Report Number: ICRR0022632

1. Project Data

Project ID	Project Name
P150148	DRC - Statistics Development Project

Country	Practice Area(Lead)
Congo, Democratic Republic of	Poverty and Equity

L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Project Cost (USD)
IDA-D0880	31-Dec-2020	23,965,424.53

Bank Approval Date	Closing Date (Actual)
28-Aug-2015	31-Dec-2020

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	45,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	25,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	24,325,954.53	0.00

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The project appraisal document (PAD) stated the objective as: "to strengthen the capacity of the National Statistical System to produce and disseminate core economic and social statistics" (par. 15).

For this Review, the objectives of the project are assessed as follows:

PDO 1: Strengthen capacity of the National Statistical System (NSS) to produce core economic and social statistics.

PDO 2: Strengthen capacity of the NSS to disseminate core economic and social statistics.

The objectives of the project remained unchanged, but some outcome indicators were revised at restructurings. This Review will therefore perform a split rating.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?
No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
Yes

d. Components
Component 1: Data Production, Dissemination, and Use

The component was to finance activities aimed at improving statistical infrastructure, the quality and timeliness of national accounts statistics, agriculture statistics, and poverty and inequality statistics produced by the NSS. It also was to support the dissemination and use of statistical information.

- *1.1: Cartography of the population and housing census* (original amount: US$14 million; actual amount not reported). The grant would help close the financing gap for the census cartography and the technical assistance to the National Statistical Institute (INS) and the Census Agency for analysis of the results. It would be disbursed after the WBG received the program of activities for the cartography of the population census issued by the Census Bureau and the Bureau had demonstrated that it had secured the total budget for those activities.
- *1.2: System of surveys on household living conditions* (original amount US$8.25 million; actual amount: not reported). The grant would help the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) design and implement a coherent and financially sustainable system of household surveys to monitor household living conditions with a multi-topic questionnaire.
- *1.3: Agriculture census and survey* (original amount: US$9.8 million; actual amount not reported). The grant would finance the implementation of a system for collecting, processing, and updating agricultural statistics.
- *1.4: National Accounts Statistics* (original amount: US$1.8 million; actual amount: not reported). The grant would finance technical assistance on national accounts and the production and analysis of complementary data on businesses to update key macroeconomic aggregates.
- *1.5: Information Technology and Equipment for Data Production and Diffusion* (original amount: US$1.25 million; actual amount: not reported). The grant would finance the upgrading of the NSS and the information technology (IT) infrastructure and data management systems for the data production activities the project supported.

Two sub-components were added after the first restructuring, but the total cost and financing of the project remained unchanged. The two components were:

- *1.6 Enterprise census* (original amount: US$6 million: actual amount: not reported)
- *1.7 Improving public finance statistics* (original amount: US$2 million; actual amount, not reported)

Further changes were conducted during the second and third restructurings. These changes are summarized after Component 2.

Component 2: Human Resources Development and Management

The component was to support the INS in attracting and retaining qualified statisticians through an effective system of human resources development and management. The component had five subcomponents:

- *2.1 Staffing and human resources policies* (original amount US$0.5 million; actual amount: not reported). The activity was to support establishing a strategic staffing plan to enable INS to attract and retain qualified statisticians and provide the necessary support to statistics departments in line ministries. To achieve that goal the grant was to finance technical assistance in six activities: establishing the skill needs of the INS; drafting an operation manual for INS; developing a 3-year staffing plan; developing an end-of-career framework; developing internal procedures, collective labor agreements and a new salary scale; and workshop activities in support of the strengthening capacity plan.
- 2.2 *Development of the National Statistics Schools* (original amount US$3.0 million; actual amount: not reported). The activity was to support assessing the local statistics schools, reviewing the statistical training curricula, drafting of syllabi, and training materials for teaching applied statistics and demography, hiring and remunerating professors to deliver specific courses and train local trainers, and acquire material as needed to support students in statistics training programs.
- *2.3 Scholarship program for training at regional and national statistics and demographic schools and short-term training related to statistics* (original amount US$1.1 million; actual amount: not reported). The activity was to support formal pre-service training to prepare Congolese for competitive examinations for admission to regional statistical and demographic schools.
- *2.4 Young Professional Program* (original amount: US$2 million; actual amount: not reported). The grant would support the hiring and remuneration of "Young Professionals" on qualified assignments in the NSS through a government-owned "Young Professionals Program." The support was contingent on the success of the activities outlined in sub-component 2.1.
- *2.5 Project management* (original amount US$3.3 million; actual amount: not reported). The sub-subcomponent was to support activities that fostered the coordination of statistical operations and strengthening the capacity of the project coordination unit (PCU) located in the National Institute of Statistics.

Restructuring

The project had three restructurings. The first one added two sub-components (1.6 and 1.7) to Component 1, reallocated funds from sub-component 1.1 (housing and population census) to sub-components 1.6 and 1.7, and removed sub-component 2.4 (Young Professionals program) and reallocated those funds to sub-components 2.1 and 2.3. The second restructuring reallocated funds within Component 2 and reduced to US$8.8 million the funds allocated to it. The third restructuring reduced the grant amount to US$30 million, and cut the funds allocated to Component 1 from US$35.1 million to US$21.2 million and reallocated. The

names of the components changed in the first restructuring. The table below presents the financing by components for the original and restructured components and their actual value.

Financing by components (US$ million)					
Component	**PAD**	**R#1**	**R#2**	**R#3**	**Actual**
1. Data Production, Dissemination and Use	**35.1**	**35.1**	**21.2**	**19.5**	**16.6**
1.1 TA to the population and housing census	14.0	2.1	2.5	n.a.	n.a.
1.2 Household surveys	8.3	10.0	3.45	n.a.	n.a.
1.3: Agriculture census and survey	9.8	10.0	0.75	n.a.	n.a.
1.4 Economic Statistics	1.8	2.7	5.00	n.a.	n.a.
1.5 Improving IT, Equipment and Dissemination	1.3	2.4	1.50	n.a.	n.a.
1.6 Enterprise census		6.0	7.70	n.a.	n.a.
1.7 Improving public finance statistics		2.0	0.30	n.a.	n.a.
2. Human Resource Development and Management	**9.90**	**9.90**	**8.8**	**5.5**	**7.7**
2.1 Staffing and policies	0.50	1.50	1.00	n.a.	n.a.
2.2 Support for the development of the National Statistics Schools	3.00	3.00	1.40	n.a.	n.a.
2.3 Scholarship program for training	1.10	2.10	2.10	n.a.	n.a.
2.4 Young Professional Program	2.00	0.00	0.00	n.a.	n.a.
2.5 Project Management	3.30	3.30	4.30	n.a.	n.a.
Total financing	**45.00**	**45.00**	**30.00**	**25.00**	**24.3**

e. **Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

The project was approved on August 28, 2015, became effective on June 20, 2016, and closed on December 31, 2020, as planned. The government requested restructuring the project on February 28, 2019, September 1, 2020, and December 15, 2020. The WBG approved the requests on April 4, 2019, December 15, 2020, and March 9, 2021 after the project closed. The restructurings were level 2.

The original project cost was SDR 32 million (US$45 million equivalent). Of this amount, US$15 million was cancelled in the second restructuring and a further US$5 million in the third, for a total cost of US$25 million after the restructurings. The third restructuring allocated US$19.5 million to Component 1 (Data Production, Dissemination and Use) and US$5.5 million to Component 2 (Human Resources Development and Management). Actual project cost was US$24.3 million, split into US$16.6 million for Component 1 and US$7.7 million for Component 2. The cost refers to the WBG's contribution.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Despite its immense natural resources wealth, the DRC lacks infrastructure and social services, is unstable and fragile, and ranks among the poorest countries in the world, a result of bad governance and decades of conflict. Since 2009, political and economic reforms have led to faster economic growth , and its Human Development Index rose from 0.44 in 2016 to about 0.57 in 2019. In 2006 the country started implementing a poverty reduction strategy, which was renewed in 2012; the strategy required continuous monitoring and evaluation and timely statistical information that the country's statistical system could not provide. The existing system could not meet users' needs for data, and its overall capacity was weak.

