Public Disclosure Authorized

Report Number: ICRR0022999

1. Project Data

Project ID P149182	Project Name MP Citizen Access to Responsive Services		
Country India	Practice Area(Lead) Governance		
L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-57050	Closing Date (Original) 31-Mar-2021		Total Project Cost (USD) 28,280,000.00
Bank Approval Date 29-Jan-2016	Closing Date (Actual) 31-Mar-2021		
	IBRD/II	DA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	35,000,000.00		0.00
Revised Commitment	28,280,000.00		0.00
	28,280,000.00 0.00		
Actual	28,2	280,000.00	0.00
Actual	28,2	280,000.00	0.00

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

According to the Financing Agreement (p. 5) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, p. 5), the objective of the project was to:

• improve access to Public Services Guarantee Act (PSGA) services by citizens of Madhya Pradesh, and in particular by under-represented groups.

The project development objective remained the same, but final-year targets for two outcome indicators were modified in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. With strong evidence of project-supported trends in outcomes prior to the pandemic, this Review will not perform a spit rating.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation? Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
No

d. Components

The project had two complementary components. The components differed in the way they were financed, their modalities, and the types of activities they supported.

Component 1 was results-based financing (RBF: US\$25 million at appraisal; actual US\$26 million) with disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) to incentivize the implementation of reforms and activities aimed at: (i) improving access to services and conducting citizen outreach campaigns, (ii) simplification of government services through Government Process Reengineering (GPR) and automation of back-end procedures of line departments to improve their integration with front-end interfaces, and (iii) performance management through focus on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools and collecting beneficiary feedback. Financing was to be disbursed against the achievement of DLIs.

Component 2 was technical assistance (TA: US\$10 million at appraisal; actual US\$2.28 million) to support institutional strengthening through activities aimed at: (i) providing information and communication technology (ICT) and capacity building support for conducting GPR in line departments, and (ii) building capacity of the Madhya Pradesh State Agency for Public Services (MPSAPS) through hiring of a Project Management Consultant (PMC). This component did not have a separate results framework. Financing was to be disbursed against Interim Financial Reports (IFRs).

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
Planned costs at appraisal were US\$50 million, with US\$35 million from a World Bank credit and US\$15
million from the borrower. The project was approved in late January 2016, underwent a mid-term review in
July 2019, and closed as scheduled in March 2021. There were four major disbursements (between US\$5
and US\$7 million) made in October 2016, April 2018, June 2019, and April 2020, and four minor
disbursements (under US\$ 1 million each) in between. Each Bank disbursement was matched by a 30
percent contribution from the government.

The project was restructured three times -- in December 2020, and twice in March 2021 -- to enable it to focus on activities that had become priorities because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Total World Bank financing was revised downwards from US\$35 million to US\$28.28 million. All cancelled funds were under the TA component, as the government became significantly more restrictive about spending with the onset

of the pandemic, and some planned purchases of hardware and software were covered by grants available through other central government schemes (ICR, p. 17). Savings were also realized from the depreciation of the rupee against the dollar. Spending under the second component therefore decreased from a budgeted US\$10 million to US\$2.28 million. US\$1 million was reallocated to the first component, and US\$6.72 million was cancelled in line with the government's reprioritization.

Spending under the RBF component increased from the planned US\$25 million to US\$26 million, and funds were reallocated to reflect downward revision of some outcome targets due to lockdowns and restrictions on movement of citizens. The two outcome-level DLIs (1 and 2, focusing on in-person services) were reduced by US\$0.8 million and US\$1.2 million respectively, and DLIs 4, 6, 7 and 8 (focusing on digital and other remote services) were increased by US\$0.6 million, US\$0.7 million, US\$0.7 million, and US\$1 million respectively.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

The objectives were aligned with country context. Madhya Pradesh is a low-income state, with more than one-third of its population living below the poverty line. Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) comprise about 16 and 17 percent of the population, respectively. Due to remote geographies and low literacy rates, many citizens are unable to access public services and benefits to which they are entitled under social protection schemes. The MP Public Service Guarantee Act (PSGA), passed in 2010, was intended to set standards for delivery and timeliness of public services. A 2016 survey, however, found that three-quarters of users were still not receiving services within stipulated time frames, and that SCs, STs, and women were still disproportionately disadvantaged in terms of public services access. The World Bank's 2018 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) emphasized the need to strengthen the agility, performance, and responsiveness of India's public sector institutions, finding persistent gaps in public service delivery, particularly for vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in rural areas. The government's ability to process applications for services was especially limited by lack of integration of various databases.

