Report Number : ICRR0021134

1. Project Data

Project ID	Project Name
P114111	CAR - Emergency Power Response Project
Country	**Practice Area(Lead)**
Central African Republic	Energy & Extractives

L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Project Cost (USD)
IDA-H4500,TF-94990	30-Jun-2012	8,000,000.00
Bank Approval Date	**Closing Date (Actual)**	
17-Feb-2009	28-Apr-2017	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	8,000,000.00	2,500,000.00
Revised Commitment	7,976,928.41	2,250,801.02
Actual	7,648,253.07	2,250,801.02

Prepared by	Reviewed by	ICR Review Coordinator	Group
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the Financing Agreement (Schedule 1, page 6):
"To partially restore reliable electricity supply to the Project Implementing Entity's customers in Bangui, including essential service providers such as the Recipient's water company and hospitals and improve the financial and operational performance of the sector."

The PDO as stated in the Project Paper (page 5):

"To partially restore reliable electricity supply to the Power Utilities' (ENERCA - in French) customers in Bangui and to improve the financial and operational sustainability of the sector."

This ICR Review is based on the PDO as stated in the Financing Agreement. The project's efficacy will be assessed vis-à-vis the following objectives. (i) To partially restore water supply to the Project Implementing Entity's customers in Bangui, including essential service providers such as the Recipient's water company and hospitals: and (ii) To improve the financial and operational performance of the sector.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

There were five components (Project Paper, pages 5-6 and 24-26).

One: Rehabilitation of Hydropower stations. *Appraisal estimate US$6.00 million. Actual cost US$6.01 million*. This component aimed at restoring electricity and providing quality electricity services in Bangui. Activities included: (i) installation of electrical protection devices at Boali 1: (ii) replacement of the regulation set comprising the regulator and wicket gates for the five turbines of the Boali 1 hydropower plant: (iii) retrofitting the Boali 2 transformer: (iv) upgrading the Boali 1 transformer by installing cooling fans: and, (v) procuring a new transformer to secure the five hydropower turbine feeding transformers and a spare transformer to replace the current one in Boali 1.

Two: Compact fluorescent lamps (CFL) program. *Appraisal estimate US$0.60 million. Actual cost US$0.40 million*. This component aimed at electricity conservation for lighting purposes through replacing incandescent bulbs in households and public houses. Activities included: (i) providing on average four lamps each to about 20,000 customers: and, (ii) technical assistance in the form of a knowledge transfer program with a utility that had already implemented such a CFL plan (ELECTROGAZ in Rwanda).

Three: Prepayment Meters. *Appraisal estimate US$2.20 million. Actual cost US$1.90 million*. This component aimed at increasing electricity bill collection rates and inducing energy conservation among users. Activity included a pilot program aimed for introducing pre-payment meters among the main consumer categories (such as, households, government institutions and the Bangui city council).

Four: Loss reduction program. *Appraisal estimate US$0.90 million. Actual cost US$1.10 million*. This component aimed at replacing old low-voltage distribution lines with Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) insulated aluminum cables in Bangui neighborhoods, where technical losses were lower and electricity theft more uncommon.

Five: Project Implementation Support. *Appraisal estimate US$0.40 million. Actual Cost US$0.40 million*. This component provided implementation support to the Public Works Agency (AGETIP in French) in the areas of fiduciary management.

There was an unallocated component. *Appraisal estimate US$0.40 million. Actual cost US$0.00 million.*

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project cost. Appraisal estimate US$10.50 million. Actual cost US$9.90 million. The cost of Component One activity (rehabilitation of the hydropower plant) were higher than expected at appraisal and grant resources from the State and Peace Building Fund (SPF) of US$2.50 million initially earmarked for a "Safe and Reliable Public Electricity Project" were reallocated for funding this component.

Project financing. The project was financed by an IDA grant of US$8.00 million and a SPF Trust Fund administered by the Bank of US$2.50 million. Cumulative project grant at appraisal US$10.50 million. Amount disbursed US$9.90 million (including US$7.6 million of the IDA grant and US$2.30 million of the SPA grant). The project resources to fund project activities were reduced over time due to the appreciation of the US$ relative to the CFA France (CFAF) of about 20% during project implementation. There was parallel financing for complementary activities such as, sector rehabilitation from the French Development Agency (AFD in French) and electrification of 10,000 homes in Bangui over the 2007-2011 period from the European Union (EU).

Borrower contribution. None was planned at appraisal. There was no Borrower contribution up to project closing.

Dates. There were four Level 2 restructurings. These changes were made through the first restructuring on June 30, 2012: (1) Some activities were dropped due to security considerations and shortage of resources. The dropped activities included, installation of a new stator at the G3 turbine, a spare transformer at Boali 1, a media campaign for prepayment meters, a safety plan for Boali dams and a technical project audit: (2) The closing date for the IDA grant was extended by two years to June 30, 2014 and for the SPF grant by a year to June 30,2013: and, (iii) The Results Framework was modified.

The second restructuring on April 23, 2014 extended the closing date by ten months from June 30, 2014 to December 30, 2015.
The third restructuring on October 26,2015 extended the project closing date by ten months from December 30,2015 to October 31, 2016 for completing ongoing components one and three activities.
The fourth restructuring on August 2, 2016 extended the closing date by six months from October 31, 2016 to April 28, 2018 for completing the activity associated with rehabilitation of Boali 1.
The SPF grant closed one behind the original schedule on 06/30/2013 and this project closed four years and ten months behind schedule on 04/28/2017.
Split rating. This review does not use a split rating because the reduction in scope and revision of

indicators did not involve a substantive change of PDO.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

Periodic internal conflicts in the years before appraisal had led to dilapidation of infrastructure, including power sector infrastructure. During the summer of 2008, there was a humanitarian crisis when the electricity utility - Enerca - lost about half of its generation and supply capacity in the capital - Bangui - due to a technical failure that lasted several weeks. The power shortages also affected water supply, which relied on electricity for pumping water around the city. Since Enerca remained in a critical state at appraisal with frequent technical failures, insufficient generation capacity, high energy losses (due to unpaid bills and electricity theft) and a dire financial situation, the PDO was highly relevant to the government strategy of restoring reliable power supply to Bangui. The project was in line with the Government's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) issued in 2009. The PRSP highlighted the importance of rehabilitating infrastructure and restoring basic public services. The PDO was relevant to the Government's National Recovery and Peace Building Plan for 2017-2021 period. The third pillar of the Plan highlighted the need for promoting economic recovery and boosting productive sectors through repairing and constructing infrastructure (including energy infrastructure).

The project was aligned with the joint African Development Bank (AfDB)/World Bank Interim Strategy for 2007-2008. This strategy supported the need for: (i) economic recovery, strengthening public sector governance and technical capacity and, (ii) human development, with an emphasis on the poor. The Bank's Country Engagement Note for the 2016-2017 period highlighted the need for restoring public sector institutions, providing basic support to livelihoods and providing basic social services.

Rating	Revised Rating
High	Not Rated/Not Applicable

b. Relevance of Design

The statement of the PDO of the project, which was designed as rapid response to crises and emergencies (OP/BP 8.00) was clear and the causal links between the project activities, their outputs and outcomes were logical. And the intended outcomes were measurable in principle. Component one activities such as rehabilitation of hydropower stations can be expected to contribute to the outcome of restoring electricity capacity in Bangui. Component two, three and four activities such as replacing incandescent bulbs with Compact Fluorescent Lamps (CFLs), introducing pre-payment meters among the main consumer categories, replacing old voltage distribution lines with Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) insulated aluminum cables in Bangui neighborhoods were technical losses were lower and preparing dam safety and emergency preparedness plans can be expected to contribute to the outcome of improving the operational and financial performance of ENERCA (the Central African Republic Power Utility).

