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PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

**WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT PILOT SUPPORT PROJECT
(LN. 3251-IVC)**

October 30, 2000

Operations Evaluation Department

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (annual averages)

Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF)

1990	US\$ 1.00	CFA Franc 272
1991	US\$ 1.00	CFA Franc 282
1992	US\$ 1.00	CFA Franc 265
1993	US\$ 1.00	CFA Franc 283
1994	US\$ 1.00	CFA Franc 555
1995	US\$ 1.00	CFA Franc 499

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
CAA	Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement
DCGTx	<i>Coopératives Rurales d'Epargnes et Prêts</i> (Savings and Loans Cooperatives)
FONDEV	<i>Fonds de Développement</i> (Special Development Fund)
HRDP	Human Resources Development Program
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IDEF	<i>Institut d'Education Feminine</i> (Institute for the Education of Women)
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEP	Ministère d'Education Primaire (Ministry of Primary Education)
MPF	Ministère pour la Promotion des Femmes (Ministry for the Advancement of Women)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
RCI	<i>République de Côte d'Ivoire</i>
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
WID	Women in Development

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

Director-General, Operations Evaluation:	Mr. Robert Picciotto
Director, Operations Evaluation Department:	Mr. Gregory K. Ingram
Manager, OEDCR:	Mr. Ruben Lamdany
Task Manager:	Ms. Gita Gopal

The World Bank
Washington, D.C. 20433
U.S.A.

Office of the Director-General
Operations Evaluation

October 30, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT


**SUBJECT: Performance Audit Report on Côte d'Ivoire
Women in Development Pilot Support Project (L3251-IVC)**

Attached is the Performance Audit Report (PAR) of the Côte d'Ivoire - Women in Development Pilot Support Project (Loan 3251-IVC) prepared by the Operations Evaluations Department. The project was proposed as the first phase (2-year duration) of a program to provide institutional strengthening for women in development (WID) activities in the Côte d'Ivoire in three areas: the coordinating role of the Ministry for the Advancement of Women (MPF); rural extension, and urban vocational training programs.

The objectives were consistent with the Borrowing country's WID policies, the World Bank's assistance strategies and the prevailing thinking on women's roles in development in the late 1980s. However, the project was not successful because it did not thoroughly assess the capacity of the new and administratively inexperienced MPF to undertake a dynamic coordination role nor factor this into the design. Not enough emphasis was placed on the project's pilot nature to document experience and results from a WID perspective, missing opportunities for WID-specific lessons to be learnt.

One positive impact was that other projects in the RCI portfolio (e.g., the Poverty Assessment and Land Management Project) benefited from its analyses of Ivorian women's legal rights and access to land. The PAR confirms the ICR and Evaluative Memorandum ratings: unsatisfactory outcome; unlikely sustainability; negligible institutional development impact; and unsatisfactory Bank performance.

The added value of this desk review is to redress a deficiency in the ICR that was noted in the OED Evaluative Memorandum: *"The ICR did not draw specific lessons related to the WID-only focus of the project."* From that perspective, the following lessons are drawn. As gender is a cross-cutting issue, the most effective way to integrate women's issues into mainstream activities is for staff of technical ministries to implement women-specific initiatives. Having a women's agency implement an activity within the purview of a technical ministry will undermine effective integration and marginalize relevant women-specific projects. The most appropriate role for a women's ministry/ agency is to assist technical agencies with planning, analytical support, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation to document results and lessons. Participatory appraisals and beneficiaries' needs assessments are essential for addressing potential beneficiaries' needs at appraisal and can avoid creating false expectations. Social development interventions work best when combined with economic and livelihood activities.



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This study has been prepared by Ms. Adyline Waafas Ofosu-Amaah (Consultant), with Gita Gopal as task manager. Roziah Baba provided administration Support.

RATINGS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Principal Ratings

	ICR Ratings	Evaluative Memo Ratings	PAR Ratings
OUTCOME	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
SUSTAINABILITY	Uncertain	Unlikely	Unlikely
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible
BORROWER PERFORMANCE	Deficient/Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
BANK PERFORMANCE	Deficient/Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory

Key Staff Responsible

	Task Manager/ Team Leader	Division Chief	Country Director
APPRAISAL	Kei Kawabata	Kevin Cleaver	Ismail Serageldin (Director, AF1)
IMPLEMENTATION	Christian Fauliau (12/93) Alice Morton (12/93- 6/95)	Jean-Paul Chausse, Section Chief, Ian Porter	Olivier Lafourcade (Director, AF1) Olivier Lafourcade (Director, AF4)
ICR	Elizabeth Morris- Hughes	Ian Porter	Shigeo Katsu

PREFACE

This is a Performance Audit Report (PAR) on the Côte d'Ivoire Women in Development Pilot Support Project, for which IBRD Loan 3251-IVC in the amount of \$2.2 million was approved on August 2, 1990. The loan became effective on February 22, 1991, and closed on June 30, 1995 after two extensions. Final disbursement took place on December 29, 1995, at which time a balance of US\$890,699 was canceled.

The Norwegian Grant Fund (TF21505) was signed on November 19, 1991 for an amount of NOK 3 million. It was extended from the original closing date of June 1993 to June 1994. In December 1993, NOK 2.2 million had still not been disbursed. This grant closed on December 31, 1995, at which time the grant balance of NOK 956,976 (US\$ 147,001.07) was canceled.

This PAR was prepared by the Operations Evaluations Department (OED). It is a desk audit that is based on the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR), Memorandum of the President (MOP), loan documents, review of project files, and interviews and discussions with World Bank staff and consultants.

An Implementation Completion Report (ICR, Report No. 16116 dated November 15, 1996) was prepared by the Africa Region. This ICR documented the project's implementation experience, including the numerous implementation delays and problems. It also identified and analyzed factors that contributed to the project's outcomes and listed a number of lessons on how to structure a multi-sectoral project of this nature.

However, the ICR did not identify or discuss lessons relating to the WID-specific content of the project, nor on how to integrate women's issues in sector activities. An Evaluative Memorandum prepared by the OED in March 1997 noted this deficiency and recommended that an audit be conducted. This PAR responds to the Evaluative Memorandum's recommendation by identifying lessons relating to, or resulting from, the WID-specific focus of the project, and makes recommendations specifically addressing these lessons. The draft PAR was sent to the Borrower and co-financier for comment on September 15, 2000. We only received an acknowledgement letter from the Government to this PAR (Annex 2) but no comments were received from the co-financier.

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND

A. Project Objectives

1.1 The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire Women in Development Pilot Support Project was approved in FY91. Its objectives were to: improve rural women's farming systems and access to markets; upgrade the skills of urban women enrolled in selected Institutes for the Education of Women (IDEFs); improve the welfare of participating urban and rural households; and change the perception of the role of women by managers and staff who provide support services and by society at large and women themselves.

B. Project Components, Design and Financing Costs

1.2 The project was designed as a two-year pilot phase of a medium-term institutional strengthening program to be implemented by the Ministère pour la Promotion de La Femme (MPF) in three sub-regions of the country. Its three components included: institutional strengthening; rural outreach; and training.¹ Total project costs amounted to \$3.6 million, financed by a \$2.2 million IBRD loan, US\$1.389 million of Government counterpart funds, and US\$0.058 contribution from the beneficiaries. The NOK 3 million Norwegian Grant, added to the project in November 1991, financed the small-scale credit scheme.

2. PAR FINDINGS AND RATINGS

A. Relevance of Project Objectives

2.1 The objectives were consistent with the Borrower's policies, World Bank's assistance strategies and the prevailing thinking on women's roles in development in the late 1980s. Studies conducted prior to, and in anticipation of the project (the Côte d'Ivoire Living Standard Surveys – CILSS) had found a number of misperceptions of the role and contribution of women to the economy and society. It also found that Ivorian women's lower educational levels, and general gender biases contributed to the persistent gender differentials in formal labor market participation and wages. The Government adopted a national strategy to address women's issues and concerns in 1987 and established the MPF. This project was designed to assist the Government to strengthen the capacity of the MPF to respond to these findings and to reorient projects to better incorporate women's needs. Thus, the objectives were relevant in terms of addressing demonstrated government, stakeholder, and World Bank priorities.

¹ Strengthening the capacity of the MPF in policy and program formulation, especially coordination of project activities; increasing rural women's access to agricultural extension services, food processing technologies, financial services and training for basic household, health and education needs; and improving the marketable skills and social welfare of marginalized urban women through special vocational and basic household skills and employment activities.

B. Project Outcomes

2.2 The project's overall outcome was unsatisfactory for the following reasons. None of the project's six principal activities to be implemented over 24 months were carried out in full and none of the objectives had been achieved when the project closed in 1995, two years behind schedule. About 40 percent of the loan was cancelled. The project's initial accomplishments involved activities designed to modify the MPF's rural outreach services and the infrastructure components involving rehabilitation of existing IDEFs. Only two out of seven studies were completed (an additional two, not mentioned in the SAR, were also prepared). Completion of the MPF's training and capacity building slipped two years because of staffing constraints – especially high staff mobility which seriously undermined the MPF's institutional stability, and therefore, ability to discharge its responsibilities. Training materials to support the MPF's Department of Information and Documentation, and vital for the institutional strengthening objective, were not produced. One educational institute (the IDEF at Arrah) was not constructed. Other factors that contributed to jeopardizing the project's outcomes included: the project's expansive agenda and experimental nature; the complexities involved in implementing such a novel activity with cross-sectoral goals; the failure to include a credit scheme at the outset, despite beneficiaries' interest;² and the lack of incorporation of specific monitorable indicators of performance.

C. Sustainability

2.3 The likelihood of sustainability was significantly reduced by the non-completion of key project activities. While the outreach activities between the Vocational Training Center staff and the target groups in the rural areas were successful, this initial momentum was not maintained, due to capacity constraints and implementation delays. The project made an attempt to respond to beneficiaries' needs for credit. However the mechanism proposed (FONDEV), the size of the grant fund, and its management and implementation were not adequate to the demand, and merely raised beneficiaries' expectations that went unmet. The lack of stability within the PIU and the failure to impart capacity to the MPF staff (for planning, policy analysis, coordination, research, M&E or project management) also compromised their ability to undertake or continue project activities. For these reasons, sustainability is unlikely.

D. Institutional Development

2.4 The institutional development impact is negligible because the MPF could not meet the significant challenges presented by the cross-sectoral emphasis of the project and the need for coordination. None of the MPF's institutional strengthening objectives were achieved. Neither were the skills of participating ministries in integrating women's issues into their work enhanced. The MPF staff's dedication and competence could not compensate for their lack of project management experience. Continual staff and

² A credit scheme was thought inadvisable given the "overall crisis of the banking sector" and the presumed complexity of the pilot. However, the interest in credit was so intense that a compromise was reached to set up the Rural Development Fund to provide seed capital for beneficiaries. Revisiting the situation about a year into the project, the Norwegian Grant Fund was approved to finance rural credit and training equipment. Expectations were extremely high for this fund, and it could not effectively deal with the credit problem.

leadership changes at the MPF thwarted plans for a progressively experienced group of professionals to undergird the MPF's capacity.³ While technical and managerial capacity represented in the MPF leadership may have been adequate, their ability to mobilize project funds from government was limited.⁴ Coordination between MPF and central ministries was so weak as to undermine the project's rationale. Efforts to strengthen ties with agencies such as the Ministry of Construction and the CAA⁵ were not sufficient to ensure effective cooperation and collaboration, as they did not appear to fully buy into the project.

E. Bank Performance

2.5 The Bank recognized the risk associated with the project, and prudently decided that it was an acceptable level of risk only if a pilot approach was adopted. However, this placed a special onus on staff to supervise the pilot elements in a non-routine manner, given their novelty and the MPF's short history. Its subsequent performance was unsatisfactory because it did not pay adequate attention to "red flags" that may have warned about difficulties.⁶ The Bank can also be faulted for designing the project in a manner that treated the MPF as a technical ministry rather than a coordinating or liaison entity. The implementation schedule and supervision were inadequate, in light of the acknowledged risks. Supervision recommendations were too generic,⁷ and often inconsistent with the problematic reality of the situation, or did not convey the gravity of the risk of failure.⁸ Technical supervision of the WID-specific progress of this pilot was non-existent until the final stages of the project.⁹

F. Borrower Performance

2.6 The Borrower's performance was also unsatisfactory. Apart from the delay brought about by the government reshuffle following a period of political instability in 1991, the multiple implementation, procurement and disbursement problems that contributed to the project's sub-optimal performance could have been avoided. Although the government made attempts to accelerate internal procedures (e.g., a directive from the Prime Minister's Office to all government ministries limiting bid evaluation to 20 days¹⁰) the situation did not improve. The lack of operational and management experience by the

³ Project implementation took place under three MPF Ministers and its portfolio was revised to include family affairs, leading to further changes at the senior management level.

