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PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

BOLIVIA

**BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION PROJECT
(TF-28620; TF-28629)**

June 20, 2002

*Operations Evaluation Department
Sector and Thematic Evaluation Group*

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (annual averages)

Currency Unit = Boliviano (Bs)

Average Exchange rate:

At appraisal (June 1992) – US\$1.00 = Bs. 3.8992

At close (1998 average) – US\$1.00 = Bs. 5.5

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BBCP	Biodiversity Conservation Project
CABI	Capitanía del Alto y Bajo Isoso
DGB	Dirección General de la Biodiversidad
DNCB	Dirección Nacional de Conservación de la Biodiversidad (National Directorate for Conservation of Biodiversity)
FUNDESNAF	Fundación para el Desarrollo del Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (Foundation for the Development of the National System of Protected Areas)
FONAMA	Fondo Nacional para el Medio Ambiente (National Environmental Fund)
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GNP	Gross National Product
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
MC	Management committee
MDSA	Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Medio Ambiente (Ministry of Sustainable Development and Environment)
MDSP	Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificación (Ministry of Sustainable Development and Planning)
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
SENMA	Secretaría Nacional del Medio Ambiente (National Secretary of the Environment)
SERNAP	Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (National Protected Areas Service)
SNAP	Sistema Nacional de Áreas Protegidas (National Protected Areas System)

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

Director-General, Operations Evaluation	:	Mr. Robert Picciotto
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June 20, 2002

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Project Performance Assessment Report on Bolivia: Biodiversity Conservation Project (TF-28620; TF-28629)

This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) on the above-named project, for which the Global Environment Facility (GEF) approved a grant of US\$4.5 million in October 1992. The Swiss Development Cooperation provided an additional US\$3.9 million. The project became effective in July 1993 and closed in December 1999, six months behind schedule. The project was fully disbursed by December 1998.

The project's objective was to help the government of Bolivia ensure the protection of representative samples of some of Bolivia's most diverse and threatened ecosystems. It would help to convert some of Bolivia's "paper" parks into "real" ones. This would be accomplished, in part, by strengthening the Government's institutional capacity to protect Bolivia's biodiversity. The major project components include: (i) support for the organization, implementation and follow-up of the National System of Protected Areas -SNAP; (ii) support to existing protected areas and establishment of new priority protected areas; (iii) alternative management systems of natural resources in buffer zones; (iv) monitoring and evaluation; and (v) administrative support to the project coordinating unit. The project also aimed to leverage additional resources to finance the National Protected Areas System (SNAP).

The objectives were consistent with the Bank's policies and country strategy and with the development priorities of the country. The project contributed to more effective protection of biodiversity by reducing poaching and illegal wood extraction and mining, and by closer monitoring of gas and oil exploration inside protected areas. The National Direction for Conservation of Biodiversity (DNCB) and its successor National Protected Areas Service (SERNAP) established a highly transparent system of funds administration and is considered one of the most credible and transparent public institutions in Bolivia. Outcome is rated **moderately satisfactory** mainly because there were significant shortcomings in relation to the establishment of a biodiversity monitoring system, the legal framework for the SNAP and the strengthening of FONAMA as mechanism to insure the long term funding of SNAP. Nevertheless, significant achievements were made. The project helped establish the SNAP and converted "paper" parks into managed protected areas. The project addressed the sector and country needs and brought about significant improvements to Bolivia's capacity to protect biodiversity at a relatively low cost.

Sustainability is rated **likely** because, although long-term financing did not take place through the Environmental Fund (FONAMA) as anticipated in the SAR, DNCB developed the technical resilience, social support, and government and stakeholder ownership that helped institutionalize the SNAP and attracted funds to continue operations after the first GEF grant was exhausted. The follow-up GEF grant is helping set up a different trust fund.

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Institutional development impact is rated **substantial**. Application of regulations has dramatically improved across the SNAP, and good communication between parks and SERNAP has contributed to improved coordination and management of the SNAP. Also, the project helped institutionalize the SNAP in a broader sense by placing protected areas on the conceptual “map” of other government agencies, private enterprises, and forest dwellers in such a way that they are beginning to acknowledge and respect protected areas.

Bank performance, both in preparation and supervision, is rated **satisfactory**. Project preparation included participation of civil society and focused on issues critical to the strengthening of the SNAP. During supervision the Bank demonstrated flexibility to adjust the project to new situations. Close supervision allowed the Bank to be an effective steward of the project. Borrower performance is also rated **satisfactory** as the implementing agency had strong ownership of the project. Continuity of vision and key staff at protected areas was critical for gradual strengthening of DNCB.

The PPAR highlights three lessons from this project:

1. *To ensure successful conservation it is necessary to build constituencies for conservation, increase risks for violators, and ensure continuing financial support to protected areas.* This is a severe challenge for a national park authority, as the costs of policing large tracts of remote land are large and the economic and political power of violators are great. DNCB was able to meet this challenge by building NGO and donor alliances in favor of protection and by gaining the support of resource-dependent people in and around protected areas. It drew on that support to protect the integrity of natural areas by increasing the risks to poachers and illicit loggers and miners.
2. *The effective participation of local populations in park protection requires implementing agencies with strong negotiation capacities to help local populations reach agreement on rules of the game to access and manage resources, and with an institutional willingness and capacity to assist local populations in meeting their development needs.* An important factor in the success of the Biodiversity Conservation Project was that in the absence of other central government institutions, park authorities assumed broad developmental roles, and assisted the local communities, organized groups and municipalities to pool available resources and obtain additional resources in support of a common agenda.
3. *The Bank's stewardship role in politically complex projects require close supervision and timely information on stakeholder.* By refusing to grant no-objection letters in regard to critical proposed appointments, the Bank helped prevent, in a timely and appropriate way, the interference of partisan politics with project activities. This contributed to the credibility and transparency of DNCB and strengthened its support from local communities, NGOs and other donors.

Attachment



Robert Picciotto
by Gregory K. Ingram

OED Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation.

About this Report

The Operations Evaluation Department assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, OED annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations. Assessments are conducted one to seven years after a project has closed. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The projects, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies.

A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by OED. To prepare PPARs, OED staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country for onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader OED studies.

Each PPAR is subject to a peer review process and OED management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the OED Rating System

The time-tested evaluation methods used by OED are suited to the broad range of the World Bank's work. The methods offer both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. OED evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (more information is available on the OED website: <http://worldbank.org/oed/eta-mainpage.html>).

Relevance of Objectives: The extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Efficacy: The extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Efficiency: The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. This rating is not generally applied to adjustment operations.

Sustainability: The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. *Possible ratings:* Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable.

Institutional Development Impact: The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Outcome: The extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project). *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

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<p>This report was prepared under the supervision of Andres Liebenthal by Aaron Zazueta (Consultant), who assessed the project in December 2001. William B. Hurlbut edited the report. Soon-Won Pak provided administrative support.</p>
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Principal Ratings

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ES*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Sustainability	Likely	Non-evaluable	Likely
Institutional Development Impact	Modest	Modest	Substantial
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible operational division of the Bank. The Evaluation Summary (ES) is an intermediate OED product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

Key Staff Responsible

<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
Appraisal	César Plaza	John Redwood	Isabel Guerrero
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Preface

This is a Project Performance Appraisal Report (PPAR) on the Biodiversity Conservation Project (BBCP) for which the Global Environment Facility (GEF) approved a grant of US\$4.5 million to the government of Bolivia in October 1992.

This report is based on the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) prepared by the Latin America and the Caribbean Region (Report No. 22380, issued on June 28, 2001), the GEF Project Document (issued March 1992), other documents in the project files, and discussions with Bank staff. An Operations Evaluation Department (OED) mission visited Bolivia in December 2001 to discuss the grant with the government and the various project implementing agencies and to visit a sample of the protected areas that benefited from the project. The cooperation and assistance of government officials at the National Service for Protected Areas (SERNAP) is gratefully acknowledged.

This PPAR focuses especially on evaluating citizen participation and biodiversity monitoring. In addition, as the last disbursements from the project were three years ago, this report also devotes special attention to assessing the factors that seem to be contributing to sustainability.

Following standard OED procedure, a draft of this draft PPAR was sent to the borrower for comments. The government's comments have been taken into account in the final version and the original comments have been included as Annex B.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Overview

1. The main objective of the Biodiversity Conservation Project (BBCP) was to help ensure the protection of representative samples of some of Bolivia's most diverse and threatened ecosystems. The project achieved most of its goals and surpassed some. It established or improved management in 14 protected areas, 5 more than the appraisal anticipated ; expanded by 50 percent the number of hectares under protection; and helped form a cadre of professionals capable of addressing the technical, social, and political complexities of park management.
2. The most important achievement for the sustainability of the project's benefits, however, was the development of capacity in the National Directorate for Conservation of Biodiversity (DNCB) to enlist political support for protected areas, which required the construction of alliances with donors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and community groups. With the political support of these allies, and despite its weak legal standing, (because it was created by Presidential Decree¹) DNCB and the National Protected Areas Service (SERNAP), DNCB's institutional successor, won several court battles against powerful interests seeking to extract resources from protected areas. These victories established precedents that have helped reduce commercial encroachment on protected areas. In several instances, when the government tried to appoint individuals to key positions in DNCB as political payoffs, opposition by donors and NGOs was instrumental in preventing the appointments and for institutionalizing the concept that only qualified individuals would be named to the positions. To contain pressures on protected areas from local communities, DNCB used protected areas management committees² and management plans as instruments to reach agreements with local people on rules to govern natural resources access and management. Closer relations with local communities required park administrators to assist these communities in their search for alternative development opportunities. Community involvement in park management has also contributed to transparency and accountability and has helped improve park protection.
3. Three aspects of the project were less successful: the development of a biodiversity monitoring system, development of a strong legal foundation for the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP), and the establishment of a national environmental fund to ensure long-term financial sustainability. Three years after the project ended, however, most project achievements have been sustained, largely owing to the human and institutional capacities developed during the project and to the credibility of SERNAP with the donor community. In November 2000, GEF approved a second grant to Bolivia for US\$15 million. This was to address the outstanding issues and improve the sustainability of SERNAP.

Country and Sector Context

4. Bolivia is one of the few countries in Latin America with relatively large tracts of natural habitat high in biodiversity and endemic species. Bolivia has more than 2,500 known species of vertebrates and 18,000 vascular plants, making the country the world's eighth richest in biodiversity, according to Conservation International. About 15 percent of the country's total land area is in natural parks and protected areas. The main threats to Bolivia's natural resources are

¹ The term in Bolivia is *Decreto Supremo*

² The protected areas management committees are composed of representatives of indigenous communities, NGOs, local municipalities and SERNAP.

expansion of commercial agriculture, forestry, mining, and oil prospecting and extraction, which together represent 27 percent of the GNP. From 1990 to 2000, deforestation in Bolivia was an average of 1.3 percent per year, most of it caused by extractive activities and land conversion for agriculture and pasture. Also, the government estimates that some 60,000 people live inside protected areas and some 200,000 people live in surrounding areas. These are poor people who customarily engage in forest burning in tropical and subtropical areas to expand the area under agriculture and pasture, small mining operations, lumber extraction, and hunting for their livelihood. Such pressures have become stronger during the late 1980s and the 1990s because of population shifts caused by mine shutdowns in the highlands, the expansion of oil exploration in the lowlands, and prolonged droughts in the Andean region.

5. For more than a decade, the government of Bolivia has become increasingly aware of the economic and strategic value of its natural resources, gradually adopting measures to prevent the loss of biodiversity. In the early 1990s the government established, under the office of the Presidency, the National Secretariat of the Environment (SENMA), responsible for formulating and monitoring environmental policy, and the National Environmental Fund (FONAMA), responsible for raising and administering funds for conservation. Similarly, in close consultation with civil society, the government of Bolivia adopted a forest action plan in 1989, an environmental law that established the SNAP in 1992, and an environmental action plan in 1993. At project appraisal, nearly 10 percent of the country's surface was under protection in 31 parks, wildlife reserves, biological reserves, or other protected areas. However, only three National Parks (Amboro, Noel Kempff and Estación Biológica Beni) were under the administration of NGOs or academic institutions, the rest were "paper" parks with little or no actual protection.

6. From 1993 to 1997, the new administration made sustainability, citizen participation, and decentralization key aspects of its economic development agenda. This decision created a very favorable policy context for the project. Also, during this period, the government drafted numerous laws and regulations that provided opportunities to address biodiversity protection in forestry, mining, and land ownership.

Institutional Arrangements

7. During appraisal responsibility for implementing the project was assigned to the SENMA, and the National Environmental Fund (FONAMA) had responsibility for administering it. Both agencies reported directly to the president. Nevertheless by the time the grant became effective, in 1993, the newly inaugurated administration had eliminated SENMA and had transferred its responsibilities for managing the SNAP to the National Directorate for Conservation of Biodiversity (DNCB) under the Ministry of Sustainable Development and Environment (MDSMA). FONAMA was also placed under the MDSMA. This institutional arrangement remained during most of the project until in 1998, the following administration transformed DNCB into the National of Protected Areas Service (SERNAP) to manage the SNAP, and created the Directorate of Biodiversity (DGB) to address biodiversity-related issues outside of protected areas. SERNAP was given more autonomy within a restructured Ministry of Sustainable Development and Planning (MDSP). FONAMA remained under the control of the MDSP. Despite these institutional changes there was significant staff continuity between DNCB and SERNAP.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND RELEVANCE

The project addressed policy, legal, and institutional issues, including the need to build system and local capacities, civil society participation, and investments for biodiversity protection. The

*objectives were consistent with the Bank's policies and country strategy, and with the development priorities of the host country. Project relevance is rated **high**.*

8. The project addressed important obstacles to biodiversity conservation specific to Bolivia and supported the Bolivian government in strengthening and expanding the SNAP. The project was also consistent with the Bank's overall country strategy seeking to assist Bolivia in addressing its environmental problems by designing a coherent set of policies, regulations and laws, and by strengthening the country's environmental institutions. The project's objective was to help the government of Bolivia ensure the protection of representative samples of some of Bolivia's most diverse and threatened ecosystems. In accordance with the Bank's 1991 Forestry Strategy, the project appraisal gave considerable attention to the need for strengthening citizen participation in the formulation of policies and regulations, and to the need to set aside land rich in biodiversity for protection. It stressed the need to build human capacities, improve planning, and direct investments in protected areas. In accordance with the Bank's policy on Indigenous Peoples (OD 4.20), the project adopted an approach to biodiversity protection that included the participation of indigenous communities and institutions. The appraisal also proposed to ensure the financial sustainability of the SNAP through the establishment of a trust fund. The project components include: (i) support for the organization, implementation and follow-up of the National System of Protected Areas -SNAP; (ii) support to existing protected areas and establishment of new priority protected areas; (iii) alternative management systems of natural resources in buffer zones; (iv) monitoring and evaluation; and (v) administrative support to the project coordinating unit. The project also aimed to leverage additional resources to finance the SNAP.

EFFICACY

*The project contributed to more effective protection of biodiversity by reducing poaching and illegal wood extraction and mining, and by closer monitoring of gas and oil exploration inside protected areas. DNCB, and its successor SERNAP, established a highly transparent system of funds administration and are regarded among the most credible and transparent public institutions in Bolivia. Efficacy is rated **substantial**.*

Implementation of the SNAP and Support to Protected Areas

9. The project had some important successes. Foremost among them, was the creation of five new parks, three more than called for in the appraisal document. In consequence, the land under protection in Bolivia grew from 10 percent of the national territory in 1993 to close to 15 percent in 1999. Second, the project established or improved management capacities in 16 parks and protected areas, 5 more than specified at appraisal. While the quality of park management varies across the system, all parks supported by the project now have resident directors and trained guards that regularly patrol parklands. This accomplishment is particularly notable considering that 13 of those protected areas either did not exist or lacked any protection before the project, and that many are located in remote areas. Finally, DNCB's central office developed the capacity to supervise and coordinate activities in protected areas and to wage political and court battles to defend the integrity of parks from violators.

10. The material contributions of the project included financing salaries of park guards and providing vehicles and radio communication systems. The project equipped and helped train 230 guards and 31 park directors and technicians—almost all of DNCB's staff—on a variety of topics such as management, negotiations, and legal issues. The project introduced the use of annual operational plans, standards for hiring staff, administration procedures, and procedures for park

management and protection, and it financed the formulation of five park management plans. Communication between the central office and protected areas was improved through the provision of a communications network consisting of 54 computers reaching 13 protected areas. The project also enabled the central office to provide support services needed and valued by staff in protected areas, such as in training and legal services.

11. FONAMA was the source of most of the recurrent implementation problems. The agency quickly became politicized and throughout most of the project period was poorly managed (Box 1). Despite the failure to strengthen FONAMA's fund raising and administrative capacities, DNCB has been able to procure the funds needed to finance the essential activities in 14 protected areas (see paragraph 27). In the last year of the project, 1998, the project faced a predictable but not anticipated shortage of funds. This resulted in a dramatic reduction of staff in an overgrown central office and elimination of some activities. No staff cuts were made among park directors and wardens. Except for the biodiversity monitoring system and training, most other critical activities continued, however.

12. Another SAR promise not delivered by the project is the establishment of a strong legal foundation for the SNAP. Currently SERNAP operates under a presidential decree, which is a weak legal basis for the SNAP given that other ministries (such as Mining and Energy and Agriculture) have older regulations that conflict with the regulations of SERNAP. DNCB did include the SNAP in the draft of the biodiversity protection component of the Biodiversity Law, but the law became too controversial and stalled. It addressed too many issues that could not easily be agreed upon in the Bolivian Congress, including biodiversity property rights and genetic regulation.

Box 1. Policies and Politics: the Decline of FONAMA

The government of Bolivia created FONAMA in the early 1990s as an independent entity overseen by the Office of the President. The trust fund was to take donor funds for conservation and distribute them to government agencies, NGOs, universities, and other organizations and was structured in a way that allowed donors to track and monitor their own funds. Steering committees reviewed potential grants with the participation of NGOs, government, universities, and donors. FONAMA was the first pluralistic Environmental Fund in Latin America. For several years it was used as a model for the creation of other funds. When the government changed in 1993, however, the new administration, though it included sustainable development in its policy agenda, was not interested in channeling funds to NGOs to carry out small projects. Its agenda consisted of much larger institutional, legal, and policy reforms, which rendered FONAMA's piecemeal approach irrelevant. FONAMA, now expected to finance the priorities of the new administration, was placed under the newly created Ministry of Sustainable Development and Environment and lost its independent status. Expectations of large donations encouraged political parties to compete for control of FONAMA resulting in frequent changes of director, growing inefficiency, and reduced transparency, which led to diminishing donor support. By 1998, FONAMA had gone from the idea of a model pluralistic funding instrument to an ineffective project administrator, a job it was not set up to do.

Citizen Participation and Alternative Management System of Natural Resources in Buffer Zones

13. Bolivia was the first country in Latin America to adopt a far-reaching law of popular participation in the early 1990s. Not surprisingly, then, citizen participation cut across the components of the BBCP. At the national level, the project supported consultations and seminars with civil society in the formulation of the proposal for the Biodiversity Law as well as for the Presidential Decrees and Ministerial Resolutions DNCB helped to develop. At the local level, the

project supported two innovative tools to involve civil society in parks and buffer zones management, co-administration and park management committees.

14. **Co-administration.** DNCB, with project support, established seven co-administration contracts (four with NGOs, two with indigenous groups, and one with an academic institution). The results of this experiment highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of such arrangements. The main strengths are more transparency in park management and autonomy from party politics. There are three important weaknesses, however. First, there is the danger that park management will collapse when funds become scarce. Second, conflicts can arise between the development and protection goals of NGOs that may make them reluctant to enforce park protection for fear of opposition by local populations. Third, nongovernmental employees lack the legal authority to enforce the law, detain poachers, gather criminal evidence, and carry weapons. Co-administration contracts performed better in areas where there were not too many pressures on the parks and when partners had a long record in environmental management and a strong capacity to raise funds. Also, co-administration arrangements with indigenous groups have a set of specific challenges that can only be resolved over time (Box 2).

Box 2. The Co-administration Process

Park co-administration arrangements with indigenous groups are particularly interesting and illustrate the strong need for a gradual approach to devolution and local capacity building. The Kaa Iyaa National Park was created by the initiative of the Capitanía del Alto y Bajo Isoso (CABI), which represents the Guaraní people that inhabit the park's buffer zone. Interested in stopping the expansion of large agricultural operations into their ancestral lands, the Guaraní, with the support of international NGOs, promoted the creation of the park. Once created, the CABI negotiated the co-administration agreement with DNCB, which agreed to hire all guards from local Guaraní communities. While the park director and the head of its scientific program are not Guaraní, park affairs are almost entirely managed by the CABI. The CABI has been key when confronting powerful interests affecting the park. In November of 1997, when the Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline was being built, the park guards, under the direction of the CABI, confiscated the equipment of the construction company because the company had not obtained a permit from DNCB. The incident escalated and the military moved in to support the construction company, making newspaper headlines. The CABI stood its ground, with DNCB's support, and eventually negotiated the creation of a special trust fund for environmental protection, funded with one million dollars provided by PETROBRAZ, the pipeline contractor. This trust fund has financed a large part of the costs of park management. The CABI would like to see all funds financing the park deposited in the trust fund and to have full administration of all park operations. They also would like to see a Guaraní Indian appointed park director. But the process of devolution will have to be slow. First, the CABI must strengthen its administrative capacities, improve staff management practices, and improve its mechanisms of accountability and transparency.

15. **Protected Areas Management Committees.** The project financed the formation and strengthening of 12 protected areas management committees that included the participation of people living in the parks or in surrounding areas. Project support included training of 65 committee members and assisting in the creation of committee regulations. Management committees meet regularly (normally every two or three months) to review the implementation of the protected areas' annual operational plan and monitor park management. The committees also participate in the selection of park guards, who are generally from the local communities, and help ensure transparency of administration and decision-making.

16. Management committees are the main instrument DNCB used to obtain local support for park protection. Through the committees, park administrators developed local agreements and support for a set of rules for resource use to make protection possible. In some parks, such as Ulla Ulla and Sajama, where local people have come to value the economic potential of wildlife and

ecotourism, communities themselves identify and sanction local violators. Park wardens rarely prosecuted local violators of park laws. Instead, they confiscated hunting weapons used by poachers and give them warnings. This allowed wardens to dissuade poachers while keeping good relations with local people. When communities are well-organized, wardens generally coordinated enforcement with local authorities and the management committees. Parks with strong management committees, such as Sajama, Ulla Ulla, and Madidi, have seen the largest reductions in poaching, illegal wood extraction, and agricultural burning. Ownership of the conservation ethic by local communities is so strong that they are effectively functioning as *de facto* park wardens.

17. Local people also use management committees to address some of their other needs. In remote protected areas like Apolobamba, Madidi, Sajama, and Noel Kempff, the protected areas' administration is the only permanent national government presence. Hence, the local management committee becomes an important contact with other development agencies. The committees also function as forums within which local stakeholders can negotiate disputes on access and use of resources in or around the park. In some areas the committees have brought together communities, local organizations, and municipalities to pool resources and undertake development activities that would not had been possible otherwise. Communities in and around the park at Sajama, for example, have used management committees to resolve land disputes and disputes over the opportunities provided by ecotourism and have agreed on a general set of rules for resource management. In Apolobamba, management committee meetings are the main means by which the park's annual operational plans are coordinated with the annual plans of the municipalities to ensure a consistent regional development strategy.

18. Involving local communities in national park affairs and the park's promise of development benefits has helped increase their interest in protecting the park. In some parks where local people continue to hunt for household consumption, communities have established rules limiting the areas where hunting is allowed. In the Kaa Iya, for example, hunting has been restricted to the park buffer zone areas, and is prohibited in the wetlands where animal diversity is high. In Madidi, local communities interested in promoting ecotourism, have banned hunting in areas known to have high animal populations and diversity. Building on the foundations that the project helped set in place, nearly everywhere, increased local interest in protecting natural resources has generated local support for SERNAP when powerful outside interests threaten the integrity of a park. Local communities also have been important allies in confrontations between SERNAP and powerful interests that have encroached upon parks (see Box 3).

Box 3. Local Alliances for Protection

In most of the instances, when SERNAP took powerful interests to court for encroaching on protected areas, the mobilization of local communities provided media coverage and political support. In August 2000, for example, SERNAP sued a timber company to stop wood extraction from Pilon Lajas. Communities living in the protected area staged a large meeting in support of SEMARNAP in the city of Rurrenabaque, and to oppose the timber company. This action by local communities was instrumental in counteracting the pressures that the timber company had placed on the government to the point that, a few months later, the company pulled out of the area. Other illegal logging operations left the area when the court verdict was made public. Also, in 1999, SERNAP opposed a permit for oil prospecting in Amboro by the Ministry of Energy and Mines. But local opposition to prospecting was high, and local communities blocked access to the park, eventually forcing the company to relinquish its plans for oil exploration in the park.

Monitoring and Information

19. The biodiversity monitoring system proposed at appraisal was a simple clearinghouse that would seek to incorporate existing expertise and experience in Bolivia. The system actually put in place, however, was complex and expensive and it was not maintained after the GEF grant ended in 1998. This monitoring system had three main problems. First, it was too ambitious in aiming to monitor project activities, biodiversity in protected areas, compliance with international conventions and agreements signed by Bolivia, and private and state economic activities in or around protected areas, including wood extraction, mining, petroleum, gas, and tourism. Second, the monitoring system was designed by a group of consultants with little consultation within the park system or among other relevant agencies. As a result, the system could not communicate with monitoring systems that were being developed for Amboro and Noel Kempff with the support of other donors, nor could it communicate well with biodiversity data banks previously developed by universities or research institutions. Third, importing and exporting information to other systems was difficult because the consultants developed their own software for the system instead of selecting among the software commonly used for this purpose. By September 1998, when an IUCN team evaluated the project, the monitoring system was no longer operating³ (Only two components of the system remain operational: the administrative monitoring module that tracks expenses for the SNAP and the module that monitors productive activities in protected areas. The latter are financed by corporations and other enterprises as part of the environmental management plan that SERNAP requires before it grants permit to carry out such activities. Guards continue to gather information, but its quality is unreliable as many guards have not been trained in the system.

EFFICIENCY

The project helped improve protection on more than 10 million hectares of land that is very rich in biodiversity. Efficiency is rated substantial.

20. The US\$4.5 million provided by GEF, with the US\$3.9 million, contributed by the co-financer, the Swiss Development Cooperation, provided basic funding for the establishment and operation of the SNAP for 5 years. This included staffing 14 protected areas, equipping and training staff at all levels, and strengthening DNCB's capacities as a manager and as an advocate for the SNAP within the government. Some aspects of the project could have been more

3. Suarez de Freitas *et al.* Bolivia Biodiversity Conservation Project, Grant agreement of the Global Environmental Trust Fund (GET Grant No. 28620-BO). Bolivia, La Paz; September 1999).

efficient. First, the biodiversity monitoring system was more costly than necessary, as it could have drawn more on existing expertise and institutional capacities in Bolivia and done more to incorporate ongoing experience in the parks of Amboro and Noel Kempff. Also, the use of standard software would have made the system less expensive to operate and maintain. Second, the Biodiversity Law would have faced less opposition had it left aside politically complex problems such as biodiversity property rights and genetic regulation; this might have helped get the law passed. Third, park management plans might have been developed more quickly and been more realistic had DNCB established better guidelines, tested its methodology, and developed local capacity before attempting to formulate the plans simultaneously in all parks.

OUTCOME

*The project clearly helped establish the SNAP and converted “paper parks” into managed protected areas, although the quality of management varies throughout the park system. The project addressed the sector and country needs and brought about significant improvements to Bolivia’s capacities to protect biodiversity at a relatively low cost. Outcome is rated **moderately satisfactory**.*

21 The project is rated moderately satisfactory mainly because three of the project components were not successful. These are the establishment of a biodiversity monitoring system, a strong legal foundation for the SNAP and the strengthening of FONAMA as a mechanism to insure the long term funding of SNAP. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that significant achievements were made. The project clearly helped establish the SNAP and converted “paper” parks into managed protected areas. In most protected areas supported by the project well-trained guards regularly patrol the parks and management committees meet to regularly deliberate and monitor park activities. Similarly, through the committees and by promoting alternative economic activities, DNCB and subsequently SERNAP have been expanding local support for parks, and political support against outside threats. Although the monitoring system cannot provide statistics for the impacts of the BBGP, field observations and reports from park rangers indicate that poaching and illegal wood extraction have diminished, animals thought extinct in some protected areas are being sighted again, and petroleum and gas companies are improving their environmental practices. Press coverage on SERNAP’s legal victories resulted in the withdrawal of large timber mining companies from most protected areas. The vicuña, once threatened with extinction, is an important success story: the population of vicuña has doubled, from about 17,000 in 1996 to 33,800 in 1998. Much of this recovery occurred in the protected areas of Apolobamba and Sajama.

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

*The major accomplishment of the project is that it helped turn “paper” parks into “real” parks. Teams of park wardens have a constant presence in 16 parks and protected areas, patrolling them regularly and interacting daily with local communities. Application of regulations has dramatically improved across the SNAP, and good communication between parks and DNCB contributed to better coordination and management of the SNAP. Also, the project helped institutionalize the SNAP in a broader sense by placing protected areas in the conceptual “map” of other government agencies, private enterprises, and forest dwellers in such a way that they are beginning to acknowledge and respect protected areas. Institutional development impact is rated **substantial**.*

22 At the end of the project, Bolivia had a functioning National System of Protected Areas, although the ability to address threats to biodiversity varied greatly across the system depending

on the nature, complexity, and intensity of the local threat. In 1998, when the IUCN team evaluated the project, it rated park management good in 13 parks or reserves that had no or incipient management before the project. The report also notes that park management was “consolidated” in Amboro, Noel Kempff, and Estación Biológica Beni, the three parks with management before the project. Accomplishments were not just confined to local park management and other organizational aspects of DNCB discussed above. DNCB also made advances in building the regulatory framework for the SNAP. During the life of the project, DNCB’s and SERNAP’s legal team developed 10 Presidential Decrees and 15 Ministerial Resolutions. Nevertheless, Congress did not pass the Biodiversity Law. To date, SERNAP continues to operate on the basis of a Presidential Decree, which is a disadvantage when SERNAP has to defend protected areas from ministries such as Mining and Energy or Agriculture that have as their legal mandate a law passed by Congress. To correct this situation SERNAP is currently negotiating with the Bolivian Congress a law that focuses on the SNAP. The law has been approved in broad terms by Congress, but legislative details and revisions are still outstanding and will have to be taken up again during the 2002 – 2003 term.²³ Despite the lack of a law, DNCB made significant achievements in institutionalizing the SNAP across the government; DNCB’s and SERNAP’s victories, press coverage, and strong alliances now make other ministries carefully consider SNAP’s regulations when issuing permits for wood extraction, mining, and oil and gas exploration in protected areas. An important factor in these accomplishments was managerial stability: the DNCB had only two directors during most of the project, despite the many institutional changes that were made. Both directors shared a similar vision for the SNAP, were highly respected conservationists in Bolivia and were skillful at mobilizing political support for the SNAP in the government, civil society, and the donor community.

²⁴ The only institutional development shortcoming of the project was related to FONAMA. As indicated in paragraph 11, FONAMA quickly became politicized and gradually lost credibility. Part of the problem is that the GOB under the 1993-1997 administration did not develop ownership of FONAMA. The GOB perceived FONAMA as a donor’s creation that had little relevance to the policy priorities of the new administration (Box 1). Despite this shortcoming, the credibility developed by DNCB resulted in another initiative for long term funding for the SNAP that has been much more successful and is being funded by the GEF follow-up grant (see paragraph 27).

SUSTAINABILITY

DNCB developed the technical resilience, social support, and government and stakeholder ownership that helped institutionalize the SNAP and attract enough funds to continue essential operations after the first GEF grant was exhausted. On this basis sustainability is ranked likely.

²⁵ Over the life of the project and beyond, DNCB, and subsequently SERNAP demonstrated significant resilience under political, social, and financial pressures. The sources of SERNAP’s resilience are its reputation as a well-managed and transparent institution and the alliances that it has established with NGOs, local communities, and donors. Another important strength has been its capacity to train and retain qualified staff. Even though it lost some staff when project funds ended in 1998, most staff cuts were made at the central office, conserving the more critical staff in protected areas. These cuts helped streamline operations and resulted in more realistic budgetary requirements to carry out essential work.

²⁶ While the project did not mobilize donor support through FONAMA it did by other means. DNCB’s good reputation allowed it to attract enough funds to continue essential operations for three years after the first GEF grant ran out and before the second GEF grant began

in 2001. Long-term financial sustainability through FONAMA was not achieved as originally planned, largely because of FONAMA's lack of transparency and inefficiency and owing to political factors (see Box 1). Confident of SERNAP strengths, donors have been willing to support the Foundation for the Development of the National System of Protected Areas (FUNDESNAP). This non-profit, private foundation is more autonomous than FONAMA and has been structured to be more accountable and transparent. FUNDESNAP is expected to raise US\$30 million during the five years of the follow-on project. By January 2002, only nine months after the project began, seven donors had pledged US\$14 million. One of them is GEF, which will support FUNDESNAP with US\$5 million as part of the follow-on project. Also, during the follow-up grant SERNAP has begun to put in place a cost recovery system based on park entrance fees. According to this system 25 percent of the funds obtained from entrance fees will be dedicated to community development activities to benefit the populations living around the parks.

BANK PERFORMANCE

Project preparation included participation of civil society and focused on a few issues critical to the strengthening of the SNAP. During supervision the Bank demonstrated flexibility to adjust the project to new situations. Close supervision allowed the Bank to be an effective steward of the project. Bank supervision both in preparation and supervision is rated satisfactory.

Quality at Entry

27 The strengths of project design included the harmonization of laws and regulations affecting protected areas; its emphasis on the need to strengthen citizen participation in the formulation of policies and regulations and in the management of protected areas; and its emphasis on the need to strengthen management capacities across the SNAP. The project appraisal stressed the need to strengthen skills, improve planning and management, and increase investments in protected areas. The appraisal also addressed the need for long-term financial sustainability through the creation of an environmental fund and proposed a study regarding a revenue-generation system for protected areas.

28 The project design had three weaknesses. First, the time required to establish and develop the SNAP was greatly underestimated. Second, it failed to anticipate and budget for costs incurred by local people while attending management committee meetings. People from remote villages sometimes had to travel three or four days to attend to management committee meetings, paying for their travel and subsistence. These costs contributed to participation fatigue and were an impediment for regular participation by many of the poorer and more remote communities. Third, it greatly underestimated the complexities associated with legal reform. Also, while the project budgeted funds to pay for the technical aspects related to the development of the various drafts of the Biodiversity Law, it failed to budget for the cost to promote drafts in Congress and other government agencies. More outreach and joint activities with Congress could have assured a sooner and more feasible legal proposal and a stronger legal status for the SNAP.

Supervision

29 The Bank showed considerable flexibility and willingness to assist the implementing agency's search for solutions to problems and in suggesting approaches to improve project achievements. An important factor in the Bank's supervision performance was that the project had the same task manager throughout. This allowed the task manager to become very knowledgeable about the project. It also created frank and open communication with the

implementing agency. These factors allowed the task manager to act in a timely fashion, plan supervision visits that responded to the needs of the project, and follow-up on key project developments. Supervision reports by the task manager showed frequent comments on the problem of FONAMA.

30 Intimate knowledge of the players and context of the project allowed the Bank to use the means at its disposal to protect the integrity of the project and prevent the politicization of DNCB. In 1997, with the advent of the new administration, the Bank refused twice to give its no-objection to an appointment for the director of DNCB since the appointee did not meet the qualifications. Had the Bank given its no-objection to this appointment, DNCB likely would have fallen prey to party politics, lost its credibility, and failed to raise the funds it needed to continue operations when the GEF grant funds were exhausted. The message the Bank sent to the new administration was strongly supported by other donors and many NGOs in Bolivia. Although sustainable development and citizen participation were not as prominent in the political agenda of the new administration, political interference with DNCB, and subsequently with SERNAP, has remained relatively low. Building on this precedent the last director of SERNAP was selected in 2001, through a competitive and transparent process with the participation of NGOs and donors. This is highly unusual for Bolivia. Also, the Bank used innovative ways to strengthen DNCB capacities by including DNCB's director as part of supervision teams for other similar projects. This helped DNCB learn from the lessons of other countries.

31 Two areas in which the Bank could have provided better guidance to the implementing agency are the design of the biodiversity monitoring system and the development of protected area management plans. The elaboration of management plans lacked sufficient technical assistance, took too long to complete, tended to be too descriptive and have action guidelines that were too broad.

BORROWER PERFORMANCE

The implementing agency had strong ownership of the project. Continuity of vision and key staff at protected areas were critical for gradual strengthening of DNCB. Borrower performance is rated satisfactory.

32 Despite the institutional changes that took place throughout the project the same team remained in charge of the project during the first five years of implementation (from 1993 to 1997). Moreover, the leader of this team was well connected with the administration and was very effective at getting the government's support for the project. Except for the personnel reduction in the central office in 1998, there was little turnover in key staff, particularly among directors of protected areas. Also, when a change in management took place in 1998 this change was not accompanied by major shifts in vision. After the Bank refused to give its no-objection to the first appointee of the new administration, the government appointed a capable, respected, and strong leader as director of DNCB who, overcoming party politics, collaborated closely with the outgoing director of the DNCB, thus ensuring project continuity. At the local level, low turnover among park directors has permitted the gradual development of a cadre of well-trained and experienced staff capable of addressing the complex political issues that characterize protected areas. With the exception of a lapse in 1998 when FONAMA staff were fired and not replaced for several months, project disbursements to area personnel were efficient, and a decentralized administration capacity was developed. An important management deficiency being addressed during the second GEF project is the lack of a long-term strategy for the SNAP.

LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

33 *To ensure successful conservation it is necessary to build constituencies for conservation, increase risks for violators, and ensure continuing financial support to protected areas.* This is a severe challenge for a national park authority, as the costs of policing large tracts of remote land are large and the economic and political power of outside violators are great. DNCB was able to meet this challenge by building NGO and donor alliances in favor of protection and by gaining the support of resource-dependent people in and around protected areas. It drew on that support to protect the integrity of natural areas by increasing the risks to poachers and illicit loggers and miners. This experience also shows that project achievements can be sustained even in the absence of a fund to guarantee long term availability of resources. The components underpinning the sustainability of the BBCP were community, NGO, and donor support, which were made possible by credibility and transparency. Key in this respect was stakeholder participation, a disposition to work with resource-dependent populations in the search for alternative economic opportunities and good communication with multiple donors.

34 *The effective participation of local populations in park protection requires implementing agencies with strong negotiation capacities to help local populations reach agreement on rules of the game to access and manage resources, and with an institutional willingness and capacity to assist local populations in meeting their development needs.* An important element of success of the BBCP is that in the absence of other central government institutions, park authorities assumed broad development roles, and assisted the local communities, organized groups and municipalities to pool available resources and obtain additional resources in support of a common agenda.

35 *The Bank's stewardship role in politically complex projects require close supervision and timely information on stakeholder.* In this project the Bank familiar with key project issues, actors, and the country context, by refusing to grant no-objection letters, prevented in a timely and appropriate way, the interference of partisan politics with project activities. This contributed to the credibility and transparency of DNCB and strengthened DNCB's support from local communities, NGOs and other donors.

Annex A. Basic Data Sheet

BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION PROJECT

Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	Appraisal estimate	Actual or current estimate	Actual as % of appraisal estimate
Total project costs	8.35	8.31	99
Loan amount	4.5	4.39	98
Co financing	8.35	8.31	99
Cancellation	0	0	0

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US\$ million)

	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99
Appraisal estimate	2.00	3.80	6.00	9.00	12.00	15.00	16.50	16.50
Revised Estimate	0.83	1.76	3.22	4.71	7.15	9.90	13.90	16.50
Actual	0.83	1.76	3.23	4.73	7.68	10.44	13.06	14.58
Actual as % of estimate	41.5	46.3	53.7	52.3	64.0	69.6	79.2	88.4
Actual as % of revised estimate	41.5	46.3	53.7	52.3	64.0	69.6	79.2	88.4
Date of final disbursement:	April 22, 1999							

Project Dates

	Original	Actual
Appraisal		03/1992
Board approval		12/21/1992
Effectiveness		07/13/1993
Closing date	02/25/1995	12/31/1998

Staff Inputs (staff weeks) and Costs

<i>Stage of project cycle</i>	<i>No. of Staff Weeks</i>	<i>US\$ ('000)</i>
Identification/Preparation	24.8	47.8
Appraisal/Negotiation	9.7	21.9
Supervision	63.9	178.6
ICR	4.0	12.7
Total	98.4	361.0

Mission Data

<i>Stage of project cycle</i>	<i>Month/ Year</i>	<i>No. of Persons</i>	<i>Days in Field</i>	<i>Specialization</i>	<i>Performance Rating</i> <i>Imple. Dev. Status Objectives</i>		<i>Types of Problems</i>
Identification and preparation	1993				S	S	
Appraisal/ negotiation	1993				S	S	
Supervision	03/1994	2		ES, PA	S	S	
	09/1994	5		ES, PA, PM	S	S	
	07/1995	4		ES, NM, IM	S	S	
	04/1996	5		PA, ES, NM, IM, CD	S	S	
	11/1996	3		PA, ES, NM	S	S	
	10/1997	4		ES, PS, FS	S	S	

Completion

ES=Environment specialist; PA=Project administrator; PM=Park management; NM=Natural resources management; IM=Institutional management; CD=Country development; PS=Program specialist; FS=Financial specialist.

Other Project Data

Borrower/Executing Agency:

<i>FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS</i>			
<i>Operation</i>	<i>Credit no.</i>	<i>Amount (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Board date</i>
GEF Sustainability of the National System of Protected areas (P060474)	TF204	15	12/20/2000


Annex B. Comments from the Borrower



REPÚBLICA DE BOLIVIA
MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA
Viceministerio de Inversión Pública
Y Financiamiento Externo

La Paz, 12 JUN. 2002
VIPFE/DGFE/NEG-02596/2002

Señor
Alain Barbu
Jefe de Grupo de Evaluación Sectorial y Temática
Departamento de Evaluación de Operaciones
BANCO MUNDIAL
Washington, D.C. 20433
USA




**Ref.: PROYECTO PARA LA CONSERVACIÓN DE LA
BIODIVERSIDAD TF-28620, TF-28629**

De mi consideración:

Adjunto a la presente, los comentarios al Informe de Evaluación de Resultados al proyecto de referencia, remitidos a este Viceministerio por el Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas, dependiente del Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificación.

Con este motivo, saludo a usted con la mayor atención.


BERNARDO REQUENA S.
Viceministro de Inversión Pública
y Financiamiento Externo
MINISTERIO DE HACIENDA

Adjunto lo indicado

Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificación
Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas
Proyecto GEF II



**COMENTARIOS AL INFORME DE EVALUACIÓN DE
 RESULTADOS PROYECTO DE CONSERVACIÓN DE LA
 BIODIVERSIDAD (TF-28620, TF-28629) DE FECHA Abril 23, 2002**

**INTRODUCCIÓN Y ANTECEDENTES
 PERSPECTIVA GENERAL**

- 2.- No es **División** Nacional de Conservación de la Biodiversidad, debe sustituirse por **Dirección**
 - y a pesar de su débil posición legal...., debe complementarse con: por contar con un Decreto Supremo para su establecimiento.
 -la oposición de parte de los donantes y las ONG fue fundamental para prevenir dichos nombramientos y para asegurar **la institucionalidad de tal forma** que solo..... (agregar negritas).
 - Aclarar que los Comité de Gestión de parques y planes de gestión están conformados por representantes de comunidades indígenas, ONGs, Municipios y el SERNAP.

CONTEXTO DEL PAÍS Y DEL SECTOR

- 4.- Aclarar que la quema de bosques se producen principalmente en zonas ubicadas en áreas tropicales, sub-tropicales y valles mesotérmicos.
 - Aclarar que el desplazamiento de la población también se debe a las reiterativas sequías en la región andina que implica procesos de desertificación.
- 5.- Se debe escribir Noel Kempff.

ARREGLOS INSTITUCIONALES

- 7.- Se debe escribir: **Dirección** Nacional para la Conservación de la Biodiversidad.

Aclarar que El FONAMA fue colocado bajo la tuición del **ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible**

Corregir:La siguiente administración **procedió a la reconversión de la DNCB....**


10. Modificar:se formularon cinco **planes de manejo** de parques....

- 12.- **Modificar:**SERNAP opera sobre la base de un **Decreto Supremo....**

PARTICIPACION CIUDADANA

- 13.- Sustituir Decretos Presidenciales por **Decretos Supremos**

Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificación
Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas
Proyecto GEF II



15.- Sustituir Comités de Gestión de Parque por **Comités de Gestión de Áreas Protegidas**.

16.- Complementar: Tal ha sido el grado de apropiación de la temática ambiental por las comunidades que la población local en Areas Protegidas actúan como verdaderos guardaparques para la preservación de la vida silvestre.

17.- Corregir: **Apolobamba** en vez de Apolobampo, administración de los parques por **administración de las áreas protegidas**.

Corregir Recuadro 3: Alianzas locales para la protección

En agosto del 2000 se realizó una gran reunión en la localidad de Rurrenabaque donde el conjunto de comunidades que habitan en el Area Protegida Pilón – Lajas rechazaron el ingreso de una empresa maderera y apoyaron las acciones que el SERNAP estaba llevando adelante en la justicia. Esta acción influyó contundente para que la presión que se había creado se diluya al punto que meses más tarde la empresa renunció a su intento de ingresar a explotar la madera.

Eliminar el párrafo: El SERNAP no tuvo apoyo a su posición en el Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificación.

Corregir: Otras operaciones ilegales de explotación forestal se fueron **de las áreas protegidas ante la posibilidad de que la DNCB inicie acciones penales**.

MONITOREO E INFORMACIÓN

19.- Se debe escribir Noel Kempff.

EFICIENCIA

20.- Se debe escribir Noel Kempff.

RESULTADOS

21.- Corregir: **Apolobamba** en vez de Apolobampo

DESARROLLO INSTITUCIONAL

22.- Se debe escribir Noel Kempff.

Sustituir: Decretos Presidenciales por Decretos Supremos.

En la parte final se menciona que: El Congreso quizás someta a votación esta ley antes del fin de la administración actual en agosto de 2002. Sustituir por: Esta Ley fue aprobada en grande por la Cámara de Diputados pero no fue revisada y aprobada a nivel detallado, por

Ministerio de Desarrollo Sostenible y Planificación
Servicio Nacional de Áreas Protegidas
Proyecto GEF II



lo tanto esta ley deberá ser considerada en la legislatura correspondiente a la gestión 2002-2003.

23.- Sustituir SENAP por SNAP