



1. CAS-ISN Data

Country: Arab Republic of Egypt

CAS-ISN Year: FY06-FY14

CAS-ISN Period: FY06 – FY14

CLR Period: FY06 – FY14

Date of this review: December 9, 2015

2. Ratings

	CLR Rating	IEG Rating
Development Outcome:	<i>Moderately Unsatisfactory</i>	<i>Unsatisfactory</i>
WBG Performance:	<i>Good</i>	<i>Fair</i>

3. Executive Summary

i. This is a difficult CLR to review, covering an unusually long period (FY06—FY14) for a country strategy that spanned several years of entrenched political stability, followed by revolution and subsequent elections which ushered in a new regime, and culminating in its overthrow by the armed forces. Indeed, since January 2011 Egypt has been undergoing dramatic change. Such change was welcomed by some sectors of society—and fostered hope in those sectors—but brought with it substantial challenges, including for the implementation of the WBG program. Underlying political and social tensions remain.

ii. Against this background, the WBG program went through two distinct phases during the review period. In January 2006-January 2011 the program described in the CAS and CAS progress report was anchored on a government development agenda that emphasized pro-growth reforms in response to a deteriorating global environment that resulted in food and financial crises. The government broadly supported the Bank program during this initial period, and—as a sign of support of Bank programs—contributed to the IDA15 replenishment. Things changed significantly in the period February 2011 to June 2014, as government commitment to the WBG program weakened after the January 2011 revolution. A modest ISN lending program envisaged an Emergency Labor Intensive project (FY12) focused on job creation and a Development Policy Loan for economic management. But the planned DPL—a key piece of the Bank strategy—could never be developed or implemented. In addition, a Health Insurance Project (FY10) that was ongoing at the start of the ISN period, and had initially broad buy in from the government, was not implemented after the revolution because government priorities changed.

iii. Within this adverse policy implementation environment for the WBG program, the Bank attempted to adapt and continue contributing to Egypt’s development agenda, but its efforts did not show tangible results based on an assessment of the ISN results framework. The inability to negotiate the Bank DPL on economic management is a telling symptom of the difficulties of the Bank’s engagement with key counterparts. These difficulties mirrored complications in the IMF’s engagement with Egypt. There was no progress on an IMF program despite an agreement in principle on

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November 20, 2012 and Egypt's need for official financing in light of little private external financing to cover an external current account deficit of 10 percent of GDP.

iv. Eleven out of thirteen objectives under the CAS and ISN program were *partially achieved or not achieved* under IEG's *CLR review* (eight out of thirteen according to the *CLR*). In some areas Bank initiatives never took off the ground, in others the dialogue did not generate the expected actions or reforms, and in yet other areas there were reversals during the ISN period of progress made during the CAS period. In *focus area I (economic management)* the budget deficit and energy subsidies worsened during the ISN period and progress that had been achieved in public sector transparency during the CAS and CAS progress report period was reversed. Only lately there has been a decrease in the underlying budget deficit according to the IMF. In *focus area II (jobs)*—an area that showed some results under the Bank program—there was partial progress on the business environment, financial sector improvement, power and transport infrastructure, education, and trade, but not enough to have a significant impact on jobs. In *focus area III (inclusion)* there was some improvement of water and air quality, and on gender issues—most of it before the ISN period—but little progress on the rest that included improving the management of water, sanitation, and irrigation systems, expanding access to healthcare, developing targeted and sustainable safety nets, and reducing interregional disparities. In some important areas—such as energy subsidies—progress was observed after the formal ISN period, but only recently policies have been put in place to address the budget deficit. Moreover, the sea change required for a productive WBG engagement with Egypt is yet to be seen. Before the ISN there had been some progress on fiscal consolidation, public sector transparency, the business environment, and air quality. During the CAS and CAS progress report period, there were a number of initiatives and pilot programs on social sectors but it is difficult to assess if they resulted in an effective improvement of inclusion, particularly in access to healthcare, safety nets, and reduced interregional and gender disparities. Yet, the Bank can claim some progress on helping develop a poverty mapping which should contribute to set up a targeting mechanism to reach the poor in the future.

v. The FY06-FY08 CAS results framework and its extension to FY11 under the June 2008 CAS progress report had an adequate design showing the country development goals, issues and obstacles, outcomes to which WBG expected to contribute, intermediate indicators (milestones), and WBG activities. The May 2012 ISN program provided a reasonable response to the challenges faced by the country at the time, focusing on implementation and obtaining results over an 18-month period. The selection of areas—macroeconomic stabilization, job creation, and governance—were appropriate to the situation of the country at the time, and were reiterated as priorities under the Systematic Country Diagnostic (2015, see footnote 1).

vi. Bank interventions, however, were not always appropriate to obtaining the proposed goals. For example, for the objective of deficit reduction the interventions were mainly monitoring or policy notes. The program had an emphasis on knowledge services in some of its key areas—perhaps reflecting the difficulties of the dialogue to put together lending operations or policy loans, and poor portfolio performance. The CLR would have benefited from more evidence on whether particular pieces of AAA either influenced in-country thinking on the issues they were designed to illuminate or informed the design of Bank operations.

vii. The revised CAS framework in the ISN was not as detailed as in the CAS and CAS progress report—for example it did not have a column showing issues and obstacles—and its objectives in the results framework supported goals in the areas of economic management, jobs, and inclusion. Moreover, the ISN results framework was weak because objectives in many cases were too broad for the planned Bank interventions and indicators were not representative of the objectives. In a number of instances indicators reflected poorly the objectives, several indicators stopped at the output level (no outcome targeted), and the indicators were too vague to be measurable by quantitative values. Some of the indicators and objectives referred to pilots that would be scaled up, but the scaling-up was not discussed in the program document. In addition, the scope of some objectives, such as reducing gender disparities, were too broad to be achieved during the review period with the planned



WBG interventions. IFC activities were included in the framework in the main areas of IFC interventions—for example PPPs—but in general there were no outcome indicators directly linked to the IFC activities, which made their contributions more difficult to evaluate than IBRD contributions.

viii. Implementation of the WBG program was not smooth even before the ISN, and became extremely difficult during the ISN, when decision making was paralyzed owing to continuous changes in the cabinet. Supervision of Bank interventions suffered as a result, and implementation of some projects stopped altogether. The Bank responded in a piece-meal fashion, but on the whole essentially shifted from lending to knowledge dissemination and advisory work, whose results are not easy to assess. Despite IFC outcomes not being measured explicitly in the results framework, IFC contributed to key WBG program objectives and adapted to changing circumstances and priorities. Owing to the political uncertainties in Egypt during the ISN period as well as government reluctance to commit to reforms, however, IFC lost traction on PPPs, with the exception of the one for Alexandria Hospitals where progress has been extremely slow, or on other advisory activities that required government commitment, especially in investment-climate-related reforms. Negative perception of the private sector in the post-revolution period resulted in several reversals of public asset privatizations as well as legal challenges to land allocation or to concessions—for example in infrastructure, which hindered IFC's ability to support job creating and developmental projects. Almost one-third of IFC's existing portfolio at the time of the ISN program was being challenged in the courts for different reasons—for example Titan Cement, Omar Effendi retail, and Bank of Alexandria.

ix. Joint WB and IFC activities were limited during the ISN period. For example, the two institutions collaborated on the Egypt Development Market Place initiative (FY13). The Bank generally coordinated well with development partners. Safeguard compliance was uneven under the WBG program, but there were some notable examples of good practice. There were serious fiduciary issues in energy, water, and transport sector projects, where the Integrity Vice-Presidency found evidence or strong indications of corrupt and collusive practices.

x. The CLR did not adhere to the IEG-OPCS *Shared Approach for Assessing Country Partnership Strategies* when rating the overall development outcome while the CLR review did. The discrepancy in ratings between the two documents then is more a reflection of this than of the substance of the assessments. The rating for overall development outcome would be *Unsatisfactory* for the CLR under the *guidelines*—the same as in IEG's CLR review—with eight out of thirteen objectives *partially achieved* or *not achieved*.

xi. IEG agrees with the lessons in the CLR, particularly on the need to respond flexibly in a high risk political environment. IEG would add that following the Arab Spring the Bank Group had to try to establish itself as a trusted development partner with the new government and with a civil society that played a key role by mobilizing. The ISN and its areas of intervention were in the spirit of the WBG becoming a trusted development partner to the new actors in Egypt. With the ISN, the WBG took a calculated risk that with the benefit of hindsight did not lead to the expected results. Embedding institutional development, capacity building, and governance more systematically in program interventions would have been warranted. On a program design issue, IEG believes that setting objectives too broad in scope is invitation to missing targeted outcomes for the program.

4. Strategic Focus

Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

1. **Congruence with Country Context and Country Program.** Egypt is a low-middle income country with a GDP per capita of US\$3,315 in current 2013 US dollars, which makes it an IBRD-only WBG client country. In 2010 half of the population in the country was considered poor. Moreover, economic activity remains unevenly distributed geographically, and concentrated in a few metropolitan areas. As a result, the poverty rate in remote areas of Upper Egypt is more than 40 percentage points



higher than in metropolitan Egypt. Egypt's growth in the past three decades was neither sustained nor inclusive, and even periods of rapid growth did not result in poverty reduction or improvements in shared prosperity. The country has long-standing structural budget and trade deficits, across-the-board energy subsidies that reached over 6 percent of GDP in 2013-14, and persistently high inflation. These pitfalls and poor job creation are largely rooted in weak public governance, including a public sector that is not transparent or accountable. Therefore the longstanding policy challenges for Egypt¹ are macroeconomic stabilization, energy reform, and improvement in public governance. The context of the period under review² was dominated by the consequences of the political turmoil that led to the downfall of the 30-year Mubarak regime and its replacement by a government ("the revolution") with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood. For the ISN, the Bank needed to get into broader consultations than in the past to build trust with counterparts with whom it had not worked before, create new partnerships, and focus on capacity building. The new government introduced a program—the National Initiative for Economic Recovery—and according to the ISN the overriding objective of the Bank program was to support the government program and help realize early credible economic gains that did not compromise the medium-term outlook. Actions under the program were expected to be carried out during the 18-month period of the ISN, which by necessity required some flexibility to address issues as they arose in a difficult political and economic context. The main objectives of the ISN were to improve economic management through control of the fiscal deficit and initiate reforms to enhance transparency and government operations, to help create jobs through direct emergency lending and take steps to improve the environment for private sector-led growth, and to ensure access of disadvantaged segments of the population to infrastructure, finance, social services, and participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of government operations.

2. **Relevance of Design.** The FY06-FY09 CAS—extended to FY11 by the June 2008 progress report—sought to support Egypt's program to achieve growth with equity by making more use of the private sector as a development agent as well as by changing the role of government in managing the economy. The FY12 Interim Strategy Note program provided a reasonable response to the challenges faced by the country, focusing on implementation and obtaining results over an 18-month period. The selection of areas—macroeconomic stabilization, job creation, and governance—were appropriate to the situation of the country at the time, and were reiterated as priorities under the Systematic Country Diagnostic (2015, see footnote 1). Bank interventions, however, were not always appropriate to obtaining the proposed goals. For example, for the objective of deficit reduction the interventions were mainly monitoring or policy notes. The program had an emphasis on knowledge services in some of its key areas—perhaps reflecting the difficulties of the dialogue to put together lending operations or policy loans, and poor portfolio performance—which makes difficult an assessment given the absence of Bank evaluation tools for these interventions. Both IFC and MIGA had significant operations during this ISN—indeed Egypt is IFC's largest exposure in the MENA region with a committed portfolio of US\$1.1 billion. But the CLR does not analyze in detail coordination under the WBG Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise Facility or a joint initiative under the Deauville Partnership process. There is wide donor support to Egypt from USAID, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Kuwait Fund, UNDP, African Development Bank, IMF and the Islamic Development Bank. The Bank coordinated with the IMF, and the CLR does not report on coordination with other development partners.

3. IFC's program focused on supporting the achievement of objectives 3—business environment—and 4—financial sector competitiveness and efficiency. To this end, IFC put in a place a substantial volume of investments projects, often coupled with advisory services that addressed firm or sectoral issues. Overall, these interventions were appropriate for attaining the proposed objectives. In addition, IFC provided adequate support for improving the management of water, sanitation, and irrigation systems (for example, the Cairo Wastewater Public Private Partnership).

¹ *Egypt: Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity*, A Systematic Country Diagnostic, Middle East and Africa Region, World Bank Group, September 2015.

² Covering the FY09-FY11 Country Assistance Strategy and the Interim Strategy Note for FY12-FY14.



Selectivity

4. The FY06-FY09 CAS—extended to FY11 by the June 2008 progress report—concentrated resources on private sector development, enhancing the provision of public services, and promoting equity through a broadly adequate combination of lending and knowledge services. The FY12 ISN program had few lending interventions planned, on a labor-intensive investment project, two significant energy projects, an urban transport project, and a DPL for economic management. Analytic work and technical assistance would support the three areas of the ISN. Sustainability is difficult to assess because at the outset this was a fairly risky program with an 18 month horizon. On the whole, the program was not particularly well balanced across the focus areas. The DPL for economic management for example, depended on anticipated conditions of dialogue and government commitment that never materialized. Therefore there was no DPL delivered under this ISN or a fall back strategy in its absence that would contribute to achieve the program objectives. The jobs area had a significant lending intervention. But there were no significant lending interventions planned under the rest of the inclusion area, which was supported primarily by dialogue on aspects of education and health policies. Continuing with work started under the CAS, the bulk of the Bank engagement was in infrastructure lending—energy, transport, and finance. The Bank Group had comparative advantage in the areas of job creation, inclusion, and infrastructure, but some aspects of economic management—such as fiscal policy—are more part of the working scope of other partners, like the IMF. It appears that—understandably under an ISN—the choice of areas reflected more what was possible at the time than a well thought-out strategy with longer term aims of institutional change, capacity development, scaling up of interventions, and sustainability.

Alignment

5. The CAS and ISN did not address specifically issues related to eliminating poverty and increasing shared prosperity. The ISN devoted little space in the text or the results framework to link WBG interventions to the reduction of poverty, promotion of inclusive growth, or pro-poor growth. Moreover, the WBG engagement under this CAS and ISN had negligible results at the end of the review period on macroeconomic management, reducing subsidies, targeting of social programs, or governance, in part because progress made under the CAS was reversed under the ISN. Yet, the Bank can claim some progress on helping develop a poverty mapping which should contribute to set up a targeting mechanism to reach the poor in the future.

This CLR Review

6. The period for this review (FY06-FY14) is unusually long for a Country Assistance Strategy. Nevertheless—and in line with the approach taken by the CLR—IEG will use the ISN FY12-FY14 results framework as a basis for the review, and—where possible with evidence—give credit to progress made before the ISN period.

5. Development Outcome

Overview of Achievement by Objective:

Focus Area I: Economic Management

7. **Objective 1 (# I.1):³ Implement government plan to gradually reduce the fiscal deficit by the end of the ISN period.** The indicator referred to launching a gradual phasing out of energy subsidies for energy intensive industries, a fairly partial measure of what was required to achieve the objective of

³ IEG's CLR review will use the same numbering of objectives as the CLR for ease of reference.



gradually reducing the fiscal deficit by the end of the ISN period. Increases in energy prices to energy-intensive sectors in 2012/13 reported by the CLR did not prevent energy subsidies to continue increasing as a share of the budget.⁴ Moreover, the budget deficit increased from 10½ percent of GDP in 2011/12 to 13.6 percent of GDP in 2013/14 because the government did not introduce a coherent energy subsidy reduction plan until July 2014—beyond the ISN period. The budgetary cost of untargeted energy subsidies reached over 6 percent of GDP in 2013/14 according to the IMF, reflecting their universal provision as well as high international oil prices. Little progress on energy subsidies was one of the key barriers to an IMF program on which the Bank DPL in this area was contingent. In July 2014, the government launched a strategy to gradually reduce energy subsidies (see also paragraph 14). The Bank prepared an Energy Efficiency Strategy AAA (FY12), and Energy Efficiency Strategy (FY11) ESW piece, and Energy/Social Safety Nets Sector Reform (FY14)—a trust funded TA, as a basis for discussion of energy subsidies, but with energy prices remaining high there was little progress in this area during the ISN period. There was some progress on fiscal consolidation before the ISN period reported *inter alia* by the CAS Progress Report, but this was reversed after 2011. Similarly, progress on public sector transparency before the ISN period—as measured by the Open Budget Index—was reversed after 2011. Bank dialogue during and after the ISN centered on improving Egypt's fiscal position. The most recent IMF visit to Egypt in September 2015 confirms that the authorities have reduced significantly the underlying budget deficit thanks to reforms to energy subsidies, and progress in containing the wage bill and increasing tax revenues. (*Partially Achieved*)

8. Objective 2 (# I.2): Increase transparency of public sector management. The Bank program envisaged an improvement in the ratings on governance and transparency scorecards by major observatories of perceptions of transparency. Reforms in this area during the ISN period did not go far enough in increasing transparency, and the progress that had been achieved during the CAS period on increased transparency has been reversed according to the Open Budget Index (OBI). The OBI increased from 18 in 2006 to 49 in 2010 (peak of period) and then decreased to 13 in 2014. A planned Bank DPL to address governance and safety net reforms in parallel with an expected IMF program never materialized. During the CAS period the Bank focused on policy dialogue on macroeconomic targets, and the findings of sectoral Public Expenditure Review notes were published on the internet. (*Not Achieved*)

9. Based on the rating of its two objectives, IEG rates Focus Area I as *Unsatisfactory*. The budget deficit and energy subsidies worsened during the ISN period, and progress that had been achieved in public sector transparency during the CAS period was reversed during the ISN. The inability to negotiate a Bank DPL on economic management is a telling symptom of the difficulties of the Bank's engagement with Egypt in this area. These difficulties mirrored complications in the IMF's engagement with Egypt. There was no progress on an IMF program despite an agreement in principle on November 20, 2012 and the need for official financing in light of little private external financing to cover an external current account deficit of 10 percent of GDP. The IMF required *inter alia* progress on energy subsidy reform to contain the budget deficit.

Focus Area II: Jobs

10. Objective 3 (# II.1): Improve the business environment. The indicator on improving the *Doing Business* ranking during the ISN period was not met. The ranking improved from 141 in 2006 to 94 in 2011, but then fell to 128 in 2014. Some regulatory reforms were done, but the indicators on reforms lacked specificity to assess if these reforms were the ones envisaged under the Bank program. In any event, some of the reforms—such as simplification of registration procedures for foreign companies and simplification of construction permit procedures—seem to foster a better environment for business, at least in a formal sense. The Bank contributed TA on Transport Regulations (FY12) and IFC contributed

⁴ According to the IMF, in 2011 natural gas and fuel oil were available for Egyptian companies at less than 40 percent of the cost recovery price. This resulted in distortions, generating a bias in favor of capital- and energy intensive industries that encouraged diversion of resources—including foreign direct investment—to these sectors, to the detriment of more energy-efficient or labor intensive industries.



in the area of PPPs. Bank work on a Power Sector PPP Framework (FY15) came late in the process to have an impact on ISN results. (*Partially Achieved*)

11. IFC implemented a number of advisory services projects that addressed issues related to improving the investment climate, such as business start-up regulations, and an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Use of mediation is expected to release assets locked up in disputes and eventually increase private sector savings, but buy-in from the government is required for this mechanism to become effective. IFC also had many investment projects supporting the objective of private-sector led growth and employment creation but their impact was not captured by the indicators for this objective. On PPPs, the one on program support Ministry of Finance is on track, the PPP on potable water in Cairo was rated *unsuccessful*, and the Alexandria hospitals PPP showed lack of progress after 8 years and \$3.2 million in expenditure. On the latter, risk remains that the private sponsors are not satisfied with the compensation and perceive it as not enough to cover the costs for the delays incurred. Moreover, a recent debt resolution and business exit AS initiative was terminated.

12. **Objective 4 (# II.2): Improve financial sector competitiveness and efficiency.** It is not clear whether the indicator on introducing a sound strategic approach to expand access to finance to the poorest was met. The CLR reports on the launching of a Micro and Small Enterprise Development Strategy (2009-13), but is silent on whether the strategy has been implemented and is making progress towards providing access to finance to the poorest. Credit to the private sector increased in nominal terms during the ISN but appears to have contracted in real terms because of high inflation. Moreover the ratio of private credit to total credit fell from 47 percent in 2006 to 23 percent in 2015. According to the CLR, financial intermediation to the private sector declined because of developments following the January 25th revolution and private borrowers disinterest in borrowing owing to the poor macroeconomic environment and uncertain security situation. In addition the IMF notes that ample banking sector liquidity was used to invest in high-yielding, zero risk-weighted government debt at the expense of low credit to the private sector and minor nominal growth in mortgages. Although mortgages increased by 7 percent in nominal terms in 2011-13, inflation during the period was at least double that amount. The indicators on developing a regulator for non-bank financial institutions and improving the soundness of the Egyptian Financial Supervisory authority were met, and Egypt's Central Bank has strengthened corporate governance in the banking system by issuing corporate governance regulations on July 5, 2011. In addition the central bank improved its own governance through amendments to the Central Bank, Banking System, and Money Law No. 88. The CLR notes interventions (MSME TA and Inclusive Regulations for Microfinance) that came too late to have an impact during ISN period, and it is unclear how or which Bank interventions contributed to improving regulations and governance in the banking system during the ISN period. A DPL series (FY06, FY08, and FY10) set the basis for the progress observed in this area prior to the ISN. There was also a Mortgage Finance project (FY06)⁵ and additional financing for it (FY09). (*Partially Achieved*)

13. IFC delivered a significant program in support of this objective, such as investments that were critical for the privatization of banks, or the creation of credit bureaus, mortgage refinancing, and support of factoring and leasing. None of them, however, were captured in the results framework for the program. IFC also supported the development of two microfinance institutions.

14. **Objective 5 (# II.3): Expand and improve power and transport infrastructure.** The goal of expanding power generation by 27,000 MW was not met, although the Bank contributed to an expansion of energy production according to the CLR. The CLR does not report on whether the share of renewable sources in the energy generation mix increased as envisaged under the program—the wind and solar component is currently 1½ percent of the mix. The Gas Infrastructure project (FY08)

⁵ The Project Performance Assessment Report for the Mortgage Finance project rated it as *moderately unsatisfactory* noting that the mortgage liquidity facility—which was incorporated as the Egyptian Mortgage Refinancing Company or EMRC—has not started performing its most important role as a centralized issuer of corporate bonds to mobilize long-term funding from domestic capital markets.



helped increase household connections to natural gas and the respective target was met. The CLR reports some progress on energy pricing and subsidies, especially more recently (July 2014). To put the issue in perspective, the government plan required fuel prices to increase by about 20 percent every year to reach close to cost recovery by 2018/19. However, at current global oil prices, the phasing out of the subsidies could be achieved sooner or with lower annual price increases. Regarding transport, the CLR reports that the financial viability of Egypt National railways improved but was subsequently set back by political instability and unfavorable economic developments. The overall safety of the railways remains an issue that will take time to be overcome. The average number of fatalities due to rail accidents on the ENR network measured as the annual number of victims per one million passenger-km increased from 0.6 in 2008 to 4.9 in March 2015. Improvements of financing and regularity of road maintenance are difficult to gauge from the CLR. The urban transport authority for Greater Cairo is not yet operational as envisaged under the ISN, and the ISN did not provide a measure for quantifying improvements in public transportation. Although some cost reduction in telecommunication services may have taken place they cannot be attributed to Bank Reimbursable Advisory Services provided in this area. The Bank also contributed with technical assistance in the Energy Pricing and Subsidy TA (FY15), but this is beyond the ISN period. The Urban Transport Regulatory Authority is supported by an IDF grant under execution (TF 14420 – FY2014). (*Partially Achieved*)

15. The advisory role of IFC in the Dairut independent power project is on track.⁶ Only one of IFC's investments in energy appears to lead to sustainable gas production. The Cairo-Alexandria Highway did not progress beyond a study, and the Cairo Airport PPP AS project was *unsuccessful*. Capacity of Cairo and Sharm el Sheik airports improved, but the government failed to delegate management of airports to the private sector.

16. **Objective 6 (# II.4): Increase the relevance of education for the labor market.** The indicator referred to testing for an eventual scaling-up of pilot schemes for improving the quality/relevance of higher education, skills development, and early childhood development. The Bank contributed to establishing quality assurance units in all universities and a fund to improve higher education through the Higher Education Enhancement Project (FY02). The CLR argues contributions through the Skills Development Project (FY04), but this project was closed in FY10 so the contribution was prior to the ISN. More recently, during the ISN period, there was a Skills Upgrading and Institutional Development TA (FY11). A Systems Approach for Better Education Results—Workforce Development TA (FY13) is the basis for next steps on the dialogue on skills development according to the CLR. IFC is providing support to bridge the skills gap for the ICT industry and improve the employability of students, although no data was provided on the impact of this initiative. The CLR notes an expansion in access to early childhood education (ECE) provided by NGOs, with Bank support through the Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project (FY05). An additional 35,823 students enrolled in kindergarten, meeting the target. Regarding an improved education curriculum, the Ministry of Education recently approved a new curriculum framework for secondary education but the ideas contained therein have not translated into a well-developed new curriculum document. The Higher Education Enhancement (FY02) project—closed in FY09—contributed with quality assurance and accreditation before the ISN period, and the CLR mentions that AAA on education led to development of new approaches to university entrance and secondary education graduation exams. (*Mostly Achieved*)

17. The ICT Sector TA has progressed as planned—and is at an early stage for outputs but no outcomes to report yet—but the TA on regulatory reform of the sector has been on hold for more than a year. The planned opening to private participation in higher education also has not materialized.

18. **Objective 7 (# II.5): Increase trade with regional and global partners.** IFC helped improve linkages across value chains but no quantitative measure of increased sales is provided in the CLR. The proposed indicator to develop schemes for improving linkages between suppliers and external

⁶ With financial closure planned for 6/30/16, the project is reporting the highest rating (4) on outputs and the next to highest rating (3) on outcomes. This, however, does not guarantee final success of the PPP.



markets is a weak measure of the objective. Moreover, WBG interventions were not commensurate with the objective. (*Partially Achieved*)

19. IFC's significant initiative in this area was the 2013 Egypt Trade Logistics which after \$1.2 million of expenditure is *on hold*. Similarly, a logistics industry development AS project was terminated in 2014. The Business Edge initiative (FY07-09) has been successful in developing SME entrepreneurs but there is no way to demonstrate that this has had an effect on export company value chains.

20. Progress made under the CAS on business environment was reversed after 2011 according to *Doing Business* reports. Moreover, Egypt ranked 119 out of 144 in the World Economic Forum Competitiveness Index owing to a deteriorated macroeconomic environment and particularly poor scores on labor and goods market efficiency, financial market development and education. During FY06-FY08 there was progress in lending to MSMEs and for mortgages—but private sector lending then fell as a share total lending and contracted in real terms—and improved governance for the overall banking sector. In addition the Bank helped develop energy, transport, and telecommunications infrastructure.

21. Based on the rating of objectives for Focus Area II IEG rates it as *Unsatisfactory*. There was partial progress on the business environment, financial sector improvement, power and transport infrastructure, education, and trade, but not enough to have a significant impact on jobs.

Focus Area III: Inclusion

22. **Objective 8 (# III.1): Improve management of water, sanitation, and irrigation systems.** The indicator referred to testing for an eventual scaling-up of pilot projects for expanding network sanitation, increase efficiency and beneficiary participation in irrigation management, and developing PPPs by the end of the ISN. The Sanitation and Sewerage Infrastructure Projects (FY08, FY11) made modest progress in expanding networked sanitation into rural areas owing to delays in design, bidding procedures, environment and social impact assessments, land acquisition issues, and local communities' opposition. The CLR notes some improvements in irrigation and beneficiary participation in irrigation management with support from the Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project (FY05). Water savings of 10-30 percent were reported based on conveyance improvements, land leveling, and adoption of agronomic practices through improved farmer awareness. IFC through an AS project helped develop the first waste water PPP in Egypt through the implementation of the New Cairo Wastewater project. (*Partially Achieved*)

23. **Objective 9 (# III.2): Improve water and air quality.** The indicators were to test a pilot for reduction of industrial air pollution and waste management, and improve regulations for environmental standards. The first Pollution Abatement project closed in FY05 but was scaled up by the Second Pollution Abatement project (FY06). There were improvements in air quality between 1999 and 2010, and pollution reduction has been sustained according to the project's ICR. The CLR reports that a waste water treatment plant was financed by Bank projects after testing of waste water pollution abatement. However, both projects supporting the plant were rated *Moderately Unsatisfactory* by management on progress toward achieving their development objectives. The Integrated Sanitation and Sewerage Infrastructure I project (FY08) is near closure, but Egypt's budget tightness has contributed to delaying payments to contractors and completion of works, which are affecting adversely the achievement of project development objectives. The Integrated Sanitation and Sewerage Infrastructure II project (FY11) had to be restructured in light of implementation delays. These delays reflected *inter alia* issues of budget tightness compounded by insufficient training of local implementing staff, which the restructuring of the project intends to amend. Although legislation for improving environmental standards was approved, the ISN indicator does not specify how improved results from these new regulations would be measured. (*Partially Achieved*)

24. **Objective 10 (# III.3): Expand access to healthcare.** The proposed indicator—introduction of health insurance reform—is a poor measure of access to healthcare. In any case, health insurance



reform was not introduced. The Bank supported this objective through Health Care Quality Improvement project (FY10), and Health Insurance Development Project approved in FY10 but not implemented because of a change in priorities by the new government. (*Not Achieved*)

25. Objective 11 (# III.4): Develop targeted and sustainable safety nets. The two indicators for this objective were to introduce a sound plan to move towards more transparent and sustainable safety nets system, and to develop and implement new pension regulations reflecting international best practice in the area. On the first indicator, it was not possible to transition away from the subsidy system to a more efficient and targeted social safety net. The CLR is not clear on why this was the case, although it may have to do with the government having other priorities. The issue of poor targeting extends to energy subsidies. The IMF—based on household surveys conducted between 2003 and 2009—notes that 90 percent of the benefits from energy subsidies accrue to the top quintile of the income distribution while only 7 percent go to the bottom quintile of the distribution. At the same time, IEG recognizes that the Labor Intensive Works Program (FY12) was geographically targeted using the poverty map that the Bank helped develop, and that according to the Egypt team, targeting has improved for cash transfer programs and food subsidies. On the second indicator, new pension regulations were developed but not implemented. The Bank provided technical assistance for this objective through the Dialogue on Safety Nets TA (FY08) and the Energy / Social Safety Nets Sectors Reforms Technical Assistance (FY14). A recent project—Strengthening Social Safety Nets (FY15)—continues with work in this area. (*Partially Achieved*)

26. Objective 12 (# III.5): Reduce interregional disparities. The indicator—which was not met—was to strengthen pro-poor targeting of public investment in Upper Egypt. It was not pointed enough to specify how strengthened pro-poor targeting of public investment in Upper Egypt would be measured. In any case, according to the CLR there has been uneven and non-sustained dialogue on this issue with the authorities, which is attributed to an unfavorable political environment. The Emergency Labor Intensive project (FY12) allotted 70 percent of disbursements to efforts in Upper Egypt. The Youth Study (FY12) is the basis of continued dialogue in this area according to the CLR. (*Partially Achieved*)

27. Objective 13 (# III.6): Reduce gender disparities. The indicators for this objective were to have informed advocacy and policy making on gender issues, and enhance women's access to finance through specialized windows. Although the indicators were met, a reduction in gender disparities can only take place over a time frame beyond the period under review. Moreover achievement of the indicators does not guarantee achievement of the objective. Indeed the Gender Equity Index reports no progress between 2009 and 2012.⁷ The Bank issued a number of reports on gender issues, including a Gender Assessment Update (FY10). According to the CLR there were a number of gender-informed operations in Egypt, including the Egypt Development Marketplace Program (FY16) and Promoting Innovation for Inclusive Financial Access (FY14)—both approved too recently to have an impact on the targeted outcomes—and the Facilitating Access to Finance (FY10). According to the Egypt team women beneficiaries constitute 32 percent of the projects on facilitating access to finance and promoting innovation and inclusive financial access, and both are making satisfactory progress based on supervision reports. Specialized finance windows were offered but evidence is thin on the number of women that actually benefited. The CLR states that Bank AAA on gender had an impact on policy dialogue in the country and the design of gender-informed operations. All in all, IEG recognizes a significant effort in this area that is expected to pay off over time and is relevant for a country like Egypt. (*Mostly Achieved*)

28. There was progress before the ISN on air quality which has been sustained, and efforts to reduce gender disparities that are expected to yield results in the future. Moreover the Bank undertook a number of initiatives and pilot programs under the CAS, but it is difficult to assess if they resulted in an effective improvement of inclusion, particularly in access to healthcare, safety nets, and interregional disparities. In practice, already lagging social outcomes deteriorated further post-2011. Unemployment

⁷ [HTTP://WWW.SOCIALWATCH.ORG/TAXONOMY/TERM/527](http://www.socialwatch.org/taxonomy/term/527)



peaked at 13.4 percent in 2013/14, with the highest levels found among youth and women. Almost half of the population was still considered poor in 2012/23.

29. Based on the rating of objectives, IEG rates Focus Area III as *Unsatisfactory*. There was some improvement of water and air quality—most of it before the ISN period—but little progress on the rest that included improving the management of water, sanitation, and irrigation systems, expanding access to healthcare, developing targeted and sustainable safety nets, and reducing interregional and gender disparities.

Overall Assessment and Rating

30. IEG rates the overall outcome under Egypt's CPS and ISN C12 as *Unsatisfactory*. All but two of the thirteen objectives under the program were *partially achieved* or *not achieved*. The ISN was clearly affected adversely by the political climate in Egypt after the revolution. Some Bank initiatives never took off the ground, in others the dialogue did not generate the expected actions or reforms, and in yet other areas there were reversals of progress that had been made during the CAS. The inability to negotiate a Bank DPL to reform economic management—contingent on an IMF program that never happened—is a telling symptom of the difficulties of the Bank's engagement with Egypt on policy reforms. In *focus area I (economic management)* the budget deficit and energy subsidies worsened during the ISN period and progress that had been achieved in public sector transparency during the CAS period was reversed. In *focus area II (jobs)*—an area that showed some results under the Bank program—there was partial progress on the business environment, financial sector improvement, power and transport infrastructure, education, and trade, but not enough to have a significant impact on jobs. In *focus area III (inclusion)* there was some improvement of water and air quality, and gender issues—although most of it took place before the ISN period—but little progress on the rest that included improving the management of water, sanitation, and irrigation systems, expanding access to healthcare, developing targeted and sustainable safety nets, and reducing interregional disparities. Before the ISN there had been some progress on fiscal consolidation, public sector transparency, the business environment, and air quality. During the CAS period, there were a number of initiatives and pilot programs on social sectors but it is difficult to assess if they resulted in an effective improvement of inclusion, particularly in access to healthcare, safety nets, and reduced interregional and gender disparities.

31. The main differences in ratings between the CLR and IEG's CLR review are on the objectives about the business environment and improving the financial sector in the *Jobs Focus Area II*, and the objective on improving water and air quality in the *Inclusion Focus Area III*. IEG recognizes that continuing to improve—or at least not reversing previous improvement—in the *business environment* after January 2011 was an uphill battle for the WBG. In addition, a number of initiatives that were not part of the results matrix, such as IFC's doing a subnational Doing Business Survey collaboratively with government ministries, are likely to have set the basis for future progress in this area. At the same time various measures, including from the World Economic Forum, show no improvement in the business environment during the review period. Such lack of improvement had a deleterious effect on the economy, which is still being felt in Egypt. As regards improving the financial sector's competitiveness and efficiency, the fact is that the financial sector became a drag on the private sector during the review period because its access to finance was reduced in relative terms. The indicators for this objective were not as specific or quantitatively measured as IEG would have hoped to gauge the financial sector's improvement in competitiveness and efficiency. In terms of air and water quality, IEG recognizes improvements in water quality during the CAS period which have been sustained, but waste water treatment projects are delayed substantially and the ISN indicator on legislation for improving environmental standards does not specify how improved results from these new regulations would be measured.

32. The CLR did not adhere to the *IEG-OPCS Shared Approach for Assessing Country Partnership Strategies* when rating the overall development outcome while the CLR review did. The discrepancy in ratings between the two documents then is more a reflection of this than of the substance of the assessments. The rating for overall development outcome would be *Unsatisfactory* for the CLR under



the *guidelines*—the same as IEG’s CLR review—with eight out of thirteen objectives *partially achieved* or *not achieved*.

Objectives	CLR Rating	IEG Rating
Focus Area I: Economic Management	<i>Moderately Unsatisfactory</i>	<i>Unsatisfactory</i>
Objective 1 (# I.1)	<i>Partially Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Objective 2 (# I.2)	<i>Partially Achieved</i>	<i>Not Achieved</i>
Focus Area II: Jobs	<i>Moderately Satisfactory</i>	<i>Unsatisfactory</i>
Objective 3 (II.1)	<i>Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Objective 4 (II.2)	<i>Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Objective 5 (II.3)	<i>Partially Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Objective 6 (II.4)	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>
Objective 7 (II.5)	<i>Partially Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Focus Area III: Inclusion	<i>Moderately Unsatisfactory</i>	<i>Unsatisfactory</i>
Objective 8 (III.1)	<i>Partially Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Objective 9 (III.2)	<i>Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Objective 10 (III.3)	<i>Not Achieved</i>	<i>Not Achieved</i>
Objective 11 (III.4)	<i>Partially Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Objective 12 (III.5)	<i>Partially Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Objective 13 (III.6)	<i>Achieved</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>

6. WBG Performance

Lending and Investments

33. There were six projects ongoing at the start of the CAS/ISN period totaling \$581 million in the areas of environment, education, and infrastructure, including irrigation. During the CAS and ISN period, IBRD made commitments totaling \$6,8 billion for twenty eight operations in social protection, education, transport, energy, solid waste and other infrastructure, agriculture, water and sanitation, environment, and financial sector. Thirty nine trust funded activities and grants for \$380 million provided complementary financing for energy, environment, pollution abatement and other sectors.

34. On average for the period FY06-15 IBRD committed resources were disbursed at a slower rate than for the MNA region and the Bank. The average disbursement ratio for Egypt’s investment operations during the period was 15 percent, as compared to 21 percent and 23 percent for the MNA region and Bank-wide, respectively.

35. The Egypt portfolio was less risky than the MNA region and Bank wide portfolios. During FY06-15, the Egypt portfolio had 17 percent of the projects at risk compared to 25 percent for the MNA region and Bank-wide. On a commitment basis the Egypt portfolio also performed better, with 9 percent of the commitments at risk compared to 17 percent for the MNA region and 17 percent Bank-wide. IEG reviewed the ICRs of twenty one projects that closed during the FY06-FY15 period and rated sixteen as moderately satisfactory or above. With respect to active projects management assessments report that thirteen projects out of seventeen were making satisfactory progress towards achieving their development objectives—four were not.



36. There were 4 IFC investment projects—with US\$96.4 million of net commitment—at the beginning of FY06. During FY06-FY15 IFC committed another US\$1.53 billion through 49 investments—the two largest in the chemical and financial sectors. The CLR did not assess the IFC portfolio, which has mostly been implemented as planned. IEG reviewed seven IFC closed investment projects and rated six of them *mostly successful* or better, and one *unsuccessful*.

37. MIGA gave guarantee coverage of US\$210 million for four projects that supported manufacturing and oil and gas exploration/production.

Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

38. A program of analytic work and advisory activities and services including 39 Economic and Sector Works (ESWs) and 100 Technical Assistance (TA) tasks were delivered during the FY06-FY15 period. The Bank provided advice to the government on education, energy, financial sector, health, gender, environment and air quality, jobs, public expenditure, social protection, infrastructure, public private partnerships and other. In addition, the Bank prepared poverty policy notes and a gender assessment update. All in all, the program of AAA supported well the Bank's lending program, although the CLR does not go into the details of how it contributed to results under the program. A number of the technical assistance projects were delivered under the fee-for-services format.

39. IFC had 4 advisory service (AS) projects approved before the review period for US\$1.74 million, which were implemented during the review period. During the review period, IFC approved 43 new AS projects amounting to over US\$24.73 million of total funds. Of these 47 projects, 10 were terminated, 4 are on hold and 6 were rated Mostly Unsuccessful/ Unsuccessful at completion. 14 were rated Mostly Successful/ Successful at completion (70 percent). IEG has validated 11 of the closed projects and found 8 of them Mostly Successful/ Successful (73 percent). Of 13 active projects, 10 appear to be on track.

Results Framework

40. The FY06-FY08 CAS and the extension through FY11 under the CAS progress report results framework had an adequate design showing the country development goals, issues and obstacles, outcomes to which WBG expects to contribute, intermediate indicators (milestones), and WBG activities. The revised CAS framework in the ISN was not as detailed—for example it did not have a column showing issues and obstacles—and objectives the framework under the ISN supported goals in the areas of economic management, jobs, and inclusion. Although the causal chain was not explicitly discussed in the text, the annex with the results framework lends itself for inference of causal links that on the whole appear credible. At the same time, the ISN results framework was weak because objectives in many cases were too broad for the planned Bank interventions and indicators were not representative of the objectives in a number of instances. For instance, some indicators reflected poorly the objectives, several indicators stopped at the output level (no outcome targeted), and indicators were too vague to be measurable by quantitative values. Some of the indicators and objectives referred to pilots that would be scaled up, but the scaling-up was not discussed in the program document. Moreover the scope of some objectives, such as reducing gender disparities, were too broad to be achieved during the review period with the planned interventions. IFC activities were included in the framework in the main areas of IFC interventions (for example PPPs) but in general there were no indicators directly linked to the IFC activities which made their contributions more difficult to evaluate than IBRD contributions.

Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

41. The main development partners in Egypt include USAID, the European Commission, the European Investment Bank, Japan, European Union countries, the Gulf countries, and the African Development Bank. There is a Development Partners Group (DPG) in which the Bank participates. The Bank has chaired several thematic groups in DPG to promote coordination mechanisms in priority sectors



(MSMEs, energy and environment, and education for example). Donor consultations were conducted as part of the preparation of the CAS and the ISN, and the Bank also initiated a quarterly program of macroeconomic briefings and discussions with development partners. Donor coordination as part of Emergency Labor Intensive project (FY12) helped smooth access to grant financing in the social sectors. There is also a multi-donor technical assistance initiative started in 2012 on financial inclusion, and joint financing with other donors in the energy sector for the Helwan South Power project (FY13). The latter was driven by the government, and the Bank has coordinated design and implementation with the Islamic Development Bank, the Kuwait Fund, and the Arab Fund.

Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

42. The CLR does not indicate fiduciary problems. During the FY06-FY14 period, however, the World Bank received 35 complaints claiming fraud or corruption—the majority in the energy (9), water (8), and transport (4) sectors. In response, INT undertook investigations into the Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project (FY05)—where several indicators of corrupt and collusive practices were found and referred to the government for follow-up action; the Cairo Airport Development Project (FY12)—where INT substantiated fraud and corruption; and both the El Tebbin Power Project (FY06) and the Giza North Power Project. In the latter two, the general manager of the company providing engineering, procurement, and construction management services was convicted in the United States for corruption. The matter is currently under investigation by INT.

43. IEG's review of ICRs reveals that safeguard compliance was uneven during the review period. For example, the El Tebbin Power operation⁸ did not undertake a recommended industrial hazard assessment. The project was rated *Moderately Unsatisfactory* owing to not meeting expected power targets due to a fire that occurred at the plant as the project was closing, underscoring the costs of safeguard noncompliance. The West Delta water conservation and irrigation rehabilitation project triggered multiple safeguard policies. But the project was cancelled, and by project closing no work had been initiated. The airports development project triggered an Environmental Assessment and the respective Environmental Management Plans were fully implemented. The only detailed environmental analysis in the Sohag rural development project⁹ was for water supply projects where water quality tests were undertaken. At the same time, the lack of due diligence with respect to cultural heritage suggests that the relevant safeguard should have been triggered, and was not appropriately handled. In a number of other projects safeguards were triggered but there is not enough information in the ICRs to validate full compliance—for example for the Avian and Human Influenza control and prevention project no evidence is available on whether safeguard procedures for biosecurity or safe carcass disposal were followed during culling activities. The rehabilitation of health facilities under the WBG program had mixed results on safeguard compliance owing to different levels of training and staff awareness, and uneven management strictness in implementing environmental practices across facilities. On the positive side, the Kureimat Solar Thermal Hybrid project illustrated good practice with respect to safeguard compliance by recognizing low awareness of environmental safeguards in the early phase of implementation, showing strong Bank support for improving environmental performance, and ensuring full compliance with safeguard policies. The Early Childhood Education Enhancement project also fully complied with Bank safeguard policies. Moreover, the Second Pollution Abatement was the first project in MENA to use country systems instead Bank safeguard policies. According to the ICR, all agreed measures were implemented and no major safeguards issues arose during implementation.

⁸ A category "A" project because it was likely to have significant adverse environmental impacts of sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented nature. All, El Tebbin Power, West Delta water, and airports development are category A projects.

⁹ Category "B" for safeguard purposes — not in the top tier of needed attention for safeguard compliance. Projects discussed in this paragraph after the Sohag rural development projects are all in the B category.



Ownership and Flexibility

44. Government ownership showed two distinct periods. During the period January 2006 to January 2011 the program described in the CAS and CAS progress report was anchored on a government national development agenda that emphasized pro-growth reforms in response to a deteriorating global environment (food and financial crisis). The government broadly supported the Bank program, and—as a sign of support of Bank programs—contributed to the IDA15 replenishment. Things changed in the period February 2011 to June 2014, as government commitment weakened significantly after the revolution. A modest ISN lending program based on the Emergency Labor Intensive project (FY12) focused on job creation. But a planned DPL for economic management—a key piece of the Bank strategy—could never be implemented. In addition, the Health Insurance Project (FY10) that had initially broad buy in from the government was not implemented after the revolution because government priorities changed. Within this adverse policy implementation environment the Bank attempted to adapt to continue contributing to Egypt's development agenda, but its efforts did not show tangible results based on an assessment of the ISN results framework.

WBG Internal Cooperation

45. Joint WB and IFC activities were limited. For example, the Egypt Development Market Place initiative (FY13) was launched jointly in Upper Egypt's major cities to target underdeveloped rural areas.

Risk Identification and Mitigation

46. The May 2012 ISN¹⁰ identified political, constitutional and legal risks, possible macroeconomic instability adverse attitudes toward the WBG, unpopularity of reforms having adverse effects on the business climate and governance. Political, constitutional, and legal risks materialized. Both the Bank and IMF were ready to provide budget support based on the program of the government elected in 2012. Political upheaval, however, prevented implementation of the government program, and thus neither a planned IMF program nor a planned Bank DPL—a key component of Bank engagement—could be developed. Macroeconomic instability and weakening international reserve and fiscal positions fostered a difficult policy-making environment. Against this background, the government attitude became more adverse to the WBG, and an ISN strategy focused on institutions and jobs—key areas of grievance of the revolution—was adapted somewhat to the political realities after the revolution. The Bank program thus shifted away from lending to focus on knowledge dissemination and advisory work.

Overall Assessment and Rating

47. IEG rates WBG performance as *Fair*, with the caveat that in the period of dramatic change after the January 11 revolution it is difficult to disentangle issues external to the WBG program from WBG performance. The ISN program provided a reasonable response to the challenges faced by the country, focusing on implementation and obtaining results over an 18-month period. The selection of areas—macroeconomic stabilization, job creation, and governance—was appropriate to the situation of the country at the time, and reiterated as priorities under the Systematic Country Diagnostic (2015, see footnote 1). Bank interventions, however, were not always appropriate to obtaining the proposed goals. For example, for the objective of deficit reduction the interventions were mainly monitoring or policy notes. The program had an emphasis on knowledge services in some of its key areas—perhaps reflecting the difficulties of the dialogue to put together lending operations or policy loans, and poor portfolio performance—which makes an assessment difficult in the absence of Bank evaluation tools for knowledge service interventions. The FY06-FY08 CAS results framework and its extension to FY11 under the June 2008 progress report had an adequate design showing the country development goals,

¹⁰ The May 2005 CAS had identified WBG program risks to external shocks from greater integration with the EU, US, and regional partners and to deficiencies in institutional capacities to implement the program.



issues and obstacles, outcomes to which WBG expects to contribute, intermediate indicators (milestones), and WBG activities. The revised CAS framework in the ISN was not as detailed—for example it did not have a column showing issues and obstacles—and its objectives of the results framework supported goals in the areas of economic management, jobs, and inclusion. At the same time the ISN results framework was weak because objectives in many cases were too broad for the planned Bank interventions and indicators were not representative of the objectives. Moreover, in a number of instances indicators reflected poorly the objectives, several indicators stopped at the output level (no outcome targeted), and the indicators were too vague to be measurable by quantitative values. Some of the indicators and objectives referred to pilots that would be scaled up, but the scaling-up was not discussed in the program document. IFC activities were included in the framework in the main areas of IFC interventions (for example PPPs) but in general there were no indicators directly linked to the IFC activities, which made their contributions more difficult to evaluate than IBRD contributions. Implementation of the WBG program was not smooth even before the ISN, and became extremely difficult during the ISN, when decision making was paralyzed owing to continuous changes in the cabinet and government officials' fear of reprisal. Supervision of Bank interventions suffered as a result, and implementation of some projects stopped altogether. The Bank responded in a piece-meal way, but on the whole essentially shifting from lending to knowledge dissemination and advisory work, whose results are not easy to assess. IFC contributed to key WBG program objectives and adapted to changing circumstances and priorities. Owing to the political uncertainties in Egypt during the ISN period as well as government reluctance to commit to reforms, however, IFC had no traction on PPPs, with the exception of the one for Alexandria Hospitals where progress has been extremely slow, or on other advisory activities that required government commitment, especially in investment climate related reforms. Negative perception of the private sector in the post-revolution resulted in several reversals of public asset privatizations as well as legal challenges to land allocation or to concessions (for example in infrastructure), which hindered IFC's ability to support job creating and developmental projects. Almost one-third of IFC's existing portfolio at the time of the ISN program was being challenged in the courts for different reasons—for example Titan Cement, Omar Effendi retail, and Bank of Alexandria. Joint WB and IFC activities were limited during the ISN period, like in the Egypt Development Market Place initiative (FY13). The Bank generally coordinated well with development partners. Safeguard compliance was uneven under the WBG program, but there were some notable examples of good practice. There were serious fiduciary issues in energy, water, and transport sector projects, where the Integrity Vice-Presidency found evidence or strong indications of corrupt and collusive practices.

7. Assessment of CLR Completion Report

48. The CLR framework of analysis is broadly consistent with the CAS and, especially, the May 2012 ISN framework. It discusses the evidence on program indicators, and while candid, it could have discussed in more detail program implementation issues, the effect of government ownership on program outcomes, the difficulties of IFC to implement its program, IBRD-IFC cooperation, and WBG's cooperation with other development partners. Moreover, the CLR is not sufficiently clear in distinguishing the progress made before the ISN and the results under the ISN, which in many instances reversed the previous progress in the observed results. In addition, much of the evidence presented is thin, without the needed analysis of WBG program contributions to country outcomes. For example, the CLR would have benefited from more evidence on whether particular pieces of AAA either influenced in-country thinking on the issues they were designed to illuminate or informed the design of Bank operations. There also is a need of a more thorough discussion of Bank performance with respect to safeguard, and fiduciary issues, where there were serious problems. The CLR did not adhere to the IEG-OPCS *Shared Approach for Assessing Country Partnership Strategies* when rating the overall development outcome.



8. Findings and Lessons

49. IEG agrees with the lessons in the CLR, particularly on the need to respond flexibly in a high risk political environment. IEG would add that following the Arab Spring the Bank Group had to try to establish itself as a trusted development partner with the new government and with a civil society that played a key role by mobilizing. The ISN and its areas of intervention were in the spirit of the WBG becoming a trusted development partner to the new actors in Egypt. With the ISN, the WBG took a calculated risk that with the benefit of hindsight did not lead to the expected results. Embedding institutional development, capacity building, and governance more systematically in program interventions would have been warranted. On a program design issue, IEG believes that setting objectives too broad in scope is invitation to missing targeted outcomes for the program.

Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CPS and ISN Objectives

Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending for Egypt, FY06-14

Annex Table 3: Analytical and Advisory Work for Egypt, FY06-15

Annex Table 4: Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY08-15 (in US\$ million)

Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Egypt, FY06-15

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Egypt and Comparators, FY06-15

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Egypt and Comparators, FY06-15

Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for Egypt, FY06-15

Annex Table 9: .List of IFC Investments in Egypt

Annex Table 10: List of IFC Advisory Services for Egypt

Annex Table 11: List of MIGA Activities in Egypt

Annex Table 12: Net Disbursement and Charges for Egypt, FY06-15

Annex Table 13: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Egypt

Annex Table 14: Economic and Social Indicators for Egypt, FY06-15



Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CPS and ISN Objectives

	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 1 – Economic Management	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
Major Outcome Measures	1. CPS Objective # 1.1 : Effective implementation of government plan to gradually reduce fiscal deficit by end ISN period (Partially Achieved)		
	<p>Indicator: Gradual phasing out of energy subsidies for energy intensive industries is launched</p> <p>Baseline: No</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>The Government's plan to reduce the fiscal deficit involved lowering energy subsidies. One of the key focus areas for Bank dialogue has been the energy subsidies and there has been some progress recently. Egypt has launched an ambitious energy subsidy reform initiative aimed at liberalizing energy prices over the coming 5-10 years. While smaller steps were taken in 2012-13, mainly to raise prices for energy-intensive sectors, broader price increases for both firms and households were implemented in July 2014 reducing subsidies by 25-30 percent and yielding fiscal savings of around 2% of GDP.</p> <p>The Bank provided supported this objective through policy dialogue. In this sense, the Bank maintained dialogue with the Government on energy subsidies in the context of the proposed development policy lending that did not materialize. The Bank also delivered two AAA activities that supported this dialogue: (i) Energy Efficiency Strategy (Phase2) (P124688) and Energy/Social Safety Nets Sector Reforms Technical Assistance (P144305).</p>	Source: CLR and Egypt Team
	2. CPS Objective # 1.2: Increased transparency of public sector management (Not Achieved)		
	<p>Indicator: Ratings on governance and transparency scorecards issued by major independent observatories of perceptions of transparency</p> <p>Baseline: Not provided</p> <p>Target: > Baseline</p>	<p>The reforms undertaken during the ISN period did not go far enough in increasing transparency and progress achieved during the CPS period has been reversed according to the Open Budget Index.</p> <p>Open Budget Index 2006: 18 2008: 43 2010: 49 2012: 13 2015: 16</p>	Source: CLR and Open Budget Index
	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
	3. CPS Objective: Improve the business environment (Partially Achieved)		



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
	<p>Indicator: Ranking in Doing Business Surveys</p> <p>Baseline: 108 (2011)</p> <p>Target: < 108 (2014)</p>	<p><u>Doing Business Rankings</u></p> <p>2006: 141 2007: 165 2008: 126 2009: 114 2010: 106 2011: 94 2012: 110 2013: 109 2014: 128 2015: 128</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Doing Business Reports</p>
	<p>Indicator: Regulatory reforms that would lead to a level playing field and a more competitive environment successfully completed</p> <p>Baseline: 108 (2011)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>The following regulatory reform activities were undertaken with support from the IFC and World Bank:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simplification of procedures to establish industrial projects by canceling the initial approval of the General Authority for Industrial Development. • Simplification of registration procedures of companies' foreign branches by reducing time to 3 days (instead of 4-6 months). Simplification of procedures, documents. • Simplification of registration procedures of foreign companies' representative offices (Reduce time to 3 days (instead of 40 days). Simplification of procedures. • Second phase of electronic business registration (Electronic payment). • Abolish security approval for the press companies. • Issuance of imports certificate valid for 3-5 years instead of stamping invoices on a regular basis and issuance of exports certificate valid for 3-5 years instead of issuing letter on a yearly basis • Simplification of Construction Permitting procedures and issuance of the Unified Construction Law executive regulations. • Development of smart regulations for Investment Zone regimes in Egypt. • Completion and launch of the Egypt Subnational Doing Business 	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The proposed indicator was not specific, and thus, it did not provide details on the regulatory reforms that were expected.</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
		<p>(SNDB) 2014 report, catalyzing reform activities by Government.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successful Completion of pilot PPPs in selected sectors, including education and irrigation. IFC has successfully advised the PPP Central Unit of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Higher Education in the implementation of the Alexandria Hospitals PPP Project. First waste water PPP in Egypt successfully completed. 	
4. CPS Objective: Improve financial sector competitiveness and efficiency (Partially Achieved)			
	<p>Indicator: Sound strategic approach to expand access to finance to the poorest adopted by the Government</p> <p>Baseline: No (2011)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>Through the Social Fund for Development (SFD), the WBG has supported the launching of a Micro and Small Enterprise Development Strategy (2009–2013) aimed at improving the environment for Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs).</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The proposed indicators was not specific and did not provide a definition of the “poorest”. From the results reported, it can be assumed that the indicator referred only to Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs).</p> <p>The CLR does not report on whether the strategy has been implemented and on whether it is making progress towards the achievement of its objectives.</p>
	<p>Indicator: Access to finance improved as measured by rise in credit.</p> <p>Baseline: No (2011)</p> <p>Target: > Baseline (2014)</p>	<p>The CLR reports that the private sector’s share in total credit increased from 45.2% in January 2011 to 53% in January 2012. However, the CLR reports that this improvement in financial intermediation to the private sector was not maintained, owing to: (i) the developments associated with the January 25th revolution, and (ii) private borrowers not being interested in borrowing due to the overall macroeconomic environment and the uncertain security situation.</p> <p>According to the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), the private sector credit to total credit was as follows:</p> <p>June 2006: 47%</p> <p>June 2007: 50.6%</p> <p>June 2008: 51.1%</p> <p>June 2009: 43.8%</p> <p>June 2010: 42.1%</p> <p>June 2011: 36.2%</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team</p> <p>The proposed indicator was not specific and lacked a quantitative baseline and target.</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
		June 2012: 31.8% June 2013: 27.5% June 2014: 24% June 2015: 22.7%	
	<p>Indicator: Annual mortgage loans extended by primary lenders</p> <p>Baseline: No (2011)</p> <p>Target: > Baseline (2014)</p>	<p>Market-based mortgage loans extended by primary lenders:</p> <p>2006: LE 300 million Egyptian pounds (LE)</p> <p>2011: LE 4.5 billion Egyptian pounds (LE)</p> <p>March 2013: 4.8 billion Egyptian pounds (LE)</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The proposed indicator lacked a quantitative baseline and target. The CLR notes that this results can be attributed to the reforms implemented by the Bank's Mortgage Finance Project (P093470). IEG rated the project development outcome of the project as Satisfactory.</p>
	<p>Indicator: (i) Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) regulator developed and (ii) soundness of Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) improved</p> <p>Baseline: (i) No (2011); (ii) No (2011)</p> <p>Target: (i) Yes (2014); (ii) Yes (2014)</p>	<p><u>(i) Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) regulator developed</u></p> <p>The Non-Bank Financial Sector Law No. 10 of 2009 established the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA).</p> <p>The Bank supported the achievement of this target through the Financial Sector Development Policy Loan series (DPLs I, II, and III—P088877, P094551, P120470), amounting to US\$ 1.5 billion in total. This DPL series had components dedicated to reforming the non-bank financial sector, and strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework of the non-bank financial sector, with clear prior actions, policy measures, and triggers outlined in the relevant Development Policy Matrices.</p> <p><u>(ii) Soundness of Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) improved</u></p> <p>Technical assistance and capacity building was provided to EFSA through a number of trust funds, namely: the Egypt MSME Development Facility (P132470/TF012894), and the Inclusive Regulations for Microfinance Transition Fund project (P149677). As of January 2011, the following results had been achieved: (i) the first organizational chart of EFSA had been approved, where EFSA was able to fully integrate its departments based on functions; (ii) the EFSA supervision department had</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p> <p>The second indicator (ii) was not specific.</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
		<p>undergone restructuring; (iii) the salary scheme of all EFSA employees had been restructured to guarantee leveled and fair compensation for all employees; (iv) EFSA had succeeded in unifying the regulations and disclosures throughout the nonbanking financial sector; and (v) EFSA has contributed substantially to reducing any systemic risk after the revolution and the reopening of the Egyptian Stock Market.</p>	
	<p>Indicator: Corporate Governance Code for the banking sector preventing potential conflict of interest, improving transparency, and establishing good governance issued</p> <p>Baseline: No (2011)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has strengthened corporate governance in the banking system by issuing Corporate Governance Regulations on July 5, 2011.</p> <p>The Egypt team reports that corporate governance was tackled under DPL III (P120470), specifically Component I: Financial and Operation Restructuring of Commercial and Specialized State-owned Banks. During supervision missions, the 2011 Banking Sector Corporate Governance Code, as well as amendments to the law, were reviewed by the team. The development outcome of this project was rated a Satisfactory by IEG.</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p>
	<p>Indicator: Central Bank Money and Banking Law amended to improve the governance of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE)</p> <p>Baseline: No (2011)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has amended the Central Bank, Banking System, and Money Law No. 88 of 2003 in October 8, 2011, introducing changes regarding improving CBE's own governance, reconstituting its own board of directors to remove conflicts of interest, and tightening supervisory capacity and processes.</p> <p>In addition, the CBE is conducting periodic stress testing of the aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector and individual banks annually since 2008, and stress testing has become an integral part of the CBE's systemic surveillance of the banking sector. Stress testing was a main action supported under the Bank Third Financial Sector DPL). In addition, the Bank has provided technical assistance to the CBE to strengthen its stress testing framework (Egypt #10240 Financial Projection Model - P130432). The technical assistance was completed as of June 2013.</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
5. CPS Objective: Expand and improve power and transport infrastructure (Partially Achieved)			
	<p>Energy Indicator: (i) Additional megawatts of power generation capacity (ii) share of renewables in generation mix</p> <p>Baseline: (i) 0 (2011); (ii) Not provided</p> <p>Target: (i) 27,000 (2014); (ii) > Baseline (2014)</p>	<p>(i) The CLR reports that, although the goal of expansion of power generation capacity by 27,000 MW was not achieved, the Government fast track power generation program added 2,600 MW and was one of the main drivers for bringing installed capacity to over 27,000 MW in total.</p> <p>The Egypt team reports that the Bank supported this indicator via two projects: Power III (P116194) and Ain Sokhna Power Project (P100047). According to the team, the first project added 1,200 MW and the second 1,300 MW. The Egypt team reports that the current total capacity reached 36,500 MW in September 2015.</p> <p>(ii) The CLR only reports that the Bank supported the Kureimat Solar Thermal Hybrid Project (P050567) that added 140 MW. IEG rated the outcome of this project as moderately satisfactory. The CLR does not report on whether the share of renewables in the generation mix increased.</p> <p>The Egypt team reports that the share of renewables in the generation mix will likely increase in the near future. However, no precise quantitative measures are provided.</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p>
	<p>Energy Indicator: Number of household consuming highly subsidized liquified petroleum gas (LPG) converted to natural gas</p> <p>Baseline: 0 (2011)</p> <p>Target: 300,000 (2014)</p>	<p>In 2008, the Bank approved the Natural Gas Connections Project (P095392) to increase household connections to natural gas. This project has now closed and management has rated the outcome as satisfactory. Through support provided by this project, conversion to natural gas consumption for 333,000 households has been achieved.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p>
	<p>Energy Indicator: (i) Energy pricing; and (ii) subsidies reform to reduce the fiscal impact of increases in global prices completed</p> <p>Baseline: No (2011)</p>	<p>(i) While smaller steps were taken in 2012-13, mainly to raise prices for energy-intensive sectors, broader price increases for both firms and households were implemented in July 2014 reducing subsidies by 25-30% and yielding fiscal savings of around 2% of GDP.</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
	<p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>(ii) Egypt has launched an ambitious energy subsidy reform initiative aimed at liberalizing energy prices over the coming 5-10 years.</p> <p>The Egypt team reports that the Bank supported the energy pricing and subsidy reform via technical assistances. First, the Bank delivered support via two related technical assistances: (a) Energy Pricing and Subsidy (P129680) (FY15) Phase I and Phase II Support on Energy Subsidy Reforms (P155336) (FY16). These two technical assistances delivered analytical work on energy pricing, capacity building on modelling of price reforms and a communication strategy. Second, the Bank delivered support through the Energy/Social Safety Nets Sector Reforms Technical Assistance (P144305). These technical assistance has an energy pricing component, a communication component, and a social component.</p>	
	<p>Transport Indicator: Capacity of key international airports (Cairo and Sharm El Sheikh); (ii) delegation of airports' management to the private sector</p> <p>Baseline: (i) Not provided (2011); (ii) No</p> <p>Target: (i) > Baseline (2014); (ii) Yes (2014)</p>	<p>(i) The construction of a new airport terminal has been completed in Cairo airport (terminal 3) and Sharm El Sheikh airport. The CLR reports that airport capacity will improve from 3.5 to 7.5 million passengers per annum. In addition, the rehabilitation/extension of the terminal 2 in Cairo airport is underway to expand further the overall capacity.</p> <p>(ii) The CLR reports that the Bank has supported the elaboration of an air transport liberalization study and that the implementation of its recommendations is ongoing. In addition, the Bank has also supported the Government in setting up management contracts for the airports</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p>
	<p>Transport Indicator: (i) Financial viability Egypt National Railways (ENR); and (ii) Safety of Egypt National Railways (ENR)</p> <p>Baseline: (i) Not provided (2011); (ii) Not provided</p>	<p>(i) The CLR reports that the financial viability improved but was set back by the political instability and economic situation. The Egypt National Railways Restructuring Project (P101103) supported the achievement of this indicator. The Egypt team reports that, at the onset of the project, support was provided to develop a financial recovery plan. The plan was on track to improve the financial sustainability of ENR as measured by ENR's earnings before</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p> <p>The proposed indicator was not specific and lacked a quantitative baseline and target.</p> <p>Results reported in the CLR are vague and do not offer any quantitative measures to judge</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
	<p>Target: (i) > Baseline (2014); (ii) > Baseline (2014)</p>	<p>interests and taxes. This progress was reversed after the revolution of January – February 2011 as the Government dramatically reduced its contribution to the public service obligations (PSO) to be paid to ENR and wages were significantly increased without the possibility of raising fares.</p> <p>The CLR also reports that the Bank is discussing railways reform with the authorities to improve governance and efficiency of railways management.</p> <p>(ii) The CLR reports that the modernization of signaling on Cairo-Assiut line is also under implementation. However, the CLR acknowledges that the overall safety of the railways is still an issue and will take a longer time to overcome.</p> <p>The Egypt team reports that the Egypt National Railways Restructuring Project (P101103) aims at improving the safety of the railways' services on targeted sections of the rail network through modernization of signaling systems, track renewal, and modernization of management and operating practices. It is therefore monitoring the average number of fatalities due to railway accidents on the ENR network measured as the total annual number of victims on ENR network per one million passenger-km. The 2008 baseline was 0.60, while the current value (as of 31 March 2015) is 4.90, for a target of 0.30 at project completion in 2019. This shows that safety has not improved yet and is likely to remain an issue until the project is completed.</p>	<p>progress in terms of financial viability and safety.</p>
	<p>Transport Indicator: (i) financing for road maintenance; and (ii) regularity of road maintenance</p> <p>Baseline: (i) Not provided (2011); (ii) Not provided</p>	<p>(i) and (ii): Government has adopted a road asset management strategy aiming, among others, to improve road maintenance. The CLR does not report on whether financing of road maintenance and regularity of road maintenance have increased.</p> <p>The Egypt team reports that there were no quantitative measures put in place to</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p> <p>The proposed indicator was not specific and lacked a quantitative baseline and target.</p> <p>Results reported in the CLR are not specific and do not offer any</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
	<p>Target: (i) > Baseline (2014); (ii) > Baseline (2014)</p>	<p>assess whether financing for and regularity of road maintenance improved.</p>	<p>quantitative measures to judge progress in terms of whether financing for and regularity of road maintenance improved.</p>
	<p>Transport Indicator: Improve public urban transport in Great Cairo as measured by [not provided]</p> <p>Baseline: Not provided (2011)</p> <p>Target: (i) > Baseline (2014)</p>	<p>The CLR reports that an Urban Transport Regulatory Authority for Greater Cairo has been established but is not yet operational. The Bank is providing support to the Government to make it fully operational. This support is delivered via an IDF grant currently under implementation (P143569 - Establishment of a Transport Regulatory Authority in Greater Cairo)</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p> <p>The proposed indicator was not specific and, thus, it did not specify how improved public urban transport in Great Cairo would be measured. The Egypt team reports that there were no quantitative measures put in place to assess progress towards improving public transport in Great Cairo.</p>
	<p>Transport Indicator: Cost of telecommunications services</p> <p>Baseline: Not provided (2011)</p> <p>Target: (i) < Baseline (2014)</p>	<p>The Bank involvement was framed under two Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS) program that did not pertain specifically to costs decrease, but rather to capacity building on statistics, legal and broadband policy. These two activities were used by the government to formulate the eMisr Strategy, a comprehensive sector development strategy to provide access to broadband to 8 million Egyptian households. The CLR notes that some cost reduction may have happened but there is no evidence that it can be attributed to Bank RAS program.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The proposed indicator was not specific and, thus, it did not specify how cost of telecommunications would be measured. In addition, Bank interventions do not commensurate with the proposed indicator.</p>
<p>6. CPS Objective: Increase relevance of education for labor market (Mostly Achieved)</p>			
	<p>Indicator: Successful testing (for an eventual scaling-up) of pilot schemes for improving quality / relevance of: (i) higher education; (ii) skills development; (iii) early childhood development</p> <p>Baseline: (i) No; (ii) No; (iii) No (2011)</p> <p>Target: (i) Yes; (ii) Yes; (iii) Yes (2014)</p>	<p>(i) Higher education Bank support was delivered through the Higher Education Enhancement Project (P056236) which was rated as Moderately Satisfactory by IEG. This project supported the establishment of a National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation in Education (NAQAAE) and quality assurance units in all universities. In addition, the project supported the establishment of a Competitive Fund for the Improvement of Higher Education that funded 159 small projects aiming at improving quality, efficiency and relevance of teaching and research in public universities. These 159</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
		<p>projects were selected on a competitive basis out of 563 proposals.</p> <p>(ii) <u>Skill development</u> On skills upgrading, the IBRD-financed Skills Development Project (P049702) (IEG: Satisfactory) developed a funding mechanism that supported training for in-service and prospective workers through a cost-shared and competitive approach. In addition, a SABER-WfD technical assistance (P132543) was provided to facilitate next steps for policy dialogue in skills development. SABER WfD helps countries evaluate the skills development policy options for improvement</p> <p>The WBG is also providing support that aims to bridge the skills gap for the ICT industry and improve the employability of students. In this sense, IFC has signed an agreement with the Information Technology Industry Development Agency (ITIDA) to help enhance the skills of prospective information and communication technology (ICT) workers in Egypt, develop sector specific education and training, and improve the employability of ICT graduates. IFC's E4E Reports are the following: E4E Arab World: 579127 – Regional MENA Study and E4E MENA: 590749 – Egypt and Morocco assessment</p> <p>Finally, the WBG has also supported the Work Force Development study in MNA countries and E4E study. These studies have highlighted for policy makers the mismatch between the type and level of skills needed by the labor market and those being supplied by the education and training system.</p> <p>(iii) <u>Early childhood development</u> The Bank supported ECD through the Early Childhood Education Enhancement Project (ECEEP) (P082952) (IEG: Moderately Satisfactory). An additional 35,823 KG students enrolled in kinder garden, which met the target of 30,000 enrollments in the Bank-funded facilities (i.e., 120% of original target).</p>	



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Jobs	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
	<p>Indicator: Improved curriculum especially with regard to the transition from secondary to post-secondary education and to the labor market</p> <p>Baseline: No (2011)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>The CLR reports that achievements in relation to the improvement of the curriculum for secondary education have been mixed. On the one hand, the Ministry of Education recently approved the new curriculum framework for secondary education, but on the other it has not been able to translate the ideas of the new framework into a well-developed new curriculum document.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The proposed indicator was not specific and, thus, it did not specify how an improved curriculum would be measured.</p>
7. CPS Objective: Increase trade with regional and global partners (Partially Achieved)			
	<p>Indicator: Development of schemes for improving the linkages between suppliers and external markets in (i) services; (ii) agriculture in upper Egypt</p> <p>Baseline: No (2011)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>IFC helped improve linkages across value chains through (i) the development of a supply chain management tool for an agribusiness lead firm; (ii) the development of a contract farming model in the poultry sector; and (iii) capacity building of suppliers and distributors in the value chains of lead firms, focusing on improving management skills through the IFC Business Edge program. In total, 1,721 persons from 130 different SMEs, part of the value chain of four large lead firms in the ICT, Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG), Pharmaceutical, and Telecommunications sector, were trained. Finally, IFC committed US\$428.2 million into 13 South-South projects with sponsors from India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and other nationalities. Furthermore, to promote trade finance, IFC committed US\$95.2 million during the period through its GTFP program.</p> <p>The CLR reports these value chain interventions helped to strengthen the overall value chain and to improve the relationship with the lead firm, resulting in increased sales of firms. However, no quantitative measures of increased sales are provided.</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p> <p>The proposed indicator is a weak measure of the CPS Objective. In addition, the WBG interventions are not commensurate with the CPS Objective.</p>

	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 3 - Inclusion	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
Major Outcome Measures	8. CPS Objective: Improve management of water, sanitation, and irrigation systems (Partially Achieved)		
	<p>Indicator: Successful testing (for an eventual scaling-up) of pilot schemes for (i) expanding networked sanitation; and (ii) increased</p>	<p>(i) <u>Networked sanitation</u></p> <p>The goal of expansion of networked sanitation infrastructure into the rural areas is progressing under the Bank-financed Integrated Sanitation and</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p> <p>Integrated Sanitation & Sewerage Infrastructure</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 3 - Inclusion	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
	<p>efficiency and beneficiary participation in irrigation management; and (iii) developing PPPs by end of ISN.</p> <p>Baseline: (i) No; (ii) No; (iii) No (2011)</p> <p>Target: (i) Yes; (ii) Yes; (iii) Yes (2014)</p>	<p>Sewerage Infrastructure Projects (ISSIP1 - P094311 and ISSIP2 - P120161 accompanied by a Sanitation Trust Fund) but was delayed due to delay in detailed designs, bidding processes and environmental and social impact assessment; local communities' obstructions; and land acquisition issues.</p> <p>(ii) <u>Increased efficiency and beneficiary participation in irrigation management</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improved irrigation and drainage services provided to over 300,000 farmers - 1,465 water user associations (WUAs) have been established, of which 711 have been fully operational. - 122 branch canal WUAs fully operational and 14 integrated irrigation water districts fully operational. - Decentralized sanitation has been pilot tested under ISSIP1, which is to be expanded under ISSIP2 and new Projects. Due to delay in implementation of the decentralized schemes under ISSIP1, it is still in pilot stage, not expansion stage. <p>The Egypt team reports that irrigation efficiency has improved through the Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project (P073977) (latest Management Assessment: Moderately Satisfactory). In this sense, water savings of 10-30% have been reported under the project based on a combinations of interventions, including conveyance improvement (mesqa and marwa improvements), land leveling and adoption of different agronomic practices through improved farmer awareness raising.</p> <p>(iii) <u>Developing PPPs</u> First waste water PPP in Egypt successfully completed (IFC) via the implementation of the New Cairo Wastewater project. The project attracted US\$120 million of private investment and reached financial close in 2010 and is now fully operational. Finally, a pilot</p>	<p>Project ISSIP 1 (P094311) – Latest Management Assessment: Moderately Unsatisfactory</p> <p>Integrated Sanitation & Sewerage Infrastructure Project ISSIP 2 (P120161) – Latest Management Assessment: Moderately Unsatisfactory</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 3 - Inclusion	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
		scheme for PPP in irrigation has been launched but the procurement aborted due to lack of sufficient qualified bids.	
9. CPS Objective: Improve air and water quality (Partially Achieved)			
	<p>Indicator: (i) Reduction of industrial air pollution pilot scheme successfully tested; (ii) Waste management pilot scheme successfully tested</p> <p>Baseline: (i) No; (ii) No (2006)</p> <p>Target: (i) Yes; (ii) Yes (2009)</p>	<p>(i) <u>Industrial Air Pollution</u></p> <p>As to pilot schemes for reduction of industrial air pollution, the pilot phase Egyptian Pollution Abatement Project (1999-2005) was successful and was scaled up by the Second Pollution Abatement Project (EPAP II) (2006-2014). Below the achievements of each of these projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EPAP I pipeline remained strong despite the unstable situation in Egypt after the Arab Spring with increasing number of companies showing interest to participate. In addition, EPAP I stimulated similar projects such as the Private Public Sector Industry Project (PPSI) financed by KfW. - EPAP II contributed to the improvements of emissions notably from cement sector and brick factories, one of the most polluting sectors. Recent Cairo Air Quality ESW observed improvements in the air quality. The finding shows that concentrations of PM10 and PM2.5 were lower in fall 2010 than in fall 1999. This decline may be attributed to several factors, namely, the expansion of the road and highway network, improved car efficiency, industrial pollution control, and efforts to contain open burning. In addition, a technical assistance (TA) component of EPAP II supported (i) the issuance of revised environmental impact assessment guidelines, stipulating a provision that severe penalties would be promulgated for establishments constructed/ operated without EIA, and (ii) the issuance of new sectoral EIA guidelines for thermal power plants and manufacturing of petrochemicals, textiles, cement, and fertilizers. <p>Finally, the Bank has also been involved in other sectors that would lead to the</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p> <p>Egypt Pollution Abatement Project (P054958) (Closed FY05)</p> <p>Second Pollution Abatement Project (P090073) (Approved FY06) – IEG: Satisfactory</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 3 - Inclusion	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
		<p>improvement of the air quality, such as the Natural Gas Connections Project, the taxi scrapping program, and the Cairo Congestion Study.</p> <p>(ii) Waste Management After the successful testing of waste water pollution abatement, the CLR reports that a waste water treatment plant was financed by the following Bank projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Integrated Sanitation & Sewerage Infrastructure Project I (P094311) (Approved FY08). Latest Management Assessment: Moderately Unsatisfactory. - Integrated Sanitation & Sewerage Infrastructure Project II (P120161) (Approved FY11). Latest Management Assessment: Moderately Unsatisfactory. 	
<p>Indicator: Environmental standards regulations improved</p> <p>Baseline: No (2006)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2009)</p>		<p>The CLR reports that there has been progress in adopting legal and institutional measures for improving air quality such as amendment of the environmental protection Law #4 of 1994 by Law #9 of 2009 which prohibits waste burning by imposing heavy fines on offenders. In addition, the air quality standards set forth in the executive regulations of 1995 were revised in 2005 and further revised as a result of the enactment of Law 9 of 2009, although these executive regulations have not yet been issued by the Council of Ministers. These Government efforts were supported by the Bank financed Egyptian Pollution Abatement Project (P090073) (Closed FY15). IEG Rating: Satisfactory.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The proposed indicator was not specific and, thus, it did not specify how improved environmental standards regulations improvement would be measured.</p>
<p>10. CPS Objective: Expand access to healthcare (Not Achieved)</p>			
<p>Indicator: Health insurance reform reflecting international best practice adopted</p> <p>Baseline: No (2006)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2009)</p>		<p>The adoption of health insurance reform has not taken place. Bank support came via the Health Insurance Development Project (P080228). Although approved in FY10, the project was not implemented by the new government at the time as it was not in line with its priorities. The Health Insurance Systems Development Project has been redesigned to better target the poorest 1,000 villages in Egypt by accrediting family health facilities that meet the national healthcare quality standards.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The proposed indicator was not specific and, thus, it did not specify how the achievement of a health insurance reform reflecting international best practice would be measured. In addition, the indicator is not a measure of access, and thus, it cannot accurately reflect the</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 3 - Inclusion	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
		IFC has financed four private sector-managed health facilities, three of which are now fully operational.	achievement of the objective.
11. CPS Objective: Develop targeted and sustainable safety nets (Partially Achieved)			
	<p>Indicator: Sound plan to move towards a more transparent and sustainable safety nets (SSN) system defined and implemented</p> <p>Baseline: No (2006)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>Despite Bank's sustained effort, it was not possible to transition away from the subsidy system to a more efficient and poverty targeted SSN system although a sustained dialogue on this issue was ongoing. In spite of this setback, the Bank is using the Energy/Social Safety Nets Sector Reforms Technical Assistance (P144305) (approved FY14) and the Social Safety Nets TA (P132258) (to be completed / delivered in May 2016) to continue to push for SSN reform. One of the main achievements of the Bank in this area has been support to the development of a poverty map for better targeting of social safety net interventions.</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team</p>
	<p>Indicator: New pension regulations reflecting international best practice defined and implemented</p> <p>Baseline: No (2006)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>In June 2010, the Egyptian Parliament approved a new Social Insurance and Pensions Law that introduced a systemic reform which was expected to constitute a landmark in the Middle East region. The new system was to be effective in January 2012, but the implementation was delayed after the revolution and in early 2013 the Government decided to cancel the law. The Bank provided technical assistance through a multiyear program developed in two phases. The decision of the Government to cancel the Social Insurance and Pensions Law delays the solution to critical shortcomings of the current pension system, notably concerning the fiscal implications of projected deficits in the existing schemes (in spite of a high tax wedge on labor), the lack of coverage of a significant number of Egyptian workers, the high volatility of the real value of pensions due to the practice of "ad hoc" arbitrary indexation, and the inadequate targeting of non-contributory pensions.</p>	<p>Source: CLR and Egypt Team.</p> <p>The Egypt team reports the following interventions supporting the achievement of this indicator:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Energy/Social Safety Nets Sector Reforms Technical Assistance (P144305) (approved FY14) - Social Safety Nets TA (P132258) (to be completed / delivered in May 2016)
12. CPS Objective: Reduce interregional disparities (Partially Achieved)			
	<p>Indicator: Pro-poor targeting of public investment in Upper Egypt strengthened</p>	<p>The Bank supported this objective via the Emergency Labor Intensive Investment Project (P126339). The project focused on upper Egypt (70% of disbursements are allotted for upper Egypt, much of</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>The proposed indicator was not specific and, thus, it did not specify how</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 3 - Inclusion	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
	<p>Baseline: No (2006)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2009)</p>	<p>which have been disbursed). Due to the prevailing political environment, the Bank was unable to establish a sustained dialogue in this area so the goal is considered only partially achieved. The Bank did release a study on youth and women in upper Egypt which enabled a continued dialogue in this area.</p>	<p>strengthened pro-poor targeting of public investment in Upper Egypt would be measured.</p>
<p>13. Reduce gender disparities (Mostly Achieved)</p>			
	<p>Indicator: Effective contribution to informed advocacy and policymaking on gender issues</p> <p>Baseline: No (2006)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2009)</p>	<p>During the ISN period the Bank released and widely disseminated a number of important reports on gender issues, including: (i) World Development Report 2012 on Gender and Development; (ii) Opening Doors: Gender Equality and Development in the Middle East and North Africa (2013) - a regional companion report to the WDR 2012; (iii) Gender Assessment “Narrowing the Gap: Improving Labor Market Opportunities for Women in Egypt (2011); and (iv) “Reclaiming their Voice: New Perspectives From Young Women and Men in Upper Egypt” (2012).</p> <p>The strong emphasis on policy dialogue on gender has also been accompanied with a renewed corporate, regional and sectoral commitment on mainstreaming gender into Bank-financed operations. In the last couple of years, regions, networks and sectors have developed gender action plans. Specifically, the MENA Regional Gender Action Plan (2012) adopted a two-pronged approach, supplementing support to country programs with an explicit focus on informing dialogue and providing a platform for debate.</p>	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>Bank interventions were not commensurate with the proposed objective.</p>
	<p>Indicator: Specialized windows for women to improve their access to finance</p> <p>Baseline: No (2006)</p> <p>Target: Yes (2014)</p>	<p>The intense policy dialogue on gender has resulted in a number of gender-informed operations in Egypt, focused on increasing female employment through business development training and access to finance including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In June 2013, the Egypt Development Marketplace Program (P129863) awarded grants of US\$1.25 million to 45 organizations, to contribute to job creation in agribusiness and handicrafts projects across Egypt, with special focus on Upper (Southern) Egypt. 	<p>Source: CLR</p> <p>According to Bank systems, the Egypt Development Marketplace Program (P129863) was approved in August 2015.</p>



	CPS FY06-FY14: Focus Area 3 - Inclusion	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	IEG Comments
		<ul style="list-style-type: none">- TA Middle East and North Africa: Enhancing Microfinance Amongst Women and Youth in MENA (P144655) (approved June 2013) that seeks to enhance microfinance access and usage amongst women and youth in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt through demand-side analysis of access to finance constraints amongst women and youth; developing financial literacy modules targeted to women and youth; and South-South learning and training.- Enhancing Access to Finance for Micro and Small Enterprises Project (P116011) (approved in April 2012). To date, a total of 77,818 loans have been disbursed to MSEs leading to the creation of over 111 thousand job opportunities	



Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending for Egypt, FY06-14

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed IBRD Amount	Approved IBRD Amount	Outcome Rating
Project Planned Under CPS/CSPSR and ISN Period							
P087970	West Delta Irrigation Infrastructure	2006	2007	2011	150	145	LIR: U
P091945	El Tebbin Power	2006	2006	2012	250	260	IEG: MU
P093470	Mortgage Finance	2006	2007	2012	50	37	IEG: S
	Ports Sector Development	2006			100		DROPPED
P090073	Pollution Abatement II	2006	2006	2015	20	20	IEG: S
P094229	Urban/Alexandria Growth Pole	2007	2008	2013	100	100	NR
	Integrated Governorates Development	2007			100		DROPPED
	Social Funds IV	2007			75		DROPPED
	Education Enhancement II	2007			60		DROPPED
	Solar Thermal	2007			2		DROPPED
	Financial Sector Restructuring Loan	2007					DROPPED
	Transport/Road Asset Management	2008			100		DROPPED
	Integrated Governorates II	2008			100		DROPPED
P101103	Railways	2008	2009	2019	100	270	LIR: MS
P094311	Delta Integrated Sanitation and Sewerage Infr	2008	2008	2016	120	120	LIR: MU
P094551	Financial Sector Loan II	2008	2008	2010		500	IEG: S
	Family Health	2008			75		
P112346	Additional Financing for Mortgage	2009	2010	2015	50	300	LIR: S
	Low Income Social Housing	2009			200		DROPPED
P100047	Ain Sokhna Power Project	2009	2009	2017	600	600	LIR: S
P117356	Railways Restructuring	2009	2011		120	330	NA
P111040	National Drainage (AF)	2009	2010		70	30	NA
P116011	Facilitating Access to Finance	2010	2010	2016	50	300	LIR: S
P095392	Gas Infrastructure	2010	2008	2015	150	75	IEG: S
P105750	Airports II	2010	2008		230	40	
	Roads Assets Management	2010			200		DROPPED
	Post-Basic Education Reform	2010			50		DROPPED
	Social Protection DPL	2010			200		DROPPED
P080228	Health Insurance System Development	2010	2010	2017	50	75	LIR: U
	Upper Egypt Integrated Development	2010			200		DROPPED
P116194	Power III	2011	2010	2017		600	LIR: MS
P113416	Clean Technology for Energy	2011	2010	2018		70	LIR: MS
	Urban Transport Infrastructure	2011					DROPPED
	Solid Waste	2011					DROPPED
P117745	Agriculture/Poultry Industry Recovery	2011	2011	2016		100	LIR: MS
P116198	Giza North (AF)	2012	2012			240	NA
P126339	Emergency Labor Intensive	2012	2012	2017	200	200	LIR: S



Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed IBRD Amount	Approved IBRD Amount	Outcome Rating
Project Planned Under CPS/CPSPR and ISN Period							
P117407	Helwan South Power Project	2013	2013	2019	537	585	LIR: MS
	Kom Ombo Solar	2013			170		DROPPED
	Urban Transport Infrastructure Project	2014			150		DROPPED
Total Planned					4629	4997	
Unplanned Projects during the CPS, CPSPR and ISN Period							
			Approval FY	Closing FY		Approved IBRD Amount	Outcome Rating
P088877	EG- FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM DPL		2006	2007		500	IEG: S
P120470	Financial Sector DPL III		2010	2012		500	IEG: S
P101201	EG-Cairo Airport Development Project-TB2		2010	2016		280	LIR: S
P120161	EG-Integrated Sanitation & Sew. Infra. 2		2011	2018		200	LIR: MU
P146244	Promoting Innovation for Inclusive FA		2014	2020		300	LIR: S
Total Unplanned					-	1,780	
On-going Projects during the CPS/CPSPR and ISN Period							
			Approval FY	Closing FY		Approved IBRD Amount	Outcome Rating
P045499	EG-NATIONAL DRAINAGE II		2000	2015		50	LIR: MS
P056236	EG-HIGHER EDUCATION ENHANCEMENT PROG		2002	2009		50	IEG: MS
P082914	EG-AIRPORTS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT		2004	2009		335	IEG: HS
P049702	EG-SKILLS DEVELOPMENT		2004	2010		6	IEG: S
P082952	EG-Early Childhood Education Enhancement		2005	2014		20	IEG: MS
P073977	EG-INTEGRATED IRRIGATION IMPR. & MGT		2005	2016		120	LIR: MS
Total On-going						581	

Source: Egypt CPS, CPSPR and ISN AO Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 10/21/15

*LIR: Latest internal rating. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory.

Annex Table 3: Analytical and Advisory Work for Egypt, FY06-15

Proj ID	Economic and Sector Work	Fiscal year	Output Type
P101219	Egypt Dev. Policy Review (DPR)	FY08	Development Policy Review (DPR)
P102748	EG-Affordable Housing and Subsidies	FY08	Not assigned
P105095	CCGPP: Egypt SOE Assessment	FY08	Corporate Governance Assessment (ROSC)
P106517	EGYPT: CFAA	FY08	Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA)
P106520	Egypt ROSC Accounting and Auditing	FY08	Accounting and Auditing Assessment (ROSC)
P107027	EG-Housing Sector Review	FY08	Not assigned
P107110	EG PER Policy Notes	FY08	Not assigned
P096690	Egypt IFMCA	FY09	Other Public Sector Study
P104888	ESMAP: EG-Design of Load Mgt Program	FY09	Not assigned



Proj ID	Economic and Sector Work	Fiscal year	Output Type
P107462	EG Poverty Policy Notes	FY09	Not assigned
P108292	Egypt Investment Climate Assessment 2009	FY09	Investment Climate Assessment (ICA)
P109073	EG: Capital Market Development	FY09	Other Financial Sector Study
P112682	Egypt-AML/CFT assessment	FY09	AML/CFT Assessment
P112699	Egypt - Macro Notes	FY09	Economic Updates and Modeling
P114066	GCMCG: Egypt III Country Assessment	FY09	Corporate Governance Assessment (ROSC)
P107017	EG Growth in Upper Egypt	FY10	Other Poverty Study
P107704	EG: Tertiary Education Review (WB-OECD)	FY10	Other Education Study
P112209	Egypt GAC - Health Pets	FY10	Other Public Sector Study
P112344	EG: Trade	FY10	General Economy, Macroeconomics, and Growth Study
P112810	Egypt - Gender Assessment Update	FY10	Country Gender Assessment (CGA)
P113136	EGYPT - Programmatic PER	FY10	Not assigned
P113558	Egypt: Competitiveness Note	FY10	General Economy, Macroeconomics, and Growth Study
P118581	EGYPT - PER POLICY NOTES	FY10	Not assigned
P118587	EGYPT - Macro Notes	FY11	Economic Updates and Modeling
P121254	EG-Energy Efficiency Strategy	FY11	Not assigned
P122907	EGYPT - Savings Study	FY11	Not assigned
P107028	EG-Youth Study	FY12	Not assigned
P122909	Egypt - Reshaping Egypt geography	FY12	Not assigned
P124688	EG-Energy Efficiency Strategy (Phase2)	FY12	Not assigned
P127912	Egypt Inequality Study	FY12	Not assigned
P128773	Expanding Opportunities for the Next Gen	FY12	Other Social Protection Study
P097251	EG-Assessment of Air Quality in Cairo	FY13	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P112378	Financial Development & Growth in Egypt	FY13	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P129136	EG-Stakeholder Mapping	FY13	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P121712	EG-Cairo Congestion Study	FY14	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P133651	Pol Dialogue - 5yr Strategy Pre-Uni Educ	FY14	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P130359	Egypt Jobs Study	FY15	Other Poverty Study
P149491	Egypt Power Sector PPP Framework	FY15	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P149518	Strategic Public Expenditure Assessment	FY15	Public Expenditure Review (PER)
Proj ID	Technical Assistance	Fiscal year	Output Type
P089140	CA: Alexandria (Egypt) CDS for Sust. Dev	FY06	Institutional Development Plan
P098092	ESMAP: EG-DEMAND MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP	FY06	Knowledge-Sharing Forum
P098489	Egypt -- Gender Policy Forum	FY06	Knowledge-Sharing Forum
P080859	EG-Income, Environment & Health Linkages	FY07	Institutional Development Plan
P093520	EG-Catalytic Role of Women in Environ	FY07	Knowledge-Sharing Forum
P096440	EG:Enhancing Women Economic Participatio	FY07	"How-To" Guidance
P102491	Egypt Trade	FY07	Institutional Development Plan
P103751	EG RTA Natl Telecom Regulatory Auth'y	FY07	Client Document Review
P105161	EG RTA Regulatory Reform, Gov'ce, Invest	FY07	"How-To" Guidance
P105312	EG-Combined Cycle Workshop	FY07	Knowledge-Sharing Forum
P088155	EG Child Labor Prevention Grant	FY08	"How-To" Guidance
P101867	EG RTA MOCIT Support	FY08	Client Document Review



Proj ID	Economic and Sector Work	Fiscal year	Output Type
P102465	EG-REGULATORY REFORM & GOVERNANCE	FY08	"How-To" Guidance
P102555	Egypt Health Technical Assistance	FY08	"How-To" Guidance
P103749	EG RTA Egyptian National Post Org Suppt	FY08	Client Document Review
P105467	FIRST #343: Credit reporting strength	FY08	"How-To" Guidance
P107551	EG-Support to Public Private Partnership	FY08	"How-To" Guidance
P107705	Dialogue on Safety net	FY08	"How-To" Guidance
P107922	EG-International Youth Forum	FY08	Knowledge-Sharing Forum
P110524	Egypt Diabetes TA	FY08	Knowledge-Sharing Forum
P110763	EG RTA MCIT Second Fixed-line License	FY08	"How-To" Guidance
P067244	EG-CDM TA for Egypt	FY09	"How-To" Guidance
P103750	EG RTA Info Tech Industry Dev Support	FY09	Client Document Review
P107068	EG-Energy Pricing Strategy	FY09	"How-To" Guidance
P107584	Dialogue on TVET	FY09	Institutional Development Plan
P110330	EG Commercial Wind Development Framework	FY09	"How-To" Guidance
P112367	Egypt Country Policy Dialogue	FY09	Client Document Review
P113461	EG MOCIT: Measuring FDI in ICT	FY09	"How-To" Guidance
P113780	EGYPT - Governance and Anti-Corruption	FY09	"How-To" Guidance
P113932	EG: Cap Bldg in ICT - Econ and Stats	FY09	Institutional Development Plan
P113934	EG: ENPO Finan Invest & Asset Mgmt	FY09	Institutional Development Plan
P117621	EG-RTA Strategic Options Broadband (Ph.2)	FY10	Institutional Development Plan
P119276	EG Integrity and Transparency TA	FY10	"How-To" Guidance
P089803	EG-ALEXANDRIA DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY	FY10	Institutional Development Plan
P107463	Egypt Supply Chain and Trade	FY10	Client Document Review
P111340	EG-Inventory of POPs Materials	FY10	"How-To" Guidance
P111559	EG-RTA Social Health Insurance	FY10	Client Document Review
P113228	EG Health and Population TA	FY10	"How-To" Guidance
P113715	EG-Agriculture TA	FY10	"How-To" Guidance
P113930	EG-RTA Cyber-security Leg and Reg (Ph.2)	FY10	Institutional Development Plan
P114297	EG-TA for Dev. of WSS Strategy	FY10	Institutional Development Plan
P117576	EG Measuring Foreign Direct Investments	FY10	Model/Survey
P118171	EGYPT - PROGRAMMATIC POVERTY MONITORING	FY11	"How-To" Guidance
P124758	EG (FBS) GDP deflator of ICT	FY11	"How-To" Guidance
P124759	EG (FBS) Rapid Resp in ICT Stats / FDI	FY11	"How-To" Guidance
P079934	EG Nile Basin Initiative Support	FY11	Institutional Development Plan
P110669	Egypt-EITI Development	FY11	"How-To" Guidance
P116956	Skills Upgrading & Institutional Dev	FY11	Institutional Development Plan
P117982	EG: RTA Market Development and Debt Mgmt	FY12	"How-To" Guidance
P118497	EG Investment Climate Assessment Update	FY12	TA/IAR
P122576	EG-RTA Green ICT (Phase III)	FY12	TA/EPD
P122612	TA on Labor Market Reform in Egypt	FY12	TA/EPD
P123362	EG-RTA Broadband Impact Assessment(Ph.3)	FY12	Institutional Development Plan
P127518	Egypt NHA Institutionalization	FY12	TA/EPD



Proj ID	Economic and Sector Work	Fiscal year	Output Type
P128638	StAR - Egypt	FY12	TA/IAR
P115896	EG-TA on Egypt Transport Regulations	FY12	TA/IAR
P117378	EG-Energy Sector	FY12	TA/IAR
P115896	EG-TA on Egypt Transport Regulations	FY12	Not assigned
P118497	EG Investment Climate Assessment Update	FY12	Not assigned
P122576	EG-RTA Green ICT (Phase III)	FY12	Not assigned
P122612	TA on Labor Market Reform in Egypt	FY12	Not assigned
P127518	Egypt NHA Institutionalization	FY12	Not assigned
P128638	STAR - Egypt	FY12	Not assigned
P126551	EG Carbon Capture and Storage Tech.	FY13	TA/IAR
P130004	EG - Reproductive Health Rights	FY13	TA/IAR
P130432	Egypt #10240 Financial Projection Model	FY13	TA/IAR
P132543	Egypt SABER WfD	FY13	TA/IAR
P111534	EG-RTA Pension 2	FY13	TA/EPD
P126551	EG Carbon Capture and Storage Tech.	FY13	Not assigned
P130004	EG - Reproductive Health Rights	FY13	Not assigned
P130432	Egypt #10240 Financial Projection Model	FY13	Not assigned
P132543	Egypt SABER WfD	FY13	Not assigned
P122531	RTAPost-Strategy for Logistics (Ph.3)	FY14	TA/IAR
P127017	EG-Bldg Platform Urban Upgrading GCR	FY14	TA/IAR
P127432	Egypt Hackathon, Djibouti-Yemen ICT	FY14	TA/IAR
P128352	Egypt Public Sector Governance TA	FY14	TA/IAR
P132357	Egypt-Income Inequality Study - Phase II	FY14	TA/IAR
P144853	Egypt Country Engagment	FY14	TA/IAR
P149290	Egypt-Allocative Efficiency of Social Ex	FY14	TA/IAR
P151341	Egypt White Paper	FY14	TA/IAR
P151342	Universal Health Coverage/Social Justice	FY14	TA/EPD
P122531	RTAPost-Strategy for Logistics (Ph.3)	FY14	Not assigned
P127017	EG-Bldg Platform Urban Upgrading GCR	FY14	Not assigned
P127432	Egypt Hackathon, Djibouti-Yemen ICT	FY14	Not assigned
P128352	Egypt Public Sector Governance TA	FY14	Not assigned
P132357	Egypt-Income Inequality Study - Phase II	FY14	Not assigned
P144853	Egypt Country Engagment	FY14	Not assigned
P149290	Egypt-Allocative Efficiency of Social Ex	FY14	Not assigned
P151341	Egypt White Paper	FY14	Not assigned
P151342	Universal Health Coverage/Social Justice	FY14	Not assigned
P129680	EG Energy Pricing and Subsidy	FY15	TA/IAR
P146535	Egypt Public Sector TA Phase II	FY15	TA/IAR
P148192	Data Analytics for Urban transport	FY15	TA/IAR
P151345	Senior Health Policy Seminar	FY15	TA/EPD
P153631	Review of Education Development Fund	FY15	TA/IAR
P153970	White Paper: EG Energy Sector Challenges	FY15	TA/EPD
P129680	EG Energy Pricing and Subsidy	FY15	Not assigned
P146535	Egypt Public Sector TA Phase II	FY15	Not assigned
P148192	Data Analytics for Urban transport	FY15	Not assigned
P151345	Senior Health Policy Seminar	FY15	Not assigned

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table ESW/TA 8.1.4 as of 10/20/15



Annex Table 4: Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY08-15 (in US\$ million)

Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount
P146143	Emergency Employment Investment Project	TF 17007	2015	2018	87,352,504
P149677	Inclusive Regulations for Microfinance	TF 17864	2015	2019	4,000,000
P116230	Egypt: Sustainable POPs Management Project	TF 17336	2015	2019	8,100,000
P119483	Egypt Vehicle Scrapping and Recycling Program	TF 17503	2015	2017	742,530
P143569	Establishment of a Transport Regulatory Authority in Greater Cairo	TF 14420	2014	2017	300,000
P149704	EG-Urban Transport Infrastructure Development	TF 15328	2014	2016	1,000,000
P144305	EGYPT Energy/Social Safety Nets Sector Reforms Technical Assistance	TF 16152	2014	2017	6,500,000
P127482	Youth Employment	TF 10201	2013	2014	30,000
P118090	EG-Enhanced Water Resources Management	TF 12952	2013	2017	6,682,000
P130801	Regional Coordination for Improved Water Resources Mgt. & Capacity	TF 12960	2013	2017	1,050,000
P117745	EGYPT-Farm-level Irrigation Modernization	TF 13794	2013	2016	3,875,410
P124683	Participatory Farm-level Irrigation Modernization	TF 98199	2012	2016	2,750,300
P124940	EG-Strengthening the Capacity of SIOIRAFI in project coordination, Monitoring & Supervision	TF 99523	2012	2015	247,510
P116230	Egypt: Sustainable POPs Management Project	TF 97823	2011	2012	100,000
P113416	Egypt - Wind Power Development Project	TF 96929	2011	2018	250,000
P119805	EG - Sanitation	TF 95965	2011	2016	9,000,000
P094311	Integrated Sanitation& Sewerage Infrastructure Project	TF 95516	2011	2016	2,911,175
P113416	Egypt - Wind Power Development Project	TF 96930	2010	2018	149,750,000
P113416	Egypt - Wind Power Development Project	TF 95224	2010	2012	490,000
P119483	Egypt Vehicle Scrapping and Recycling Program	TF 15263	2010	2017	2,718,267
P119483	Egypt Vehicle Scrapping and Recycling Program	TF 96553	2010	2017	2,583,766
P119483	Egypt Vehicle Scrapping and Recycling Program	TF 96554	2010	2015	2,564,018
P095925	Alexandria Coastal Zone Management Project (Under the Investment Fund for the Mediterranean Sea Large Marine Ecosystem)	TF 96365	2010	2017	7,150,000
P119401	Egypt Job Readiness & Job Placement for Marginalized Youth	TF 95830	2010	2014	2,850,000
P114857	EG-Monitoring & Evaluation Systems for Decentralization	TF 94425	2009	2014	406,900
P110935	EG-LAND FILLING AND PROCESING SERVICES FOR SOUTHERN ZONE IN CAIRO	TF 92102	2008	2016	950,000
P105337	Enhance Capital Market Authority Monitoring Capacity	TF 90813	2008	2011	309,000
P050567	KUREIMAT SOLAR THERMAL HYBRID PROJECT	TF 91289	2008	2012	49,800,000
P102807	Avian and Human Influenza Control and Prevention	TF 58320	2008	2011	7,141,842
P115837	EG-UT Infrastructure Development (to be dropped)	TF 57140	2008	2014	720,000
P080228	Health Care Quality Improvement Project	TF 57802	2007	2011	770,000
P101103	Egypt National Railways Restructuring Project	TF 57785	2007	2009	800,000
P095392	EG-Natural Gas Connections Project	TF 56583	2007	2008	500,000
P105358	Egypt Poverty Alleviation and Legal Rights for Women & Adolescents	TF 56265	2007	2011	1,940,262



Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount
P097326	Upper Egypt Integrated Governorates Development	TF 56898	2007	2010	730,000
P095925	Alexandria Coastal Zone Management Project (Under the Investment Fund for the Mediterranean Sea Large Marine Ecosystem)	TF 56983	2007	2009	350,000
P090073	Second Pollution Abatement Project	TF 57016	2007	2011	1,170,506
P098737	ONYX solid Waste Alexandria - Carbon	TF 56124	2006	2016	6,875,426
P088155	Egypt Child Labor Prevention Grant	TF 52886	2004	2008	1,877,487
Total					377,338,903

Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Egypt, FY06-15

LN	Exit FY	Proj ID	Project name	Total Evaluated (\$M)	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
1	2006	P052705	EG-SOCIAL FUND III	53.6	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2	2007	P005169	EG-ED.ENHANCEMENT PROG.	70.9	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
3	2007	P005173	EG Irrigation Improvement	69.9	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
4	2007	P088877	EG- FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORM DPL	500.0	SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
5	2008	P040858	EG - SOHAG Rural Development	27.1	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
6	2008	P041410	EG Pumping Station Rehab III	99.5	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
7	2009	P045175	EG-HEALTH SECTOR	93.9	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
8	2009	P050567	EG-Kureimat Solar Thermal Hybrid	0.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
9	2009	P056236	EG-HIGHER EDUCATION ENHANCEMENT PROG	50.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	NEGLIGIBLE TO LOW
10	2009	P082914	EG-AIRPORTS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	374.9	HIGHLY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
11	2009	P094551	EG-FINANCIAL SECTOR DPL II	500.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
12	2010	P049166	EG East Delta Ag. Serv.	15.9	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
13	2010	P049702	EG-SKILLS DEVELOPMENT	5.5	SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
14	2010	P120470	Financial Sector DPL III	500.0	SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
15	2011	P087970	West Delta Water Conserv. & Irrig. Rehab	0.0	NOT APPLICABLE	NOT APPLICABLE
16	2011	P093470	EG-MORTGAGE FINANCE	39.1	SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
17	2011	P102807	EG-Avian and Human Influenza Control and	0.0	UNSATISFACTORY	HIGH
18	2012	P091945	EG-EI Tebbin Power	259.6	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
19	2013	P050484	EG Secondary Education Enhancement Proj	52.1	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	HIGH



LN	Exit FY	Proj ID	Project name	Total Evaluated (\$M)	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
20	2014	P082952	EG-Early Childhood Education Enhancement	19.2	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
21	2015	P090073	EG-Second Pollution Abatement	20.0	SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
Total				2,751.4		

Source: AO Key IEG Ratings as of 10/17/15

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Egypt and Comparators, FY06-15

Region	Total Evaluated (\$M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (\$)	Outcome % Sat (No)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (\$)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (No)
Egypt	2,751.4	21	85.3	80.0	61.4	47.6
MNA	10,790.0	189	66.9	63.6	46.3	34.3
World	203,914.5	2,470	82.7	72.8	65.3	53.9

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Egypt and Comparators, FY06-15

Fiscal year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average
Mali											
# Proj	16	15	18	15	22	23	22	25	26	26	21
# Proj At Risk	1	2	2	4	1	2	6	6	5	7	4
% Proj At Risk	6.3	13.3	11.1	26.7	4.5	8.7	27.3	24.0	19.2	26.9	16.8
Net Comm Amt	1,795.1	1,321.6	1,988.5	1,793.7	3,400.5	3,893.5	4,071.8	4,614.9	4,907.7	5,921.4	3,370.9
Comm At Risk	15.0	140.0	27.1	292.1	145.0	57.2	405.0	406.8	1,004.0	1,058.0	355.0
% Commit at Risk	0.8	10.6	1.4	16.3	4.3	1.5	9.9	8.8	20.5	17.9	9.2
MNA											
# Proj	110	116	147	140	159	164	151	160	169	159	148
# Proj At Risk	10	24	28	29	40	44	54	47	39	61	38
% Proj At Risk	9.1	20.7	19.0	20.7	25.2	26.8	35.8	29.4	23.1	38.4	24.8
Net Comm Amt	6,621.3	6,118.5	7,022.1	6,779.4	8,720.5	9,450.1	8,532.3	9,082.0	12,335.1	13,628.7	8,829.0
Comm At Risk	254.3	1,148.5	991.2	1,204.0	1,913.2	1,478.6	1,839.9	1,817.0	2,284.4	2,931.5	1,586.3
% Commit at Risk	3.8	18.8	14.1	17.8	21.9	15.6	21.6	20.0	18.5	21.5	17.4
World											
# Proj	1,468	1,485	1,832	1,925	1,990	2,059	2,029	1,964	2,048	2,022	1,882
# Proj At Risk	199	243	312	386	410	382	387	414	412	444	359
% Proj At Risk	13.6	16.4	17.0	20.1	20.6	18.6	19.1	21.1	20.1	22.0	18.8
Net Comm Amt	95,193.6	100,357.1	110,835.9	135,706.0	162,975.3	171,755.3	173,706.1	176,202.6	192,610.1	201,045.2	152,038.7
Comm At Risk	11,000.1	15,354.3	18,967.7	20,857.8	28,963.1	23,850.0	24,465.0	40,805.6	40,933.5	45,987.7	27,118.5
% Commit at Risk	11.6	15.3	17.1	15.4	17.8	13.9	14.1	23.2	21.3	22.9	17.2

Source: WB AO as of 10/16/15

Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for Egypt, FY06-15

Fiscal Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Overall Result
Egypt											
Disbursement Ratio (%)	18.54	26.26	23.83	24.99	13.62	6.70	10.15	14.44	11.42	23.19	15.13
Inv Disb in FY	133.20	222.24	193.43	225.46	209.89	180.97	304.52	452.82	374.13	762.20	3,058.87
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	718.58	846.41	811.63	902.21	1,540.55	2,701.70	3,001.05	3,135.32	3,275.45	3,286.34	20,219.25
MNA											
Disbursement Ratio (%)	18.19	23.21	25.44	26.18	24.05	14.16	15.56	18.58	21.23	21.60	20.47

Fiscal Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Overall Result
Inv Disb in FY	721.59	924.42	1,086.72	1,089.80	1,088.32	795.34	890.18	1,090.02	1,250.88	1,333.97	10,271.24
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	3,967.45	3,982.48	4,272.12	4,162.43	4,524.81	5,615.28	5,722.23	5,866.73	5,892.44	6,176.22	50,182.19
World											
Disbursement Ratio (%)	23.97	22.80	22.18	26.51	26.91	22.38	20.79	20.60	20.79	21.78	22.59
Inv Disb in FY	13,087.51	13,143.69	14,561.67	18,062.48	20,928.83	20,933.36	21,048.24	20,510.39	20,756.98	21,852.73	184,885.87
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	54,609.47	57,653.48	65,651.93	68,133.54	77,760.85	93,516.54	101,234.29	99,588.04	99,852.72	100,343.74	818,344.61

* Calculated as IBRD/IDA Disbursements in FY / Opening Undisbursed Amount at FY. Restricted to Lending Instrument Type = Investment.

AO disbursement ratio table as of 10/16/15

Annex Table 9: .List of IFC Investments in Egypt

Investments Committed in FY06-FY15

Project ID	Cmt FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm
25769	2015	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	E	173,000	50,000		50,000
33294	2015	Active	Construction and Real Estate	G	60,000	60,000		60,000
36743	2015	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	6,588		6,588	6,588
36816	2015	Active	Health Care	E	967		821	821
33138	2014	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	20,000	20,000	-	20,000
33338	2014	Active	Chemicals	G	15,500	15,500	-	15,500
31441	2013	Active	Textiles, Apparel & Leather	E	11,000	11,000	-	11,000
31920	2013	Active	Finance & Insurance	G	6,000		6,000	6,000
32875	2013	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	G	42,000	36,500	8,000	44,500
33324	2013	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	G	310,000	100,000	-	100,000
33611	2013	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	12,500	2,784	-	2,784
30323	2012	Active	Education Services	G	31,000	11,000	-	11,000
30974	2012	Closed	Chemicals	G	50,000		50,000	50,000
31182	2012	Active	Chemicals	G	41,000	8,000	-	8,000
31426	2012	Active	Chemicals	E	400,000	200,000	-	200,000
32004	2012	Closed	Utilities	E	100,000	-	-	-

Project ID	Cmt FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm
32281	2012	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	6,202		6,212	6,212
28332	2011	Active	Pulp & Paper	G	84,600		10,000	10,000
28878	2011	Active	Chemicals	G	91,000	35,000	-	35,000
29246	2011	Active	Chemicals	G	30,000	12,000	-	12,000
26256	2010	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	20,000	116,299	-	116,299
27022	2010	Closed	Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing	G	223,864		120,256	120,256
27632	2010	Active	Collective Investment Vehicles	G	25,000		15,500	15,500
28833	2010	Active	Finance & Insurance	G	100,000		20,000	20,000
29128	2010	Active	Chemicals	G	120,000		85,000	85,000
29309	2010	Active	Agriculture and Forestry	E	99,600	25,000	-	25,000
26092	2009	Active	Finance & Insurance	G	200,000		196,672	196,672
26554	2009	Closed	Education Services	G	37,140	2,740	-	2,740
26638	2009	Active	Collective Investment Vehicles	G	17,000		2,530	2,530
26936	2009	Active	Collective Investment Vehicles	G	20,000		7,852	7,852
27485	2009	Closed	Pulp & Paper	G	8,600	5,200	-	5,200
26138	2008	Active	Agriculture and Forestry	E	47,000	12,500	-	12,500
26485	2008	Active	Health Care	E	30,000	15,000	-	15,000
26869	2008	Closed	Health Care	E	15,000	15,000	-	15,000
27155	2008	Active	Textiles, Apparel & Leather	G	82,400	8,000	-	8,000
27320	2008	Closed	Chemicals	G	131,000	35,000	-	35,000
24373	2007	Closed	Oil, Gas and Mining	G	76,800	25,000	-	25,000
24418	2007	Active	Health Care	G	4,168		2,110	2,110
25052	2007	Closed	Finance & Insurance	G	13,522		3,522	3,522
25136	2007	Active	Pulp & Paper	G	80,200	26,400	-	26,400
25700	2007	Active	Wholesale and Retail Trade	G	175,600	38,500	5,667	44,167
25825	2007	Closed	Health Care	E	82,400	17,000	-	17,000

Project ID	Cmt FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm
26260	2007	Closed	Textiles, Apparel & Leather	G	14,000	14,000	-	14,000
24142	2006	Closed	Food & Beverages	E	14,000	14,000	-	14,000
24311	2006	Closed	Oil, Gas and Mining	G	4,281		762	762
24586	2006	Closed	Finance & Insurance	E	20,000	20,000	-	20,000
24681	2006	Active	Finance & Insurance	G	24,000		23,280	23,280
24822	2006	Closed	Finance & Insurance	E	4,000	4,000	-	4,000
25041	2006	Closed	Finance & Insurance	G	720		477	477
Sub-Total					3,181,653	955,424	571,247	1,526,671

Investments Committed pre-FY06 but active during FY06-15

Project ID	CMT FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm	Loan Risk Rating	Equity Risk Rating
23919	2005	Active	Finance & Insurance	G	3,000		3,000	3,000		5B
7290	1997	Active	Finance & Insurance	G	884		884	884		5B
2975	1993	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	E	45,660		13,000	13,000		3A
25707	1900	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	-	40,000	39,554	79,554	3B	4B
Sub-Total					49,544	40,000	56,438	96,438		
TOTAL					3,231,196	995,424	627,684	1,623,109		

Source: IFC-MIS Extract as of end June 30, 2015



Annex Table 10: List of IFC Advisory Services for Egypt

Advisory Services Approved in FY06-15

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US\$
599631	Low Income Housing Assiut Egypt	2015	2017	TERMINATED	A2F	9,977
600152	Maadi Technology Park in Egypt	2015	2017	ACTIVE	CAS	258,227
600466	AlexBank SME	2015	2016	ACTIVE	FIG	40,700
600784	Cairo International Airport O&M	2015	2017	TERMINATED	CAS	0
582547	Egypt Secured Lending Project	2014	2015	TERMINATED	FAM	59,999
599516	Investment Readiness Platform	2014	2017	TERMINATED	SBA	17,895
599870	E4E Regulatory Reform Egypt	2014	2016	HOLD	TAC	62,950
600142	E4E ICT Sector Egypt	2014	2017	ACTIVE	TAC	787,041
582927	Egypt Leasing Development	2013	2016	TERMINATED	FAM	47,335
595247	Egypt Trade Logistics	2013	2016	HOLD	TAC	1,232,417
598147	Corporate Governance Other MENA Regional Project II	2013	2017	ACTIVE	ESG	450,000
598647	Egypt Debt Resolution & Business Exit	2013	2015	TERMINATED	FAM	250,034
599055	Egypt PPP Program - Extension of Memorandum of Understanding	2013	2016	ACTIVE	CAS	396,416
599882	Al Tadamon	2013	2017	ACTIVE	FIG	605,000
569900	Egypt SME Corporate Governance Project	2012	2016	ACTIVE	ESG	656,409
579547	MF & CB Egypt	2012	2015	TERMINATED	FAM	190,654
590687	Egypt BAS Program	2012	2013	TERMINATED	A2F	23,520
590749	E4E MENA Region	2012	2015	ACTIVE	TAC	2,707,500
592727	MENA Clean Energy Program	2012	2016	ACTIVE	CAS	85,000
594787	Egypt SubNational Doing Business 2013	2012	2016	ACTIVE	TAC	1,387,474
30051	Dairut IPP	2011	2017	ACTIVE	CAS	958,532
569954	DBACD TA	2011	2016	ACTIVE	FIG	909,146
576867	Logistics Industry Development Egypt	2011	2014	TERMINATED	IC	135,247
577707	Women A2F Study	2011	2012	TERMINATED	A2F	90,733
569849	Alternative Dispute Resolution Project Egypt	2010	2016	ACTIVE	FAM	2,555,980
573387	Advocacy for Reform II - Egypt	2010	2013	CLOSED	IC	160,248
553805	iScore Egypt 2	2008	2009	CLOSED	A2F	44,332
559966	Cairo-Alexandria- Marsa Matrouh Technical Studies	2008	2011	CLOSED	PPP	1,278,138
561596	Business Start-up Simplification Project, Egypt, Phase 2	2008	2010	CLOSED	IC	802,671
561669	Highway Study	2008	2009	CLOSED	PPP	369,351
25405	New Cairo Water	2007	2010	CLOSED	PPP	371,103
25533	New Schools PPP	2007	2011	CLOSED	PPP	988,712
26249	Alexandria University Hospitals PPP	2007	2016	ACTIVE	CAS	3,201,599
539181	Mining Policy Reform Egypt	2007	2009	CLOSED	IC	366,028
552647	New Cairo Waste	2007	2010	CLOSED	PPP	1,573,486
554071	Egyptian Mortgage Refinance Company Advisory	2007	2008	CLOSED	A2F	194,115
554365	Subnational Doing Business Egypt	2007	2009	CLOSED	IC	168,848
555045	Business Edge Egypt	2007	2009	CLOSED	SBA	308,321
557286	ABA - Private Sector Observatory	2007	2009	CLOSED	IC	94,211
539183	Bus Strtup Rg P1	2006	2008	CLOSED	IC	599,264



Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US\$
545784	Industrial Estates in Alexandria: Improving Management Mechanisms and Regulatory Framework	2006	2008	CLOSED	IC	194,528
546905	CIB II follow up on CIB I	2006	2009	CLOSED	A2F	85,857
548566	Egyptian Liquidity Facility - TA Assessment	2006	2007	CLOSED	A2F	12,490
Sub-Total						24,731,488

Advisory Services Approved pre-FY06 but active during FY06-15

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US\$
533924	EBFP Egypt Siwa Oasis	2005	2015	ACTIVE	CAS	1,582,810
533975	EBFP - Egypt Energy Efficiency Project	2005	2006	CLOSED	SBA	66,589
543088	EBFP Egypt EE BNP Paribas	2005	2007	CLOSED	A2F	68,342
532427	EBFP - United Company for Light Industries S.A.E. - PILCO	2000	2006	CLOSED	SBA	20,767
Sub-Total						1,738,508
TOTAL						26,469,996

Source: IFC AS Data as of June 30, 2015

Annex Table 11: List of MIGA Activities in Egypt

ID	Contract Enterprise	FY	Project Status	Sector	Investor	Max Gross Issuance
11051	Egyptian Refining Company	2015	Active	Oil and Gas	Germany	23
11695	Elif Global Packaging S.A.E	2015	Active	Manufacturing	Turkey	10
11695	Elif Global Packaging S.A.E	2014	Active	Manufacturing	Turkey	26
10572	Apache Egypt	2013	Active	Oil and Gas	United States	150
Total						210

Source: MIGA 10-22-15

Annex Table 12: Net Disbursement and Charges for Egypt, FY06-15

Period	Disb. Amt.	Repay Amt.	Net Amt.	Charges	Fees	Net Transfer
Jul 2005 - Jun 2006	134,017,682	111,910,798	22,106,883	32,192,051	2,508,128	(12,593,296)
Jul 2006 - Jun 2007	722,239,804	107,807,658	614,432,146	38,766,638	4,912,920	570,752,588
Jul 2007 - Jun 2008	189,379,774	148,238,123	41,141,650	67,155,335	8,525,386	(34,539,071)
Jul 2008 - Jun 2009	678,824,766	128,926,739	549,898,027	49,087,314	13,950,096	486,860,618
Jul 2009 - Jun 2010	808,069,575	148,485,601	659,583,974	41,644,041	16,401,528	601,538,405
Jul 2010 - Jun 2011	181,304,489	146,367,088	34,937,401	36,977,913	11,955,561	(13,996,074)
Jul 2011 - Jun 2012	404,031,774	138,936,726	265,095,048	38,042,480	13,044,969	214,007,599
Jul 2012 - Jun 2013	452,165,178	146,472,506	305,692,671	44,542,672	11,325,379	249,824,621
Jul 2013 - Jun 2014	372,614,108	172,164,391	200,449,718	38,597,924	10,458,051	151,393,742
Jul 2014 - Jun 2015	839,448,359	219,716,772	619,731,588	37,527,793	10,211,392	571,992,403
Report Total	4,782,095,509	1,469,026,402	3,313,069,106	424,534,162	103,293,410	2,785,241,535

Source: World Bank Client Connection 10/19/15



Annex Table 13: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Egypt

Development Partners	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Australia	9.02	9.02	9.02	9.02	4.22	9.02	9.02	2.63	..
Austria	21.12	26.15	28.02	11.47	7.36	8.75	6.81	5.01	..
Belgium	-1.33	-2.51	-1.57	-1.54	-1.3	1.1	-0.15	-0.29	..
Canada	15.85	17.65	14.45	16.96	8.89	15.17	6.82	8.1	..
Czech Republic	1.35	0.17	0.19	0.2	0.23	0.39	0.37	0.48	0.3
Denmark	29.4	30.33	47.42	16.49	18.45	12	13.83	3.84	3.03
Finland	4.25	4.21	1.12	1.02	1.86	1.95	1.45	1.99	2.24
France	62.71	77.13	141.99	111.55	140.13	115.84	140.31	54.67	..
Germany	140.61	153.91	170.27	138.84	104.49	164.33	103.44	188.1	..
Greece	3.27	6.94	12.75	14.3	9.11	8.4	1.95	0.69	..
Iceland
Ireland	0.4	0.36	0.34	0.28	0.12	0.76	0.53	0.29	..
Italy	-10.39	-11.27	6.87	10.13	-2.15	14.47	4.33	3.87	..
Japan	-5.2	-27.04	11.64	-18.81	-17.74	-91.29	-20.33	-92.46	..
Korea	5.64	5.77	7.47	5.57	4.16	3.8	4.14	2.93	..
Luxembourg	0.12	0.07	0.12	0.16	0.09	0.17	0.13	0.13	0.14
Netherlands	13.12	14.6	19.72	17.79	10.96	10.06	6.05	3.53	0.88
New Zealand	0.01	..	0.14	0.47
Norway	0.54	0.36	0.22	0.69	0.67	1.87	1.16	2.07	..
Poland	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.09	0.09	0.16	0.06	..
Portugal	0.01	0.07	0.09	0.03	0.01	0.09	0.09	0.12	..
Slovak Republic	0.12	..	0.01	..
Slovenia	0.01	..	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.01	..
Spain	33.16	11.36	15.63	20.6	7.24	16.25	1.07	1.69	..
Sweden	1.99	2.42	2.18	1.74	1.41	5.6	8.92	10.69	..
Switzerland	2.85	7.17	1.66	8.99	6.35	11.85	14.37	16.81	..
United Kingdom	18.77	0.13	8.76	35.64	8.99	17.42	14.1	32.83	..
United States	195.6	462.41	470.78	185.07	49.39	-98.33	-14.85	58.46	..
DAC Countries, Total	542.89	789.43	969.33	586.21	363.07	230.38	303.76	306.26	6.59
AfDB (African Dev. Bank)	1.33	0.91	0.67	1.63
AfDF (African Dev. Fund)	4.17	1.56	11.45	-5	-5.97	-6.37	-6.24	-6.37	-7.23
Arab Fund (AFESD)	47.64	74.82	33.21	39.77	157.05	66.76	73.77
Climate Investment Funds (CIF)	0.33	..
EU Institutions	228.47	220.66	203.63	204.68	136.86	67.56	769.43	-1.91	..
GEF	0.91	10.52	54.48	26.51	..	1.72	1.71	2.73	..
Global Fund	1.21	2.57	4.67	4.13	2.65	0.05	3.86	1.15	0.46
IAEA	1.02	0.85	0.84	0.63	0.68	0.37	0.23	0.79	0.63
IBRD
IDA	14.36	-33.3	-39.18	-50.47	-44.13	-54.05	-53.68	-60.55	..
IFAD	6.2	5.51	6.54	-2.71	-5.51	-1.73	0.38	-3.09	..
IFC
Isl. Dev Bank	3.13	1.01	4.08	3.66	-1.41	-0.26	-1.48	0.25	8.19
OFID	15.26	16.35	11.51	26.12	14.76	4.09	14.83	22.46	14.18
UNAIDS	0.29	0.56	0.32	0.46	0.45	0.46	0.23	0.12	0.09



Development Partners	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
UNDP	1.52	1.94	2.62	2.98	2.34	1.57	1.22	2.43	1.7
UNFPA	2.86	2.41	2.66	2.52	2.64	3.02	2.72	2.01	2.58
UNHCR	1.09	1.05	1.51	2	5.98	9.23	..	1.79	..
UNICEF	3.03	3.21	2.96	3.45	3.84	3.72	2.91	3.13	..
UNTA	2.23	2.92	1.41
WFP	1.1	0.41	0.53	2.46	1.13	1.73	0.76	1.37	4.5
WHO	1.43	0.68	1.42	1.58
Multilateral, Total	286.85	238.23	317.67	296.24	147.52	73.64	895.52	35.49	102.08
Cyprus	..	0.41	0.18	0.23	0.26	0.15	0.01
Estonia
Hungary	..	0.11	0.02	0.11	0.1	0.17	0.12	0.09	0.09
Israel	0.34	0.85	0.67	0.1	0.08
Kuwait (KFAED)	19.7	60.05	88.24	59.8	54.45	94.66	90.48	20.78	-4.01
Latvia	..	0	0.01
Lithuania	0.01
Romania	0.06	0.1	0.22	0.26	..
Russia	0.07
Thailand	0.1	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.02
Turkey	0.62	0.72	0.95	0.91	1.3	3.51	503.92	538.83	..
United Arab Emirates	48.24	42.91	365.22	56.38	22.28	11.68	11.02	4605.6	..
Non-DAC Countries, Total	69	105.12	455.32	117.58	78.55	110.3	605.87	5165.6	-3.9
Development Partners Total	898.74	1132.78	1742.32	1000.03	589.14	414.32	1805.15	5507.35	104.77

Source: OECD Stat, [DAC2a] as of October 20, 2015



Annex Table 14: Economic and Social Indicators for Egypt, FY06-15

Series Name											Egypt	MNA	World
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2012	2012	2013	2014	2015		Average 2006-2015	
Growth and Inflation													
GDP growth (annual %)	6.8	7.1	7.2	4.7	5.1	1.8	2.2	2.1	2.2	..	4.4	4.2	2.4
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	5.0	5.3	5.3	2.8	3.1	(0.3)	(0.0)	(0.2)	(0.0)	..	2.3	2.0	1.2
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	7,930.0	8,610.0	9,240.0	9,490.0	9,700.0	9,810.0	10,000.0	10,100.0	10,260.0	..	9,460.0	15,854.6	12,868.0
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	1,330.0	1,550.0	1,860.0	2,140.0	2,390.0	2,590.0	2,810.0	2,940.0	3,050.0	..	2,295.6	6,559.6	9,426.1
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	7.6	9.3	18.3	11.8	11.3	10.1	7.1	9.4	10.1	..	10.6	4.4	4.3
Composition of GDP (%)													
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	14.1	14.1	13.2	13.6	14.0	14.5	14.5	14.5	14.5	..	14.1	6.6	3.1
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	38.4	36.8	37.9	37.6	37.5	37.6	39.2	39.2	39.9	..	38.2	51.1	27.3
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	47.5	49.2	48.9	48.8	48.5	47.9	46.3	46.3	45.6	..	47.7	42.3	69.6
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	18.7	20.9	22.3	18.9	19.2	16.7	15.6	13.8	13.3	..	17.7	23.5	22.4
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	17.1	16.3	16.8	12.6	14.3	13.0	8.0	7.5	5.2	..	12.3	37.6	23.0
External Accounts													
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	29.9	30.2	33.0	25.0	21.3	20.6	17.4	18.1	15.2	..	23.4	52.1	28.7
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	31.6	34.8	38.6	31.6	26.6	24.7	25.8	24.8	24.1	..	29.2	41.0	28.7
Current account balance (% of GDP)	2.5	0.3	(0.9)	(1.8)	(2.1)	(2.3)	(2.7)	(1.3)	(2.0)	..	(1.1)		
External debt stocks (% of GNI)	27.5	25.8	20.3	18.3	16.8	15.3	15.6	16.7	19.5		
Total debt service (% of GNI)	2.3	2.2	2.0	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.7		
Total reserves in months of imports	7.4	7.0	6.0	7.4	6.7	3.3	2.5	2.7	2.2	..	5.0	26.3	13.0
Fiscal Accounts ^{1/}													
General government revenue (% of GDP)	28.6	27.7	28.0	27.7	25.1	22.0	22.1	23.0	25.0	23.7	25.3		
General government total expenditure (% of GDP)	37.8	35.3	36.0	34.6	33.4	31.8	32.7	37.1	38.6	35.4	35.3		



Series Name											Egypt	MNA	World
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2012	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average 2006-2015		
General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	(9.2)	(7.5)	(8.0)	(6.9)	(8.3)	(9.8)	(10.5)	(14.1)	(13.6)	(11.7)	(10.0)		
General government gross debt (% of GDP)	90.3	80.2	70.2	73.0	73.2	76.6	78.9	89.0	90.5	90.0	81.2		
Social Indicators													
Health													
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	69.6	69.8	70.0	70.2	70.5	70.7	70.9	71.1	70.4	71.6	70.1
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	98.0	98.0	97.0	97.0	97.0	96.0	93.0	97.0	94.0	..		90.9	83.6
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	91.1	92.2	93.3	94.4	94.7	94.7	94.7	94.7	94.7	94.7		88.3	65.1
Improved water source, rural (% of rural population with access)	96.1	96.4	96.7	97.1	97.4	97.7	98.0	98.3	98.7	99.0	97.5	84.5	80.7
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	28.1	27.1	26.1	25.1	24.3	23.4	22.6	21.8	21.0	20.3	24.0	22.9	37.0
Education													
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	18.6	18.2	23.5	25.2	30.8	27.4	27.5	29.5		26.7	48.7
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	107.2	108.3	..	111.4	112.3	108.6	113.4	114.8		106.5	107.8
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	73.7	75.9	85.6	86.3	89.0		76.8	70.2
Population													
Population, total (Millions)	76,274,285.0	77,605,327.0	78,976,122.0	80,442,443.0	82,040,994.0	83,787,634.0	85,660,902.0	87,613,909.0	89,579,670.0	..	82,442,365.1	385,289,526.0	6,925,381,990.6
Population growth (annual %)	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.2	..	2.0	2.1	1.2
Urban population (% of total)	43.1	43.1	43.1	43.0	43.0	43.0	43.0	43.0	43.1	..	43.0	62.4	51.5

Source: WDI Central 10/14/15

*International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2015

** Estimates