drugs (% of children under age 5 with fever)	55	..
Condom use, population ages 15-24, female (% of females ages 15-24)
Condom use, population ages 15-24, male (% of males ages 15-24)
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	185	204	225	269
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)	2.4
Prevalence of HIV, male (% ages 15-24)	1
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)	0.1	0.2	0.5	2.0
Tuberculosis JAS detection rate (all forms)	..	44	54	48
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability				
CO2 emissions (kg per PPP \$ of GDP)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
Forest area (% of land area)	44	..	46	48
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	..	61	63	68
Improved water source (% of population with access)	74	79	83	89
Marine protected areas (% of total surface area)	0	0	0	0
Terrestrial protected areas (% of total surface area)
Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development				
Debt service (PPG and IMF only, % of exports, excluding workers' remittances)	22	15	11	8
Internet users (per 100 people)	0.0	0.0	0.9	7.6
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	0	0	0	78
Net ODA received per capita (current US\$)	101	40	38	76
Telephone lines (per 100 people)	1	2	3	3
Other				
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)	6.1	5.9	5.6	5.0
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	300	340	330	440
GNI, Atlas method (current US\$) (billions)	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.7
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)	22.3	20.2	17.4	25.9
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	53	54	55	58
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	37	46
Population, total (millions)	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.7
Trade (% of GDP)	131.5	122.0	104.8	80.6

Source: World Development Indicators databases as of 5/8/2012

