The World Bank Group in Chad, Fiscal Years 2010–20
Country Program Evaluation
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COVID-19  coronavirus
CPE    Country Program Evaluation
CPF    Country Partnership Framework
DPF    development policy financing
DPO    development policy operation
EITI   Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FY     fiscal year
GBV    gender-based violence
GDP    gross domestic product
HIPC   heavily indebted poor countries
ICR    Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA    International Development Association
IEG    Independent Evaluation Group
IMF    International Monetary Fund
ISN    Interim Strategy Note
PARSET Education Sector Reform Project
PBF    performance-based financing
SWEDD  Sahel Women Empowerment and Demographic Dividend
TTL    task team leader

All dollar amounts are US dollars unless otherwise indicated.
Acknowledgments

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Overview

Overview and Main Findings

World Bank Group support to Chad was aligned with government priorities and World Bank diagnostics. Particularly during the latter half of the evaluation period, the World Bank made a deliberate effort to identify and address Chad’s main development constraints, including those that were also drivers of conflict. These constraints include (i) a legacy of domestic and regional conflict; (ii) weak governance, including weak public financial management; (iii) inadequate provision of basic services; (iv) overreliance on oil for fiscal resources; (v) gender inequality (including implications for high fertility); (vi) climate change; and (vii) inadequate physical infrastructure.

The Bank Group–supported program helped advance several human development objectives. This was particularly the case with respect to the delivery of basic services in health, education, and social protection. Advances were also made in gender equality, including through interventions in health, education, and agriculture. However, although consecutive strategies highlighted that pervasive gender-based violence hindered efforts to improve gender equality, there was no explicit strategy to reduce gender-based violence. Several projects approved at the end of the evaluation period (but not envisaged in the Country Partnership Framework) attempted to address gender-based violence through sensitization and training, but the project monitoring and evaluation framework did not include indicators to measure progress.

Timely budget support helped stave off an imminent fiscal crisis but did not ultimately achieve sustained reform. Budget support operations were successful in allowing the government to continue to function. However, these operations could not address fundamental shortcomings with weak public financial management, which contributed to arrears accumulation, or bring about fiscal
sustainability writ large. In a context marked by government instability, development policy operations failed to achieve sustained meaningful policy reform.

Few results were achieved in agriculture, infrastructure, and public resource management. Although the World Bank helped Chad achieve some improvement in domestic tax and customs revenue collection and transparency in the use of natural resource revenues, the quality of governance was not significantly improved.

Notwithstanding the challenges inherent in working in a fragile and conflict-affected situation, the performance of the Bank Group portfolio in Chad was weak according to project outcome ratings and relative to expectations. Performance was undermined by a combination of procurement delays, high turnover of government counterparts, and a lack of continuity in World Bank staff working on Chad.

Procurement challenges were a recurrent problem for most investment projects in Chad, undermining performance across the board. Although program documents usually contained credible assessments of procurement risk and identified mitigation measures, their design was often overly complex given Chad’s limited capacity. Efforts have been made to simplify Chad’s procurement code, but vested interests continue to undermine the integrity of the system.

Collaboration with development partners helped improve World Bank effectiveness. This was particularly the case for the health and social protection portfolios and with the International Monetary Fund, where collaboration was guided strongly by support to help Chad reach the Completion Point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.
The following lessons are offered for consideration regarding future World Bank engagement in Chad:

Timely and targeted analytical work is necessary to inform priority setting, policy dialogue, and the design of reforms. In the case of Chad, when timely analytical work was available, it informed the design of more successful interventions. This was especially true for the World Bank’s social protection portfolio. Unfortunately, little analytical work was undertaken before and in the early part of the Interim Strategy Note period, when lending was curtailed. This was a missed opportunity that affected the World Bank’s ability to provide timely, targeted, and effective support when conditions improved. In recent years, however, there has been a surge in proposals for analytical work from a number of Global Practices. Given the prevalence of capacity and absorptive constraints, it is important to strategically prioritize analytical work to help identify the most binding constraints to development gains and to inform efforts to address them.

Procurement challenges warrant priority attention since they constrain implementation across the portfolio. This will require addressing the underlying political and bureaucratic obstacles. In Chad, this is not solely an issue of technical capacity, and an effective solution will require higher-level dialogue with the government.

Although working in Chad is challenging in the face of difficult conditions in the field, it is critical that the World Bank strengthen incentives to attract and retain talent to work on Chad. This is needed to improve continuity of engagement with country authorities and compensate for weak client capacity (including high turnover of government officials). Retaining country team staff and task team leaders for longer periods can help preserve operational and institutional knowledge and keep ongoing reforms and project implementation on track.
Aperçu des principaux résultats et enseignements tirés

L’aide du Groupe de la Banque mondiale au Tchad est en cohérence avec les priorités de l’État tchadien et avec le diagnostic de la Banque mondiale. Plus précisément, durant la deuxième moitié de la période d’évaluation, la Banque mondiale s’est efforcée d’identifier les principales contraintes qui pèsent sur le développement du Tchad, notamment celles qui ont constitué des facteurs de conflit, et d’y remédier. Au cœur de ces contraintes figurent (i) une histoire faite de conflits nationaux et régionaux ; (ii) une gouvernance déiciente, concernant particulièrement la gestion des finances publiques ; (iii) la fourniture insuffisante de services de base ; (iv) une dépendance excessive à l’égard du pétrole comme source de revenus ; (v) l’inégalité entre les sexes (et le taux de fécondité élevé qui lui est associé) ; (vi) le changement climatique et (vii) des infrastructures physiques inadaptées.

Le programme soutenu par la Banque mondiale a permis d’atteindre plusieurs objectifs de développement humain, concernant particulièrement la fourniture de services de base dans les domaines de la santé, de l’éducation et de la protection sociale. Des avancées ont également été réalisées en matière d’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes, grâce notamment à des programmes dédiés à la santé, à l’éducation et à l’agriculture. Cependant, bien que les politiques successives aient montré que l’omniprésence de la violence fondée sur le genre entravait les efforts visant à améliorer l’égalité entre les sexes, aucune stratégie explicite n’a été adoptée pour la réduire. Plusieurs projets approuvés à la fin de la période d’évaluation (mais non prévus dans le Cadre de partenariat pays) ont tenté de trouver des solutions au problème de la violence fondée sur le genre, à travers la sensibilisation et la formation, mais le cadre de suivi et d’évaluation de tels projets ne comportait pas d’indicateurs permettant de mesurer les progrès réalisés.
Le soutien budgétaire apporté au moment opportun a permis d’éviter une crise budgétaire imminente, mais n’a pas abouti, en définitive, à des réformes durables. Les mesures de soutien budgétaires ont permis à l’État de continuer à fonctionner, sans toutefois remédier aux carences majeures liées à une mauvaise gestion des finances publiques, ayant contribué à l’accumulation d’arriérés, ni à assurer une viabilité budgétaire. Dans un contexte marqué par l’instabilité de l’État, les actions qui s’inscrivent dans le cadre de la politique de développement n’ont pas été en mesure d’entraîner des réformes profondes et durables.

Les résultats atteints en matière d’agriculture, d’infrastructures et de gestion des ressources publiques sont peu nombreux. Bien que la Banque mondiale ait contribué à améliorer le recouvrement des impôts nationaux et des recettes douanières du Tchad et la transparence dans l’utilisation des revenus des ressources naturelles, la qualité de la gouvernance ne s’est pas améliorée de manière significative.

Nonobstant les défis inhérents aux actions menées dans des situations fragiles affectées par le conflit, la performance de l’ensemble des projets de la Banque mondiale au Tchad est faible, selon les critères d’évaluation des résultats et par rapport aux attentes. La performance a été affectée par la combinaison de plusieurs facteurs : retards d’approvisionnement, changements fréquents d’interlocuteurs au sein du gouvernement et renouvellement du personnel de la Banque mondiale au Tchad.

La collaboration avec les partenaires de développement a permis d'améliorer l’efficacité de l’action de la Banque mondiale, concernant plus particulièrement la santé, la protection sociale, et les projets menés en collaboration avec le FMI. Collaboration fortement guidée par la volonté d’aider le Tchad à atteindre le point d’achèvement dans le cadre de l’Initiative en faveur des pays pauvres très endettés.

Les points suivants constituent les enseignements à prendre en compte par la Banque mondiale pour définir ses actions futures au Tchad :

Une analyse ciblée et régulière est nécessaire pour motiver la prise de décision concernant les objectifs prioritaires, le dialogue politique et la conception des réformes. Dans le cas du Tchad, lorsque de telles analyses étaient disponibles, elles ont permis l’élaboration de projets plus efficaces. Ce fut particulièrement le cas des projets de la Banque mondiale dans le domaine de la protection sociale. Malheureusement, peu de travaux analytiques ont été entrepris avant et au début de la période d’application de la Note de stratégie intérimaire, lorsque l’octroi de prêts a été limité. Une occasion ratée qui a empêché la Banque mondiale de fournir en temps utile, lorsque les conditions s’étaient améliorées, une aide ciblée et efficace. Récemment, cependant, le nombre de projets analytiques émanant de plusieurs pôles de Pratiques mondiales a augmenté. Compte tenu des limites des moyens et de la capacité d’absorption, il est important de donner la priorité aux travaux analytiques permettant d’identifier, de comprendre et de s’attaquer aux contraintes les plus déterminantes en matière de développement.

Toute l’attention doit se focaliser sur les difficultés d’approvisionnement, car elles compromettent la mise en œuvre de l’ensemble des projets. Cette approche nécessite de résoudre les obstacles politiques et bureaucratiques sous-jacents. Le problème du Tchad n’est pas uniquement un problème de capacités techniques, y apporter une solution efficace nécessite un dialogue de plus haut niveau avec l’État.
Bien que mener des projets au Tchad soit complexe en raison des conditions difficiles sur le terrain, il est crucial que la Banque mondiale renforce ses mesures incitatives pour attirer et garder les talents susceptibles de travailler pour le Tchad. Cette démarche est nécessaire pour améliorer la continuité des relations avec les autorités du pays et compenser les capacités limitées du pays (notamment en raison du changement fréquent des responsables gouvernementaux). Le maintien des équipes-pays et des responsables de groupes de travail sur place pour des périodes plus longues peut contribuer à conserver les connaissances opérationnelles et institutionnelles et à maintenir les réformes en cours et les projets engagés sur la bonne voie.
The purpose of this Country Program Evaluation (CPE) is to assess the World Bank Group’s development effectiveness in Chad over the past decade within a context of high fragility and extreme poverty. The report covers the implementation of the Interim Strategy Note (ISN, fiscal years [FY]10–FY12) and the Bank Group’s Country Partnership Framework (CPF, FY16–20) with Chad and the Bank Group’s 2019 Performance and Learning Review. This CPE reviews the relevance and effectiveness of Bank Group assistance between FY10 and FY20 and identifies lessons to inform the design and implementation of the next Bank Group–supported partnership strategy with Chad.

This CPE responds to the following evaluation questions.

1. To what extent did the Bank Group–supported strategy address Chad’s most binding development constraints, including its drivers of fragility?

2. How effective was Bank Group support in responding to, implementing, and adapting to evolving development needs in the country?

3. How effectively did the Bank Group coordinate with other development partners and stakeholders during the design and implementation of its partnership strategies in Chad to enhance program relevance, coherence, and impact?

This CPE is structured as follows: Chapter 1 discusses the country context. Chapter 2 assesses the Bank Group–supported strategy and its alignment to government priorities. Chapter 3 describes the Bank Group portfolio of interventions in Chad and assesses the effectiveness of these interventions in addressing the country’s main development constraints and fragility drivers. Chapter 4 evaluates Bank Group coordination with development partners and stakeholders in the design and implementation of its support. Chapter 5 provides findings and lessons for future Bank Group engagement in Chad.
Chad is one of the world’s lowest-income countries. The country ranks 187th out of 189 countries and territories in the Human Development Index (UNDP 2019a). Between 2010 and 2018, Chad’s Human Development Index score increased from 0.374 to 0.401, reflecting an increase of seven years for life expectancy and 1.1 years in mean years of schooling, but a 7.2 percent decrease in gross national income per capita. The income share held by the poorest half of the population remained relatively unchanged between 2010 and 2019 (UNDP 2019a, 311). The level of inequality reflects disparities in income and wealth, weak social cohesion, and weaknesses in the functioning of markets and the role of government.

Chad has been considered a fragile state since the World Bank introduced this classification in 2006. This reflects its weak institutional and policy environment; weak governance, including weak public financial management; inequitable management of public resources; and inadequate provision of basic services. Part of Chad’s fragility is due to regional insecurity, resulting in a large inflow of refugees (who make up 3 to 4 percent of the population).

Over the evaluation period, conflict and terrorism rose across the Sahel, culminating in the death in battle of Chad’s president in 2021. Figure 1.1 shows a deterioration of the security situation in Chad between 2010 and 2020. Of 2,518 conflict casualties recorded between 2010 and 2020, about 74 percent occurred after 2016. Chad’s army is increasingly combating a range of rebel groups who also target the civilian population. On April 19, 2021, President Idriss Déby was killed while leading his troops in an offensive against rebels in northern Chad. After his death, his son, General Mahamat Idriss Déby, dissolved parliament and took control as head of a transitional military council. The African Union has since called on the council to share power with civilians until elections can be organized. Protests against the military council have taken place across the country. World Bank operations and disbursements were paused while a review of the situation under Operational Policy 7.30 was conducted; they resumed in July 2021.
Chad is at high risk of external and public debt distress. Chad remains at high risk of external and public debt distress in large part because of commercial borrowing in 2013 from a private company (Glencore) to cover revenue shortfalls and in 2014 to purchase a share in the Doba Oil Consortium (IMF 2019a). Although the risk of external debt distress was moderate in 2010, by 2014 it had risen to high, and it has remained there since. Total debt rose from 24 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 to 34 percent in 2010 and 43.7 percent in 2019. The coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19) has put additional pressure on Chad’s finances. Efforts to reduce Chad’s dependence on oil revenue, raise non-oil revenue, and free up resources for domestic investment have been largely unsuccessful.

Chad has suffered multiple waves of COVID-19 infection. The majority of the 5,000 cases reported to date (likely an underestimate given weak testing capacity) were in the capital of N’Djamena. Economic growth, which was 3.2 percent in 2019, declined sharply to an estimated −0.9 percent in 2020, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. The country’s limited health structures and capacity, together with difficulties in procuring the needed protective equipment and vaccines, make it likely that localized outbreaks
will continue. These outbreaks are expected to further strain resources that are already insufficient for delivering essential health programs. In 2020, the World Bank approved a $17 million Chad COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Project to help prevent, detect, and respond to COVID-19.

**Main Development Constraints and Drivers of Conflict**

From a review of diagnostics and analysis prepared by the World Bank and other sources, the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) has distilled seven main development constraints affecting Chad over the evaluation period, the first four of which have also been identified as drivers of conflict and fragility. These constraints include (i) a legacy of domestic and regional conflict; (ii) weak governance, including weak public financial management; (iii) inadequate provision of basic services; (iv) overreliance on oil for fiscal resources; (v) gender inequality (including implications for high fertility); (vi) climate change; and (vii) inadequate physical infrastructure.

**Legacy of Domestic and Regional Conflict**

Security threats are closely linked to the Boko Haram insurgency and other terrorist groups that remain the main cause of displacement in the Lake Chad region and the inflow of refugees to Chad (UNHCR and World Bank 2016; World Bank 2018f). The regional security environment disrupts imports through the Douala-N’Djamena corridor (through which 90 percent of Chad’s imports travel), Doba-Douala pipeline oil exports, and Chad’s livestock exports to Nigeria.

Reflecting the domestic and regional context, security expenditures are a large share of the government’s budget. In 2018, resources allocated to the Ministry of Defense accounted for 7.8 percent of total expenditures, and allocations to the Ministries of Public Health and Social Protection represented only 4.8 and 0.5 percent, respectively (Kitzmuller and Kassim, 2019). The public investment budget (estimated at 75 percent of the social sector budget) relies heavily on external funding.
Chad has for decades been affected by the inflow of displaced persons and refugees because of conflicts across its borders with the Central African Republic, Libya, Nigeria, and Sudan. In 2015, it was estimated that more than 700,000 displaced people lived in Chad. Of these, 463,000 were refugees (including 366,000 from Sudan, 93,000 from the Central African Republic, and 2,000 from Nigeria). There were also 230,000 returnees from the Central African Republic and Libya and 70,000 long-term internally displaced people from the 2007 conflict and subsequent cross-border attacks from Darfur. In 2015, Chad joined a regional coalition to confront Boko Haram, which has contributed to reprisals on Chadian territory.

**Weak Governance, Including Weak Public Financial Management**

Governance challenges are characterized by corruption, lack of public sector transparency, weak enforcement of laws, and lack of accountability (World Bank 2012b; IMF 2019b). Weak governance also manifests itself in the frequent shuffling of ministers and senior government officials, which directly affects the implementation of reforms and projects. For example, during the implementation of the World Bank–supported public financial management capacity-building project (2007–16), Chad had eight different prime ministers (World Bank 2017c). The absence of a consistent high-level counterpart hindered monitoring of program results and raised doubts about government ownership (World Bank 2018a). Corruption is considered one of the most problematic factors for doing business in Chad, according to the 2018 Enterprise Survey (World Bank 2018c). The incidence and depth of bribes for firms in Chad is higher than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF 2019b). This has contributed to low confidence in public institutions, which are characterized by lengthy procurement procedures, weak project implementation units, weak technical capacity to undertake fiduciary activities, weak technical capacity of civil servants to execute reforms, slow processing of documents, and a high turnover of trained senior staff.
Inadequate Provision of Basic Services

After the 2008 financial crisis, oil prices fell sharply, forcing the Chadian government to significantly reduce the already thin budget for education, health, and other public services. Chad relies heavily on often-unpredictable donor funding to finance basic public services. Social assistance programs remain limited and often fail to reach the poorest people. Rapid population growth also increases pressure on the provision of basic services, employment, housing, and urban infrastructure. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted supply chains, employment, and income, particularly for rural households, jeopardizing the already weak social protection systems that have little capacity to offset these impacts.

Inadequate public resources allocated to improving livelihoods leave the already poor population with limited access to basic health and education services and social safety nets. The arrival of refugees and returnees from neighboring countries has increased the burden on already overstretched basic service delivery (World Bank 2015b). In 2019, there were on average five doctors per 100,000 people in Chad, of which more than half were based in the capital city, N’Djamena (World Bank 2021). Almost half of the national health care labor force is made up of unskilled workers. The distance to the nearest health care facility remains large (on average 3 kilometers in urban areas and 5 kilometers in rural areas; World Bank 2021), and high out-of-pocket costs prevent people in all wealth quantiles from seeking care. In 2017, the World Health Organization noted that only 20 percent of Chadian women reported having given birth at a health facility (World Bank 2021).

Public spending on education is approximately 2.5 percent of GDP, the lowest in the region (World Bank 2021). Small budgets for education have resulted in inadequate compensation and provision of training for teachers, contributing to the high rate of absent teacher and low education quality. Community schools are largely deprived of teaching supplies and equipment. Long distances and a lack of schools are leading factors preventing boys and girls from attending school.
Fiscal Sustainability and Overreliance on Oil Revenue

The government relies heavily on oil revenue to maintain fiscal stability and meet recurrent spending needs. Declining and variable oil revenues (which constituted 70 percent of government revenues in 2013) and the absence of mechanisms to hedge against oil price fluctuations make public expenditures volatile and highly procyclical (IMF 2013). The inability to predict revenue inflows over the medium term brings significant planning challenges and makes it difficult for policy makers to balance current and capital spending. This leaves the government unable to meet the basic needs of the population and invest in diversifying the economy, as was especially the case during oil shocks in 2014–15. Since the mid-2010s, the challenging fiscal outlook has been compounded by increased demand for security expenditures in the midst of the military campaign against Boko Haram and other armed groups. Fragility could thus be exacerbated by oil price volatility. Alternatively, a relaxation of the fiscal stance through the accumulation of arrears or excessive domestic and external borrowing could disrupt private and financial sector activities and contribute to debt distress.

Gender Inequality

Chad experiences significant gender inequality (Ngatia et al. 2020). Approximately 50 percent of women in Chad participate in the labor force, compared with the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 62 percent in 2019 and in contrast to 73 percent of men. Gender disparities in primary and secondary education are exacerbated by inadequate school sanitation facilities for girls, which resulted in high dropout rates for girls. Women do not have the same opportunities to join the formal labor force due to gender norms that assign women most of the unpaid work and limit their movement, free use of their time, and access to resources.

Only one-quarter of married women ages 15–49 participate in decisions on their own care. Underpinning this phenomenon are widespread child marriage, female genital mutilation or excision, and early childbearing; 30 percent of women are married before the age of 15 and 70 percent by the age of 18. Child marriage reduces girls’ education levels and contributes to low literacy, low wages, low agriculture productivity among girls and women, and
higher fertility. Chad’s average fertility rate of 5.6 (total births per woman) in 2019 is higher than the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 4.6, although it has declined from 5.2 in 2009.\textsuperscript{7} The high fertility rate intensifies pressure on the government to provide basic services, including those in health and education. Women in Chad also face significant rates of gender-based violence.\textsuperscript{8}

### Climate Change and Competition for Resources

The effects of climate change and increasing natural resource scarcity exacerbate intercommunal tensions. Chad has been rated among the five countries most vulnerable to climate change.\textsuperscript{9} Chad’s Sahelian ecosystem is naturally prone to irregular agroclimatic conditions. Desertification during the 1970s caused climatic disturbances throughout the country, including droughts, floods, and erratic rainfall (SFCG 2014). These have been difficult to overcome because of a lack of agriculture technology, weak institutions, limited access to markets, and a lack of financing. Climatic variations destroyed grazing lands, forcing people to permanently move from the north to the south and east and disrupting transhumance routes and patterns (Guiry-anan, Kohomta, and Nandoumabé 2018). Along with increasing population and livestock numbers, resource competition between farmers and pastoralists has increased. Agropastoral conflict has been on the rise since the 1980s (Médard and Ozias 2007).

The rising temperature and declining rainfall pose threats to Chad’s already low agricultural productivity. In Chad, only 4.1 percent of land is arable, of which only 6 percent has been cultivated (World Bank 2021). Only 9 percent of available water resources is used for irrigation, which covers only 1 percent of agricultural land. Low agricultural productivity limits diversification of cash crops, especially during the off-season. Furthermore, recurring droughts have heightened tensions between farmers and herders. Among these climate challenges, the agriculture sector is also plagued by (i) security risks near the Lake Chad Basin; (ii) the lack of public investment in the sector (including limited road connectivity); (iii) limited access to capital and modern farming technologies; (iv) high transport and distributional service costs; and (v) inadequate land and water management.
Inadequate Infrastructure

Large transport and telecom infrastructure gaps impede economic growth, integration, and access to external markets (Kitzmuller and Kassim, 2019). The 2016 World Economic Forum’s Enabling Trade Index ranked Chad 124th out of 136 countries on the availability and quality of transport infrastructure. Transport underdevelopment is exacerbated by insecurity (armed groups pose threats to goods in transit); inadequate road networks; lack of professionalism among carriers; levies, both legal and illegal, imposed on road transport; and soil instability (a significant challenge to the construction of dirt roads in the busiest regions). In addition, high transportation costs prevent nearly half of Chadians from traveling to seek medical attention (World Bank 2010a).

In 2010, Chad had limited access to telecommunications and faced high costs for information and communication technology services (World Bank 2010a). Isolation of many communities, incomplete market liberalization, and the absence of fiber-optic backbone infrastructure at the national level adversely affected regional and international trade and private sector development. In 2016, the Enabling Trade Index ranked Chad last out of 136 countries on the availability and use of information and communication technology services.
The World Bank reported gross national income per capita in purchasing power parity (current international dollars) of $1,620 for Chad.

See also the World Inequality Database, https://wid.world/country/chad/.

Constraints to development identified by the World Bank Group are consistent with those identified by development partners. The African Development Bank’s strategy (2015–20) noted that Chad was plagued by a difficult climatic environment, economic and financial vulnerabilities, infrastructural constraints, and an unattractive business environment. The World Food Programme (2019–23) identified the high prevalence of food insecurity and malnutrition, gender inequalities, climate and weather-related crises, and conflicts and insecurity-driven displacements as major development constraints. Similar constraints were identified by the United Nations Children’s Fund and United Nations Population Fund.

See labor force participation data at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS.

According to the most recent Demographic and Health Survey (2014–15); see https://dhsprogram.com/publications/publication-FR317-DHS-Final-Reports.cfm.

See fertility data at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=TD.


According to Ngatia et al. (2020), 3 in 10 women report experiencing physical violence at home since the age of 15.

See the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative Country Index at https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/ (accessed March 2022).
This chapter reviews Bank Group–supported strategies between FY10 and FY20 as reflected in the ISN (FY10–12) and CPF (FY16–20) and assesses the extent to which they addressed Chad’s main development constraints, including those also identified as major drivers of conflict and fragility.

Bank Group engagement with Chad over the period of this CPE was heavily influenced by a previously challenging relationship. In 2006, the World Bank suspended disbursements on its portfolio in response to the government not upholding revenue management arrangements agreed to under the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project as a condition for the World Bank to support the pipeline (World Bank 2010a). In response, the World Bank and the Chadian government negotiated a transitional memorandum of understanding for 2007 stipulating that the government would spend 70 percent of all oil revenues on priority development sectors. Disbursements for some projects resumed, although by late 2007, it became clear that the government was not upholding the agreement (World Bank 2010a).

In February 2008, a rebel attack on the capital prompted the closure of the World Bank office in N’Djamena, the evacuation of staff, and the suspension of mission travel. Because the agreements on oil revenues had not been respected, World Bank management decided to keep the office closed until a solution was found (World Bank 2010a). In September 2008, the government repaid the balance of pipeline-related credits, ending World Bank engagement in the Chadian petroleum sector. In 2008–09, no new lending was approved. However, in January 2009, the World Bank office reopened and resumed dialogue with authorities and stakeholders toward an inclusive development program to improve the inferior social and economic conditions in Chad. The chronology of World Bank engagement in Chad between 2003 and 2020 is described in appendix A.
This evaluation finds that Bank Group support to Chad was consistent with government priorities and the findings of World Bank diagnostics and that it focused on the main critical constraints to growth and poverty reduction. The World Bank identified the main development constraints, including conflict drivers in Chad, and made a deliberate effort to address these in the design of the CPF. The overarching development objectives of Bank Group engagement in Chad did not change significantly during the evaluation period or across strategies. All engagement areas under the ISN were sustained under the CPF (figure 2.1). The assessment of development priorities presented in the Systematic Country Diagnostic anchored the design of the CPF, which had elements clustered in relation to three strategic engagement areas: (i) strengthening management of public resources; (ii) improving returns to agriculture and building value chains; and (iii) building human capital and reducing vulnerability for households. Promoting gender equality was emphasized in all World Bank strategies as a precondition for economic development. The social protection portfolio became prominent only during the CPF period, aligning with the government’s first National Social Protection Strategy in 2015.
Figure 2.1. Links among the ISN (FY10–12), SCD (2015), and CPF (FY16–20)

Note: CPF = Country Partnership Framework; FY = fiscal year; ISN = Interim Strategy Note; SCD = Systematic Country Diagnostic.
The preparation of the ISN (FY10–12) signaled the Bank Group’s formal re-engagement with Chad. A major objective of the Bank Group during the ISN period was to improve its knowledge of the political economy and rebuild trust with the government. In the ISN, the World Bank outlined plans to support strengthening public financial management, improve livelihoods and access to key social services, and improve regional integration. Reflecting the fragile environment, the ISN adopted a limited and gradualist approach, initially focusing on the efficient and transparent use of public resources and improving access to reliable poverty data. The ISN expired in June 2012 and was not formally extended. From that point until the adoption of the 2016 CPF, Bank Group engagement was largely guided by the requirements for receiving large-scale debt relief at the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point (box 2.1).

**Box 2.1. Reforms and Objectives Supported by the World Bank to Be Achieved before the HIPC Completion Point**

**Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper**

» Prepare a fully participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and satisfactorily implement it for at least one year.

**Governance**

» Make satisfactory progress in strengthening public expenditure management to identify and track poverty-related spending.

» Adopt law and application decrees on public procurement; publish a quarterly public procurement bulletin; complete audits by internationally reputed firms for the five largest contracts in 2001; adopt Budget Settlement Law for 2000 before adoption of Budget Law for 2002; adopt Budget Settlement Law for 2001 before adoption of Budget Law for 2003; nominate judges for commercial courts in the five largest cities.

» Implement for one year a governance action plan in consultation with the International Development Association and International Monetary Fund.

(continued)
**Box 2.1.** Reforms and Objectives Supported by the World Bank to Be Achieved before the HIPC Completion Point (cont.)

**Health**

» Ensure at least 75 percent of health districts and centers are operational, up from 68 percent in 1999.

» Achieve a three-dose diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus vaccination rate of at least 40 percent in 1999 and an assisted birth rate of at least 20 percent.

» Increase availability of condoms through the social marketing project by at least 25 percent relative to 2000.

*Source: IMF and IDA 2001.*

*Note: HIPC = heavily indebted poor countries.*

The ISN listed six major development challenges for Chad: (i) climate and environmental challenges that made agriculture unproductive; (ii) instability, conflict, and a large inflow of refugees; (iii) heavy dependence on oil revenue for fiscal management; (iv) low quality of budget spending; (v) lagging indicators in health and education; and (vi) an unfavorable business environment. The ISN noted that development progress was undermined by internal conflict, weak governance, and a lack of government commitment to reform (World Bank 2010a, 2).

The ISN drew significantly on analytics produced by development partners (mainly the African Development Bank and European Union). This was necessary given shortcomings in institutional memory because a number of World Bank staff who had previously worked on Chad had moved on, some to work on other countries. During the five years of the ISN, a relatively small amount of Chad-specific analytical work was undertaken, despite the steepness of the learning curve associated with World Bank reengagement in a complex and volatile conflict-affected situation. That said, analytical work to underpin operations and guide strategy was ramped up during the CPF period.
The Bank Group–supported strategy (CPF) starting in 2016 was aligned with Chad’s National Development Plan (2017–21). The National Development Plan stressed the importance of women’s empowerment and the need to improve the quality of life for women and female adolescents by strengthening their access to high-quality health services, improved nutrition, and property rights, themes that also featured in the ISN. The CPF (FY16–20) was prepared against the backdrop of regional security threats and large numbers of refugees, oil commodity price shocks (2015–18), and the growing impact of climate change. It focused on agriculture, social protection, education, health, the energy sector, public financial management, and the development of local capacity for hydrocarbon resource management.

Reflecting the findings of the 2015 Systematic Country Diagnostic, the CPF supported efforts to improve Chad’s business environment. These efforts were most evident in the telecom sector, where the International Finance Corporation has been using Millicom investments and advisory services to enhance mobile network connectivity in Chad. IFC commissioned a digital financial survey to explore innovative ways to support connectivity in Chad. The survey assisted the International Finance Corporation with addressing challenges with the country’s tax structure and other business constraints. The International Finance Corporation also supported the government in developing a public-private partnership law, enacted in 2017.

As with the ISN, the CPF (FY16–20) drew on lessons from IEG’s evaluation on the Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project (World Bank 2009). These lessons included the need to improve dissemination of the World Bank’s lending and nonlending reports to support greater government commitment and the need to focus more on community-based projects to reach vulnerable groups. The ISN noted that the World Bank’s project portfolio was too complex and ambitious. The World Bank experienced a high rotation of task managers and therefore needed greater and more consistent supervision support. Increased support to implementation teams was also necessary to ensure financial management and procurement procedures were well understood and adhered to and to support the development and implementation of appropriate monitoring and evaluation frameworks and tools.
COVID-19 Response

At the request of the Chadian government, World Bank financing was shifted in 2020 to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mother and Child Health Services Strengthening Project resources were used to procure key supplies and equipment for infection control and prevention, including personal protective equipment at the health facilities in project-supported provinces. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Bank agreed to keep the project active until all remaining funds were fully disbursed. The pandemic also paused community-based activities (for example, reproductive health education and school-based activities) supported under the Sahel Women Empowerment and Demographic Dividend (SWEDD) project. Some resources were shifted to support the national quality control laboratory in Chad to produce hydroalcoholic gels, under the supervision of the World Health Organization. In April 2020, the World Bank approved $55 million for COVID-19 response, which included support to improve vaccination access for women.

Chad’s Participation in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative

During the evaluation period, the World Bank worked with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help Chad reach the Enhanced HIPC Initiative completion point. At the end of 2000, Chad’s external public and publicly guaranteed debt amounted to $1.06 billion, equivalent to 75 percent of its GDP. Of the total debt, approximately 84 percent was owed to multilateral institutions and 16 percent to official bilateral creditors. In May 2001, the International Development Association (IDA) and IMF agreed that Chad had reached the completion point under the HIPC Initiative. The total amount of debt relief committed at that time (but not yet delivered) implied a 30 percent reduction in the net present value of Chad’s public and publicly guaranteed external debt as of the end of December 2000 (IMF 2015b). The World Bank provided direct technical assistance to the government to progress through the HIPC Initiative. This assistance included the Second Population and AIDS Project and the Education Sector Reform Project.
In education, the World Bank–supported reforms aimed to improve access to and quality of education. Reforms and objectives to be achieved by the completion points are described in box 2.1.

The government had intended to reach the HIPC completion point in 2004, but internal and regional conflicts prevented the implementation of national development plans. It was not until April 2015 that the boards of IDA and the IMF agreed that Chad had made satisfactory progress in implementing its commitments under the HIPC Initiative. Chad fully met 11 of the 15 triggers, including participatory preparation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and its satisfactory implementation for at least one year. Debt relief under the HIPC Initiative from all of Chad’s creditors was estimated at $170.1 million in present value terms at the end of 2000. After reaching the HIPC completion point, Chad also benefited from further nominal debt service reduction from IDA ($509 million) and the African Development Fund ($236 million) under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. The combined effect of the HIPC Initiative, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, and additional bilateral assistance was to reduce the present value of the debt-to-exports ratio from 55.1 percent at the end of 2013 to 31.3 percent at the end of 2015 (IMF 2015b).

More recently, to improve debt sustainability and as part of the World Bank’s Sustainable Development Finance Policy, Chad agreed to start publishing a quarterly bulletin (within three months of the end of the quarter) covering all central government debt (excluding state-owned enterprises and publicly guaranteed debt) and agreed not to enter into any contractual obligations for new external public and publicly guaranteed nonconcessional debt in FY21, unless the nonconcessional debt limit was adjusted by the World Bank to reflect any material change of circumstances or in coordination with the IMF and adjustments in the IMF Debt Limits Policy.

Despite significant debt relief, Chad continues to face debt challenges related to its domestic and private external debt. In 2019, the IMF recommended that Chad focus on strengthening debt management and refrain from contracting nonconcessional debt. In April 2020, the IMF projected that the net present value of public and publicly guaranteed external debt–to-exports would increase from 60.6 percent in 2019 to
88.1 percent in 2021. Public and publicly guaranteed debt service–to-revenue was projected to increase from 10.9 percent in 2019 to 17.9 percent by 2021. By 2021, Chad was at high risk of external debt distress largely because of more than $1 billion in debt owed to Glencore and a syndicate of private lenders.
An Interim Strategy Note provides a framework for the World Bank’s engagement in a country until a full-fledged strategy can be adopted. Interim Strategy Notes are developed in consultation with the government and a range of stakeholders, discussed by the Bank Group’s Board of Executive Directors, and then publicly disclosed.

3 | Effectiveness of World Bank Group Support

World Bank projects and operations in Chad over the evaluation period were rated, on average, moderately unsatisfactory for development outcomes, with only one project rated satisfactory (figure 3.1). This translates into weak performance in nearly all sectors. The worst outcome ratings were in the agriculture, education, and financial sectors. Sectors that had somewhat better outcome ratings included the information and communication technology; social protection; transportation; and industry, trade, and services sectors. IEG evaluated three of five budget support operations that supported reforms in public administration; social protection; and industry, trade, and services. All were rated moderately unsatisfactory or worse.

Three main factors influenced the low ratings of World Bank projects in Chad. The World Bank’s own self-assessments (Implementation Completion and Results Reports [ICRs]) and IEG validations (ICR Reviews) provide a useful guide to the main issues behind the relatively inadequate project performance. First, the assessments highlight how the government’s long and complex procurement processes contribute to prolonged implementation delays. World Bank teams attempted to mitigate weak management and implementation capacity, but this in itself caused difficulties because of frequent government staff turnover. Implementation delays also resulted from the decentralized nature of projects combined with a low-capacity environment. Second, earlier projects suffered from weak design issues, where there were disconnects between indicators and project results. Third, weak government implementation capacity, particularly for data collection and management, resulted in significant shortcomings and difficulties in attributing projects’ achievement of development objectives.
The rest of this chapter provides a more granular assessment of the effectiveness of Bank Group support to Chad. The discussion is organized in relation to the development constraints and drivers of conflict and fragility articulated in the section Main Development Constraints and Drivers of Conflict in chapter 1.1.

**Weak Governance, Including Weak Public Financial Management**

Chad’s institutions and policy performance improved marginally over the evaluation period after sharp declines in the decade before 2010. According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, rule of law and control of corruption improved somewhat over the evaluation period because of, among other factors, strengthened transparency and oversight of the oil sector and ratification and implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. The indicator for voice and accountability was essentially unchanged, and regulatory quality deteriorated (figure 3.2). Chad remained
near or at the bottom 10 percent of countries for all six World Governance Indicators in 2019. As measured by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, Chad’s policies and institutions improved marginally during the evaluation period. Chad’s average overall score rose from 2.4 in 2010 to 2.8 in 2019, still below the 3.1 average for IDA countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.3

**Figure 3.2. Worldwide Governance Indicators, Global Ranking**

![Graph showing Worldwide Governance Indicators, Global Ranking](source: World Governance Indicators database, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/.)

**Note:** Percentile global ranking is the percentage of the 215 countries whose indicators were found to be worse than Chad’s. The WGI data was not available for 2001 for all countries.

Despite consistent engagement, the World Bank’s impact on Chad’s public financial management was modest. This reflected an inability to overcome the challenges of high government turnover, slow procurement, overly complex design, and security challenges. Under the Fiscal Consolidation Program development policy operation (DPO), single-source procurement contracts were not reduced and budget settlement was not accelerated. Under the emergency DPO (approved in FY17), the public wage bill was not reduced by targeted amounts, and there were significant
delays in providing oversight of state-owned enterprises and freezing of tax exemptions. In the Second Programmatic Economic Recovery and Resilience development policy financing (DPF; approved in FY19), triggers to improve the efficiency of the public wage bill and state-owned enterprise transparency and oversight were dropped. At the same time, there was some progress. The Public Financial Management Capacity Building Project (approved in FY07) helped reduce delays in budget execution and the number of steps in the expenditure circuit from 12 to 6. This project also resulted in the preparation of quarterly budgetary and financial reports and made some budget information available to the public. The Fiscal Consolidation Program DPO (approved in FY16) reduced the number of ghost workers on the public payroll, improved the procurement code by separating the procurement regulation function from the control function, and reduced some extraordinary spending.

The ISN aimed to improve Chad’s Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Performance score on the quality and timeliness of the annual accounts from a C rating in 2009 to an (ambitious) A rating in 2012. Instead, the 2018 assessment found consistently weak performance of Chad’s public finance management system, with an overall D+ score despite positive results on the computerization of Chad’s expenditure chain, restrictions on extraordinary spending procedures, and adoption of new tax codes. Chad received D ratings for annual financial reports, external audits, in-year budget reports, and extra-budgetary units’ expenditures not recorded in the central government financial statements (exceeding 10 percent of total budgetary expenditure; PEFA 2018). Chad’s best performance was for payroll controls and accounting for revenue, for which it obtained a C+. The 2019 Performance and Learning Review assessed overall progress toward greater public financial management transparency as modest.

The CPF target for reducing arrears accumulation was not achieved. Indeed, the Performance and Learning Review noted that the ratio of the stock of public expenditure arrears to total public expenditure had increased to 8.7 percent of the GDP; by the end of 2018, however, accumulated external arrears were about $63 million (0.6 percent of the GDP), down from $31 million (CFAF 17 billion) in 2017 (IMF 2020b).
World Bank efforts to support improvements in the effectiveness and transparency of hydrocarbon revenue management were partially successful. The World Bank’s Public Financial Management Capacity Building Project (approved in FY07) supported the government’s efforts to audit oil revenues. Government officials indicated that Bank Group–supported training and capacity building on petroleum sector management for staff were useful.\(^4\)

Guided by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) process, Chad’s governance of the oil sector has seen a meaningful improvement. The World Bank, through funding from the EITI Multi-Donor Trust Fund, supported the creation of a revenue-tracking unit at the Treasury with a mechanism for recording and monitoring payments from extractive companies. Chad joined the EITI in 2010 and became EITI compliant in May 2013. Since April 2018, all oil and gas contracts have been published online by EITI. World Bank technical assistance and lending continued after compliance was achieved, supporting efforts to broaden the scope of EITI reporting, making Chad the first country to include oil transport (the Chad-Cameroon pipeline) and refining (the Djermaya refinery) in its EITI reporting. The World Bank also helped Chad become a leader in publicly disclosing information about oil-backed loans from Glencore and in commodity trading (disclosing information about the sale of oil). Chad provides access to the national oil company’s audited financial statements and detailed quarterly bulletins about the oil sector on the Ministry of Finance and Budget website. The World Bank continues to support the mainstreaming of EITI reporting, including by working to increase engagement with civil society organizations.

**Fiscal Sustainability**

Timely budget support alleviated the government’s fiscal crisis and prevented fiscal collapse. In 2016, the Fiscal Consolidation Program DPO (and its supplemental financing approved in FY17) provided $130 million in budget support in response to Chad’s public resource needs, which had ballooned because of negative oil price shocks amplified by security challenges. This support enabled Chad’s government to pay public service salaries and maintain core state functions, reducing reliance on more expensive or
destabilizing sources of finance and preserving past development gains. The reversal of those gains would have had dire implications for Chad’s development and could have destabilized the region.

World Bank support to fiscal consolidation helped improve Chad’s non-oil primary balance. The Fiscal Consolidation DPOs (approved in FY16) contained prior actions to reduce extraordinary spending, which contributed to bringing Chad’s non-oil primary balance to −4.2 percent of non-oil GDP in 2019, from −28.7 percent in 2010 (IMF 2020a).

There was progress on non-oil revenue mobilization, but it remains volatile. Non-oil revenues were 7.7 percent of non-oil GDP in 2010. In 2013 and 2014, Chad benefited from statutory and exceptional advances from the Bank of Central African States (4.5 percent of non-oil GDP), which temporarily increased non-oil revenues. However, customs revenues fell thereafter due to security disruptions to cross-border trade and a slowdown in demand from Nigeria. The onset of COVID-19 and its economic impacts have likely also had a negative impact on oil revenue, adding to a record of highly volatile revenue developments (table 3.1).

Table 3.1. Annual Change in Revenue, 2011–20 (as a share of Chad’s non-oil GDP, %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total revenue</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>−8</td>
<td>−15</td>
<td>−17</td>
<td>−38</td>
<td>−10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>−11</td>
<td>−27</td>
<td>−27</td>
<td>−58</td>
<td>−29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>−4</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-oil</td>
<td>−6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>−13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>−7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>−3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAX</td>
<td>−8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>−13</td>
<td>−10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>−3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nontax</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>−25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>−20</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>−29</td>
<td>−40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>−29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

a. Estimated.
Inadequate Provision of Basic Services

Health Services

The World Bank contributed to a significant improvement in access to and quality of health services in project areas, particularly during the latter half of the evaluation period. During the ISN, the restructuring of the Second Population and AIDS Project (approved in FY10) introduced performance-based financing (PBF) and led to partial improvements in the quality and use of mother and child health services. The proportion of pregnant women receiving prenatal care, children being immunized, and youth ages 15–24 using condoms fell short of the targets because of weak local capacity to collect and manage data and underfunding of PBF toward the end of the project. Only the proportion of births attended by health workers was achieved during this period. The World Bank expanded PBF under the Mother and Child Health Services Strengthening Project (approved FY14), which led to a significant improvement in access to and quality of maternal health. All key indicators—such as access to prenatal care, use of modern contraception, and attended births—exceeded CPF targets (table 3.2).

World Bank financing led to an improvement in the quality of health centers and services in target areas. Under the Mother and Child Health Services Strengthening Project, the PBF provided incentives for health facilities and health care workers in five regions covering 2.17 million people (of which 30 percent were women and girls of reproductive age) to expand coverage and improve the quality of essential health services. The project equipped health care facilities with 155 solar fridges, surpassing the target of 134. As a result, 100 percent of tracer drugs were available in targeted health facilities, exceeding the target of 75 percent. The quality of health services in targeted areas improved from 42 percent to 65.4 percent, exceeding the target of 30 percent. Despite this progress, limited government funding for the health sector challenges the sustainability of this model. In 2019, activities supported by PBF stopped when project funding ended and the government was unable to continue support. Indeed, at 4.5 percent of the GDP in 2018, the budget for public health care services was low and below the regional average of 5 percent. This amount represents approximately $32 per capita per year, lower than the average of $40.50 per capita per year for other countries at Chad’s level of income.
### Table 3.2. Mother and Child Health Key Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Achievement</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISN period (2010–12)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CPF (2016–20)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnant women receiving prenatal care (no.)</td>
<td>48,300 (2014)</td>
<td>80,000 (2020)</td>
<td>171,460 (2020)</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Births attended by a skilled provider (no.)</td>
<td>20,839 (2013)</td>
<td>35,000 (2020)</td>
<td>70,872 (2020)</td>
<td>Achieved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: CPF = Country Partnership Framework; ISN = Interim Strategy Note.

### Education

The World Bank contributed to increasing access to primary and secondary education in project areas, particularly in the latter half of the evaluation period. PARSET (approved in FY03) sought to provide 400 new primary school classrooms and 400 blocks of latrines separated for boys and girls to
increase enrollment and survival rate to sixth grade. By 2012, the project had exceeded the target by providing 400 new classrooms and 465 latrines. However, the survival rate to sixth grade reversed, dropping from 44 percent to 36 percent in 2012, well short of the 70 percent target. Only two of the eight target regions reached target gross enrollment rates. PARSET Phase II (approved in FY13) reduced the number of targeted regions from eight to six. The project stabilized the mobile payment system by financing salaries for 10,480 community teachers by 2020, surpassing the target of 7,000. According to the project’s impact assessment (World Bank 2020d), 75 percent of community teachers believed that the payments motivated their attendance, which in turn improved the primary school completion rate from 37 percent in 2011 to 63 percent in 2020, surpassing the target of 43 percent. The community teachers continued to receive payments until project closing in October 2021. Other development partners, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, continued to work on this platform to coordinate payments to teachers under the leadership of the Agence pour la Promotion des Initiatives Communautaires en Education - APICED. However, at the beginning of the 2020–21 school year, the schools were closed when civil servants went on strike because of the coup d’état in N’Djamena.

Although access to education improved, there is no evidence of an improvement in learning outcomes. PARSET supported the establishment of the Centre National des Curricula, which prompted a transition to Chadian-produced materials. In 2012, the project purchased and distributed 3.7 million textbooks (surpassing the target of 2.9 million) to schools in target areas. With additional financing, PARSET Phase II expanded to all regions nationwide. The project improved the textbook-to-student ratio from 25 percent in 2013 to 52 percent in 2020, surpassing the target of 50 percent. The project provided training to build capacity to 10,965 community teachers, exceeding the target of 9,000 community teachers. However, evidence of an improvement in students’ learning outcomes is not available.

Social Safety Nets

The CPF supported the government’s move toward a sustainable social safety net system to improve targeting of poor beneficiary households. The
DPO for Emergency Fiscal Stabilization (approved in FY17) supported the establishment of the Safety Net Unit (Cellule Filets Sociaux). As a result of World Bank financial and technical support, this unit became fully operational, providing strategic guidance and inputs to social protection activities in Chad. Under the Safety Nets Project (approved in FY17), 14,560 additional households in target areas were identified, surpassing the CPF target of 9,000 for 2020. By 2020, the World Bank and other partners had identified 355,392 beneficiary households, or 1.8 million people out of 6.5 million living below the poverty line, of which 20 percent have been registered in the Unified Social Registry, including 100 percent of the beneficiaries under the Safety Nets Project. Despite the progress, the system has not yet been used nationally for targeting purposes. However, support to the Unified Social Registry system was retained and expanded under the Refugees and Host Communities Support Project (FY19). By August 2020, 60,000 additional households were registered, of which 8 percent of households were refugees.

**Gender Inequality**

The World Bank contributed to gender equality and women’s and girls’ empowerment through its agriculture, health, and education interventions. Measurement of gender outcomes was restricted to the health and education sectors. The agriculture portfolio adopted gender-responsive activities to improve women’s economic situation, and the share of women participating in these projects exceeded targets, but no outcome data were disaggregated by gender.

The ISN contributed modestly to gender equality. During the ISN period, the World Bank’s contribution to gender equality focused on three key outputs: (i) completion of poverty and gender assessments; (ii) increase in women’s access to antenatal care in targeted regions by 46 percent (from 79,000 in 2009 to 116,000 in 2012); and (iii) improvement in the girls-to-boys ratio in primary schools in four targeted regions. Of these outputs, only the first was achieved (under the Second Population and AIDS Project, approved in FY02). Additional financing to this project (approved in FY10) provided payments to eligible health centers, but access to prenatal care fell short of the target.
Despite this shortfall, prenatal consultations in target regions increased from 1.6 percent in 2011 to 3.6 percent in 2013. PARSET (approved in FY03) supported the construction of separate latrines for girls, recruited female community teachers, provided tutoring to female students, and developed and incorporated gender sensitization modules into all teacher training programs. However, only two of the four regions involved reached the target for the girls-to-boys ratio.

Women’s and girls’ empowerment improved during the CPF period. The CPF sought to increase women’s access to modern contraceptives, assisted births, and antenatal care. The approach was sustained under the Mother and Child Health Services Strengthening Project (approved in FY14), which contributed to an increase in the number of women of reproductive age in targeted areas using modern contraceptive methods, from 7,916 in 2014 to 108,947 women in 2020, exceeding the target of 14,000. Pregnant women in targeted areas receiving antenatal care tripled from 48,500 in 2014 to 171,460 in 2020, exceeding the target of 80,000. Births attended by health care workers increased from 20,836 in 2014 to 70,872 in 2020, surpassing the target of 35,000. Despite promising outcomes from project interventions, the national rate of contraceptive usage by women in Chad remains low, although it increased from 4.8 percent in 2010 to 8.1 percent in 2019 (compared with an average of 31 percent in the Sub-Saharan Africa region). The average fertility for women in Chad remains high, at 5.6 children per woman in 2019, although it has decreased from 6.5 in 2010.

The regional SWEDD (approved in FY15) contributed to improvements in women’s and girls’ empowerment in health and education (box 3.1). The project organized social awareness campaigns on reproductive health, recruited female facilitators for safe spaces and health workers, and established safe spaces for girls designed for skill development (including reproductive health) and empowerment. The project sought to improve reproductive health knowledge of women, girls, and men in targeted areas from 32 percent in 2015 to 85 percent in 2025. By 2019, the rate was 43 percent, and the project is considered to be on track to achieve the target in 2025 under additional financing provided to SWEDD (approved in FY20). The number of girls ages 16–19 in targeted areas who participated in life skills and economic empowerment interventions reached 20,909 in 2019,
just above the project’s target of 20,000. The project strengthened strategic partnerships with religious leaders, including female preachers, who are key models in Chad’s society, to promote reproductive health for women and girls’ education. Involvement of female preachers is an innovation specific to Chad and was highly praised by development partners and government officials. The project trained 1,350 religious leaders and female preachers, exceeding the target of 750, to sensitize their communities on gender topics (including reproductive health and girls’ education). Female preachers also operated as community health workers and teachers. Data on the achievements of these interventions are not yet available, but an impact evaluation was underway at the time of this evaluation.

Box 3.1. Financing for Gender Equality: The SWEDD Project in Chad

The pilot phase of the Sahel Women Empowerment and Demographic Dividend (SWEDD) is a promising example of “financing for gender equality.” This project combined increased access for vulnerable women and girls to skills, services, and resources, with activities aimed at changing behavioral and social norms and improving the enabling policy environment. The multipronged approach of this intervention, however, faced implementation difficulties in the fragile context of Chad because of weak synergies and coordination of partners and sectors, as well as weak institutional and technical capacities of implementing partners. The evidence collected for this evaluation has shown that the suitable response to these challenges is to establish and reinforce a diversified, inclusive, multilevel engagement that involves not only sectoral ministries but also local civil society; community structures (traditional governance bodies, local associations, women’s groups, parents’ associations, Islamic women’s preachers, and so on); national and decentralized authorities; opinion makers at all levels (religious and traditional leaders, role models, media); women and girls; and men and boys.

An important lesson emerging from SWEDD is that results can be achieved only through a combination of both demand and supply-side interventions. This means that sensitization and communication aimed at changing behaviors and social norms need to be complemented by effective action to increase access to services, markets, assets, and finance and to support women’s economic empowerment through skill development. The low quality of and insufficient access to services in Chad represented a major challenge to achieving results.

(continued)
Another critical lesson from SWEDD is the need to introduce flexibility and gradualism into the project, strengthen the skills of implementing partners, increase institutional capacity, and improve risk management and coordination among stakeholders operating in various sectors (both internal coordination among components of the project and external coordination among other World Bank Group–relevant projects and other development partners). SWEDD has partially succeeded in achieving greater flexibility by establishing new partnerships with experienced international nongovernmental organizations, which supported the development of technical capacity of local nongovernmental organizations and governmental institutions. However, this strategy requires adequate investment in financial and human resources. It also requires investing in robust monitoring and evaluation frameworks—linked to the country strategy measurement framework—to measure progress in reducing gender inequalities, attributable to World Bank–financed interventions, to allow for necessary adjustments during implementation and a clear understanding of how these interventions address the specific needs, challenges, and opportunities of targeted women and girls.


The CPF contributed to an improvement in girls’ retention in school and primary school completion rates in intervention sites. Through the provision of latrines, coaching and skills development, school enrollment fees, school uniforms, food, and accommodations, SWEDD contributed to a reduction in the girls’ dropout rate, from 5.5 percent in 2014 to 0.8 percent in 2019. After restructuring, the retention rate of adolescent girls improved from 94.5 percent in 2015 to 98.8 percent in 2019. Under PARSET Phase II (approved in FY13), the provision of subsidies to community teachers contributed to an improvement in primary school completion rates, which reached the targets of 55.5 percent for boys in 2020 (from 48 percent in 2015) and 35.8 percent for girls in 2020 (from 29 percent in 2015). The project also improved the gender parity index from 74 percent in 2013 to 78 percent in 2020, slightly above the target of 77 percent. Regrettably, SWEDD’s
geographical coverage is small and could not therefore generate impact at the provincial or national level. Thus, the share of female secondary school students in Chad remains low at 31.3 percent, significantly lower than that of neighboring countries Mali (44.1 percent) and Niger (41.9 percent; World Bank 2021).

Improvements in women’s participation in economic activities were observed under the agriculture and social protection portfolios. In social protection, pilot cash transfer activities under the Safety Nets Project (approved in FY17) targeted women-headed households. A 2021 impact evaluation found that women benefited from cash transfers in unique ways. Women were more likely than men to start new businesses and report higher revenues and profits; they also experienced increases in self-efficacy and mental and physical health (Kandpal, Schnitzer, and Daye 2021). The Agriculture Production Support Project (approved in FY12) aimed to finance 200 subprojects for female farmer organizations in target areas to enhance crop and livestock production to increase the farmers’ income. Actual achievement fell short, providing only 74 subprojects, due largely to the long and delayed subproject approval process. Despite the shortfall, the project’s ICR reported that it enabled the women’s groups to add approximately CFAF 300 million (approximately $500,000 in 2012) to their product value compared with before the project, according to the government estimates.

Although women’s productivity is hindered by weak land tenure, SWEDD succeeded in increasing the number of areas cultivated by women’s groups. This increase was achieved through a combination of capacity building, provision of tractors, and advocacy for women’s access to land. Between 2016 and 2019, land cultivated by women increased from 152 hectares to 1,921 hectares in target areas. The Value Chain Support Project (approved in FY14) provided grants to 33 percent of female beneficiaries (against a target of 20 percent) to increase small and medium enterprise production and improve access to local and regional markets in the meat and dairy industry. The Climate Resilient Agriculture and Productivity Enhancement Project (approved in FY18) sought to train at least 50 percent of young female researchers and provide agricultural assets and services to at least 30 percent of female farmers. At the time of this evaluation, there had been no progress
with the training, but agricultural services had reached 12 percent of female farmers in target areas.

Gender-based violence (GBV) was not directly addressed until the latter half of the evaluation period. The ISN and Systematic Country Diagnostic highlighted the problem of GBV and the high prevalence and impact of GBV on poverty and the vulnerability of women, but they did not articulate a strategy to deal with this problem. However, there was little explicit follow-through in the CPF. Only in FY19 did the World Bank explicitly tackle GBV. This was seen in three projects: the Rural Mobility and Connectivity Project (approved in FY19), Additional Financing to SWEDD (approved in FY20), and the Refugees and Host Communities Support Project (approved in FY19). The projects sought to support behavioral change through gender-sensitized communication campaigns and training. SWEDD sought to prepare, publish, and implement an action plan against GBV by the end of January 2020, but this plan was paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Refugees and Host Communities Support Project plans to provide a stand-alone assessment of GBV by the time of the project’s midterm review in late FY22.

**Climate Change and Competition for Resources**

The World Bank’s contribution to increasing agricultural resilience and food security in the face of climate change was limited. The Agriculture Production Support Project (FY12) was the main World Bank project in Chad before FY15 to address climate change challenges. The project aimed to address a food emergency while also achieving longer-term crop production increases. The project’s risk assessment, however, did not recognize that government capacity was insufficient to achieve this goal. Low government capacity and limited experience also posed risks to the chosen community-driven development approach. These challenges, combined with low government buy-in, caused further delays. Given the emergency nature of the project, a formal baseline economic and financial analysis was not conducted. Weak monitoring and evaluation also undermined the ability to assess the project’s success.

To strengthen climate resilience, the World Bank supported an increase in available agricultural land and the capacity for water extraction. Since 2012,
the World Bank has supported sustainable land and water management to enhance beneficiaries’ ability to cope with climate change and to make agricultural production more resilient and thus bolster food security through the Agriculture Production Support Project. By 2017, the area brought under sustainable land and water management practices was 2.5 times greater (235,520 hectares) than the appraisal target of 95,000 hectares. However, the project covered only 4.5 percent of Chad’s arable land and introduced only two of the projected three sustainable land management innovations (agroforestry and rangeland management). The project boosted livestock numbers with 330,000 additional animals (99 percent of target, or a 3 percent increase of the national herd) and achieved an increase in food crop production through expansion of land farmed. The FY15 Emergency Food and Livestock Crisis Response Project expanded water access by rehabilitating 172 water wells, against a target of 157. Although expanding total livestock, farmed land, and water access reduced short-term vulnerability, it will not be sustainable in the longer term if population growth remains high.

**Inadequate Infrastructure**

Progress toward regional integration and connectivity continues to face challenges because of low security on the roads and a lack of project management skills among counterparts. The active Central African Economic and Monetary Community Transport-Transit Facilitation Project was self-assessed in 2021 by World Bank staff as moderately unsatisfactory because of unsatisfactory contractor performance, weak contract management by the project implementation unit, and challenges in obtaining counterpart funding. This project was intended to support the rehabilitation and maintenance of some sections of the Bongor-Kelo-Moundou-Koutere road. However, the government terminated work before meeting performance targets. Other projects were more successful. The World Bank successfully supported the authorities in harmonizing Chad’s legal and regulatory framework for electronic communication services. In 2014, the government enacted a new framework that established a new regulator for the telecom sector, L’Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des Postes. The regional Central African Backbone project increased mobile coverage from 24 percent of Chad’s population to 83 percent, exceeding
the target of 50 percent. The number of individuals covered by the wireless network of a mobile operator or internet service provider increased by 336 percent, helping to provide internet connection to 863,000 people by the time the project closed. The share of individuals using the internet in Chad increased from 28 percent in 2010 to 57 percent in 2020.

Cross-Cutting Factors Affecting the Impact of World Bank Group Support

Procurement Challenges

Procurement delays have been a long-standing challenge in Chad and were difficult to resolve despite significant efforts of Bank Group staff. World Bank Project Appraisal Documents before 2010 described Chad’s procurement rules as having considerable weaknesses. Procurement processes were described as not transparent and characterized by delays in contract signing and weak contract management. Delays were also due to slow approval of bid evaluation reports, delays in signing contracts, and limited experience of procurement staff with World Bank procurement rules (World Bank 2017d, 2018f).

The World Bank attempted to use DPF to address procurement challenges. The Fiscal Consolidation DPOs of 2015–16 required the Council of Ministers to adopt a procurement code to separate the procurement regulation function from the control function, which the government adopted in 2015, but operationalization has been slow. In 2017, the Emergency Fiscal Stabilization DPF had a prior action to build capacity on the national Procurement Regulatory Agency. This DPF sought to implement the new procurement code and make the Procurement Regulatory Agency functional by requiring the government to (i) appoint the president and members of the National Council of Regulation and (ii) allocate a regular budget line to the Procurement Regulatory Agency. Despite these actions, the value of single-source procurement contracts as a share of the total increased substantially from 33 percent to 57 percent instead of falling to 25 percent as targeted (World Bank 2018e).
Procurement risks were elevated for most investment projects. Out of 45 investment projects reviewed, 13 rated procurement risks as high, 14 as substantial, and 10 as moderate. Eight projects did not identify procurement risk as a challenge. To mitigate procurement risks, some projects planned to launch baseline studies (World Bank 2012c), simplify processes, train project implementation staff, and hire a procurement specialist proficient in World Bank procurement procedures (World Bank 2017d). Most of the projects that rated procurement risk as moderate planned to use either a United Nations agency or a bilateral donor as a service provider or executing agency to implement project activities. Examples include the Emergency Food and Livestock Crisis Response Project, SWEDD, and PARSET.

Many government officials interviewed for this CPE indicated a lack of familiarity with World Bank procurement rules. It was common for self-evaluations of World Bank projects to identify procurement delays as a reason for inadequate performance. These delays were attributed to a lack of awareness of World Bank fiduciary obligations, lack of counterpart ability to manage the World Bank’s procurement process effectively, weak capacity of project implementation units, and complex government processes related to implementation (World Bank 2011, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2020a). High turnover of government employees was often behind these reasons. Although project documents generally contained detailed implementation plans, the Bank Group country office had no staff assigned to train new employees of project implementation units on procurement.

High Turnover of Task Managers

The October 2009 self-assessment of the World Bank’s portfolio in Chad identified high rotation of task managers as a major factor complicating delivery. Turnover among task team leaders (TTLs) was high for much of the evaluation period, particularly for DPF operations. Between 2016 and 2018, five different TTLs oversaw the Fiscal Consolidation DPO, with two TTLs serving less than one year. There were at least three TTLs for each DPF operation except for the Fiscal Consolidation Support Grant (FY17). The lack of consistent leadership was not conducive to maintaining a strong policy dialogue, building trust, and ensuring consistency of reforms (and the underlying results chain).
Turnover of staff managing investment projects was also high, with 11 projects having an average of 6 TTLs each. The rest of the 33 projects had an average of 5 TTLs per project. High turnover was prevalent in all sectors (agriculture, macroeconomics, human development, and urban development) and was not primarily explained by long-duration projects, as shown in figure 3.3. Reasons for high turnover identified by past TTLs included career progression, the insecure environment, and changes due to reorganization of the Country Management Unit of which Chad was a part in 2012 (table 3.3). Overall, 168 TTLs managed 44 investment projects. The average of 4 TTLs per project was twice the average for the Africa region.8

Figure 3.3. Task Team Leaders per Project versus Project Duration

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.

Note: Each dot represents a project duration-number of TTLs combination among the 44 projects detailed in appendix C. Out of 44 projects, 32 had more than one TTL per every two years of project duration. IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; TTL = task team leader.
Table 3.3. Turnover of Task Team Leaders for Investment Projects in Chad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Approval FY</th>
<th>Exit FY</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Project Duration (years)</th>
<th>TTLs (no.)</th>
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<td>Population and AIDS 2 SIL (P072226)</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>Africa Emergency Locust Project (P092473)</td>
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<td>Local Development Program Support APL (P066998)</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>GEF Community-Based Ecosystem Management Project (P078138)</td>
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<td>CEMAC Transport Transit Facilitation Project (P079736)</td>
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<td>Public Financial Management Capacity Building (P090265)</td>
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<td>Population and HIV/AIDS II—AF (P105724)</td>
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<td>Support to NSDS implementation (P131771)</td>
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<td>Sahel Women’s Empowerment and Demographics Dividend Project (SWEDD)</td>
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<td>Emergency Food and Livestock Crisis Response (P150080)</td>
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<td>Enhanced Capacity toward Sustainable Petroleum Sector Management (P155829)</td>
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<td>Domestic Resource Mobilization and Management Project (P164529)</td>
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<th>Project Name</th>
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<th>Status</th>
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<td>Lake Chad Region Recovery and Development Project (P161706)</td>
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<td>Cameroon—Chad Power Interconnection Project (P168185)</td>
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<td>SWEDD AF (P172604)</td>
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<td>Mainstreaming the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (P168666)</td>
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<td>ALBIÂ—Chad Local Development and Adaptation Project (P171611)</td>
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<td>CHAD COVID-19 Response Project (P173894)</td>
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Note: The “TTLs (no.)” refers to TTLs who left the project and did not return before project closing. FY = fiscal year; TTL = task team leader.
1 In what follows, we cover six of the seven main constraints identified. The first main constraint (the legacy of domestic and regional conflicts) and its associated security dimensions are not within the Bank Group’s mandate or expertise to address directly. However, the World Bank can, as a development institution and working through other channels, contribute to development solutions that can alleviate some of the drivers of conflict, particularly those related to competition for scarce resources.

2 The Worldwide Governance Indicators are a research data set summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprises and citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. The indicators do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. These indicators are not used by the Bank Group to allocate resources.

3 The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment consists of 16 criteria grouped in four equally weighted clusters: economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions. For each of the 16 criteria, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high).

4 The Performance and Learning Review confirms training for 32 staff in France, but the effort fell short of the target due to poor indicator definition.

5 The project developed a quality measure to capture a wide range of indicators of health care service quality and delivery at the health center and hospital level. An increase in the percentage score represents positive change in the capacity of health facilities and the quality of service.

6 No target was set for this result indicator as indicated by the Implementation Completion and Results Report.

7 For example, the Agriculture Production Support Project experienced a two-year implementation delay due to procurement problems. The Chad Digitalization of Revenue Administrations and COVID-19 Response Project experienced a three-year procurement delay.

8 The World Bank Engagement in Situations of Conflict evaluation found that in many conflict-affected countries, the World Bank experiences difficulties in attracting staff, although the trend is particularly pronounced in Chad.
Donor coordination was largely through an informal donor group (Comité des Partenaires Techniques et Financiers) convened by the ambassador of France for much of the evaluation period.¹ This group met monthly to discuss budget support and monitoring for implementation of reforms. Since 2019, the group has been co-led by representatives of the United Nations and the European Union. The World Bank continued to have strong engagements with the macroeconomics and education sector working groups.

The World Bank coordinated with other donors during the design of projects but less frequently during the implementation. In education, the World Bank relied on data from the United Nations Children’s Fund; the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; and the African Development Bank to target beneficiaries. For social protection projects, the Bank Group coordinated with United Nations agencies and the European Union during design for diagnostics on poverty and vulnerability, targeting and registration approaches, and payment systems and during implementation on joint missions and technical meetings.

Evidence from 18 ICRs suggests strong collaboration among the Bank Group and development partners. This was particularly evident with respect to macroeconomics and governance, oil revenue management, education, health, and agriculture. Collaboration took place through information sharing, debriefing of mission findings, supervision missions, and complementarity of donor projects. The main development partners were the IMF, the African Development Bank, Agence Française de Développement, and the German Agency for International Cooperation. Coordination with Agence Française de Développement supported the preparation of the 2016 tax code for Chad, which was aligned to prior actions supported by the Bank Group Fiscal Consolidation DPF operation.
Collaboration was particularly close between the World Bank and the IMF. DPO prior actions were complementary to the IMF performance criteria (see Table 4.1). Collaboration was also particularly close in supporting Chad in meeting the specific preconditions of the HIPC completion point (see Chapter 2).

Table 4.1. Complementarity between World Bank Prior Actions and IMF Performance Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Bank Prior Actions</th>
<th>IMF Performance Criteria</th>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank Group prior actions on the DPO Fiscal Consolidation Program focused on enactment of tax codes consolidating all tax-related fiscal regulations, validation of data collected through the civil servant biometric census, expansion of taxpayer base and increase in revenue, enactment of a procurement code, and improvement of Doing Business indicators (World Bank 2016).</td>
<td>Bank Group prior actions were complementary to the 2014 IMF Extended Credit Facility performance criteria and structural benchmarks on fiscal balance, prevention of arrears accumulation, protection of pro-poor expenditures, publication of consolidated oil revenue data, and reduction in the use of extraordinary spending procedures (IMF 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Chad Emergency DPF of FY17 and the Programmatic Economic Recovery and Resilience Grant DPF had prior actions on reducing allowances of civil servants by 50 percent, auditing the public payroll, reducing tax expenditures, suspending the use of nonconcessional external debt with more than a year maturity, and implementing a procurement code. These complemented the IMF performance criteria for the period.</td>
<td>Bank Group prior actions were complementary to some of the IMF performance criteria for 2014–17. These criteria are a floor on non-oil primary budget balance, a ceiling on net domestic government financing, an accumulation of domestic payment arrears by the government, and the accumulation of new external payment arrears by the government or public nonfinancial enterprises (IMF 2017).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: DPF = development policy financing; DPO = development policy operation; FY = fiscal year; IMF = International Monetary Fund.
1 Thematic or sector working groups existed at different times over the evaluation period. The World Bank was a member of three of six of these groups—the macroeconomics, public finance, and private sector subcommittees. Only the macroeconomic group met regularly.
Bank Group support to Chad was aligned with government priorities and World Bank diagnostics. Particularly during the latter half of the evaluation period, the World Bank made a deliberate effort to identify and address Chad’s main development constraints, including those that were also drivers of conflict. These are (i) a legacy of domestic and regional conflict; (ii) weak governance, including weak public financial management; (iii) inadequate provision of basic services; (iv) overreliance on oil for fiscal resources; (v) gender inequality (including implications for high fertility); (vi) climate change; and (vii) inadequate physical infrastructure.

The Bank Group–supported program did advance several human development objectives. This was particularly the case with respect to the delivery of basic services in health, education, and social protection. Advances were also made in gender equality, including through interventions in health, education, and agriculture. However, although consecutive strategies highlighted the pervasiveness of GBV, which hindered efforts to improve gender equality, strategies to reduce GBV were not explicitly integrated. Several projects approved toward the end of the evaluation period (but not envisaged in the CPF) attempted to address issues of GBV through sensitization and training, but the existing project monitoring and evaluation framework did not include indicators to measure progress.

Few results were achieved in agriculture, infrastructure, and public resource management. Although the World Bank helped Chad achieve some improvement in domestic tax and customs revenue collection and transparency in the use of natural resources revenues, the quality of governance was not significantly improved.

Timely budget support helped stave off an imminent fiscal crisis but did not ultimately achieve sustained reforms. Budget support operations were successful in allowing the government to continue to function. However, they could not address fundamental shortcomings with weak public financial management that contributed to arrears accumulation or bring about fis-
cal sustainability writ large. In a context marked by government instability, DPOs failed to achieve sustained meaningful policy reform.

Notwithstanding the challenges inherent in working in a fragile and conflict-affected situation, the performance of the Bank Group portfolio in Chad was unsatisfactory according to project outcome ratings and relative to expectations. Performance was undermined by a combination of procurement delays, high turnover of government counterparts, and a lack of continuity in World Bank teams working on Chad.

Procurement delays and challenges were a recurrent problem for most investment projects in Chad, undermining performance across the board. Although program documents usually contained credible assessments of procurement risk and put in place mitigation measures, their design was often overly complex given Chad’s limited capacity. Some efforts have been made to simplify the procurement code, but vested interests that derived rents from the current system remained in place.

Collaboration with development partners helped improve World Bank effectiveness. This was particularly the case for the health and social protection portfolios and with the IMF, where collaboration was guided strongly by support to help Chad reach the completion point under the HIPC Initiative.

The following lessons are offered for consideration regarding future World Bank engagement in Chad:

» Timely and targeted analytical work is necessary to inform priority setting, policy dialogue, and the design of reforms. In the case of Chad, when timely analytical work was available, it informed the design of more successful interventions. This was especially true for the World Bank’s social protection portfolio. Unfortunately, little analytical work was undertaken before and in the early part of the ISN period, when lending was curtailed. This was a missed opportunity that affected the World Bank’s ability to provide timely, targeted, and effective support when conditions improved. In recent years, however, there has been a surge in proposals for analytical work from a number of Global Practices. Given the prevalence of capacity and absorptive constraints, it is important to strategically prioritize analytical work to help identify the most binding constraints to development gains and inform efforts to address them.
Procurement challenges warrant priority attention since they constrain implementation across the portfolio. Efforts to address procurement challenges will require confronting the underlying political and bureaucratic obstacles. In Chad, addressing these obstacles is not solely an issue of technical capacity, and an effective solution will require higher-level dialogue with the government.

Although working in Chad is challenging in the face of difficult conditions in the field, it is critical that the World Bank strengthen incentives to attract and retain talent to work on Chad. Attracting and retaining talent are necessary for improving continuity of engagement with country authorities and compensating for weak client capacity (including high turnover of government officials). Maintaining country team staff and TTLs for longer periods can help retain operational and institutional knowledge and keep ongoing reforms and project implementation on track.
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IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2020b. “Requests for Disbursement under the Rapid Credit Facility, Extension of the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, and Rephasing of Access—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Chad.” Country Report 20/134, IMF, Washington, DC.


APPENDIXES

Independent Evaluation Group

The World Bank Group in Chad, Fiscal Years 2010–20
Appendix A. Chronology of World Bank Group Engagement in Chad Since 2003

» **November 2003**: The World Bank Group Country Assistance Strategy for fiscal years 2004–06 aims to build Chad’s national capacity to manage the petroleum economy and support effective use of resources for poverty reduction.

» **January 2006**: Disagreement arises over the use of oil revenues under the World Bank–supported Chad-Cameroon pipeline project. The World Bank suspends disbursements on all active International Development Association projects in Chad.

» **July 2006**: The World Bank and the government of Chad sign a memorandum of understanding on poverty reduction. The government commits to enhance transparency and accountability, with a pledge of support for Chad’s independent oil revenue oversight authority.

» **January–November 2007**: The World Bank and the government negotiate a transitional memorandum of understanding stipulating that the government would spend 70 percent of all oil revenues on sectors linked to improved living standards and reducing poverty, such as health, education, and rural development.

» **December 2007**: The World Bank Group concludes that the government has not honored the agreement.

» **February 2008**: Rebels attack Chad’s capital; the World Bank closes its office and evacuates staff; all missions are suspended. Since the agreements on oil revenues had not been respected, World Bank management decides to keep the office closed until a solution can be found.

» **September 2008**: The government repays the balance on the pipeline project and associated credits ($66 million) to the World Bank.
» **January 2009:** The World Bank office reopens. Dialogue begins with the government on possible resumption of support.

» **October 2009:** The Bank Group concludes that complexity and ambition in the design of many of its projects had a negative effect on portfolio performance. Several projects suffered from frequent rotation of task managers.

» **May 2010:** An Interim Strategy Note marks a new strategy covering June 2010 through June 2012.

» **June 2010:** The first new lending project since 2007 is approved.

» **June 2012–15:** The Bank Group continues to operate on the basis of the Interim Strategy Note, starts preparation of a full Country Partnership Framework, and coordinates with the International Monetary Fund on the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative completion point program.

» **2015–17:** Oil price shocks weaken the fiscal situation and threaten macroeconomic stability.

» **April–May 2015:** The International Development Association and the International Monetary Fund agree that Chad has made satisfactory progress in meeting the requirements for reaching the floating completion point. The respective boards of the International Development Association and the International Monetary Fund approve the completion point document.

» **December 2015:** The Country Partnership Framework for fiscal years 2016–20 is discussed by the Board of Executive Directors.
Appendix B. World Bank Group Portfolio in Chad, Fiscal Years 2010–20

The World Bank Group’s active reengagement in 2010 was followed by a significant inflow of resources to Chad (figure B.1). During fiscal years [FY]10–20, World Bank support to Chad totaled $1.5 billion for 49 International Development Association and trust-funded commitments (figure B.2). International Finance Corporation (IFC) investments amounted to $110 million. There was no Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency exposure in Chad during the review period. Nine investment projects approved before FY10 that remained active during the evaluation period amounted to an additional $215 million. International Development Association commitments to Chad increased sharply starting in FY16, totaling nearly $1 billion over FY16–20 (figure B.1). Due to the fragile operating environment and the fact that the IFC was not present in the field during this period, IFC’s engagement in the country was relatively limited and influenced by the pace of business development and portfolio growth in the country. In alignment with the Bank Group approach, IFC committed nearly $138 million – including two ongoing investment projects – during this period to support enabling sectors, including information and communication technology, health, and financial services. Some of IFC’s top clients included Millicom Chad, Ecobank Chad, Providence Clinic Chad, and Geyser SA.
Figure B.1. New IBRD and IDA Commitments to Chad, FY10–20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World Bank Group CAS Periods</th>
<th>FY10-12</th>
<th>FY13-15*</th>
<th>FY16-20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount Commitments (US$, million)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: FY = fiscal year; IBRD = International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDA = International Development Association; CAS = Country Assistance Strategy.
*There was no formal World Bank Group strategy during this period.
Four sectors were prominent in the World Bank’s lending portfolio, each with at least a 10 percent share of commitments. These were public administration, agriculture (including forestry and fisheries), oil and gas, and education. One-fifth of lending focused on challenges related to central government agencies, including to strengthen public financial management systems, improve transparency of resource allocation, and provide budget financing to the government. A further one-fifth focused on the agriculture, fishing, and forestry sector through World Bank support for access to crop and livestock productive capacity, adoption of improved technologies to increase productivity and climate resilience of agriculture production systems, and the use of sustainable land and water management practices in climate-vulnerable ecosystems. Approximately 11 percent of the portfolio related to the oil and gas sector, including forecasting and analyzing oil revenues; managing oil revenues; and disclosing contracts, licenses, and au-
dits of accounts of the state-owned oil company. In education, with approximately 10 percent of the portfolio, the World Bank focused on improving access and equity in primary education, improving teaching and learning conditions in primary schools, and expanding access to skills training.

Development policy financing amounted to $360 million through five such operations (including one programmatic series of two operations). Two-thirds of prior actions supported fiscal stabilization through expenditure rationalization, fiscal risk management, protection of critical government programs, and mitigation of related negative social effects on poor and vulnerable people. Approximately one-fifth of prior actions supported reforms in the oil and gas sector, and 9 percent addressed challenges in agriculture extension and research support. Figure B.3 shows the sector distribution of prior actions for the five operations.

**Figure B.3.** Prior Actions in Development Policy Operations by Sector, FY10–20

![Sector distribution chart]


*Note:* FY = fiscal year; ICT = information and communication technology; ITS = industry, trade, and services.
The World Bank approved 35 investment policy financing operations for Chad during FY10–20, including trust-funded activities (figure B.4). Of these, the majority of financing focused on the agriculture, fishery, and forestry sector (24 percent); education (15 percent); health facilities construction and services (13 percent); and oil and gas (12 percent).

**Figure B.4. Investment Policy Loan Commitments to Chad by Sector, FY10–20**

The suspension of World Bank disbursements in 2006 and the temporary closure of the office in 2008 curtailed some of the World Bank’s advisory services and analytics (ASA) work, but World Bank staff continued to produce work on public administration, financial management, and education. This work informed the design of the Interim Strategy Note. During the Country Partnership Framework period, the World Bank prepared 21 analytical products, mainly focusing on macroeconomic management and the social sectors (figure B.5). In recent years, there has been a significant supply increase for advisory services and analytics activities proposed across a large number...
of Global Practices. Between FY21 and FY22, almost half the size of ASAs during the CPF period were delivered (figure B.6).

Figure B.5. World Bank ASA Completed in Chad, 2004–20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy period</th>
<th>Amount (US$, millions)</th>
<th>ASA Activities (no.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAS 2004–06</td>
<td>$0.80</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISN 2010–15</td>
<td>$1.15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPF 2016–20</td>
<td>$7.4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Note: ASA data are aggregated to the strategy period due to extensions of the initial approved date. ASA = advisory services and analytics; CAS = Country Assistance Strategy; CPF = Country Partnership Framework; ISN = Interim Strategy Note.
Figure B.6. Approved World Bank ASAs by Sectors, FY10–20 and FY21–22


Note: The figure includes regional ASAs. ASA = advisory services and analytics; CAS = Country Assistance Strategy; FY = fiscal year; ICT = information and communications technology; ITS = industry, trade, and services; WSS = water supply and sanitation.
Appendix C. Private Sector Development

Several World Bank Group projects contributed to improving the business environment for agriculture. The Agricultural Production Support Project boosted private sector trade. The project constructed two weighing stations along the main corridor to facilitate trade between Chad and Cameroon and a customs general directorate headquarters in Chad. The project also facilitated a bilateral transit data-sharing customs agreement with Cameroon. Unfortunately, continued conflict hampers cross-border trade and undercuts foreign demand. Likewise, the ongoing Chad Value Chain Support Project improved the business environment by (i) providing a one-stop website for the National Agency for Investment and Exports to publish online legal announcements; (ii) offering information on starting a business, including information on fees and procedures; (iii) developing standard rules of procedure for companies with at least 25 employees; and (iv) acquiring relevant computer hardware.

Despite these improvements, Chad has made only limited progress over the past six years in improving its businesses environment. The Bank Group–supported reforms sought to enhance the regulatory environment for businesses by improving business entry, trade logistics, property registration, construction permit attainment, and contract enforcement. However, only four out of the minimum eight reforms to improve the business environment were implemented. The Doing Business survey ranked Chad 185th out of 189 countries in 2014. The score reflected challenges with starting a business, paying taxes, and trading across borders. By 2020, Chad was still toward the bottom of the list of countries.
Appendix D. Methodology

This evaluation used mixed methods to assess three key questions. Methods included (i) systematic desk review and (ii) virtual interviews. The systematic desk review entails an in-depth review of key World Bank Group strategies for Chad covering fiscal years (FY)10–20. This review assesses the relevance, effectiveness, and evolution of the Bank Group's support over the period and how the Bank Group adapted to the country's most pressing development challenges. It also examines the lessons learned and the performance of interventions against the Bank Group's development objectives. The desk review was complemented by virtual interviews with key stakeholders (for example, government, nongovernmental agencies, and task teams) in Washington, DC, and Chad.

The evaluation relied on various sources of information. The Country Program Evaluation drew on available and relevant Bank Group, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), and outside documentation (table D.1). Bank Group documentation included country-specific documents and specific project and program documents, such as Project Appraisal Documents; Implementation Status and Results Reports; Implementation Completion and Results Reports; implementation documentation (including minutes of review meetings and aide-mémoire of supervisory missions); and Expanded Project Supervision Reports for the International Finance Corporation. This documentation will be supplemented by material provided by development partners. In particular, the United Nations Development Programme and the German Agency for International Cooperation have prepared a rich body of material on the Lake Chad region and the increasing environmental challenges in the country that threaten food security and agricultural outputs. This material will inform both a backward- and forward-looking orientation for the evaluation.
Table D.1. Evaluation Questions, Methods, and Data Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Question</th>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Data Sources and Requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To what extent did the World Bank Group–supported strategy address Chad’s most binding development constraints, including the program’s relevance to fragility drivers and the sequencing of reforms?</td>
<td>» Project portfolio review and analysis (lending and nonlending)</td>
<td>» Externally credible data sources on conflict events in Chad (for example, UCDP, ACLED)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>» Key stakeholder interviews, triangulated by stakeholder group</td>
<td>» Access to former and present World Bank staff and decision makers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>» Focus group discussions</td>
<td>» Business intelligence data on lending and nonlending projects and project financing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>» Portfolio analysis and coding</td>
<td>» FCV guidance: FCV strategy and background papers, FCV analytical work (World Bank and other sources)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>» SCDs, CENs, ISNs, CPFs, RRAs, fragility assessments, social assessments, and citizen engagement modules</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>» Field visits to designated project areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. How effective was the Bank Group program in responding to, implementing, and evolving to meet existing and emerging development needs in the country?</td>
<td>» Portfolio review and analysis</td>
<td>» PADs, ICRs, ICRRs, PPARs, impact evaluations, and other relevant studies for closed projects</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Key stakeholder interviews, triangulated by stakeholder group</td>
<td>» Expert analysis of open project designs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>» Expert analysis review of existing portfolio</td>
<td>» Restructuring project papers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Focus group discussions</td>
<td>» Collaboration with the Geospatial Operational Support Team to identify salient World Bank intervention areas and their alignment to sites of fragility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Geospatial analysis</td>
<td>» RRAs, fragility assessments, social assessments, and citizen engagement modules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>» Human resources data analysis</td>
<td>» Tracking data on personnel and resourcing of the Chad program over the past 10 years</td>
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(continued)
### Evaluation Question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. How effectively did the Bank Group coordinate with other development partners and stakeholders during the design and implementation of its partnership strategies in Chad to ensure program relevance, coherence, and sustainability?</th>
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</thead>
</table>

### Methods

- Interviews with UN and humanitarian partners
- Portfolio review and analysis
- Project-level analysis applying a conflict sensitivity filter

### Data Sources and Requirements

- Comprehensive data on UN–World Bank engagements at the project level obtained from OPSSP (UN Partnership Team)
- External evaluations of UN and humanitarian efforts in Chad
- Access to former and present World Bank, UN, and humanitarian staff working on Chad

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.

Note: ACLED = Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project; CEN = Country Engagement Note; CPF = Country Partnership Framework; FCV = fragility, conflict, and violence; ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report; ICRR = Implementation Completion and Results Report Review; ISN = Interim Strategy Note; OPSSP = Office for the Promotion and Strengthening of Social Protection; PAD = Project Appraisal Document; PPAR = Project Performance Assessment Report; RRA = Risk and Resilience Assessment; SCD = Systematic Country Diagnostic; UCDP = Uppsala Conflict Data Program; UN = United Nations.
The evaluation aimed to identify main development constraints and drivers of fragility. To identify the main development constraints, IEG reviewed the Systematic Country Diagnostic (2015), the Interim Strategy Note FY10–12, the Country Partnership Framework (FY16–20), 49 lending operations or projects, 32 analytical products available during the evaluation period, and strategies of development partners such as the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme (2018), and the African Development Bank (2015). IEG identified the top seven development constraints based on these criteria: (i) challenges identified by Bank Group strategies; (ii) alignment of the constraint to the Country Partnership Framework (FY16–20); (iii) alignment of the constraint to other regional and external shocks identified in the government’s national strategy; and (iv) identification of constraints by interviewed stakeholders. To identify conflict drivers, IEG reviewed the Interim Strategy Note (FY10–12), the Systematic Country Diagnostic (2015), the Country Partnership Framework (FY16–20), a 2016 draft conflict and fragility assessment, the 2021 Risk and Resilience Assessment, and the 2021 Lake Chad Regional Risk and Resilience Assessment. A list of the most commonly identified conflict drivers was created. From this list, the main development constraints that were also conflict drivers were identified.

This Country Program Evaluation was among the first to be conducted during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, making country missions impossible. All meetings were held virtually. Because of mission travel restrictions, the evaluation team was unable to assess the contribution of Bank Group support in project areas.
Objet : projet du rapport d’évaluation du programme Pays (EPP)

Réf : 51/02/22/RP/na

En réponse à votre courrier dont les références sont citées ci-dessus, relatif à la lettre de Monsieur OSCAR CALVO GONZALEZ, Directeur du Département du Développement Humain et de la Gestion Économique du Groupe d’Évaluation Indépendant de la Banque Mondiale, je viens par la présente confirmer que la Banque Mondiale reste et demeure un partenaire clé qui peut contribuer à booster le secteur minier du Tchad d’une manière conséquente. Nous apprécions sa présence au Tchad à sa juste valeur.

Vous souhaitant bonne réception de la présente, je vous prè de croire, Monsieur le Représentant Résident, à l’assurance de ma considération distinguée.

ABDELKERIM MAHAMAT ABDELKERIM