



## Agriculture and Environmental Services Lessons from Recent Evaluations

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### Summary of Recent Project Performance Assessment Reports

#### Ghana: Land Administration Project

The constitution of Ghana endorses control of land by a variety of customary authorities (“chiefs”). Ownership rights and land claims are unclear as surveys are poorly developed, but it is estimated that 80 percent of all land is under the control of chiefs. Sizeable economic rent accrues to land and the allocation of these rents is contested by the state and the chiefs. This struggle for rents forms an unspoken part of the rationale for the National Land Policy introduced by the government in 1999. This policy aimed to “harmonize” statutory laws and

customary interests bearing on land. The Bank-supported Land Administration Project aimed to build on this policy.

The objective of the project was “to develop a sustainable and well-functioning land administration system that is fair, efficient, cost effective, decentralized, and that enhances land tenure security. The project’s biggest achievement was to open deeds offices in eight regions, thereby removing the need for people in these localities to travel great distances to register land.

The IEG review found that land tenure reform requires a long-term commitment by the government and its

development partners. The commitment may be facilitated by a programmatic lending instrument but the commitment must precede the choice of instrument—the instrument will not by itself create the necessary commitment. The Bank’s good practice guidelines indicate that the efficiency of land administration services tends to be higher when they are handled by a single agency, but in practice, consolidating land agencies will not by itself ensure improved efficiency. This project also demonstrates the risks with having multiple co-financiers: if each donor insists on imposing its own procurement and disbursement procedures, then implementation may be delayed. Divergence in the strategic priorities of the financiers may hinder the ability to achieve agreed-upon outcomes.

*Source: Project Performance Assessment Report on Ghana Land Administration Project, 2013*

### **Lao PDR: Second Land Titling Project**

In a country like Lao PDR, where there is little or no transparency in reviewing the status of land rights and limited enforcement of these rights, the security offered by land titles will always be qualified and the scope for expropriation is likely to be substantial. If the government is not willing to commit to a long-term program of land administration and to allocate the necessary budget, the benefits from land titling projects may not be achieved or sustained.

Preparation of a long-term government program of land administration was an explicit aim of the first Bank-funded titling project implemented over 1996-2005, but when the second project was approved in 2003 the government had still not developed such a program. It is important to recognize that meeting or exceeding titling targets does not necessarily mean that the process achieved full coverage of parcels eligible for systematic titling. Today, even though the government still says it will title all the estimated 1.6 million parcels in the country by 2020, the promise of a land administration program remains unrealized, and about 1 million parcels remain without title. It may prove more effective for policy reforms and regulatory changes to be completed before a campaign of systematic land titling is launched. Systematic land titling does not necessarily ensure a significant and sustained increase in tenure security in the absence of impartial and efficient enforcement of the new land titles.

*Sources: Project Performance Assessment Report on Lao-PDR Second Land Titling Project, 2013*

### **Malawi: Community-Based Rural Land Development Project**

The original objective of the Community-Based Rural Land Development Project was to increase the incomes of 15,000 poor rural families through the implementation of a decentralized, voluntary, community-based land reform pilot program. The project met its output target, settling 15,142 poor rural families and providing each with a two-hectare plot. Two separately-authored impact evaluations found that the increase in incomes, farm output, and agricultural productivity of beneficiaries largely exceeded comparable results achieved by matched control groups. However, the boost to agricultural productivity was largest in the year after resettlement, tapering off after beneficiaries had used up their resettlement grant.



Key lessons from this project are that the willing buyer/willing seller approach to land redistribution can be made to work—but the institutional framework needed for success is demanding. The design details of this model of land reform are critical to its success, and giving the rural poor the option of homesteading remains a valid objective. Land redistribution is, however, but one component of a successful land reform project. Contract farming to help land reform beneficiaries shift from subsistence cultivation to cash cropping also merits closer investigation.

*Source: Project Performance Assessment Report on Malawi Community-Based Rural Land Development Project, 2013*

### **Tunisia: Agricultural Support Services Project**

The Tunisia Agricultural Services Project aimed to address the need for better quality agricultural services that are relevant to the challenges of market-driven agriculture. Past government policies and agricultural services had focused exclusively on maximizing production volume. With the signing of new trade agreements, there was a need to increase the quality and competitiveness of agricultural products to take advantage of potential new markets and to enhance their ability to compete with imports entering the domestic market. Agricultural services at the time were supply-driven and studies had shown a weak link between service supply and production response. The project aimed to address this by moving to a more demand-driven approach with producers setting the agenda.

This report assesses the development effectiveness of the Tunisia Agricultural Support Services Project (2001-08). At the time that the project was prepared, Tunisia's agricultural sector was shifting from an emphasis on food self sufficiency and production for the domestic market to increasing integration in the world market. Past government policies and support to the agricultural sector had been focused exclusively on maximizing production volume. With the signing of new trade agreements, there was a need to turn attention to increasing the quality and competitiveness of Tunisia's agricultural products to take advantage of potential new markets and enhance their ability to compete with imports entering the domestic market. Agricultural services at the time were supply-driven and studies had shown a weak link between service supply and production response. The project was conceived to address the need for better quality agricultural services that are relevant to the challenges of market driven agriculture by moving to a more demand-driven approach with producers setting the agenda.

The project improved quality standards for some agricultural products and led to a greater understanding of international market demands. Laboratory upgrades enhanced Tunisia's capacity to meet international standards for export to control the quality of agriculture inputs, and also improve animal health diagnostic capacity. Agricultural research is now better documented and a broader number of stakeholders have input to the research agenda. The project was less successful at promoting greater private sector participation in the provision of agricultural extension services and strengthening the provision of services through producer organizations. The benefits of association were not realized because the associations supported by the project lacked buy-in and ownership of their members who viewed these groups as arms of the government that did not represent their interests. The overall impact of project achievements on competitiveness, however, was hampered by the absence of complementary policy reforms to improve incentives, and continuing state control of marketing.

The project experience demonstrates how the benefits of a comprehensive project design can be outweighed by complexity and resources being spread too thin. It also showed that when there are multiple implementation agencies the primary coordination unit must have sufficient leverage over the other agencies to play a proactive role in project management. Attempts to move from public to private provision of services can be undermined if there is not sufficient attention to beneficiary needs and incentives, both for producers and service providers. Finally, while the literature and empirical evidence elsewhere show that producer associations can be an effective way of providing farmers with inputs, access to services, and a way to insert their interests into agricultural policy, the benefits of association are only realized when there is buy-in of their members.

*Source: Project Performance Assessment Report on Tunisia Agricultural Support Services Project, 2013*

### **Tunisia: Natural Resources Management and North West Mountains and Forest Area Projects**

IEG assessed two projects that aimed to address land degradation and to enhance the local population's socio-economic conditions in Tunisia. Both projects combined support for the construction of soil and water conservation works, financing for agriculture and non-farm income-



generating activities, and the construction of basic rural infrastructure. Both used an integrated participatory approach that engaged local communities in the local development planning process. The Natural Resources Management project piloted this approach within Regional Agriculture Development Offices, while the North West Mountains and Forest Area Projects targeted a particular region.

One lesson shared by both projects is that weaknesses in the structures that are used to integrate communities into the development process can undermine long term collaboration with the communities. It is important that community organizations have sufficient legal standing to ensure their legitimacy in representing the communities' priorities to government agencies, that communities view the leaders of such organizations as legitimate, and that all segments of the population are represented.

Under both projects, support for alternative income-generating projects was limited to training and technical support for production issues. Many of the training participants were unable to access existing sources of credit. IEG's evaluation found that attention to markets and ensuring the availability of credit is crucial.

Finally, despite three decades of World Bank support to integrated rural development projects with significant investments in soil and water conservation works, no assessment has been made to determine the actual impacts of these interventions on erosion, soil fertility, groundwater recharge, or dam siltation. IEG found that the effectiveness of natural resource management interventions requires attention to monitoring and evaluation of actual outcomes.

*Source: Project Performance Assessment Report on Tunisia Natural Resources and North West Projects, 2013*

### **Assessment of Avian Influenza Control Projects in Nigeria, Romania, and Nepal**

The Bank's experience with avian influenza and pandemic preparedness demonstrates an important example of attempting to provide global public goods, of trying to work effectively across sectors (principally agriculture and health), and of trying to shift from crisis response to prevention. In FY13, IEG completed project evaluations of three avian influenza control projects prepared under the Global Program Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness in Nigeria, Romania, and Nepal. These projects aimed to assist countries in their ability to respond to outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza and to build capacity to respond to a possible influenza pandemic.

In Nigeria, the emergency project was rapidly prepared to respond to an unfolding crisis, with serious outbreaks of avian influenza occurring in poultry and an urgent need for assistance due to gaps in the veterinary and public health systems. The project was generally successful in containing outbreaks, with 300 outbreaks controlled over 2006-2008, due in part to high-level government support for the project and effective collaboration between key ministries at the federal and state levels. However, once outbreaks were contained, the level of attention to the project declined, progress slowed, and a number of facility upgrades were left incomplete at project closure. The evaluation notes that epidemic communication strategies require inputs from all stakeholders, as inaccurate alarmist messages can spread panic and cause significant economic harm. It also notes that pilot efforts (such as on improving biosecurity at live bird markets) may have little impact in the absence of a rigorous assessment of benefits and a clear plan for scale-up.

In Romania, the animal health agency had already controlled

avian influenza outbreaks in poultry effectively prior to project approval. The animal health agency became reluctant to implement the project as originally designed, and all animal health activities were dropped under project restructuring. Serious implementation delays also meant that many human health activities were not completed by project closure. The project demonstrates that countries that have already demonstrated capacity to effectively respond to an emergency may not need an emergency project. If the real need is for long-term capacity building, then using a template design prepared under emergency circumstances may lead to a lack of commitment from key implementing agencies.

In Nepal, the emergency project was slow to start, in part because of difficulties in finalizing a working agreement between the Bank, the government, and the United Nations agencies providing operational support. Implementation eventually improved, especially once outbreaks of avian influenza in poultry were detected in 2009, and substantial improvements in surveillance, diagnostic, and outbreak response capacity were improved, though some facilities upgraded under the project were not completed or were not in use. The project demonstrates that investments in laboratory equipment and civil works may be inefficient without sufficient staff capacity to operate and maintain them. It shows that compensation systems designed to encourage farmers to report disease outbreaks may be undermined if the real value of payments declines due to inflation. And it shows that collaboration with United Nations agencies can provide technical expertise that the World Bank lacks, but engagement of these agencies in global programs should be conducted in part at a headquarters level to avoid delays.

*Source: Project Performance Assessment Report on Avian Influenza Control Projects in Nigeria, Romania, and Nepal, 2013*

## 2. Findings from Country and Corporate Evaluations

### The Liberia Country Program Evaluation (2003-2011)


In 2013, Liberia crossed the 10-year milestone within which post-conflict countries face the omnipresent threat (50 percent chance) of relapsing into violent conflict. IEG's evaluation of World Bank assistance in Liberia broadly supported the Bank's approach in Liberia during its post-conflict reconstruction and recovery period, but found that the country's enclave-based natural resource-led growth model offered little in the way of local employment and sustainable wealth creation. IEG noted that the Bank was

not paying sufficient attention to the issue of land ownership and contested claims — a key driver of conflict and a threat to peace and stability — especially with regard to grievances around the award of industrial forest and agricultural concessions. The Government of Liberia's new development strategy has committed to improving the manner by which concessions are negotiated, managed, and monitored to ensure that they more effectively contribute to broad-based economic and social development. The environment has been a cross-cutting theme of the Liberia country assistance strategies, but the Bank's support for the environment has fallen short of its aims. IEG found that a decade after conflict, no analysis of the country's environmental priorities had been undertaken, nor had the Bank carried out a comprehensive institutional assessment of the Environmental Protection Agency to determine the requirements needed to be able to effectively perform environmental protection functions. The evaluation can be found at: [http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/Liberia\\_cpe.pdf](http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/Liberia_cpe.pdf)

### Managing High-Value Natural Resources in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (2013)

IEG's evaluation of World Bank Group assistance to low-income fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) examined the links between conflict, fragility, and the management of high-value natural resources in more than two dozen World Bank Group client countries. The evaluation noted that FCS rely to a much greater extent on high-value natural resources than non-FCS countries, that revenue from oil represents





the largest sector share, and that public revenue streams in some FCS are fully or almost fully dependent on revenues from oil/gas.

IEG found that the World Bank has helped low-income FCS access critically needed foreign exchange – especially during the post conflict period – to support reconstruction and restoration of core state functions. Early policy and regulatory reforms attracted foreign direct investment, but performance has not been in line with best practice extractive policies.

In many FCS there has been: a rush to sign contracts that have not been in the country's best interest, driven by entrenched interests or lack of capacity; an under collection of taxes, fees, and royalties; limited attention to the distribution of benefits and local development; and an overall lack of sensitivity in lending operations to drivers of conflict and fragility. The Bank's support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has strengthened demand-side governance, and contract transparency has increased in FCS. Yet low-income FCS perform worse than non-FCS: just two of the 16 FCS participating in EITI are fully compliant with EITI standards.

In FCS countries where conflict was fueled by a failure to share the benefits of resource-related rents, the attitude and perceptions of resource-affected communities are important for maintaining peace and stability. World Bank-supported mining laws include community development clauses, but lack the means to empower local citizens and oversee implementation. Community Development Agreements lack specificity, enforcement, grievance mechanisms, and social accountability. The Justice for the Poor Program is addressing these gaps, but such efforts need to be imbedded in operations. The Bank can be more effective by systematically building analysis of local social dynamics and historical grievances around land and resource use into the design of Bank operations, by tending to issues of elite capture and inter-group dynamics in local benefit sharing arrangements, and by purposively including women and youth (who have tended to be excluded from decision-making processes) in benefit sharing deals. More effort is needed to ensure that extractive industries support sustainable local and regional development, especially since extractive investments in FCS have often offered few benefits for the local economy or employment opportunities for local communities.

The evaluation also notes the need for greater collaboration across sectors and between the Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency in FCS, which has been the exception rather than the norm.

The evaluation World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, can be found at: [https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/fcs\\_eval\\_0.pdf](https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/fcs_eval_0.pdf)


### **3. Preview of Upcoming Evaluations and Knowledge Products**


#### **Avian Influenza and Pandemic Preparedness: Learning Product**

IEG is producing a new line of products with a learning focus. A report on the Bank's experience with avian influenza and pandemic preparedness will draw on six completed Project Performance Assessment Reports, desk reviews of 23 closed projects focusing on avian influenza, and additional analysis and interviews (forthcoming March 2014). This report will provide technical lessons from project evaluations on issues such as biosecurity, surveillance systems, compensation mechanisms, and diagnostic systems, while offering suggestions for improving monitoring and evaluation indicators. The report identifies strategic lessons on how the global program on avian influenza can inform future crisis response, and on the difficulty of ensuring that emergency agendas are sustained once international attention moves on. The report notes the successes of the Bank in rapidly preparing a global investment program in a field where the Bank did not have much prior experience by working with international technical agencies, but also notes that pandemic preparedness and risk reduction has not been mainstreamed into ongoing programs, and that the Bank has not provided significant additional support for zoonotic diseases or pandemic preparedness since 2010.

## **Forthcoming Project Performance Assessment Reports**

- Indonesia: Land Management and Policy Development Project
- Brazil: Parana Biodiversity Project
- Brazil: Ecosystem Restoration of Riparian Forests in Sao Paulo
- Brazil: First Programmatic Reform Loan for Environmental Sustainability
- Brazil: First Programmatic Policy Loan for Sustainable Environmental Management (SEM DPL)
- Nigeria: Fadama II
- Ghana: First, Second, and Third Natural Resource and Environmental Governance Projects (NREG DPL)





For more information, visit the IEG on the web at  
<http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org>