Given the emergency nature of the project, the design appropriately focused on restoring reliable power supply to Bangui and preventing the future occurrence of the crisis and did not specifically address the medium or long-term power sector issues (such as increasing future generation capacity).

Rating	Revised Rating
Substantial	Not Rated/Not Applicable

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective

To partially restore reliable electricity supply to customers in Bangui, including essential service providers such as the water company and hospitals:

Rationale

Outputs. (ICR, pages 15-17 and ICR Datasheet).

- The following activities were completed as targeted: Maintenance of the three main transformers of the power plants at Boali 1 and 2, replacement of the five turbines and their speed controllers, installation of a circuit breaker for the new transformer of substation A and 12 transformers for substation B and Boali 1.
- 16 new transformers were installed at project closure. This exceeded both the revised and original targets of fourteen and seven respectively.

Outcomes.

- Additional energy distributed by the hydropower plants increased from 125 Gigawatt-hours (GWh) at the baseline to 159 GWh at project closure. This exceeded the target of 150 GWh.
- Number of hours of load shedding at the four hospitals, due to increased energy generation and upgraded transmission and distribution of the hydropower plants, dropped to zero. This was slightly short of the target of five hospitals.
- Number of hours of load shedding for water facilities due to increased energy distribution by the hydropower plants decreased from five at the baseline to zero as per the revised target.

Although there was parallel financing from other donors, these activities by other donors had not been completed at project closure. Given that the targets were realized in most cases, it is reasonable to conclude that the project made a Substantial contribution to realizing the PDO of partially restoring reliable electricity supply to customers in Bangui, including essential service providers such as the water company and hospitals.

Rating
Substantial

Objective 2
Objective
To improve the financial and operational performance of the sector:

Rationale
Outputs.

- 3,500 prepayment meters were installed. This was short of the revised target of 5,500 prepayment meters.
- 22,200 households were provided with Compact Fluorescent Lamps (CFLs) at project closure. This exceeded the target of 20,000 CFLs.
- 56,134 CFLs were distributed to hospitals. There were no targets for this indicator.
- 168.3 Kilometer (Km) of Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) insulated cable were laid to replace bare copper wires at project closure. This exceeded both the revised and original targets of 150 km and 15 km respectively.
- 16 newly equipped transformers were installed. This exceeded both the revised and original targets of fourteen and seven respectively.
- The Board of Directors for the Central African Republic Power Utility Company (ENERCA) were nominated at project closure but the external audit of ENERCA was not undertaken due to lack of funding.
- Dam safety and emergency preparedness plans were not prepared at project closure, as the expert required to support ENERCA in this activity was not willing to go to the Central African Republic due to security concerns.

Outcomes.

- The cash generation target for ENERCA was exceeded. The performance index improved from 32.9% in 2009 to 67% in 2017, thus exceeding the target of 49.6%. However, the new prepayment system had not been generalized yet as of project closing, and the payment of bills by the public sector remains an issue.
- Bill collection ratio of the Public Works Agency (due partly to the new prepayment system) improved from 65% at the baseline to 67% at project closure. This was short of the target of 80%.
- 1.92 Megawatts (MW) of generating capacity was saved each year through the CFL program. This was short of the target of 2.0 MW. It is not clear if this result could be sustained given that some of the CFLs were sold back in the market, as they were more expensive compared to the incandescent bulbs.

Rating

Modest

5. Efficiency

Economic Analysis. An economic analysis was conducted at appraisal and at closure of the project components (restoring capacity through rehabilitating hydropower plants, improving operational and commercial performance of the sector through electricity conservation measures and reducing technical and non-technical losses). These components accounted for about 90% of the appraisal cost and 95% of the actual cost. The costs of rehabilitating hydropower plants included capital and maintenance costs and the benefits were assumed to come from improved electricity connections to the urban and suburban households, hospitals and the water utility. The improvements in operational and commercial performance of the utility were assumed to come from increased collection rates through prepayment of meters, replacing old voltage distribution lines with Polyvinyl Chloride insulated aluminum cables and replacing incandescent bulbs in households and public houses. The Ex post Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) was 21%. An overall ex ante EIRR was not calculated at appraisal (The ex ante EIRR for the rehabilitation of power plants, and loss reduction systems were estimated at 20% and 43% respectively).