⁴ A spending freeze following the change of government in 1993 exacerbated the understaffing situation.

⁵ The state institution that manages foreign funds, grants and loans.

⁶ Technical ministries had stressed their inability to "drastically reorient their programs to be more gender conscious" e.g., the MOH's inability to release midwives/nurses to visit villages with the animatrices. The MPF Minister had warned at appraisal that reorientation should not become an end in itself, but should be complemented with specific activities, such as a credit scheme.

⁷ E.g., "strengthen central organization", "reorganize Service Administrative et Financier – SAF", were not specific enough as to the requisite steps and actions that should have been taken under the prevailing circumstances. While they became more detailed as time went on, they could not overcome structural constraints in the bureaucracy.

⁸ Even in August 1994, when the action plan and budget submitted by the MPF indicated multiple problems such as unauthorized expenditures, Bank staff continued discussing follow-up plans for the preparation of a national project.

⁹ Even at the ICR preparation stage, not much priority was given to drawing lessons on how to integrate women's issues in sector activities. According to the ICR Task Manager, Management considered that this was in excess of what an ICR should do, resulting in the ICR's failure to "draw specific lessons related to the WID-only focus of the project", as was noted by the OED Evaluative Memorandum.

¹⁰ No. 2298 of 3 August 1994.

MPF and PIU staff was aggravated by the insufficient assistance they received from other agencies, e.g., Ministry of Construction was slow in establishing bidding documents for construction of the IDEFs and the CAA was slow in replenishing the counterpart fund.

3. CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Conclusions

3.1 The project was a product of its time, designed to focus attention on women's roles in the development context.¹¹ It was designed to provide a boost to WID issues in the Bank and the Côte d'Ivoire. To an extent, it was an ideal mechanism through which the parties could support the MPF in playing a catalytic role. The substantive rationale was that the project would: provide dedicated resources to respond to women's limited access in the targeted sectors, provide supervision resources to enable the Bank and the Borrower to monitor the impact of these dedicated resources, and bring visibility to the issue within the government bureaucracy. This substantive rationale made sense. However, the organizational (design) rationale was problematic.

3.2 The project's institutional framework was to enhance the capacity of the nascent MPF to coordinate cross-sectoral gender activities of main line ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture. This approach was organizationally and institutionally feasible if staff mobility was low and access to technical expertise was high - both were lacking in this case. The project placed too much emphasis on the MPF's dynamic and charismatic leadership and not enough on the difficulties of coordination in the complex bureaucracy. It failed because it did not solidify MPF's linkages with the technical ministries at the central and field levels, nor take sufficient precautions to sensitize main line ministries to the project's relevance and beneficial impacts for their programs. Thus, these ministries did not appreciate the relevance and the added value of the project within the context of their own mandates, rendering the project a non-starter in many respects. The debate about the extent of reorientation that ministries' sectoral projects would have to undergo suggests either one of two conditions: at best, a lack of capacity to make appropriate changes (a legitimate concern about possible additional responsibilities on ministries). At worst, it signifies a resistance to integrating women's issues in sector programs (a classic gender mainstreaming problem).

3.3 The design and scope were ambitious, given the size of the loan and the project's time frame. It could probably have achieved more success if it had continued to be developed in tandem with the other components of the Human Resources Development and Rural Support Projects to allow for cross-fertilization of approaches and collective learning from those experiences. While the 24-month period was in theory feasible, the sequencing of activities -- building the training centers (IDEFs) first, then training participants, as opposed to identifying the training needs and then designing the training institutes -- may have also contributed to the less than satisfactory performance. It is also

¹¹ As referred to in paragraph 4, new lending instruments such as the Lending and Innovation Lending (LILs) now provide more flexibility to undertake innovative and untested projects of this nature.

not clear if the CAA's tardiness in replenishing the counterpart fund was the manifestation of a waning government commitment or limited priority attached to women's issues.

B. WID/Gender-Specific Lessons Learned

3.4 From these conclusions one can draw the following five lessons: three relating to the technical design of gender-specific projects, and last two to the Bank's role in facilitating the design and monitoring of such projects.

1. ***The role and functions of a women's ministry/agency.*** Within the government framework, women's (or other gender-specific) issues are no sectoral agency's domain, but every agency's responsibility, hence the need for a cross-sectoral approach. The most appropriate role of a women's agency is catalytic, to assist sectoral agencies with planning and analytical support, coordination to ensure coherence, and monitoring and evaluation to document results and lessons. Strengthening institutional capacity in these areas is as important as a separate budget devoted to women-specific programs. Without these two, such an institution will not succeed in focusing technical ministries' efforts on this cross-cutting issue.
2. ***The role and functions of technical ministries/agencies.*** The most effective way to integrate women's issues into mainstream activities is for staff of technical ministries to implement women-specific initiatives. An important component of preparatory activities for launching such an initiative is capacity building and sensitization on gender-specific issues for technical ministries. Having a women's ministry implement a women-specific activity within the purview of a technical ministry will undermine efforts to effectively integrate or mainstream gender issues, lead to failure, as in this case, and ultimately marginalize women-specific initiatives.
3. ***Social development interventions for women work best when combined with economic and livelihood activities.*** Literacy and skills building programs designed for women that do not at the same time target their livelihood and/or income generating activities will not be sustainable over the long run.
4. ***Participatory planning*** is an important preparatory activity as participants' expectations (and misconceptions) are an important barometer of the services that a project could (and should) address. There were many indications during appraisal that beneficiaries' needs were linked to livelihood and income-related activities, and that a credit scheme was a desired component, but these were not heeded, resulting in beneficiaries' diminished interest in, and enthusiasm for, the project.
5. ***Monitoring and evaluating the WID-specific aspects and impacts of projects.*** A pilot approach without built-in mechanisms to record implementation experience and results from a WID or gender-specific perspective will not automatically provide the learning tools. During implementation, this aspect was not emphasized, missing many opportunities for WID-specific lessons to be documented.

C. Recommendations

1. Support government initiatives for the advancement of women by providing financial and technical support (including gender training and sensitization), not just to women's institutions, but to technical ministries as well, by integrating women-specific interventions into sectoral programs and projects, with technical ministries as the primary implementing agencies for these activities.
2. Support ministries and agencies to establish effective monitoring and evaluation systems for the gender-specific impacts of their interventions and to analyze and utilize such data in planning and coordination of development interventions.
3. Strengthen the capacities of technical ministries to liaise more effectively with women's agencies by designating gender focal points and establishing task forces.

Basic Data Sheets

CÔTE D'IVOIRE PILOT WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (LN. 3251-IVC)

1a. Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	Appraisal Estimate	Actual	Actual as % of Appraisal Estimate
Total Project Costs	3.91	1.77	45
Loan Amount	2.19	1.13	52
Co-financing (Norwegian Grant)	0.27	0.23	85
Government Contribution	1.45	0.41	28
Cancellation			
IBRD		US\$0.9	
Norwegian Grant		NOK956,976.96	

1b. Project Dates

Steps in Project Cycle	Proposed Date	Date Revised	Actual Date
IEPS			November 28, 1988
Appraisal	April, 1989		April 24, 1989
Negotiations	May 21, 1990		May 29, 1990
Board Date	July 3, 1990	July 24, 1990	August 2, 1990
Signing			October 1, 1990
Credit effectiveness	December 31, 1990		February 22, 1991
Mid-term review			
Closing	June 30, 1993	June 23, 1993* June 28, 1994	June 30, 1995

* First revision on June 23, 1993, extending closing date to June 30, 1994.

1c. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	Appraisal Estimate (US\$ million)	Actual (US\$ million)	Actual as a percentage of estimate
FY1991	0.40	0.27	67.5
FY1992	0.92	0.61	66.3
FY 1993	1.36	1.11	81.6
FY 1994	1.72	1.26	73.2
FY 1995	2.20	1.31	60

Date of last disbursement: 29 December 1995

1d. Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

Appraisal Estimate			Actual	
			Weeks	US\$
Identification to appraisal	N/A		20.5	61,500
Appraisal	N/A		25.6	78,800
Negotiation	N/A		39.4	118,200
Supervision	N/A		94.7	284,100
Completion	N/A		5.2	15,600
Total			185.4	558,200

1e. Mission Data

Stage of Project Cycle	Actual Date	# of Persons	Skills Represented	Days In Field	Performance Rating		Comments
					Implement. Status	Project Objectives	Types of Problems
Preparation to appraisal	4/89	4	N/A				
Mid-term Review	3/90						
Supervision	3-4 1993						
No. 1	12/90	1	SE	15	1	1	CLC
No. 2	8/91	1	SE, FA	11	2	1	PMP
No. 3	12/91	2	SE, FA		2	2	PMP, FP, PP, TP, SP,
No. 4	3/92	2	SE		2	2	PMP, FP, PP, SP,
No. 5	7/92	1	SE		1	1	PMP, FP, PP, SP,
No. 6	3/93	2	SE		1	1	PMP, CLC, AF, PP, SP,
No. 7	6/93	3	SE, CS, FA		2	2	PMP, PP, SP, TP,
No. 8	9/93	5			2	2	
No. 9	3/94	4	A, SE, E, GS	7	2	2	PP, PMP, PP, TP, FP
No. 10	8/94	3			S	S	PMP, AF, PP, TP, FP
No. 11	12/94	3	GS, E, HRS	4	U	S	PMP, CLC, AF, TP, PP, FP
No. 12	7/95	3	E, PA, C	24	U	S	PMP, CLC, AF, PP, TP

^a **Performance Ratings:** 1 = Problem Free; 2 = Moderate Problems; 3 = Major Problems; S = Satisfactory; U = Unsatisfactory

^b **Specialized Staff skills:** A = Agricultural Specialist; AE = Agricultural Economist; SE - Socio-economist; CS - Credit Specialist; FA - Financial Analyst; E - Economist; GS - Gender Specialist; HRS - Human Resources Specialist (PA- Program Assistant Daniele Jaekel, C-consultant Ibrahima Dione)

^b **Types of Problems:** CLC = Compliance with Legal Covenants; PMP = Project Management Performance; AF = Availability of Funds; TP = Training Progress; PP = Procurement Progress; SP = Studies Progress; FP = Financial Performance

1f. Analysis of Project Objectives

Component	Objective	Types of Objective	Activity
Institutional training and capacity building of MPF	Strengthen capacity for policy formulation	Input	Training staff on management principles of Training and Visit (T&V) system, refresher course for FIE teachers, training of outreach workers.
	Strengthen capacity for monitoring, information feedback and dissemination	Process	Data collection and information dissemination, M&E of operational programs.
	Support MPF's Dept. Of Information, Documentation and Outreach	Output	Establish an outreach and cooperative program with other technical ministries to provide "subject matter specialist" for systematic visits to farmers.
Rural outreach	Improve the economic and social welfare of rural households in three sub-regions	Input	Establish \$150,000 rural development fund (FONDEV)
		Output	Improve access to agricultural extension, form cooperatives
		Process	Improve food storage through processing and marketing
		Impact	Improve literacy, numeracy and capacity to save
Skills training	Improve marketable skills of marginalized urban women	Input	Training in skills for which there is market demands; better preparation in competing for specialized vocational training programs; employment assistance; literacy training.

*Le Directeur de Cabinet
du Premier Ministre*

*République de Côte d'Ivoire
Union - Discipline - Travail*

Abidjan, le

03 OCT. 2000

N° 3636 /CPM/CAB 9/mjk/00

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**Monsieur Ruben Lamdany
Chef de Groupe Evaluation des Pays
et Relations Régionales
Département de l'Evaluation des
Opérations**

**1818 H Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20433**

U.S.A


**Objet : Côte d'Ivoire : Projet Pilote d'Appui aux Femmes
dans le Développement (Ln.3251-IVC)
Projet de Rapport d'Audit de Performance**

Monsieur,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre courrier en date du 15 Septembre 2000 relatif à l'objet susmentionné.

Vous remerciant de votre parfaite collaboration, je vous prie de croire **Monsieur**, à l'assurance de ma haute considération.

**Pour le Directeur de Cabinet
et par délégation
Le Chef de Cabinet**



G. U. YOMAN