The objectives were congruent with the Country Partnership Framework for India (CPF, FY 2018-22), as public service delivery was one of the CPF's four catalytic "hows" of engagement that were intended to serve as impact multipliers. The project's objectives were also relevant to both India's Strategy for New India@75 and the Atma Nirbhar Madhya Pradesh – Roadmap for 2023, which emphasized the need for effective public service delivery through a public oriented, transparent, and accountable administration. These government strategies also recognized that inequality and poverty affect some population groups more seriously, such as SCs/STs, and that these groups therefore have heightened needs to access public services.

The project remained relevant through the unprecedented and unpredictable context of the COVID-19 pandemic through adjustments that reinforced the virtual and digital components of the project already in place. The retained relevance applied less to the project's under-represented target groups, however, who were already at a disadvantage when it comes to online access.

Rating

High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

Improved access to PSGA services by citizens of Madhya Pradesh

Rationale

The theory of change for this objective involved both supply-side and demand-side interventions. It held that increasing the number of points of presence (PoPs) for service application and delivery, improving the user-friendliness of in-person service kiosks (*Lok Seva Kendras*, LSKs), increasing the range of services covered under the PSGA, increasing the number of channels for PSGA services (including on-line services), and strengthening back-end functions would increase the availability and accessibility of public services. Efforts to raise citizen awareness through communications and outreach were to increase demand for services. Taken together, these interventions would improve access to PSGA services for citizens.

Outputs

The number of fully operational PoPs increased from 336 LSKs at baseline to 428 LSKs plus an additional 37,522 Common Service Centers (CSCs) and MPOnline kiosks at closure, vastly exceeding the target of a total of 536 PoPs. The project harnessed about 400 private agencies through public-private partnerships (PPPs) that were reimbursed for implementing public service delivery. One LSK was established at every district and Tehsil level, and at any block where the population exceeded 5,000. For every grouping of six villages, a CSC was established. To cater to the urban population, MPOnline kiosks were set up in every ward or colony, staffed by the private sector. According to the project team, the project fully realized the potential for smaller one-stop-shops at the village level, leveraging their capacity to deliver services that were initially only available through LSKs. This made possible an exponential increase in service availability.

The target for all LSKs having information/facilitation services (from a baseline of zero) was fully met in the project's first year. The project team worked with the government to make it a mandatory contractual requirement for the private vendors that were hired to operate the LSKs to include information desks.

The number of PSGA services available online increased from 47 services at baseline to 355 services at closure, exceeding the target of 350 services. The project team later added that the use of non-LSK online services increased from 5.13 percent of all services to 17.34 percent at closure. According to the ICR (p. 11), the pandemic triggered accelerated project efforts to make services available online and through other channels (phone calls, mobile phones) that do not require in-person contact.

The percentage of PSGA services provided within the legal time frame increased from 87 percent at baseline to 97 percent at closure, exceeding the target of 95 percent. According to the ICR (p. 15), the project

facilitated the development of a "one-day governance" scheme, where specific services were guaranteed within one day, made possible by inter-departmental integration and the removal of administrative barriers. Using open data and creating service delivery rankings, a culture of competition and accountability was created among service providers, reducing delivery times.

The number of channels through which services can be accessed—kiosk, web, mobile apps, phone/helpline, village level service providers— increased from a baseline of one channel (LSKs) to seven channels by project closure, exceeding the target of four channels. These included physical offices and kiosks (Offices of the Designated Officers, LSKs, CSCs, MPOnline kiosks), online through the mpedistrict14 portal, on mobile phones through the mpedistrict mobile application, and phone calls.

The number of PSGA services issuing digital certificates increased from one at baseline to eight at closure, exceeding the original target of five and the revised target of eight services.

The number of services having undergone GPR increased from 80 at baseline to 303 at closure, exceeding the target of 288 services. GPR led to significant increases in the number of transactions per month for certain services (average monthly issuance of income certificates, domicile certificates, and certified copies from record rooms increased by 23.8, 73.6, and 120 percent, respectively) (ICR, p. 39).

Annual reports on PSGA service delivery were presented, as planned, to a High-Power Committee (established in 2014 and chaired by the Chief Secretary, coordinating inter-departmental coordination across departments delivering PSGA services, and acting as Steering Committee for the project). These reports were generated by a project management team with expertise on M&E, communication, technical coordination, procurement and contracts management, project planning, budgeting, and execution.

Outcomes

The percentage of citizens accessing PSGA services (measured by the number of applications for PSGA services processed annually as a percentage of the total population of the state) increased from 5.4 percent in 2016 to 14.9 percent in Year 4 of the project (prior to the pandemic), meeting the Year 4 target of 14.89 percent. In year 5 (2021), PSGA service access fell to 9.88 percent due to pandemic lockdowns, such that neither the original end target of 16.9 percent nor the revised end target of 15.9 percent were achieved. However, the project's trajectory over its first four years suggests that, in the absence of pandemic lockdowns, the original end target would have been achieved (ICR, p. 8, Figure 3). In addition, the project's intermediate outcome achievements, particularly the increases in number of PoPs, expansion of delivery channels such as online and telephone-based services, and shortening of delivery times, suggest that access to services was substantially improved.

Additional evidence provided by the project team showed that the main results referenced in the ICR, expressed as percentages of the population, were not corrected for population growth (estimated at 1.43 percent per year). When corrected for population growth, achievement was 13.16 percent of the population accessing services in Year 4 and 8.77 percent in Year 5.

Rating

Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

Improved access to PSGA services by under-represented groups

Rationale

In addition to the logic governing the first objective, the theory of change for this objective included outreach strategies targeted at women and SC/ST groups, information education and communication awareness campaigns, and mechanisms for collecting and analyzing beneficiary feedback that were designed to support the project's responsiveness to the needs of the under-represented groups (ICR, p. 10). These additional targeted interventions were to improve access to PSGA services specifically for under-represented groups.

Outputs

The project developed and rolled out a focused outreach strategy for women, SCs, and STs. This strategy included information, education, and communication campaigns encompassing street plays, newspaper articles, radio jingles, and public service announcements, as well as translation of key materials into tribal dialects.

To ensure responsiveness to the needs of under-represented groups, the project carried out annual surveys to collect and analyze beneficiary feedback for the project's first four years. The fifth year was missed due to elections, as the Election Commission of India prohibits any outreach to citizens during election season. As a result, the project could publish only three of the four beneficiary feedback reports envisaged during the project period. In addition to annual surveys, citizen feedback was solicited through numerous other channels, including text messaging, helplines, outbound call centers, QR codes displayed at LSKs, and several other online portals.

Outcomes

The percentage of all applications for PSGA services that were submitted by SCs and STs (self-identified) increased from 14.19 percent at baseline to 41.4 percent in project Year 4, exceeding the Year 4 target of 41.35 percent (no baseline was provided). In Year 5, after lockdowns led to the closure of LSKs, the percentage was 41.23 percent, against a target of 42.4 percent. These results indicate that SCs and STs experienced a significant expansion of access to services under the project and did not suffer disproportionate losses in access even under pandemic-related restrictions.

The percentage of all applications for PSGA services that were submitted by women increased from 10.31 percent at baseline to 22.36 percent in project Year 4, declining to 18.38 percent in Year 5 and therefore not meeting the target of 23.36 percent. Compared with SCs/STs, women were markedly more impacted by pandemic restrictions during the project's final year.

The ICR (pp. 10-11) cites a study by the Indian Institute of Management, Indore, finding that less developed districts in the state accessed PSGA services during the project period in a higher proportion than their population share in the state, supporting the conclusion that the project increased access among underrepresented groups.

Rating Substantial

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

The project substantially increased access to public services for the citizens of Madhya Pradesh, especially for under-represented groups (SCs/STs and women), meeting or exceeding targets through its fourth (penultimate) year. Access to in-person service centers was adversely affected by pandemic-related restrictions, but the project's expansion of online and other delivery channels maintained substantial access to public services even in its final year, and the ICR presents convincing evidence that its original (higher) outcome targets were on track to be met if the pandemic had not intervened.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

No economic or financial rate of return was calculated for the project. The PAD noted that positive impacts were expected to be twofold: reduced transaction costs for citizens in obtaining services, and reduced administrative costs due to integration, simplification, and automation within service delivery systems.

