



Report Number: ICRR0022210

1. Project Data

Project ID

P163559

Project Name

South Sudan Emergency Food and Nutrition

Country

South Sudan

Practice Area(Lead)

Agriculture and Food

L/C/TF Number(s)

IDA-D1860

Closing Date (Original)

31-Jul-2019

Total Project Cost (USD)

50,243,624.03

Bank Approval Date

04-May-2017

Closing Date (Actual)

31-Jul-2019

IBRD/IDA (USD)
Grants (USD)

Original Commitment

50,000,000.00

0.00

Revised Commitment

50,000,000.00

0.00

Actual

50,243,624.03

0.00

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The project objectives of the Emergency Food and Nutrition Security Project (EFNSP) were: (a) to provide food and nutrition support for the protection of lives and human capital of eligible beneficiaries; and (b) to help farmers re-engage in agricultural production in selected drought-affected areas in South Sudan (Grant Agreement: 2017).



For the purpose of assessing the extent to which the PDO was achieved in Section 4 of this review, it will be parsed into two distinct objectives as follows:

Objective 1: To provide food and nutrition support for the protection of lives and human capital of eligible beneficiaries.

Objective 2: To help farmers re-engage in agricultural production in selected drought-affected areas in South Sudan.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

Component 1. Support to Human Capital and Livelihoods Protection (estimated costs at appraisal- US\$42.0 million; actual costs at project completion- US\$41.0 million).

The component sought to increase access to food for vulnerable households, protect mothers and children, and prevent negative coping activities by poor households. Sub-components were: (a) support to Unconditional Food Transfers to eligible beneficiaries to prevent hunger-related deaths and livelihood erosion; and (b) support to Integrated Management of Nutrition to meet urgent nutritional requirements of children under the age of five, pregnant women, and lactating mothers.

Component 2. Support to Re-engagement in Crop and Livestock Production (estimated costs at appraisal – US\$7.5 million; actual costs at project completion- US\$7.5 million).

Helping farmers affected by drought to re-engage in crop and livestock production by: (a) supporting crop production by helping farming households with seeds, tools and training to grow more food, and: (b) supporting livestock production to improve livestock health among pastoralists and agro-pastoralist communities.

Component 3. Support to Project Implementation Arrangements (estimated costs at appraisal - US\$0.5 million; actual costs at project completion US\$0.8 million).



Financing the administrative costs of the project Implementation Unit (PIU), including financial management, procurement, environmental and social safeguards, and management, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of project activities.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Costs and Financing

The Emergency Food and Nutrition Security Project (EFNSP) was financed wholly by a Grant of US\$50 million (also considered the project cost), from the IDA Crisis Response Window. There were no co-financers, and any informal government contributions have not been estimated.

Dates.

EFNSP was approved on May 4, 2017, and closed on July 31, 2019, the original closing date. The project implementation period was two years and 3 months. The bulk of disbursements for Component I were made in the first year of the project.

Restructuring

There were no changes in objectives, components or monitorable indicators, and no other significant adjustments. There were no restructurings.

Implementing Agencies

For South Sudan its representative was the Ministry of Finance and Planning. The Government's Implementing Agency was the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, with most field activities implemented by three United Nations agencies: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Program (WFP), and the United Nations International Childrens Fund (UNICEF).

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

The South Sudan Emergency Food and Nutrition Security Project (EFNSP) was a rapidly prepared response, designed as an emergency operation, to address extreme food shortage and limited agricultural production capacity in South Sudan, one of the poorest countries in the world.

The food shortage had built up over time but reached crisis proportions in 2017 after a severe drought in 2016. Prolonged internal conflict over much of the previous decades, and further conflict after South Sudan became independent in 2013, had left the country with minimal productive capacity and a population



destitute by almost any measure. The situation became significantly worse from 2013. Trade disputes limited exports of oil, the Government's largest source of revenue. Estimated GDP per capita fell from US\$1,111 in 2014 to less than US\$200 in 2017. And the consumer price index increased by 480 percent from February 2016 to February 2017, largely due to increases in food prices. By 2016, an estimated 83 percent of the country's population was living below the poverty line.

Increasing agricultural productivity has been a key objective for South Sudan over decades, but little progress has been made. Years of conflict and widespread displacement have destroyed the base (markets, roads, institutions, and the technical knowledge of farmers), for agricultural growth. Thus, the country's annual cereal production gap, which had been 220,000 metric tons in 2014 rose to 500,000 tons in 2016. Most farmers produced less food than they needed to feed a household.

The Bank's response to the crisis was within its overall strategy for South Sudan, as elaborated in the Country Engagement Note for the Republic of South Sudan (2017). Government's strategy document was the South Sudan Development Plan, which is consistent with the Bank strategy. Both documents highlighted two objectives. First, the humanitarian objective of urgently increasing access to food, especially for the most vulnerable (the poor, women, and children). And second, an agricultural development objective; to expeditiously increase the capacity of farmers to improve agricultural productivity, thereby tackling Sudan's food shortage at its source.

The project was a direct response to both objectives, each with a corresponding component. The first objective was to "provide food and nutrition support for the protection of lives." This was the immediate *humanitarian goal* – urgent provision of food, very different from the *development goal* of the second objective - "to help farmers re-engage in agricultural production" (through increasing agricultural productivity).

One perspective of the dual nature of the project would be that the two thrusts do not mesh in terms of time-frames and the technical skills required for implementation. Improving productivity might be considered too long-term, not fitting the short duration of an emergency operation. Also, the development actions might take attention and skills away from the humanitarian activities. Notwithstanding, for EFNSP, the choice was made to tackle both objectives.

In South Sudan's case the inclusion of both objectives was appropriate. The food crisis was both immediate and structural. South Sudan is unusually bereft of every infrastructure that would enable improved agricultural productivity. Even farmers' knowledge of agriculture, has been eroded by disrupted activity due to the conflict. Leaving out the development component would simply be maintaining South Sudan's incessant food crisis and reliance on external assistance to mitigate the food deficit. In the event, the development part of the project was fully implemented in most activities, complementing the achievements of the humanitarian part of EFNSP.

Thus, both of the project's objectives, taken together, were relevant: (i) they were fully consistent with the Bank's and the Government's strategies; (ii) were evident needs given the urgency of providing food to help alleviate an extreme food shortage; (iii) there was need to enable farmers to re-establish productive agriculture and reduce vulnerability to future natural disasters; and (iv) the two objectives were complementary, responding to both the immediate challenge to alleviate the food crisis, and the fundamental need to increase farm productivity to be independent of future emergency food assistance.



EFNSP's objectives were Substantially relevant to Government and Bank development strategies for South Sudan

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

Provide food and nutrition support for the protection of lives and human capital of eligible beneficiaries.

Rationale

Theory of Change.

Humanitarian aid through both general and targeted food and nutrition programs was the main goal of the project, comprising 90 percent of actual project costs. Food distribution was the responsibility of the WFP and UNICEF agencies working together. According to the ICR (para 9) the project's primary beneficiaries of the food distribution program at the start of the project were households facing "food consumption gaps that were reflected by above usual acute malnutrition" defined as Phase 3 (ICR, para 7) of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) developed by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS). In general, people in five states in South Sudan (Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei and Eastern Equatoria) were assessed as the most qualified "primary beneficiaries." Eligible beneficiaries were identified using Integrated Rapid Response Missions (IRRM) in vulnerable states and communities to determine the extent of food insecurity facing individuals based on those in IPC Phase 3. The ICR noted, however, that the implementing agencies "had the flexibility to (i) change target areas as per the emerging needs, and (ii) shift from geographical targeting to vulnerability based targeting" (ICR, paras 9 and 71).

Outputs (information presented below for Objective 1 was based on the ICR, Table 3 and Annex 1)

The primary objective was to provide food and nutrition support for the protection of lives and human capital of eligible beneficiaries. Based on this criterion to broadly define the target group, the project focused on providing food insecure individuals with two or more meals per day.

- 268,000 individuals received direct food support enabling them to consume two meals per day, which was seven percent more than the targeted 250,000 individuals.



More focused outputs, (targeted to particular groups) relating to the nutrition of children, women and their health, were about 90 percent of targets (70 percent for access to sanitary services). Such targeted assistance included:

- 107,000 children received supplementary food in the intended quantities, 89 percent of the targeted 120,000 children.
- 74,000 pregnant or lactating women received supplementary food, 93 percent of the targeted 80,000 women.
- 170,000 individuals gained access to sanitary services (access to soap and water, safe drinking water, latrines, and health and nutrition education), about 71 percent of the targeted 200,000 individuals.

Outcomes

Against its primary objective "to provide food and nutrition support for the protection of lives and human capital of eligible beneficiaries", Objective 1 was achieved. Based on the data recorded under "Outputs" above, the number of beneficiaries attributable to the project was 11 percent above the target for the project which was nearly fully achieved in the first year of the project, half the total project period. The number of individuals receiving two meals/day or more was 7 percent above the target.

The efficacy with which Objective 1 was achieved is rated by this review as Substantial.

Rating

Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

Help farmers re-engage in agricultural production in selected drought-affected areas.

Rationale

Theory of Change

The second component of the project, which implemented actions in support of Objective 2, comprised a relatively small part of project costs - about 10 percent - but it had particular significance - tackling the base of South Sudan's food crises which was the low and variable agricultural productivity. In the short implementation period of the project, actions had to be practical and relatively straightforward for farmers to take on, for instance, seeds for crop varieties with short-term growing cycles and better yields.. With respect to management, especially of procurement which needed to be efficient, FAO provided the needed support. Farmers in drought-affected areas were the target beneficiaries for this objective

Outputs (information presented below for Objective 2 was based on the ICR, Table 3 and Annex 1)

The first challenge for this project was to reach households in drought-affected areas. The actual number of families helped to re-engage in agricultural production was close to 32,000, above the target of 30,000 households. Other achievements (outputs) contributing to the main objective included:



- The amount of seeds and planting materials distributed was 453 metric tons (50 percent more than the target of 300 metric tons).
- 855,000 animals were vaccinated, more than four times the targeted 200,000 animals.
- 60,000 farm tool kits were distributed - six times the targeted 10,000 farm kits.

Outcome

As shown above, output achievements under Objective 2 exceeded targets for all the monitored actions. With respect to the project's overarching goal – the PDO indicator was the "number of households supported to resume crop and livestock production." The households which were helped to re-engage in crop and livestock production in drought affected areas was 31,800. This achievement was 6% above the targeted outcome of 30,000 households.

The Efficacy with which Objective 2 was achieved is rated by this review as Substantial.

Rating

Substantial

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

Overall Quantitative Outcomes. For both objectives, intended actions were achieved, exceeding the scale planned, and in turn, the outcomes exceeded targets. This review therefore rated the achievement of Objectives 1 and 2 as Substantial.

In addition to the achievements of Objectives 1 and 2 the ICR reported on the total number of beneficiaries and the proportion of all beneficiaries who were female.

- A total of 642,000 beneficiaries are reported to have received various forms of assistance or support from this project. This was 11% more than the project target of 580,000 beneficiaries.
- 58% of beneficiaries were female compared with a target of 50%

Overall Qualitative Outcomes. The ICR also stresses that the project generated qualitative benefits attributable to the project that were also considered in the assessment of benefits, namely: (a) saved lives and avoidance of severe health issues; (b) increased social cohesion; (c) the re-emergence of markets for the sale and purchase of assets; (d) long-term benefits from improved nutrition and education; and (e) benefits associated with indirect economic impacts of capital accumulation (para 92). The value of these benefits was



not quantified in the ICR but the benefits listed are typical of the results that have been acknowledged for similar projects.

The project's performance was achieved in the face of considerable hazards and operational impediments due to the incessant internal conflicts in South Sudan throughout the project's implementation. Flexible and judicious project management (e.g. choice of operational locations, timing of activities, and informal village interactions with conflict combatants contributed to the achievement of most project targets though it did not completely resolve all the problems and challenges.

Nevertheless, despite limited evidence on outcomes, both objectives exceeded their targets, and secondary benefits were arguably significant. This review has rated the project's Overall Efficacy as Substantial.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

Economic Analysis.

As is frequently the case in humanitarian aid projects, an economic rate of return was not calculated at appraisal or in the ICR for component 1 of the project. Various difficulties imposed by the nature of the project - such as rapid preparation and implementation, leaving little time for monitoring impacts; measurement difficulties for impacts on health and nutrition; and the impact of conflict; and other variables – preclude calculation of an overall project economic rate of return. For component 2 (more comparable to a conventional investment project than component 1) an ERR was estimated at appraisal and found to be 22 percent. However, component 2's share of actual project costs was only about 8 percent, limiting its relevance to a cost-benefit analysis for the project-as a whole. In this case cost-effectiveness and implementation efficiency were more relevant yardsticks:

Cost-Effectiveness

Total costs at project closure amounted to US\$45.4 million, 91 percent of the project costs estimated at appraisal. Achievements were 610,406 beneficiaries from the humanitarian assistance program (component 1), 11 percent more than the 550,000,000 beneficiaries targeted at appraisal. For Component 2 (reengagement in agricultural production), achievements (31,800 participants) also exceeded the planned 30,000 participants. Thus, with project costs lower than costs estimated at appraisal and actual achievements greater than these, the project was more cost-effective than envisaged. Given their experience in food distribution it not surprising that all the agencies employed techniques to be cost-effective in this project. It was surprising, however, that the ICR did not explore the experience of two of these agencies concerning actual costs per beneficiary of the distribution of food and agricultural tools.



Implementation Efficiency

The project got off to a fast start, with 89 percent of disbursements made in the first year. Retroactive financing of US\$14.7 million facilitated the fast start. Other factors were the procurement and disbursement systems designed for the project. Funding from the World Bank went directly to the three agencies, which enabled rapid procurement without delays from the Government procurement and disbursement systems. Finally, strong performance of the three agencies was a critical factor for the speed and quality of the project's achievements. According to the ICR, the WFP reduced costs by improving road and river corridors and removing illegal check posts with the support of government authorities. WFP also reduced its reliance on air transport from 35 percent in 2017 to 7 percent in 2019. In addition, it expanded storage capacity in South Sudan by 27,000 mt and deployed 124 mobile storage units in hard to-reach locations to position supplies ahead of the rainy season. Strategies aimed at increasing the use of road and river transport and reducing air transport entailed cost savings of 85 percent for the transport of food (para 33).

Overall Efficiency

The project's cost effectiveness was satisfactory and, with targeting efficiently achieved, and nearly 90 percent of disbursements made in the project's first year, implementation efficiency was excellent. Based on EFNSP's strong performance in terms of cost-effectiveness and implementation efficiency, the project's Overall Efficiency was rated Substantial.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The project responded to a crisis-situation – a major food deficit, with prospects for an even greater food security crisis if there were further erosion in South Sudan's human and physical infrastructure. Faced with this situation, urgent provision of food and its efficient distribution was a clear priority. There was also a need to help farmers hit by drought to recover their productive capacity so that the nation could grow more food and reduce dependency on imports and aid. Thus, the two thrusts of the project – the “humanitarian” urgent supply of food (Objective 1), and the “development” assistance to farmers (Objective 2) were both relevant. The efficacy of the project's achievements was substantial. The scope of food distribution exceeded targets and the number of



farmers re-engaging in agriculture also reached its goal. The project was cost-effective and implemented expeditiously. Efficiency was therefore rated Substantial.

With relevance, efficacy and efficiency all substantial this review concluded that the project had minor shortcomings and this review has therefore rated its Overall Outcome as Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating
Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

South Sudan's extreme climatic conditions, such as severe droughts and extensive flooding, make cultivation and farm investments inherently risky. Frequent droughts leave families below subsistence levels and highly vulnerable to further stress. Locusts and other pest infestations add to the risks of growing crops, and ticks as well as a number of livestock diseases play havoc among cattle. Any continuation of South Sudan's long-standing internal conflicts would add further to rural uncertainties and investments. Roads are few and they are to a large extent often in disrepair, and the government has low institutional capacity. In this highly challenging physical and institutional environment, continuing any development initiative is difficult.

The project's agricultural initiatives could continue but would likely need intensive support and advisory services, not guaranteed in South Sudan's encumbered economy. The humanitarian aid program was not intended as an investment operation – only as emergency provision of food and some services. With that completed, the limited institutional infrastructure that was strengthened to handle future food aid distribution is likely to erode. Continued development aid, including from the Bank, would be beneficial. It is noted that a rural development project is currently being prepared by the Bank. However, despite such initiatives, given the climatic and security uncertainties noted above, risks for EFNSP's development outcome are High.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

Project preparation was expeditious, taking less than four months. As an emergency response project, speed of delivery was in itself a key element in the project's quality at entry. The project stood on firm ground. Its relevance was anchored in the Bank strategy for South Sudan, and chronic food shortages had reached crisis dimensions. The project and its objectives responded to this. The task team had the knowledge to create a detailed project design providing clear guidance for project implementation. The two-pronged approach proved appropriate and manageable.



The decision to use experienced UN agencies as the project implementers, rather than government, brought in their higher technical capacity and a more streamlined management, particularly for procurement. A weaker aspect was M&E design, which could have been broader based to monitor qualitative as well as quantitative results. Overall, however, quality at entry was Satisfactory.

Quality-at-Entry Rating Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

Due to prolonged conflict and lack of access to the field, supervision by the Bank was largely virtual. The Bank team collaborated well with Government and the three UN agencies and was able to facilitate the action plan and completion as scheduled. This included achieving the monitoring indicators in the Results Framework (ICR Annex 1). With the Bank task team leaders limited to two over the project period, continuity in leadership was helpful. The project performed as planned and to schedule. Approval to closure took 26 months in line with the original closing date at appraisal. Nearly all implementation targets were achieved or exceeded. The Bank team and the diligence of the UN agencies in implementing the project were a key factor in these achievements, operating under particularly difficult circumstances. This review rates the quality ESFNSP supervision as Satisfactory.

Quality of Supervision Rating Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

All three implementing agencies were to undertake M&E of activities under their responsibility, reporting to the Project Implementation Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. They provided quarterly progress reports for Government and the Bank to contribute to implementation support and general supervision.

Information on project progress for the ICR's Results Framework was collected comprehensively, but nearly all the information was related to physical achievements (e.g. number of project beneficiaries, amount of farm tools). Quantitative and qualitative information on outcomes - such as the project's impact on yields of the higher quality seed; improvements in welfare; and the degree to which targeted benefits



reached the intended beneficiaries - was not provided. although for a short-duration project quantitative outcomes are not easy to achieve

Thus, while M&E design for an emergency project is not typically expected to cover anything but the most basic and easily measured information; addition as feasible of several key qualitative indicators would have added greater understanding of achievements of the project's broader objectives. Rapid rural appraisal, village meetings, discussions with key informants or other means, are amongst the options that might have provided a quickly determined indicative assessment of the project's broader outcomes.

b. M&E Implementation

The agencies traced and reported progress against the project's development objectives. M&E procedures differed between the agencies, although overall, in spite of security impediments, the key physical data intended for monitoring was collected.

c. M&E Utilization

The quarterly progress reports were used by all parties (the agencies, Government, and the Bank) for decision making on project implementation, although as observed above, information was limited to physical progress. The ICR comments that the M&E information might also have been used to "refine project implementation," although this is not elaborated.

Summarizing M&E as a whole, coverage was thorough for physical data, but this was not matched by quantitative and qualitative data on project outcomes. Nevertheless, the M&E systems designed and managed by the three UN agencies, collected data as required by the legal agreements with the Bank. Any shortcomings were apparently not detected by Bank supervision missions. However, given the very difficult circumstances in which this emergency project was implemented, the quality of M&E is rated Substantial.

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

Environment

The project was classified as category B and triggered the following safeguards: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01); Pest Management ((OP/BP 4.09); and Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10). An Environmental and Social Management Framework, and an Integrated Pest Management Plan were prepared as guidance documents, although both were delayed. Several environmental issues were addressed, amongst them, disposal of wastes, and safety procedures for livestock husbandry. There were some implementation



issues: the company hired to manage the safeguards performed unevenly; and the ICR reported that some safeguards documents were incomplete.

Social

The ICR advises that social cohesion was enhanced by the project through wide-based community consultation including indigenous peoples who were members of the project implementation committees and input distribution committees. Divisions and sources of tension within and between communities were improved by such collective decision making and related actions. The ICR also noted that "Although the grievance response mechanism (GRM) was effectively addressing the concerns and resolving issues among the beneficiaries, proper documentation was weak) (ICR, para 60).

Despite some shortcomings, the ICR concluded that: "The overall environmental and social safeguards compliance was adequate" (para 58).

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial.

Financial covenants were complied with and audit reports were timely and unqualified. However, there were two shortfalls in financial management: the intended computerized accounting system was not utilized; and there were gaps in the financial management manual (ICR para 61).

Procurement

Procurement and related disbursements were expeditious, substantially due to the direct handling of procurement and disbursements by the implementing agencies. All procurement activities were treated as prior reviewed under the enhanced procurement measures for Sudan's emergency food program. No procurement issues were noted (ICR, para 62).

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

d. Other

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Efficiency rating raised to substantial due to cost-effectiveness, expeditious



			implementation, and compliance with expectations on efficiency for an emergency project.
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory	The Bank enabled a broadly successful project performance amidst considerable implementation constraints.
Quality of M&E	Modest	Substantial	While there were moderate shortcomings in M&E design and implementation, overall M&E performance complied with the legal requirements for this emergency project.
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

Based on the project experience, the ICR listed seven lessons. This review considers that the following five lessons drawn from the ICR (with some adaptations) emerge as potentially relevant to future similar emergency projects:

1. *An emergency response project can lay the foundation for a longer-term development program.*

EFNSP comprised both a ‘humanitarian’ operation (urgent provision of food for short-term mitigation of famine), and a “development” operation helping farmers who had suffered seriously from drought to ‘re-engage’ in agricultural production. Food provisions were the kernel of EFNSP, as typical in a food-crisis response project. The inclusion, however, of the development component met the need to help farmers become self-reliant. Food provision provided an immediate palliative, but the development part gave follow-on benefits not long after. The lesson is that a forwards looking approach to a food crisis – by helping farmers to become self-reliant - can reduce a country’s chronic food deficit and dependence on external assistance.

2. *In crisis response projects, implementation by non-government agencies rather than government institutions may be appropriate when the agencies have greater capability - speed rather than capacity building would generally be paramount.*

The lesson from this project was that implementation of the project by three competent UN agencies – FAO, WFP and WHO – with extensive experience with food distribution and basic rehabilitation of farming in South Sudan, were able to start and carry out the operation effectively at a fast pace on behalf of a government with very weak implementation capacity in a large country

3. *With a flexible approach, rapid preparation need not preclude an effective, more socially responsive project outcome.*

The emergency project was prepared in less than four months, yet the lesson is that several design adjustments were successfully made while the project was being implemented - such as choice of



beneficiaries on a vulnerability basis rather than by location, and improving targeting to the most needy.

4. Tailored procurement procedures and capable staffing are particularly important in an emergency project.

The humanitarian aid part of the project was disbursed within a year, and the development part by project closure. The lesson is that implementation by established UN institutions was possible because their procurement guidelines were in line with Bank guidelines, hence prior review was not needed, and management of procurement was under the control of qualified, experienced and competent agencies.

5. M&E design can include reasonable means of assessing impact of an emergency operation.

The M&E system effectively monitored achievements against the project's physical targets. This was a notable success given the conflict situation and severe logistical challenges facing the gathering of data. However, all monitoring data were in output terms. While M&E is not the first priority for an emergency operation, some understanding of the real outcome and impact of the project would have been informative. The lesson is that a small sample survey, or even anecdotal information obtained through structured conversations, could have provided greater understanding of beneficiary views, the impacts of project actions, and the way forward..

13. Assessment Recommended?

Yes

Please Explain

As part of a multi-project/several-countries review of Bank experience with emergency response projects.

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is a thoughtful review and provides issues-oriented discussion of the achievement of the project. Discussion is placed within overviews of the difficulties of providing food and social services as intended. The Results Framework contains candid and well written explanatory notes and follows standard OPCS guidance, systematically comparing achievements against appraisal targets. The analysis, while providing data on the project's achievements and its efficiency, would have been strengthened by some international comparative data on food distribution costs, and qualitative measures of achievements/impacts of the programs or an explanation of their absence during project implementation. The ICR did, however, provide some useful lessons.



A future project may be approved in 2021, and it would have been informative to have had at least a brief comment on this in the ICR, factored into the discussions of risks to development outcome as this would have provided greater reflection on risks and design for this operation.

Overall, the quality of the ICR is Substantial.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial