



1. Project Data

Project ID

P152903

Project Name

Reinsertion and Reintegration Project

Country

Congo, Democratic Republic of

Practice Area(Lead)

Social Sustainability & Inclusion

L/C/TF Number(s)

IDA-D0600,TF-A0087

Closing Date (Original)

31-Dec-2019

Total Project Cost (USD)

20,333,343.36

Bank Approval Date

15-May-2015

Closing Date (Actual)

31-Aug-2019

IBRD/IDA (USD)

Grants (USD)

Original Commitment

21,500,000.00

6,500,000.00

Revised Commitment

20,182,659.48

6,443,756.31

Actual

20,333,343.36

6,443,756.31

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) in Financial Agreement (FA), Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and Implementation Completion Report (ICR) are identical. The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to **support the socio-economic reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants** (ICR p1, FA p5).

This ICRR treats the following as the project objectives:



PDO 1: to **support the economic reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants**

PDO 2: to **support the social reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants**

The ICR refines the original PDO by stating that the key objective was “to help XCs reintegrate into society and be at par with the socioeconomic level of their peers” (para 6). This ICRR also recognizes the interdependence of these two objectives in contributing to the higher-level objective of responding to situations of fragility and conflict (ICR para 6).

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

Note: Following descriptions taken from ICR p7. Actuals taken from the economic analysis ICR table 2, p17, Cost Benefit Analysis – component investment amounts. They total the Original Commitment amount rather than the total Actual amount. The ICR does not provide any other breakdown of cost across components.

Component 1: Reinsertion – **(Appraisal: IDA US\$ 5.352 million, Actual US\$ 6.251 million)**: activities provided to all demobilized XCs at the CPRs over six-months focusing on foundational skills to enable return to civilian life, such as livelihoods/career guidance and training, psycho-social support, medical referral, recreational activities and formation of representative council.

Component 2: Reintegration – **(Appraisal: IDA US\$ 5.382 million/TDRP US\$ 3.258 million, Actual \$10.093million)**: once returned to their communities, and over a two year period, this component supported XCs with vocational start-up kits; Outreach Services; Drop-in Services, information, advisory and referral services. It also facilitated XCs to (i) join economic associations with other XCs and community members, or (ii) engage in individual or partnership Income Generating Activities (IGAs). These activities were also supported by ongoing activities of Component 5.

Component 3: Support to Demobilized Ex-combatants' Households – **(Appraisal: TDRP US\$ 3.242 million, Actual US\$ 3.786 million)**: support to ex-combatant households including the spouse and/or other household members, through provision of life skills and basic livelihoods training, and psycho-social counselling. These activities complement support provided to XCs for successful reintegration (component 2).

Component 4: Support to Vulnerable Groups – **(Appraisal: IDA US\$ 1.173 million, Actual \$1.370 million)**: support for cultural and sport activities for children associated with armed groups (CAAF) and their social reintegration into the community, including technical support to UE for monitoring and evaluation (with UNICEF responsible for overall family tracing, reunification and socio-economic reintegration). Specialized support and dedicated facilities provided for women, spanning medical needs and screening, Sexual and



Gender Based Violence (SGBV), childcare, skills training. Within the CPRs, the project supported chronically ill and disabled XCs with technical support, supplementing MONUSCO's activities. Finally, psycho-social support, including follow-up and monitoring, was provided for traumatized XCs.

Component 5: Project Management, Sensitization, Monitoring and Evaluation – **(Appraisal: IDA US\$ 3.091, Actual US\$ 3.091 million)**: This provided a 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' (gathered from communities) communications and public information strategy to restore a climate of trust to facilitate reintegration ahead of and throughout the project life cycle; project management to cover overall administration and management of project activities. The administrative structure of the UE was divided in six (6) Provincial Offices and 9 City Offices. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and MIS to provide monitoring data on beneficiaries, including a baseline and community survey, annual evaluation, mid-term review and a final evaluation.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

In late 2018, the World Bank team decided to close the project around 5 months early (August 2019 instead of December 2019) principally because of concerns over living conditions in the CPRs, and possible reputational risks to the Bank. This was precipitated by MONUSCO withdrawing the monitoring of the CPRs due to funding cuts (ICR para 5, 16 and 17).

Key dates: The project was approved on 15 May 2015 and became effective on 27 January 2016. The midterm review completion was 9 April 2018. The original closing date was 31 December 2019 and actual closing date was 31 August 2019. Funding disbursements were at about 95% by that time (ICR para 16).

The Trust Fund closing date was extended from August 31 2016 to June 30 2017 to allow for a reallocation to draw down the Trust Fund financing against the IDA allocation (ICR para 14).

Costs: IDA loan of US\$15M was approved and US\$13,884,587M disbursed. A Trust Fund grant of US\$6.5M was approved, later revised to US\$6,443,756M, which was the actual amount disbursed. Therefore the total funding approved was US\$21.5M and total disbursed was US\$20,328,343 (ICR p2). The ICR does not specify which components received less funding to account for this difference between appraisal total and actual disbursement. The actuals listed above in Section 2d total the approved amount of US\$21.5M.

The Government pledged a contribution of US\$10M towards the total program costed at around \$85M (MONUSCO was also a project partner – other funding contributions not detailed in ICR) but disbursed US\$3M (ICR para 55).

The ICR reports that the component costs at appraisal and closing are identical (ICR table 1 and Annex 3). However, Table 2 of the ICR details EIRR and NVR against each component, using 'total investment' figures.

3. Relevance of Objectives



Rationale

The ICR rates the relevance of the PDO as high, due to the project directly meeting needs of the DRC Government and close alignment at a high level with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy 2013-2016, including an expressed intention to 'respond to situations of fragility and conflict' (ICR para 18 and PAD paras 12-14). Importantly, the project was also considered in, and aligned with the longer-term context of the phases of DDR work in the DRC over the last decade or more (ICR para 1 and 2). The design was also comprehensive in its consideration of the social and economic factors across each element of DDR – disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration. Further, the project's design integrally partnered with critical actors, such as MONUSCO and UE.

However, there were shortcomings in terms of the specific project responding to the given development challenge outlined in the PAD. Two issues highlighted in the ICR point to weaknesses in the Bank's approach. First, there was insufficient formal governance arrangements in the design to sufficiently manage the respective organizations' responsibilities. This was felt most acutely when MONUSCO withdrew its support (ICR para 67 and see ICRR Section [X] QAE below). Second, there was insufficient up-front recognition of the fact that ongoing local security, economic and living conditions were inadequate for development related and income generating activities, which hampered PDO 1 - economic integration in particular (Borrower Comments ICR Annex 5). Given the Bank's involvement in this sector in DRC since around 2004, this project being a 'third phase' DDR project (ICR para 2, PAD para 11), and the PAD's acknowledgement of the need for "higher than normal supervision and support requirements" (p50), these three issues may have been better anticipated.

The ICR rates relevance as *substantial*, based on strong alignment with both the Government and Bank's strategies, but minor misalignment to the Bank's previous experience in the country and an inaccurate assessment of the conditions needed to meet PDO 1 - economic integration objectives.

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

To support the economic reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants

Rationale

Note: The Theory of Change discussion is relevant to both PDO 1 and 2.



Theory of Change

The project's theory of change is described in the ICR (paras 6-9), and aligns with the PAD's 'Project Overview' (p28) which was prepared prior to the theory of change being a requirement for design. The intermediate level activities such as psychosocial support, community engagement and skills training were linked to expected intermediate outcomes (including those of partner organizations) of reinsertion, reintegration and support to households, and logically supported the overall objectives of supporting social and economic reintegration respectively. Together, these constitute a small but critical contribution to the complex set of actions needed to improve peace in the region.

The ICR's useful distinction between the social and economic objectives of the program (diagram p6), allows for more meaningful assessment of the project outcomes, since outputs and outcomes against these two elements were in fact, very different. The diagram sets out a third objective at the same level, that of 'households and vulnerable groups are reintegrated'. This is consistent with social insertion and economic reintegration. The PAD, however, views 'support to households and vulnerable groups' as activities *in support* of 'socio-economic reintegration', as does this review. Vulnerable groups and gender considerations were explicit throughout the results framework.

The assumptions listed in the ICR against the theory of change (p6) were reasonable and largely held true with two main exceptions. Firstly, MONUSCO support (on which the design relied) did not continue to project completion, which contributed to early project closure and significant risks and some negative outcomes (see Section 4 and 9 for discussion). Secondly, far fewer women participated than had been envisaged (see Section 4 for discussion).

Missing from the assumptions however, was firstly, an acknowledgement of the likely need for the Bank to engage at the political level, given the political and security sensitivities of the context and type of project (Section 8a for discussion). Secondly, there appears to have been an assumption that there would be sufficient proximate economic opportunities to which to apply newly gained skills and knowledge, in support of economic reintegration, but this was not the case (see Section 3 for discussion).

Outputs and outcomes

The ICR relies principally on three main available data sources, supplemented by some other partner reports, to make its evaluation. It acknowledges that none of these correlated neatly with the project's results or M&E framework, leaving insufficient data to assess some aspects of the project (see M&E discussion below). The main (though not exclusive) sources are: a 2017 baseline survey (conducted more than a year after the project began); 2018 IST research commissioned by the Bank; and a 2019 joint Bank-UN qualitative review. The August 2019 Closure Report also provided data. Therefore, this does not allow assessment of outcomes based on planned results and the indicator framework. Instead, this ICRR draws its assessment from the evidence presented in the body of the ICR, drawn from the sources listed above, and referencing the intentions outlined in the PAD.

PDO 1 - Economic Reintegration - is supported by PDO level indicator 1 (*number of beneficiaries*), PDO indicator 2 (*Level of participation in economic activities*), and PDO indicator 3 (*Meeting monthly household food consumption needs*). These include intermediate indicators 1a - completing the reinsertion phase, disaggregated by gender, 1b - forming economic associations, 1c - satisfaction with reintegration, 1d - consuming at least two meals a day.



PDO Indicator 1. Number of Beneficiaries: under the project, a total of 5,533 ex-combatants were demobilized. Against a target of 4,800, 4,435 ex-combatants (XCs) were reintegrated and/or reinserted (ICR Table 2 (p16) - the focus of the Bank's contribution) – 92.3% achievement of the target. 3,796 of these were fully reintegrated, 639 were reinserted (early stage of return to communities). It should be noted that this is the most conservative outcome, since there were inconsistencies in total beneficiary targets between the English and French versions of the PAD and the ICR, ranging from 4,500, 4,700 to 4,800.

In addition, 1,098 were also demobilized (making a total of 5,533) but either deceased, considered foreign combatants, or they voluntarily joined the police or military (ICR Table 1, p9). The sub-target of 480 female participants fell far short, at only 89 in total. The ICR indicates that this was due to most women being in administrative roles in the armed groups (not armed themselves) and 'preferring not to enter the program' (see also Section 12, Lesson 1). Previous project Team Leaders confirmed that the sub-target was based on an estimate of 10% of the total expected number of XCs, but there was very limited information at project appraisal on the profile and gender of combatants (TTL-Reviewer correspondence). Women did, however participate at higher than anticipated rates as 'host community' members (para 22).

PDO Indicator 2. Level of participation in economic activity: this was much lower than the target of 70% of XCs by year 4 of the project. The ICR reports that overall, 67% were still unemployed some months after returning home, although while results varied across CPR locations. This improved to 54% in the 2019 IST survey. A lack of available jobs in their location was cited as the biggest single reason for the lack of employment (see also Section 3 and 12 of this ICRR). 83.9% of XCs received professional training at the CPRs with 64% saying the training was useful. However, only 8.4% of those employed were working in the sector of their professional orientation (ICR paras 24, 25).

1b Economic associations: Evidence indicates a total 60 of the expected 300 were formed under the project (ICR para 28). According to implementing partners FAO and Caritas, this represented a total of 2,823 XCs (around 50% of the total reintegrated XCs) who received training and support in various aspects of business and economic management. The ICR does not discuss why the overall number of formed associations was so low, nor whether this number of participating individual beneficiaries was satisfactory. In fact, it highlights in several places (para 27, 71 and 73) the positive lessons learnt from DDR II projects but does not present evidence from this project.

1c Satisfaction with reintegration support - Reintegration kits (e.g. various tools, equipment, livestock, seeds etc, chosen by XCs) provided to XCs and household members were intended as an important part of facilitating economic activity. The ICR reports that 68.2% of XCs received a kit (against an expected 95% - ICR para 11) and that about three quarters of those retained and used the kit as intended. The others reported kits either stolen, damaged, inappropriate, insufficient, or sold to support their families. Rent for a business location was also unaffordable for many (ICR para 26). It also notes, however, that these issues along with distribution and transportation challenges, could have been better anticipated through partner planning to achieve higher efficacy of the kits (para 55).

PDO Indicator 3. Meeting monthly household food consumption needs after 6 months at reintegration location: It was expected that by year 4, 70% of households would be able to meet their monthly food consumption needs indicated at the intermediate level, by consuming at least two meals a day (intermediate indicator 1d). The efficacy of this PDO indicator cannot be assessed however, because it appears that rates of household food consumption was only measured once through the Baseline Survey in 2017. The ICR does not provide evidence of comparison rates at project closing. The Baseline Survey (noting this was taken a year after the project began) reported only 27.5% of XCs consumed at least 2 meals a day, and only 4.4% of



beneficiaries could almost always meet the food needs of their household (ICR para 30). As the ICR points out, it should be noted these challenges are not simply economic but reflect the dire humanitarian situation in the region.

Overall, while results against beneficiary targets were strong (relevant to both PDO 1 and 2), there was very little participation in economic activity (formation of economic associations and low employment), patchy satisfaction with the usefulness of reintegration support (kits and training) and very few households meeting their food consumption needs.

Rating

Modest

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

To support the social reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants

Rationale

PDO 2 - Social Reintegration - is supported principally by PDO level indicator 4 (*Feeling socially accepted by their communities*) which includes intermediate indicators 2a - spouse or household member perceiving social acceptance of XCs, 2b - spouse or household member participating in community activities, 3a - psycho-social support for trauma, 3b - improvements in mental health, 3c - female ex-combatants reporting equal treatment. Note: PDO Indicator 1 (*number of beneficiaries*) is also relevant to PDO2 but not repeated here.

PDO Indicator 4. Feeling socially accepted after 6 months at the reintegration location: Results against social integration indicators were significantly stronger than those against economic integration. The ICR reports that most beneficiaries felt very positive about reintegration support overall, with 83.7% feeling they reintegrated very well or well (against a target of 65% – para 11) while only 7.9% indicated poor/very poor reintegration (para 32) (intermediate indicator 2a). 93.1% of respondents to the IST survey reported that the community accepted them back (ICR para 33). This was measured over a baseline survey in 2017 and then confirmed through the IST perception survey and partner research. Some three quarters of respondents across locations did not feel discriminated against and did feel at ease in their workplaces (ICR para 38). Close to two thirds of XC respondents and half of household member respondents participated in community activities (intermediate indicator 2b), such as sports, cultural and social events (ICR para 34) against a target of 60% of household members by year 4 (PAD p25).

3a Psycho-social support: Evidence is provided for numbers of people given medical support in terms of those received (6793), referred onto/treated at medial facilities (1490) and for numbers of mentally ill patients supported (679). While these numbers appear significant, it is not clear how these figures relate to the original targets of 80% of those identified as traumatized, receiving support – Indicator 3a). Two clinical psychologists and three nurses were on hand at various times throughout the project and supported vulnerable groups as well as those presenting with other diseases (ICR para 35). Around one third of respondents were aware of available psycho-social support (ICR para 38).



3b Improved mental health amongst those having received support is not able to be assessed over time, given a lack of evidence (ICR 38). But training for some 50 local administration staff and UENPDDR personnel on the importance of caring for mental health was a positive new addition to the DDRIII project (ICR para 52).

3c Female XCs reporting feeling treated equally with men was somewhat mixed between different CPR locations but largely positive overall. Feeling less equally treated ranged from around 25-50%. An average of 20% felt better treated and an average of 53% felt equally treated.

The ICR also presents an extensive list of indirect, non quantifiable benefits listed in the Efficiency Analysis (Annex 4) – all of which are plausible but it does not indicate where the list was drawn from, neither does it present evidence of their attainment.

Overall, there were some strong but also mixed results against PDO 2. Perceptions of social acceptance by both XCs and community members far exceeded expectations. Participation in community participation met expectations. Evidence against provision of psycho-social support was solid but actual improvements in mental health could not be directly measured. Equal treatment of female XCs was on average, also fairly strong.

Rating

Substantial

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

Efficacy is rated *modest*, given the project partly achieved its objectives. There is reasonable evidence to demonstrate solid outcomes against most aspects of the *social integration* PDO, such as high satisfaction with social reintegration by both men and women. Outcomes against the other PDO, *economic integration* indicators, however, were significantly weaker, with very low levels of employment or economic participation, few regularly eating at least 2 meals a day or being able to meet their household food needs.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Modest

Primary Reason

Low achievement

5. Efficiency

The *ex post* Economic and Financial Analysis carried out for the ICR (Annex 4) shows the project was economically viable overall. No *ex ante* analysis was carried out, making comparison before and after the project impossible. The NPV was positive and EIRR (62.2%) was considered robust across the range of activities (ICR para 47) and across an average planned vs actual beneficiaries of 92.4% (ICR Table 2, p16).



Even against the Sensitivity Analysis conducted, considering plus and minus variations in costs and benefits of 20%, all of the sub-projects were rated robust 'under any circumstances' (ICR Annex 4).

The economic and financial analysis does not separate *economic reintegration* objectives from *social reintegration* objectives so it is not possible to assess the relative efficiency of each. It only remains to make assumptions in this regard, based on the fact that there were much stronger outcomes against social than economic reintegration objectives (see Section 4 above). The efficiency analysis does note that many of the economic and indirect social benefits, such as flow on effects over time of literacy, vocational and business training, were not yet quantifiable, making the overall assessment conservative generally. (Annex 4, Table A.1 lists suggested, but not assessed, indirect benefits.)

Planned and actual project costs are presented as identical (ICR para 43) and total the approved project amount (US\$ 21.5M) rather than the total project cost (US\$20.3M ICR p2). This appears to confirm that data for actual costs at closing was poor and increases the importance of the sensitivity analysis results noted above, to confirm overall investment efficiency in a range of possible circumstances.

The project closed some 5 months early but had disbursed around 95% of funds at that point (ICR para 16). There was a delay of around 6 months in the Swedish contribution of US\$ 6.5M but the ICR does not note any impact of this on the project's overall efficiency.

Generally, the project's alignment with the Government's objectives, previous DRR projects, established partners for implementation, and M&E design allowed for reasonable efficiencies to be realized within the complex and often very difficult operational and political environment. Evidence for this is high beneficiary numbers overall, no cost overruns, no substantial revisions of the project's approach, strong outcomes in experiences of social reintegration in particular.

Noting the difficult context, factors which compromised the project's efficiency were a large number of complex activities to manage in a setting that was not conducive to the economic objectives of the project; a deterioration of trust between the Government, MONUSCO and the World Bank, which affected implementation of some activities (see Sections 3 and 4 above) and ultimately resulted in early closure; a succession of three TTLs resulting in a lack of continuity and some disagreements between partners over funds transparency and disbursement (ICR para 68), and significant gaps in project reporting, including the year's delay on conducting the baseline survey, and therefore, less information to make timely decisions or fully assess progress and outcomes (See Section 9 *M&E* below).

Efficiency is rated *modest*, given that while there was reasonable economic and financial efficiency overall, the economic analysis is somewhat at odds with the poor economic outcomes for recipients. In addition, there were significant inefficiencies with regards to project implementation.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

- a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:



	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	62.20	92.40 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The overall outcome of the project is rated *Moderately Unsatisfactory*. Its Relevance was substantial, generally well aligned with Government and Bank priorities. Overall efficacy was modest, given it partially achieved its objectives. There were significant shortcomings in achieving PDO1 *economic reintegration*, while PDO2 *social reintegration* objectives were largely met and some elements exceeded. Efficiency was also modest, with reasonable economic and financial viability but inefficiencies in implementation.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

The ICR infers a very high risk to development outcome, given the unstable political context and continuing violence and unrest. It also states that these ongoing contextual factors 'give rise to questions' as to the role of international partners in supporting peace and stability, as well as the effectiveness of instruments such as DDR in contributing to broader peacebuilding programs (para 70). It does not, however, detail the questions alluded to, nor does it address any likelihood of recidivism of XCs.

However, the overall high satisfaction levels of both community members and XCs, with their integration experiences (PDO level indicator 4), would indicate a low risk, particularly to *social* reintegration development objectives of the project. The *economic* elements of the development objective face higher risk, demonstrated by the substantially lower-than-targeted levels for beneficiaries either involved in economic activity or able to meet their household food consumption needs (PDO indicators 2 and 3). This appears due in large part, to the overall lack of employment opportunities and broader regional instability (see Section 3).

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The conception of the project was comprehensive and generally well aligned with previous Bank and local experiences in DDR. This included the majority of the significant contextual risks and sensitivities of



a potential violent and conflict affected location, and with the Government's objectives and capacity. The design was explicit in its consideration of gender and of vulnerable groups throughout the project cycle. The theory of change from inputs and activities to outcomes was logical, with the exceptions regarding missed assumptions set out above (see section 4, Theory of Change).

Sufficient consideration was given to environmental and financial management and associated risks, with no significant unforeseen issues arising.

There were, however, gaps in assessment of implementation risks associated with reliance on critical partners, (e.g. MONUSCO). The PAD rates project level risk as 'substantial', given the likely coordination challenges of working with multiple implementation partners, but focusses on ensuring financial and reporting risks are addressed (PAD p53). It does not propose mitigations for governance or communication type risks inherent in challenges of coordinating multiple critical implementing partners, nor the potential need for political level engagement to avert crises (see Section 5 *Efficacy*). The project's M&E design was generally adequate (see Section 9a), although its heavy reliance on partners without commensurate formal governance arrangements proved problematic when one critical partner withdrew. There also appears to be have been an overestimation of local economic conditions to support the expected economic outcomes, as suggested in the Borrower's Comments (ICR Annex 5).

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The succession of three Team Leaders with differing approaches over the life of the project appears to have had a negative effect on continuity and overall trust with UE in particular. A breakdown in links between implementing partners resulted in disagreements over transparency of financing and ultimately, too little political level engagement that occurred too late, by both the Bank and the UN following the withdrawal of MONUSCO's support (ICR para 68), leading to early project closure. Further, there were significant gaps in information gathering during the life of the project (including a baseline survey one year after project commencement. See M&E Section 9b), resulting in significant data gaps across the board, and difficulty in assessing the final outcomes. Having acknowledged these limitations, the team did seek to fill information gaps and were able to deliver important aspects of the project in spite of the poor interaction amongst relevant partners. Thus, quality of supervision is rated moderately satisfactory, but marginally so.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization



a. M&E Design

The elements of the project's M&E design generally allowed for useful and regular data collection to support progress towards the PDOs. The ICR reports 'adequate and reliable' indicators were presented in the project (para 47) and the PAD sets out a reasonable results framework and surveys that aligned with the project's overall theory of change, based on previous relevant projects. A key element was an innovative management information system that was intended to capture data daily to support monitoring and eventual evaluation. Day to day M&E would primarily be implemented by two dedicated UE officials.

b. M&E Implementation

Data collection rested primarily with UE. While biometric data and tracking of XCs movement and progress through stages of reinsertion and integration was regularly entered into the MIS, reporting overall – including against the results framework itself – proved to be poor. Two annual reports were missing, regular tracer beneficiary surveys were not undertaken, the Baseline survey was late (conducted in 2017, a year after project commencement) and expected studies on gender and children were not forthcoming. It is not clear why these shortcomings occurred.

Consequently, the ICR does not present meaningful data against the project's results framework. Instead, the ICR rests principally on three alternative sources of data, which were commissioned to offset some of these data gaps. The Bank commissioned IST research in 2018, a completion workshop was conducted in 2019 and the UN DPKO and Bank commissioned a joint qualitative study of the assemble and triangulate the best available information. The evidence of satisfaction with social reintegration experiences, is fairly strong. Evidence of target attainment beyond beneficiary numbers, and against economic reintegration and mental health improvements remains patchy.

c. M&E Utilization

The ICR reports that M&E did support management decision making particularly in the latter part of the program (para 62). Examples of this are thin, but the primary example of this was the decision to close the program early, due to poor conditions in the CPR, precipitated by the withdrawal of MONUSCO's support (ICR para 15). The delayed Baseline survey provided 'inadvertently good data' on program successes (ICR para 62) a year into the project but there was insufficient follow-up on which to base later decisions or evaluation.

The M&E quality rating is *modest*, with significant shortcomings in implementation in particular. Consequently, evaluation of efficacy against both the social and economic objectives and the project overall was very difficult, given the lack of data against the results framework and missing reporting throughout the project. The studies and closing workshop, along with the Baseline survey provided some triangulation of findings. M&E design overall was adequate but utilization appears limited.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest



10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project did not trigger any World Bank safeguard policies, since it was expected at appraisal, to have limited social or environmental impacts. It was expected these could be mitigated by standard good practices (ICR para 64, PAD para 78, p71). This was despite the PAD also rating key environmental and social risks as ‘substantial’ (p15). The PAD notes that because the project was prepared under paragraph 12 of OP10 for ‘projects in situations of urgent need’, safeguard instruments were deferred into the implementation period. An environmental and social action plan was developed (PAD p21, Annex 5). However, the ICR does not refer to this action plan, nor safeguard instrument preparation or implementation. For RPC construction works, UNOPS was to implement its own environmental, social and gender safeguards process, which was considered to be equivalent to World Bank processes (PAD p21). No assessment of UNOPS’ approach during the project is made in the ICR.

The ICR does not point to any significant environmental impacts or risks, although it notes that it was difficult to ensure effectiveness of some mitigation measures that the project had in place (e.g. training on relevant issues through livelihoods activities, technical measures re pesticide use and water protection) due to the frequent movement of XCs (ICR para 64). This appears consistent with the PAD’s overall assessment of environmental risks and its planned mitigation measures.

Social risks, however, are noted in the ICR as having been ‘serious’, which, although primarily related to the actions of a third party (the military’s transport of XCs and MONUSCO’s withdrawal of monitoring of CPRs), ultimately resulted in its early closure (ICR para 65). Because these particular risks were not highlighted in the PAD, there appears to have been little mitigation action in this regard. Consequently, the ICR does clearly highlight the importance of better formalizing and leveraging partner relationships (which did not occur satisfactorily during the project) in order to have minimized these negative outcomes (ICR paras 67 and 68 and Section E *Lessons and Recommendations*)

The ICR also notes on the positive side, that gender-based violence risks as well as support to vulnerable groups were mainstreamed through the project (para 65) and integrated into the results framework.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

The ICR reports that fiduciary performance improved over time with World Bank implementation support. Unaudited quarterly interim financial statements and audited annual financial statements were submitted and “acceptable to the World Bank” (para 66). The ICR does not state whether any audits were qualified and presents no other information on fiduciary compliance.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

There may well have been unintended negative impacts from the early closure of the project, such as further reducing progress towards achieving economic integration targets in particular, although the actual effects of early closure were not assessed as part of the ICR. While early closure was mostly associated



with MONUSCO's withdrawal of support for CPRs, as the ICR points out, key project structures could have been better leveraged to ensure partners worked more closely to anticipate and mitigate risks (para 56). No other unintended impacts were evident from project documentation.

d. Other

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

The ICR provides excellent lessons, reflective of both successes and difficulties of the project.

Principal among these are:

- 1. Eligibility criteria for participation in DDR projects must account for local realities and communities to ensure broad engagement.** The project design clearly took a comprehensive view of the communities of people it needed to support in order for reinsertion and reintegration to be successful. It also notes though, that eligibility criteria should have been less specifically tied to e.g. weapons, because that meant very few women (who did not often have weapons) approached the project (ICR para 71). Broader criteria could have allowed broader participation.
- 2. For DDR programs to be effective in reducing armed violence, they must be linked to broader social and economic reforms.** Without explicit alignment with broader social, justice and economic development strategies, including regional and cross-border strategies, DDR programs alone cannot sustain reductions in armed violence. This project exemplified 'third generation' DDR approaches (ICR para 71) and was aligned with these broader government and partner strategies.
- 3. DDR programs are contingent on partnerships, which need to be formalized through clear agreements on divisions of responsibilities.** Explicit expressions of responsibilities between partner organizations at project outset would have helped manage both coordination and political challenges that arose when MONUSCO withdrew its support of the program and possibly avoided early project closure.
- 4. Politically sensitive DDR programs often require more time and a combination of analytical, technical and political skills than the Bank's business model allows.** At the



internal Bank project management level, the complexity of DDR programs often requires full time attention to manage sensitivities and many moving parts but project managers are regularly expected to be managing multiple projects. This raises the likelihood of often significant safety or security risks manifesting, as well as operational and reputational risks. At the broader political level, the ICR suggests that quicker and higher-level political engagement by the Bank could have changed the trajectory of the project away from early closure.

Additional lesson from IEG

1. **The viability of economic reintegration activities is contingent on favorable local economic and security conditions.** The Borrower's Comments (ICR Annex 5) highlight that the violence and permanent insecurity in the regions where the CPRs were located; large regularly moving populations; and very limited economic opportunity for both XCs and local communities made the economic integration aims of the project essentially unviable. While the PAD assesses *macroeconomic* risk as moderate, despite clear recognition of the volatile security situation, it does not address in detail the viability of the local economic activities and targets in relation to this known context. Consequently, the preparation offered by the project for developing economic opportunities was not able to be widely applied and targets fell far short.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR presents quite a strong narrative, pieced together from available evidence, noting the project had significant data gaps. These gaps were due to firstly, difficult on-the-ground conditions in a conflict-affected area, secondly, to poor implementation of monitoring and evaluation, and thirdly, to early project closure which hampered efforts to collect closing data. The ICR is fairly clear on where evidence is drawn from and where conclusions are difficult to draw due to evidence gaps. The ICR is forthcoming on the project's challenges. It should be noted that while the project team acknowledges some of the deficiencies in data collection for the ICR, in the absence of travel due to Covid-19, an investigation into a project of this kind was that much more difficult. Completing the review in these circumstances is to be commended given the level of detail provided and the lessons captured.

However, there were shortcomings. No meaningful data entered in the ICR results framework that could be included in the ICRR assessment. There were inconsistencies throughout (as distinct from acknowledged data gaps), between the PAD and ICR and within the ICR itself, mostly related to targets – both those set and final completion levels. There was very little information presented on financial compliance. Recognition of risks was also inconsistent between the PAD and the ICR, and sometimes within the ICR (e.g. see Section 10a Safeguards), as were some of the descriptions of outcomes versus the ratings given (e.g. Efficiency ratings



para 48 and 49). These inconsistencies and gaps made assessment of Efficacy outcomes difficult, particularly in relation to target attainment.

The Lessons are a strength of the ICR. The analysis reflects most of the specific data and implementation challenges described, and complements these with bigger picture structural and political challenges the Bank faces with regard to DDR projects.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial