



1. Project Data

Project ID

P117440

Project Name

SV Income Support and Employability

Country

El Salvador

Practice Area(Lead)

Social Protection & Labor

L/C/TF Number(s)

IBRD-78110

Closing Date (Original)

31-Dec-2014

Total Project Cost (USD)

54,000,000.00

Bank Approval Date

24-Nov-2009

Closing Date (Actual)

31-Aug-2016

IBRD/IDA (USD)
Grants (USD)

Original Commitment

50,000,000.00

0.00

Revised Commitment

50,000,000.00

0.00

Actual

49,385,031.81

0.00

Prepared by

Salim J. Habayeb

Reviewed by

Judyth L. Twigg

ICR Review Coordinator

Joy Behrens

Group

IEGHC (Unit 2)

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The objectives of the Project were to: (a) provide temporary income support to the urban vulnerable poor; (b) improve the coverage of labor intermediation and training services to the urban vulnerable poor; and (c) improve the institutional capacity of the Borrower to develop an integrated social protection system (Loan Agreement, 7/19/2010). The PAD's statement of objectives is consistent with the Loan Agreement.

Note: One PDO-level outcome target was revised on 8/2/2013 by increasing the number of beneficiaries of the Temporary Income Support Program from 40,000 to 43,000, as program coverage was scaled up through fund re-allocations among components. Since both the original and revised outcome targets were



met, and since the moderate revision was made upward, setting a higher bar for the project, a split evaluation was not deemed to be warranted by both the ICR and this ICRR.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

The ICR included the loan proceeds of US\$50 million in the components breakdown, but did not include the Borrower's contribution, which was estimated at US\$4 million at appraisal. The TTL stated that it was difficult to assess accurately the Borrower's contribution, as it largely consisted of in-kind support for staffing and community projects at the municipality level (TTL Clarifications, 4/19/2017).

Component 1: Support the design and implementation of the Temporary Income Support Program (Appraisal US\$37.3 million; Actual US\$40.7 million). This component was to be delivered through four subcomponents: 1.1. Financing transfers of the Temporary Income Support Program; 1.2. Training and delivery for program participants; 1.3. Institutional strengthening of the Social Investment Fund for Local Development; and 1.4. Institutional strengthening of municipalities.

Component 2: Strengthening of labor intermediation, information and occupational training systems (Appraisal US\$10.3 million; Actual US\$6.7 million). This component had three subcomponents: 2.1. Strengthening the labor intermediation system; 2.2. Strengthening the labor market information system and statistics; and 2.3. Strengthening the occupational training system.

Component 3: Support the design and development of the Universal Social Protection System (Appraisal US\$2.4 million; Actual US\$2.6 million). This component included two subcomponents: 3.1 Improvement of the institutional capacity of the Technical and Planning Secretariat of the Presidency; and 3.2. Design and implementation of key tools for the development of Social Protection Policy design.

Note on the selection of participants in the income support program: The project used a combination of targeting mechanisms to select participants, including geographic targeting and poverty maps, categorical targeting with a set of criteria, administrative targeting and prioritization index, self-selection, and community-based targeting and validation (ICR, pp. 33-34).

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

At appraisal, the total project cost was estimated at US\$54 million, including an IBRD Loan of US\$50 million, and government counterpart funding of US\$4 million (see note in Section 2d above). By project closing, US\$49.4 million of the Loan proceeds were disbursed. The higher than planned spending in



Component 1 and lower spending in Component 2 was due to the coverage scale-up of the Temporary Income Support Program, including pilots to target youth (ages 16-24 years) in municipalities with high crime rates in 2013. Also, at that time, there was lesser need for strengthening the technical and vocational training systems (TTL Clarifications, 4/19/2017). Hence, US\$3.2 million were re-allocated from Component 2 to Component 1 on 8/2/2013.

The project was appraised on 10/15/2009 and became effective one year later on 1/18/2011. The project underwent five restructurings: on 12/16/2010, to change the disbursement modality to output-based funding to the Salvadoran Institute of Professional Training; on 3/2/2012, to redefine eligibility of operating costs, and for reallocations between components; on 08/02/2013, to revise/clarify intermediate indicators and fiduciary arrangements, and reallocations between components; on 07/07/2014, to extend the closing date from 12/31/2014 to 12/31/2015 to complete project activities; and on 09/14/2015, to extend the closing date from 12/31/2015 to 8/31/2016 to support the government's increased emphasis on youth employment.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

At appraisal, the objectives were relevant to the country needs in responding to multiple crises related to food, fuel and the international financial crisis of 2008, while at the same time contributing to the establishment of an integrated social protection system. During the crisis, GDP growth decelerated from 4.7% in 2007 to 1.3% in 2008. More than 30,000 formal jobs were lost by the end of 2008, mainly in export-oriented industries. According to the ICR, urban areas faced a relatively larger impact from the crisis and had a higher concentration of the poor population (58%) than rural areas. In June 2009, the government launched an Anti-Crisis Plan, comprising of short and medium-term interventions, which included the establishment of a Universal Social Protection System with a 'rights-based approach' to provide a minimum standard of services and economic opportunities. The Project was prepared as a Specific Investment Loan in response to an urgent request by the government to deal with the financial crisis, and the PAD (p. 7) stated that the project investments would complement policies supported by the "Sustaining Social Gains for Economic Recovery DPL". The project was consistent with the Country Partnership Strategy 2009–10, as it directly addressed two of its three objectives: (a) to strengthen delivery of social services by providing a temporary income support for the urban poor, while designing a universal social protection system; and (b) to increase economic opportunities by extending coverage of labor intermediation and training.

At project closing, some of the country needs changed, as attention increasingly shifted towards youth and social-emotional skills training. However, the pursuit of institutional capacity improvements to develop an integrated social protection system continues to be relevant, and, labor intermediation and training services constitute main pillars of the new government program, titled Youth with Everything Program (*Programa Jovenes con Todo, or PJET*), according to the ICR. The ICR (p. 12) states that both project objectives and design are relevant to the formulation of the follow-on social protection project that is being prepared, notably for promoting targeting, training services, and the use of cash transfers that promote beneficiary participation.



Rating

Substantial

b. Relevance of Design

The design was consistent with the stated objectives and showed a causal chain linking funding and planned activities to outputs and intermediate outcomes to outcomes as follows: financial transfers to the beneficiaries would protect their income and would plausibly prevent them from falling deeper into poverty; training of participants would likely improve their employability; expanding labor intermediation and occupational training systems were likely to improve coverage of the urban vulnerable poor, while increasing employability; and designing social protection policy and related system strengthening would contribute to capacity improvements towards the development of an integrated social protection system.

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective

Provide temporary income support to the urban vulnerable poor.

Rationale

Outputs

- Cash transfers of US\$100 for a six-month period provided to 44,239 program participants.
- Provision of US\$2,500 per community subproject as operational support to the municipalities. The project supported 1,241 community subprojects (small scale, simple, labor intensive, and suitable for the majority of unskilled labor).
- Provision of training to the beneficiaries by the Salvadoran Institute of Professional Training.
- Capacity building support to the Social Investment Fund for Local Development for designing and supervising subprojects, and for strengthening M&E.
- Institutional strengthening of the municipalities with technical assistance, equipment, and personnel training.

Outcomes



The theory of change, laid out by the ICR, was that the temporary income would provide timely and predictable transfers, preventing the participants from falling deeper into poverty, and that training was expected to improve their employment opportunities. The number of individuals who received temporary income support increased from a baseline of zero in 2009 and reached 40,000 beneficiaries in 2013, attaining the original target, and further increased to 44,239 individuals in 2016, slightly exceeding the revised target of 43,000 persons. The impact evaluation showed that, a year after the income support program, participants earned US\$17.9 more per month, on average, reflecting a 22% increase from what they had earned at the end of cash transfers. The income support program helped the beneficiaries through increased participation in the labor market by 5.5 percentage points in the medium term when contrasted with a comparison group. The impact evaluation also showed that the program was well targeted, as 78% of the recipient households were poor, including 45% living in extreme poverty (ICR, p. 15). As a result, the program had a net effect in extreme poverty reduction around 8 percentage points. According to the ICR, this record has positioned the temporary income support program in El Salvador as a best practice program in the region (ICR, p. 13).

In addition, the percentage of female participants in the Temporary Income Support Program increased from a baseline of zero in 2009 to reach 70.8 percent by the end of the program in 2016, exceeding the target of 60 percent. The percentage of individuals aged 16 years or older in targeted settlements that were covered by the income support program increased from a baseline of zero in 2009 to reach 22.4% in 2006, exceeding the target of 20 percent. The percentage of participants who completed the training and activity requirements increased from a baseline of zero in 2009 to reach 86.5% in 2016, short of the target of 90%; the ICR explains this minor shortfall by the difficulties faced by youth in attending training in municipalities with high levels of crime and violence, and where mobility was limited. The percentage of youth among participants increased to 37.4% in 2016, slightly short of the target of 40 percent.

The ICR also notes the importance of capacity strengthening at the municipality level. Municipal teams were trained in the identification of training needs and labor demand, and the sub-projects helped in establishing closer linkages with communities, as local leaders and the Associations for Community Development were involved in validation of the temporary income participation roster and in prioritizing of community subprojects. The efforts to better connect communities and municipalities were recognized by the Secretariat of the Presidency as a contributing factor in enhancing government preparedness to scale up social assistance programs (ICR, p. 17).

Rating
Substantial

Objective 2

Objective

Improve the coverage of labor market intermediation and training services to the urban vulnerable poor.



Rationale Outputs

- Establishment of 71 employment intermediation offices; provision of furniture and equipment; and hiring of staff for these offices (labor counselors, business outreach coordinators, and technical staff for entrepreneurship initiatives).
- Technical assistance provided to the National Employment Network.
- Purchase of 30 vehicles for outreach activities.
- Technical assistance for data collection methods, organizing job fairs, partnerships with the private sector, development of a portal, and online registration.
- Financing of a communications campaign in support of the National Employment Network.
- Technical assistance to the Ministry of Labor in fiduciary aspects and financial management, and in systematizing statistical labor market information through the creation of a Labor Market Observatory.

Outcomes

According to the ICR, the theory of change was that expansion and improvements in the Ministry of Labor's intermediation and training services would expand coverage to more municipalities and reach the urban poor. Before the project, the Ministry of Labor had limited coverage, with eight regional offices and 28 employment offices that mostly served populations with higher education levels. The offices did not have clearly defined roles, responsibilities, or adequate staffing. At project closing, the Ministry had 71 fully functional employment offices, exceeding the target of 66 offices. The number of people 18 to 25 years old enrolled in the National Employment Network increased from a baseline of 3,700 persons in 2009 to 127,293 in 2016, far exceeding the target of 44,000. The performance of employment offices improved in terms of job allocations by registering 100,186 job allocations between June 2009 and June 2016, reflecting a 59% increase when compared to the performance records prior to the project. 235 employment fairs were organized by the project, exceeding the target of 50 employment fairs. The number of new employers enrolled in the National Employment Network increased from a baseline of 384 employers in 2009 to 5,401 in 2016, far exceeding the target of 800 employers.

Rating High

Objective 3 Objective

Improve the institutional capacity of the Government to develop an integrated social protection system.

Rationale Outputs

- Technical assistance for the development of a Social Protection Policy.



- Development of a regulatory framework for the institutional coordination of the Universal Social Protection System.

Outcomes

The ICR's theory of change was that, by articulating the universal social protection system framework, the government would have a road map for establishing an integrated social protection system. The Salvadoran Assembly approved the Social Protection and Development Law in 2014. The law also mandated the development of a national plan for social protection and the design of a targeting system, which was developed through the Unique Registry of Beneficiaries, and its implementation started under the project in a phased manner. However, according to the ICR, the Social Protection and Development Law was too generic for concrete policy applications. It did not establish criteria for planning and evaluating social sector interventions, nor did it establish policy prioritization based on vulnerability (ICR, p. 14). The outcome indicator concerning the approval of a normative framework for the universal social protection system did not fully capture the progress in developing an integrated social protection system.

Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

The PAD analyzed the Temporary Income Support Program under Component 1 (75% of project costs at appraisal), and focused on income and employability effects. The analysis showed that the urban poverty headcount would be expected to fall by 5% due to income support, and that the project would reduce extreme urban poverty by 14%. The probability of being employed would be increased by 6% during the four years after training. The analysis estimated an internal rate of return of 10%. The cost-benefit flows showed that the project would have an expected net social revenue exceeding US\$40 million.

The ICR estimated project returns on the basis of employability gains as poverty reduction gains. The impact evaluation of the income support program estimated that, compared with a control group, the likelihood of project beneficiaries to be employed was 5.5% higher, and that the average wage was 13% higher than the average wage of the control group in the medium term. The economic analysis estimates future cash flows of the program, reflecting incremental social benefits, under the assumption that the wage gain would remain throughout a beneficiary's economic active life. The internal rate of return in the flow of costs and wage gains was estimated at 11%. The estimation of the present value of financial flows of the program, assuming discount rates of 3%, 6%, and 12%, showed that, for each dollar invested in each beneficiary, the program obtained a benefit in wage gains equal to US\$3.7, US\$2.6, and US\$1.5, respectively. According to these



results, the analysis deemed the program to be efficient (ICR, p. 15).

There were some issues affecting the efficiency of implementation, although some were related to broader factors beyond the control of the project, such as gang violence, which affected the mobility of both program personnel and participants, given the risk of coercion. Some youth refrained from applying to the program. Municipalities took preventive measures, including avoiding making public the dates on which the transfers were paid. Mass media broadcasted allegations that some gang members benefited from the income support program. This negatively affected public perception of the program even though subsequent investigations did not substantiate the allegations.

Project effectiveness was delayed by one year because of delays in congressional approval. Late effectiveness contributed to two project extensions in 2014 and 2015 to allow the completion of project activities. In 2014, the new government changed some of the strategic priorities towards youth issues, and the Secretariat of the Presidency took over broader responsibilities, thus diverting some of its attention from its implementation role under the project. The new 'Youth with Everything Program' exclusively targeted youth and did not include community subprojects. The Temporary Income Support Program had to adapt to the new strategy by limiting the participants' age to 16–29 years, introducing a new module for life skills training, and doubling training hours. Given favorable returns, but with some shortcomings in the efficiency of implementation, efficiency is rated Substantial.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	10.00	75.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	11.00	82.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of objectives is rated Substantial as they answered the country's needs in responding to the financial crisis of 2008, and they continue to be relevant in contributing to the establishment of an integrated social protection system. Relevance of design is rated Substantial as the project design laid out a logical results chain linking funding and planned activities to outputs and intermediate outcomes to outcomes, as discussed in



Section 3. The objective to provide temporary income support to the urban vulnerable poor was achieved and is rated Substantial. The objective to improve coverage of labor market intermediation and training services to the urban vulnerable poor was exceeded and is rated High. The objective to improve the institutional capacity of the government to develop an integrated social protection system was largely achieved and is rated Substantial. Efficiency is rated Substantial in view of favorable returns, but with some shortcomings in the efficiency of implementation. These ratings are indicative of minor shortcomings in the project's preparation and implementation, and therefore an Outcome rating of Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating
Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

The risk that development outcomes will not be maintained is substantial. The fiscal situation could put future funding of social programs at risk. According to the Country Partnership Strategy 2016–19, the fiscal situation in El Salvador is deteriorating, and measures of austerity have been adopted. The government is seeking a fiscal agreement among political sectors to manage the fiscal situation in the medium and long terms, including to allow continued funding of social programs. The risks of lower budgetary allocations would also affect the Social Investment Fund for Local Development and the municipalities, and there is no sustainability plan. In addition, political interference remains a constant risk.

The development of the Unique Registry of Beneficiaries also faces challenges that may affect its sustainability. Although the Social Protection and Development Law firmly established the role of the Technical and Planning Secretariat of the Presidency in ensuring financial, technical, and institutional conditions for the functioning of the unique registry, the law does not define the consequences if such conditions are not met. The law established the unique registry as a mechanism for targeting beneficiaries of social programs, but it does not explicitly mandate its use, and at project closing, some incompatibilities remained among different institutional databases (ICR, p. 18), although the TTL explained that the government continues its efforts to establish a common database, and that gradual progress was being made (TTL Clarifications, 4/19/2017).

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating
Substantial

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project's strategic relevance was appropriate, as the government and the Bank designed an operation that contributed to the Salvadoran response to the financial crisis. The project design captured complex



demands in articulating a short-term response to the crisis, such as prompt income support, as well as medium-term interventions for the development of a universal social protection system. The Bank considered lessons learned in designing income support programs from experiences in other Latin American countries, including the need for conducting impact evaluations to guide corrective actions, involving stakeholders, taking account of implementation capacities, and effectively using information and communication strategies.

Preparation and appraisal were consistent with the Bank's fiduciary role. Both implementation and M&E arrangements were well prepared. The Bank accurately assessed the capacities of implementing institutions with the exception of the fiduciary responsibility assigned to the Social Investment Fund for Local Development. The Bank developed an operational manual for the project. Risks were well identified, and adequate mitigation measures were planned, including reliance on the experience of municipalities working in gang territories.

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The Bank was proactive and effective in its supervision and implementation support. It ensured consistency with the Bank's fiduciary role, and provided timely identification and resolution of implementation issues. The Team conducted an effective midterm review, leading to a restructuring that redefined responsibilities and realigned priorities and resources to increase the likelihood of achieving development objectives. The ICR does not provide information on the quality of reporting. The ICR reports that the government expressed its satisfaction with the support provided by the Bank, and with the Bank's understanding of political processes in the country (ICR, p. 19, and Borrower's Comments, Annex 7, p. 58).

Quality of Supervision Rating

Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

To a large extent, the government and implementing agencies were indistinguishable since the Technical and Planning Secretariat of the Presidency was responsible for overall coordination of the project, and was a main implementing institution. Therefore, both the ICR and the ICRR opt for a unified rating for the Borrower Performance. The government was and remains committed to the comprehensive Anti-Crisis Plan that it has launched, and to the project that constituted an integral part of its response to the crisis. The government enacted social protection legislation that was supportive to the project. Coordination was undertaken through the government's Inter-sectoral Committee of the Universal Social Protection System. The ICR notes good coordination among various actors, and states that the government was able to



manage complex activities that required coordination with multiple institutions and stakeholders. The ICR also reports that the government facilitated communications within and across institutions. Monitoring and evaluation arrangements were adequate. Overall, fiduciary aspects were in compliance with Bank policies, with some minor shortcomings. Procurement performance was adequate. There were some shortcomings in the integration of the employment intermediation system with the information system of temporary income support, and delays in implementing the Unique Registry of Beneficiaries. Within the larger scope of the Borrower's appropriate performance, these shortcomings are minor. Given the large extent to which the Borrower has ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development outcomes, the Borrower Performance is rated Satisfactory.

Government Performance Rating

Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

See above.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating

Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating

Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The objectives were clearly specified, and the indicators reflected progress toward achievement of the objectives. Outcome and intermediate indicators were clear and straightforward to monitor. Data collection methods and related analysis were appropriate. The ICR acknowledges that indicators were more reflective of outputs than of outcomes (ICR, p. 10). As stated in Section 4, the outcome indicator concerning the approval of a normative framework for the universal social protection system did not completely capture the progress in developing an integrated social protection system.

b. M&E Implementation

Implementation was satisfactorily undertaken, transitioning from MS Excel forms to an automated information system in 2014. The Institute of Professional Formation also adapted an information system that the municipalities could use. The indicators were well measured, and data was reliable and of good quality. M&E arrangements were sustainable, as they were an integral part of the functions of government institutions. Income and employment gains were measured by the impact evaluation and by the information



system for employment intermediation, which monitored the number of people who were able to find a job through employment offices. In addition to the impact evaluation and qualitative evaluations, the Social Investment Fund for Local Development also carried out process evaluations.

c. M&E Utilization

M&E was used both for measuring outcomes and also to fulfill regular government functions in social protection, such as for labor intermediation. M&E was used to monitor progress of the Five-Year Plan for Development 2014–2019. Monitoring of indicators served as a managerial tool to track the effectiveness of social programs and to provide analytical inputs to policy makers. The inventory of social program evaluations was made publicly available for use by stakeholders, researchers, and national and international organizations.

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) was triggered by the project, which was classified under category “B”. Safeguards were correctly recorded in the PAD and ICR. There was full compliance with safeguard policies. Category B was assigned because the sub-projects included rehabilitation of social infrastructures, although no adverse impact was expected given the small scale of the structures. An environmental monitoring framework was included in the guidelines of the Temporary Income Support Program, and the Social Investment Fund for Local Development produced a guide for environmental best practices to be applied in the sub-projects. Also, the Social Investment Fund appointed dedicated staff to monitor compliance with the environmental guide. The ICR (p. 11) notes highly satisfactory compliance.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial management. Planning, budgeting, accounting, internal controls, flow of funds, financial reporting, and auditing arrangements were adequate overall. According to the ICR, by ‘mid-project’, financial management ratings were assessed as moderately satisfactory because of a small number of ineligible expenditures. Other shortcomings were observed in the internal control system, specifically related to the verification of eligibility criteria for cash transfers. The shortcomings were resolved.

Procurement. Procurement processes were adequately implemented and were rated by the supervision team



as satisfactory for most of the project period. Guidelines were followed. The Secretariat of the Presidency performed in a satisfactory manner given its experience with Bank-assisted projects. The Bank team provided additional training sessions for the government's technical teams in procurement and financial processes. Procurement was completed as planned, although some minor shortcomings in contract administration were observed in 2016.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

The impact evaluation found a slight increase of 3% in civic participation by program beneficiaries, and a qualitative assessment by the Social Investment Fund also indicated an increase in social cohesion during the implementation of community subprojects, where participants stated that they identified more than before with their communities and neighbors (ICR, p. 17).

d. Other

12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Substantial	Substantial	---
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		High	---

Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons

The ICR (pp. 20-22) offers several useful lessons, including the following lessons adapted by IEG:

A temporary income support program effectively responds to a crisis when it combines predictable income with training and community activities to improve the participants' employability and earnings, as undertaken by the project.



Effective targeting of beneficiaries requires a combination of technical methods with validation by local community knowledge. Under the project, local leaders and Associations for Community Development were involved in the validation of the temporary income participation rosters.

Designing and implementing a cash transfer program in high-crime areas require ownership by local actors because of their knowledge of the territory, local stakeholders, and prevailing risks. The government extended efforts to enhance municipality ownership, as municipalities could manage risks in their own territory, work closely with community leaders and police, and implement security protocols to ensure the safety of program participants.

A strong inter-sectoral coordinating body can effectively facilitate the development of a social protection system. The Technical and Planning Secretariat of the Presidency had adequate political and technical leverage to coordinate main stakeholders, reach inter-sectoral consensus, follow up on the implementation of social protection programs, and ensure the provision of financial resources by the central government.

The TTL identified another lesson during the TTL meeting with IEG Team (4/19/2017):

Legislation will be most successfully implemented when accompanied by framing the rules that would facilitate execution of the new law and make it operational. Under the project, initial efforts understandably focused on processing the Social Protection and Development Law. Implementation of the law progressed only when an operational manual was developed.

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provides high-quality analysis and candor. The report is results oriented. The quality of the evidence is strong, and the evidence is well presented, providing a firm basis from which conclusions can be drawn. The ICR is clear, succinct, and internally consistent. The ICR adheres to the guidelines, although project costs should have included the Borrower's contribution (or an explanation of the difficulty of estimating that contribution). The report offers useful lessons derived from project experience. Additional strengths of the report are the quality of its economic and financial analysis, and its elucidation of the project experience in bridging the immediate response to the crisis with the post-crisis period. The quality of the ICR is rated High.

a. Quality of ICR Rating



High