CLR Review
Independent Evaluation Group

1. CPS Data	
Country: Haiti	
CAS Year: FY09	**CAS Period**: FY09-FY12
CLR Period: FY09-FY14	**Date of this review:** September 22, 2015

2. Ratings		
	CLR Rating	**IEG Rating**
CAS FY09-FY12		
Development Outcome:	*Moderately Satisfactory*	*Unsatisfactory*
ISN CY12 and ISN FY12-FY13		
Development Outcome	*Moderately Satisfactory*	*Moderately Satisfactory*
Overall WBG Performance		
WBG Performance	*Good*	*Good*

3. Executive Summary

i. Haiti suffers from severe institutional weaknesses that have impaired the pace of economic development and led the World Bank Group to classify it as a fragile state—as reflected in its score of 3.2 or less in the Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. The context of the period under review though, was dominated by the consequences of the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 causing unprecedented loss of life and physical capital. The main challenges were reducing vulnerability to disasters, reconstructing infrastructure, developing human capital—especially primary education and maternal and child health, and promoting private sector development. The WBG program set interventions and outcomes consistent with the scope of the government's crisis response program and its longer term priorities. The CAS—designed for FY09-FY12—formally ended six months early, in December 2011, owing to the shift in priorities as a result of the earthquake. The Bank was quick to respond to the earthquake with technical advice, timely adjustments to the Bank program, a damage assessment, and additional commitments for recovery and reconstruction. The ISNs (CY12, FY12-FY13) that followed the CAS appropriately gave priority to emergency response to the earthquake and reconstruction, and kept as longer term priorities issues related to human capital, business environment, and institutional development, continuing with work already started under the FY09-FY12 CAS.

ii. The FY09-FY12 CAS is assessed against its original results framework, and understandably most objectives were not achieved owing to the unprecedented disruption of the 2010 earthquake. In practice, many of the CAS's original longer term objectives became less relevant and progress in some areas understandably came to a halt after the earthquake, two years earlier than CAS completion. As a result of quick Bank action, there were additional achievements in the aftermath of the quake and preceding the ISNs, which cannot be assessed by IEG in the absence of a results framework. To the extent that Bank activities started after the quake continued under the ISN period, such achievements

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are picked up there. The bulk of IEG's assessment in this review covers the two ISNs, where results were significantly better than under the CAS. Despite a difficult environment, the ISNs were successful in starting to build human capital, reducing vulnerabilities, reconstructing housing, and upgrading neighborhoods. Still, the program under the ISNs was much less successful on the longer term priorities it set for itself. The promotion of inclusive growth fell significantly short of expectations and there was virtually no progress on strengthening governance and institutional capacity. The difference in achievement across focus areas can be attributed to government ownership and to government priorities to allocate limited local capacity across program objectives. The government was committed to the short term objectives of reconstruction and reducing vulnerabilities, and thus devoted substantial human and financial resources to them. Such government support also facilitated cooperation among the numerous donors operating in Haiti in those areas. The focus on short term issues limited the ability to devote human and financial resources to the longer term issues of growth and institutional development. As a result, there was less government action on reforms in the business environment—including reform of the electricity sector and company, on enhancing governance, and on building institutional capacity. Thus, achievement of outcomes in those areas of the Bank program suffered..

iii. The FY09-FY12 CAS showed a dispersion of knowledge and investment activities over a number of sectors that was not conducive to good results. Bank programs under the ISNs though, were focused and selective with interventions balanced across focus areas and consistent with a well distributed set of objectives across the areas. Following the earthquake the Bank was a leader in damage assessment and quickly undertook additional commitments, even before the new ISN. The ISN CY12 was intended to support Haiti's reconstruction after the earthquake while a new government took office. It prioritized investments for reconstruction where the Bank had experience, with investments in disaster risk management, education, and agriculture. Instruments included sector investment grants (emergency operations where needed), a Development Policy Operation, and trust fund resources to strengthen or complement IDA interventions. Knowledge activities would be complementary to promote infrastructure and business environment development. Given that Haiti was not prepared for a new CAS, the ISN CY12 was followed up by the ISN FY12-FY13, which continued work started under the ISN CY12 and included additional work on reconstruction, human capital, inclusive growth and governance. Although causal chains were not explicitly discussed in the texts, the annexes with the results frameworks lend themselves for inference of causal links that on the whole appear credible. But in a number of instances the indicators had a tenuous connection with the program objectives, and some indicators (health/agriculture/regulatory reforms business environment) were overambitious in light of implementation constraints and public sector capacities. Program implementation was very slow in some areas (electricity, governance, institutional capacity building). Aid to Haiti is fragmented and lacking both in terms of coordination and harmonization, and the Bank program faced many donor coordination challenges. The Bank cooperated effectively with other development partners on specific projects, but the CLR recognizes that the project-by-project approach is not fully effective and needs to be replaced by a programmatic approach that is more effective in supporting the government's sector strategies. This was a joint IDA-IFC CAS but the CLR provides limited information on collaboration between IFC and the Bank.

iv. Haiti is a high risk country where the Bank needs to remain engaged or even intensify engagement. Therefore the key in future will be to adopt safeguards that minimize risks while aiming for realistic results. The following suggestions for continued Bank engagement in Haiti are in line with the CLR and other documents:

- Design programs assuming continued fragility, changing circumstances, and low local capacity for the foreseeable future.
- Strengthen implementation capacity support to the government while building WBG capacity in Haiti to handle portfolio growth and riskiness.
- Project management remains a significant bottleneck for timely project execution. Give priority in budget for close and intensive implementation support and additional training to locals.

- Sector reforms require long-term programmatic approach, which includes institution building and understanding the political economy environment for reforms.
- Governance and capacity development in Haiti will continue to be a challenge for the Bank for the foreseeable future, as evidenced in the results of the relevant focus area under the CAS FY09-FY12 and ISNs. The Bank has no way around it but staying engaged in these areas to build sustainable institutions that are accountable and capable of effectively delivering services. But programs should not anticipate significant service delivery improvements early in implementation, and build capacity in ministries with simple design and clear institutional objectives.

4. Strategic Focus

Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

1. ***Congruence with Country Context and Country Program***. Haiti suffers from severe institutional weaknesses that have impaired the pace of economic development and led the World Bank Group to classify it as a fragile state—as reflected in its score of 3.2 or less in the Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. It is an IDA-only borrower, consistent with its status as the poorest country in the Latin America and Caribbean Region. In 2012, the overall poverty headcount amounted to 59 percent and extreme poverty to 24 percent. The context of the period under review[1] though, was dominated by the consequences of the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 causing unprecedented loss of life and physical capital. The government issued the Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti (PARDH), partly based on a Post Disaster Need Assessment (PDNA) that identified reconstruction needs. The government's emergency response was supported by pledges of international aid of US$8.1 billion for 2010-12 (37 percent of 2010-12 GDP), of which US$1.2 billion corresponded to debt relief. In May 2012, the government issued a Strategic Development Plan (PSDH) laying out the strategy for long-term development based on four planks: territorial reform, economic reform, social reform and institutional reform. The Bank's response was congruent with the PARDH and the PSDH. The immediate response was to mobilize US$100 million to restore key state functions, rebuild critical infrastructure, and provide nutritional security. The Bank at the time was implementing the FY09-FY12 CAS. Ongoing projects under the CAS—which formally ended six months early, in December 2011, owing to the shift in priorities as a result of the earthquake—were restructured or received additional financing to restore essential services such as education, and channel resources to local administrations. Some longer term priorities of the CAS were put on hold in light of the demands from the emergency response to the earthquake. The ISNs (CY12, FY12-FY13) that followed the CAS appropriately gave priority to emergency response to the earthquake and reconstruction, and kept as longer term priorities issues related to human capital, business environment, and institutional development, continuing work already started under the FY09-FY12 CAS.

2. ***Relevance of Design***. To analyze design, IEG will divide the period of review in two: the CAS FY09-FY12, which ended in December 2011, and the period of the two Interim Strategy Notes (CY12, and FY13-FY14). The CAS results matrix included a set of outcomes consistent with the government's program. Each strategic area of intervention (promoting growth and local development, investing in human capital, and reducing vulnerabilities to disasters) was backed by WBG interventions. The interventions in the four areas contained an adequate combination of technical assistance, specific projects on Community Driven Development for example, and support from targeted trust funded activities. The CAS's longer term objectives became less relevant and progress in some areas

[1] Covering the FY09-FY12 Country Assistance Strategy, the CY12 Interim Strategy Note, and the FY13-FY14 Interim Strategy Note.

understandably came to a halt when the earthquake struck, two years earlier than CAS completion. The Bank quickly and appropriately adjusted the program to focus on damage assessment and emergency response.

3. The ISN CY12 was intended to support Haiti's reconstruction after the earthquake while a new government took office. It prioritized investments for reconstruction where the Bank had experience, with investments in disaster risk management, education, and agriculture. Instruments included sector investment grants (emergency operations where needed), a Development Policy Operation, and trust fund resources to strengthen or complement IDA interventions.

4. Knowledge activities would be complementary to promote infrastructure and business environment development. Given that Haiti was not prepared for a new full CAS, the ISN CY12 was followed up by ISN FY12-FY13, which maintained the priorities of ISN CY12 and included additional work on reconstruction, human capital, inclusive growth and governance. It intended to concentrate human and financial resources on the achievement of outcomes in key areas for reconstruction. The main assumptions for WBG interventions to work were strong government ownership during project implementation and appropriate local capacity to implement the projects. The program in Haiti represented an immense effort of cooperation with development partners: US and Canada on housing, education, and agriculture; UN Habitat, UNOPS, OIM and AFD on return of displaced persons to neighborhoods; World Food Program on improving nutrition and coordinating school feeding; and UNOPS on multi-hazard mapping and building assessments. The Bank led donor coordination for budget support and played a convening role in the housing sector.

5. The IFC program addressed both the original CAS Pillar of *Promoting Growth and Local Development* as well as ISNs Strategic Objective of *Promoting Inclusive Growth*. It initially included electricity generation, investment in Integrated Economic Zones, developing the SME lending capability at a key bank, and providing advisory services towards private investment in telecom. Later on IFC work extended to advisory services projects on regulatory reform in leasing and secured transactions, and new green-field investments in ports and in a hotel. The broadening of IFC's scope was consistent with longer term priorities in business environment and regional development.

<u>Selectivity</u>

6. The FY09-FY12 CAS showed a dispersion of knowledge and investment activities over a number of sectors that was not conducive to good results. Selectivity was manifested for new IDA grants under the two ISNs. Operations were selected on the basis of government commitment, IDA's comparative advantage vis-à-vis other development partners, readiness for implementation, and implementation capacity. The aftermath of the earthquake focused the minds of both the government and the Bank to concentrate human and financial resources on emergency response and reconstruction. The Bank became the leading donor in the housing sector, and made significant investments in education, private sector development (creating jobs), and agriculture. Housing, education, and disaster risk management were given priority. The Bank decided to not be part of building backbone roads, ports and airports, where other donors were present, nor in health, where other partners took the lead. Still, the Bank program intended to have a long term impact on Haiti by fostering institutional change and capacity development in the education, agriculture, and budget spheres.

<u>Alignment</u>

7. The program was aligned with the twin goals on poverty and shared prosperity and focused on areas that subsequently were identified as priorities by the Systemic Country Diagnostic. In particular, it prioritized reducing vulnerability to disasters, reconstruction and infrastructure, human capital development—especially primary education and maternal and child health, and promoting private sector development. The need for social inclusion of vulnerable groups was the background for a

number of these interventions. Poverty and shared prosperity issues were not directly reflected in the results framework.

5. Development Outcome

Overview of Achievement by Objective:

The Country Assistance Strategy FY09-FY12

Focus Area I: **Promoting Growth and Local Development**

8. **Increase income generating opportunities and improve access to infrastructure services at local and national levels**. Through the Community Driven Development project (FY06) many initiatives in 59 rural municipalities generated income generating activities. However, the indicator related to improving the cost recovery for the public electricity company was not met, and the indicator on reducing the amount of travel time on selected road was met partially. (*Partially Achieved)*

9. The Transport and Territorial Development Project (FY06) helped complete one of the road sections targeted and made progress on a second targeted road.

10. IFC contributed in this area with investment and advisory services projects for electricity generation, garment export/Integrated Economic Zones, and SME financing, along with advisory services projects for the telecom and training of entrepreneurs (business edge).

11. **Enhance agriculture sector contribution to economic growth and local development**. The number of producers receiving agriculture extension services in Thiotte-Baptiste was targeted to increase from 300 in 2009 to 3000 in 2012 through the Strengthening of Agriculture Public Services project (FY09). The project was affected adversely by weaknesses in procurement and disruptions caused by the earthquake, and thus the target was achieved, even if late. Yet, the indicator used is a poor metric for the contribution of the agriculture sector to economic growth and local development. (*Partially Achieved)*

12. IEG rates the outcome of IEG support under Focus Area I of the CAS as Moderately Unsatisfactory. Although the area was in line with country development goals and supported appropriately by the Community Driven Development project (FY06), the Territorial Development project (FY06), the Strengthening of Agriculture Public Services project (FY09), and trust-funded activities, its two objectives were only partially achieved, with shortfalls on cost recovery for the public electricity company, reduction of travel time on selected roads, and extension services to targeted rural areas.

Focus Area II: **Invest in Human Capital**

13. **Increase access to basic education.** Increased education access would be facilitated by tuition waivers and reconstruction of schools through the Education For All APL (FY07) and the Emergency School Reconstruction project (FY09). The target on tuition waivers was met (about 155,000 against a target of 135,000 in the CAS) but the target to reconstruct 11 schools by 2012 was not met. Following the 2010 earthquake the Bank concentrated on the tuition waivers and left the school reconstruction to other development partners, primarily to the IADB. *(Mostly Achieved)*

14. **Improve the nutritional security of children**. The indicator was to develop and adopt a national nutrition strategy. A national nutrition strategy was developed but not adopted during the CAS. *(Partially Achieved)*

15. **Improve access to clean water**. The indicators were to provide improved water services—potable water and sanitation services—in selected communities. The Rural Water and Sanitation project (FY07) helped increase access to and use of sanitation to nearly 5,000 households in the 7 communities targeted, meeting the CAS target, and the Rural Water and Sanitation project (FY07) helped construct 8 rural water networks serving 33,000 people by 2014 (against the 65,000 targeted by 2012). *(Partially Achieved)*

16. Based on the rating of objectives, IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area II of the CAS as Moderately Unsatisfactory.

Focus Area III: **Reduce Vulnerability to Disasters**

17. **Strengthen institutional capacity for disaster preparation, response, and recovery.** The indicator for this objective comprised targets on number of days to prepare a post-disaster response plan and a recovery plan. The target for the response plan (10 days) was met for the cholera epidemic and Hurricane Thomas, but not for the 2010 earthquake, while the target for the recovery plan (60 days) was met. (*Mostly Achieved)*

18. **Integrate vulnerability reduction and risk management into national, sectoral, and local development strategies**. Five ministries (Public Works, Agriculture, Education, Environment, and Social Affairs) were supposed to integrate vulnerability strategies into sectoral plans during the CAS. While a civil protection unit with defined procedures, response plan, and a communication strategy was in place during the CAS, there was no mainstreaming of a disaster reduction plan in the targeted ministries. *(Partially Achieved)*

19. IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area III of the CAS as Moderately Unsatisfactory. Despite support from several Bank projects—Emergency Bridge Reconstruction and Vulnerability Reduction (FY09), Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management (FY05), Catastrophe Insurance (FY07), Avian Human Influenza Emergency (FY09)—progress was modest in this area. The target for the post-disaster response plan was not met in the aftermath of the massive earthquake—but met in subsequent smaller emergencies—while the target for the recovery plan was. At the same time, in contrast with expectations under the CAS, there was no mainstreaming of a disaster reduction plan in targeted ministries.

Focus Area IV: **Strengthen Institutions and Support the Delivery of Visible Results**[2]

20. **Improve public sector management systems, including strengthen budget preparation and execution, and internal and external controls**. The target for incorporating a multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting was not met. The PEFA report of November 2011 gives a rating of D+ to the relevant indicator (#12) against a target of B. The target for scope, nature, and follow-up of external audit was not met. The PEFA report of November 11 does not rate the relevant indicator (#26) owing to lack of documentation against a target of B under the CAS. *(Not Achieved)*

21. **Improve the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development to manage public sector investments.** This was to be achieved by an increase in the share of the non-salary commitment in the ministry's operating budget. No progress was made in this regard during the CAS. *(Not Achieved)*

[2] This topic was also a cross-cutting issue under the CAS.

22. IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area IV of the CAS—also a cross-cutting issue—as Unsatisfactory. The Bank provided support through the Governance Reform project (FY10) and Strengthening of the Management of Agriculture Public Services (FY09), but no visible results were achieved during the CAS.

CAS FY09-FY12 Assessment

23. IEG rates the overall outcome of the FY09-FY12 CAS as Unsatisfactory. All in all, most outcomes under this CAS were partially achieved or not achieved, reflecting the significant disruptions caused by the earthquake. As a result of quick Bank action though, there were additional achievements in the aftermath of the quake and preceding the ISNs, which cannot be assessed in the absence of a results framework. To the extent that Bank activities started after the quake continued under the ISN period, such achievements are picked up there.

The Interim Strategy Notes CY12 and FY13-FY14

Focus Area I: **Reduce Vulnerability and Increase Resilience**

24. **Enhance disaster preparation and response capacity**. The target was to increase by 15 percentage points the share of the population living in a municipality with a certified CCPC (*Comité Communal de Protection Civile*) by 2012. The activity to support the CCPCs was not initiated owing to implementation delays and the target of 35 percent of the population by 2012 was not met. (*Not Achieved*)

25. **Rehabilitate selected public infrastructure and strengthen the resilience of critical transport infrastructure**. The indicator for this objective related to rehabilitating roads and critical bridges, and repairing road sections to satisfactory standards by 2014. Achievement fell slightly short of targets. The CLR reports that 150 km of roads were rehabilitated (against a target of 168 km). Access was restored to selected critical points of the transport network—4 fjords and emergency overpasses restored, 11 out of 14 bridges affected by the 2008 hurricane season strengthened, and 5 road sections rehabilitated. (*Mostly Achieved*)

26. **Enhance prevention and treatment of cholera**. The targets were to increase significantly the number of people benefiting from targeted health and hygiene education, water treatment and cholera prevention, and provide access to water sources to people in rural areas. Nearly 3 million people have been sensitized to recognize better cholera early warning signs and symptoms and to pursue proper treatment (target 1.5 million by 2013). Moreover the Rural Water and Sanitation project (FY07) provided nearly 60 thousand people with access to improved water supply in 15 communities (target 51 thousand by 2013). (*Achieved*)

27. IEG rates the outcome of IEG support under Focus Area I of the ISNs Moderately Satisfactory. Objectives were supported by the Emergency Bridge Reconstruction and Vulnerability Reduction project (FY09), the Cholera Emergency Response project (FY11), and the Disaster Risk Management and Reconstruction project (FY12).

Focus Area II: **Sustainable Reconstruction**

28. **Upgrade neighborhoods and repair housing.** Neighborhoods were upgraded and housing repaired. The rental housing cash grant program, developed with the government and donors under the Housing Reconstruction Urban Community Driven Development project (FY11), supported the return of about 14,800 households from camps to safe rental units, benefiting 48,000 people (half of which women) against a target of 9,000 households by 2012. (*Achieved*)

29. **Improve services in project neighborhoods.** The Housing Reconstruction Urban Community Driven Development project (FY11) benefited 25,000 households through community-wide upgrading. (*Achieved*)

30. **Improve access to electricity.** The target was to increase the average daily electricity service in metropolitan Port Au Prince from 14 hrs/day(2011) to 16 hrs/day(2014). This target was achieved by the end of the ISN FY13-FY14 period. (*Achieved*)

31. **Increase the commercial viability of electricity sector.** Although the indicator target—to increase cash recovery index to 27 percent by 2014—was achieved, commercial losses remain extremely high and the public electricity company is unable to pay for basic maintenance services and fuel, and, even with government subsidies, its financial arrears (including to suppliers) are growing for generation of electricity under the power purchasing agreement. (*Not Achieved*)

32. Based on the rating of objectives, IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area II of the ISNs Moderately Satisfactory.

Focus Area III: **Building Human Capital**

33. **Increase access to schools and provide school feeding**. The indicators on the number of children receiving enrolment subsidies was achieved. There was no metric about the school feeding dimension. Nevertheless the CLR reports that 150,000 students (cumulatively) benefited from one snack and hot meal per day from January 2012 to June 2014. The CLR reports that the target on teachers trained was met, although the results matrix reports 2,600 qualified teachers trained against a target value of 3,000. The Bank supported this objective through the Education For All APLs (FY07, FY12), and the objective also benefited from a multi-donor trust fund activities to support it (FY10, FY14, FY15). (*Mostly Achieved*)

34. **Reduce the vulnerability of women.** The indicators refer to the number of girls receiving training, life skills, and placement services, and camp residents trained in preventing Gender Based violence and equipped with Gender Based Violence (GBV) prevention kits. Both indicators were met. (*Achieved*)

35. **Increase access to health and social protection services.** The indicator targeted an increase in the percentage of people in selected areas that would receive access to a basic package of health, nutrition, and population services. However it lacked a baseline. The CLR reports that supported by a trust-funded activity the indicator target of 10 percent was met. (*Achieved*)

36. Based on the rating of the objectives, IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area III of the ISNs Satisfactory.

Focus Area IV: **Promote Inclusive Growth**

37. **Improve the business environment and broaden access to finance**. The indicator to increase the volume of lending from the banking system was met, but the indicator to approve regulatory texts for the Integrated Economic Zones (IEZ) was not. The indicator on lending is too broad to be a good metric for access to finance. (*Partially Achieved*)

38. IFC's investment in textiles in the export zone together with advisory services projects on secured transactions, leasing, credit rating, and micro-insurance contributed to this objective. Yet, passage of the various laws remains unlikely in the short run. In addition, business environment improvements from IFC investments in mining, water, electricity, and finance remain uncertain. IFC's attempt to develop M Banking is on hold, and lending for housing finance did not meet expectations.

39. **Enhance regional economic development**. The indicator was to make operational a park authority to manage a National Historic Park. The transitional Park Authority mechanisms were defined in March 2014. A transitional director has been designated who will lead the Park Management Plan preparation process defining the governance and management structure to be in place in 2016. (*Partially Achieved*)

40. **Enhance agricultural services to farmers and improve rural access to basic socio-economic infrastructure**. As of 2014, 4,565 farmers had received improved agriculture information, technologies, inputs, material, and services—short of the target of 6,000 farmers under the ISNs. (*Mostly Achieved*)

41. The CLR mentions two IFC advisory services projects (Business Edge and MSME Sogebank) that started in 2009 but did not provide data to indicate what portion of their activities were outside the capital area, which would be needed to assess impact on regional and rural development.

42. Based on the rating of objectives, IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area IV of the ISNs Moderately Unsatisfactory.

Focus Area V: **Strengthen Governance and Capacity**

43. **Enhance disaster response capacity**. This objective was based on increasing the number of disaster risk management units capable of incorporating hazard risk analysis into their programs (from 0 to 3), approve five cholera management departmental plans and start to implement them, and have the bridge management unit of the Ministry of Public Works operational by 2012. The Bank contributed to the objective through the Emergency Cholera project (FY11), the Emergency Bridge Reconstruction and Vulnerability Reduction project (FY09), and the Disaster Risk Management and Reconstruction project (FY12). Two risk management units are functional, all 6 intervention departments have departmental management plans, and the bridge risk management unit became operational in 2012. (*Mostly Achieved*)

44. **Strengthen institutional capacity for housing repair and reconstruction**. Urban development plans were prepared in 4 neighborhoods (against a target of 6 for the indicator) where the Bank works on housing and neighborhood reconstruction. (*Mostly Achieved*)

45. **Strengthen the Ministry of Public Works energy policy and planning capacity**. The indicator for this objective envisaged the completion of an energy sector master plan by 2012. The master plan is yet to be completed. (*Not Achieved*)

46. **Strengthen education institutional capacity**. The indicator envisaged an increase to 75 percent in the share of schools receiving at least one inspector visit per year by 2012. As of 2014, 65 percent of schools are being inspected once a year. (*Mostly Achieved*)

47. **Strengthen government capacity to manage and monitor service delivery**. The share of targeted population covered by health providers contracted by the Ministry of Health increased by at least 10 percent through a project funded by the Rapid Social Response trust fund. As a result they have improved access to social services. (*Achieved*)

48. **Reform the business environment**. While a committee for business environment reforms was created, progress on reforming the business environment was limited. (*Not Achieved*)

49. **Strengthen capacity to implement the National Agriculture Extension Strategy**. The Bank supported the elaboration of a ministry of agriculture 5-year agriculture investment plan. However, the CLR does not report on whether the priorities outlined in this plan were reflected in annual investment plans. (*Partially Achieved*)

50. **Improve transparency and accountability in Public Financial Management**. In 2013, the electricity company (EDH), the Ministry of Public Works, and the Ministry of Economy and Finance signed a memorandum of understanding to define roles and responsibilities in the preparation, monitoring and audits of public transfers in the electricity sector. However, in the past two years, weak communication and coordination amongst these entities resulted in random rather than realistic estimates of needed subsidies. The other three indicators for this objective relate to improvements in PEFA indicators: #25 on quality and timeliness of annual financial statements, #26 on the scope, nature, and follow-up of external audit, and #28 on legislative scrutiny of external reports. Haiti has not had a recent PEFA to assess the indicators, and the CLR reports some improvement on issues related to #28. (*Not Achieved*)

51. IEG rates the outcome of IEG support under Focus Area V of the ISNs Unsatisfactory. Most of the efforts under the Bank program to strengthening governance and institutional capacity are progressing very slowly, or not showing the results envisaged.

ISN CY12 and ISN FY12-FY13 Assessment

52. IEG rates the overall outcome under the ISN C12 and the ISN FY12-FY13 as Moderately Satisfactory. Despite a difficult environment, the program was successful in starting to build human capital, reducing vulnerabilities, reconstructing housing, and upgrading neighborhoods. At the same time the program was much less successful on the longer term priorities it set for itself, such as inclusive growth and strengthening governance.

Overall Assessment and Rating

CAS FY09-FY12

53. IEG rates the overall outcome of the FY09-FY12 CAS as Unsatisfactory. All in all, seven of the nine CAS objectives were partially achieved or not achieved, reflecting the significant disruptions caused by the earthquake. As a result of quick Bank action there were additional achievements in the aftermath of the quake and preceding the ISNs, which cannot be assessed by IEG in the absence of a results framework. To the extent that Bank activities started after the quake continued under the ISN period, such achievements are picked up there.

ISN CY12 and ISN FY12-FY13

54. IEG rates the overall outcome under the ISN C12 and the ISN FY12-FY13 as Moderately Satisfactory. Despite an environment that was complicated by the aftermath of a devastating earthquake, the program was successful in starting to build human capital, reducing vulnerabilities, reconstructing housing, and upgrading neighborhoods. At the same time the program was much less successful on the longer term priorities it set for itself. The promotion of inclusive growth fell significantly short of expectations, and there was virtually no progress on strengthening governance and capacity. The difference in achievement across focus areas can be attributed in part to government ownership and to government priorities to allocate limited local capacity across program objectives. The government was committed to the short term objectives of reconstruction and reducing vulnerabilities, and thus devoted substantial human and financial resources to them. Such government support also facilitated cooperation among the numerous donors operating in Haiti in those areas. The focus on short term issues limited the ability to devote human and financial resources to the longer term issues of growth and institutional development. Moreover, the government appeared much less committed to reforms in the business environment (including reform of the electricity sector and company), in enhancing governance, and in building institutional capacity. As a consequence, results in those areas of the Bank program suffered.

Objectives	CLR Rating	IEG Rating
CAS FY09-FY12		
Focus Area I: Promoting Growth and Local Development	**Moderately Unsatisfactory**	**Moderately Unsatisfactory**
Focus Area II: Invest in Human Capital	**Moderately Satisfactory**	**Moderately Unsatisfactory**
Focus Area III: Reduce Vulnerability to Disasters	**Moderately Satisfactory**	**Moderately Unsatisfactory**
Focus Area IV: Strengthen Institutions and Support Delivery of Visible Results	**Unsatisfactory**	**Unsatisfactory**
Development Outcome	***Moderately Satisfactory***	***Unsatisfactory***
ISN CY12 and ISN FY12-FY13		
Focus Area I: Reduce Vulnerability and Increase Resilience	**Moderately Satisfactory**	**Moderately Satisfactory**
Focus Area II: Sustainable Reconstruction	**Moderately Satisfactory**	**Moderately Satisfactory**
Focus Area III: Building Human Capital	**Satisfactory**	**Satisfactory**
Focus Area IV: Promote Inclusive Growth	**Moderately Unsatisfactory**	**Moderately Unsatisfactory**
Focus Area V:Strengthen Governance and Capacity	**Unsatisfactory**	**Unsatisfactory**
Development Outcome	***Moderately Satisfactory***	***Moderately Satisfactory***

6. WBG Performance

Lending and Investments

55. At the start of the CAS period, IDA had 12 ongoing operations totaling $160 million. The ongoing portfolio included investment operations in community driven development, governance, education, transport and territorial development, and electricity.

56. During the CAS period, IDA made commitments totaling $72 million for eight operations, including operations to reconstruct bridges and reduce vulnerabilities, a community-driven development project, a transport project, emergency school reconstruction, electricity, and strengthening management of public services. The amount of the commitments where about half the plan under the CAS because after the earthquake priorities shifted and disbursements were made under the two ISN programs.

57. Under the two ISNs that covered CY12 and FY13-FY14 IDA committed an additional US$662 million for rebuilding energy infrastructure, disaster risk management and reconstruction, education for all, business development and investment, relaunching agriculture, and DPL operations for reconstruction and growth. This amount compares with US$550 million planned under the ISNs.

58. During the full period under review there were 25 trust funded activities for US$281 million, primarily for Port au Prince housing reconstruction, improving maternal and child health, education, governance, and complementing the emergency DPL (FY11).

59. On average, for the period FY09-15, IDA committed resources were disbursed at a rate of 26 percent, similar to the LCR region (27 percent) and at a higher rate than Bank wide (22 percent). The disbursement rate for the Haiti program is notable in light of the difficulties faced by Haiti in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake and the significant additional resources committed.

60. The Haiti portfolio was riskier than the LCR Region and Bank wide portfolios. During FY09-FY15, the Haiti portfolio had 66 percent of the projects at risk, as compared to 21 percent for the LCR Region and 20 percent Bank-wide. On a commitment basis, the Haiti portfolio also was riskier with 56 percent of the commitments at risk as compared to 16 percent for the LCR region and 18 percent Bank-wide. IEG reviewed the ICRs of sixteen projects that closed during the FY09-FY15 period and rated ten as moderately satisfactory or better, and six as moderately unsatisfactory or unsatisfactory. With respect to active projects, management assessments report that about half were making satisfactory progress towards achieving their development objectives, with a significant number of projects, including the Business Development and Investment (FY13), Relaunching Agriculture (FY12), and Rebuilding Energy Infrastructure and Access (FY13), being rated Moderately Unsatisfactory or Unsatisfactory in latest supervision reports.

61. There were no IFC investment projects at the inception of the review period. During the review period, IFC committed US$95.1 million through 10 investments. The two largest investments were to develop SME lending capacity within a bank for US$25 million (where the IFC had made an equity investment as well) and to develop electricity generation capacity for US$16 million.

62. The CLR did not discuss IFC's portfolio, but according to IFC internal documents one of the projects merited a rating of "sub-standard". A mining project (a regional initiative with operation in Haiti) has been similarly termed "doubtful deteriorating". IEG has not reviewed any of the IFC investments.

Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

63. A program of analytic work and advisory activities and services including 3 Economic and Sector Works (ESWs) and 28 Technical Assistance (TA) tasks were delivered during the FY09-FY15 period. The Bank provided advice to the government on early recovery and damage assessment, energy access expansion and efficiency, nutritional security, trade integration, poverty measurement, health, education, social protection, and social dimensions of reconstruction. All in all, the program of AAA supported well the Bank's lending program, and according to the CLR made an important contribution to the work on damage assessment and recovery planning.

64. IFC had two advisory service (AS) projects approved before the review period for US$5.5 million, which were implemented during the review period. During the review period, IFC approved 13 new AS projects amounting to over US$12.4 million of total funds. Eight of these AS projects have closed, and seven were rated MS/S/HS at completion by IFC with IEG validating two of them with MS/"Not Applicable" ratings. One of the closed projects was rated Unsuccessful by IFC and was validated similarly by the IEG. Two have been terminated and another put on hold. Of the four active projects, only one that was approved in 2015 appears to be implemented as planned.

Results Framework

65. The CAS results framework had an adequate design showing the country development goals, issues and obstacles, outcomes to which WBG expects to contribute, intermediate indicators (milestones), and WBG activities. Although the causal chain was not explicitly discussed in the text, the annex with the results framework lends itself for inference of causal links that on the whole appear credible. At the same time, in some instances the indicators had a tenuous connection with the program objectives, and some indicators lacked baseline value. The quantified targets were generally overambitious in light of implementation constraints and public sector capacities, and IFC activities were kept outside the framework which made their contributions difficult to evaluate. The scale up to

country level outcomes from Bank interventions were not explicitly discussed in the program documents. The ISN frameworks were nicely developed for an ISN, with well-articulated links of outcomes to country development goals, and appropriate Bank interventions supporting the outcomes. ISN outcomes generally had measurable indicators. Yet, in a number of instances indicators reflected poorly the objectives and several indicators stopped at the output level (no outcome targeted). The latter reflected the difficulty to measure outcomes over a short period in an emergency situation that compounded a context of weak capacity for the program. Some of the indicator target values—health, agriculture, regulatory reform in business environment—were overly ambitious and had to be revised. The CLR attributes this to an underestimation of the time that it would take to build implementing units and the required institutional capacity following the earthquake. IFC activities were kept outside the original framework which made their contributions difficult to evaluate.

Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

66. The Haiti program faced many challenges, and donor coordination was prominent among them. Aid to Haiti is fragmented and lacking both in terms of coordination and harmonization. Within this context, the Bank made efforts to coordinate its support with others. It led the donor's working group on budget support and economic governance reforms. In education it cooperated effectively with the Caribbean Development Bank, CIDA, IDB, and AFD on the tuition waiver mechanism. In energy it cooperated with US and IDB in the preparation of white paper for electricity sector reform. The Bank has coordinated with other donors on water, nutrition, electricity, disaster risk management, transport, agriculture, health and cholera, but the CLR recognizes that the project-by-project approach is not fully effective and needs to be replaced by a programmatic approach that is more effective in supporting the government's sector strategies.

Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

67. A number of projects triggered environmental safeguards, which generally appear to have been addressed by the Bank. Based on IEG's review of 16 Implementation Completion Reports of Haiti projects that closed during the period under review—only two of which were approved after the earthquake[3]—in several instances there was no systematic documentation of safeguard outcomes in these ICRs. With respect to fiduciary issues, the team reports that over the FY10-FY15 period INT received 6 allegations and undertook two investigations. A 2011 investigation into the Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project (FY10) resulted in 2013 in the debarment of the complaining firm from receiving future World Bank-financed contracts. The second investigation—opened in 2013 and closed in 2015—pertained to two separate allegations under the Education for All II Project which were substantiated. Concurrent with the INT investigation, the Bank's education team took action to improve implementation and supervision of the project.

Ownership and Flexibility

68. The government was committed in a number of areas of the Bank program, particularly those related to reconstruction and emergency response. The program certainly was responsive in making adjustments and responding to changed country conditions from the effects of the earthquake. By the same token, the government demonstrated less commitment—or evidenced less priority—to reform the energy sector, improve institutions and governance, and reform the business environment. As a result Bank program results suffered in all these areas.

[3] The Emergency DPO (FY11) and Cholera Emergency Response Project (FY11).

WBG Internal Cooperation

69. Bank-IFC cooperation on regulatory reform of the business environment showed limited progress owing primarily to government prioritization of other issues. Moreover, the original results framework for the program failed to integrate IFC activities, and this limits the ability to assess the effectiveness of cooperation on the ground. Although the Haiti team has explained that there is ongoing joint exploration of synergies and entry points, the CLR could have explained better collaboration between IFC and the Bank.

Risk Identification and Mitigation

70. Risks to the Bank program identified—natural disasters, socio-political volatility, insufficient government and institutional capacity, corruption—were appropriate, and the Bank showed responsiveness and flexibility to deal with them when they arose. Clearly the Haiti program is a high risk program with some risks that are hard to mitigate. IEG concurs with the CLR that the Haiti program was worth taking the risks, given the potential for significant Bank impact in the country. The enlarged program (under ISNs) enabled the Bank to play a larger role in policy reform and donor coordination.

Overall Assessment and Rating

71. IEG rates WBG performance as *Good*. The WBG stepped up its game after the earthquake in Haiti, and its program supported the government in key areas for responding to the devastation caused by the earthquake and the reconstruction of the country, which now positions Haiti well to address the significant long term challenges that remain. The CAS FY09-FY12 results matrix included a set of outcomes consistent with the government's program. It showed though, a dispersion of knowledge and investment activities over a number of sectors that was not conducive to good results. The Bank was quick to respond to the earthquake with technical advice and timely adjustments to the Bank program. Even before the ISNs, it was contributing to improve Haiti's precarious situation by assessing damages, feeding children in schools, helping prepare and implement the cholera response, and starting reconstruction. The ISN CY12 was intended to support Haiti's reconstruction after the earthquake while a new government took office. It prioritized investments for reconstruction where the Bank had experience, with investments in disaster risk management, education, and agriculture. Instruments included sector investment grants (emergency operations where needed), a Development Policy Operation, and trust fund resources to strengthen or complement IDA interventions. Knowledge activities would be complementary to promote infrastructure and business environment development. Given that Haiti was not prepared for a new full CAS, the ISN CY12 was followed up by ISN FY12-FY13, which continued with work initiated under the ISN CY12 and included additional work on reconstruction, human capital, inclusive growth and governance. Although causal chains were not explicitly discussed in the texts the annexes with the results frameworks lend themselves for inference of causal links that on the whole appear credible. But in a number of instances the indicators had a tenuous connection with the program objectives, and some indicators (health/agriculture/regulatory reforms business environment) were overambitious in light of implementation constraints and public sector capacities. In addition, IFC activities were kept outside the framework. Program implementation was very slow in some areas (electricity, governance, institutional capacity). The Bank made efforts to coordinate its support with others. It led the donor's working group on budget support and economic governance reforms. In education it cooperated effectively with the Caribbean Development Bank, CIDA, IDB, and AFD on the tuition waiver mechanism. In energy it cooperated with US and IDB in the preparation of white paper for electricity sector reform, and with them is on the PM's energy commission. The CLR recognizes that the project-by-project approach to coordination is not fully effective and needs to be replaced by a programmatic approach that is more effective in supporting the government's sector strategies. Bank-IFC cooperation on regulatory reform of the business environment showed limited progress owing primarily to government prioritization of other issues.

7. Assessment of CLR Completion Report

72. The CLR framework of analysis is broadly consistent with the CAS FY09-FY12 and ISNs (CY12, FY12-FY13) frameworks. The CLR discusses the evidence on program indicators, but could have been more substantive in explaining the WBG's contribution to country outcomes. While it is candid, the CLR could have discussed in more detail program implementation issues. Several indicators were—particularly those related to quality—were dropped from one document to the other without much explanation in the text. Thus it is difficult to interpret the reason for the indicators being dropped. The CLR also could have explained better IFC-Bank collaboration.

8. Findings and Lessons

73. Haiti is a high risk country where the Bank needs to remain engaged or even intensify engagement. Therefore the key in future will be to adopt safeguards that minimize risks while aiming for realistic results. The following suggestions for continued Bank engagement in Haiti are in line with the CLR and other documents:

- Design programs assuming continued fragility, changing circumstances, and low local capacity for the foreseeable future.
- Strengthen implementation capacity support to the government while building WBG capacity in Haiti to handle portfolio growth and riskiness.
- Project management remains a significant bottleneck for timely project execution. Give priority in budget for close and intensive implementation support and additional training to locals.
- Sector reforms require long-term programmatic approach, which includes institution building and understanding the political economy environment for reforms.
- Governance and capacity development in Haiti will continue to be a challenge for the Bank for the foreseeable future—as evidenced in the results of the relevant focus area under the CAS FY09-FY12 and ISNs. The Bank has no way around it but staying engaged in these areas to build sustainable institutions that are accountable and capable of effectively delivering services. But programs should not anticipate significant service delivery improvements early in implementation, and build capacity in ministries with simple design and clear institutional objectives.

Annex Table 1: Summary Achievements of CAS Objectives

	CAS FY09-FY12: Focus Area 1 - Promote Growth and Local Development	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
Major Outcome Measures	1. CAS Objective: Increase in income-generating opportunities, better access to infrastructure services at local and national level (Partially Achieved)		
	Indicator: Community Driven Development Project - Number (proportion) and US$ amount of income-generating community subprojects fully operational for six months or more **Baseline:** 103 sub-projects (50%) for US $1.85m are operational for six months or more (2008). **Target:** 502 sub-projects (75%) for US $10.2m are operational for six months or more (2012).	Since the project began in 2006, about 1.15 million people benefited from the project, through 1,400 sub-projects implemented in 59 rural municipalities, who received US$ 24 million (target US$10.2 million). A total of 83% of productive and income-generating activities were operational twelve months after their completion.	Source: CLR
	Indicator: EDH (Public Electricity Company) Cash Recovery Index **Baseline:** 27% (Dec. 2008) **Target:** 37% (2012)	Despite an increase in power generation capacity (E-Power commissioned in 2010), the target of increasing the cash recovery index to 37% by 2012 was not met.	Source: CLR
	Indicator: Amount of travel time reduced on selected roads **Baseline:** TBD on each road before rehabilitation **Target:** 30% reduction (2012)	The Transport and Territorial Development Project (PTDT) completed one and was on track to complete the other of the two road sections targeted. On the first road, the transit time was cut in half and on the second road it was reduced from 6 to 2hrs (66% reduction).	Source: CLR The indicator was revised at the CLR stage. The original indicator was “cost of transport on selected rehabilitated roads”. Neither the CPS nor the CLR provided a baseline. The target was revised upwards at the CLR stage from 25% to 30%.
	2. CAS Objective: Enhance agriculture sector contribution to economic growth and local development (Partially Achieved)		
	Indicator: Number of producers receiving agricultural extension services in the project area (Thiotte – Baptiste)	The Strengthening of Agriculture Public Services Project (RESEPAG) reached 1,000 producers in 2011, against a target of providing support services to 3,000 farmers by 2012. After the earthquake, the original closing date was extended by one year to	Source: CLR

	CAS FY09-FY12: Focus Area 1 - Promote Growth and Local Development	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	Baseline: 300 (2009) **Target:** 3,000 (2012)	deal with implementation delays caused by weaknesses in procurement, as well as, the death of one project implementation unit staff in the earthquake. The project eventually reached 4,565 as of May 2014.	
	CAS FY09-FY12: Focus Area 2 – Invest in Human Capital	**Actual Results (as of current month/year)**	**Comments**
	3. CAS Objective: Increase access to basic education (Partially Achieved)		
	Indicator: Number of student benefiting from tuition waivers **Baseline:** 29,000 (2009) **Target:** 135,000 (2012)	The Haiti team reports that number of children supported by the tuition waiver program reached about 155,000 by June 2011.	Source: CLR
	Indicator: Number of reconstructed schools **Baseline:** 0 (2009) **Target:** 11 (2012)	During the CPS period, architects were recruited and designs of schools were finalized for most of the 11 schools.	Source: CLR
Major Outcome Measures	4. CAS Objective: Improve nutritional security of children (Partially Achieved)		
	Indicator: Build consensus on National Nutrition Strategy **Baseline:** No strategy in place **Target:** Strategy adopted	In the context of significant malnutrition among the vulnerable population (19 to 22% of children are moderately or severely malnourished), progress was made on a nutrition strategy. All major stakeholders in the nutrition sector coalesced to advance the nutrition agenda. A national nutrition policy was prepared and consensus was developed around a strategy.	Source: CLR
	5. CAS Objective: Improve access to clean water (Partially Achieved)		
	Sanitation **Indicator:** Number of latrines in use in project communities **Baseline:** 3,000 (2009) **Target:** 4,950 (2012)	The Project successfully contributed to increasing access to and use of sanitation in 4,964 households in the 7 communities targeted for this intervention.	Source: CLR
	Indicator: Number of beneficiaries receiving improved water services in participating communities (access, continuity and safety) **Baseline:** 0 (2009) **Target:** 65,000 (2012)	The Bank program improved access to potable water by constructing 8 rural water networks serving 33,000 people.	Source: CLR

	CAS FY09-FY12: Focus Area 3 – Reduce Vulnerability to Disasters	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	6. CAS Objective: Strengthen institutional capacity for disaster preparation, response and recovery (Mostly Achieved)		
	Indicator: Number of days post-disaster to prepare (i) response plan; (ii) recovery plan Response Plan **Baseline:** 30 days **Target:** 10 days (2012) Recovery Plan **Baseline:** 180 days **Target:** 60 days (2012)	The target for the response plan was not met in that it took 30 days to prepare the Port au Prince earthquake response plan while it was met for the recovery plan in that it took less than 60 days to prepare. The target for the response plan was met for the cholera epidemic and Hurricane Thomas, but not for the 2010 earthquake.	Source: CLR
	7. CAS Objective: Integrate vulnerability reduction and risk management into national, sectoral and local development strategies and programs (Partially Achieved)		
	Indicator: Risk management and vulnerability reduction strategies integrated in development plans. **Baseline:** Sectoral plans consider risk management **Target:** 5 key ministries integrate vulnerability strategies into sectoral plans (Ministries of Public Works, Agriculture, Education, Environment, and Social Affairs).	While there was a functioning civil protection unit with clearly defined procedures, response plan, and an elaborated communication strategy that was sufficiently staffed, mainstreaming disaster reduction in all the five targeted ministries had not taken place during the CPS period.	Source: CLR

	CAS FY09-FY12: Results Area 4 – Strengthen Institutions and Support the Delivery of Visible Results	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	8. CAS Objective: Improve public sector management systems, including strengthened budget preparation, budget execution and strengthened internal and external controls (Not Achieved)		
	Indicator: Multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting (PEFA indicator 12) Baseline: D (2007) Target: B (2011)	The target of incorporation of multi-year perspective in fiscal planning, expenditure policy and budgeting was not reached. PEFA report of November 2011 gives Indicator 12 a rating of D+.	Source: CLR
	Indicator: Scope, nature and follow-up of external audit (PEFA indicator PI 26) Baseline: D+ (2007) Target: B (2011)	The target for scope, nature and follow-up of external audit was also not achieved. PEFA report of November 2011 does not rate Indicator 26 owing to lack of documentation.	Source: CLR
	9. CAS Objective: Improve capacity of Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) to manage public sector investments (Not Achieved)		
	Indicator: Non-salary commitment rate of MARNDR's operating budget Baseline: 80% (2009) Target: 95% (2012)	No progress has been made with respect to the increase in the level of non-salary-commitment of the Ministry of Agriculture's operating expenses.	Source: CLR

Summary of Achievements of ISN Objectives

	ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Focus Area 1 - Reduce Vulnerability And Increase Resilience	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
Major Outcome Measures	1. ISN Objective: Enhance disaster preparation and response capacity (Not Achieved)		
	Indicator: Share of population living in a municipality with a certified CCPC (*Comité Communal de Protection Civile*) **Baseline:** 20% (2011); **Target:** 35% (2012)	The activity to support the CCPCs was not initiated due to implementation delays.	Source: CLR The target was revised upwards at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage from 25% to 35%.
	2. ISN Objective: Rehabilitate selected public infrastructure rehabilitated and resilience of critical transport infrastructure strengthened (Mostly Achieved)		
	Indicator: Additional km of roads rehabilitated and critical bridges and road sections repaired to satisfactory standards **Baseline:** 0 (2011) **Target:** 168 Km (2014)	The CLR reports that, during the ISN period, 150 Km of roads were rehabilitated. In addition, the CLR reports that access was restored to selected critical points of the transport network, including 4 fjords and emergency overpasses that were restored, 11 out of 14 other bridges impacted by the 2008 hurricane season that were strengthened, and 5 road sections that were rehabilitated.	Source: CLR
	3. ISN Objective: Enhance prevention and treatment of cholera (Achieved)		
	Indicator: Additional people benefiting from targeted health and hygiene education, water treatment and cholera prevention measures **Baseline:** 1 million (2011) **Target:** 1.5 million (2013)	Overall, nearly 3 million people have been sensitized to better recognize cholera early warning signs and symptoms and to pursue proper treatment.	Source: CLR The indicator was reformulated at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
	Indicator: Number of people in rural areas provided with access to improved water sources under the project **Baseline:** 33,680 (2011) **Target:** 51,000 (2013)	The Rural Water and Sanitation project increased access to water services in participating rural communities. It provided 59,367 people with access to improved water supplies in 15 communities.	Source: CLR The indicator was introduced at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.

	ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Focus Area 2 - Sustainable Reconstruction	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
Major Outcome Measures	4. ISN Objective: Upgrade neighborhoods and repair housing (Achieved)		
	Indicator: # of displaced households (HH) that have returned to neighborhoods **Baseline:** 0 (2011) **Target:** 9,000 HH (2012), 22,500 beneficiaries of which 50% women	The Port au Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction and Urban CDD AF projects achieved the objective of upgrading neighborhoods and repairing housing. The rental housing cash grant program, developed in conjunction with Government and donors, supported the return of about 14,800 households from camps into safe rental units. The number of people who benefited from the program was 48,000 of which half were women.	Source: CLR The objective was reformulated at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. The target was revised upwards at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
	5. ISN Objective: Improve services in project neighborhoods (Achieved)		
	Indicator: # of households benefitting from community-wide upgrading **Baseline:** 0 (2011) **Target:** 25,000 HH (2014), 125,000 beneficiaries of which 50% women	The Port au Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction and Urban CDD AF benefited 25,000 households. The number of people that benefited from the program was 80,000 of which half were women.	Source: CLR The objective was reformulated at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. The target was revised upwards at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
	6. ISN Objective: Improved access to electricity (Achieved)		
	Indicator: Average daily services availability (metro Port au Prince) **Baseline:** 14 hrs. / day (2011) **Target:** 16 hrs. / day (2014)	By mid-2014, the average level of service was 16 hours per day.	Source: CLR The objective included a "quality" dimension that was dropped at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage and only "access" was kept as part of the objective. The indicator was changed at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
	7. ISN Objective: Increase the commercial viability of the electricity sector (Not Achieved)		
	Indicator: EDH (Public Electricity Company) Cash Recovery Index **Baseline:** 22% (2011) **Target:** 27% (2014)	As of May 2014, the EDH cash recovery index was 29%. Despite this progress, major political economy issues, financial, and commercial hurdles that continued to exist in the sector, including very high commercial losses (35%, national average) with EDH being unable to pay for the cost of basic maintenance services, fuel, and amounts due for generation under power purchasing agreement, even with subsidies.	Source: CLR The target was revised downwards at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.

	ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Focus Area 3 - Building Human Capital	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
Major Outcome Measures	8. ISN Objective: Increase access to schools and provide school feeding (Mostly Achieved)		
	Indicator: # of children receiving enrollment subsidies (per year) **Baseline:** 80,000 (2011) **Target:** 280,000, 50% girls (2014)	The Tuition Waiver Program financed by the Education for All APG1, APG2, and the EFA Multi-donor Trust Fund supported the enrollment of 300,000 students (cumulative) disadvantaged children in non-public schools from January 2012 to June 2014. In addition, approximately, 150,000 students (cumulative) benefitted from one snack and hot meal per from January 2012 to June 2014.	Source: CLR The objective was reformulated at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. Originally, the objective also included improving the quality of education. This dimension of the objective was dropped at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. The target was revised upwards at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. The indicator did not measure school feeding.
	Indicator: Additional qualified primary teachers **Baseline:** zero **Target:** 3,300 (2012)	The CLR reports that the Meeting Teacher Needs Project trained 2,600 qualified teachers.	Source: CLR The target was revised upwards at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. Although the quality dimension in the original objective was dropped, a proxy indicator for quality was left in the results framework.
	Indicator: # of children participating in integrated nutrition/health program, person/years **Baseline:** 28,000 (2011) **Target:** 56,000 (2012)	150,000 students (cumulative) benefitted from one snack and hot meal per day from June 2012 to June 2014.	The indicator was dropped at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
	9. ISN Objective: Reduce the vulnerability of women (Achieved)		
	Indicator: # of girls that received training, life skills, and placement services **Baseline:** 0 (2011) **Target:** 1,000 (2014)	The Adolescent Girls Initiative (AGI) trained 1,000 young, vulnerable Haitian women between the ages of 17-20 to increase their future employability and earnings. Beneficiaries received vocational, professional, and life skills training,	Source: CLR

ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Focus Area 3 - Building Human Capital	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	stipends to cover expenses for the training and internship (delivered via a mobile payment system) and an internship to facilitate entry into the labor market and give the girls hands-on experience.	
Indicator: Camp residents are equipped with Gender Based Violence (GBV) prevention kits and receive training in GBV prevention Baseline: 0 (2011) Target: 6,000 (2012)	The Rapid Social Response TF financed gender based violence trainings and kits for 7,000 women to protect themselves in a camp-setting.	Source: CLR
10. ISN Objective: Cash transfers to residents of earthquake affected neighborhoods		
Indicator: # work days temporary employment opportunities created in the implementation areas, including female beneficiaries Baseline: 0 (2011) Target: 450,000 workdays (2012), of which 225,000 for women	The Emergency Community Cash for Work project created 602,237 days of work y March 2012.	Source: CLR The objective and the indicator were dropped at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
11. CPS Objective: Increase access to health and social protection services (Achieved)		
Indicator: Percentage of people in targeted areas with access to a basic package of health, nutrition and population services Baseline: TBD Target: 10% improvement	In the target area of 3 communes with a population of 150,000, 65,000 people benefited from improved access to social services through the Kore Fanmi program funded by the Rapid Social Response trust fund. While a baseline was not collected, the project intervened in remote, underserved, and extremely poor areas where the project reached 43% of the population. According to the Haiti team, the project surpassed the target of 10% of people in the targeted area.	Source: CLR The objective and the indicator were introduced at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. The indicator lacked a baseline.
12. ISN Objective: Government has an understanding of options and international models to build a social protection mechanism		
Indicator: A roundtable on Social Protection options and objectives is held with key officials and stakeholders Baseline: No	A conference on social protection priorities and options was held in December 2014 with officials and stakeholders (UN, USAID).	Source: CLR The objective and the indicator were dropped at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.

	ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Focus Area 3 - Building Human Capital	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	Target: Yes (2012)		

	ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Results Area 4 – Promote Inclusive Growth	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
Major Outcome Measures	13. ISN Objective: Improve business environment and broaden access to finance (Partially Achieved)		
	Indicator: Increased volume of outstanding loan portfolio at end of each year Baseline: Haitian Gourde 28.5b (2011) Target: Haitian Gourde 55.0 (2014)	As of 2013, the volume of outstanding lending portfolio was 63.6b.	Source: CLR The target was revised upwards at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
	Indicator: Approval of regulatory texts for Integrated Economic Zones (IEZs) Baseline: Not yet approved (2011) Target: Signed by executive Branch or submitted to Parliament (2012)	With a template for the IEZ law provided by the WBG, the Presidential Commission for Business Law Reform was drafting the law. However, the law had not yet been submitted to the Parliament or signed by the Executive branch.	Source: CLR
	14. ISN Objective: Enhance regional economic development potential (Partially Achieved)		
	Indicator: Operationalization of the Park Authority to manage National Historic Park Baseline: none (2012) Target: Hiring of key staff in Park Authority (2014)	The transitional Park Authority mechanisms have been defined in March 2014. A transitional Director has been designated, who will lead the Park Management Plan preparation process. This process will define in detail the new Park Authority governance and management structure to be in place in 2016.	Source: CLR The indicator was introduced at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
	15. ISN Objective: Enhance agricultural services to farmers enhanced and improve rural access to basic socio-economic infrastructure (Mostly Achieved)		
	Indicator: # of farmers that have access to improved agriculture information, technologies, inputs, material, and services (also disaggregated by gender) Baseline: 1,000 (2011)	As of 2014, 4,565 farmers had received improved agriculture information, technologies, inputs, material, and services (38% women).	ource: CLR The objective was reformulated at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. The original indicator induced improving agricultural productivity and income.

	ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Results Area 4 – Promote Inclusive Growth	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	Target: 6,000 (2014) of which 20% women		The target was revised upwards at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. However, the CLR notes that the target should have been 3,000 as it had originally been stated in the ISN for CL12.
	ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Focus Area 5 - Strengthening Governance And Capacity	**Actual Results (as of current month/year)**	**Comments**
Major Outcome Measures	16. ISN Objective: Enhance disaster response capacity (Mostly Achieved)		
	Indicator: # of Disaster Risk Management Units in line Ministries that are able to incorporate hazard risk analysis into their programs **Baseline:** 0 (2011) **Target:** 3 (2012)	Units were established and have been functional in the Ministry of Public Works (MTPTC) and Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT) under the Prime Minister's Office, which is responsible for regional development.	Source: CLR The target was revised upwards at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
	Indicator: Five cholera management departmental plans approved and under implementation **Baseline:** 4 approved and 2 under implementation (2012) **Target:** 5 under implementation (2013)	Through the Bank's Emergency Cholera project, all 6 intervention Departments have Departmental Cholera Management Plans. A national cholera focal point and Departmental coordinators were put in place in each of the 6 Departments.	Source: CLR The baseline and target were introduced at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
	Indicator: Ministry of Public Works (MTPTC) bridge management unit operational (2012) **Baseline:** No (2011) **Target:** Yes (2012)	The Bank supported the establishment of the bridge management unit in 2011, which became operational in 2012.	Source: CLR
	17. ISN Objective: Strengthen institutional capacity for housing repair and reconstruction (Mostly Achieved)		
	Indicator: Community urban development plan completed and approved by targeted communities **Baseline:** 1 (2012) **Target:** 6 (2014)	Urban development plans were prepared in each of the 4 neighborhoods where the Bank works on housing and neighborhood reconstruction. The Bank financed urban plans in 2 communities and the Bank leveraged its engagement in those neighborhoods for financing through other partners for 2 of the other communities. At the time the target was	Source: CLR The baseline and target were revised upwards at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.

ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Results Area 4 – Promote Inclusive Growth	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	set, it was thought that the Bank would work in 6 communities but in the end it only worked in 4.	
18. ISN Objective: Strengthen the Ministry of Public Works (MTPTC) energy policy and planning capacity (Not Achieved)		
Indicator: Energy sector master plan completed **Baseline:** No (2012) **Target:** Yes (2012)	Five international firms having submitted offers to do the master plan (an early version should be delivered by October 2014).	Source: CLR
19. ISN Objective: Strengthen education institutional capacity (Mostly Achieved)		
Indicator: % of schools receiving at least 1 inspector visit per year **Baseline:** N/A (2011) **Target:** 75% (2012)	65% of schools being inspected once a year.	Source: CLR The target was introduced at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
20. ISN Objective: Strengthen Government's capacity to manage and monitor service delivery (Achieved)		
Indicator: % of targeted population covered by health providers contracted by Ministry of Health **Baseline:** Not provided **Target:** 10% improvement	With regard to the specific indicator for service delivery, in the target area of 3 communes with a population of 150,000, 65,000 people benefited from improved access to social services through the Kore Fanmi pilot program funded by the Rapid Social Response trust fund.	Source: CLR The indicator was introduced at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
21. ISN Objective: Reform the business environment (Not Achieved)		
Indicator: Permanent public-private committee to define priorities for business environment reforms created **Baseline:** No (2012) **Target:** Yes (2014)	While a committee for business environment reforms has been created, progress on the objective of reforming the business environment was limited. The Prime Minister created a Working Group on "Doing Business" Reform that includes members from the public administration as well as representatives from the private sector and has appointed a Coordinator.	Source: CLR The indicator was introduced at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage.
22. ISN Objective: Strengthen capacity to implement the National Agriculture Extension Strategy (PDVA) (Partially Achieved)		
Indicator: Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) annual investment plan (PIP) reflects prioritization of investment as described in the National Agriculture	The Bank supported the elaboration of MARNDR's 5-year agriculture investment plan. However, the CLR does not report on whether the priorities outlined in this plan were reflected in annual investment plans (PIPs).	Source: CLR

	ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Results Area 4 – Promote Inclusive Growth	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
	Investment Plan (2011 - 2016) **Baseline:** No **Target:** Yes		
	23. ISN Objective: Improve transparency and accountability in Public Financial Management (Not Achieved)		
	Indicator: Audits of public transfers to the electricity sector **Baseline:** No audits completed (2011) **Target:** Audits of transfers to the electricity sector have been completed (2012)	With Bank engagement, EDH, MTPTC and the MEF signed a MOU to define roles and responsibilities in the preparation, monitoring and audit of public transfers in the electricity sector in 2013. However, in the last two years, weak communication and coordination amongst these entities resulted in random estimates of necessary subsidies rather than realistic ones.	Source: CLR
	Indicator: Quality and timeliness of annual financial statements (PI-25) **Baseline:** D+ (2011) **Target:** C (2014)	Treasury submitted government accounts to the Court of Accounts within the statutory time frame and the Court significantly reduced the backlog of audits, having completed the audits for general accounts for 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. The CLR does not report on the PEFA indicator.	Source: CLR The indicator was introduced at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. The CLR does not report on the PEFA indicator. Haiti has not had a recent PEFA to assess the indicators.
	Indicator: Scope, nature, and follow-up of external audit (PI-26) **Baseline:** D+ (2007) **Target:** C (2014)	In general, there was no follow up of audit recommendations from the Court of Accounts. However, the IIERP project supported the follow up of Finance General Inspection on key audit recommendations and worked with some line Ministries to address them.	Source: CLR The indicator was introduced at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. The CLR does not report on the PEFA indicator. Haiti has not had a recent PEFA to assess the indicators.
	Indicator: Legislative scrutiny of external audit reports (PI-28) **Baseline:** D (2011) **Target:** C (2014)	<u>Legislative Scrutiny of The Annual Budget Law</u> The government made progress in providing detailed budget documents to Parliament for review. However, weak capacity in Parliament, specifically the absence of permanent technical support at the legislative level undermined deep scrutiny from the legislative body. <u>Legislative Scrutiny Of External Audit Reports</u>	Source: CLR The indicator was introduced at the ISN FY13-FY14 stage. The CLR does not report on the PEFA indicator. Haiti has not had a recent PEFA to assess the indicators.

	ISN CY12 and ISN FY13-FY14: Results Area 4 – Promote Inclusive Growth	Actual Results (as of current month/year)	Comments
		In general, external audit reports were submitted to Parliament alongside the draft budget but were never discussed in Parliament. Without technical support, it was difficult for Parliamentarians to review the external audit reports.	

Annex Table 2: Haiti Planned and Actual Lending, FY09-15

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Approved Amount	Outcome Rating
Project Planned Under CPS FY09-12							
P111667	HT Avian Human Influenza Emergency	2009	2009	2012	1.6	1.6	IEG: MU
P114292	HT Emerg Bridge Reconst & Vulnerab Reduc	2009	2009	2015	20.0	20.0	LIR: MS
P114775	HT (AF) Community-Driven Develop Project	2009	2009	2016	8.0	8.0	Not applicable
P115261	HT: Emergency School Reconstruction	2009	2009	2012	5.0	5.0	IEG: MS
P113623	HT Strength. Mgmt of Agr Pub Serv GFRP	2009	2009	2015	5.0	5.0	LIR: MS
P112164	HT (AF) Electricity Loss Reduction Proje	2009	2010	2014	3.0	5.0	Not applicable
P117944	HT 3rd Econ. Governance Reform Operation	2009	2010	2011	12.5	12.5	LIR: MS
Not Available	Development Policy Op (Haitian FY10)	2009	Dropped	Dropped	14.0	Dropped	Dropped
P118139	HT (AF) Rural CDD (PRODEP)	2009	2010		9.0	15.0	Not applicable
Not Available	AF Support for Govt Priority Plan	2010	Dropped	Dropped	11.0	Dropped	Dropped
Not Available	Governance TA	2010	Dropped	Dropped	3.0	Dropped	Dropped
	Education and Training (APL II)	2011	Delayed	Delayed	12.0	Delayed	Delayed
	Total CPS Period				104.1	72.1	
Project Planned Under ISN CY2012							
P126346	Disaster Risk Management and Reconstruction	CY2012	2012	2017	60.0	60.0	LIR: MS
P124134	HT Education for All Project - Phase II	CY2012	2012	2017	70.0	70.0	LIR: MS
P123974	HT Business Development and Investment	CY2012	2013	2018	20.0	20.0	LIR: MU
P126744	HT Relaunching Agriculture: RESEPAG II	CY2012	2012	2017	40.0	40.0	LIR: MU
P118239	Development Policy Operation	CY2012	2011	2012	30.0	30.0	IEG: MS
Total ISN CY12					220.0	220.0	
Project Planned Under ISN FY13-Y14							
P130749	HT (AF) Infra. & Instit. Emerg Recov.	FY13-14	2013	2016	35.0	35.0	Not applicable
P127203	Rebuilding Energy Infrastructure and Access	FY13-14	2013	2018	90.0	90.0	LIR: U
P123706	HT Improving Maternal and Child Health	FY13-14	2013	2019	70.0	70.0	LIR: MS

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Approved Amount	Outcome Rating
P133352	HT - Ctr & Artibonite Reg Dev.	FY13-14	2014	2020	50.0	50.0	LIR: MS
P144614	HT Cultural Heritage and Tourism Sector	FY13-14	2014	2021	45.0	45.0	LIR: S
P127208	Economic Reconstruction and Growth DPC I	FY13-14	2013	2014	20.0	20.0	LIR: U
	Economic Reconstruction and Growth DPC II	FY13-14	Dropped	Dropped	20.0	Dropped	Dropped
Total ISN FY13-FY14					330.0	310.0	
Total Planned					654.1	602.1	
Unplanned Projects during the CPS and ISN							
P120895	HT MST Infra. & Instit. Emerg Recov.j		2010	2016		65.0	LIR: MS
P121193	HT (AF) Education for All APL1		2010			12.0	Not applicable
P120110	HT Cholera Emergency Response Project		2011	2014		15.0	IEG: MS
P121391	HT Post-Disaster Part Cred Guarant Prog		2011	2015		3.0	LIR: U
P121833	HT-(AF) Housing Reconstruction Urban CDD		2011	2016		30.0	Not applicable
P149116	HT Urban CDD Project - AF		2014	2016		7.5	Not applicable
Total Unplanned						132.5	
On-going Projects during the CPS and ISN Period			Approval FY	Closing FY		Approved Amount	
P093936	HT Governance Technical Assistance Grant		2005	2009		2.0	IEG: S
P090159	HT Emergency Recov.& Disaster Management		2005	2012		12.0	IEG: MS
P095371	HT Economic Governance TAG II		2006	2011		2.0	IEG: U
P093640	HT CDD Project (PRODEP)		2006	2013		38.0	IEG: MS
P095523	HT Transport and Territorial Development		2006	2014		16.0	LIR: MS
P100564	HT 2nd Econ. Governance Reform		2007	2010		23.0	IEG: MU
P104690	HT Catastrophe Insurance		2007	2011		9.0	IEG: MS
P089839	HT Rural Water and Sanitation		2007	2012		5.0	IEG: MS
P099918	HT (APL1) Education For All		2007	2012		25.0	LIR: MS
P098531	HT Electricity Project		2007	2014		6.0	IEG: U
P106621	HT Meeting Teacher Needs for EFA		2008	2012		6.0	IEG: MU
P106699	HT Urban CDD / PRODEPUR		2008	2016		15.7	LIR: MS

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Approved Amount	Outcome Rating
	Total On-going					159.7	

Source: Haiti CPS, ISN and WB Business Warehouse Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 9/9/15
*LIR: Latest internal rating. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory.

Annex Table 3: Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY10-FY14 for Haiti ($M)

Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount
P133352	HT Center and Artibonite Regional Development	TF 17021	2015	2020	8.0
P147166	HRF Grant for Strengthening Governance in Education and Water Sectors	TF 17656	2015	2016	17.3
P124134	Haiti - Education for All Project - Phase II	TF 17830	2015	2017	24.1
P127208	Economic Reconstruction and Growth Development Policy Credit	TF 15662	2014	2014	10.0
P126346	Disaster Risk Management and Reconstruction	TF 13014	2014	2016	0.6
P124134	Haiti - Education for All Project - Phase II	TF 17666	2014	2017	14.8
P123706	Improving Maternal and Child Health through Integrated Social Services	TF 14474	2013	2019	20.0
P123706	Improving Maternal and Child Health through Integrated Social Services	TF 13431	2013	2014	0.9
P121690	Household Development Agent Pilot	TF 13828	2013	2015	1.5
P126744	Relaunching Agriculture: Strengthening Agriculture Public Services II Project (GAFSP - IDA)	TF 11396	2012	2018	10.0
P125805	Port au Prince Neighborhood Housing Reconstruction	TF 99644	2011	2016	65.0
P121690	Household Development Agent Pilot	TF 97793	2011	2013	1.5
P124983	Haiti Housing Community Reconstruction Support	TF 98974	2011	2014	0.5
P123205	JSDF Grant for Emergency Community Cash for Work Project	TF 97742	2011	2012	2.8
P118239	Emergency Development Policy Operation	TF 97532	2011	2012	25.0
P114174	Haiti Education for All Fast-Track Initiative Catalytic Fund	TF 97009	2010	2016	22.0
Project Information Not Available		TF 97035	2010	2010	38.8
P106862	TTR IS Fund Phase 2	TF 94160	2009	2010	0.0
P104400	HT - Improving Health Surveillance	TF 93484	2009	2012	0.4
P116936	LICUS GRANT WB-UN/MINUSTAH MARTISSANT ROAD REHABILITATION PROJECT	TF 91944	2009	2010	0.9
P114936	HT SPF Rural Water and Sanitation Project	TF 93527	2009	2014	5.0
P107447	Haiti Institutional Strengthening for Donor Project Implementation	TF 92305	2009	2011	0.4
P112133	Supplemental EGRO-II Development Policy Grant	TF 92314	2008	2009	10.0
P100811	Port-au-Prince Area Community Driven Development Pilot Project (PCF) / PRODEPAP	TF 57498	2007	2009	1.3
P089873	Haiti Economic Governance Reform Operation	TF 55414	2006	2009	0.6
	Total				281.2

Source: Client Connection as of 9/9/15

Annex Table 4: Analytical and Advisory Work for Haiti, FY09 - FY15

Proj ID	Economic and Sector Work	Fiscal year	Output Type
P132356	HT Public Expenditure Review (PER)	FY15	Public Expenditure Review (PER)
P148914	Poverty Assessment	FY15	Poverty Assessment (PA)
P153924	Haiti PIM Evaluation	FY15	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
Proj ID	**Technical Assistance**	**Fiscal year**	**Output Type**
P123483	Haiti Adolescent Girls Initiative	FY15	TA/IAR
P124634	Education Service Delivery Support	FY15	TA/IAR
P130583	Social Dimensions of Reconstruction	FY15	TA/IAR
P130606	Haiti #10227 Strength Ins Reg	FY15	TA/IAR
P131111	Ag. Index Insurance Capacity Building	FY15	TA/IAR
P132421	HT Trade Facilitation	FY15	TA/IAR
P148915	Haiti Poverty NLTA	FY15	TA/IAR
P152842	HT-JIT Cholera Dialogue and Fundraising	FY15	TA/EPD
P153191	Digital Jam Haiti	FY15	TA/EPD
P155029	Resilient Productive Landscapes	FY15	TA/EPD
P117508	HT Enhance. Political Leadership	FY14	TA/IAR
P123160	HT Poverty Measurement and HH Survey	FY14	TA/IAR
P127500	HT Safety Nets phase 2 NLTA	FY14	TA/IAR
P128866	HT Diagnostic Trade Integration Study	FY14	TA/IAR
P146604	HT Gender Mainstreaming	FY14	TA/IAR
P147295	Haiti Energy Policy Dialogue	FY14	TA/EPD
P125916	HT-Energy Access Expansion SFLAC	FY13	How-To Guidance
P128403	HT- Gender Based Violence	FY13	Client Document Review
P113429	HT Nutritional Security and Safety Nets	FY12	TA/IAR
P118765	Haiti #8050 Strength. Account & Audit P	FY12	TA/IAR
P114989	HT Implementation of HOPE	FY10	Institutional Development Plan
P119724	HT Early Recovery and Damage Assessment	FY10	Model/Survey
P094807	HT PPIAF Electricity	FY09	Client Document Review
P103968	HT-Woodfuels: Promoting Efficient Stoves	FY09	How-To Guidance
P109895	HT (CCH)Energy CDM in poor countries	FY09	Knowledge-Sharing Forum
P110384	Haiti - AML/CFT Technical Assistance	FY09	How-To Guidance
P111455	Haiti - Technical Assistance for StAR	FY09	How-To Guidance
P111654	HT Telecom Regulations II - Rural Access	FY09	Client Document Review

Source: WB AO Table ESW/TA 8.1.4 as of 9/10/15

Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Haiti, FY09-Present

Exit FY	Proj ID	Project name	Total Evaluated ($M)	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
2010	P093936	HT Governance Technical Assistance Grant	2.1	SATISFACTORY	HIGH
2010	P100564	HT 2nd Econ. Governance Reform	24.1	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2010	P117944	HT 3rd Econ. Governance Reform Operation	12.5	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2011	P095371	HT Economic Governance TAG II	0.5	UNSATISFACTORY	HIGH
2011	P104690	HT Catastrophe Insurance	9.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2011	P118239	HT- Emergency DPO	30.6	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2012	P089839	HT Rural Water and Sanitation	5.2	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2012	P090159	HT Emergency Recov.& Disaster Management	19.3	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	HIGH
2012	P106621	HT Meeting Teacher Needs for EFA	5.9	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2012	P111667	HT Avian Human Influenza Emergency	1.3	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2012	P115261	HT: Emergency School Reconstruction	5.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	HIGH
2013	P093640	HT CDD Project (PRODEP)	62.8	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	HIGH
2014	P095523	HT Transport and Territorial Development	28.1	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2014	P098531	HT Electricity Project	10.3	UNSATISFACTORY	HIGH
2014	P120110	HT Cholera Emergency Response Project	15.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2015	P113623	HT Strength. Mgmt of Agr Pub Serv GFRP	5.1	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
		Total	236.6		

Source: BW Key IEG Ratings as of 9/9/15

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Haiti, FY09-15

Region	Total Evaluated ($M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat ($)	Outcome % Sat (No)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat ($)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (No)
Haiti	236.6	16	77.0	62.5	4.3	12.5
LCR	37,798.6	311	89.5	76.1	81.1	65.1
World	141,386.6	1,645	82.2	70.4	64.8	51.3

Source: WB Business Warehouse as of 9/9/15
* With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Haiti and Comparators, FY09-15

Fiscal year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average
Haiti								
# Proj	20	19	22	16	19	17	15	18.29
# Proj At Risk	12	6	9	12	14	12	8	10.43
% Proj At Risk	60.0	31.6	40.9	75.0	73.7	70.6	53.3	57.87
Net Comm Amt	214.1	319.2	426.3	517.2	692.5	733.6	758.0	523.00
Comm At Risk	145.0	52.0	192.0	400.7	487.5	477.8	369.3	303.46
% Commit at Risk	67.7	16.3	45.0	77.5	70.4	65.1	48.7	55.82
LCR								
# Proj	331	349	353	346	332	315	291	331.00
# Proj At Risk	74	68	61	68	72	70	68	68.71
% Proj At Risk	22.4	19.5	17.3	19.7	21.7	22.2	23.4	20.86
Net Comm Amt	26,198.1	32,161.5	32,557.8	33,341.8	30,843.3	29,271.0	27,713.0	30,298.09
Comm At Risk	3,297.1	5,316.1	3,195.2	4,503.5	6,097.4	6,355.6	5,866.5	4,947.33
% Commit at Risk	12.6	16.5	9.8	13.5	19.8	21.7	21.2	16.44
World								
# Proj	1925	1990	2059	2029	1,964	2,048	2,022	2,005.29
# Proj At Risk	386	410	382	387	414	412	444	405.00
% Proj At Risk	20.1	20.6	18.6	19.1	21.1	20.1	22.0	20.21
Net Comm Amt	135,706.0	162,975.3	171,755.3	173,706.1	176,202.6	192,610.1	201,045.2	173,428.65
Comm At Risk	20,857.8	28,963.1	23,850.0	24,465.0	40,805.6	40,933.5	45,987.7	32,266.09
% Commit at Risk	15.4	17.8	13.9	14.1	23.2	21.3	22.9	18.34

Source: WB Business Warehouse as of 9/9/15

Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for Haiti, FY09-15

Fiscal Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Overall Result
Haiti								
Disbursement Ratio (%)	23.72	40.33	36.11	34.00	28.08	21.97	14.94	25.87

Fiscal Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Overall Result
Inv Disb in FY	26.02	48.95	75.76	81.94	89.30	99.46	62.25	483.68
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	109.68	121.39	209.84	241.05	318.01	452.69	416.70	1,869.36
LCR								
Disbursement Ratio (%)	39.50	39.18	30.88	21.96	23.95	18.76	20.75	27.32
Inv Disb in FY	3,967.28	4,998.44	4,513.46	3,338.43	3,523.98	2,491.08	2,560.11	25,392.78
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	10,043.21	12,756.70	14,614.23	15,201.65	14,712.30	13,280.99	12,336.80	92,945.88
World								
Disbursement Ratio (%)	26.51	26.91	22.38	20.79	20.60	20.79	21.78	22.50
Inv Disb in FY	18,062.48	20,928.83	20,933.36	21,048.24	20,510.39	20,756.98	21,852.73	144,093.00
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	68,133.54	77,760.85	93,516.54	101,234.29	99,588.04	99,852.72	100,343.74	640,429.72

* Calculated as IBRD/IDA Disbursements in FY / Opening Undisbursed Amount at FY. Restricted to Lending Instrument Type = Investment.
BW disbursement ratio table as of 9/9/15

Annex Table 9: Net Disbursement and Charges for Haiti, FY09--15

Period	Disb. Amt.	Repay Amt.	Net Amt.	Charges	Fees	Net Transfer
Jul 2008 - Jun 2009	26,017,126	15,656,629	10,360,498	-	3,615,550	6,744,948
Jul 2009 - Jun 2010	75,198,869	35,941,644	39,257,225	-	200,645	39,056,580
Jul 2010 - Jun 2011	92,800,469	-	92,800,469	-	-	92,800,469
Jul 2011 - Jun 2012	73,764,130	-	73,764,130	-	-	73,764,130
Jul 2012 - Jun 2013	76,894,660	-	76,894,660	-	-	76,894,660
Jul 2013 - Jun 2014	93,368,566	-	93,368,566	-	-	93,368,566
Jul 2014 - Jun 2015	49,108,492	-	49,108,492	-	-	49,108,492
						-
Report Total	487,152,312	51,598,273	435,554,040	-	3,816,195	431,737,845

Source: World Bank Client Connection 9/10/15

Annex Table 10: List of IFC Investments in Haiti

Investments Committed in FY09-15

Project ID	Primary Sector Name	Project Size	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm
34593	Transportation and Warehousing	57,050	12,000	-	12,000
34672	Finance & Insurance	25,000	25,000	-	25,000
34687	Textiles, Apparel & Leather	27,532	10,000	-	10,000
32421	Accommodation & Tourism Services	57,200	13,250	-	13,250
31244	Collective Investment Vehicles	75,000		10,000	10,000
31704	Utilities	820	820	-	820
29607	Electric Power	5,000	1,000	-	1,000
27274	Electric Power	58,600	16,000	-	16,000
29598	Textiles, Apparel & Leather	3,000	3,000	-	3,000
26167	Finance & Insurance	4,000		3,992	3,992
	Sub-Total	313,202	81,070	13,992	95,062

Investments Committed pre-FY09 but active during FY09-15

Project ID	Primary Sector Name	Project Size	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm
	NONE				
	Sub-Total	-	-	-	-
	TOTAL	313,202	81,070	13,992	95,062

Source: IFC-MIS Extract as of June 30, 2015

Annex Table 11: List of IFC Advisory Services for HAITI

Advisory Services Approved in FY09-15

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US$
600407	Haiti Cap Haitian Port Rehabilitation	2015	2016	ACTIVE	CAS	1,925,147
593907	Leasing Development Project in Haiti	2014	2016	ACTIVE	FAM	601,048
600127	Scotiabank Greenfield MFI Haiti	2014	2015	CLOSED	FIG	59,500
600288	Haiti STCR	2014	2017	ACTIVE	FAM	489,462
600303	Haiti Credit Reporting System Development	2014	2018	ACTIVE	FAM	1,181,118
599059	MiCRO GIIF	2013	2016	DROPPED	FAM	1,977,543

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US$
580647	Haiti Housing Finance	2012	2015	CLOSED	FIG	370,856
588587	Sogebank Mobile Banking	2012	2016	ON HOLD	FIG	251,988
594707	Haiti power - Rehabilitation of EDH	2012		TERMINATED	PPP	15,000
565348	Haiti Investment Generation Strategy	2010	2014	CLOSED	IC	3,209,366
576807	Grupo M	2010	2010	CLOSED	SBA	80,000
561951	MSME Sogebank	2009	2013	CLOSED	A2F	1,633,018
564707	Business Edge Haiti	2009	2013	CLOSED	SBA	624,214
	Sub-Total					12,418,260

Advisory Services Approved pre-FY09 but active during FY09-15

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US$
26250	Haiti TELECO	2007	2011	CLOSED	PPP	2,447,500
26252	Haiti PSP Airprt	2007	2010	CLOSED	PPP	3,005,500
	Sub-Total					5,453,000
	TOTAL					17,871,260

Source: IFC AS Data as of June 30, 2015

Annex Table 12: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Haiti

Development Partners	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Australia	..	18.4	2.61	1.93	2.06	..
Austria	..	8.93	0.59	0.15	0.53	..
Belgium	5.3	25.18	13.12	8.43	6.37	..
Canada	119.72	458.87	242.04	167.2	105.95	..
Czech Republic	0.01	2.77	0.37	0.13	0.03	..
Denmark	..	24.98	-0.02	0	-0.09	..
Finland	1.22	12.18	8.24	2.36	4.47	..
France	49.02	144.09	53.52	74.3	50.2	..
Germany	16.89	43.57	27.91	25.49	11.49	..
Greece	0.05	0.72	0.01	0.01	..	..
Iceland	..	0.81	..	0.1	0.07	..
Ireland	1.42	6.85	4.23	3.18	2.83	..
Italy	0.68	63.07	2.78	1.01	1.9	..
Japan	24.84	71.98	22.24	16.36	13.41	..
Korea	0.43	5.54	0.97	2.45	4.64	..

Development Partners	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Luxembourg	1.04	3.82	2.35	1.88	1.71	..
Netherlands	0.22	19.15	13.87	16.71	6.79	..
New Zealand	0.06	1.44	..	..	..	..
Norway	4.28	66.78	24.12	22.24	14.22	..
Poland	..	0.15	0.56	0.06	..	..
Portugal	..	0.11	0.47	0.01	0.1	..
Slovak Republic	..	..	..	0.02	..	..
Slovenia	..	0.42	0.38	0.05	0.06	..
Spain	144.9	155.77	92.57	15.36	5.88	..
Sweden	0.48	40.31	19.15	15.21	5.68	..
Switzerland	6.07	23.02	17.38	16.36	21.95	..
United Kingdom	7.97	26.17	15.57	5.17	14.99	..
United States	319.56	1106.85	620.18	427.64	405.38	..
DAC Countries, Total	704.16	2331.93	1185.21	823.81	680.62	0
CarDB (Caribbean Dev. Bank)	14.16	6.32	8.05	9.56	20.05	..
EU Institutions	102.67	284.27	180.72	131.41	105.28	..
GAVI	..	..	0.1	2.15	3.66	..
GEF	0.3	1	0.66	1.36	2.43	..
Global Fund	28.89	11.36	38.76	24.39	22.54	..
IAEA	0.25	0.81	0.28	0.09	0.03	..
IBRD	..	..	..	..	..	..
IDA	39.2	69.38	63.86	84.65	92.71	..
IDB Sp.Fund	138.94	183.63	185.3	154.87	195.82	..
IFAD	10.05	6.04	5.2	3.24	3.26	..
IFC	..	..	..	..	..	..
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	61.44	124.07	12.93	22.58	9.96	4.98
Isl.Dev Bank	..	..	5	..	..	..
OFID	4.53	2.25	4.79	-0.26	3.78	..
UNAIDS	0.49	0.96	1.02	1.04	0.9	..
UNDP	8.51	10.54	6.88	7.25	5.66	..
UNFPA	2.61	6.61	3.23	3.1	3.53	..
UNICEF	2.36	2.32	3.47	2.24	2.68	..
UNPBF	0.79	2.33	0.67	..	0.02	..
WFP	0.27	2.75	2.89	3.19	2.14	3.7
Multilateral, Total	415.46	714.64	523.81	450.86	474.45	8.68
Cyprus	..	0.13	..	..	..	..
Estonia	..	0.68	..	..	..	..
Hungary	..	0.04	0.1	0.02	0.01	..
Israel	0.03	5.19	0.73	0.01	0.08	..

Development Partners	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Latvia	..	0.12	..	..	..	..
Lithuania	..	0.02	..	..	..	..
Romania	..	0.07	..	..	..	
Russia	..	..	..	0.05	..	..
Turkey	0.01	7.51	0.26	0.45	0.68	..
United Arab Emirates	..	4.63	..	0.02	..	
Non-DAC Countries, Total	0.04	18.39	1.09	0.55	0.77	0
Development Partners Total	1119.66	3064.96	1710.11	1275.22	1155.84	8.68

Source: OECD Stat, [DAC2a] as of 9/10/15

Annex Table 13: Economic and Social Indicators for Haiti, 2009 – 2015

Series Name								HT	LCR	World
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average 2009-2015		
Growth and Inflation										
GDP growth (annual %)	3.1	(5.5)	5.5	2.9	4.2	2.7	..	2.2	2.6	2.0
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	1.7	(6.8)	4.1	1.5	2.8	1.3	..	0.8	1.5	0.8
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)	1,580.0	1,490.0	1,590.0	1,640.0	1,710.0	1,750.0	..	1,626.7	14,004.3	13,639.1
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) (Millions)	680.0	660.0	710.0	760.0	810.0	830.0	..	741.7	9,015.3	10,043.2
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	(0.0)	5.7	8.4	6.3	5.9	4.6	..	5.1	3.6	3.4
Compositon of GDP (%)										
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		5.1	3.1
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		33.0	26.7
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		62.1	70.3
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		20.7	21.8
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	(1.2)	(24.3)	(15.7)	(21.6)	(14.9)	(9.2)	..	-14.5	20.6	22.2

External Accounts										
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	14.1	12.1	13.4	13.3	14.3	15.0	..	13.7	24.2	28.6
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	42.6	61.6	54.2	48.1	48.5	50.6	..	50.9	24.8	28.5
Current account balance (% of GDP)	(1.9)	(1.5)	(4.3)	(5.5)	(6.4)	..	..	-3.9		
External debt stocks (% of GNI)	22.0	14.3	9.9	14.1	14.9	..	..	15.0		
Total debt service (% of GNI)	0.7	2.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	..	..	0.6	3.3	
Total reserves in months of imports	4.5	5.3	5.1	6.2	6.8	..	..	5.6	8.8	13.9
Fiscal Accounts /1										
General government revenue (% of GDP)	17.8	23.9	21.9	23.4	20.8	19.6	20.9	21.2		
General government total expenditure (% of GDP)	22.4	22.8	25.5	28.2	28.0	26.0	24.0	25.3		
General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	(4.6)	1.1	(3.6)	(4.8)	(7.2)	(6.4)	(3.1)	-4.1		
General government gross debt (% of GDP)	28.0	17.5	12.0	16.6	21.5	26.7	27.6	21.4		
Social Indicators										
Health										
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	61.4	61.9	62.3	62.7	63.1	..	..	62.3	74.4	70.5

Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	65.0	67.0	68.0	68.0	68.0	..	..	67.2	92.4	83.6
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	25.5	25.9	26.3	26.7	27.1	27.4	27.6	26.6	81.9	65.9
Improved water source, rural (% of rural pop with access)	48.2	48.1	48.0	47.9	47.7	47.6	47.6	47.9	81.9	82.1
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	60.0	85.5	57.5	56.2	54.8	53.5	52.2	60.0	16.5	35.0
Education										
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		73.4	51.1
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		109.1	108.2
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		89.5	72.4
Population										
Population, total (Millions)	9,765,153.0	9,896,400.0	10,032,864.0	10,173,775.0	10,317,461.0	10,461,409.0	..	10,107,843.7	605,162,822.7	7,004,862,848.3
Population growth (annual %)	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	..	1.4	1.1	1.2
Urban population (% of total)	50.5	52.0	53.5	54.8	56.2	57.4	..	54.1	78.8	52.3

Source: WDI Central 9/10/15

*International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April