The ICR's analysis estimates more than US\$150 million in savings from reduced transaction costs. Savings from administrative costs are not calculated. The transaction cost savings estimate is based on a model covering the reduction in number of days to deliver a service, the number of supporting documents required, and the number of visits to an LSK required. It assumes that time saved in requesting and receiving services can be assigned a monetary value based on wage rates and other factors. The ICR does not interrogate the assumption that the saved time would be used for productive (wage-earning) activities, nor does it vary the value of saved time for different groups. An assessment of efficiency gains based on lowered administrative costs might have been more informative, especially as the project resulted in significant increases in the numbers of citizens accessing services and services delivered. As actual spending by LSKs and other PoPs could have been calculated, this exercise would have been less speculative than the one that was performed.

Other elements of the project, however, demonstrated substantial efficiency. The preparation phase was efficient due to high-level political and bureaucratic commitment to the project; the main government counterpart

was both the technical head of the Department of Public Service Management and Secretary to the Chief Minister, creating a convergence of technical and political ownership (ICR, p. 15). Implementing teams within both the government and the Bank remained stable, helping to maintain good communication channels and ensuring a smooth working relationship. Where appropriate, tasks were decentralized and delegated to lower levels of administration and/or authority. Project activities were implemented with only 57 percent of planned funds disbursed while still achieving intended outcomes. Project preparation and supervision costs were low relative to the overall project cost. Implementation arrangements were well supported and had the capacity to innovate when necessary. Efficiencies in monitoring allowed for quick identification of issues and corrective action, speeding implementation. The results-based approach functioned smoothly. The project closed on time, even with its last year coinciding with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Some issues arose with procurement (see Section 10b), mostly related to frictions between the government and Bank staff over which procurement regulations to use. According to the project team, the government had strong and legitimate reasons to prefer its own systems, but the project's legal arrangements clearly stipulated that Bank procurement procedures had to be applied.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 □ Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 □ Not Applicable

^{*} Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The project was highly relevant to country context, government strategy, and Bank strategy. Efficacy is rated substantial based on strong and attributable achievement of outcomes through the project's fourth year, with a trajectory prior to the COVID-19 pandemic clearly leading toward achievement of key outcome targets, and acceleration of remote service delivery during the pandemic. Efficiency is rated substantial due to broad evidence of implementation efficiency, even in the absence of convincing economic analysis. Taken together, these ratings indicate that there were only minor shortcomings in the project's preparation, implementation, and achievement, leading to an Outcome rating of Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

Two main risks to the development outcome of the project were identified in the ICR: technical and financial. Overall, however, the risk to the development outcomes of the project was low given numerous factors, including the high relevance that was retained and perhaps even strengthened with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, strong government ownership and administrative leadership of the project, and visible efficiency gains from GPR and the move to provision of online services, both of which have given the government effective tools to meet ever-increasing demand for citizen services. In this process the relevant government institutions were strengthened in different ways, but the GPR was fundamental as it redesigned and simplified business processes, removed administrative bottlenecks, and positively changed and enhanced service quality parameters, such as time, cost, complexity, efficiency, and convenience to citizens.

Importantly, the sustainability of the project benefitted significantly from increased levels of transparency and accountability in the provision of services. The project team later described these as the de facto main outcomes of the project, even though they were not part of the project's original theory of change or results framework. Importantly, however, this unintended impact reduces the risk to the development outcome markedly, as increased transparency and accountability in the provision of services makes it unlikely that many of the factors that inhibited compliance with the PSGA legislation will reemerge.

On the technical side, it was important that the software initially budgeted for under the second component was procured internally at subsidized rates and provided by the State Data Center. An experienced firm has been contracted for further development and maintenance of the technical systems for online provision of services. Moreover, the project team confirmed that the government extended the contract with the project management team brought in by the Bank, which is a sign of its commitment to retention of technical skills.

On the financial side, the setup of the LSKs as PPPs with a guaranteed minimum income of INR 50,000 per month from a so-called Viability Gap Fund (VGF) poses a fiduciary risk to the government, with outlays already having increased during the pandemic. The PAD notes that fewer than half of LSKs are subsidized through the VGF, but the ICR does not provide an update on this figure before or after the pandemic. To mitigate this risk, the government is considering bringing to an end the guaranteed minimum income by turning the LSKs into self-sustaining units.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project was well prepared in response to strong demand from the government. Deep and broad ownership created an enabling environment that was resilient to the onset of the COVID-19 Pandemic. The project was, however, the first of its kind and more complex than the traditional investment lending projects the government was used to (PAD, p. 11). The perceived complexity stemmed from the mix of a results-based and a TA component, but extensive consultation with stakeholders across government were conducted to contextualize the project's goals and make them practical and realistic. Moreover, the outcomes were identified based on well-researched structural

problems including issues of disadvantage, vulnerability, geographical exclusion, and gender. This was done by a joint task team with experts both from the Bank and the government.

Despite the limited use of funds under the TA component, the project contributed significantly to institutional strengthening and extensive capacity building of state systems and human resources. It could be questioned whether this component of the project was over-budgeted, but given the pioneering nature of the project, it was challenging to anticipate the government's commitment to use its own funds for the project's software elements. COVID-19 also impacted the spending of resources under this component, as the incentives to spend TA money were reduced and some planned follow up activities were cancelled. According to the project team, in a non-COVID context the project would most likely have been extended, but the government's shift in short-term priorities led to the decision to close the project according to its original timeline.

Quality-at-Entry Rating Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The project was adequately supervised and responded well to events outside the control of the Bank or government. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic was met resolutely with three level-2 restructurings during the final year of implementation. There was a good working relationship and continuous dialogue between the Bank and the government. The project relied on staff with a wide range of internal technical skills. Project management and technical support were also provided through a Project Management Consultancy (PMC) hired with Bank financing. The PMC did a significant amount of work (including dealing with ongoing procurement challenges) to keep the project on track. The positive impact of the strong ownership and partnership characterizing the project was reflected in its smooth implementation with results meeting and, in some cases, exceeding annual targets until the project's final, pandemic-affected year.

Quality of Supervision RatingSatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The project's M&E framework was sound. The PDO indicators and intermediate results indicators were all clearly specified, comprehensive, measurable, timely, and credible. They all had clear baselines, and most were quantitative. However, the framing of annual targets as percentage-point increases over prior years,

rather than simple numerical targets, was easily misunderstood, and it would have strengthened the outcome indicators if they had incorporated the impact of population growth up front.

The project team collected data regularly, and a four-member data analytics team was constituted in 2016. The project used innovative methods to collect data and information on applications, beneficiaries, and timeliness of service delivery from real-time management information systems (MIS) and dashboards that were built for this purpose. The design of the framework also ensured that a robust beneficiary mechanism to collect proactive feedback from citizens on the quality of services provided was embedded across government.

b. M&E Implementation

The M&E framework was fully implemented, with comprehensive data collection across all PDO-level indicators and intermediate results indicators carried out throughout the project's lifecycle and beyond. Data were collected through the project management information system, and real-time data from the various departments were consolidated in the Chief Minister's Dashboard. The data analytics team aggregated service delivery data across service platforms and departmental databases. All data were audited and verified by an independent agency, which contributed to the credibility of reported achievement. The timeliness and accuracy of data were particularly important for this project, as disbursements relied on DLIs. This level of institutionalization increases the probability of the M&E functions being sustained.

While not directly involved in defining and measuring target indicators for the project, citizens were proactively engaged in providing feedback on the quality and accessibility of services. A helpline, with a toll-free number to a call center, was established for complaints and grievances. An outbound call center that sought proactive feedback from citizens was also established.

c. M&E Utilization

The M&E framework was used in a highly proactive and innovative manner. The delivery of online services enabled the generation of large amounts of data that were used effectively to monitor and improve the quality of service delivery. The Chief Minister's Dashboard, an on-line portal that not only integrates data from various sources on a single platform but also analyzes data in real time to facilitate swift evidenced-based decision making, was reviewed by the Chief Minister on a monthly basis. The Dashboard is able to provide data disaggregated by territory, administration, service, and gender. The Borrower's Completion Report (Annex 7 to the ICR) includes a pilot analysis using such data to shed light on the project's impact by district and the level of equity in service access across districts. This analysis suggests, for example, that the population of the less developed districts is accessing a higher proportion of public services than their share in the state population would suggest.

M&E Quality Rating High

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was rated Environmental Assessment category C and did not trigger any of the Bank's safeguards policies.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial management was sound, but there was some room for improvement. While financial reporting met Bank standards, there were often delays in the auditing of expenditure statements, requiring multiple follow-ups by the project team. The delays were partly due to turnover of financial management staff. The ICR does not provide information on whether the auditors' statements were qualified, but the project did not face issues related to the flow of funds.

Procurement experienced shortcomings that raised several red flags in the Bank system. Staff turnover and the fact that counterparts felt more comfortable and accountable following state procurement norms resulted in delays in procurements under Component 2. These issues remained throughout the project's lifetime, with the Bank team unable to sustain improvements. However, as noted above, the issues confronted procedural rather than indicating any conduct that could put the integrity of the project at risk. The project team further noted that the shift in internal Bank systems to STEP, introduced in the middle of the project, contributed to some of the challenges that were experienced.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

Increased transparency and accountability in the provision of PSGA services was an unintended positive impact of the project, derived from the increased availability of channels and the ability to use online platforms for accessing services. The increased visibility of departmental and district performance reduced opportunities for corruption, such as bribery and speed money, that previously had been common challenges for citizens in accessing services. The project team described this impact as creating a different, more robust kind of government.

d. Other

11. Ratings			
Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	

Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Quality of M&E	High	High
Quality of ICR		Substantial

12. Lessons

The ICR (pp. 22-23) presents a range of insightful lessons, two of which are summarized and expanded on here:

New models of service delivery can fundamentally change the culture of governance and the relationship between the state and citizens. While the PDO for this project focused on increasing access to PSGA services, the process of achieving these objectives included business process reengineering, changes in institutional mandates, and re-imagined structures, leading to fundamental strengthening of transparency and accountability in the provision of services. The interface between citizens and service providers grew to arm's length, reducing opportunities for rent-seeking behaviors as business process reengineering and the removal of various stages of approval meant less red tape and greater accountability.

Reliance on countries' own systems when they are strong enough is rightly a central feature of the aid effectiveness agenda. The procurement issues in this project were largely related to the government being contractually obliged to follow Bank procurement regulations, while the government's own procurement systems might have been adequate to guarantee fiduciary compliance. Setting up parallel systems has been found to create duplication and increase transaction costs, hamper alignment with country priorities and ownership, and constrain efforts to strengthen national capacity. On the other hand, using recipient country procurement systems can provide incentives and momentum to strengthen domestic capacity and systems, and to enhance domestic accountability processes.

13. Assessment Recommended?

Yes

Please Explain

There are aspects of this project, particularly in relation to the impact on citizens overall and marginalized groups in particular, that could provide valuable insights into support for provision of online services and the extent to which such interventions can be expected to impact the poorest in equal measure to average citizens. The structure of the project's results framework lends itself well to such an assessment. A wealth of data is apparently available in the full Borrower's Completion Report, which would help inform the assessment. Finally, the unintended impact and strong lesson on the link between GPR and online provision of services, strengthened transparency and accountability, and reduced opportunities for rent-seeking merit further exploration.

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is clear, candid, and analytically sound. It follows established guidelines. Its lessons are insightful and drawn directly from the project's preparation and implementation experience. Despite some minor shortcomings in the completeness of data and information (for example, on the value of reallocated amounts to DLIs (Table 1) and the reported achievement of some outcome indicators in different locations in the document), the ICR provides a detailed overview of the project with comprehensive evidence to support the ratings of project performance. Its presentation of the project's theory of change is sound, though there could have been more clarity in explaining how the TA components were to support the achievement of project outcomes. The ICR draws on and presents the executive summary of the Borrower's Completion Report, which contained substantial analysis and evidence that could not be fit into the main ICR. The Borrower's report was a strong resource for clarification of some questions raised by the ICR, including on the adjustment of indicators for population growth and the measurement of increase in access to online services.

a. Quality of ICR Rating Substantial