Document of
The World Bank

Report No.: 88958

PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

NIGERIA

SECOND NATIONAL FADAMA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
IDA-38380

June 26, 2014

IEG Public Sector Evaluation
Independent Evaluation Group

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

*Currency Unit = Naira (**NGN**)*

Currency Unit = Nigerian Naira

2000	US$1.00	NGN101.70
2001	US$1.00	NGN111.23
2002	US$1.00	NGN120.58
2003	US$1.00	NGN129.22
2004	US$1.00	NGN132.89
2005	US$1.00	NGN131.27
2006	US$1.00	NGN128.65
2007	US$1.00	NGN125.81
2008	US$1.00	NGN118.55
2009	US$1.00	NGN148.90

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADP	Agricultural Development Program
CDD	Community Driven Development
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
FCA	Fadama Community Association
FMARD	
FUG	Fadama User Group
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
ISN	Interim Strategy Note
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IEGPS	IEG Public Sector Evaluation
LDP	Local Development Plan
MTR	Mid-term Review
NFCO	National Fadama Coordinating Office
LGA	Local Government Area
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
SFCO	State Fadama Coordinating Office

Fiscal Year

Government: January 1- December 31

Director-General, Independent Evaluation	:	Ms. Caroline Heider
Director, IEG Public Sector Evaluation	:	Mr. Emmanuel Jimenez
Manager, IEG Public Sector Evaluation	:	Ms. Marie Gaarder
Task Manager	:	Ms. Lauren Kelly
		Mr. Hassan Ibrahim
		Ms. Katheryn Steingraber

Table of Contents

This report was prepared by Lauren Kelly, Professor Hassan Ibrahim, (Head, Agriculture Department, Federal University Dutsin-Ma, Katsina State, Nigeria), and Kathryn Steingraber (Consultant), who assessed the project in November 2014. The report was peer reviewed by Anis Dani and panel reviewed by Christopher D. Nelson. Marie Charles, Language Program Assistant, provided administrative support.

Boxes

Tables

Figures

Principal Ratings

	ICR*	ICR Review*	PPAR
Outcome	Highly Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Moderate	Moderate	Substantial
Bank Performance	Highly Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEGWB product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

Key Staff Responsible

Project	Task Manager/Leader	Division Chief/ Sector Director	Country Director
Appraisal	Sidi Jammeh	Joseph Baah-Dwomoh	Hafez M. H. Ghanem
Completion	Abimbola Adubi	Karen Brooks	Onno Ruhl

IEG Mission: Improving World Bank Group development results through excellence in evaluation.

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20-25 percent of the Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEG peer review, Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank department. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEG Rating System for Public Sector Evaluations

IEG's use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: http://worldbank.org/ieg).

Outcome: The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. *Possible ratings for Outcome:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High, Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Acknowledgments

This report was prepared by Lauren Kelly, Senior Evaluation Officer and Rural Livelihoods Specialist in the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank, in collaboration with Dr. Hassan Ibrahim, Head, Agriculture Department, Federal University Dutsin-Ma Katsina State, Nigeria and Kathryn Steingraber, Consultant, IEG. The assessment was overseen by Marie Gaarder, Manager, and Kenneth Chomitz, Senior Advisor, IEGPS and supported by Jeff Tanner, Impact Evaluation Specialist, IEG. Dr. Anis Dani, Lead Evaluation Officer and former Senior Social Specialist in the World Bank, provided valuable Peer comments and Chris Nelson, Senior Evaluation Officer, provided Panel comments. The team is grateful to Maria Gabriela Padrino and Jeff Lecksell for graphics support and Marie Charles, Language Program Assistant, for production support. The team would also like to express its gratitude to several staff members in the World Bank Country Office in Abuja who helped to facilitate a safe and effective assessment mission including Chinwe Agatha Ukpong-Bassey, Chika Ozo Chime, and Ruth Adetola Adeleru.

This assessment would not have been possible without the support of the National Fadama Coordination Office and the excellent services provided by the Fadama Coordination Offices in the States of Bauchi, FCT, Kaduna, Niger, Lagos and Oyo selected for this review. The team especially thanks the State Fadama offices, desk offices, and facilitators for helping IEG to locate and visit independently pre-selected beneficiaries that had been supported under Fadama II.

Source: IEG

Preface

This is a Project Performance Assessment of the Second Fadama Development Project that became effective on May 27, 2004 and that closed on December 31, 2009, as planned. Total actual project costs were US$118 million compared to the appraisal estimate of US$125 million. The second in a series of three consecutive rural development projects, Fadama II represented a significant shift in the way the World Bank framed its approach to service delivery and income generation in rural Nigeria. It was the first project to introduce the concept of community driven development to Nigeria's agriculture sector. A third phase of the project – Fadama III – was approved in December 2008 and was under implementation at the time of this review. For this assessment, IEG visited areas that had been supported by the second phase of the project.

METHODOLOGY

This project performance assessment seeks to validate the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the reported results of the second phase of the Fadama project in Nigeria. Significant limitations in the external assessment of the project and the Bank's completion reporting introduced complexities for the design of a comprehensive assessment of this project's performance. An Objectives based assessment, this review developed and implemented fit-to-purpose methods to evaluate three inter-dependent project objectives.

The primary objective of the second phase of the Fadama program was to sustainably increase the incomes of Fadama Users -- those who depend directly or indirectly on Fadama resources (farmers, pastoralists, fishers, hunters, gatherers, and service providers). This assessment was challenged by the fact that the project's monitoring and results framework did not collect income data. An independent beneficiary assessment conducted one year after the project began also experienced difficulty in collecting recall data on the change in major components of household income. Owing to these difficulties, the assessment utilized household composition and size and the change in major productive assets as the explanatory variable of their exercise while treating income as a dependent variable. The assessment was challenged by the fact that it counted the change in major productive assets as an outcome variable while the measured assets were the explanatory variable, or the input of the project. Neither the monitoring nor the assessment schemes measured sustainability as a function of the objective. None of the assessments disaggregated the results at the level of resource user.

To test the project's critical assumption – that Fadama users had sustainably increased their incomes as a result of the transfer of project supported assets - IEG administered a one-on-one survey to a random stratified sample of 10% of the direct Fadama beneficiaries that had been interviewed for the 2006 impact assessment. The survey was designed to verify and gauge the present day status of their public and private assets delivered under the project's second phase, since data pertaining to the effective functioning of these assets was used as a proxy to measure incomes by the external assessment. Sixty private and twenty public assets across six states were validated and assessed through this exercise.

The second objective of the project was to empower communities to take charge of their own development agenda. The indicators used to report on the achievement of this objective were limited, namely, the number of local development plans that were successfully implemented and the number and types of groups that were formed. The second purpose of IEG's survey was to learn more about group dynamics (functioning, participation in decision-making, heterogeneity of decision-making etc.) and to assess whether, through this vehicle, communities were empowered to take charge of their own development agenda. The survey included questions adapted from the "Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital (SC-IQ)" from Measuring Social Capital (Grootaert et al, 2004) and utilized measures derived from the "*Search for Empowerment: Social Capital as Idea and Practice at the World Bank*" (Woolcock and Narayan). The latter discusses ways that teams can quantify social capital for the purpose of deriving measures that can be aggregated at the community level. It points to the now commonly used measure of membership in informal and formal associations and networks – including density and characteristics, group functioning, contributions to groups, participation in decision-making, and heterogeneity of decision-making etc.

Beneficiary Selection. IEG's data collection was conducted in 6 of the 12 participating Fadama II states (four of the twelve states included in Fadama II were inaccessible due to heightened security risks). Beneficiaries included in this assessment were identified through their participation in a 2006 mid-line Beneficiary Assessment conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) located in Washington DC. A random stratified sampling method was applied to select 118 direct project beneficiaries – representing 10 of the direct project beneficiaries that participated in the IFPRI assessment- covering a total of 64 Fadama User Groups. IEG was careful to ensure that project beneficiaries were randomly selected from the direct project beneficiary list that was randomly selected by IFPRI. The random cohort of beneficiaries was then stratified to ensure that regional, cultural, and religious differences and gender were taken into account.

The IEG assessment was developed to gather beneficiary perceptions about group participation, composition, inclusion, and roles in local decision-making, including choice of and control over the use of the project awarded assets, paying attention to the project's inclusive aim of empowering marginalized and vulnerable persons. Recent work by White & Philips (2012) on using small n data discusses how such methods can draw on the implicit theory of change to assess whether theoretically predicted changes occurred as expected, or whether the causes and assumptions set out in the theory of change varied or whether the observed outcomes were a result, in part or whole, of external factors.

Table 1. Sample Composition of the PPAR Assessment (n=118)	
Gender	36 female beneficiaries (30%)
Age	Mean: 49; Min:23; Max:80; Missing: 3
Status	Leader (titled role): 57 (48%); Active Participant: 45 (38%); Not very active participant: 13 (11%)
Groups	65 Fadama User Groups (FUGs) were interviewed from a cross-section of user groups including farmers, pastoralists, vegetable processors, women widows, fishers, animal traction, livestock, millers, beekeepers, pottery, etc.

Table 2. States, Local Governments and Villages Included in IEG Assessment	
State	Local Government Area and Village(s)
Bauchi	Warji (Dagu); Bauchi (Bojinji, Kuitum, Gwallaga, Bauchi – Iya
Federal Capital Territory (FCT)	Bwari (Kuchiko); Gwagwalada (Tunga Maje)
Kaduna	Kagarko (Kubacha); Kauru (Damakasuwa)
Lagos	Badagry (Agonkanme, Akarakumo, Idale), Lagos Island (Okepopo, Sura)
Niger	Katcha (Jibo, Emigi, Kashe); Shiroro (Zumba, Gusoro, Shadnayi)
Oyo	Ido (Omi Adio); Orire (Atere)

IEG developed and conducted *Semi-Structured Group Interviews* with members of local government in twelve local government areas (two per state), the inter-village level Fadama Community Associations, members of the Fadama project infrastructure (Fadama State Coordination offices, local desk officers, and village level project facilitators) and with villages that had and had not directly participated in the project. The purpose of the group interviews was to understand present day perceptions about local development planning, the present status of the Fadama supported local development plans, local needs and perceptions about financing for local development.

Figure 1. Fadama II Areas included in the IEG Assessment



The project’s third objective was to reduce conflict. There were several challenges associated with the way that conflict data was collected and reported in the project that necessitated further field validation and inquiry. The most significant challenge relates to terminology, and the different methods that were used to collect the data at baseline and endline. Specifically, the recall data purportedly measures the number of *actual* conflicts that occurred while the endline data aggregates the number of conflicts that were *reported* in the Fadama project system. The project did not define the types or level of conflict it was targeting and fails to provide a metric that can attribute the reduction of conflict to the project interventions. IEG conducted *interviews* in six states and twelve local government areas with the Fadama project staff that were responsible for monitoring and reporting conflict. This included interviews with facilitators and desk officers in each local government area visited to gather information on how conflict was defined, understood, monitored, reported, and mitigated. IEG also conducted targeted group interviews with pastoral communities who had participated in the project to ascertain their perceptions about reported incidences of pastoral-farmer conflicts in the project areas.

Assessment Limitations. The assessment did not attempt to determine actual beneficiary incomes as a result of the project - owing to the lack of a baseline (recall data was utilized to determine pre-project income levels) and weakly constructed proxy indicators during the project cycle (See Chapter 3). This assessment was also not designed to conduct a comparative analysis between beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups. This is in part due to the fact that areas – not beneficiaries - were targeted in the Fadama programs (beneficiaries “opted-in”) and that there were significant spillover effects observed by IEG between areas and between phases. Also, Fadama III, launched in 2009, rolled out the program nationally. A previous attempt by the project to establish a control group was problematic because the Propensity Score Matching technique used by the evaluation did not model the participation decision. Rather, the variables chosen for the matching were likely to have affected the outcome.

Dissemination. Following standard IEG procedures, copies of the draft PPAR have been shared with relevant Government officials and agencies for their review and comment. Comments received are included in Annex E of the report.

Executive Summary

This is a Project Performance Assessment of the *Second Fadama Development Project* implemented between 2004 and 2009. “Fadama” is a Hausa name for irrigable land--usually low-lying plains that overlay shallow aquifers that straddle Nigeria's major river systems. The second in a series of three consecutive rural development projects, Fadama II represented a significant shift in the way the World Bank framed its approach to service delivery and income generation in rural Nigeria. It was the first project to introduce the concept of community driven development to Nigeria’s agriculture sector.

Fadama II had three separate but mutually reinforcing objectives to: Sustainably increase the incomes of Fadama users -- those who depend directly or indirectly on Fadama resources (farmers, pastoralists, fishers, hunters, gatherers, and service providers); empower communities to take charge of their own development agenda; and reduce conflict between Fadama users. This set of objectives was and remains *highly relevant* in the Nigerian context. Individually and collectively, they reflect a sharp course-correction from the project’s first phase that had trigged conflicts between resource users by favoring one group over another. Moreover, the former supply led approach to agricultural service delivery failed to take into account relative needs and farmer capacity.

The project design – featuring a community driven development approach – was *substantially relevant.* The project was designed to foster cooperation between resource users, through a facilitated negotiation of local needs and a focus on conflict mitigation. The demand-driven approach was designed to more effectively match rural service delivery with identified core local needs. It was also designed to be socially inclusive. The project design would have been more relevant had it been poverty-targeted. Design also lacked an adequate diagnostic of the income constraints of the more marginalized groups included in the project. While the project targeted several resource user groups in its primary objective, implementation arrangements maintained a bias towards farming and agricultural production. Conflict lacked a clear definition and a theory of attribution. An emphasis on the reporting of conflict reduction, rather than on rewarding early-identification, mitigation and resolution resulted in under-reporting by the project.

The project made *substantial* progress on achieving its first objective of sustainably increasing the incomes of Fadama users. While data made available from an external assessment lacks validity, IEG validated the project assumption that sustained assets could generate additional income that could be saved and reinvested over time. By revisiting 10 percent of all direct project beneficiaries interviewed by a 2006 external assessment, IEG was able to validate that 64 percent of their private assets were generating income, or had since yielded sufficient profits for repair or reinvestment. Public infrastructure investments were less successful with only 50 percent still functioning at the time of the IEG visit.

Efforts to empower communities to take charge of their own local development were less successful and are therefore rated *Modest*, mainly due to the discontinuation of the program activities after project close. Support made available to Fadama II villages was

limited to one project cycle, though the project was scaled up in a subsequent phase. The project was successful in supporting 95 percent of all community associations formed under the project to implement their local development plans. But the empowerment related indicators used by the project were inadequate to measure the project's empowerment effects. IEG validated the existence of local development plans in all twenty-two villages it randomly selected for site visits. But none of these plans had been updated since 2006 and all of them required additional finance. With few exceptions, interviews with local government officials revealed that the participatory and negotiated decision-making promoted by Fadama was not occurring there.

To better understand the contribution that the project may have had on empowering local communities, IEG administered a survey adapted from the *Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital (SC-IQ)"* (Grootaert et al, 2004) to 118 randomly selected beneficiaries in the six states selected for the evaluation. The survey revealed that Fadama was perceived to yield additional welfare benefits and to have increased savings, but benefits were enjoyed more by group leaders and active members than non-active members, indicating significant elite-capture. Members with stronger inter-personal networks had more voice in the choice and control over assets. Fadama increased female participation in local economic development planning but evidence suggests that women and other members of vulnerable and marginalized groups were often not able to afford or obtain their needed assets.

Efforts to reduce conflict between Fadama user groups are rated *Substantial.* While IEG cannot validate the pronounced reduction in conflict due to the different benchmarks, definitions, and data collection methods used throughout the life of the project, IEG found that there was substantial attention to resource related disputes that took place within the confines of the project. Interviews revealed that traditionally competing groups came together under the local develop plan to better understand and negotiate their livelihood needs. The grievance redress mechanism implemented by the project induced greater participation by lowering the cost of entry which resulted in the resolution of several instances of reported conflict in Fadama areas. IEG notes with concern however that by project close, there were an estimated 171 conflicts that had occurred in Fadama areas that had not been resolved. Information on their severity or effects was not made available to the IEG team.

The efficiency of the project is rated *Modest* owing to a lack of methodological rigor in determining the estimated rates of returns at project end, inefficient targeting owing to purposive selection of the states and local governments, and inefficient use of monitoring, data collection and assessment systems to support implementation and the design of subsequent project phases.

Bank and Borrower performance were generally satisfactory, with shortcomings. The Bank built local ownership for the project, by conducting extensive stakeholder consultations, engaging policy makers in extensive dialogue and carrying out project-related studies. However a more elongated engagement and sensitization period was needed at the village level to mitigate risks of elite capture and undue influence by traditional authorities and village elites. Insufficient attention was paid to building capacity for environmental management, which proved to be a challenge in this project.

Bank supervision supported external data collection and analysis early on in the project cycle, but misrepresented these early results as end-line outcomes. A decision to scale up the project nationally was based on results measured two years after the project became effective.

Lessons

- ***Technical interventions that transform land related assets require a socially and culturally sensitive project design that -- to the extent possible -- provides inclusive development opportunities to all affected parties***. The Fadama program is illustrative of the risks that are attendant in neglecting social analysis in technical work streams. The project's first phase contributed to conflict between natural resource users groups by financing activities that expanded livelihood benefits to one user group at the expense of others.

- ***Community based approaches to local development require sustained and phased commitment.*** None of the Fadama villages visited by IEG demonstrated a present day capacity to participate in local development planning in a socially inclusive and accountable manner, in despite of the project's efforts to instill this. Fadama II villages were only supported by one project cycle. Villagers interviewed for this review expressed a significant level of disappointment about the lack of continued access to facilitated negotiation for the provisions of local goods and services. The conflict training and mediation module piloted by the project was appreciated by stakeholders but ultimately found to be unsustainable in the absence of the project architecture. Maintenance of public infrastructure has also expectedly emerged as a key challenge.

- ***The sustainability of community-based initiatives depends crucially on an enabling institutional environment, which requires government commitment, and on accountability of leaders to their community to avoid "supply-driven demand-driven" development*** *(Mansuri and Rao, 2004).* This overarching lesson on community driven development put forth by the World Bank's Development Economics Groups is very applicable to the Nigerian context.

- ***Programs designed to change behavior need to be grounded in a deep understanding of context; they need to be willing to engage in a study of what motivates people.*** Programs implemented at scale should include a sensitive design that takes into account the different cultural, linguistic and ethnic characteristics of the targeted population. Programs designed to change behavior also require observational and qualitative indicators, that in turn, require capacity building and implementation support to tweak project assumptions and project adjust design in real time.

Caroline Heider
Director-General
Evaluation

1. Background and Context

1.1 The Second National Fadama Development project was prepared towards the end of the ill-famed Abacha regime, characterized by disastrous economic and social policies that severely weakened the credibility of the state. Under the regime, the World Bank had progressively disengaged from the country, with no new lending and very little analytical undertakings. With the return of democracy, under the Obasanjo administration, the Bank undertook a major effort to identify and approve new investment loans to support the development of key sectors. IEG's Country Evaluation of the World Bank program in Nigeria (1998-2007) found that this effort was hamstringed by the Bank's multi-year absence that resulted in a lack of knowledge about the country and its societal dynamics. Nigerian government officials, for their part, were unfamiliar with Bank procedures. While the Bank undertook analytic work in the fiduciary areas, operations in some sectors, including rural development, moved ahead without the necessary analytical underpinnings.

1.2 The Second National Fadama Development Project was one of the earliest projects prepared by the Bank after its reengagement in Nigeria. The project's preparation and design was heavily influenced by country and corporate risks facing the Bank at the time. A community driven development approach was seen as a useful vehicle to overcome some of the fiduciary risks that were plaguing the portfolio -- including mis-procurement issues that had had led to a moratorium on new sector lending at that time. It was also seen as a useful vehicle to reduce conflict-related risks that had emerged as a result of the former project model. Fadama II was classified as a corporate risk project due to farmer-pastoralist conflicts that had occurred as a result of an ill-conceived design under Fadama I. [1]

1.3 At the Federal level, the concept of community driven development was being promoted by the Government as a means to empower states, local governments, and communities to achieve poverty reduction. During the first year of its administration, the newly elected Government established a national Poverty Alleviation Council and placed the responsibility for coordinating antipoverty efforts with the National Planning Commission. Poverty reduction initiatives were to be demand driven, with community participation and decentralized decision making. They would be implemented directly by communities. This represented a major shift of strategy from the past top-down approach, which had been characterized by poor targeting, poor design, inefficient and incomplete implementation, and increasing popular frustration.

1.4 At the time of project design, an estimated 52 percent of all Nigerians were living below the poverty line, including 80 percent of the rural population. For rural Nigeria, it was clear that a new pro-poor service delivery model was needed. But according to the most recent poverty survey conducted by the Nigerian statistics agency, published in 2012, the total number of persons living in poverty in Nigeria has risen to 61 percent,

---

[1] Farmer-pastoral conflicts occurred under Fadama I because the project failed to mitigate the risks associated with its support for expanded farming systems, in areas which were also being used for pastoral grazing. Land related conflicts were especially pronounced in Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, and Imo States where there was a significant loss of life and destruction of property.

with no significant change in the rural areas, especially in the north. This is in despite of an average growth rate of roughly 7 percent between 2005 and 2013. One of the main reasons why poverty and inequality has increased in Nigeria over this period is that growth has been concentrated in sectors that are less labor-intensive, such as oil, telecommunications, and banking. Agriculture, the biggest employer in the economy, has been largely ignored by the government, until recently. During the project period, for example, the federal government's agricultural expenditure as a share of the total budget declined from 2.2% in 2001 to 1.7% in 2005 (Mogues et al. 2008). The second phase of Fadama was designed to address this neglect in the sector by investing in the productive capacity of local communities, mainly at the farm level. But with a funding level of U$100 million and thousands of small scale activities planned across twelve of Nigeria's states, the task promised to be formidable.

2. Objectives, Design and their Relevance

RELEVANCE OF OBJECTIVES

2.1 As articulated in the legal agreement, Fadama II has three separate but mutually reinforcing objectives:

(1) Sustainably increase the incomes of Fadama users -- those who depend directly or indirectly on Fadama resources (farmers, pastoralists, fishers, hunters, gatherers, and service providers);

(2) Empower communities to take charge of their own development agenda;

(3) Reducing conflict between Fadama users.

2.2 The relevance of each of these objectives is rated **High**. The objectives reflect a high degree of learning about what works and what does not work in achieving sustainable development in rural Nigeria. Individually and collectively, these objectives represent a sharp course-correction based on learning from the first phase whose relevance and efficacy were challenged by a socially insensitive supply-led service delivery model. The prior project had supported an expansion of farming systems into valuable wetland areas that have traditionally been used by other groups for grazing, watering, transit etc. It prioritized one user group over others which had the unattended effect of triggering resource related conflicts. Moreover, the supply led approach was insensitive to farmers' ability to adopt or afford the maintenance of the technology.

2.3 By empowering community members to take charge of their own development agenda, the project sought to enhance the utility of rural services and goods that were being provided, by taking stock of critical needs at the village level while assuring that the needs of the most marginalized were also considered. In Nigeria, assets such as seeds and fertilizers have been highly subsidized and distributed as political patronage. The project sought to challenge the sense of entitlement that had resultantly emerged by offering communities a chance to choose inputs that were most needed and to experience a sense of ownership *vis-à-vis* the investment required.

2.4 The third objective directly corrects for the resource related conflicts that were triggered under Fadama I. At appraisal, the Fadama project estimated that roughly 1,262 resource related conflicts had occurred in Fadama areas during the implementation of the first phase. These conflicts reportedly resulted in some 2,058 deaths and 4,750 injuries, as well as significant crop and livestock loss in especially in Oyo, Adawama, Ogun, Imo, Lagos, Bauchi, and Gombe States. Farmer-Pastoral conflicts in Nigeria were so severe in 2013 that they were classified as *war* by the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer (against a five point scale that ranks conflict in escalating order: disputes, non-violent crises, violent crises, limited wars and wars.

2.5 Taken altogether, the objective encapsulates components of a community driven development model of capacity building and service delivery - the first of its kind in the rural development sector in Nigeria. It was highly in line with the development vision of the time, as reflected in the Interim Strategy Note developed during the transition period.

> "[*This] CDD approach is consonant with what the Nigerian people want and is reflected in the Government's poverty program. CDD involves strengthening and financing accountable and inclusive community-based organizations that represent the interests of the poor, and forging functional links between community based organizations and local governments…this will mean building the capacity of both the communities and local governments and policy and institutional reform that* allows *communities and local government more control of development activities in their areas"* (ISN, 2001).

2.6 The objective could have been strengthened by including select local government areas as one of the many stakeholders that were targeted by the project, especially considering the role that it is expected to play in providing and maintaining local public works and services. Underlying the objective is an assumption that rural incomes can be increased and sustained through a local development planning process that is inclusive, accountable and considerate of competing resource needs. In order for incomes to be sustained, the *process* has to be maintained. This will require the buy-in and support of local government.[2]

2.7 The World Bank's FY06-FY09 *Country Partnership Strategy* also recognizes the importance of engaging at a decentralized level but focuses heavily on a few "lead" states. The *2nd Country Partnership Strategy* – implemented between FY10-FY13 - placed a premium on governance, with a focus on transparency and accountability in the use of public resources, including the participation of communities in decision making and oversight. Building on the CDD approach, the CPS committed to increase civil society and community monitoring and evaluation, planning and budgeting at sector and

[2] Nigeria's constitution requires a transfer of 44% of its federal account resources to its 36 states and 774 local government authorities to fund local service delivery.

local levels. Referring to the perceived success of the CDD approach to date, the CPS recommended moving to a larger scale [CDD] operation that would include more communities and that would integrate both the Local and State Government in the process. The integration of State and Local government was viewed as means to achieve sustainability and maintenance of the social infrastructure. The objective of Fadama's third phase, approved in 2008, retained its focus on the Fadama user, but its design also included capacity development for local governments.

PROJECT FINANCING, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

FINANCING

2.8 The total planned project costs were US$125 million including US$ 100 million of IDA finance, a Government contribution of US$16 million and projected community contributions of US$ 9 million. Actual project costs were roughly equivalent to estimated costs, with the exception of community contributions which were notably lower than anticipated. The lower than anticipated contributions are linked to the changes made during implementation to the contribution ratios for productive assets. Actual project costs were US$124.5 million. This PPAR was only able to identify and validate the following expenditures: US$103 million from IDA, US$15 million from the Government, and US$4 million in community contributions, or a total or a total of US$122 million.

DESIGN

2.9 The project concept was based on a community driven development approach. It first set out to mobilize some 480 facilitators who engaged in social mobilization, group formation, sensitization, and training on inclusive decision-making and participatory local development planning. Community groups – or *Fadama user groups* - were formed on the basis of economic interests, taking care to mobilize traditionally marginalized groups, per the project's operating procedures. Once formed, and once group leaders were elected, the groups collectively organized into *Fadama Community Associations* (FCA) where facilitators would oversee a process of collective bargaining organized around the development of a Local Development Plan. Overseen by an elected Association Chair, the FCA was responsible for overseeing the drafting of an inclusive development plan that allocated sub-project financing across three main investment categories: (1) Capacity Building, (2) Rural Infrastructure; (3) Private Productive assets. Individual groups were required to open a bank account to track funds and to enable a mechanism for the required group contribution towards the public or private assets.

2.10 Group contributions towards the purchase or construction of the assets varied depending on whether they were public or private and the nature of the asset. Contributions were not configured based on a pre-determined income level. Rural infrastructure projects were either *public* (access roads, culverts, bridges) or *club goods* (boreholes and pumping machines, cooling sheds, market infrastructure) that were approved at or across the FCA level. For rural infrastructure assets, the project provided 90 percent of the finance while the Association was expected to contribute 10 percent. This was paid either in cash or in-kind (labor) depending on the project arrangement. The pilot productive assets were mainly private, distributed either individually to group members or as a shared group asset. Typical private goods provided included irrigation pumps, processing equipment, fishing equipment, honey extraction equipment and smaller items such as knapsack sprayers, watering cans, wheelbarrows, storage bins, workbulls and ridgers. The financing ratio for this category of asset changed three times during the life of the project, from 50:50, to 60 (project):40 (group contribution); to 70 (project):30 (group contribution). The project empowered the FCA with an oversight function: the FCA would disburse matching project financing to groups once the requisite contribution was made to the group's bank account.

2.11 The participatory and inclusive planning process promoted by the project was intended to facilitate a residual demand for continued participation, accountability and oversight in local development planning. Oversight of the Fadama Community Associations was provided by state and local Fadama Development groups, constituted under the project. At the local level, Local Fadama Desk Officers and Local Fadama Development Committees were established by the project. The Local Fadama Desk Officers provided clearing house functions for the Local Development Plans, screening the plans to make sure that they were compliant with the project's funding criteria Local Fadama Development Committees -- chaired and co-chaired by a high ranking member of local government and a traditional or community leader – reviewed and approved the plans. Government representation in the Local Fadama Development Committees was limited to one-third of the committee's total membership in order to ensure a majority representation of the FCAs, civil society and the private sector.

2.12 At the State level, the state Agricultural Development Program (ADP) coordinated activities on behalf of the State Agricultural and Natural Resources Ministry. The state structure included State Fadama Development Offices that resided in the state Agricultural Development Programs. The State Project Coordinator reported directly to the Program Manager of the ADP and every six months to a State Fadama Development Committee (SFDC). SFDCs, chaired by the Permanent Secretaries of the State Ministries of Agriculture and Natural Resources, provided oversight of the project, including approval of work plans and budgets, and bi-annual progress reporting to a National Fadama Coordinating Office. The SFDC was responsible for executing a communications strategy, recruiting and organizing training of facilitators, organizing training of all relevant stakeholders, tracking results, and transmitting these to the National Fadama office with whom the Bank liaised.

2.13 At the national level, a National Fadama Technical Committee, chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, provided technical input and coordination with other relevant programs. It was in charge of reviewing project progress, approving work plans and budgets. A National Fadama Development Office was organized as a Program Secretariat for the Committee and was responsible for day-to-day federal level coordination.

RELEVANCE OF DESIGN

2.14 The community driven development approach was and remains *substantially relevant* in the rural Nigerian context. The project was designed to foster cooperation between resource users, through a facilitated negotiation of local needs and a focus on conflict mitigation. The demand-driven approach was designed to more effectively match rural service delivery with identified core local needs. It was also designed to be socially inclusive. The local development plan was a relevant tool to compel competing resource users to make choices that could, on the one hand, best serve individual needs, while on the other hand, reject options that too coarsely abridged the needs of others'.

Box 1. Fadama II Constituencies % /Total

Constituent groups	Percentage	Number
Crop Farmers	42.76	4519
Livestock Producers	13.09	1383
Pastoralist	2.71	286
Fisherfolks	6.93	732
Agro-Forestry	1.58	167
Hunters	1.27	134
Gatherers	0.48	51
Marketers	5.04	533
Agro- Processors	15.15	1601
Other Non-Farm	4.08	431
Widows	1.73	183
Physically Challenged	7.00	196
Unemployed youths	2.66	281
Elderly	0.66	70
HIV/AIDS	0.35	37
Total	100.0	10,568

Source : Fadama II MTR 2007

2.15 While **substantially relevant** to the objectives, the project design could have been strengthened in several ways. First, the project was not poverty targeted. The states and the areas targeted by the project were selected by national and state administration. Within the local government areas selected, groups were formed on the basis of economic interests, with somewhat restrictive membership criteria – including the opening of group bank account and a group contribution. While the requisite group contribution for rural infrastructure was set at 10%, the group contribution for the private productive assets was initially set at 50:50. Recognizing that this ratio was creating a significant barrier to entry for the less affluent groups, the project changed the ratio two more times over the course of implementation – to 40:60 in 2006 and to 30:70 by 2007, but only just before all of the assets had been awarded.

2.16 The project's social guidelines, incorporated in the project's operating manual, encouraged the formation of marginalized groups (youth, widows, physically challenged, people living with HIV/AIDS etc.) as a way to ensure that the voices of groups traditionally marginalized by gender, age, and class were fully heard and that their interests were reflected in local development planning. While the project design facilitated the participation of these groups, and successfully integrated their needs into the local development plan, only 7% of these participants were able to afford the goods and services requested through the plan (MTR, April 2007).

2.17 Second, while various stakeholders were targeted by the objective, the appraisal only provides an analysis of income constraints for one user group– the *farmer groups* – and the project's implementation arrangements maintain a bias towards crop production (the project was hosted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development). The constraints to increased incomes in the rural space are listed as mainly inadequate rural infrastructure, weak links between agricultural research, extension, and service providers, scarce or non-existent access to rural finance, a lack of clear property rights, and continued reliance on rudimentary agricultural production techniques. Equivalent diagnostics (analysis of constraints, growth trajectories) were not conducted for the other resource user groups (non-sedentary pastoralists, fishing communities and other non-farming activities). Conflict was viewed as a constraint to increased agricultural investment.

2.18 Third, the idea and definition(s) of the kinds of conflict that could be dampened by attention to resource competition between Fadama user groups was under-diagnosed, ill-defined, and inadequately monitored. Activities designed to reduce conflict were conceived mainly as support for pastoral infrastructure (improved and demarcated stocking routes and grazing areas etc.) and they were offered against a menu of other critically needed rural infrastructure choices, such as access to water. Recognizing the value of achieving a peace dividend in conflict-prone areas, the project could have offered separate and additional conflict-oriented options underpinned by positive social and economic incentives. Rather, conflict related activities were bundled with the Rural Infrastructure Menu and the financial contribution was the same. Further, some of the rural infrastructure that was developed for pastoral communities (especially increased access to water) had the unintended impact of attracting new and additional herders who were not aware of the stock route markers and who lacked built relationships with area farmers.

2.19 Given that ultimately the agricultural sector strategy seeks to significantly expand the amount of rural land in Nigeria under irrigation, these activities may have been able to delay, but not address the drivers of conflict in the Fadama areas. The project was not able to sponsor or maintain a dialogue with non-sedentary pastoralists, although an initial attempt was made to engage the Miette Allah of Nigeria at the beginning of the project cycle. Rather, the project engaged sedentary agro-pastoralists, many of whom have been settled in the Fadama areas for more than two decades, but mis-represented the identity of these groups in project documentation. To sustainably reduce conflict in the Fadama areas, project design could have focused on building in a shared understanding and analysis of local patterns and critical conditions of land governance and its effects while addressing some of the structural conditions and socio-political dynamics affecting the risks of violence in the contested areas. Further risk analysis and mitigation could have been developed to cope with the effects of transforming existing assets.

Source: IEG

DESIGN OF THE MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

2.20 This section reviews the relevance of design of the project's Management Information System and the project's Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and tools.

2.21 The Second Phase of Fadama, Fadama II, created a new framework and new instruments for measuring results. The project shifted implementation modalities, so the shift in data collection methods, monitoring and reporting is appropriate. However, since nine of the twelve states treated under Fadama I were included in Fadama II, it would have been useful at appraisal to include information about the farmer organizations that had been treated under the first phase. The project commissioned a Participatory Rural Appraisal with the aim of establishing a welfare related baseline, however the data was neither used as a baseline for the project M&E nor was it used by the mid-line assessment to track results. The approach was appropriate for the project context. It developed proxy rural welfare indicators and used these to determine the presence of vulnerable and marginalized groups in the communities. However the process was not embedded in the monitoring and reporting systems. It also utilized welfare proxies, where the project objective directly calls for the measurement of income which in itself was overly ambitious.

2.22 A Management Information System was put in place, but the system was not fully operational until mid-term. The system monitored a number of outputs, but fell short of including indicators that in the aggregate could measure the outcomes envisioned by the project. The system was not designed, for example, to collect disaggregated data by user group. Nor was it designed to measure change in income levels. Measurement of empowerment was limited to outputs, namely (1) the number of groups that were formed and (2) the number of development plans that were implemented. The project did not include qualitative indicators -- that would have required observation – to measure participation, inclusion, and representation. More sophisticated questions about the success of the project were left for the external assessment, however without a baseline, and with no firm plans for an end-line – it is not clear how the external assessment would have measured change.

2.23 Conflict lacked a clear definition and an explanation of how it would be linked, or attributed, to project interventions. There is a mismatch between the project aim of reducing conflict and project language that sought to lower the number of *"reported" conflicts.* The reporting of low-level conflict would have been desirable in order to dampen its effects. However the system was designed to encourage a declination in the number of "reported conflicts." This may have had the unintended effect of allowing low-intensity disputes to escalate in the absence of effective mitigation prompted by timely reporting. Project targets associated with the conflict reduction objective also appear somewhat non-sensible. The project set out to reduce Fadama related conflicts by 50 percent of the baseline value of conflicts that were reported to have been triggered by Fadama I. But fully meeting this target would allow for a remaining 571 conflicts to occur during the project period in targeted Fadama areas.

3. Achievement of the Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE I: SUSTAINABLY INCREASE THE INCOMES OF FADAMA USERS

3.1 Fadama II aimed to sustainably increase the incomes of Fadama users -- those who depend directly or indirectly on Fadama resources (farmers, pastoralists, fishers, hunters, gatherers, and service providers). The project set a quantitative target of increasing the average real incomes of 50 percent of the targeted project beneficiaries by twenty percent, but it did not establish a baseline. The project commissioned an external assessment in 2006, one year after the project began implementation. Using recall data, the external assessment reported that Fadama II had increased the average real income of 50 percent of the beneficiaries by 63 percent, compared to a 16 percent real income increase within an identified control group. The implementation completion report indicates that by project close, Fadama II had increased the average real income of 50 percent of project beneficiaries by 63 percent, however an endline study was not conducted. None of the results reported included a desegregation of the income effects across user groups, including the effects on the marginalized and vulnerable. Nor did the project measure sustainability, a core component of the objective.

3.2 IEG was not able to validate either reported result due to weaknesses in the construct of the impact assessment and due to the absence of evidence associated with the results reported in the completion report. A brief summary of the instruments' limitations is provided below:

- *The 2006 Impact Assessment* demonstrated very weak construct validity, since the questions that were asked in the household survey were mainly tautological. The assessment did not measure change in income; it measured the change in value of the productive assets at the household level, before and after the launch of Fadama II. The assessment was conducted just one year after the household assets had been distributed. It could be assumed that, in the short run, households that receive an additional productive asset would report an increase in income, if income is measured against a net change in assets. The IFPRI household survey established its baseline by asking participants to recall their household composition and size, major productive assets, and major components of household income. It then counted assets - or the change in major productive assets - as the outcome variable even though the household asset was the explanatory variable, or the input of the project. The construct of the treated versus control groups was also problematic because the Propensity Score Matching technique used by the evaluation did not model the participation decision. Rather, the variables chosen for the matching were likely to have affected the outcomes.[3]

- *The National ICR* is candid about the fact that by 2009, "most of the State Fadama Development Offices [had] not conducted the impact evaluation study at the end of the project life…and the few States such as Ogun, Oyo, Bauchi, Kaduna, Taraba that started the study have not concluded for the results to be available" (National ICR p.52). The National Implementation Completion Report uses the mid-line data, in most cases, to report results. The World Bank's Implementation Completion Report then inexplicably reports this data as progress made at end-line. IEG reviewed all participating State Implementation Completion reports and the National Implementation Completion report and found no evidentiary basis for the end-line results reported. [4]

IEG's Asset Verification and Sustainability Exercise

3.3 Assumptions about the project's income effects are linked to the reported benefits that have been derived from the public and private assets that were distributed by Fadama

[3] The internal validity of the evaluation was also challenged by the fact that nine of the twelve Fadama II states had also participated in the first phase. Fadama II did not give special preference to or bias against Fadama I beneficiaries. However, former Fadama I beneficiaries might have derived an advantage because of their membership in Fadama User Associations supported under the prior project. This could have introduced some selection bias in sampling Fadama II beneficiaries in the sense that fadama user association members would have been more likely to join Fadama II beneficiaries and thus more likely to be sampled. The double-difference estimator that was used in the impact evaluation helps to address the impacts of such differences in initial conditions by differencing out any additive fixed effects of such differences but does not completely solve the potential problem of selection bias because the impacts of Fadama II may interact with participation in Fadama I.

[4] The National ICR includes a table on income impacts for all states treated that compares mid-line achievement to baseline, and end-line to mid-line. As discussed in the design section of this review, the mid-line assessment discarded the base-line assessment owing to the quality of the data collected. Baseline data was collected in the form of a participatory rural assessment; it did not collect income related data. Regarding end-line data, the table indicates that the data is sourced from the 2006 assessment.

II. [5] Since the project objective explicitly aims to *sustainably* raise incomes, the IEG post-project assessment offers a unique opportunity to learn about the sustainability of the assets that underlie the reported increase in incomes in Fadama II villages. Since the income effects were assessed against a randomly selected sample of project beneficiaries in 2006, IEG revisited 10% of these beneficiaries to assess whether the effects that were reported were still being enjoyed by this subset.

3.4 IEG administered a one-on-one survey to a random stratified sample of 118 persons representing 10 percent of the direct project beneficiaries that had participated in the 2006 assessment. The random cohort was stratified to ensure that regional, cultural, and religious and gender differences were taken into account. Within this cohort, IEG collected data on 163 pilot acquisition assets and 20 shared rural infrastructure projects (including site visits to 60 of these private assets and all 20 rural investments). Through the survey and the site-level asset verification exercise, IEG collected data on the choice, control, use and status of the assets.

3.5 *Sustainability of the Private and Public Assets.* Of the 163 pilot acquisition assets reported to have been received, information concerning their status was available for 149 assets.[6] Of these, 64 percent were reported to be either (1) presently operational or (2) presently in disrepair, bur useful in having generated enough savings or a profits to replace the asset or purchase additional ones. Site-visits to 49 privately owned assets validated this reported finding. Of the 49 private assets visited, 60 percent were either (1) presently operational, including repair or (2) had been replaced through profits and savings generated by the asset(s). Rural Infrastructure was less sustainable. IEG visited twenty rural infrastructure projects and found 50 percent of these to be operational at the time of the visit in November 2013. Of all the public assets visited, boreholes were the least functioning (40% were operational), followed by rural roads (50%). All of the culverts visited, on the other hand, had been maintained.

3.6 Several preliminary lessons emerged from the asset verification exercise that could be explored further for future project planning purposes. These lessons include:

- ***The Fadama model was more effective in Rural Areas than Urban and Peri-Urban areas.*** Of the thirty randomly selected beneficiaries that reside in peri-urban or urban areas (FCT and Lagos), only six or 20% of the urban beneficiaries had access to functioning assets. In rural areas, the percentage of beneficiaries that had access to functioning assets was 71% (or 60 out of 84 beneficiaries). This finding coincides with the empowerment literature that generally finds that social cohesion is an integral ingredient to successful social capital formation and associated welfare gains. In FCT, interviews with beneficiaries and Fadama staff

---

5 According to the ICR, the project supplied some 73,599 pieces of equipment through 7,766 subprojects, and that by project close, more than 90 per cent of the productive assets micro-projects/subprojects had been implemented.

6 These assets included processing machines (gari/ground nut, etc.), work bulls/ridgers, irrigation pumps, milling machines, wheelbarrows, knapsack sprayers, seeds/fertilizer, storage bins, refrigerators, market stalls, animal pens, beehives, grinders, graters, hydraulic jacks, fish ponds, and water storage containers.

revealed that the requisite community contributions had been paid for by one of the State Ministers. FCT Fadama staff suggested that this act may have decreased the level of ownership of the assets and responsibility for their maintenance. The price and value of land also significantly affected the success of the productive assets. Land rental prices are higher in urban and peri-urban areas and Fadama beneficiaries pointed to the fact that this differential was not taken into account in project design.

- ***Interventions that require behavioral change require a different assistance strategy than technical interventions designed to support existing practices.*** This was found to be especially the case for fish farming projects, where the project sought to increase productivity by introducing caged fish. While the project introduced new technology, it was introduced in a vacuum without taking into account existing cultural practices and norms in the fishing communities. There was also a lack of technical assistance provided for these projects and their operations and maintenance costs were especially high.

- ***Capital intensive equipment, such as cassava grinding machines were removed from operation due to complaints about noise and air pollution.*** In many of the unsuccessful cassava milling operations visited, machines had been removed or not maintained owing to complaints about the diesel exhaust. Other concerns were linked to cassava mill effluent effects on the soil.

- ***The heavy subsidy provided for rural infrastructure may be one of many factors explaining their lack of upkeep.*** This lesson is in line with the IFPRI Impact Assessment that found that while the subsidies had produced positive near term impacts on beneficiaries' access to markets and transportation costs, the high level of subsidy offered to communities for rural infrastructure (10% community: 90% project subsidy) may have induced construction of public goods that could not in the medium to long run afford to be maintained.

3.7 Based on the additional evidence collected as part of this assessment, progress made against the first objective of sustainably increasing the incomes of Fadama users is rated *Substantial.*

OBJECTIVE II: EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES TO TAKE CHARGE OF THEIR LOCAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

3.8 The project's second objective was to "empower communities to take charge of their own development agenda." A single indicator was used to measure and report on the project's empowerment objective: the number of local development plans that were successfully implemented. The indicator was used as a proxy for measuring the empowerment process, since participatory and inclusive criteria were established for the formulation and financing of the plans. A target was set at 60 percent. The project reported that an average of 94.5 % of all Fadama Community Associations had implemented their local development plans and that more than 90 percent of the investments awarded were completed by project close.

3.9 IEG utilized several evaluation tools to validate the achievement and assess the sustainability of this objective. IEG convened village level meetings in twenty-two local government areas to ascertain the status of the local development plan and to inquire as to whether the plan had been updated. IEG was able to validate the existence of a local development plan in each of the village settings it visited while learning that none of the plans had been updated and that none of the villages had engaged in a Fadama style participatory planning process after project close.[7] In all cases, villagers cited a lack of finance and the absence of the Fadama style facilitation to explain the current lack of participation in the Fadama style process.[8]

3.10 IEG also conducted one-on-one interviews with representatives of the twelve local government areas. With one exception (in Niger State), none of the local governments visited were currently aware of or using the local development plans that had been developed under Fadama II.[9] While the local representatives have changed since the project was implemented, there was no evidence that the project had had an effect on the way that development decisions were being made at the local level. In some of the local government areas visited, there was an awareness of the operations and maintenance needs of the infrastructure built under Fadama but there were ongoing discussion about who would pay for its upkeep.

Social Capital-IQ

3.11 The project also tracked the number and types of groups constituted under the program, but did not report on group dynamics. In the "*Search for Empowerment: Social Capital as Idea and Practice at the World Bank*" authors Woolcock and Narayan reviewed and reported on several ways to quantify social capital for the purpose of deriving measures that can be aggregated at the community level. The review points to the now commonly used measure of membership in informal and formal associations and networks – including density and characteristics, group functioning, contributions to groups, participation in decision-making, and heterogeneity of decision-making. Qualitative information derived from the World Bank's Social Development's Department Local Level Institutions study conducted in Indonesia, Bolivia, and Burkina Faso has also helped to link these social capitol indicators to household welfare.

---

[7] Village level meetings consisted of members of the a representative of the State Agricultural Department, State Fadama coordinating office staff, Fadama Community Association chairs and members, Local Fadama Desk Officers, local Fadama facilitators, members of the Fadama user groups, and non-Fadama village residents.

[8] This assessment was designed to understand the present day effects of the Fadama II program on a randomly selected cohort of 10 percent of the beneficiaries included in the 2006 IFPRI assessment. Interviews with the FCAs visited indicated that all of the Local Development Plans validated by IEG were prepared between 2004-2006. In all FCAs visited, there was no evidence that a new Local Development Plan had been prepared, and all beneficiaries indicated a desire to update their plan and to receive further financing. They also indicated the need for further support by "fadama-like" facilitation services which were no longer being formally provided. This is a testament to the perceived benefits of the program as well as to the challenges of changing the beneficiary schemes in-between fadama phases. According to Management comments, Fadama II villages that also received support under the third phase have continued to engage in participatory local development processes. However, IEG did not assess present day effects of the 3rd Phase, since this was ongoing at the time of the assessment.

[9] Management comments reinforced this finding, noting that the Niger state government is currently implementing a performance-based CDD type rural-service delivery model at the Ward Level and that synergies have been created (the Niger State Fadama Coordinator is also in charge of the state's rural development program).

3.12 IEG administered an adapted version of the "Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital (SC-IQ)**"** from *Measuring Social Capital* (Grootaert et al, 2004) to 10%, or 118 of the direct project beneficiaries that participated in the 2006 assessment. The questionnaire was developed to gather beneficiary perceptions about group participation, composition, inclusion, and roles in local decision-making, including choice of and control over the use of the project awarded assets, paying attention to the project's inclusive aim of empowering marginalized and vulnerable persons (see Annex C).

3.13 Because group formation for social welfare purposes, and in more affluent cases, for economic purposes is a commonly adopted risk-mitigation and wealth creation tool in rural Nigeria, the IEG assessment sought to compare the dynamics and effects of the Fadama group formation to other pre-existing groups and to assess whether Fadama had influenced the manner by which groups were formed and functioned after project close. The assessment found that:

- ❖ *Group Participation in Fadama II yielded individual welfare benefits, increased access to savings, and similar to non-Fadama Groups, acted as a buffer in times of emergency (Figure 2). Figure 3 shows that almost 90 percent of all respondents reported that membership in a Fadama User Group had improved their household, livelihood or had provided greater access to basic services, as compared to just under 50 percent for Non-Fadama User Groups. Female respondents (55%) were more likely to respond that their FUG provided access to savings compared to male respondents (44%).*

Figure 2. Services Enjoyed by Fadama User Groups Compared to other Economic User Groups



Figure 3. Benefits Enjoyed by Fadama User Groups Compared to Other Economic and Welfare Related Groups



❖ *But Fadama benefits seem to have been enjoyed more by group leaders and active members indicating a certain degree of elite capture in the program (Figure 4).*

Figure 4. Access to Fadama Benefits Stratified by Level of Participation in Groups



Source: IEG's Fadama II Beneficiary Assessment Survey conducted in November 2013 adapted from the "Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital (SC-IQ)" from Measuring Social Capital (Grootaert et al, 2004).

3.14 The IEG assessment asked all 118 beneficiaries about their role in choosing and controlling the assets obtained under Fadama II and categorized the responses on the basis of their membership in the groups. The assumption was that all members of the groups – whether relatively better-off or very poor – would have had a representative voice in the decision-making process and that assets would be controlled either by the group (in the case of group assets) or by the individual (in the case of individual assets).

The surveys were administered individually and to the best extent possible, away from other group members. The survey reveals that:

- ❖ *Fadama members with stronger inter-personal networks appear to have had more voice in the choice of assets and greater control over their use.*

Figure 5. Who Chose Fadama Assets?



Source: IEG

3.15 As shown in Figure 5 and 6, perceptions about who chose and controls Fadama assets varies on the basis of status in the group. Group leaders (Chair, Treasurer, or Secretary) predominantly recalled that the group had chosen the asset, active members recalled the choice being made by the group as well as individuals, while non-active members also recalled that the group leader had chosen the asset.[10] Group leaders and active members also appear more in control of the use of assets than inactive group members.

---

[10] Although the IEG beneficiary survey was randomized, it was randomized on the basis of an earlier randomization run by the IFPRI impact evaluation. IEG found that elites, as identified by their leadership functions in the groups, had been oversampled by the impact evaluation, and this had some effect on the results reported by the IEG assessment. Since elites and active group members were oversampled, it may be expected that the results of IEG's survey are somewhat overestimated.

Figure 6. Who Controls Fadama Assets?



Source: IEG

Social Inclusion: Women and Vulnerable Groups

3.16 The Local Development Planning Modules encouraged and achieved representation of women's groups (43% of all groups) and vulnerable persons (widows) in the Fadama Community Associations. IEG was only able to administer the adapted social capital survey to a small subset of women beneficiaries, however these beneficiaries were randomly chosen and stratified across the states. Interviews with women's groups revealed:

3.17 **Fadama increased female inclusion in local economic development planning.** Of the thirty-six women beneficiaries randomly selected for the IEG assessment, 81% reported that they had not been represented in an economic group prior to Fadama II. At the time of the assessment – five years after project close – 94% of these women reported belonging to the same group and 31% of these women beneficiaries belonged to a second economic interest group.

3.18 **Fadama was less Cost-Prohibitive on average compared to other non-Fadama Groups, as measured by Price of Entry and Dues Assigned.** The average entry fee, or registration fee for Fadama User Groups was roughly ½ the average registration price of other economic interest groups. The average registration fee for a Fadama User Group was reported as 620 Naira versus 1,081 Naira for other groups. Monthly dues were also higher for non-Fadama Groups, with members paying an average of 249 Naira compared with 145 for the Fadama Groups. Non-Fadama groups were also more erratic in their pricing, with membership fees ranging from zero to 30,000 Naira. Fadama Group registration ranged from Zero to 5,000N. Women also reported that, on average, their Fadama group fees were roughly a half the amount paid by men.

Table 3. Membership Entrance Fees and Dues - Descriptive Statistics

	Fug Membership Fee	Other Group Membership Fee	Fug Group Dues	Other Group Dues
No. of Observations	114	59	109	56
Mean	620	1081	145	249
Median	200	200	100	110
Standard Deviation	90	522	12	73
Mode	0*	0*	200	100

*There were 29 FUGs and 18 Non-FUGS that reported no membership fee requirement.

Table 4. Average Fadama User Group Membership Fee disaggregated by Gender

	Women	Men
Number of Observations	34	79
Average FUG Membership Fee	348	682
Standard Deviation	72	111
Median	200	300
Maximum	1600	5000

3.19 **However, while there was a high rate of female participation in Fadama II, more information is needed to understand how women are actually benefitting from the assets they acquired.** The project's mid-term review found that many women and vulnerable persons found it difficult to contribute the requisite contribution needed for the asset acquisition. The review also found that in many cases, the equipment that was acquired by women was being operated by hired hands who benefited more from the assets than the beneficiaries. The mid-term review recommended lowering the beneficiary contribution for women and vulnerable groups to 10 percent, however this recommendation was not taken up by the current phase.

3.20 Recent research undertaken during Fadama III on Women's Empowerment suggests that while there are limitations to women's participation and access to goods and services under the Fadama model – owing to the role that interpersonal networks play in accessing the project's goods and services – women with less access benefit from exposure to their more powerful peers in the Fadama groups formed (Box 2).

Box 2. Unpacking Women's Empowerment in the Fadama Program

Recent analysis undertaken on the participation and performance of female farmers groups in the Fadama program provides a sophisticated assessment of the project's contribution to women's empowerment in rural Nigeria. While pointing to the many important contributions that women make to the production, processing, and marketing of agricultural commodities in Nigeria, the authors point to the many constraints that women face in trying to make a living from the sector, namely the lack of land ownership and access rights, credit, labor, inputs and extension services. Membership in the Fadama User Groups provides women with an opportunity to overcome some of these constraints, but only a few women, relatively, are offered the chance to participate since group access is highly correlated with interpersonal networks and the support of men. Men have helped women gain access to the project because of the high level of interdependency between men (farming) and women (processing) in the sector. Women have also benefited from the gender related program criteria, which had facilitated a higher degree of participation than most other World Bank projects (44%).

Interviews with 105 female group members and 8 focus groups in Ogun State revealed that there are at least three important factors that have impacted female group performance including:

(i) social cohesion, generally stemming from pre-existing geographic or community ties;

(ii) economic needs and ties, specifically finding that groups that share economic activities and perform them frequently perform more effectively; and

(iii) financial and technical support- from men - including administrative (men tend to be more literate) and technical assistance. The most successful women were those in co-productive arrangements with their husband or a male relative.

Women reported feeling empowered at the community level due to increased opportunities to invest in social (rites of passage) and productive initiatives provided by the Fadama program. However for many women beneficiaries, this benefit did not extend to the household.

Source: Porter, R & Zovighian, D. 2013. Unpacking Performance and Empowerment in Female Farmers Group: The Case of the Fadama Project in Nigeria. World Bank: Washington, DC

3.21 Based on the additional evidence collected as part of this assessment, progress made against the second objective of empowering communities to take charge of their own local development is rated ***Modest.***

OBJECTIVE III: REDUCING CONFLICT

3.22 The project's third objective was to "reduce conflict between Fadama users." A key assumption put forth by the project was that facilitated negotiation over the use of common pool resources could reduce conflict between competing groups. Reduced conflict would then translate into increased livelihood opportunities and enhanced welfare effects.

3.23 Based on a reported number of conflicts that occurred in Fadama areas during the first phase of the project, Fadama II set a target of reducing conflict by 50%. The target was set against a baseline number of 1,142 conflicts that reportedly occurred between 1996-2002 in the areas treated by Fadama I. The data made available suggests that these conflicts resulted in 2,058 deaths and 4,750 injuries, as well as significant crop and livestock loss. Conflict was reported to be particularly severe in Oyo, Adawama, Ogun, Imo, Lagos, Bauchi, and Gombe, States (See Annex C). The data was collected by recall at the beginning stages of Fadama II. None of the methods used to collect the data was made available to IEG, including a description of the identification of the types of respondents or how these conflicts were attributed to the Fadama interventions. Conflicts were reported at the level of the state, rather than the local governments, where the Fadama programs are situated.

3.24 The target set for the project was and remains unclear. Interviews with the Fadama staff were not able to provide a rationale for why the project sought to reduce Fadama related conflicts (those that would presumably be triggered by project interventions) by only 50 percent. If effective, the project still would have contributed to some 571 conflicts in the project areas. By project close, the project reported: "an aggregate 85 percent reduction in conflict, with no conflict in 6 of the 12 states, and only a few isolated cases of minor conflicts in the remaining states." IEG was not able to obtain the source data for these reported results but notes that a reduction of conflict by 85 percent would result in 171 conflicts having occurred in 6 of the 12 Fadama states, rather than "a few isolated cases of minor conflicts" as was reported.

3.25 To validate the results reported, IEG tracked the reported results through the M&E system, including a review of the national and state completion reports (Annex D). The National Completion Report indicated that conflict related data was available for ten of the twelve states at project close, and that nine of the ten states report incidents of conflict. While in some cases many or all of these conflicts were mitigated or resolved, the data reported by the national completion report negates the outcome level data reported by the Bank (that there was "no conflict in six of the twelve states.") To further validate and assess the conflict related data reported, IEG reviewed the state level implementation completion reports. Here, IEG found that the only conflicts included in the M&E framework were those conflicts that had been "reported" rather than those that occurred. This suggests that the definition of conflict and the manner by which it was being reported may have varied significantly between the baseline and endline of the project. Data reported by the States was collected from various and inconsistent sources and references to the types of conflict that were mitigated included everything from stakeholder conflict to institutional conflicts, encroachments, and minor conflicts, etc.

3.26 Interviews with Desk Officers and Facilitators further validated this finding. The interviews revealed that opinions differed as to whether a conflict should be reported if it was able to be mitigated by the project teams – in some cases local project staff attested that if a case of crop trampling was able to be resolved than there was no need to report it in the MIS, for example. Others attested to recording and reporting each of these low-level conflicts.

3.27 This perceived proclivity to downplay both the nature and frequency of resource related conflicts was pervasive throughout the project reporting structures. The tendency to underreport conflict is likely linked to the nature of the indicator, which inappropriately asked project staff to report on conflict reduction as opposed to conflict identification, mitigation, and resolution. If the indicator had been reversed, and an "early-warning" system was rewarded, it is likely that the reporting would have looked differently. The project supported conflict training and equipped local level staff with tools to report and mitigate conflict, by organizing and supporting dedicated conflict committees. Qualitative data collection concerning the techniques used to negotiate, mitigate or resolve conflicts could have contributed to a greater degree of learning about the added value of the Fadama approach vis-à-vis traditional methods.

Findings from IEG's Perception-Based Interviews on Fadama's Conflict Related Tools

3.28 To better understand the role that Fadama II played in affecting resource-related conflicts between different user groups, IEG conducted one-on-one interviews with the Fadama staff and the local Fadama conflict committees that were constituted for the purpose of supporting conflict reduction in the project areas. IEG posed conflict-related questions in group interviews with State and Local Fadama Staff, the Fadama Community Associations, and village beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the project. It also met with select pastoral groups near or around their reserve sites.

3.29 IEG learned that there was a general appreciation for the attention paid to conflict in the Fadama program and all parties interviewed attested to the value of the grievance mechanisms that were introduced by the project. Stakeholders present in the town hall meetings convened by IEG in the twenty-two villages visited by the mission revealed that Fadama participants appreciated the opportunity of getting to know one another, and that this experience had increased their awareness about each other's needs. Another perception shared by all stakeholder groups interviewed was that Fadama II lowered the cost of reporting grievances. Traditionally, grievant parties would report to one or more of Nigeria's traditional chiefs, and if violent, to the police. Each of the grievant parties would be taxed, or would have to pay a fine. Under Fadama II, the conflict mediation team worked with the traditional authorities to facilitate dialogue. And under Fadama II, there was no tax. Interview responses from triangulated sources suggested that Fadama had the effect of supporting increased reporting of low-lying tensions, because the activity was free of charge. However, this does not bear out in the quantitative data provided. After project close, in areas no longer treated by Fadama, the system has reverted to the original one.

3.30 In several of the states visited by IEG, conflict was framed mainly as one between the non-sedentary pastoral groups and the sedentary farmers. In arranging interviews with participating pastoral groups, IEG learned that the project did not engage transhumant pastoralists. Most of the pastoralists that participated in the Fadama II project had been settled for more than a decade, and even this group was underrepresented. Pastoral groups were not included in the vulnerable group classification, which required increased recruitment efforts on the part of the facilitation teams to fulfill the project guidelines. Vulnerable Groups in total represented 12 percent of the project population; pastoralists represented 3 percent.

3.31 The Fadama conflict committees were comprised of dedicated but youthful Nigerians who, in order to avoid nepotism or undue influence, were asked to work in areas where they had no societal ties. Many of their local efforts were effective in dealing with non-violent grievances and disputes over Fadama related resources, as revealed by the data on conflict resolution and interviews in twenty-two villages where conflict related questions were posed. However, interviews with members of the conflict committees revealed that engagement with the transhumant groups would have required very different project arrangements and specific attention and support to the issue by both the State Governments and the World Bank.

3.32 The project utilized pastoral rural infrastructure as a conflict mitigation tool. Interviews with pastoral groups that participated in the program revealed that while the project interventions produced benefits, they also led to some unintended impacts that increased risks. Increased access to water in pastoral grazing areas tended to attract new users to the area who were unfamiliar with local relationships, customs and informal farmer-pastoral agreements. If pastoral rural infrastructure was envisioned as a conflict mitigation tool, then the menu option could have been offered separately, in the form of a peace dividend, whereby the contribution could have also been lowered. The pastoral infrastructure was also hard to incentivize, since it would often require cross FCA cooperation and since it was one option offered alongside a menu of other critical rural infrastructure options, such as boreholes, and roads. There was also an inadequate amount of land provided by the Government for this purpose.

3.33 Project efforts to reduce conflict *between Fadama user groups* is rated ***Substantial.*** While IEG cannot validate the pronounced reduction in conflict due to the different benchmarks, definitions, and data collection methods that were used by the project, IEG found that there was substantial attention to resource-use disputes that occurred within the boundaries of this project, with specific attention paid to mitigating conflict between participating resource-users.

4. Efficiency

4.1 The project conducted a cost-benefit analysis - including estimates of various economic rates of return related to the project as a whole - at appraisal. The standard measures of project viability, the Net Present Value (NPV) and the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) were computed based on assumed best practices in agricultural and non-farm enterprises for a 15-year period. For the whole project, the ERR and NPV were computed as 40 percent and US$2,374 million respectively assuming an opportunity cost of capital of 12 percent.

4.2 The key quantifiable benefit expected from the subproject investments was income from the incremental production of high value horticultural and livestock products. The smallholder household was expected to increase its income by 400 percent on average. Livestock production (especially cattle fattening and high-value horticulture production) was assumed to generate the greatest increases in income. The annual incremental revenues were expected to be derived from improvements and expansion of existing production practices and from diversification into nonfarm activities.

4.3 Production benefits were expected either from an expansion of cultivated area (on average, farm sizes double from 0.5 hectare to 1.0 hectare in the south and from 0.8 hectare to 1.6 hectares in the north) or through increases in the cropping intensities. The total output of high value crops was expected to increase by 400 percent, almost all of it accounted for by intensification. Cereals production would increase by 300 percent (to

6.3 million tons per year), with 20 percent of this increase coming from increases in productivity. With regard to the main enterprise subsectors of the project, investments in crop-livestock production systems were expected to generate an ERR of 43 percent, and investments in agro- processing enterprises generate an ERR of 41 percent with palm oil and rice processing generating the highest returns, and investments in aquaculture generate 31 percent. Among all production activities, the farm enterprises with large ruminants, especially cattle and ram fattening, generate the highest return, while farm enterprises with poultry and small ruminants produced marginal returns.

4.4 By project close, the ERR and FRR were reported to be 43 percent and 48 percent respectively, representing a marginal increase of 7.5 percent and 6.7 percent over and above the baseline (PAD) values. Factors that are reported to have contributed to the higher rates of ERR and FRR were: (i) the choice of subproject investments by beneficiaries, which indicate a preference for the most profitable activities; and (ii) the training and advisory activities provided by the project in association with these activities.

4.5 The project conducted a benefit-cost analysis and an internal rate of return (IRR) analysis for 25 economic enterprises. The analysis found that benefit-cost ratios for all enterprises were profitable except for those of conventional livestock where the ratio was less than 1, indicating that for every naira expended, 0.5 naira was obtained as benefits. IRR values for the enterprises showed very high returns. The return on investment for irrigation pumps was estimated at 1.83; grains processing was 1.16 for 2 tons/8-hours capacity; and for groundnut oil extractor 1.74. Aquaculture and artisanal fisheries yielded an IRR of over 61 percent and for Fadama roads, the IRR was calculated at 56 percent.

4.6 Although the returns reported are plausible for individual activities, there is no information provided in the analysis as to how many observations were used to generate the economic rates of return or the representativeness of the samples that were used to generate the data. The economic analysis indicates that the "results were generated from data collected from the project at the end of its life." However, the project helped beneficiaries to acquire 73,599 pieces of equipment through 7,766 subprojects under the productive assets component and 5,000 rural infrastructure investments (representing some 35% of project finance) under the rural infrastructure component. Without better understanding the methods by which the analyses were conducted, it is not possible to validate the reported returns.

4.7 Data collected by the external assessment (2006), the mid-term review (2007) and the IEG assessment in some ways challenge some of the conclusions made by the economic rate of return analysis issued at project close. For example, whereas the ICR indicates that the training and advisory activities provided by the project may have contributed to the higher returns, both the external assessment and IEG found very little uptake of these activities. By April 2007, only 12 percent of all Fadama user groups had accessed the training and advisory activities provided by the project. IEG's field visits revealed a high demand and need for advisory services. Most of the failed enterprises encountered by the assessment could be linked to a lack of expert technical assistance, especially after the project ended. Several attempts to diversify away from the original enterprise – including poultry, pig or fish farming – were undermined by a lack of training or access to disease surveillance or treatment, accounting, and marketing expertise.

4.8 The ICR also does not explain how the project achieved many of its high rates of return despite the fact that the outcomes differed from the assumptions made by the PAD. The data collected across two dry season cropping cycles at mid-term suggests that for Fadama beneficiaries, crop production increased while livestock production and other non-farm activities decreased (See Figure 7). According to the PAD, livestock production would generate the greatest income increases and annual incremental revenues were expected to be derived from improvements of existing production practices and from diversification into nonfarm activities. Other evidence suggests that the reported returns on crop production would mainly be derived from an expansion of cultivated areas as opposed to an increase in cropping intensity. Between 1997-2008, the contribution of agriculture to GDP increased from 4.2 to 7.2 percent, driven by an expansion in areas planted with staple crops rather than high value commodities. Productivity has remained flat or declining (IFPRI 2010). The PAD based its cropping estimates on a high rate of return from high value crops as opposed to staple crops and that almost all of it would be accounted for by intensification.

Figure 7. Change in Sources of Income Due to Fadama II Interventions (2004-2006)

Source of Income	% Contribution to Total Income Before project (October 2004-September 2005)			% Contribution to Total Income After Project (October 2005-September 2006)		
	FII Beneficiaries	Non FII Beneficiaries living in FII Local Government Areas	Non-Beneficiaries living outside the FII Local Government Areas	FII Beneficiaries	Non FII Beneficiaries living in FII Local Government Areas	Non-Beneficiaries living outside the FII Local Government Areas
Crop Production	46.40	53.80	46.90	56.80	56.50	60.20
Non-Farm Activities	48.50	38.70	43.30	41.10	39.90	39.30
Livestock Production	4.90	7.43	9.70	2.10	3.50	0.05
Other Activities (e.g. beekeeping, hunting, fish farming etc.	0.00	0.13	0.19	0.00	0.14	0.54

Source: IFPRI 2007

4.9 The ERR/IRR generated disaggregated data on commodities rather than the beneficiary groups. From the data it is not discernable whether the vulnerable and marginalized groups experienced a positive rate of return. The data provided by the external assessment, for example, suggests that there was no significant increase in income derived from other activities supported by the project – such as bee keeping, fish farming, hunting etc. Many of these activities would have been targeted at the marginalized groups.

Other Aspects of Efficiency

4.10 *Targeting.* The project was implemented in twelve states purposely selected by the government of Nigeria in collaboration with the World Bank. Within the states, local government areas were also purposely selected. Viewed as a poverty reduction tool by the government of Nigeria (and the World Bank), this purposive selection was an inefficient method to reach the very poor. The poorest states in Nigeria, for example, were not treated during this phase. [11] While this was a project that was being piloted with a view towards scaling up, most of the states selected were in the humid and dry savannah zones, a factor that limited the project's ability to determine whether activities could be replicated elsewhere. The project sought to support resource users across the Fadama value chain – from production to marketing. But the criteria for selecting these end-users were unclear. How would a facilitator choose from amongst the many marketers in highly populated urban areas who were selling Fadama related goods? The dilemma resulted in urban groups being chosen who either did not need the assistance or whose participation did not have a measurable effect on users downstream of the marketing chains.

4.11 *Integrating Learning.* Although a Participatory Rural Assessment was conducted at appraisal in 2004, by 2006 the mid-term assessment judged the data to be too poor to use as a baseline. The PRA data was thus discarded and new data on groups and perceptions about welfare *vis-à-vis* the project distributed assets was collected. By 2008, the project had begun preparing the third phase, and did not commission an end-line study to measure attributable change between mid-term and endline. Since the project was moving into a third phase, findings from the end-line study could have been useful in informing the design of the third phase. The project's third phase, planned three-quarters of the way through the second phase, included a design that left behind the villages treated in the second phase. In a CDD operation where villagers have been newly exposed to the principles and practices underlying this approach, the decision to abruptly end treatment is likely to undermine much of the investments made to date.

4.12 Efficiency is rated ***Modest*** owing to a lack of methodological rigor in determining the estimated rates of returns at project end, inefficient targeting given the implicit poverty objective of the program, and inefficient use of data to inform implementation and the design of subsequent project phases.

[11] The 2006 IFPRI Assessment notes that, "As with Fadama I, selection of states to participate in Fadama II was not random. The 12 Fadama II states and the local Fadama resource areas where the project operated were purposely selected by the government of Nigeria in collaboration with the World Bank."

5. Ratings

Outcome

5.1 The outcome of Fadama II is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

5.2 Its three objectives are rated *Highly Relevant.* Taken in tandem, the objectives reflect a high degree of learning about what works and what does not work in achieving sustainable development in rural Nigeria. The objectives represent a sharp course-correction based on learning from the first phase and are fully in line with the poverty and empowerment objectives enshrined in Nigeria's national, state and local development strategies. The relevance of the project objectives could have been strengthened by including local governments, at least as a pilot exercise. The project design – featuring a community driven development approach – was *Substantially Relevant.* The project was designed to foster cooperation between resource users, through a facilitated negotiation of local needs and a focus on conflict mitigation. The demand-driven approach was designed to more effectively match rural service delivery with identified core local needs. It was also designed to be socially inclusive. Project design would have been more relevant had it been poverty- targeted, included other groups in the original growth diagnostics, and more clearly defined the types of conflict the project was seeking to reduce and how conflict would be reported.

5.3 Progress made against the first objective of sustainably increasing the incomes of Fadama users is rated *Substantial* in despite of the paucity of evidence that was made available at project-close. However, since most of the assumptions about the project's income effects are linked to the presence of sustainable assets, IEG can verify that the assets recorded were distributed and that 64 percent of the private and 50 percent of the public assets visited were still operational or had yielded sufficient profits for repair and/or reinvestment as of November 2013.

5.4 Efforts to empower local communities to take charge of their own development agenda were less successful and thus rated *Modest.* IEG verified that all randomly selected villages treated by Fadama II had developed a local development plan but found that none of these villages have reconvened a Fadama style process in support of participatory and inclusive decision-making, or negotiation amongst resource users over competing land use needs since project close. With the exception of one local government visited, none of the local governments were utilizing the Fadama development plan or the planning apparatus (facilitated negotiation among competing resource user groups) to make decisions about local development planning and financial allocations. While beneficiaries interviewed reported that group participation in Fadama II yielded individual welfare benefits, increased access to savings, and similar to non-Fadama Groups, acted as a buffer in times of emergency, Fadama benefits appear to have been enjoyed more by group leaders and active members than non-active members, or the elite versus the non-elite members of the groups. Fadama members with pre-existing strong inter-personal networks appear to have had more voice in the choice of assets and greater control over their use. Fadama increased female inclusion in local economic development planning. However, while there was a high rate of female participation in

Fadama II, findings from the project's Mid-Term Review indicate that women, along with vulnerable and marginalized groups, were often not able to afford or obtain their assets of choice.

5.5 Project efforts to reduce conflict between Fadama user groups is rated *Substantial*. While IEG cannot validate the pronounced reduction in conflict due to the different benchmarks, definitions, and data collection methods that were used by the project, IEG found that there was substantial attention to resource-use disputes that occurred within the boundaries of this project and between specific Fadama group members. Interviews in twenty-two villages revealed that due to the conflict module in the project, competing groups met and negotiated with one another for the first time. The grievance redress mechanism implemented by the project induced greater participation by lowering costs of entry.

5.6 *Efficiency* is rated *Modest* owing to a lack of methodological rigor in determining the estimated rates of returns at project end, inefficient targeting given the implicit poverty objective of the program, and inefficient use of data to inform implementation and the design of subsequent project phases.

Risk to Development Outcome

5.7 There is a very high risk to sustaining the development outcomes achieved under Fadama II. IEG visited the Fadama II areas that were not currently benefitting from Fadama's third phase. In all of these areas, while former beneficiaries demonstrated a high level of exuberance for the community driven development approach, the communities were no longer empowered to influence the local development agenda. All of the communities visited were able to physically reproduce and speak to the achievements of their 2006 Local Development Plan. However none of the communities had, of their own volition, re-engaged in a participatory and socially inclusive local development planning process. None of the communities had revisited or updated their Fadama facilitated local development plan.

5.8 The IFPRI impact assessment did not measure sustainability since the evaluation was conducted one year after the distribution of assets. The evaluation did however point to several prevailing trends at the time that could heighten the risk of sustaining the income streams supported under Fadama. One of these risks relates to the very low uptake of advisory services. Project reporting (the project mid-term review) observed collusion between advisory service providers and FCA/FUG officials, so that the independent recruitment of providers was compromised, potentially signifying a degree of elite capture in the project and a risk over time to fostering sustainable enterprises. IEG found, based on interviews with beneficiaries, that most of the failed enterprises encountered by the assessment could be linked to a lack of expert technical assistance, especially after the project ended. Several attempts to diversify away from the original enterprise – including poultry, pig or fish farming – were scuttled due to the lack of exposure to modern techniques, disease surveillance or treatment, and/or by accounting and marketing expertise. As noted by the IFPRI impact assessment, Fadama II increased the demand for postharvest handling technologies but did not have a significant impact on the demand for financial management and marketing expertise.

5.9 A decision to scale-up the Fadama program - made half-way through the project's 2nd Phase - tripled the number of states included in the program – from twelve to all thirty-six States. The decision was partly due to a then growing national discontent surrounding donors' decisions to favor "lead" States. The roll-out significantly stretched the program's capacity and significantly diluted available resources. It also prevented the program from reinvesting in the beneficiaries who had engaged in the second phase. While there was some effort to reinforce the capacity of the beneficiaries that had received support under Fadama II, the third phase purposively selected new villages that had not been treated under the second phase, leaving many phase II beneficiaries disappointed.

Bank Performance

QUALITY AT ENTRY

5.10 Quality at Entry was rated Satisfactory by the Quality Assurance Group in 2003 and is rated **Moderately Satisfactory** by this review, with some notable weaknesses. The Bank built local ownership for the project, by conducting extensive stakeholder consultations, engaging policy makers in extensive dialogue and carrying out project-related studies. PHRD funds were obtained to ensure that relevant analytical and technical work was conducted, including a gender assessment. Conflict mitigation models implemented by DFID in a wetlands project in Jigawa state were also studied and replicated in the Fadama approach.

5.11 Interviews with the state offices revealed that more could have been done to sensitive staff of the Agricultural Development Programs within the State Agricultural ministries given the dramatic shift in approach that was being introduced and the associated political economy implications. Supervision reports of "interference" by ADP staff who were, by agreement, charged with the oversight of the project, are reflective of tensions that would have been expected in moving from one PIU approach to another, with different staff.

5.12 The Fadama II project was designed at a time just before the World Bank began synthesizing lessons on its approach to community driven development. Since then, many aspects of Bank assistance in this area have been scrutinized and improved upon by the Bank's own teams. One such area is the attention paid to the quality of the facilitation team – recruitment, training, institutionalization, etc. The original facilitation recruitment strategy lacked an accurate communication strategy about the nature of facilitation (low-wage, deployment and placement issues). The Bank supported decentralized training at entry, in partnership with the World Bank Institute on issues relevant to the project. But the lack of a standardized module for the local development plans initially created confusion among the facilitators who were tasked to deliver these plans under a very tight timeline.

5.13 As discussed in the Relevance of Design section of the report, while there was ample time for preparation of this project, the program was not poverty targeted. Rather, the initial community contribution ratios led to a high level of participant exclusion, even though socially marginalized groups were targeted by the project. There was also a lack of a diagnostic of the barriers and constraints facing groups other than *farmers*. While relevant, the project's conflict related objectives should have been defined and designed in a way that encouraged identification, appropriate reporting, and fair redress.

5.14 Inadequate attention was also paid to the program's capacity to comply with the World Bank's Safeguard Policies. Section 9 of this review details how the program fell short of fulfilling these standards, especially with regard to environmental management in the sensitive Fadama areas.

QUALITY OF SUPERVISION

5.15 Quality of Supervision is rated **Moderately Satisfactory.**

5.16 Owing to the many corporate risks present in the project portfolio at the time of design, the World Bank supervision team paid placed a premium on overseeing the financial management of the project. Supervisory oversight of procurement performance was generally satisfactory. An independent procurement audit was conducted, and the procurement team participated in the mid-term review exercise of the project. The overall assessment was that the project's procurement operations, which were decentralized were well managed. Financial management risk -- assessed as high at appraisal -- were managed by the effective use of a Project Financial Management Unit which received adequate resources and which was supported with standardized written procedures and training. Project activities were periodically reviewed by the Internal Audit Unit (IAU) in the PFMUs and the Internal Auditors within the project administration. Challenges identified during problem-solving supervision missions were properly resolved. And audit reports were timely and of acceptable quality. Overall, the project's financial architecture was sound and the financial management aspects of the project received adequate attention during project preparation and implementation. Satisfactory oversight of the procurement of goods and services in this project is noteworthy, since in total, the decentralized procurement system oversaw the purchase of some 73,599 pieces of equipment and the construction of 5,000 rural infrastructure investments.

5.17 This was a fast disbursing project vehicle that allowed the project and its disparate parts to maintain momentum on the ground. Project credibility and its early viability was based on making the promised matching funds available for use. While attention to the disbursement cycle was critical, the emphasis seemed to have detracted from the supervision of the quality of the facilitation with regards to the communication of community driven development principles. Implemented for the first time in the agricultural sector in Nigeria, none of the facilitation staff recruited had previously been trained or expose to CDD concepts. There was a lack of oversight, for example, of the quality of the facilitation process, the quality of communication, and the integrity of the group formation. There was also a lack of sensitization of the state level agricultural development program staff who were, in effect, side-stepped as part of this new service delivery approach.

5.18 The project cycle should have been longer, with more attention paid in the first two years to the quality of facilitation, communication and group formation. Fadama II was approved in December 2003, it became effective in July 2004, and was officially launched in the State of Bauchi by then Bank President Wolfowitz in October 2004. By September 2004, some 500 Nigerians had been recruited and trained with the expectation that individuals could be deployed to sensitize communities on such topics as community driven development, local empowerment and conflict mitigation and to effectively induce representative and inclusive group participation. By October 2004, project supervision expected that fully functioning Fadama user groups (FUGs) and representative community associations (FCAs) would be formed. By November 2004, project supervision expected that a first batch of Local Development Plans could be ready for review. Remuneration incentives and/or suspensions of non-performing facilitators were introduced on the basis of the delivery of the plan.

5.19 In sum, within weeks of being trained and deployed, facilitators had to navigate complex social relations in new environments where they were expected to induce inclusive and participatory group formation and decision-making while cobbling together a village's first local development plan. With very little time to complete these tasks, facilitators were often unable to avoid undue influence by local traditional authorities or village elites.

5.20 World Bank supervision engaged in an independent assessment to collect beneficiary assessments early on in the project cycle. As a beneficiary assessment launched one year after the distribution of project financed assets, the exercise would have been very useful to establish a project baseline. However, due to pressure to expand the program, the early findings were conveyed as impacts and used to justify the expansion of the program nationally. Attention was turned towards the preparation of phase III more than a year prior to the close-out of the second phase. Inadequate resources and incentives were made available to the Fadama II team to properly close the project. By project close, the project had not conducted an endline study to assess results. The World Bank implementation report misrepresents the 2006 beneficiary assessment findings as endline results and provides inconsistent information on conflict as compared to national and state level reporting.

5.21 Overall bank performance is rated *Moderately Satisfactory.*

Borrower Performance

5.22 Borrower Performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

The active participation of the Federal and State Governments enabled the effective implementation of the project, and the roll-out of a new approach to rural service delivery in the agricultural sector in Nigeria. Resources from various agencies were made available to the project team to allow for their active participation in project design throughout the protracted preparation period. The government was also instrumental in facilitating stakeholder consultations. Counterpart funding was prompt and the government actively participated in project preparation and implementation. The President of the Republic chaired the wrap-up meeting of one of the preparation missions and was the presiding officer of the project's formal launch workshop. The Government fulfilled all its legal obligations towards the project, but records on environmental compliance are lacking, especially with regard to the expansion of the irrigation systems. There was somewhat less support from Local Governments, some of whom did not provide the project with timely counterpart contribution, delaying implementation of some activities.

5.23 Enthusiastic about the early results of the project, the Government requested that the program scale-up from 12 to all 36 states. While the desire to reach underserved areas is appropriate, the request had the undesirable effect of ending support to the Fadama II beneficiaries in a premature way. With project funding withdrawn, neither the Government nor the States moved towards fully institutionalizing the Fadama approach or funding to support demand-driven local development planning after project end. So that while there was much enthusiasm and high level support for the Fadama project, there is less evidence that its approach will be sustained.

IMPLEMENTING AGENCY

5.24 Implementing Agency performance is rated **Satisfactory.** Fadama II was situated within a Projects Coordinating Unit of the supervising ministry (FMARD) tasked with ensuring convergence of policies, approaches, criteria and operating procedures among similar government and externally-funded poverty-reduction programs and projects in the sector. Day to day implementation involved a National Fadama Coordination Office, the twelve state Fadama offices, the 126 Local Fadama Desks within the participating local governments, and 1,470 FCAs. Fadama II was one of the first community driven development projects implemented in Nigeria. Project implementation was characterized by a learning-by-doing approach, with regard to social mobilization, group formation, local development plan formulation, monitoring and reporting. New roles were created by the project, new staff were recruited and indoctrinated into a development paradigm that had not been experienced before. The project was administered in a very efficient manner, although this was due in part to the output based expectations of the project (opening bank accounts, forming groups, drafting LDPs, overseeing financing criteria etc.). Nevertheless, there is evidence that all of these parts worked together to deliver timely results. Whereas the World Bank, based on its experience should have been in charge of quality review, the implementing agents oversaw multiple project level assessments that reflect a high degree of effort and willingness to learn from implementation. Interviews with the State Fadama Offices that oversaw Fadama II revealed a high level of commitment and passion for the community driven development approach. Agents – at the state and local level – were very familiar with the Fadama constituents and evidenced congenial working relationships, and care about their wellbeing. More could have been done at all levels to sensitize and build the capacity of local governments with the aim of mainstreaming the approach into local development planning over time. The Government ICR notes that civil society requested independent validation of the data collected and the project assessments at the FCA level. This practice of transparent social auditing has been incorporated into many of the World Bank's current generation of community driven development programs.

5.25 Overall Borrower performance is rated *Moderately Satisfactory.*

Monitoring and Evaluation

DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND UTILIZATION OF THE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM

5.26 Monitoring Design, Implementation and Utilization are rated **Modest**.

5.27 Project design was complex and multi-layered. To monitor, track, report and internalize learning in real-time, Fadama II would have needed a robust monitoring and reporting system, with forward and backwards linkages throughout the various implementing channels. At appraisal, the Bank team helped to put in place a computerized Management Information System and a Participatory M&E system that involved several stakeholders groups in the Fadama structure. The system was designed to track and report on key technical, financial and socioeconomic information pertaining to the program. IEG was not able to assess the system since it was not in working order at the time of the mission visit, four years after project close.

5.28 IEG was able to assess tenants of the system, through interviews with the M&E officers at the national and state levels and through a review of relevant historical documents. The MIS was difficult to get up and running. By mid-term, although general implementation information was being made available through quarterly and biannual reporting, it was found inadequate to handle all the data requirements and tracking of a complex and rapidly expanding CDD project. Moreover the capacity of staff had not been fully built in some states. The MIS was reported to be non-functioning by mid-term. Recommendations made at mid-term, and corrections made to the system, reportedly made the system more-user friendly. However, interviews with Fadama staff engaged with the MIS indicated that at some point before the project closed, the system crashed.

5.29 This assessment finds that the Management Information System, the Participatory M&E system and associated training was underfunded and under-prioritized by the Bank. All M&E activities – the MIS, external assessments, including the mid-term review and the impact evaluation, quarterly and biannual reporting, and close-out reporting – were funded at a level of US$1.6 million or 1.4% of total project funding. The capacity of the Fadama staff, including the facilitators and the desk officers, to implement the Management Information System was overestimated. According to the mid-term review, capacity was lacking since this was one of the first projects in Nigeria to introduce the concept of participatory monitoring and evaluation. M&E Officers lacked the capacity to design and implement monitoring and evaluation studies and to carry out the different types of assessment introduced by the project.

5.30 The MIS components were better aligned with project implementation than tracking, aggregating and assessing progress towards the project's objective. Priority was placed on tracking inputs (group formation) and outputs (LDPs) and oversight of the procurement and disbursement, rather than on tracking outcomes. Four different assessment methods were used to collect baseline, mid-line, impact at mid-line, and at close. None of the outcomes can therefore be considered to have a baseline, which for a project that set percentage and numerical targets against "a baseline" proves problematic. The close-out assessment planned for the end-line was reengineered to develop a baseline for the third phase, which was approved one year before the close of Fadama II. Since Fadama III supported different local government areas, the IE team that had conducted the mid-line assessment moved its assessment to new areas to conduct the new baseline for the third phase, rather than repeating the mid-line exercise at close for the second phase.

5.31 Overall, the Management Information System developed for Fadama II appears to have been too cumbersome for the project context. At the time, only 32.8% of Nigeria's rural communities were connected to the National Power Grid and less than 5% of these communities could afford to purchase power off-grid (MTR, 2007). While project staff welcomed an automated system, stakeholders at each level reported transmission problems – especially from the level of the local Fadama desk to the state Fadama office. Lessons from Fadama II were used to course correct some design elements of Fadama II – such as the benefit contribution for the productive assets – and were also used to inform the design of Fadama III.

6. Compliance with the World Bank's Policies

Safeguards

6.1 The FADAMA II was classified as a Category A Project. It also triggered six of the World Bank's Safeguard Policies including Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04), Forestry (OP/GP 4.36), Pest Management (OP 4.09), Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12) and Projects in International Water Ways (OP/BP 7.60)

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (OP 4.01)

6.2 The Implementation Completion Report was wholly unsatisfactory in its treatment and reporting of the mitigation of the negative environmental effects that were identified by the project's Environmental Management Plan. According to the ICR, "the environmental and social management plans were adequately funded and properly implemented" (p. 9). However there is insufficient evidence that the potentially negative environmental effects of the subprojects implemented through Fadama II were mitigated. Rather, project documentation points to neglect of some of the key aspects of the environmental mitigation plan.

6.3 Decreased soil fertility was one of the main risks identified by the Environmental Management Plan. The project required soil monitoring during the third and fifth year of the project cycle. According to the Mid-term review, undertaken in 2007, these monitoring activities were not carried out. The IFPRI Impact Assessment found that Fadama II had reduced the demand for soil fertility management technologies, owing to the fact that the project offered mainly postproduction advisory service. Surface and ground water quality monitoring was supposed to be carried out by the Federal Ministry of Water Resources (FMWR). Mitigation activities were to include: construction of monitoring wells and hydrological situations, the procurement and installation of solid state loggers, the procurement of water quality sampling equipment and reagents, and routine data retrieval from monitoring wells and hydrological stations and interpretation including water collection and analysis twice annually. By project close, many of these activities had not been *systematically* carried out and IEG was not able to obtain data on soil fertility or water quality in the Fadama areas treated by project level interventions.

Pest Management (OP 4.09)

6.4 A Pest Management Plan was developed for Fadama II which contained a list of agrochemical to be used in Fadama areas, methods of handling and recommended dosages. The plan was supposed to be supported and implemented by the advisory services component. However, since only a fraction of the Fadama User Groups (12% by 2007) had access to the advisory services component of the project, it is not clear how the remaining 88% of users technically implemented the pest management plan in their sub-project areas. The ICR does not provide any assessment of the project's compliance with this operational policy.

Financial Management and Procurement

6.5 The project's financial architecture was sound and the financial management aspects of the project received adequate attention during project preparation and implementation. At appraisal, financial management risk was assessed as high due to the inherent risks associated with the CDD approach. Financial risks were mitigated by establishing a Project Financial Management Unit that implemented financial controls. Throughout implementation, supervision was also focused on the FM risk rating and challenges identified during supervision missions were resolved. Project activities were periodically reviewed by the Internal Auditors. The audit reports were timely and were satisfactory in terms of scope. When qualifications arose they were adequately addressed. The project also demonstrated strong procurement performance. Procurement was decentralized and subject to periodic reviews. Post procurement reviews were conducted on a regular basis and an Independent Procurement Audit was also carried out.

7. Lessons

- ***Technical interventions that transform land related assets require a socially and culturally sensitive project design that -- to the extent possible -- provides inclusive development opportunities to all affected parties***. The Fadama program is illustrative of the risks that are attendant in neglecting social analysis in technical work streams. The project's first phase contributed to conflict between natural resource users groups by financing activities that expanded livelihood benefits to one user group at the expense of others.

- ***Community based approaches to local development require sustained and phased commitment.*** None of the Fadama villages visited by IEG demonstrated a present day capacity to participate in local development planning in a socially inclusive and accountable manner, in despite of the project's efforts to instill this. Fadama II villages were only supported by one project cycle. Villagers interviewed for this review expressed a significant level of disappointment about the lack of continued access to facilitated negotiation for the provisions of local goods and services. The conflict training and mediation module piloted by the project was appreciated by stakeholders but ultimately found to be unsustainable in the absence of the project architecture. Maintenance of public infrastructure has also expectedly emerged as a key challenge.

- ***The sustainability of community-based initiatives depends crucially on an enabling institutional environment, which requires government commitment, and on accountability of leaders to their community to avoid "supply-driven demand-driven" development*** *(Mansuri and Rao, 2004).* This overarching lesson on community driven development put forth by the World Bank's Development Economics Groups is very applicable to the Nigerian context.

- ***Programs designed to change behavior need to be grounded in a deep understanding of context; they need to be willing to engage in a study of what motivates people.*** Programs implemented at scale should include a sensitive design that takes into account the different cultural, linguistic and ethnic characteristics of the targeted population. Programs designed to change behavior also require observational and qualitative indicators, that in turn, require capacity building and implementation support to tweak project assumptions and project adjust design in real time.

Bibliography

Agbonlahor, M. et al (2009) Beneficiary Assessment/Impact Evaluation of the Second National Fadama Development Project in Lagos State, Nigeria. Lagos State Government Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives: Lagos State, Nigeria.

Alsop R. and Nina Heinsohn. “Measuring Empowerment in Practice: Structuring Analysis and Framing Indicators.” World Bank Group Working Paper 3510. February 2005.

Bates, R. Ethnicity, “Capital Formation and Conflict”. World Bank Group Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 12.

Bauchi State Fadama II Implementation Completion Report Brief Presented to World Bank Project Performance Assessment Mission (Nov. 14, 2013).

Bebbington, A., Michael Woolcock, Scott Guggenheim, and Elizabeth Olsen. The Search for Empowerment. Social Capital as Idea and Practice at the World Bank. Kumarian Press Inc. 2006.

Chambers, R. Revolutions in Development Inquiry. Earthscan Publications 2011.

Chambers, R. Rural Appraisal. “Rapid, Relaxed, and Participatory.” IDS Discussion Paper No. 311. October 1992.

Chikewendu, O. et al. (2007) Beneficiary Assessment/Impact Evaluation of the Second National Fadama Development Project in Kaduna State. Kaduna State Fadama Development Office: Kaduna, Nigeria.

Conflict Barometer 2013. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. Heidelberg Institute: Heidelberg, Germany.

Dani, A and Arjan de Haan. Social Policy and Structural Inequalities in New Frontiers of Social Policy. Apr 29, 2008.

Grootaaert. C and Thierry van Bastelaer. “Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A Synthesis of Findings from the Social Capital Initiative”. April 2001.

Grootaert, C, D Narayan, V Nyhan Jones, M Woolcock. Measuring social capital: An integrated questionnaire. The World Bank. Working Paper No. 18. 2004 .

Fund for Peace. Conflict Bulletins for Nigeria. Retrieved from: http://library.fundforpeace.org/nigeria

IFPRI. From the Ground Up: Impacts of a Pro-Poor Community Driven Development Project in Nigeria. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00756. March 2008.

Internal Implementation Completion Report Niger State (May, 2009) Niger State Fadama Development Office.

Implementation Completion & Results Report (ICR). Second National Fadama Development Project (NFDP-II). Ogun State Fadama Development Office. World Bank/FGN .

Imo State Fadama Coordination Office Fadama II ICR (no date).

Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Presented to Federal Government Final Inspection Team (Borrower). Gombe State Fadama Development Office. Dec 15, 2008.

Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Kaduna State.

Nkonya, E. et al. (2007) Beneficiary Assessment/Impact Evaluation of the Second National Fadama Development Project. National Fadama Development Office: Abuja, Nigeria.

Oyo State Fadama Development Office (2007) Beneficiary Impact Assessment of Second National Fadama Development Project in Oyo State.

Porter, R & Zovighian, D. 2013. Unpacking Performance and Empowerment in Female Farmers Group: The Case of the Fadama Project in Nigeria. World Bank: Washington, DC

Taraba State Implementation Completion Report (Internal).

World Bank. Project Appraisal Document. Second National Fadama Development Project. November 18, 2003.

World Bank. Implementation Completion Report. Second National Fadama Development Project. June 28, 2010.

Annex A: Basic Data Sheet

NIGERIA: SECOND NATIONAL FADAMA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (IDA-38380)

Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million)

	Appraisal estimate	Actual or current estimate	Actual as % of appraisal estimate
Total project costs	125.37	124.54	99.34
Loan amount	100.00	102.78	103.00
Cofinancing	n/a	n/a	n/a
Cancellation	n/a	n/a	n/a

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	2004	***2005***	***2006***	***2007***	***2008***	***2009***	***2010***
Appraisal estimate (US$M)	5.5	28.6	50.1	74.0	92.0	100.0	100.0
Actual (US$M)	1.3	13.6	43.1	70.0	91.3	100.0	100.0
Actual as % of appraisal	23.6	47.6	86.0	94.6	99.2	100.0	100.0
Date of final disbursement: May 2010							

Project Dates

	Original	Actual
Concept Review		07/09/2002
Appraisal		06/28/2003
Board approval		12/16/2003
Signing		02/17/2004
Effectiveness		05/27/2004
Mid-term Review	06/29/2007	06/15/2007
Closing date	12/31/2009	12/31/2009

Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank budget only)	
	Staff Weeks (number)	US$ 000s (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY00	36.08	116.11
FY01	39.1	143.35
FY02	60.43	201.05
FY03	150.43	517.29
FY04	7.47	245.96
Total:	360.51	1223.76
Supervision/ICR		
FY05	101.55	335.25
FY06	105.41	294.45
FY07	70.60	199.99
FY08	76.70	225.09
FY09	37.05	135.20
Total:	391.31	1189.98

Task Team members

Name	Title (at time of appraisal and closure, respectively)	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Sidi C. Jammeh	Senior Economist	AFTAR	TTL- Lending
Luce Tran	Operations Analyst	AFTS4	Team member
Aziz Bouzaher	Lead Environmental Specialist	AFTS1	Team member
Abigael Bunmi Ipinlaiye	Temporary	AFCW2	Team member
Adenike Sherifat Oyeyiola	Sr Financial Mgt. Specialist	AFTFM	Team member
Edward Olowo-Okere	Lead Fin Mgt Specialist	AFTFM	Team member
Christophe Crepin	GEF Program Manager	AFTS4	Team member
Africa Eshogba Olojoba	Sr Environmental Spec.	AFTEN	Team member
Azra Sultana Lodi	Senior Program Assistant	AFTAR	Team member
Bayo Awosemusi	Lead Procurement Spec.	AFTPC	Team member
Mary Asanato	Procurement Analyst	AFTPC	Team member
Chukwudi H. Okafor	Senior Soc. Dev Spec.	AFTCS	Team member
Esther Usman Walabai	Sr. Agriculturist	AFTS3-HIS	Team member
Sameena Dost	Counsel	LEGAF	Team member
Hisham A. Abdo Kahin	Sr. Counsel	LEGJR	Team member
John Amedu Eimuhi	Program Assistant	AFCW2	Team member
Lucas Kolawole Akapa	Senior Operations Officer	AFTAR	Team member
Song Li	Consultant	AFTS4	Team member
Samuel Wariboko Eremie	Sr. Agriculturist	AFTS3-HIS	Team Member

Supervision/ICR			
Simeon Ehui	Lead Sector Economist	AFTS3	TTL-Supervision
Abimbola Adubi	Sr. Agricultural Spec.	AFTAR	TTL- ICR
Adenike Sherifat Oyeyiola	Sr. Financial Mgt. Sp.	AFTFM	Team Member
Obadiah Tohomdet	Sr. Communication Officer	AFREX	Team Member
Amos Abu	Sr. Environmental Spec.	AFTEN	Team Member
Aisha D.A. Kaga	Team Assistant	AFCW2	Team Member
Ngozi Blessing Malife	Team Assistant	AFCW2	Team Member
Azra Sultana Lodi	Senior Program Assistant	AFTAR	Team Member
Bayo Awosemusi	Lead Procurement Spec.	AFTPC	Team Member
Chau-Ching Shen	Senior Finance Officer	LOAFC	Team Member
Chukwudi H. Okafor	Sr Soc Development Sp.	AFTCS	Team Member
Esther Usman Walabai	Sr. Agriculturist	AFTS3-HIS	Team Member
Hisham A. Abdo Kahin	Sr. Counsel	LEGJR	Team Member
John Amedu Eimuhi	Program Assistant	AFCW2	Team Member
Lucas Kolawole Akapa	Senior Operations Officer	AFTAR	Team Member
Modupe Dayo Olorunfemi	Team Assistant	AFCW2	Team Member
Rajiv Sondhi	Senior Finance Officer	LOAFC	Team Member
Samuel Wariboko Eremie	Sr. Agriculturist	AFTS3-HIS	Team Member
Aniceto Bila	Sr. Operations Officer	AFTAR	Team Member
Stanislaw Manikovski	Consultant FAO	External	Team Member
Noble Nweze	Consultant	External	Team Member
Akinrinmola Akinyele	Financial Mgt. Spec.	AFTFM	Team Member
Sambo Ingawa	Consultant	External	Team Member
Dayo Phillips	Consultant	External	Team Member
Amadou Soumaila	Snr Irrigation Engineer FAO	External	Team Member

Other Project Data

Borrower/Executing Agency:

Follow-on Operations

Operation	*Credit no.*	*Amount (US$ million)*	*Board date*

Annex B: PPAR Fadama II Beneficiary Survey

Date and Time of Interview:
Interview GPS Coordinates/Location Description:

State	
LGA	
Village	
Name of Interviewee	
Gender	
Age	
Interviewed by IE	

1a. Think back to Fadama II. During that time did you belong to any groups or associations? ____Yes/No

1b. Do you belong to any groups or associations now? ____Yes/No

If yes to either 1a or 1b complete table A below.

Table A. Groups/Associations

Group (Traders or business association, Professional Association (doctors, teachers, etc.), Trade or Labor union, Neighborhood Committee, Religious Group, Political Group, Cultural Group, Credit or Savings Group, Youth Group, etc.)	Before Fadama II (pre-2003) Number of people	During Fadama II (2003-2009) Number of People	After Fadama II “now” (2009-2013) Number of People	Were you a Leader? Y/N	How actively did you participate in meetings? 1 – Leader 2 – Very active 3 – Somewhat active 4 – Does not participate in decision making
FUG					
Other:					
Other:					

2. Compared to during Fadama II, do you participate in more or less groups or organizations?

1 More
2 Same number

3 Fewer

3. During Fadama II, how often did you attend meetings?

Table B. Meeting Attendance

Group	How Often
FUG	
Other	

4. What are the requirements to join this group? (Please fill out Table C for each group)

1 Born into group
2 Required to join
3 Invited
4 Voluntary choice
5 Marital Status
6 Age
7 Religion
8 Gender
9 Education
10 Health

Table C. Group Membership Requirements

Group	Membership Requirement
FUG	
Other	

5. How much did you pay to join and participate in the group?
Table D. Membership Fees

Group	Register	Monthly Fee
FUG		
Other		

6. What are the benefits from joining this group?

1 Improves my household's wealth
2 Important in times of emergency/in future
3 Benefits the community
4 Enjoyment/Recreation
5 Spiritual, self-esteem, pride
6 Recognition, social status

Table E. Benefits of Group Membership

Group	Benefit & How
FUG	
Other	

7. Did the group help your household get access to any of the following services?

Table F. Access to services

Service	FUG	Other Group

Education Training		
Health Services		
Water supply or sanitation		
Credit or Savings		
Agricultural input or technology		
Irrigation		
Other (specify)		

8. Thinking about the members of this group, are most of them the same (Y/N)…

Table G. Group Composition

Service	FUG	Other Group
Neighborhood/Village		
Family or Kin Group		
Religion		
Gender		
Age		
Ethnic or linguistic group/race/caste/tribe		

9. Since Fadama II, has membership in the groups declined, remained the same, or increased?
Fug: Other Group:

10. When a decision is made in this group, does it come from inside or outside of the group?

How does it come about?
1 Decision is imposed from outside
2 The leader decides and informs the other group members
3 The leader asks group members what they think and then decides
4 The group members hold a discussion and decide together
5 Other (specify)

Table H. Group Decision Making

Group	Code
FUG	
Other Group	

11. Are leaders in this group elected?

1 By an outside person or entity
2 Each leader chooses his/her own successor

3 By a small group of members
4 By the decision/vote of all members
5 Other (specify)

Table I. Leadership Selection

Group	Code
FUG	
Other Group	

12. How is your group funded?
1 Members' dues
2 Other sources within the community
3 Sources outside the community

Table J. Funding Sources

Group	Code
FUG	
Other Group	

Asset Questions:

1. Did you have a project in the LDP?

   Yes No

   If no, why not?

   If yes, what was your project?
   (Fill table on next page)

2. How much did you pay for this asset? Did you have to borrow to pay for it?
3. Who chose this asset?
4. Who decides who can use this asset?
5. Does the asset work?
6. Has the asset ever broken? If yes, did you pay to fix it (how much)?
7. Do you make a profit from owning this asset? If so, how much?
8. Have you been able to save because of this asset
9. Have you reinvested any of the money you have made from this asset?

Annex C: Summary Table of Conflicts, Fadama I (1996-2002)

S/N	NFDP-II PARTICIPATING STATES	NO. OF REPORTED INCIDENCE OF FARMER-PASTORALIST	NO. OF REPORTED INCIDENCE OF FARMER-FISHERMEN	NO. OF REPORTED INCIDENCE OF FARMER - HUNTER	NO. OF REPORTED INCIDENCE OF PASTORALIST -HUNTER	NO. OF REPORTED INCIDENCE OF PASTORALIST - FISHERMEN	NO OF INJURED PERSONS AS A RESULT OF THE CONFLICT	NO OF PERSONS KILLED DUE TO THE CONFLICT	NO OF LIVESTOCK LOST DUE TO THE CONFLICT	VALUE OF CROPS DAMAGED DUE TO THE CONFLICT (N)	VALUE OF LIVESTOCK KILLED DUE TO THE CONFLICT (N)	PASTORALIST - FARMER CONFLICT RESOLUTION INSTRUMENTS	NO OF CASES RESOLVED BY THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION INSTRUMEN	TOTAL NO OF REPORTED CASES	% OF RESOLVED CASES	REMARKS
1.	Adamawa	98	8	10	10	12	600	440	1500	5.3m	10.2m	5	35	138	36	
2.	Bauchi	28	4	0	0	0	26	6	0	1.5m	2.0m	4	28	32	88	
3.	Borno	32	0	0	0	0	109	13	300	2.0m	2.0m	7	18	32	56	
4.	FCT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	
5.	Gombe	11	0	0	0	0	366	20	200	1.4m	657,000	4	11	11	100	
6.	Imo	47	26	30	29	36	42	19	191	334,000	233,000	4	28	168	17	
7.	Jigawa	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4.0m	0	4	7	7	100	
8.	Kaduna	22	3	0	0	0	0	4	0	30,000	0	4	22	25	88	
9.	Katsina	13	7	1	15	0	0	0	3	0	0	4	27	36	75	
10	Kebbi	26	12	1	7	0	5	1	6	46,000	12,000	4	35	46	76	
11	Kogi	15	0	0	0	1	27	17	0	1.0m	0	4	15	16	94	
17	Kwara	23	0	0	0	0	120	50	10000	0	10.0m	0	23	23	100	
13.	Lagos	42	0	14	0	0	40	15	70	2.0m	0.8m	4	34	56	61	
14.	Niger	10	5	0	0	3	22	0	0	100,000	0	4	10	18	56	
12	Ogun	377	0	0	0	0	128	28	4343	43.3m	14.7m	4	268	377	71	
16.	Oyo	232	0	0	0	0	3489	1503	1700	7.90m	15m	0	0	232	0	
17.	Plateau	4	0	2	0	0	11	0	7	20,000	49,000	4	2	6	33.3	
18.	Taraba	38	1	0	0	0	32	22	39	1.5m	2.5m	4	25	39	64	
	Total	1025	66	58	61	52	5017	213	1836	70.43m	58.151	68	588	1262	47	

Annex D: Conflict Related Data Reported at State and National Levels

State	Bank's Implementation Completion Report	National Implementation Completion Report	Individual State's Implementation Completion Report
Adamawa	Conflicts were reduced by an average of 85% (in fact Zero conflict was reported in 6 states).	60% reduction	
Bauchi		60% reduction	Very minimal (2 pg.) completion report, only data point was 306 conflicts, unclear for which time period. Number of conflicts includes those reported to village heads, chiefs, police, etc.
FCT		Significant reduction	
Gombe		100% reduction	"there was no reported case of conflict over Fadama resources usage during the project implementation" however there were some minor reported cases of conflicts which were not related to Fadama II resource use[12]
Imo		80% reduction	Imo reported resolution of conflicts between the following groups: FCAs/FUGs in over 30% of the PAA project; FCAs/FUGs in over 25% of the RI projects; LFDOs and FCAs/FUGs in 20% of the projects. Overall, SFDO waded into several conflicts between institutions and stakeholders with over 88% success ratings in all existing conflicts[13] (Beneficiary Assessment 2007). Imo also provided data on number of conflicts reported and resolved by year ranging from three in 2004 and 2008 to eleven in 2005.
Kaduna		On-going impact studies	Kaduna State has not recorded any conflict in the fadama areas. This is attributed to the social inclusiveness during the planning stages of the Project[14]. Minimal treatment of conflict in state ICR.
Kebbi		83% reduction	
Lagos		3.5% reduction (?)	
Niger		90% reduction	Baseline data stated there were 223 conflicts, which were minor in nature in 2004, as of the mid-term there were 4 conflicts reported, so the calculated reduction in conflict is 93%[15].

[12] Gombe data on conflict cited two sources: the conflict data came from the 2006 beneficiary assessment/impact evaluation but there was a figure that indicated that as of 2008 there were still no reported conflicts.

[13] Imo data was reported from the 2007 beneficiary assessment, however additional data from beyond 2007 is also found in the report.

[14] Unclear source data for Kaduna.

Ogun		35.5% reduction	Examples provided of the types of conflict that occurred – report states there were conflicts between different groups but that they were all resolved. Baseline 175 conflicts reported before year 2004 and 75% reduction in conflict at project completion[16]
Oyo		On-going impact studies	
Taraba		100% or considerable reduction, two different data points in National ICR.	No serious cases of conflict were reported, there were minor cases of encroachment which were resolved through traditional mechanisms. There is a table that shows there were 4 conflicts from 2004 to 2008 which were all resolved.

[15] Used mid-term data

[16] Unclear where this data comes from

Annex E: List of Persons Met

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING HELD BETWEEEN THE IEG/WB EVALUATION TEAM AND THE NFCO TEAM, ABUJA

NOVEMBER 7, 2013

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION
1	Tayo Adewumi	National Project Coordinator
2	Bala A. Masaki	Livestock specialist
3	Peter O. Ajibaiye	Senior Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist (Fadama III)
4	Dr. Frank Idefoh	Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist (Fadama II)
5	A.S. Balarabe	Special Assistant to NPC
6	Ipinlaye A.B	Project Implementation Support Officer
7	Awotunde O.O	Operation Officer
8	Eugene Analune	ICT Officer
9	Olasehinde Peter	ICT Officer
10	Kwaji Duguri	Procurement Officer
11	Alabi Samuel	M&E Specialist
12	Ajuwon S.S	Programme Development Officer NFRA
15	Oyebanji Ruth	Community Development Officer

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE IEG-WB EVALUATION TEAM AND FCT FADAMA II PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION UNIT

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION
1	Dr. Mike Uwazie	FCT ADP/ Coordinator Fadama II
2	Abdullahi D. Salisu	FCT Fadama III Coordinator
3	Bashir Altine	Rural Finance and Livelihood officer
4	Mohammed Sani	Internal Auditor
5	Babatunde Wasiu	Monitoring and Evaluation officer
6	Ajayi O.R	Project Accountant
7	Ejembi Joshua	Procurement Officer
8	Bamisaiye Babatunde	Environmental Management officer
9	Usman Adangara	Communications officer
10	Hussaini Iliyasu	Community Development Officer
11	Lawal Ado	Technical Assistant

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE IEG/WB EVALUATION TEAM MEETING AND GWAGWALADA AREA COUNCIL OFFICIALS, FCT ABUJA

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION
1	Dr. Ahmed Abdullahi	Head Of Agric. Dept
2	Baba Nsako Suleman	Desk Officer Fadama II and III
3	Aso Dobi Ibrahim	Desk Officer Fadama II and III
4	Tahir G. Ado	Desk Officer Fadama III
5	Suleiman M. Idris	Desk Officer Fadama II and III
6	Abdullahi Yakubu	Desk Officer Fadama II and III
7	Isah N. Dobi	Desk Officer Fadama II and III
8	Wakili Sani Paiko	Desk Officer Fadama II and III
9	Mohammed A. Idris	Agricultural Officer

PARTICIPANTS AT THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE IEG/WB EVALUATION TEAM AND THE FULANI PASTORALIST FUG FROM KWAKU FCA, FCT ABUJA

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION
1	Abdul Na Makwalli	Treasurer
2	Musa Adamu	Member
3	Ibrahim Kwaku	Chairman
4	Joshua Ndori	FCA Chairman
5	Ahmadu Diko	Member
6	Idris Adamu K	FCA Secretary
7	Ishaya Peter	Member
8	Muhammad Adamu	Member

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE IEG-WB EVALUATION TEAM AND BWARI AREA COUNCIL OFFICIALS, FCT ABUJA

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION
1	Comfort Dabara	Desk Officer
2	Salome Tatari	Desk Officer
3	Williams Dikko	Federated FCA Chairman
4	Gimba R.S	Desk Officer
5	Babatunde Wasiu	FCT Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
6	Usman Adangara	FCT Communications Officer
7	Alfa, Mohd Kudu	Technical and Training Officer
8	Hussaini Iliyasu	FCT Community Development Officer

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE WORLD IEG TEAM AND THE KADUNA STATE FADAMA II PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION UNIT

NOVEMBER 13, 2013

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION
1	Isyaku I. Dauda	State Project Coordinator
2	Dominic A. Teku	Environmental Officer
3	Ibrahim Usman	Communication Officer
4	Abubakar Aboki	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
5	Dauda Ashafa Abubakar	Community Development Officer
6	Kasim A. Jere	Training and Technical Assistance Officer

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE MEETING HELD BETWEEN THE IEG/WB EVALUATION TEAM AND KAGARKO LGA OFFICIALS, KADUNA STATE

S/N	NAME	RANK
4	Isyaku I. Dauda	State Project Coordinator
5	Ibrahim Usman	Communication Officer
6	Dauda Ashafa Abubakar	Community Development Officer
7	Helen T. Usman	Head of LGA Agricultural Extension Unit
8	Yuwana S. Pawah	Desk Officer Fadama III
9	Rifkatu A. Dogo	Facilitator Fadama II and III
10	Danladi Saleh	Facilitator Fadama II and III
11	A. C. Egoh	Desk Officer Fadama III
12	Aishatu Abdulmalik	Facilitator Fadama iii
13	S Kadanya B.K	Internal Auditor (SFCO)
14	Garba Lamido	Procurement Officer
15	Dominic A. Teku	Environmental Officer
16	Abubakar Aboki	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
17	Esther D. Ali (Mrs)	Rural Finance and Livelihood Officer
18	Hon. Monica B. Sambo	LGA Councilor for Education
19	Hon. Daniel Awusan	LGA Councilor for Works
20	Hon. Iliya A. Akuso	LGA Councilor for Social Development
21	Hon. Samaila A. Garba	LGA Councilor

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE INTERACTIVE SESSION BETWEEN IEG/WB EVALUATION TEAM AND LGA/SFCO/FCA OFFICIALS AT KAGARKO LGA, KADUNA STATE

S/N	NAME	RANK
1	Isyaku I. Dauda	State Project Coordinator
2	Abubakar Abolu	M&E
3	Garba Lamido	Procurement Officer
4	Kadanga B.G	Project Accountant
5	Dominic A. Teku	Environmental Officer
6	Esther D. Ali	Rural Finance and Livelihood Officer
7	Ibrahim Usman	Communications Officer
8	Hon. Dikko Sadau	LGA Secretary
9	Hon. AY Jere	LGA Vice Chairman
10	Hon. Daniel Awason	Councilor
11	Hon. Monika B. Sambo	Councilor
12	Helen T. Usman	LGA Official
13	Bawa Guwa	District Head
14	Yahama Jatau	District Head
15	Tanko Barnchas	FCA Member
16	Kande Audu	FCA Representative

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE INTERACTIVE SESSION BETWEEN IEG/WB EVALUATION TEAM AND LGA/SFCO/FCA OFFICIALS AT KAGARKO LGA, KADUNA STATE

17	Ladi Zakariya	Local Fadama Desk Committee Member
18	Lami Suleh	FCA Treasurer
19	Amuda Donda	FCA Member
20	Halilu M. Mahi	FCA
21	Gaiya S.K	FCA
22	Abdulkarim Ibrahim	FCA
23	Danjuma Kdb	Chairman FCA
24	Hussaini Karim	Secretary FCA
25	Usman Gajere	Chairman FCA
26	Ali Madaki	FCA Ariba
27	Saidu Yari	Treasurer FCA
28	Alhaji Abdulha	FCA Member
29	Usman I Erejo	Secretary FCA
30	Dauda Bahago	Chairman FCA
31	Danladi Saleh	Facilitator
32	Rifkatu A. Dogo	Facilitator
33	Alkali C. Egoh	Desk Officer
34	Aishatu Abdulmalik	Facilitator
35	Yuwana S. Paroh	Desk Officer

LIST OF BAUCHI SFCO OFFICIALS PRESENT AT THE MEETING WITH IEG/WB EVALUATION TEAM

S/N	NAME	POSITION
1	Mohammed D. Abdul	Communications Officer
2	Musa H. Bello	Rural Finance and Livelihoods Officer
3	Ibrahim Muhammad Dodo	Project Accountant
4	Zailanio Othman	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
5	Ahmed Wakili	Training Technical and Advisory Services Officer
6	Ali Garba	State Project Coordinator
7	Salisu S. Chinade	Procurement Officer
8	Musa Kallah Kawa	SFCO STAFF
9	Hajara D. Kushi	Community Development Officer

LIST OF LAGOS SFCO OFFICILAS PRESENTAT THE MEETING WITH IEG/WB EVALUATION TEAM

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION
1	Dr. Olayiwola Onasanya	Director, Agric Services Former SPC
2	L.B. Lawal	Head of Procurement Dept (LSPPA)
3	Babije Balogun	Former M AND E OFFCER FADAMA II
4	Twins H.O	Environmental Officer Fadama II
5	Balogun Bidemi	Communication Officer
6	Olawale Egbeyemi	Project Accountant Fadama II
7	Oladende S. Mobolaji	Rural Finance & Livelihoods Officer
8	Ola Olajunoke	Environment Officer (Fadama III)
9	Obayemi Jonathan Adewole	M&E Officer (Fadama III)
10	Ajijola Foluso S.	SPC Fadama III
12	Kayode M. Ashafa	Prog. Manager, Lagos State Agric. Development Agency

LIST OF OYO SFCO OFFICALS PRESENT AT THE MEETING WITH IEG/WB EVALUATION TEAM

S/N	NAME	DESIGNATION
1	Oladipo T.O	Former SPC
2	Ademola -Taiwo EF	Community Development officer fadama ii
3	Adegoloite Latifat O.	Current Community Development officer fadama iii
4	K.T. Olaworin	Procurement Officer
5	J.A Adekunle	Communication Officer
6	G.A Oyedele	Monitoring and evaluation officer
7	Oni Philip A.	Facilitator
8	Adeleye Modupe E.	Rural Finance and livelihood officer
9	S. B. Ogundare	Project Accountant
10	I.A Akanni	Environmental Officer
11	A.W Dauda	Training & Technical Officer
12	A.H Olayinka	State project Coordinator

LIST OF NIGER SFCO OFFICALS PRESENT AT

THE MEETING WITH IEG/WB EVALUATION TEAM

S/N	NAME	RANK
1	Muh. S. Vatsa	Technical Training and Advisory service officer
2	Aliyu Mohammed Etsugaie	Acting Environmental Officer
3	Aishatu S. Muhammed	Rural Finance and Livelihoods Officer
4	Shehu Jibrin	Procurement Officer
5	Mohammed Musa Isah	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
8	Abubakar Ndaguje	Community Development Officer
9	Baba Shaaba	Communication Officer
10	Samual Sabastine	MIS OFFICER
11	Engr. Aliyu U Kutigi	State Project Coordinator
12	Usman AbdulKadir	Project Accountant

Annex F: Asset Verification Exercise

State	Bauchi		Photo Verification
LGA	Warji		
Village/Location	Dagu		
Asset	Groundnut threshing Machine	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Four groundnut threshing machines shared by this Women's FUG are generating income for all members (through sale of ground nuts, renting of machines).		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	The four assets are controlled by the FUG Chair who makes the decisions about where and how to let the machines. FUG chair was more affluent than rest of FUG members. The groundnt machine that was available for viewing was located at the FUG chair's home.		

State	Bauchi		Photo Verification
LGA	Bauchi		
Village/Location	Gwallaga		
Asset	Water pumping Machine	Asset Working? No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes. The original and purchased pump(s) generate(d) income. The one pictured requires repair, a new one has been purchased and was reportedly being used the field.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset			

State	Bauchi	Photo Verification

LGA	Bauchi		
Village/Location	Gwallaga		
Asset	Sprayer	Asset Working?	Yes ✓
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes. Rents out for 100N a day. He has saved 4000N which he has used to buy fertilizer.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual ownership,chose it and controls it. Paid 400N.		

State	Bauchi			Photo Verification
LGA	Bauchi			
Village/Location	Bauchi			
Asset	Grain Milling machine	Asset Working?	Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Asset is still operational and well maintained. Income is generated on daily basis			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset				

State	Bauchi	Photo Verification
LGA	Bauchi	

Village/Location	Kuitum		
Asset	Ridgers and Animal Traction Equipment	Asset Working?	Yes/No
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	2 Ridgers were identified out of 6, one was operational, the other needed repair. Income is received from renting out the animal traction equipment. FUG has saved 20,000N per year. FUG has also replaced equipment with proceed.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	The Group chose		

State	Bauchi			**Photo Verification**
LGA	Bauchi			
Village/Location	Bojinji			
Asset	Ridgers and Animal Traction Equipment	Asset Working?	Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	The 7km road is operational and has improved movement within the village.			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	FCA project. Interviews revealed that everyone in the FCA chose the asset and everyone can use it.			

State	FCT			Photo Verification
LGA	Bwari			
Village/Location	Kuchiko			
Asset	RI: Borehole	Asset Working?	Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	No water before borehole, got water from the river. The water is untreated but fine to drink. Prior to well the children had problems with diarrhea but no longer have			

	problems. They charge 5 naira for 25L of water. Profit from the well went to repair the well, pay for light/electricity and incidentals.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	FCA Chair project.		

State	FCT		Photo Verification
LGA	Bwari		
Village/Location	Kuchiko		
Asset	Milling Machine	Asset Working? No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	No income generated. Asset worked for a few months, but not long enough to make a profit. Mill broke and the community could not afford to repair it.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	The Women's Milling FUG chose the Asset. Governor provided the 30% contribution, group paid nothing.		

State	FCT		Photo Verification
LGA	Gwagwalada		
Village/Location	Tunga Maje		
Asset	Cassava processing Machine	Asset Working? No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Asset was removed from the place of installation and kept in members home because neighbors complained about the smell of the waste products from cassava		

	processing.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset			

State	FCT		Photo Verification
LGA	Gwagwalada		
Village/Location	Tunga Maje		
Asset	Cassava Milling Machine	Asset Working? No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Income was earned when milling machine was operational The asset broke after 1 year, was repaired once, when the asset broke again, there was no money for repair. No Savings/ No reinvestment. Group indicated that neighbors were not happy with the diesel exhaust.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	2 people from the FUG were in charge of the asset (Chair + other). The FUG contributed the in-kind construction of shed. Fadama contributed Asset.		

State	FCT		Photo Verification
LGA	Gwagwalada		
Village/Location	Tunga Maje		
Asset	Ground Nut Oil Processing Machine	Asset Working? No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Asset was not able to be located. Interviews indicated that the machine arrived, was mounted, worked for 1 year, broke, and the FUG did not have enough money to repair. Asset was reportedly sold. No Savings or		

	Investment.	
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Paid for by the Agriculture Minister of FCT. Group Asset was controlled by Chair and sold by chair.	

State	FCT		Photo Verification
LGA	Gwagwalada		
Village/Location	Tunga Maje		
Asset	RI: Borehole	Asset Working? No ✗	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Borehole was working for a while, but then pump broke. People are paying 5N for privately provided water now.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	FCA project, chosen by chief and located steps away from the Chief's house.		

State	Kaduna		Photo Verification
LGA	Kagarko		
Village/Location	Kubacha		
Asset	Vegetable Grinding Mill	Asset Working? No/Yes	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	First grinding mill was used until the coil burned out. Profits from first mill were used to buy two more grinding mill that use different fuel sources. Generated income, savings, lending, and reinvestment.		

Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Group asset but picked and controlled by individual (active member of FUG).		

State	Kaduna		Photo Verification
LGA	Kagarko		
Village/Location	Kubacha		
Asset	Sprayer	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes. Rents out sprayer for income. The asset broke, he had enough funds to repair it, and he has savings from the income he has earned from the asset.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual chose it, paid 50% for the asset.		

State	Kaduna		Photo Verification
LGA	Kagarko		
Village/Location	Kubacha		
Asset	Wheelbarrow	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Repaired wheelbarrow, bought additional wheelbarrow, rents out to farmers for 500N and to market sellers. Saved 13,000N. Lends money to his family.		

Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual chose and controls asset.

State	Kaduna		Photo Verification
LGA	Kauru		
Village/Location	Damakasuwa		
Asset	Storage Facility N09.968710 E008.538080	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual chose asset, controls asset. In Fadama II, Storage Equipment was under the RI, contribution was just 10%. An individual could have chosen RI.		

State	Kaduna		Photo Verification
LGA	Kauru		
Village/Location	Damakasuwa		
Asset	Vegetable Grinding Machine N09.968720 E008.537990	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income,			

profit, savings, reinvestment?				
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset				

State	Kaduna			Photo Verification
LGA	Kauru			
Village/Location	Damakasuwa			
Asset	Vegetable Grinding Machine N09.968720 E008.537990	Asset Working?	No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Machine was operational for first six years. It generated revenue and savings. Not repaired.			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Group chose asset and controlled asset. Paid 50%			

State	Kaduna			Photo Verification
LGA	Kauru			
Village/Location	Damakasuwa			
Asset	Vegetable Grinding Machine	Asset Working?	Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Asset functional, sold for a larger machine. Revenues generated pay for farm labor costs and fertilizer.			

Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Group chose asset and controlled asset. Paid 50%.

State	Kaduna		Photo Verification
LGA	Kauru		
Village/Location	Damakasuwa		
Asset	Water Pump N09.960530 E008.527550	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Pump has helped to generate additional income, savings. Lends pump to family members.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual chose the assets and the individual control the assets. Paid 50%.		

State	Kaduna		Photo Verification
LGA	Kauru		
Village/Location	Damakasuwa		
Asset	Sprayer N09.966900 E008.539700	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Still operational. No information on Savings or Reinvestment.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Paid 5000N. Individual chose asset and individual decides who uses it.		

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Lagos Island			
Village/Location	Lagos Island			
Asset		Asset Working?	No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Group opted for a Chicken Coup. After receiving the asset they attempted to do an integrated Poultry-Fish Farm. Both operations failed due to lack of technical knowledge. Also, issue with land, since the group did not own the land on which the chicken coup was placed.			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Group chose and chair decides how it is used. Group went into debt, and are still paying debt for the fish stock. Group expected FIII, but were not beneficiaries of FIII.			

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Lagos Island			
Village/Location	Lagos Island			
Asset	Water Tank	Asset Working?	No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?				
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset				

State	Lagos	Photo Verification

LGA	Lagos Island		
Village/Location	Lagos Island		
Asset	Cold Storage at the Market/Office space	Asset Working?	Yes ✓
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset			

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Lagos Island			
Village/Location	Lagos Island			
Asset	Butcher Stand at the Market	Asset Working?	Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?				
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset				

State	Lagos	Photo Verification

LGA	Badagry		
Village/Location	Idale		
Asset	Cassava Grinder	Asset Working?	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes, invested money in fish and pigs, owing to Fadama, but without TA he lost both to disease		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset			

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Badagry			
Village/Location	Idale			
Asset	Access Road	Asset Working?	No ✗	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Road not maintained because the Fish Culture Strategy was not successful			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset				

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Badagry			
Village/Location	Idale			
Asset	Aquaculture – Fish Cage Culture Strategy	Asset Working?	No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Fish culture strategy was not successful – the operation was expensive and complex and with little stock, fishermen returned to heading out in their pirogue boats.			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset				

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Badagry			
Village/Location	Idale			
Asset	Cassava Mill	Asset Working?	No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Earned a profit the first year, but did not save and could not afford to fix the asset when it broke			

Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Group asset

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Badagry			
Village/Location	Idale			
Asset	Water Pump	Asset Working?	Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes, the asset generates profit, savings, and reinvestment. It broke, and she paid to fix it. She buys inputs for the farm with the profits made.			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual chose the asset; Individual decides how to use the asset			

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Badagry			
Village/Location	Idale			
Asset	Water Pump	Asset Working?	Water Pump works; watering can is broken.	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes, the asset generates profit, savings, and reinvestment. It broke, and he paid to fix it. He buys inputs for the farm with the profits made.			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual chose the asset; Individual decides how to use the asset			

State	Lagos		Photo Verification
LGA	Badagry		
Village/Location	Akarakumo		
Asset	Water Pump, Watering can, Knapsack, Sprayer, Wheelbarrow	Asset Working?	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes, the pump generates profit, savings, and reinvestment. It broke, and he paid to fix it. He buys inputs (fertilizers, chemicals, seeds) for the farm with the profits made. The knapsack sprayer and the wheelbarrow are broken,		

	not repaired.	
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual chose the asset; Individual decides how to use the asset.	

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Badagry			
Village/Location	Idale			
Asset	Water Pump, Plastic Drum and Knap sack Sprayer 6:41277N and 2:92306E	Asset Working?	Yes/No	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Water pump, sprayer and one drum work; one other drum broken. Saved and reinvested in farm.			
Who controls the Asset and	Individual chose the asset; Individual decides how to use			

who benefits from the Asset	the asset.	

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Badagry			
Village/Location	Idale			
Asset	Water Pump, Knap sack Sprayer, Water drum	Asset Working?	No, pump and sprayer are broken. Water drum is functional	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Made a profit while asset was functioning, invested in fertilizer, manure and fuel, pump broke, not able to pay for repair.			

Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual chose the asset; Individual decides how to use the asset.	

State	Lagos			Photo Verification
LGA	Badagry			
Village/Location	Akarakumo			
Asset	Water Pump, Knap sack Sprayer, 2 Water drums	Asset Working?	Yes/No Water pump works; sprayer and drums are not working.	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings,	Profits were made, $ was saved, and profits were reinvested into inputs and maintenance of water pump.			

reinvestment?		 
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual chose the asset; Individual decides how to use the asset.	

State	Niger			Photo Verification
LGA	Shiroro			
Village/Location	Shadnayi			
Asset	Borehole	Asset Working?	No The borehole was never	

		functional.
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	No profit, savings or reinvestment.	
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Facilitator chose the asset. Facilitator told the community that they had a "borehole" allocated to them through Fadama.	

State	Niger		Photo Verification
LGA	Shiroro		
Village/Location	Gusoro		
Asset	3 Market stalls	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes-profit (600N/mo) Yes- Savings Yes- Reinvestment		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Group chose the asset, group meets to decide. This is a women's FUG.		

State	Niger		Photo Verification
LGA	Shiroro		
Village/Location	Zumba		
Asset	Refrigerator	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate	Yes-profit Yes- Savings		

income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes- Reinvestment, $ used to purchase Yes- repaired		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Group chose the asset. The chair controls asset. This is a women's FUG.		

State	Niger			Photo Verification
LGA	Katcha			
Village/Location	Kashe			
Asset	Culverts	Asset Working?	Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	The culverts are well maintained and facilitate evacuation of rice from the fields			

Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	RI		

State	Niger		Photo Verification
LGA	Katcha		
Village/Location	Jibo		
Asset	Borehole	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset			

State	Niger		
LGA	Katcha		
Village/Location	Emigi		
Asset	Borehole	Asset Working?	No ×
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	The Bore hole is no longer operational, no effort to repair for now		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset			

Photo Verification

State	Oyo		
LGA	Orire		
Village/Location	Atere		
Asset	Knapsack Sprayer	Asset Working?	Yes ✓
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	No savings. Sprayers broke, 2 more were purchased. No signficant profits.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Group chose. The FUG got 2 sprayers. The group decides who uses the sprayers.		

Photo Verification

State	Oyo		Photo Verification
LGA	Orire		
Village/Location	Atere		
Asset	Gari processing machine	Asset Working? No ×	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes profits were made, savings and reinvestment into labor, But asset in disrepair.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Group decided. One group member selected decides who uses asset.		

State	Oyo		Photo Verification
LGA	Ido		
Village/Location	Omi Adio		
Asset	Bee Hive	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Yes, has made profits, expanded business and is partnering with (INDIAN NGO) to expand business, honey marketing.		

Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Group decided, group controls asset.

State	Oyo		Photo Verification
LGA	Ido		
Village/Location	Omi Adio		
Asset	Grinding Machine	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Profits-Y Savings-Y Reinvested –Y Bought a second machine. Pays for O&M.		
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Project decided. Chair decides. Widow FUG.		

State	Oyo		Photo Verification
LGA	Ido		
Village/Location	Omi Adio		
Asset	Grinding Machine	Asset Working? Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Profits-Y Savings-Y Reinvested –Y Bought a second machine. Pays for O&M.		
Who controls the Asset and	Project decided. Chair decides.		

who benefits from the Asset	Widow FUG.

State	Oyo			Photo Verification
LGA	Ido			
Village/Location	Omi Adio			
Asset	Water pump and Siphon Tube	Asset Working?	Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Profits-Y Savings-Y Reinvestment –Y (fertilizer and seeds)			
Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual decides. Individual controls.			

State	Oyo			Photo Verification
LGA	Ido			
Village/Location	Omi Adio			
Asset	Knapsack Sprayer	Asset Working?	Yes ✓	
Does the Asset generate income, profit, savings, reinvestment?	Profits-Y Savings-Y Reinvestment –Y (bought another sprayer)			

Who controls the Asset and who benefits from the Asset	Individual decides. Individual controls.

Annex G: Borrower Comments

COMMENTS ON IEG DRAFT PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT:
NIGERIA: SECOND NATIONAL FADAMA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IDA 38380

The project has carefully reviewed the report of the external assessment done by IEG on the closed Second National Fadama Development Project. The high professionalism exhibited by the review team is hereby greatly acknowledged. However, there are some few observation on key components of the report as shown below:

<u>Paragraph 1, line 2on Page X</u>: **"To test whether Fadama users had sustainably increased their incomes due to the second phase of the Fadama program, IEG administered a one-on-one survey to a random stratified sample of 10% of the direct Fadama beneficiaries that had been interviewed for the 2006 impact assessment….."** *The IEG study included randomly selected 118 beneficiaries of the 1281 beneficiaries who were included in the sample. The study did not include a control group, which could have given a much better picture of performance of the Fadama II beneficiaries. A lot has changed since Fadama II Project ended and assessment of impact of the Project would have been much more rigorous by comparing performance of beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries with matching characteristics. Plus the sample size is small and could lead to serious biases. There are plans to revisit all Fadama II beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to assess the sustainability of the Fadama II Project. This approach will verify most of the results that were drawn in this Project using methods and data that are insufficient to draw such strong conclusions.*

On page x, the IEG report claimed that "An independent beneficiary assessment conducted one year after the project began implementation assessed incomes as a function of the asset." This is not true. The IEG team made reference to an old version of the report; the correct version is in <u>this book</u> . In the correct report income was assessed and productive assets separately:

a. income (from crops, livestock, non-farm activities, etc) and these were collected directly by asking respondents their income before and after Fadama II support. Data was not collected using asset. Use of *expenditure as a measure of income was avoided because of difficulty for respondents to remember such data after one year.*

b. Productive assets – the change in the value of group and private productive assets were assessed.

This misunderstanding has led to conclusions that need to be corrected. For example even though IEG reports "project made substantial progress on achieving its first objective of sustainably increasing the incomes of Fadama users" (page xiv), this is based on the observation that 64% of the productive assets are still generating income. An assessment of the income of the beneficiaries could have produced a better assessment of the change of income of beneficiaries – rather than the current assessment that uses productive asset to assess income.

Last sentence on Page xiii: **"The assessment did not attempt to determine actual beneficiary incomes as a result of the project - owing to the lack of a baseline and weakly constructed proxy indicators during the project cycle (See Chapter 3). This assessment was also not designed to conduct a comparative analysis between beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups"** *The Impact Assessment conducted by IFPRI in 2006 made use of Comparative analysis between beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups; while the IEG assessment did not employ this method. The results from the two assessments therefore may not be the same. The IEG study included randomly selected 118 beneficiaries of the 1281 beneficiaries who were included in the sample. The study did not include a control group, which could have given a much better picture of performance of the Fadama II beneficiaries. While the IFPRI report indicated a 58.5% income increase for all beneficiaries at MTR, at ICR income of beneficiaries increased by 63%. A lot has changed since Fadama II Project ended and assessment of impact of the Project would have been much more rigorous by comparing performance of beneficiaries with non-beneficiaries with matching characteristics. Plus the sample size is small and could lead to serious biases. We are planning to revisit all Fadama II beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to assess the sustainability of the Fadama II project. This approach will verify most of the results that were drawn in this project using methods and data that are insufficient to draw such strong conclusions.*

Page xiv paragraph 3 line 6-11: **"….Design also lacked an adequate diagnostic of the income constraints of the more marginalized groups included in the project. While the project targeted several resource user**

groups in its primary objective, implementation arrangements maintained a bias towards farming and agricultural production. Conflict lacked a clear definition and a theory of attribution. An emphasis on the reporting of conflict reduction, rather than on rewarding early identification, mitigation and resolution resulted in under-reporting by the project…" *There was no bias towards farming and agricultural production in the implementation of Fadama II Project as claimed in the report judging by the fact that the content of the LDP evolve through participatory process, thereby recognizing the priority projects of different economic interest groups (crop farmers, livestock farmers, fisher folks, processors, gatherers, hunters, vulnerable groups, etc).*

Page XV, first Paragraph last sentence: **"With few exceptions, interviews with local government officials revealed that the participatory and negotiated decision-making promoted by Fadama was not occurring there"**

This should be related to political instability and staff turnover at this level of governance. *However, the project made tremendous effort by establishing the Local Fadama Desk Office (LFD) and Local Fadama Development Committee (LFDC) chaired by the LGA chairperson. In addition, capacities of the relevant staff (Desk officers and members of LFDC) were strengthened to perform their expected roles. The sum of $3.5 was allocated and utilized for this purpose.*

Page XV, second Paragraph: **"…Members with stronger interpersonal networks had more voice in the choice and control over assets. Fadama increased female participation in local economic development planning but evidence suggests that women and other members of vulnerable and marginalized groups were often not able to afford or obtain their needed assets"** *Group benefit is usually a function of individual participation and contribution. The project identified this challenge during implementation where the required community contribution for assets was reduced twice to accommodate women and other vulnerable & marginalized members of the group. In addition, the project supported about 20% of the beneficiaries who were vulnerable and marginalized (i.e widows, physically challenged, aged, PLWHA, etc) with 0% beneficiaries' contributions.*

Page XV, third Paragraph last sentence: **"..IEG notes with concern however that by project close, there were an estimated 171 conflicts that had occurred in Fadama areas that had not been resolved. Information on**

their severity or effects was not made available to the IEG team..." *But without a baseline, it is not easy to assess impact of Fadama II on conflict resolution. So again, IEG approach has shortcomings in its assessment.*

Page XV, fourth Paragraph last sentence: "**The efficiency of the Project is rated *Modest* owing to a lack of methodological rigor in determining the estimated rates of returns at project end, inefficient targeting owing to purposive selection of the states and local governments, and inefficient use of monitoring, data collection and assessment systems to support implementation and the design of subsequent Project phases"** *Selection of participating States and LG for in the project was based on predetermined criteria among which Fadama Resources Potential was key. (see copy of letter to Federal Character Commission(FCC) attached as annex 1).*

Page xv, fifth Paragraph last sentence: **"…Insufficient attention was paid to building capacity for environmental management, which proved to be a challenge in this project..".***It should be noted that capacities of the Environmental Officers under the Fadama II Project have been adequately built under the project with several specialized training organized for them both within and outside Nigeria. Based on the capacity building, the project Environmental officers were able to prepare and implement safeguard and mitigation measures. The project also, received technical assistance from FAO on execution of stock routes and grazing reserve sub-projects, though not implemented under the LDP arrangement, but 100% supported under EMP. This intervention greatly assisted in reducing resource use conflicts.*

Page xvi line 2: **"A decision to scale up the project nationally was based on the result measured one year after the project became effective..".** *Fadama II became effective in May 2004 and the assessment took place in October, 2006 – i.e. 2 years and not one year as claimed in the report. The actual reasons for follow up project are stated in paragraph 10, page 8 of Fadama III PAD "…The justification for a follow-on operation is two-fold: FGN has requested it, and the measured success of Fadama II Project supports it …"*

Page xvi under lessons para 2: **"The conflict training and mediation module piloted by the project was appreciated by stakeholders but ultimately found to be unsustainable in the absence of the project architecture"** *Even* *after the Project closure, community groups still relate to the conflict committee created by the project, e.g. Eriti in Ogun state.*

Paragraph 2.4, page 3: "Farmer-Pastoral conflicts in Nigeria were so severe in 2013 that they were classified as *war* by the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer (against a five point scale that ranks conflict in escalating order: disputes, non-violent crises, violent crises, limited wars and wars" *Most of the reported cases of conflict after the close of Fadama II Project were mainly due to reasons (cattle rustling and reprisal attack) other than the common resource use that was addressed during Fadama II implementation. Moreover, Fadama II operated in only 12 states and 120 LGAs out of 36 States and FCT, and 774 LGAs respectively.*

Paragraph 2.9 page 4: **"Overseen by an elected Association Chair, the FCA was responsible for overseeing the drafting of an inclusive development plan that allocated sub-project financing across three main investment categories: (1) Capacity Building, (2) Rural Infrastructure; (3) Private Productive assets"** *Advisory services and later on Input support (which was included in the design at the midterm of the project) are the fourth and fifth investment categories;*

Paragraph 2.12 lines 6 and 9: *"SFDO" should be changed to "SFDC".*
Paragraph 2.13 line 2: **"Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development"** *should be changed to "Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources".*
Paragraph 2.16 page 6: **"While the project design facilitated the participation of these groups, and successfully integrated their needs into the local development plan, only 7% of these participants were able to afford the goods and services requested through the plan (MTR, April 2007)".** *The 20% of vulnerable and marginalized groups that participated in the project has surpassed the MTR figure of 7% at ICR.*
Paragraph 2.17 page 6: "…**the appraisal only provides an analysis of income constraints for one user group– the *farmer groups* – and the project's implementation arrangements maintain a bias towards crop production**…"
The same constraint applies to other resource users since they all operate within the same socio-economic environment and project framework;
Paragraph 2.19 page 7: **"…The project was not able to sponsor or maintain a dialogue with non-sedentary pastoralists, although an initial attempt was**

made to engage the Miette Allah of Nigeria at the beginning of the project cycle..” *Miette Allah of Nigeria and Sedentary Agro-Pastoralists are the same group made up of pastoralist and agro-pastoralist. The target of the project was actually trans-human and that was why the stock route, watering point and grazing reserve were executed under EMP.*

Paragraph 2.21 Page 8: **“…The project commissioned a Participatory Rural Appraisal with the aim of establishing a welfare related baseline, however the data was neither used as a baseline for the project M&E nor was it used by the mid-line assessment to track results..”** *Baseline was done which formed a basis for the project RMF, but IFPRI did not utilze it because it does not … In addition, CDD project usually assume a baseline of zero because FCAs/FUGs were not yet constituted.*

Paragraph 2.23 page 9: “…**The project set out to reduce Fadama related conflicts by 50 percent of the baseline value of conflicts that were reported to have been triggered by Fadama I. But fully meeting this target would allow for a remaining 571 conflicts to occur during the project period in targeted Fadama areas…”.** *The project was designed to reduce conflict amongst resource use. It should be noted that there is a significant correlation between reduction in reported conflict and reduction in total conflict because reduction in the part will lead to reduction in the whole. Moreover, the project operated in maximum of 120 LGAs out of the 774 LGAs in Nigeria.*

Paragraph 3.19 page 18: “…The mid-term review recommended lowering the beneficiary contribution for women and vulnerable groups to 10 percent, however this recommendation was not taken up by the current phase…” ***The mid-term review recommendation of lowering the beneficiary contribution for women & vulnerable groups was actually taken up in the 3rd phase as outlined in the PAD and PIM.***

Paragraph 3.23 page 19-20: “Conflicts were reported at the level of the state, rather than the local governments, where the Fadama programs are situated..” *The respective SFDOs used Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) to collect conflict data in all Project areas using the project developed monitoring format as contained in annex II.*

Paragraph 3.24 page 20: “…IEG was not able to obtain the source data for these reported results…”*The source data for reported conflict figure is available with the project and the tool used to collect the data at FUG, FCA, LGA and State levels was shared with IEG during the PPA exercise. (see copy attached as Annex II). The project had definition of conflict, facilitators were* *trained, and conflict resolution committees were established and trained to mitigate and address common resource use conflicts. It should also be noted that conflicts, once occurred cannot be hidden.*

Paragraph 3.29 page 21: "…**IEG learned that the project did not engage transhumant pastoralists. Most of the pastoralists that participated in the Fadama II project had been settled for more than a decade**…". *Fadama III engaged transhumant pastoralist through their umbrella association; Miette-Allah of Nigeria with whom the Project actively worked and coordinated the activities of the highly mobile group whose movement changes with season.*

Paragraph 5.8 page 27: "…**One of these risks relates to the very low uptake of advisory services…"** *Incidences of low uptake of advisory services were at the beginning of the Project. The trend was reversed with the introduction of the input support sub-component that supported provision of critical factors on risk sharing basis thereby inducing more uptake of advisory services activities by user groups.*

Paragraph 5.17 page 29: "**There was a lack of oversight, for example, of the quality of the facilitation process, the quality of communication, and the integrity of the group formation. There was also a lack of sensitization of the state level agricultural development program staff who were, in effect, side-stepped as part of this new service** delivery approach.." *serious sensitization was organized for policy makers (ADP inclusive) before the project became effective. Complain of being side-stepped is purely that of attitude and mind set leading to resistance to change; top-down vs bottom-up. However, many ADPs/staff were involved as public service provider under the Fadama II project. By the official launch of the project, Facilitators were significantly trained to commence the preparation of the LDPs.*

Paragraph 5.18(line 3)& 5.19 pages29 and 30: **" … The project cycle should have been longer, with more attention paid in the first two years to the quality of facilitation, communication and group formation. Fadama II was approved in December 2003, it became effective in July 2004, and was officially launched in the State of Bauchi by then Bank President Wolfowitz in October 2004. By September 2004, some 500 Nigerians had been recruited and trained with the expectation that individuals could be deployed to sensitize communities on such topics as community driven development…"** *Change "July 2004" to read "May 2004".* Training of Facilitators: *Intensive training and deployment of Community Facilitators began in December, 2003 and January, 2004 using the PPF (a scanned copy of Certificate issued to one of the trained Facilitators is attached as annex V) with a follow up training in April, 2004 before the official launch in October*

2004.Refer to one of the training report attached as Annex III and the Response letter (Annex 1) to query made by the Federal Character Commission and Agency of Government responsible for ensuring federal nature of the country is complied with in all its ramification. Also, see Minutes of meeting with the TTL held at the Commissioning of NFDO office highlighting the progress of implementation at the take off of project as Annex IV.

Para 5.20 Page 30: "World Bank supervision engaged in an independent assessment to collect beneficiary assessments early on in the project cycle. As a beneficiary assessment launched one year after the distribution of project finance Fadama II …" *The FGN engaged IFPRI and not the World Bank.*

Para 5.20 Page 30 : "Attention was turned towards the preparation of phase III more than a year prior to the close-out of the second phase. Inadequate resources and incentives were made available to the Fadama II team to properly close the project. By project close, the project had not…" *Fadama II was not abruptly closed and FGN set up different team to look at Fadama III while NFDO continued with Fadama II.*

Para 6.2 Page 33: "However there is insufficient evidence that the potentially negative environmental effects of the subprojects implemented through Fadama II were mitigated. Rather, project documentation points to neglect of some of the key aspects of the environmental mitigation plan…" *it should be noted that ESMPs were properly prepared, implemented and supervised.*

Para 6.3 Page 33: "The project required soil monitoring during the third and fifth year of the project cycle. According to the Mid-term review, undertaken in 2007, these monitoring activities were not carried out." … *soil monitoring activities were conducted after midterm by the Federal Department of Land Resources, water loggers were constructed and installed in all the participating State to monitor water quality and ground water level.*

Para 6.4 Page 34: "However, since only a fraction of the Fadama User Groups (12% by2007) had access to the advisory services component of the project, it is not clear how the remaining 88% of users technically implemented the pest management plan in their subproject areas. The ICR does not provide any assessment of the project's compliance with this operational policy." *PMP trainings were conducted for all Groups in the participating States, for instance cleared TOR for such training in Lagos State is hereby attached as annex 6. Also, social analysis was undertaken under the EIA of the Project.*

RATINGS

Outcome: The rating should have been at least satisfactory. Because as observed by IEG team the objectives were highly relevant, the approach of the CDD is substantially relevant, while progress against the first objective of the PDO substantial. However, empowerment of local community cannot be said to be modest, because the IEG team seems not to adequate understanding of the empowerment as it relates to the Project. The concept of empowerment under the Project is for the people to come together to identify their needs, prioritise them and be able to prepare their development plan, implement and monitor it. Specifically an analysis of how the LDPs were prepared and implemented using the PRA tool would have provided the IEG team an insight into the extent to which the beneficiaries were empowered. In addition, the communities for the first time have been given a voice through the implementation as they could now question local authorities over their developmental issues. Women also, were observed to be holding public positions, participating in community affairs and decision making. There is also the linking of communities to rural banking; saving and team culture was enhanced by the Project. Furthermore, as a result of empowerment of the Project some community members were appointed into sensitive Government positions, for instance, In Adamawa State, a leader of a vulnerable group was appointed as Special Assistant to the Governor, a position he is holding till today. As part of the expressed capacities of the empowered communities under the Project some state Governments such States include Niger, Ogun and Imo have adopted the Fadama approach in rural development.

Borrower: Given the pioneering efforts of Fadama II as the first productive CDD Project in Nigeria with the observed impact as attested by the IEG report 5 years after Project closure, the IEG team is hereby invited to review the ratings of the Project based on the aforementioned comments and clarifications from ***moderately satisfactory*** to at least ***satisfactory***.