Operational and administrative issues. There were cost overruns associated with the activity of rehabilitating hydropower plants. The overruns were due to a combination of factors including: (i) exchange rate fluctuations (the US$ appreciated by 20% relative to the CFA Franc and this reduced the funding for activities denominated in US$ terms (ICR, page 9): (ii) security conditions during implementation, and increased demurrage and storage fees for imported goods. (ICR, page 12). There were time overruns, with the emergency project closing over four years behind schedule. This was partly due to the security conditions in the country during implementation. This project was approved in a period of relative political stability in the wake of the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement between the government and the rebels. Project implementation before the civil war in 2013 was smooth and activities related to prepaid meters, energy loss reduction and Compact Fluorescent Lamps were launched and some of them completed relatively quickly (ICR, page 19). Security and political situation deteriorated significantly, with a coup d'état in March 2013, followed by a political impasse that eventually was resolved with the 2016 election.The deteriorating security conditions contributed to delays associated with the activity of rehabilitating the plant. The ICR (page 9) notes that most companies were willing to bid for supply, but not supply and install power plants, and hence the project had to find alternate ways of implementing the envisaged activities (such as using a sole source procurement for replacing the five turbines, instead of rehabilitating them as initially planned during appraisal). These factors contributed to the extension of the closing date. At closure, the bank activities financed by the Bank were completed and Bank resources were disbursed, unlike the activities funded by other donors which were not yet complete when this project closed. (ICR, page 17). Taking these factors into account, the IEG rates efficiency of this emergency operation as Substantial, despite the time overruns.

Efficiency Rating
Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 ☐Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	21.00	95.00 ☐Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of the PDO to the government and the bank strategies is rated as High. Relevance of design is Substantial. Efficacy of the sub-objective - to partially restore reliable electricity supply to customers in Bangui, including essential service providers such as the water company and hospitals - is rated as Substantial, given that most targets had either been realized or exceeded. Efficacy of the other sub-objective - to improve the financial and operational performance of the sector - is rated as Modest, given that the targets had not been realized. Efficiency is rated as Substantial, in view of the economic analysis and although there were cost and time overruns, these were partly due to exogenous factors.
Taking these factors into account, the outcome is rated as Moderately Satisfactory, reflecting moderate shortcomings in the project's achievement of its objectives.

a. **Outcome Rating**
Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Financial risk. There is substantial risk to ongoing benefits given that distribution of the CFL program was only partial, the external audit of the Central African Power Utility (ENERCA) had not yet been completed at project closure and the level of bill collection rates were below the projected target. Further, although incandescent bulbs in households and public houses were replaced by Compact Fluorescent Lamps (CFL) through the CFL program, there is substantial risk to ongoing benefits, given that some of the CFLs were sold in the black market as they were more expensive than the incandescent bulbs.

Political risk. Following the elections held in 2016, new political institutions had come into power and this in conjunction with the country's engagement with the donor community could help in the efforts towards peace and security in the country context.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Substantial

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project was prepared based on the experience from an ongoing project approved on May 24, 2007 (*Emergency Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project*) and from the recommendations of the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) with respect to emergency response situations (*Project Performance Assessment Report, Mozambique - Energy Technical Assistance and Rehabilitation Project* in 2004). Lessons incorporated at design included focusing exclusively on emergency needs and not on sector reforms. The emergency project was prepared relatively quickly, as it was based on the accelerated procedures authorized by OP/BP 48.00 under which Bank assistance could be provided to mitigate potential effects of future crises in countries at high risk, without addressing long term development issues. The project design and financing was coordinated with the French Development Agency (AFD) who were financing activities associated with the partial rehabilitation of power generation in the country. Several risks were identified at appraisal including High risks associated with the macro-economic framework, the country's situation and political situation, and risks associated with corruption and fraud (with regard to procurement and financial management). Appropriate mitigation measures were incorporated at design including using the implementing agency which had experience with executing Bank-financed project and hence was familiar with the Bank's fiduciary policies. Overall project risk with the mitigation measures was rated as High, in view of the reputational risk to the Bank. Appropriate arrangements were made at appraisal for fiduciary compliance (discussed in section 11).

The measures incorporated at design for mitigating the risks associated with fraud were inadequate, given that some Compact Fluorescent Lamps (CFLs) intended for conserving electricity for lighting purposes were sold by the beneficiaries in the market. This undermined the economic gains that were expected from the CFLs.

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

Fifteen Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) were filed over a nine-year period (on average twice a year). Bank supervision were coordinated with the missions of the French Development Agency (AFD) and this aided in harmonization of the different projects supported by the two donors. Following the deteriorating security conditions in March 2013, the Bank's resident staff transferred to Yaoundé in Cameroon and this aided in conducting supervision meetings with the representatives of the implementing agencies. The continuity of leadership with the same Task Team Leader being responsible through the life of the project aided in completion of activities, despite the security and political developments that hampered project implementation. The support provided by the Bank's supervision aided in fiduciary compliance and addressed issues that arose during implementation (such as allowing a sole source procurement for replacing the five turbines rather than rehabilitating them as planned at appraisal (discussed in section 5).

The environment expert in the supervision team joined the team only during the final mission (discussed in section 11).

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

The key government entities involved in overseeing the project design and implementation were the Ministry of Energy and Hydraulics, the Ministry of Economy and Planning and the Ministry of International Cooperation and Energy Regulation Agency. The government's commitment during implementation remained strong despite the political and security concerns. This aided in coordinating the project activities funded by the various donors. Despite tight budgetary considerations, the government provided financial support to the power utility during the transitional period when the energy infrastructure was being rehabilitated.

The ICR (page 25) provides little details but states that property acquired with project resources was breached during implementation.

Government Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

The two implementing agencies were the Power Utility (Enerca in French) and the Public Works Agency (AGETIP-CAF) in the Ministry of Energy and Hydraulics. The two agencies oversaw project implementation despite the security concerns during project implementation. There was compliance with fiduciary safeguards.

There was no environment expert in the implementing agency's team during implementation (discussed in section 11). There were significant procurement delays, due to the lack of coordination between the two implementing agencies. This was eventually resolved through regular meeting between the two entities and this aided in the finalization of the stalled transactions in the final years of the project.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design
The key outcome indicators at appraisal included indicators aimed at restoring reliable electricity supply (reduction in the number of hours of load shedding from eight hours per day to three hours by 2012) and improved financial and operational performance of the sector (revenue generated by ENERCA for operation and maintenance of the system). The Public Works Agency (AGETIP-CAF) which had experience through a prior Bank financed project (Emergency Infrastructure Project) was responsible for monitoring the performance of the Central African Republic Power Utility (ENERCA).

b. M&E Implementation
Given that the original Results Framework and the indicators were designed under emergency conditions, the results framework was revised and indicators (including four key outcome indicators) were added during implementation. The key outcome indicators that were added included additional energy generated at Boali 1, the number of hours of load shedding at hospitals and water facilities, an indicator aimed at capturing improvements in the financial and operational performance of ENERCA (nomination of the Board of Directors and external audit of ENERCA) and preparation of dam safety and emergency preparedness plan. All revised indicators had baselines and specified targets. The indicator associated with the nomination of the Board of Directors was more appropriate as an intermediate indicator for monitoring performance.

c. M&E Utilization
The M&E system was used as a tool during project implementation to assist project management, refine the Results framework, keep the stakeholders informed of project progress and reallocate resources according to realities on the ground during implementation and monitoring project performance.

M&E Quality Rating
Modest

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as a Category B project. In addition to environmental assessment (OP/BP 4.01), one social safeguard policy was triggered: Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37).

OP/BP 4.01 was triggered given that the existing transformers could contain Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC), which is classified as a persistent organic pollutant that could affect human health (Project Paper, page 18). Although the project was not expected to have any impact on the structure of existing dams, OP/BP 4.37 was triggered given that the project depended on the safety of the existing hydropower stations (Project Paper, page 19). Given that this was an emergency project under OP/BP 8.00, environmental assessments were conducted and disclosed after project effectiveness.

The ICR (page 11) notes that there were no environmental issues during implementation and compliance with safeguards was overall deemed to be satisfactory. The ICR (page 11) however notes, there was no environment expert either in the Bank's supervision team and in the implementing agency's team during implementation and an environment expert joined the team only during the final mission. The ICR also notes with respect to Safety of Dams, although a dam safety evaluation was completed in 2011, the dam safety plan was prepared. However, the recommendations of the plan were not acted upon due to security considerations The ICR (page iv) notes that no safety failure reported during the lifetime of the project.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Fiduciary Management. The Public Works Agency (AGETIP-CAF) was in charge of financial management and procurement arrangements. AGETIP-CAF was already managing these funds for an ongoing Bank-funded Emergency Infrastructure project. An assessment of the financing management arrangements of the AGETIP-CAF conducted by the Bank at appraisal, concluded that the fiduciary arrangements were deemed to be satisfactory (Project Paper, page 14).

Financial Management. There was compliance with financial management. The ICR (page 11) notes that annual audits of the financial statements of the project were completed annually by a private firm and the audits were unqualified.

Procurement. The ICR (page 11) notes that there was compliance with procurement management. The ICR (page 12) notes that although procurement operations were not disrupted, there were procurement delays especially in the wake of the political crisis in 2013, which led to a massive displacement of people, including government officials and due to the security considerations during project implementation.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

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d. Other

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12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Modest	Substantial	There is significant financial risk.
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	There were minor shortcomings in quality-at-entry and during supervision.
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

Note
When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons

The ICR (pages 26 and 27) draws the following main lessons from the experience of implementing this project.

(1) A simple design and coordination with interested external donors are important in achieving outcomes in a fragile environment. In this project, the relatively simple design allowed several activities to be implemented in the first two years of the project life. Given that funding in fragile environments is scarce, bringing in external donors helped in getting the needed resources and technical capacity to supply the planned activities and to generate results on the ground.

(**2) A simple results framework and design (with limited number of components and activities) and implementation focused on realistic achievements can be useful in post-conflict countries and environments**. In the context of this project, a shorter list of performance indictors would have been more realistic and easy to track in an environment with low capacity and limited data availability.

(3) An effective Project Implementation Unit (PIU) and continuity of leadership on the part of the Bank supervision team can be useful in coping with the risks in a fragile environment. In this project, the PIU was already familiar with the Bank's fiduciary requirements. This in conjunction with continuity of leadership by the supervision team aided in completion of project activities.

(**4) In post-conflict countries and environments with weak implementation capacity, it would be useful to simplify project design and focus on limited key achievements**. Although the PDOs of restoring reliable electricity supply to customers and improving the financial and operational performance of the sector was important in the country context and to the government and Bank strategies, the experience of this project showed that the quality of achievements could have been improved, if resources had been spent only on energy generation, transmission and distribution activities and all aspects related to issues of operational and financial efficiency of the electricity company left to a follow-on project.

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is reasonably well-written and concise. It candidly discusses the issues that arose during implementation, in the context of security considerations. The lessons it draws are based on evidence and analysis and the ratings assigned to the outcomes are consistent with the guidelines. However, the description of the borrower and implementing agencies performance is rather brief. It is also not clear what the issues were pertaining to breach of property acquired with project resources.

a. **Quality of ICR Rating**
Substantial