The World Bank's Country Statistical Performance Indicators (50 indicators in five data dimensions—use, services, products, sources and infrastructure) showed that the DRC's statistical system had improved by 2014, after making available highly demanded data such as poverty indicators (and gender and primary school data. Still, its score on performance was low and below the average for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The system did not produce quality data in a timely manner, in part because of its limited resources which, after paying salaries, left little money to collect data. The poor conditions of the statistical system persuaded the government to improve the country's statistical capacity. The effort started in 2009 by establishing the INS, giving it technical independence to conduct its activities. In 2012 the government approved a National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS). The INS lacked qualified staff to produce and publish statistics meeting international standards, and the statistical infrastructure lacked basic information, such as a population census, making it difficult to set policies where population information was essential (e.g., schooling, GDP per capita).

The WBG's recent Systematic Country Diagnostic (FY18) for the DRC identified five priorities for the country to achieve growth with shared prosperity. Two would help address the problems of the statistical system: priority area 2, building inclusive institutions and strengthening governance; and priority area 4, building human capital. The project would contribute to these areas by supporting the development of INS human resources and the basic infrastructure for statistical operations (cartography of population census, household surveys) to ensure statistics meet international standards. By improving the ability to produce relevant data in a timely manner, the project was aligned with the FY2013-FY2016 Country Assistance Strategy's first objective of "increasing state effectiveness and improving good governance."

Rating
Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1
Objective
Strengthen capacity of the NSS to produce core economic and social statistics

Rationale

The project objectives remained unchanged, but project outputs and outcomes as well as the outcome targets were revised during its execution through three restructurings approved on April 4, 2019, December 15, 2020 (15 days before closing), and March 9, 2021 (two months after closing).

Theory of change

The PAD did not present a theory of change, but the ICR reconstructs it from information in the PAD and supervision reports. The ICR presents two theories of change, one at project appraisal and other after restructuring. The two results chain have common elements, though the one reconstructed after restructuring was simpler and more direct. The review uses the simple and direct theory of change to summarize the logic behind the program.

The ICR's theory of change presents a valid results chain between project activities, outputs, and outcomes. The project's higher-level expected outcome was to improve evidence-based decision making in DRC, which was to be achieved by achieving the project's two objectives of strengthening capacity of the INS to (a) produce core economic and social statistics and (b) disseminate these statistics.

To assess achievement of these objectives, the ICR divides the inputs into group 1—data production, dissemination, and use— and group 2—human resources development and management. The inputs in group 1 contribute to the outputs and the outcome in objective 1. Inputs in group 2 and inputs in group 1 contribute to the outputs and the outcome in objective 2; for example, improving IT and equipment (including the INS building) would contribute to delivering routine statistical publications available in the INS website, thereby contributing to the *production* of statistics in objective 1 and to their *dissemination* in objective 2.

The theory of change identifies four elements of the result chain: (a) major activities; (b) outputs (i.e., inputs); (c) mid-level outputs (outcomes in IEG terminology); and (d) PDO/outcome.

Major activities and inputs

At appraisal, the activities encompassed: (i) supporting cartography (i.e., drawing a map) of population census and housing census; (ii) designing and implementing a system of household surveys; (iii) conducting agricultural census and surveys; (iv) supporting national accounts statistics; and (v) improving IT and equipment for data protection and diffusion.

The activities after project restructuring narrowed to: (i) providing technical assistance to the population and housing census, and supporting (ii) household surveys, (iii) agricultural census and surveys, (iv) economic statistics; (v) enterprise census, (vi) public finance statistics, and (vii) improving IT and equipment for data production and diffusion. During the restructurings, the *population and housing census cartography* was removed, affecting the results of other activities, and reducing the potential impact of the project.

Outputs

At project closing the activities were expected to deliver 14 outputs, of which 10 were on data production, dissemination, and use and four were on human resources development and management.

- Before restructuring, none of the eight outputs were achieved.
- After restructuring, six outputs were achieved and three were not achieved. The outputs achieved included: number of statistical publications (25), LSMS-ISA survey for Kinshasa, price indices,

finalizing 2 out of 3 technical tools for the agricultural census, and certification of the E-QUIBB database (QUIBB is the French acronym for the Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire Survey -CWIQ-, designed to gather information related to poverty such as housing conditions, water and sanitation, education, health, income, and assets). The project did not produce the planned development guide of the Government Financial Operations Table (TOFE), the registry for enterprise statistics or the plan to implement the data dissemination policy.

Outcomes

The expected outcome was *the number of statistical products completed and published by the INS following international standards* (baseline value: 0; original target 5; revised target 4). The PAD listed eight statistical products that INS was expected to produce during the project's life, of which 5 were to be completed and published at project closing as follows: one per year in 2016 and 2017, two in 2018, and one in 2019. After the first restructuring in April 2019, the target was set at 4 products. INS completed and published the consumer price index and the statistical yearbook, which followed international standards. Among the products either not completed were the agricultural census, the household survey, the national accounts, and GDP and input-output tables.

The original and the revised outcome targets were partially achieved, at 40 and 50 percent, respectively. Because achievement is modest under both the original and revised targets, there is no need to split the rating. The overall outcome achievement for the first objective, under both the original and revised outcome targets, is modest.

In sum, achievement of the objective of strengthening capacity of the INS to produce core economic and social statistics was modest.

Rating
Modest

OBJECTIVE 2
Objective
Strengthen capacity of the NSS to disseminate core economic and social statistics (original outcome targets)

Rationale
The text for objective 1 is valid for objective 2.

Major activities and inputs

The activities at appraisal and at closing aimed to strengthen the capacity of staff and students to disseminate core economic and social statistics. The activities included: (i) establishing INS staffing plans and policies; (ii) supporting the development of national statistics schools; (iii) providing scholarships and training to Congolese students; and (iv) establishing and implementing a Young Professionals program. In addition, five activities in group 1 supported the outputs for objective 2; they were: developing a master sample frame from the census cartography, implementing the Living Standards Measurement Study Integrated Survey on

Agriculture, updating to a base year the national accounts and the consumer price index, and making the datasets available in INS website.

At appraisal, it was expected that the activities would help to:

- develop and validate technical training courses in the national schools of statistics;
- graduate statisticians or equivalent from national and regional statistics or demographic schools; and
- recruit and finance young professionals.

Outputs

- Before restructuring, none of the expected three outputs listed in the PAD under component 2 were achieved.
- After restructuring, the four outputs were either achieved or substantially achieved. They were:
    - improved curriculum of the statistical schools in Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Goma with teachers receiving on the job training (Target: Yes);
    - 40 scholarships funded by the project (Target: 45);
    - 33 young graduates supported by the project (Target: 30);
    - 147 statistics technicians trained in national statistical schools (Target: 180)

Outcomes

The expected results were the number of: (a) statistical outputs with data readily available to users through the INS data portal and (b) qualified staff working for the NSS (including the INS and the statistical departments of the Ministries of Education, Health, Agriculture, and Finances).

- *Number of statistical outputs with data readily available to users through INS data portal* (Baseline value: 0; original target 6). At closing, the actual number was 3, meeting 50 percent of the original target. *Modest.*
- *Number of qualified staff working for the NSS, including the INS and the statistical departments of the Ministries of Education, Health, Agriculture and Finances.* The indicator was dropped in the first restructuring because it was considered an intermediate indicator. Not rated.

Achievement of the objectives of the project under the original outcome target is Modest.

Rating
Modest

OBJECTIVE 2 REVISION 1
Revised Objective
Strengthen capacity of the NSS to disseminate core economic and social statistics (revised outcome targets)

Revised Rationale

The theory of change and inputs did not change, but one outcome indicator was removed and the target for the remaining outcome indicator was revised downward.

Outcomes

After the first restructuring one outcome indicator was left for this objective: *the number of statistical outputs with data readily available to users through the INS data portal* (Baseline value: 0; target, 3). The ICR reports that the target of 3 statistical outputs in the portal was met. The statistical outputs in the INS portal were the data on the consumer price index and the data on households and enterprises obtained through the high frequency phone survey. The data can be found in Publications | Institut National de la Statistique [https://www.ins.cd/publication]; the most recent consumer price index information is for December 2020.

Achievement of this objective under the revised outcome targets is therefore rated Substantial

Revised Rating
Substantial

OVERALL EFFICACY
Rationale
Under the original outcome targets, achievement of both objectives was modest, for an overall modest efficacy rating.

Overall Efficacy Rating	**Primary Reason**
Modest	Low achievement

OVERALL EFFICACY REVISION 1
Overall Efficacy Revision 1 Rationale
Under the revised outcome targets, achievement of the first objective was modest, and achievement of the second objective was substantial, for an overall substantial efficacy rating.

Overall Efficacy Revision 1 Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

Slow project execution prevented the implementation of activities essential for success. The population and housing census failed to take off on time and was removed in the first restructuring, about 43 months after the project was approved and about 20 months before it closed. The lack of population and housing census data led to delays in executing other components like the agricultural census, forcing the parties to develop an alternative methodology to advance the task. By April 4, 2019, when the first restructuring was approved, none of the expected outputs and some intermediate results had been achieved, but about 60 percent of actual project costs had been disbursed.

Deficiencies in project management (e.g., lack of knowledge of WBG procedures, poor staffing of the PCU, delays in appointing a project manager) and in supervision caused the delays that resulted in severe shortcomings in implementation efficiency across the first two-thirds of the project's life (43 out of 64 months). The three bodies in charge of implementing and monitoring the project were not fully functional because the Project Steering Committee and the focal points did not have sufficient budget to operate the project; when funds became available, the Committee never met. The project implementation unit did not recruit key members on time, the financial management specialist conducted multiple incompatible tasks, and the monitoring and evaluation specialist did not fulfill his tasks. Last, the internal auditor contract was cancelled because of issues with a previous contract with the World Bank.

Cost per unit of product delivered gives a sense –albeit imperfect– of how well the funds were used. At Board approval the expected results for the two objectives were 12 products, later revised to 7. Each original expected result would cost US$3.75 million at appraisal and US$3.6 million if the revised targets had been met, but that did not happen. Only 5 of the final 7 products were delivered, at a cost of US5 million, 33 and 40 percent higher than the expected cost per product at appraisal and after restructuring. Because the consumer price index is counted twice as an output (as statistical output and as product completed and published), it should be counted once to measure cost. In this case, the unit cost rises to US$6.75 million, 75 percent over the expected revised cost. While this gross value cannot substitute for a proper cost-benefit analysis of the project, it helps to answer the question of whether the project was implemented at least cost. Answer: No.

This Review rates overall efficiency as modest.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 ☐ Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 ☐ Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The project's objectives were relevant over its entire lifetime. Efficacy was modest under the original outcome targets and substantial under the revised outcome targets. Efficiency was modest. The project's main achievements were to complete and publish two statistical products -- the Statistical Yearbook and the Consumer Price Index -- and have three statistical outputs with data readily available to users through the INS data portal (the Consumer Price Index and data for households and enterprises gathered through a high frequency telephone survey).

The table below summarizes the project's ratings and the calculations for the overall outcome rating. With the large majority of the project's disbursements having occurred prior to the restructuring that revised the outcome targets, the overall Outcome rating is driven by achievement under the original outcome targets.

Rating Dimension	Original outcome targets	Revised outcome targets
Relevance of Objectives	Substantial	
Efficacy	Modest	Substantial
Efficiency	Modest	
Outcome Rating	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Outcome Rating Value	3	4
Amount Disbursed at second restructuring (US$ million)	23.77	0.56
Disbursement (%)	97.7%	2.3%
Weight Value	2.93	0.092
Total sum of weights	3.022	
Overall Outcome Rating	**Moderately Unsatisfactory (3.0)**	

a. **Outcome Rating**
   Moderately Unsatisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

The main risk arises from the government's lack of commitment to conduct institutional reforms by establishing the INS Scientific Council and the National Council for Statistics. The second risk comes from the uncertainty about the future availability of funds to finance first the statistical work needed to validate the data for the enterprise census and the household surveys and then to publish their reports. The third risk comes from the low capacity of human resources, but ; a small step has been taken to reduce this risk by training people in the statistical schools, but for that to matter, the INS or other organizations of the national statistical system must use them. These problems are already affecting one result of the project: the government has not hired yet the 33 young professionals that the project hired to support the INS; soon, the 163 upcoming graduates studying statistics and related fields will face the same problem.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The World Bank designed a project whose objectives had substantial relevance and ambitious scope but this was inconsistent with a realistic assessment of the country's capacity and its institutional setting. The Bank designed the project based on the needs established in the NSDS, which lack of funds and technical capacity. The main executing agency, INS, had low capacity and insufficient human resources to conduct surveys. The World Bank underestimated the risks from shortcomings in institutional capacity and arrangements. The three main bodies in charge of executing and monitoring the project were not functional: the Project Steering Committee in charge of coordinating and supervising the project; the Project Implementation Unit in the INS managing the project and its fiduciary aspects; and the focal points in the INS and other NSS members providing technical inputs. Last, several project activities depended on outputs from the population and housing census cartography.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The Bank conducted seven supervision missions, the last one in late 2019, one year before the project closed. The ICR notes that the "World Bank's supervisory role was to facilitate effective project implementation and ensure value for money, transparency and accountability" (par. 167). The results of the project and the problems it faced during execution indicated that the Bank could have done better in providing training to government staff on Bank procedures, especially fiduciary and procurement aspects. The ICR reports that "in addition to the TTLs, a statistician/economist was assigned in the country shortly before the project's first restructuring" (par. 168), about 43 months after project approval and 22 months before closing, too late to advance the project to its original goals. The ICR also reports that country office experts provided constant training and advice to the client, but judging by the project's results, the support was still less than was needed to deliver the results expected. Last, with negligible results before the first restructuring, the Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) rated generously the various categories rated, incorrectly reflecting the reality of the project.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The PAD defined clear objectives and indicators that captured the contributions of the components and outputs to the project's outcomes. The indicators were relevant, measurable, time bound, and had defined baseline and target values; with hindsight, the targets turned out to be overly ambitious. To assess progress every six months, a workshop was held in which all parties involved in executing the project, stakeholders, and beneficiaries participated. This Review agrees with the ICR's assessment that the design could have considered imposing more rigorous implementation requirements, such as hiring key personnel earlier on and make sure the Project Steering Committee was operational.

b. M&E Implementation

The Bank monitored the project through regular missions as agreed with the government, producing aide memoires, ISRs, and financial, audit, and mid-term review reports although this was curtailed after COVID-19 arrived . This effort permitted the Bank to collect data on the indicators and report them in ISRs. The effort was insufficient to deal with the project's implementation problems, such as not having an operational Project Steering Committee, the Project Implementation Unit being without a manager for extended periods, fiduciary problems, and delays in reporting results; these shortcomings delayed executing the project and contributed to delays in gathering data on the associated outcome and intermediate indicators. The last report was archived on February 12, 2020 and disclosed on the following day.

c. M&E Utilization

The Bank and stakeholders knew of the project's challenges despite overly optimistic ISRs, but information on outcomes and intermediate results was not used in a timely manner to restructure the project and address the problems plaguing it, as attested by two subsequent restructurings approved two weeks before and 10 weeks after its closing.

M&E Quality Rating
Modest

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project fell in category C of safeguards and did not trigger any social or environmental safeguard Operational Policy.

Two occupational health and safety incidents happened during the enterprise census activities, one severe and the other serious. Both were accounted for through the World Bank's Safeguards Incident Response Toolkit.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial management was weak during the project's life. For a time, the project lacked a financial management specialist and an external auditor of accounts. Project activities were not properly accounted for, and the Bank discovered the shortcomings in financial management because of: (a) complaints from the field that enumerators for the enterprise census were not being paid; (b) the government's failure to provide a detailed report on expenditures, information on payments made, and balance to be paid to census enumerators; and (c) an overrun of funds allocated to the enterprise census over the allocated budget. After the problem with enumerators appeared, the Bank conducted a review of the project's financial management; the review led to an increase in the amount allocated to the enterprise census and discovery of US$4.8 million of questionable or ineligible expenditures, which turned out to be US$6.0 million after further revisions. These problems arose from weaknesses in internal controls; an accountant performing as cashier, treasurer, and accountant; weak asset management; and no inventories of fixed assets, among other factors.

The procurement assistant lacked knowledge of procedures, and had to frequently conduct the procurement work without qualified oversight during implementation for about 11 and 19 months. The quality of procurement records was variable; for some contracts it was impossible to know the criteria used to assess bids.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

None reported.

d. Other

The ICR notes that the project included gender indicators under its statistical operations, but not gender results indicators.

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	The Bank designed a project to meet the country's needs, but overlooked its low capacity and acted late to correct implementation problems
Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest	

Quality of ICR	---	Substantial

12. Lessons

The ICR offers the following lessons, with which IEG agrees, with adaptation:

- When supervision reports overrate outcomes and underrate fiduciary, management, and implementation risks, the odds are low for correcting the problems promptly and high for achieving unsatisfactory results. Therefore, supervision missions should identify and flag risks early and rate projects fairly.
- When the government uses differential salaries and bonuses to reward staff with the same qualifications in the implementing agencies, the odds are high that the project will experience implementation problems.
- To prevent failure in a context where there is low capacity and high statistical needs, the WBG needs to: (a) assess what needs can realistically be satisfied with existing capacity, and (b) ensure that, soon after grant or credit approval, key positions are filled and the staff in charge of managing the project receive proper training in basic management skills and Bank procedures (e.g., fiduciary, procurement, etc.).
- When in a country like DRC the project design pays insufficient attention to implementation requirements, the project is likely to deliver unsatisfactory results. Therefore, to raise the odds of success, the design must consider imposing more rigorous implementation requirements, such as hiring key personnel and ensuring funds are set aside to pay the members of the project steering committee.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR analyzes well the project's design and implementation issues and presents good information about project developments and results. It should be noted that the ICR reconstructed a credible theory of change, which neither the PAD nor the Restructuring Papers had developed.

The review notes two areas where the ICR faltered. First, its discussion of achievement of results (efficacy) is convoluted: it covers different types of activities and phases in the implementation, making it difficult to understand what the project achieved in terms of outputs and outcomes; for example, each of paragraphs 63-70 informs about project activities conducted and not conducted, intermediate inputs, outputs, and outcomes. The reader must go to Annexes 1, 7, and 8 to find out the indicators and what was achieved; it would have helped the reader if the ICR had indicated which outputs would contribute to producing and to disseminating the products and statistical outputs of the project. Second, the ICR's criteria of weak project management as a

reason for its modest rating for efficiency does not address the question of how economically resources and inputs are converted to results.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial