

## 1. CAS Data

**Country:** Ghana

**CAS Year:** FY07

**CAS Period:** FY08 – FY12

**CASCR Review Period:** FY08 – FY12

**Date of this review:** 8/29/2013

## 2. Executive Summary

- i. This review examines the implementation of the FY08-FY12 Ghana Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of FY07 and CAS Progress Report (CASPR) of FY10, and assesses the CAS Completion Report (CASCR). The CAS was presented as an IDA-only strategy, and this review covers only the program of the World Bank.
- ii. The CAS was anchored in the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS) that was endorsed by 16 development partners. Its overarching objectives were to support Ghana to sustain economic growth of at least 6 percent per year, surpass the 2015 MDG of halving poverty to 26 percent during the CAS period, and start to reduce inequalities. As the G-JAS, the CAS adopted the three pillars of the Ghana's second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II); however, there was no clear indication of the specific CAS objectives under each pillar – they were expected to be aligned with the relevant GPRS II objectives, but it was not clear whether they would maintain the same scope and time horizon for attainment of these objectives. The CASPR reaffirmed the overall objectives of the CAS; but in its attempt to be aligned with the new Government's Medium-Term Development Plan, which was evolving and expected to be revised, there was even less clarity on what specific objectives the CAS aimed to achieve during the CAS period.
- iii. IEG rates the overall outcome of the CAS as *moderately unsatisfactory*, below the CASCR rating of *moderately satisfactory*. Although some progress was made in all areas under the three pillars, none of the objectives was fully achieved, and in more than half of the cases progress fell considerably short of expectations. The Bank's support contributed to Ghana's good progress in enhancing mining sector revenue management, in improving agriculture productivity, in expanding ICT services, and in strengthening the health insurance system. However, progress was slow and fragmented in all the other areas: macroeconomic management was erratic; improvement in the road network was too slow to remove persistent travel bottlenecks; although procedures to start a business were streamlined, the overall business environment did not improve appreciably while access to credit remained difficult; although household electrification improved, distribution losses increased and the finances of the electricity sector remained precarious; while land title registration procedures were simplified, improvement in land administration was hampered by partial progress in required legal and institutional reforms; although child health care delivery and prevention improved, this had not translated into lower infant and maternal mortality rates; participation in primary education increased, but education quality and learning achievement remained low; although access to safe water improved overall, the situation appeared to have worsened in peri-urban areas while access to improved sanitation lagged seriously behind; while there was consensus on the need for better targeting and a common targeting system was officially adopted, it was yet to be applied for social programs; poor incentive framework and monitoring capacities resulted in continuous degradation of natural resources; and finally, most of the Bank support for decentralization, public sector reforms, statistical capacity building, and mainstreaming social accountability mechanisms was relatively recent, with limited evidence for concrete results.
- iv. IEG rates IDA performance as *moderately unsatisfactory*, below the CASCR rating of

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*moderately satisfactory.* The broad objectives of the CAS were aligned with the Government's development strategies, but there was a lack of clarity on the specific CAS objectives that the Bank aimed to achieve during the CAS period. The selection of areas of engagement reflected the division of labor under the G-JAS and adjusted for the changing circumstances. The Bank's choice of instrument, which relied heavily on DPOs, reflected its commitment to have better alignment with the Government's programs and responded to the needs linked to the economic crisis. However, these DPOs were not adequately supported by a technical assistance program to build the administrative capacity of the client. This led to poor results in several instances. As the specific CAS objectives were not clearly articulated, the results chain was incomplete, making it difficult to assess the relevance of the outcome indicators or the achievement of the CAS objectives. Despite enhanced field presence, supervision remained a challenge, partly due to overly complex design in many projects and partly due to high staff turnover. Portfolio performance was volatile; disbursement and project success rates were below the regional averages. As the CASCR notes, internal assessment of the operations under supervision seemed to lack realism, thus impeding early identification and resolution of implementation issues. The Bank was responsive to the new administration's priorities and adjusted the CAS program after the mid-term review, including replacing all but 6 outcome indicators in the results matrix, but without providing additional clarity on the underlying objectives to be measured by the indicators. There was good effort at donor coordination, as well as heightened attention on safeguard issues after the FY08 investigation by Inspection Panel.

- v. IEG concurs with lessons drawn in the CASCR, and underscores two additional points. First, policy lending operations ensure alignment and client ownership of the Bank's program, but carry the risk of exposing the Bank's program to the client's political and administrative constraints. To mitigate this risk, they need to be accompanied by a strong program of capacity building to ensure smooth implementation. Second, a good results framework depends on a clear articulation of the CAS objectives to be achieved during the strategy period, as well as a strong results chain linking the Bank's interventions to the CAS objectives and to the higher-level country goals. Without these, the relevance of the indicators cannot be properly assessed, nor can the achievement of the CAS program.

### **3. Assessment of WBG Strategy**

#### **Overview of CAS Relevance:**

##### Country Context:

1. Ghana entered the CAS period with strong GDP growth (over 5 percent per year in 2000-07) and poverty reduction (from 42 to 35 percent in 1997-03). Despite a slowdown in 2009, growth continued at a robust pace of over 8 percent annually in 2008-12, but amid persistent fiscal and external imbalances (both rose to 12 percent of GDP by 2012). Tight monetary policies and other stabilization measures reduced inflation to single digit, although inflation pressures and short-term stability risks remained. After revisions to its national accounts, Ghana became a lower middle-income country with GDP per capita at US\$1,343 in 2010. Assuming unchanged income distribution since the last household poverty survey in 2006, the CASCR calculates a poverty headcount index of 24.8 percent by end-2010 compared to the 2015 MDG target of 26 percent. At the same time, significant challenges remained: infrastructure was not keeping up with massive needs despite significant public investment, cost recovery in the utilities was becoming more difficult in an environment of energy shortages and increasing marginal energy cost, regional disparities persisted, and Ghana's macroeconomic performance continued to be hostage to the political cycle.

2. Ghana's second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II, 2006-09) was adopted in 2005 with an ambitious overarching goal of raising average per capita income to middle income levels by 2015. Seeking to diversify the economy's structure from traditional cocoa to cereals and other cash

crops for export markets and to develop other sectors (e.g., tourism, ICT, light industry, value-added minerals), the strategy emphasized policies to promote equitable growth that would be sustainable over the medium to long term. The strategy's actions were organized around three pillars: *private sector competitiveness, human resource development, and governance and civil responsibility*. The GPRS II was succeeded in 2009 by the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) 2010-12, which provided the new administration an opportunity to incorporate its own priorities into medium-term planning and to respond to emerging realities (e.g., large macroeconomic imbalances, discovery of oil and gas), and gave additional weight to good governance, water and sanitation, agriculture and climate change. A spatial approach to development planning was also highlighted.

Objectives of the WBG Strategy:

3. The CAS was anchored in the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS) that was endorsed by 16 development partners. Its overarching objectives were to support Ghana to sustain economic growth of at least 6 percent per year, surpass the 2015 MDG of halving poverty to 26 percent during the CAS period, and start to reduce inequalities. As the G-JAS, the CAS adopted the three pillars of the GPRS II; however, there was no clear indication of the specific CAS objectives under each pillar – they were expected to be aligned with the relevant GPRS II objectives, but it was not clear whether they would maintain the same scope and time horizon for attainment of these objectives. The CASPR reaffirmed the overall objectives of the CAS; but in its attempt to be aligned with the new Government's Medium-Term Development Plan, which was evolving and expected to be revised, there was even less clarity on what specific objectives the CAS aimed to achieve. Both the CAS and CASPR results matrices were consistent with the text of the strategy documents, except that the cross-cutting theme of gender was not captured by the results matrix.

Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

4. **Congruence with Country Context and Country Program:** There was a high degree of internal consistency between the analysis of the country context and the GPRS II objectives, with which the G-JAS and the CAS objectives were intended to be fully aligned. There was also a clear articulation of division of labor among the development partners. Changes at the CASPR stage responded to amended government priorities and changing macroeconomic circumstances, and sought to maximize the use of IDA funds.

5. **Relevance of Design:** The design of the Bank interventions reflected its strong commitment to better alignment with the Government's budget and overall results orientation. In particular, the program gave a greater reliance on DPOs for achieving its overall objectives. Such a choice of instrument called for a strong technical assistance program to support administrative capacity building of the client, which was not in place. World Bank Country Survey FY11 indicated that the Bank's capacity building work in Ghana declined significantly between FY06 and FY11. The strong focus on Pillar I was consistent with the top priority on growth; however, the wide scope of issues covered under this pillar translated into an unfocused program and stretched the Bank's supervision capacity. Despite the priorities given to good governance, the support program under Pillar III was weak, as was that for the cross-cutting issues of social accountability and gender.

6. **Strength of Results Framework:** The CAS results framework was based on the Ghana Partnership Results Matrix (GPRM), which was meant to be an evolving matrix that would be agreed upon between the Government and the development partners annually. As the specific CAS objectives were not clearly articulated, the results chain linking IDA interventions to CAS objectives and to higher-level country goals was incomplete; and in its place was a chain going from IDA interventions to outcomes indicators and to GPRM targets, which subsequently underwent significant changes in the CASPR – the 21 GPRM targets were replaced by 66 Country Long-term Strategic Development Goals and all but 6 of the CAS outcome indicators were discarded and replaced by 48 new indicators. Such a results framework focused all the attention on the minute details of the program and proved to be too unstable to be a reliable tool for tracking progress and assessing results. The indicators proposed were generally set at the appropriate level, although in some cases they were too narrowly defined to be a relevant proxy for the achievement of the CAS outcomes sought. For example "increase in

employment in the ICT sector” is very loosely connected, if at all, with the objective of “creating an environment for more competitive and lower cost ICT services”. Some indicators were specific to individual IDA lending operations and did not reflect the broad contribution of the WBG.

7. **Risk Identification and Mitigation:** The CAS identified four types of risks. (i) Political risks related to the electoral cycle, which would be mitigated by a flexible program, materialized with the change of government and the Bank adjusted its program to respond to the priorities of the new administration. (ii) Economic risks from the external environment (as well as internal macroeconomic management) also materialized, and in response, the Bank augmented its budget financing along with development partners. (iii) Social stability risks did not flare up, but the proposed mitigation (i.e., analysis for better understanding of the links between poverty, growth and inequality) would not seem adequate if they did. (iv) Risk of inadequate concessional financing was considered low, and indeed ODA to Ghana was on an upward trend until FY11. The CASPR identified a number of new challenges and risks, but did not discuss any mitigation strategy. Of the risks highlighted in the CASPR was the mismatch between the expectations for the country program and the capacity of counterparts to deliver, which was particularly important in the context of significant policy lending. As this risk was not anticipated in the CAS and no mitigation measure was proposed in the CASPR, it was not adequately addressed, contributing to the implementation difficulties encountered in many of the DPOs.

#### **Overview of CAS/CPS Implementation:**

##### Lending and Investments:

8. At the beginning of the CAS period, 19 IDA-financed projects totaling \$936 million were on-going. During the CAS period, IDA financed an additional 35 projects for \$2.5 billion, against the planned \$2.6 billion for 48 projects. Budget support operations accounted for 40 percent of the new IDA financing compared to the planned 50 percent in the CAS. Excluding the budget support operations, close to 80 percent of the investment lending went to support the objectives under Pillar I (private sector competitiveness), while the pillar on governance and civil responsibility received less than 5 percent of the resources. A trust fund portfolio of 31 operations provided \$137 million, a third of which went to the Energy Development and Access Project (FY08, \$50 million). Urban water, land, and education were other focus areas of TF resources.

9. IDA’s portfolio performance was volatile, with the proportion of projects at risk going up from 17.6 percent in FY08 to 38.9 percent in FY09, down to 10.5 percent in FY11, then up again to 28.6 percent in FY12. Not only were the movements in Ghana more pronounced than Africa as a whole, the portfolio was also riskier than the average for the Africa region (22.2 percent) at the end of FY12. IEG reviewed the completion reports of 8 projects completed during the CAS period and rated the development outcomes as *satisfactory* or *moderately satisfactory* in 4 projects and *moderately unsatisfactory* in 4 projects. At 50 percent, this represented a lower success rate than the average for African region (66 percent). The Implementation Status Reports rate 87 percent of the 45 projects under implementation as *satisfactory* or *moderately satisfactory*. The big disconnect raises questions over supervision quality as there might be cases where potential issues had not been detected.

##### Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

10. The CAS document indicated that a comprehensive review of AAA would be undertaken in 2008 to determine the future AAA program. In a changing environment, the Bank increasingly resorted to just-in-time policy notes to complement more formal ESW. As in the case of lending, the AAA program was revised in the CASPR to reflect the new economic and political environment, and to support new priorities with a special focus on public financial management and public sector effectiveness. Against this background, only two of the four planned ESW and three of the five planned TA were delivered, while 15 additional ESW pieces and 12 TA projects were completed (plus 6 ESWs and 4 TAs that are on-going).

11. The AAA appeared to have been prepared as input to lending or to promote dialogue on issues and policies in a context of changing priorities. The lack of an M&E system for the WBG’s

knowledge products makes it difficult to assess the quality and impact of the AAA delivered. Overall, the World Bank Country Survey FY11 indicated that the Bank was well regarded for its technical competence and for producing useful knowledge and research work, but less so for its effectiveness at adapting its knowledge to Ghana's needs and providing straightforward and intellectually honest advice to the Ghanaian government.

#### Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

12. Although the CAS was anchored in the 16 partner Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy, the CASCR is silent about how the overall partnership worked during the CAS period, except for providing a description of the Bank's role and an example of good coordination. The CASPR reported that progress was made in donor harmonization in a number of areas, but also underlined weak government leadership and poor quality of dialogue between development partners and the Government. The World Bank Country Survey in FY06 and FY11 showed significant decline in the ratings for the Bank's collaboration with other partners and with the Government.

#### Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

13. Following a request registered with the Inspection Panel in FY08, the Panel investigated the waste management in Accra under the Second Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (FY04-FY12), and found that the Bank did not comply with several provisions of Bank policies on Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01), Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12) and Project Supervision (OP 13.05). In response to the Panel's findings, Management pursued a two-pronged approach, including (i) dialogue with the Government to accelerate work in capacity building and planning for an integrated solid waste management strategy; and (ii) preparation of an environmental assessment that focused attention on meeting urgent needs for waste management.

14. In the period FY-09-FY12, INT recorded more than 21 allegations of fraud and corruption, and found sufficient basis to open 8 cases. Two of these were substantiated.

#### ***Overview of Achievement by Objective:***

15. While the CAS was clear about its intended alignment with the three pillars of the GPRS II, it was less clear about the objectives that the Bank aimed to achieve during the CAS period, which might differ in scope from those of the GPRS II. The assessment below follows the relevant objectives as formulated in the GPRS II.

#### **Pillar I: Raise private sector competitiveness**

16. There were eight objectives under this pillar. Maintaining macroeconomic stability was introduced at CASPR stage to address the deteriorating macroeconomic imbalances; and increasing private sector employment was abandoned as a CAS objective in the CASPR, without an explanation.

17. **Maintain sound macroeconomic management and budget governance.** Macroeconomic management was erratic during the CAS period. Periods of good policy implementation and fiscal discipline were followed by spending slippages, larger-than-budgeted wage increases, and the recurrence of significant energy subsidies. As a result, the overall fiscal deficit on a cash basis oscillated between a high of 8½ percent of GDP in 2008, a low of 4½ percent of GDP in 2011, and an estimated 12 percent of non-oil GDP in 2012. Government payment arrears also persisted. In 2011, for example, while gross arrears clearance was substantial at 2.7 percent of non-oil GDP, the Government accumulated new arrears of about 1.3 percent of non-oil GDP. The latest IMF Article IV Consultation (April 2013) notes robust growth momentum accompanied by rising fiscal and external imbalances and inflation pressures. Against this background, the two indicators (non-oil fiscal deficit under 6 percent of GDP and inflation below 7 percent in 2012) were missed. IMF programs were the main drivers of macro support; the Bank provided budget support under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit series (FY07, FY08, FY09, and FY11). IEG rated PRSC6 (closed in FY08) as *moderately unsatisfactory* because in addition to lack of progress in energy sector reform, the fiscal deficit grew excessively, threatening macroeconomic stability.

The latest ISRs rated PRSC7 and 8 as *moderately satisfactory*.

18. **Improve the enabling environment for business, including trade and financial services.** Significant progress was made in reducing the time and the number of procedures to start a business. However, there was no change in other areas measured by DB indicators, and Ghana's overall Ease of Doing Business ranking deteriorated slightly over the CAS period. Some progress was made in developing PPP for infrastructure with a unit for PPPs set up at the Ministry of Finance, a PPP proposal submitted (city of Accra), and another in the pipeline (Ministry of Transport). However, access to credit remained a key constraint for doing business: although the number of rural community bank accounts increased by 27 percent (from 3 to 3.8 million in 2009-11), the share of private sector credit to local private enterprises declined from 66 percent in 2008 to 55 percent in 2011 instead of rising to 70 percent as the CAS expected). Overall, the World Economic Forum's Competitiveness Report considers that Ghana's competitiveness remains weak because of increased government regulation and a deterioration of institutional quality.

19. The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Project (FY06) and the Economic Management Capacity Building Project (FY06, additional financing FY08), were the main instruments of IDA support for this objective. Both projects were restructured and extended to allow the full use of funds. In the case of the MSME, the last ISR notes that key activities that would assist SMEs in the Tema Export Processing Zone to become more competitive have stalled due to delayed decision making on the client side. An Investment Climate Assessment was delivered in FY09. The CAS discussed a number of planned interventions by IFC in the Ghanaian financial sector; the CASCR provides no information on IFC's contribution.

20. **Enable agricultural producers to improve productivity, diversify crops, and expand production for exports.** Partly reflecting productivity gains from more intensive farming practices and technology adoption, agriculture grew at about 6 percent a year in 2008-11, contributing significantly to major reductions in poverty and malnutrition. The use of fertilizer and other inputs, and better varieties contributed to the significant increases in yields, which surpassed the CAS targets by a wide margin in all key staples. The target of establishing at least 3 PPPs to promote private investment in agricultural investment was also met with private firms entering PPP arrangements in the fertilizer distribution network, out grower schemes, and horticulture export facility. However, cropping intensity ratios did not improve in either formal or informal irrigation schemes; the increase in the proportion of formal sector credit to agriculture was slower than expected; and no reliable data is available on government spending in agriculture sector to assess the progress made towards meeting NEPAD commitment of increasing the share of agricultural spending. Moreover, export value of nontraditional agricultural exports declined by 5 percent in a very difficult external environment.

21. The main instrument of IDA support was a series of four Agricultural Development Policy Operations (FY09, FY10, FY11, and FY12) aimed at enhancing the contribution of agriculture to growth while improving the management of soil and water resources. Three of the four programmatic loans were completed and the ICRs of the first two rated the development outcome as *moderately satisfactory*, with the target of a 30 percent yield increase in key staple crops in 2007-10 achieved, but below-expectation progress in three of the nine objectives (access to credit, quality of budgetary process, improved irrigation performance). The PRSC series and the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (FY07) provided additional support, as well as the recent Ghana Commercial Agriculture (FY12). In addition, the Bank prepared the Agribusiness Indicators report (FY12) and the on-going Cocoa Sector Policy Brief on the policy actions and priorities for the cocoa sector. The CASCR reports that IFC provided advisory services and investments to address inadequate agricultural credit to the farming and agribusiness sector by Ghana's commercial banks.

22. **Manage natural resources in a sustainable and transparent way.** Progress was made in improving the institutional framework to manage resources sustainably, but Ghana continued to struggle with the sustainability of its natural resources, particularly the forests. On a positive note, mining sector revenue collection, management and transparency were enhanced by the adoption of fiscal models; and environmental assessment guidelines were produced for many sectors leading to the preparation of institutional frameworks for environmental policy. However, little progress was made in strengthening the incentive framework and monitoring capacities to prevent further environmental

degradation and deforestation as illegal timber continued to dominate the domestic timber market.

23. The most important IDA instrument was the Natural Resources and Environmental Governance Project--NREG--(FY08) and DPOs (FY09, FY10), which achieved uneven success among its many objectives. For example, although some measures were undertaken to ensure a predictable and sustainable financing for the forest and wildlife sectors, uncontrolled informal harvesting remained a problem. On the other hand, improvement in mining sector revenue management led to the validation of Ghana as EITI compliant in the minerals sector and the application of EITI methodologies to local revenue-sharing arrangements. The NREG series also increased discussion of conflict and human rights issues in the minerals sector, bringing together the government, mining companies, and civil society organizations, and contributed to the development of an overall climate change management framework, with several key sectors (agriculture, forestry, transport and energy) moving ahead with their own climate strategies. As an input to this work, the Bank delivered (with other partners) an Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Policy Note (FY11) that analyzed the impact of global warming and how Ghana should adapt in response.

24. **Improve access to land and security of property rights.** The CAS outcome indicators measured only the development of a better-functioning land administration, not the improvement of access to land or of security of property rights. The intended institutional changes were partly achieved: on the one hand, the administrative procedures for land title registration were simplified, leading to sharply reduced time to register land title (from 17 months in 2007 to 6 months in 2010); on the other hand, the goal of integrating land services was partially thwarted by the continuing independence of two of the six land agencies and the limited progress made in computerizing the cadaster and linking it to a geographical information system. Moreover, two of the three legislations scheduled for passage were not approved by parliament, hampering progress toward harmonizing customary and statute land laws and moving toward a more efficient system of land use planning.

25. IDA supported this objective through the Land Administration Projects I (LAP, FY04-FY11) and II (FY10). Both projects show weak implementation records (LAP I was extended twice), in part due to lack of coordination between the many donors associated with the projects as well as procurement delays that resulted from slow preparation of terms of reference and bidding documents.

26. **Scale up investment in energy generation and distribution.** Significant progress was made in expanding household electrification, but there were no gains in reducing distribution losses in Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), which remained at around 26 percent in 2006-11, while the finances of the electricity sector remained precarious due to long delays in adjusting tariffs to cost recovery level. The ECG's bill collection rate improved slightly from 88 to 89 percent in 2009-10, but has since deteriorated. As triggers for the Bank's PRSC 7 and 8, the EITI principles were extended to the oil and gas sector and a new Petroleum Regulatory Authority was established. However, only a third of the expected number of rural household gained access to solar lighting, and there is no data on the quantity of electricity traded within the WAPP.

27. The Energy Development and Access Project (FY08, additional financing FY10) was IDA's main instrument to support this objective. Its latest ISR rated the project development outcome as *moderately unsatisfactory* because the sales of solar panels to villages without electricity were below expectations, the energy distribution losses increased significantly, and the ECG collection performance deteriorated while its costs rose sharply. The West Africa Power Pool Projects I-III (WAPP, FY05, FY06 and FY09) aimed to establish a well-functioning, cooperative power pooling mechanism for West Africa. The overall progress under WAPP I and II was unsatisfactory due to slow pace of implementation of the Benin components, and there was considerable risk of not achieving the development objective unless the project was further extended to permit the non-WB parts of the project to be finished. Under WAPP III, the Burkina Faso and Ghana utilities were working closely and making progress on procurement, but more recently the project appeared to have gone off-track.

28. **Create an environment for more competitive and lower cost ICT services.** The outcome indicators did not measure progress in creating an environment for expanding ICT services; instead, they measured how ICT services were leveraged for broader growth and development. As the CASCR

reports, Ghana made significant progress in expanding mobile telephony services and the IT-enabled services sector (ITES). Nevertheless, there is less evidence that such progress has been leveraged to achieve diversified growth and development – while new ICT/ITES jobs increased, albeit below CAS expectations but with faster progress for women employment, export-led revenues in the sector declined in 2009-11. The main Bank intervention was the e-Ghana project (FY07), which received additional financing in FY11. Through the project, the Bank supported improvement in the enabling environment for ICT (mainly regulatory institutions) for local ICT businesses and services, and development of e-Government applications and government communications.

29. **Enhance transport infrastructure.** Progress in transport infrastructure was slow despite substantial amount of IDA support (about \$500 million including regional projects). As a result, although the average transit time for imports moving by containers from the exit at the port Tema to Ouagadougou decreased as expected, the targets of reducing travel time on Bus Rapid Transit System and increasing the share of road in good condition on the Tema – Ouagadougou segment were unmet. The CASCR notes slow procurement for Bank-supported projects and weak governance in the sector. These factors, compounded by domestic contractors not delivering good quality road work, explain why progress in transport infrastructure in Ghana was not faster. The Community-Based Rural Development (FY05-FY11, supplemental FY08) had a component to rehabilitate priority feeder roads and upgrade farm-to-village tracks and trails, but the share of “good” and “fair” feeder roads did not increase as expected because of inadequacy of the programmed maintenance of the road network. The Transport Sector Project (FY09) aimed to improve the mobility of goods and passengers by strengthening institutions, regulations, operations and maintenance, and infrastructure investment; while most components of the projects moved forward, they did so with substantial delays.

30. IEG rates the outcome of WBG assistance under Pillar I as *moderately unsatisfactory*. The objectives were relevant to raise private sector competitiveness, but lacked the required focus to produce results. The Bank stretched itself too thinly over many sectors and activities, as the Bank itself recognizes, and the agenda appears to have overwhelmed the authorities. As a consequence, the results suffered. While good progress was made in enhancing mining sector revenue collection, management and transparency through the adoption of fiscal models; improving agriculture productivity with intensive farming practices and technology adoption; and expanding ICT services, progress was slow and fragmented in all other areas. Macroeconomic management was erratic; improvement in road network was too slow to remove persistent travel bottlenecks; while household electrification improved, distribution losses increased, the finances of the electricity sector remained precarious and rural household continued to lack access to power; access to land and secure property rights did not improve appreciably due to weak support as a result of poor donor coordination and procurement problems, and Ghana continued to struggle with the sustainability of its natural resources, particularly forests.

#### **Pillar II: Improve Human Development Outcomes**

31. Under this pillar, IDA supported human development objectives that are critical to the MDG agenda with interventions in health, education, water and sanitation, and social protection sector.

32. **Improve health service delivery to raise the productive capacity of the labor force.** Two of the three CAS targets (reducing infection rate of infants born to HIV infected mothers and improving payments of health insurance claims) were achieved, but there are conflicting data with regard to the proportion of children receiving vitamin A supplement, where good coverage reported by IDA projects was not confirmed by district level data reported to Ghana Health Service. These good outcomes notwithstanding, infant and maternal mortality MDG remains off-track and the CASCR notes that most of the Bank interventions encountered significant delays. On the other hand, the latest ISRs found the Health Insurance Project (FY08) and the Nutrition and Malaria Control for Child Survival Project (FY08) to be progressing satisfactorily, especially with respect to health care prevention and delivery to infants and children under 5, while the Multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS Project (FY06) was rated as *highly unsatisfactory* by IEG. The Bank is also preparing a Ghana Health Status Report.



33. **Enhance education delivery to raise the productive capacity of the labor force.** As an indication of improved access to and participation in basic education, primary completion rate increased from 80.1 percent in 2007 to over 90 percent in 2012 in deprived districts. There is no information on education quality as the outcome indicator on teaching quality (teacher absenteeism) was not tracked, although the CASCR notes that quality remains low and learning achievements as reflected by test results did not improve significantly. While equitable access to education was a strategic development goal, all the original CAS indicators pertaining to gender disparity were removed in the CASPR, and the CASCR notes limited progress in addressing geographic and gender disparities. The CASPR added an indicator on education sector governance (establishment of the Council for Technical, Vocational, Education and Training by 2012); however, the CASCR reports that such a council had been established by Act 718 of July 2006, prior to the start of the CAS period.

34. The Bank's contribution to this objective was limited as both the Education Sector Project (FY04-FY12) and the Education for All Fast Track Initiative Grant (FY09-FY11) suffered from design flaws, high staff turnover, and slow disbursements. IEG's review of the Education Sector Project found a lack of a logical link between projected activities and the expected outcomes, and a lack of an appropriate monitoring system. The Education for All Fast Track Initiative Grant was ultimately cancelled and reimbursed. IFC planned to provide advisory services to strengthen private school's financial, managerial and educational capacities and improve the environment of private education; the CASCR provides no information on

35. **Enhance the quality and efficiency of water and sanitation services.** All four outcome indicators measured the access to water and sanitation services even though sector governance was identified as a long-term development goal. No baseline was provided for any of the indicators to allow assessment of progress; but the CASCR reports that between 50 to 80 percent of the targets were met. Despite the progress, the CASCR notes significant challenges in improving access to improved sanitation - at 12.4 percent of the population, Ghana was behind African average for providing adequate sanitation access and off track to meet the MDG target (53 percent by 2015). The Bank supported this objective with several projects, including the Second Urban Environmental Sanitation Project (FY04) and the Urban Water Project (FY05, additional financing FY12), both of which suffered significant implementation delays, with the former not entirely disbursed at closing and subject to an Inspection Panel investigation; the Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation project (FY05, additional financing FY07), which performed well in water but less so in sanitation; the successful Community Based Rural Development Project (FY05-FY11) and the Sustainable Rural Water and Sanitation Service (FY10) which was progressing well.

36. **Improve the targeting of services and preventative activities to underserved areas and vulnerable groups.** The CASCR reports that despite agreement with the authorities on the need to introduce a common targeting system and having developed such a system in partnership with other development partners, the Government showed a strong reluctance to change specific rules for social programs. Consequently, although a common targeting system was adopted, there is no evidence for the implementation of the targeting system for social programs. Supported by the Bank's Ghana Social Opportunities Project (FY10), which was the Bank's main intervention for this objective, the number of households benefiting from cash transfers exceeded the CAS target by 40 percent, but the jobs created under the public works program fell considerably below expectations (52 percent below CAS target and 76 percent below project target).

37. IEG rates the outcome of WBG assistance under Pillar II as *moderately satisfactory*. Bank's support contributed to the progress in health insurance in Ghana, but its role in improving child and maternal health outcomes was less clear. Access to primary education improved, but quality remained low. Overall access to water improved, although there are indications that the situation worsened in per-urban areas, and access to sanitation remained a serious challenge. Despite consensus on the need for better targeting of social programs and the adoption of a common targeting system, there is no evidence of application of the system for social programs.

**Pillar III: Strengthen Governance and Civil Responsibility**

38. The objectives under this pillar underwent considerable re-organization and rationalization in the CASPR, with all original outcome indicators discarded and replaced by new indicators.
39. **Strengthen the civil and public services.** Although the public sector reform strategy and the national decentralization policy were adopted (although the Civil Service Bill was yet to be approved), and the Ghana Revenue Authority was established, only limited progress was made in implementing the needed reforms. The CASCR notes the complexity of the reforms and a failure to build consensus around the pace and the models for public sector reform and decentralization as the key reasons for the lack of progress in this area. The Economic Management and Capacity Building Project (FY06) was the Bank’s main instrument to support this objective, and the most recent ISR suggested that overall progress of the project was *moderately satisfactory*, producing a revised civil service law, a new salary pay structure for public sector employees, and improving the civil service training college. It noted, however, that the decentralization component of the project was dropped due to non-achievement of project objective in this area and little prospect for progress in the near future. A Local Government Capacity Building Project (FY11) is expected to yield results in the next CAS period.
40. **Improve statistical services and data analysis for better evidence-based policy making.** Although the provisional results of the 2010 Population and Housing Census were made available in early 2011, there is no data on the professional qualification of Ghana Statistical Service staff while the production of the Annual Progress Reports of the GSGDA was generally delayed. The CASCR notes that further progress needs to be made before the national statistical system is able to meet the demand for statistics, particularly of the quality and range required for better analysis and monitoring of economic development. The Bank’s Statistics Development Program (FY12) was proposed for FY10, but experienced long delays in government approval of the project and in signing of the legal agreements. Not yet effective, it was rated as *moderately unsatisfactory* by the latest ISR.
41. **Strengthen the capacity of citizens and non-state actors to engage in national development and fight against corruption.** The CASPR identified social accountability as one of two cross-cutting issues for mainstreaming going forward. Three outcome indicators were proposed to measure the achievement of this objective: (i) mainstreaming social accountability (SA) mechanisms in the M&E of four Bank projects in the fisheries, water, transport and gas sectors, which was partially achieved as SA mechanisms were only adopted in the Oil and Gas Capacity Building Project (FY10) and the Local Government Capacity Support Project (FY11), and it is unclear how the SA mechanisms worked in these two projects; (ii) alignment of SA mechanisms, tools and approaches used in Bank program with strategic plan, which the CASCR reports to have been achieved as EITI principles were extended to the oil and gas sector where non-state stakeholders were involved monitoring payments and expenditures in the sector; and (iii) legal framework and systems for improved access to information, which was not achieved as the Freedom of Information Law was pending approval by Parliament even though some steps were taken to promote and/or mandate disclosure of information (e.g., oil and gas contracts). In addition to the PRSCs, a Governance Partnership Facility grant on Social Accountability (FY10) was the Bank’s main support instrument. Overall, however, it appears that the Bank lacks tools for working effectively with Parliament on social accountability.
42. IEG rates the outcome of WBG assistance under Pillar III as *moderately unsatisfactory*. While there were a number of papers and draft policies prepared to launch decentralization and public sector reforms, there is no evidence of significant progress. The Bank’s support fell below expectations in strengthening statistical services and data analysis capacity for better decision making. Relatively minor steps were taken to mainstream social accountability mechanisms, which generally require a significant change of culture and long-term support.

Objectives	CASCR Rating	IEG Rating
Pillar I: Raise private sector competitiveness	<i>Not Rated</i>	<i>Moderately unsatisfactory</i>
Pillar II: Improve human development outcomes	<i>Not Rated</i>	<i>Moderately satisfactory</i>
Pillar III: Strengthen governance and civil responsibility	<i>Not Rated</i>	<i>Moderately unsatisfactory</i>

<b>4. Overall IEG Assessment</b>		
	<b>CASCR Rating</b>	<b>IEG Rating</b>
<b>Overall Outcome:</b>	<i>Moderately satisfactory</i>	<i>Moderately unsatisfactory</i>
<b>IDA Performance:</b>	<i>Moderately satisfactory</i>	<i>Moderately unsatisfactory</i>
<p><b>Overall outcome:</b></p> <p>43. IEG rates the overall outcome of the CAS as <i>moderately unsatisfactory</i>, below the CASCR rating of <i>moderately satisfactory</i>. Although some progress was made in all areas under the three pillars, none of the objectives was fully achieved, and in more than half of the cases progress fell considerably short of expectations.</p> <p>44. The Bank's support contributed to Ghana's good progress in enhancing mining sector revenue management, in improving agriculture productivity, in expanding ICT services, and in strengthening health insurance system. However, progress was slow and fragmented in all the other areas: macroeconomic management was erratic; improvement in road network was too slow to remove persistent travel bottlenecks; although procedures to start a business were streamlined, the overall business environment did not improve appreciably while access to credit remained difficult; while household electrification improved, distribution losses increased and the finances of the electricity sector remained precarious; land title registration procedures were simplified, but improvement in land administration was hampered by partial progress in required legal and institutional reforms; while child health care delivery and prevention improved, this had not translated into lower infant and maternal mortality rates; although participation in primary education increased, education quality and learning achievement remained low; access to safe water improved overall, but the situation appeared to have worsened in peri-urban areas while access to improved sanitation lagged seriously behind; although there was consensus on the need for better targeting and a common targeting system was officially adopted, it was yet to be applied for social programs; poor incentive framework and monitoring capacities resulted in continuous degradation of natural resources; and finally, most of the Bank support for decentralization, public sector reforms, statistical capacity building, and mainstreaming social accountability mechanisms was relatively recent, with limited evidence for concrete results.</p> <p><b>IDA Performance:</b></p> <p>45. IEG rates IDA performance as <i>moderately unsatisfactory</i>, below the CASCR rating of <i>moderately satisfactory</i>. The broad objectives of the CAS were aligned with the Government's development strategies, but there was a lack of clarity on the specific CAS objectives that the Bank aimed to achieve during the CAS period. The selection of areas of engagement reflected the division of labor under the G-JAS and adjusted for the changing circumstances. The Bank's choice of instrument, which relied heavily on DPOs, reflected its commitment to have better alignment with the Government's programs and responded to the needs linked to the economic crisis. However, these DPOs were not adequately supported by a technical assistance program to build the administrative capacity of the client. This led to poor results in several instances. As the specific CAS objectives were not clearly articulated, the results chain was incomplete, making it difficult to assess the relevance of the outcome indicators or the achievement of the CAS objectives. Despite enhanced field presence, supervision remained a challenge, partly due to overly complex design in many projects and partly due to high staff turnover. Portfolio performance was volatile; disbursement and project success rates were below the regional averages. As the CASCR notes, internal assessment of the operations under supervision seemed to lack realism, thus impeding early identification and resolution of implementation issues. The Bank was responsive to the new administration's priorities and adjusted the CAS program after the mid-term review, including replacing all but 6 outcome indicators in the</p>		

results matrix, but without providing additional clarity on the underlying objectives to be measured by the indicators. There was good effort at donor coordination, as well as heightened attention on safeguard issues after the FY08 investigation by Inspection Panel.

#### **5. Assessment of CAS Completion Report**

46. The CASCR is well prepared and provides a candid assessment of CAS implementation. There is adequate information on the results achieved and sufficient analysis to draw lessons. However, the CASCR would have benefited from more discussion of the program revisions and the overhaul of the results matrix in the CASPR. Given the number of development partners involved in the strategy it would have been useful to have a better understanding of the workings of the WB and development partners cooperating to achieve common goals.

#### **6. Findings and Lessons**

47. IEG concurs with lessons drawn in the CASCR, and underscores two additional points. First, policy lending operations ensure alignment and client ownership of the Bank's program, but carry the risk of exposing the Bank's program to the client's political and administrative constraints. To mitigate this risk, they need to be accompanied by a strong program of capacity building to ensure smooth implementation. Second, a good results framework depends on a clear articulation of the CAS objectives to be achieved during the strategy period, as well as a strong results chain linking the Bank's interventions to the CAS objectives and to the higher-level country goals. Without these, the relevance of the indicators cannot be properly assessed, nor can the achievement of the CAS program.

- Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of the CAS Objectives.**
- Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending, FY08-13**
- Annex Table 3: Trust Funds, FY08-FY12 (in US\$ million)**
- Annex Table 4: Planned and Actual Analytical and Advisory Work, FY08-12**
- Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Ghana, FY08-12**
- Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Ghana and Comparators, FY08-12**
- Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Ghana and Comparators, FY08-12**
- Annex Table 8: IDA Net Disbursements and Charges Summary Report for Ghana (in US\$)**
- Annex Table 9: Total Net Disbursements of Development Assistance and Official Aid, 2008-2011 (in US\$ million)**
- Annex Table 10: Economic and Social Indicators for Ghana and Comparators, 2008 - 2011**
- Annex Table 11: Ghana - Millennium Development Goals**



**Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of the CAS Objectives.**

CAS FY08-FY12: Pillar I Raise private sector competitiveness		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
<b>Major Outcome Measures</b>	<b>1. Maintain a sound macroeconomic management and budget governance</b>		
	Non-oil fiscal deficit is reduced from 10 % of GDP in CY2009 to below 6 % in 2012	Non-oil fiscal deficit 7 % in 2012.	Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
	Consumer price inflation rate is reduced from 19 % in 2009 to below 7 % in 2012	CPI Inflation in 9.1 % (average) and 8.8 % (end-of-period) in 2012.	Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
	<b>2. Improve the enabling environment for business, including trade and financial services</b>		
	Average number of days to register a business reduced from 33 days in 2009 to 28 days in 2012	Average number of days to start a business is 12 in 2013.	Source: Doing business
	% of private sector credit to local private enterprises from 66 % in 2008 to 70 % in 2011	55% in August 2011.	Source: CASCR
	Growth in number of Rural Community Banks' deposit accounts from 3.0 million in 2009 to 3.1 million in 2011	3,766,175 in 2011.	Source: Country team
	At least two Ministries, Departments, or Agencies (MDAs) submitted PPP proposals to fully operation PPP unit in Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning by 2012	The PPP Policy has been approved by Cabinet in June 2011, and the Government has set up a PPP Unit at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, already a proposal was submitted by the city of Accra, and the pipeline from the Ministry of Transport is under analysis.	Source: CASCR
	<b>3. Enable agricultural producers to improve productivity, diversify crops, and expand production for exports</b>		
	Improved cropping intensity ratio in irrigation schemes from 0.85 in 2008 for formal schemes to 1.40 in 2010 and from 0.48 for informal schemes in 2008 to 0.72 in 2010.	Cropping intensity ratio in formal schemes: 0.86 and informal schemes: 0.41.	Source: CASCR
	Increased yields in key staples by 12% by 2012, in relation to baseline, resulting from adoption of improved technologies – average yields for key staples in 2006 (mt/ha): Maize: 1.50, Cassava: 12.20, Rice: 2.00, Sorghum: 0.98, Millet: 0.83	Yield in key staples is maize: from 1.50 to 1.89 mt/ha (+26%) rice: from 2.00 to 2.71 mt/ha (+36%) sorghum: from 0.98 to 1.28 mt/ha (+31%) millet: from 0.83 to 1.24 (+49%) cassava: from 12.20 to 15.43 mt/ha (+26%) and un-weighted average 33.5%.	Source: CASCR
	Increased proportion of formal sector credit going to agricultural sector from 4.3% in 2008 to 10% by 2010	7.3% in 2010.	Source: CASCR
	Progress made towards meeting NEPAD commitment by increasing the share of government spending to the agricultural sector by at least 2 percentage points by 2011 from a baseline of 3-7% in 2008	It was estimated in 2010 (AgDPO2 PAD) that public expenditures on agriculture amounted to 4-5%, which includes regular expenditures by the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, rural roads by the Ministry of Roads and Highways, and agricultural research by the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology are included	Source: CASCR
	At least 3 public private partnerships established to promote private investment in commercial farming (to include out-grower arrangements) by 2012	Three PPP established: Vegpro has established an out grower scheme near Kpong on the left bank of the Volta River in partnership with the	Source: CASCR

CAS FY08-FY12: Pillar I Raise private sector competitiveness		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
		Government's Millennium Development Agency. Shed 9 at the Port of Tema is a tripartite management agreement between the Port of Tema(GPHA), the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and the Fruits Terminal Company Limited (FTCL). FTCL is a special purpose vehicle established jointly by SPEG (the exporters association) and Golden Exotics (the local subsidiary of Compangie Fruitiere, the biggest horticulture sector multinational company and the largest user of Shed 9, by volume).	
<b>4. Manage natural resources in a sustainable and transparent way</b>			
75% of all timber exports verified as legal by 2011	Baseline share of domestic timber market from legal sources (sawmills and bush mills) estimated at 16%, policy measures to increase legal supply and repeat monitoring yet to be established.	Source: CASCR	
Improved mining sector revenue collection, management, and transparency as evidenced by: (a) fiscal model applied to six mines, resulting in improved overview of revenues due to the Government of Ghana and a reduction of the "revenue gap" difference between paid amounts and amounts actually due) by 2012	Application of fiscal models completed and has allowed modification of the method of calculating royalties and removal of certain allowable deductions for the mining companies, and has given support to proposals to revise regulations, including an increase from 3 to 5 % royalty payments.	Source: CASCR	
National environmental assessment system (EIA and SEA) institutionalized and consolidated by 2012	Environmental assessment guidelines were produced for the general construction, health, mining, agriculture, energy, tourism, manufacturing and services and transport sectors which led for preparation of an institutional framework. An online system was created at Environmental Protection Agency to streamline EIA application process. In addition to Sector Strategic Environmental Assessment some district assemblies have also adopted this environmental policy instrument to mainstream social and environmental concerns upstream in their planning processes.	Source: CASCR and <a href="http://www.epaghanaeia.org">http://www.epaghanaeia.org</a>	
<b>5. Improve access to land and security of property rights</b>			
Turnaround time for registering titles reduced from 17 months in 2007 to less than 6 months by 2010	Turnaround land title registration 2.5 months in 2010	Source: CASCR	
Land laws consolidated and harmonized with customary land practices by 2011	Two of three pieces of legislation scheduled for passage were not approved by parliament, hampering progress towards the intended outcome of harmonizing customary and statute laws and moving towards a more efficient system of land use planning.  <a href="http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/governance/m">www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/governance/m</a>	Source: CASCR	



CAS FY08-FY12: Pillar I Raise private sector competitiveness	Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
	inistries/328-ministry-of-lands-and-natural-resources	
<b>6. Scale up investment in energy generation and distribution</b>		
National household electrification rate is increased from 58 % in 2009 to 63% in 2012	66% by the end of 2011.	Source: Minister of Energy, Ghana
Losses in ECG energy distribution are reduced from 23 % in 2009 to 19% in 2012	Losses remain about 26.6% by December 2011.	Source: CASCR
15,000 rural households to access solar lighting by 2012 (0 rural households have access in 2009).	5,519 rural households have access to solar energy.	Source: CASCR
ECG bill collection efficiency is increased from 88 % to reach 92 % by 2012	By close of 2010 the ratio stood at 89.1%.	Source: CASCR
Extension of EITI principles to the oil and gas sector by 2011	EITI principles were extended to the Oil and Gas Sector in 2011.	Source: CASCR
Establishment of new Petroleum Regulatory Authority 2011	A Petroleum Regulatory Authority was established in 2011.	Source: CASCR
Quantity (MW) of electricity traded between WAPP "Zone A" increases from 0 to 200 CEB, 70 CIE, 70 NEPA, 80 VRA by 2012	No data available.	
<b>7. Create an environment for more competitive and lower cost ICT services</b>		
Increased employment in the ICT/ITES sector from 3,050 new jobs in 2009 of which 1,773 held by women to 6,000 in 2012 of which more than 3,000 held by women	According to survey of ICT companies, employment in ICT/ITES sector increased to 5,000 of 2,650 (53%) are held by women.	Source: CASCR
Increased export led revenues in the ICT/ITES sector from 60 m USD in 2009 to 90 mill USD in 2012	According to survey of ICT companies, export-led revenues in the ICT/ITES sector at 52 M USD in 2011	Source: CASCR
<b>8. Enhance transport infrastructure</b>		
Average travel time by bus on Bus Rapid Transit System pilot corridor improves from 65 minutes in 2007 to 40 minutes by 2012	The construction contract under procurement and travel time will be measured subsequent to implementation of the BRT system	Source: CASCR
Average transit time for imports moving by containers from the exit at the Port of Tema to Ouagadougou decreases from 7 days in 2007 to 6 days in 2012	6 days Data provided Customs Division (which has tracking agreement with Roads and Highways)	Source: Ghana WB team
Percentage of road in good condition (International Roughness Index (IRI) <4.5) on the Tema – Ouagadougou portion of Corridor is increased from 50% in 2007 to 80% in 2012	Percentage of road in good condition (International Roughness Index (IRI) <4.5) on the Tema – Ouagadougou portion of Corridor is currently 55%	Source: CASCR

CAS FY08-FY12: Pillar II Improve Human Development Outcomes		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
<b>Major Outcome Measures</b>	<b>1. Improve health service delivery to raise the productive capacity of the labor force</b>		
	Infants born to HIV infected mothers who are infected reduced from 30% in 2004 to 15% in 2011	Infection rate of infants born to HIV infected mothers reduced 5.2 % in 2011.	Source: Ministry of Health
	Proportion of children between 6 and 59 months of age who have received at least one vitamin A supplement in the last six month kept at the level of 80 % (2008 achievement) or above by 2011	Northern Region - 41% Upper East Region - 99% Upper West Region - 56%by 2011-9	Source: CASCR
	National Health Insurance Scheme: % of total claims not paid within statutory 30 days reduced from 30% in 2007 to 15% in 2011	100 % (% of total "clean" claims) reimbursed by NHIS within 60 days.	Source: CASCR
	<b>2. Enhance education delivery to raise the productive capacity of the labor force</b>		
	Primary completion rate in deprived districts increased from 83.2% in 2009 to 91.6% in 2011		Source: World Development Indicators Total Primary completion rate is 99% in 2012.
	Teacher absenteeism reduced from 27% in 2005 to 20% in 2011	The average teacher absentee rate, based on survey by the Center for Democratic Development (2008), was 27 percent. No current data available.	Source: World Bank <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3012/597550replacement0bx358311B00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1">https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3012/597550replacement0bx358311B00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1</a> Not achieved.
	Council of Technical, Vocational, Education and Training (COTVET) established by 2012	Council for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (COTVET) is a national body set up by an Act of Parliament of the Republic of Ghana to co-ordinate and oversee all aspects of technical and vocational education and training in the country. COTVET was established by Act 718 of July 2006.	Source: COTVET and CASCR
	<b>3. Enhance the quality and efficiency of water and sanitation services</b>		
	500,000 people to gain access to safe water supply in urban areas by 2012	250,000 people expected to be connected.	Source: CASCR
	700,000 people to gain access to safe water supply in rural areas by 2012	561,754 people provided with water supply systems.	Source: CASCR
	100,000 people in small towns have access to appropriate sanitary facilities by 2012	50,424 people provided with sanitation facilities.	Source: CASCR
	90,000 children to benefit from sanitation facilities at schools by 2010	60,000 children benefited by 2012.	Source: CASCR
	<b>4. Improve the targeting of services and preventative activities to underserved areas and vulnerable groups</b>		
	500,000 person days of employment created under the labor intensive public works program by 2012	240,000 by Feb 2012	Source: Monthly Reports consolidated by National Coordinating Office/Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
	No. of households benefiting from cash transfers increases from 16,000 in 2010 to 50m000 by 2012	70,000 households in 2012	Source: ISR from Ghana Social Opportunities Project.
Adoption and implementation of the common targeting approach by 2011	A common targeting system using a PMT has been adopted and tested. Government has shown strong reluctance to change specific rules for social programs.	Source: CASCR	

CAS FY07-FY12: Pillar III Strengthen Governance and Civil Responsibility		Actual Results (as of current month year)	Comments
<b>Major Outcome Measures</b>	<b>1. Strengthen the civil and public services</b>		
	Public sector reform strategy developed by June 2010 and implemented thereafter	Public sector reform strategy finalized in Feb 2011	Source: CASCR
	National Decentralization Policy endorsed by Cabinet by July 2010	National Decentralization Policy endorsed by Cabinet in April	Source: CASCR
	Civil Service Bill endorsed by Cabinet by July 2010	The Civil Service Bill has not been approved by Cabinet.	Source: CASCR
	Establishment of a single Ghana Revenue Authority by 2011	Ghana Revenue Authority was established in May 2010	Source: CASCR
	Real time financial reports are produced by MDAs through GIFMIS by 2012	Budget execution reports on the consolidated fund for MDAs generated through GIFMIS by November 2012.	Source: GIFMIS from e-Ghana project.
	Improved consolidation and comprehensiveness of reliable government fiscal reports, based on GFSM2001 reporting standards, for quality economic decision making	Consolidation for MDAs is now scheduled to be achieved upon implementation of the GIFMIS 'Pay-to-Procure' and 'General Ledger Modules' by July 2012. A GFS compliant chart of accounts/budget classification basis for the fiscal reports is now instituted in GoG to support the consolidation process.	Source: CASCR
	Every year, recommendations of Public Accounts Committee on Audited Accounts and Audit Reports on Consolidated Accounts are implemented	Process is ongoing but implementation of recommendations across audited entities uneven and weak	Source: CASCR
	<b>2. Improve statistical services and data analysis for better policy and decision making</b>		
	Provisional results of the 2010 Population and Housing Census available in 2011	Provisional results of the 2010 Population and Housing Census released in February 2011	Source: Ghana Statistical Service
	Proportion of Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) staff with professional qualifications increases from 39% in 2009 to 50% in 2012	No data available.	
	Annual Progress Reports (APRs) available for all sectors with gender disaggregation of key indicators by 2012	Production and availability of Ministries, Divisions and Agencies APR is a trigger for the 2011 Performance Assessment Framework under the MDBS.	Source: CASCR
	<b>3. Strengthen the capacity of citizens and non-state actors to engage in national development and fight against corruption</b>		
	Social Accountability (SA) mechanisms mainstreamed into the monitoring and evaluation of four projects: fisheries, water, transport and gas infrastructure by 2011	SA mechanisms mainstreamed in two projects: Oil and Gas Capacity Building Projects and in Local Government Capacity Support Project.	Source: CASCR
	Use of SA mechanisms, tools and approaches in Bank program aligned with strategic plan for mainstreaming by 2012	Not implemented by 2012. Tracking mechanism in place now to track feedback from direct beneficiaries of Bank operations financed by the GPEF grant— implementation unclear.	Source: CASCR
Conditions for improved access to information: FOI legislation approved by Parliament by Dec 2010 and the development of systems for public disclosure by June 2011	The Freedom of Information (FOI) Law has not yet been passed by Parliament. Some results were achieved: (i) Prior action through budget support and policy dialogue resulted in executive approval in 2010 of the FOI bill, which is pending Parliament approval; (ii) Action plan to promote proactive disclosure of information by line ministries; and (iii) Executive directives in 2011 mandated disclosure of oil and gas contracts by extractive companies	Source: CASCR	

**Annex Table 2: Planned and Actual Lending, FY08-13**

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Proposed Amount	Approved Amount	Outcome rating
<i>Planned projects</i>						
P103631	PRSC 6	2008	2008	100	100	IEG rating: MU
P079749	WA Regional Transit/Trade (West Africa Regional Transport and Transit Facilitation Project)	2008	2008	60	80	LIR*: MS
P102000	Transport Sector Project	2008	2008	100	225	LIR: S
P074191	Ghana: Energy Development and Access Project (GEDAP)	2008	2008	90	90	LIR:MU
P102675	Agriculture DPL 1	2008	2008	10	25	LIR: MS
P102971	Natural Resources and Environmental Governance Project ( NREG)	2008	2008	3	20	LIR: MS
P105424	Economic Management Capacity Building (EMCB) Additional Financing	2008	2008	10	10	LIR:MS
P117924	PRSC 7	2009	2011	200	215	LIR: MS
P096407	WA Regional Corridor (Abidjan-Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation Project)	2009	2010	60	120	LIR: MS
P094919	West African Power Pool Phase 3 (WAPP: The First Phase of the Inter-Zonal Transmission Hub Project of the WAPP APL3 Program)	2009	2011	30	26	LIR: U
P113172	NREG DPO 2	2009	2009	8	10	LIR: MS
P110147	Agriculture DPL 2	2010	2010	25	25	LIR: MS
P118188	NREG DPO 3	2010	2010	10	10	LIR: MS
P120016	Additional Financing for the Ghana Energy Development and Access Project (GEDAP)	2010	2010	25	70	LIR:MU
P120005	Gas and Oil Capacity Building project	2010	2011	35	38	LIR: MS
P120026	Sustainable Rural Water & Sanitation Serv	2010	2010	75	75	LIR:S
P115247	Ghana Social Opportunities project (Regrouped Social Protection DPO 1-3)	2010	2010	40	89	LIR:S
P122796	Agriculture DPL 3	2011	2011	50	57	LIR:S
P114264	Ghana Commercial Agriculture	2011	2012	100	100	LIR: MS
P118858	Ghana Statistics Development Program	2011	2012	30	30	LIR: MU
P127314	PRSG 8	2012	2012	100	100	LIR:MS
P122808	Agriculture DPL 4	2012	2012	50	50	NA
P120636	Land Administration 2	2011/2012	2011	30	50	LIR: S
P124775	Ghana - West Africa Regional Fisheries Program	2012	2012	25/50	50	LIR:MS
	ICT Access	2009	Dropped	15		
	WA Air Safety	2009	Dropped	15		
	Decentralization DPO 1	2009	Dropped	25		
	Decentralization DPO 2	2010	Dropped	20		
	WA Regional Transit/Trade Phase II	2010	Dropped	105		
	Employment	2010	Dropped	20		
	PRSC 9	2011	Dropped	100		
	Business Environment DPO	2011	Dropped	10		
	Decentralization DPO 3	2011	Dropped	20		
	Gas Infrastructure project	2011	Dropped	300		
	Decentralization % Basic Services	2011	Dropped	100		
	Agriculture DPO 5	2011	Dropped	15		
	NREG DPO 4	2011	Pipeline	8		
	Managing for Results SWAp	2008	Dropped?	8		
	Decentralization cap bldg	2009	Dropped?	5		

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Proposed Amount	Approved Amount	Outcome rating
	Land Admin/Mgt (LAMP)	2010	Dropped?	20		
	Urban Water 2	2010	Dropped?	40		
	Economic Governance and Poverty Reduction Credit II (EGPRC-II)	2011	Dropped?	200		
	Urban Policy	2011	Dropped?	50		
	Vocational Skills	2011	Dropped?	40		
	Ghana EITI++ Natural Res Value Chain	2012	Dropped?	50		
	Medium and Small Enterprises Initiative AF	2012	Dropped?	30		
	Vocational Skills Development Project	2012	Dropped?	50		
	Urban Water and Sanitation project	2012	Dropped?	100		
	Total planned projects			2,587	1,665	
	<b>Non-planned projects FY08-13</b>					
P125595	Ghana - PPP Project		2012		30	LIR:S
P113301	Economic Governance and Poverty Reduction Credit (EGPRC)		2009		300	IEG rating: S
P120942	eGhana Additional Financing		2010		50	LIR:S
P118112	Ghana Skills and Technology Development Project		2011		70	LIR:MS
P122692	Ghana Local Government Capacity Support Project		2011		175	LIR:S
P129544	Additional Financing for Ghana Urban Water Project		2012		50	LIR:MS
P105092	Nutrition and Malaria Control for Child Survival		2008		25	LIR:S
P111117	Community Based Rural Development Project Supplemental		2008		22	LIR:S
P115065	2nd Additional Financing for Small Towns Water Supply & Sanitation Project		2009		15	LIR:S
P101852	Health Insurance Project		2008		15	LIR:S
P129565	West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program 2A		2012		60	LIR:S
	<b>Total non planned projects FY08-13</b>				812	
	<b>Total projects FY08-13</b>				2,477	
Project ID	Project name	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount	Outcome rating	
	<b>Ongoing projects</b>					
P000970	Trade Gateway & Investment Project	1999	2010	51	IEG rating: MU	
P093610	eGhana	2007	Active	40	LIR:S	
P085006	Ghana - Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Project	2006	Active	45	LIR:MS	
P092986	GH-Economic Management Cap. Bldg. (EMCB) Proj.	2006	Active	25	LIR:MS	
P081482	Community-Based Rural development	2005	2011	60	LIR:S	
P071157	Land Administration Project	2004	2011	21	LIR:MS	
P056256	Urban Water Project	2005	Active	103	LIR:MS	
P050623	Road Sector Development Project	2002	2008	220	IEG rating: S	
P050620	Education Sector Project	2004	2012	78	IEG rating: MU	
P082373	GH Second Urban Environmental Sanitation Project	2004	2013	62	LIR:MS	
P088797	Multi-Sectoral HIV/AIDS Program	2006	2011	20	IEG rating: HU	
P084015	Small Towns Water Supply and Sanitation Project	2005	2010	26	LIR:S	
P069465	Rural Financial Services Project	2000	2008	5	IEG rating: MS	

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Proposed Amount	Approved Amount	Outcome rating
P099287	Fifth Poverty Reduction Support Credit	2007	2008		110	IEG rating: MS
P105098	Ghana Small Towns Water Supply & Sanitation Additional Financing	2007	2010		10	LIR:S
P100619	Ghana Urban Transport Project	2007	Active		45	LIR:MS
P094084	West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAPP)	2007	Active		15	LIR:S
P075994	WAPP APL 1 (1st Phase - Coastal Transmission Backbone)	2005	Active		40	LIR:MU
P094917	WAPP APL 1 (2nd Phase - Coastal Transmission Backbone)	2006	Active		45	LIR:MU
<b>Total ongoing projects</b>					<b>936</b>	

\* LIR: Latest internal rating. U: Unsatisfactory. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory.

Source: Ghana CAS, ISN and WB Business Warehouse Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 05/06/2013.

**Annex Table 3: Trust Funds, FY08-FY12 (in US\$ million)**

Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approved Amount	Approval FY	Closing FY
P124812	Ghana - West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (GEF)	TF 10905	3.50	2012	Active
P129724	Land, Services and Citizenship for the Urban Poor - Developing a National Urban Agenda	TF 11275	0.76	2012	Active
P129329	Building Capacity of the Urban Poor for Inclusive Development in Ghana - Phase 1	TF 11280	0.25	2012	Active
P129726	Sustainable Urban Local Government Capacity Building in Ghana	TF 11279	0.40	2012	Active
P124678	Ghana EITI - Post Compliance I	TF 10102	0.40	2012	Active
P123407	Ghana PAC Capacity Building Project	TF 99406	0.50	2012	Active
P125211	NPFE Ghana	TF 98497	0.03	2011	2012
P118585	Ghana: Statistics Development Program (MDTF)	TF 97577	6.00	2011	Active
P098538	Sustainable Land and Water Management	TF 97579	8.10	2011	Active
P098538	Sustainable Land and Water Management	TF 95451	0.20	2010	2012
P098538	Sustainable Land and Water Management	TF 91800	0.25	2008	2010
P114510	Institutional Support to the Accountancy Profession In Ghana	TF 97576	0.50	2011	Active
P124060	GH - FCPF Readiness Grant	TF 10903	3.40	2012	Active
P124060	GH - FCPF Readiness Grant	TF 93723	0.20	2009	2011
P116441	Ghana Education For All Fast Track Initiative	TF 92810	14.20	2009	2011
P105617	Solar PV Systems to Increase Access to Electricity Services in Ghana	TF 92834	2.00	2009	Active
P105617	Solar PV Systems to Increase Access to Electricity Services in Ghana	TF 92833	2.40	2009	Active
P114088	One Child one Solar Light	TF 92668	0.20	2009	2010
P102971	Natural Resources and Environmental Governance Project	TF 90632	0.60	2008	2009
P109174	Support to African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET)	TF 91932	1.00	2008	2011
P109174	Support to African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET)	TF 91431	1.00	2008	2011
P074191	Ghana: Energy Development and Access Project	TF 90450	50.00	2008	Active
P103741	Strengthening the Adjudication Capacity of Traditional Leaders	TF 90812	0.40	2008	2011
P092509	Ghana Urban Transport Project	TF 90550	7.00	2008	Active
P104416	Capacity Building for Specialized Audits for the Ghana Audit Service (SAI)	TF 90531	0.25	2008	2011
P103927	Support to Internal Audit Agency to improve Internal Auditors Skills	TF 90688	0.50	2008	2011
P070970	Ghana Rural Energy Access	TF 90542	5.50	2008	Active
P092986	GH-Economic Management Cap. Bldg. Proj.	TF 94774	2.40	2010	Active
P092986	GH-Economic Management Cap. Bldg. Proj.	TF 90745	5.20	2008	2011
P056256	Urban Water Project	TF 11457	7.00	2012	Active
P056256	Urban Water Project	TF 92093	13.00	2008	2010
<b>Total FY07-12</b>			<b>137.1</b>		

Source: Ghana FY 08-May2012 CPS/CPSRP and WB Business Warehouse Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 12/19/2012.

**Annex Table 4: Planned and Actual Analytical and Advisory Work, FY08-12**

Project ID	Economic and Sector Work	Proposed FY	Delivered to Client FY	Output Type
	<i>Planned (CAS FY08-12)</i>			
P102037	External Review of Public Financial Management 2007	2008	2009	Report
	PER @ Instit. For Svce Del	2011	Dropped	
	PEIR W&S	2011	Dropped	
	Economics of Adaptation of CC	2011	2011	Report
	<i>Non-planned</i>			
P096354	Country Economic Memorandum		2008	Report
P117086	Oil and External Competitiveness		2009	Report
P101584	An Assessment of the investment climate in Ghana		2009	Report
P118911	Ghana Water Resources Development Policy Paper		2011	Report
P113250	GH-Poverty Assessment		2010	Report
P131420	Ghana-Energy Sector Review		Active	Report
P113189	GH-Ext. Review of PFM/PER		2011	Report
P119165	Agribusiness Indicators-Ghana		2012	Report
P128360	Ghana Health Country Status Report		Active	Report
P109574	Education Sector Strategy		2011	Report
P122517	Ghana: Faith and Service Delivery		Active	Report
P123553	MTDS - Ghana		2012	Report
P133632	Ghana Policy Note		Active	Policy Note
P117744	Joint Review of Public Expenditure and Financial Management (JRPEFM)		2012	Report
P123193	GH-Policy Note--Cocoa Sector Policy Brief		Active	Policy Note
P117597	Oil and External Competitiveness		2010	Report
P121311	FSAP Ghana		2011	Report
P122361	Ghana II Corporate Governance ROSC Assessment		2011	Report
P132404	Social Interventions in Infrastructure		Active	Report
P122310	Ghana ICR ROSC		2012	Report
P143735	Economic opportunities in the 3 northern		Active	Report
P125016	GH-Provision of Urban Water Services		2012	Advisory Services Document
P122198	Consulting Services to asses Project implementation management by DAs		Active	Model/Survey
P117627	Health Systems for Outcomes - Ghana		2011	How-To Guidance
P122484	GH-Governance Activities (FY11)		Active	Advisory Services Document
P123475	Governance and Public Sector Reform		2011	How-To Guidance
AAA ID	Technical Assistance	Proposed FY	Delivered to Client FY	Output Type
	<i>Planned (CAS FY08-12)</i>			
P102813	Ghana Decentralization and Accountability	2008	Dropped	Institutional Development Plan
P089477	Ghana - Telecom Assistance	2007	2007	Institutional Development Plan
P102515	Job creation and skills development in Ghana	2008	2008	How-To Guidance
P119945	Economic Cluster Development for Ghana Western Corridor	2011	Dropped	How-To Guidance
P122656	ICT Review	2011	2012	How-To Guidance
	<i>Non-planned</i>			
P110285	GH: Science and Technology Review		2010	How-To Guidance
P119999	Gas and Oil Technical Assistance		Active	Institutional Development Plan
P122656	Ghana: ICT for Transformation		2012	How-To Guidance



AAA ID	Technical Assistance	Proposed FY	Delivered to Client FY	Output Type
P113597	GH-Social Accountability		2010	How-To Guidance
P097719	Ghana Community Broadcasting Development		2009	How-To Guidance
P111329	TA to Ghana Education Sector Plan 2009		2009	Institutional Development Plan
P125016	GH-Provision of Urban Water Services		2012	Advisory Services Document
P122198	Consulting Services to asses Project implementation management by DAs	Active	Model/Survey	
P117627	Health Systems for Outcomes - Ghana		2011	How-To Guidance
P122484	GH-Governance Activities (FY11)		Active	Advisory Services Document
P123475	Governance and Public Sector Reform		2011	How-To Guidance
P091640	Decentralization and Community Empowerment		2008	How-To Guidance
P110004	Ghana - Food Safety Action Plan Preparation		2011	Client Document Review
P126800	Ghana Indian Women Farmers Partnership		2012	Advisory Services Document
P123347	GH-FSAP Follow-up		Active	How-To Guidance
P119760	Ghana Hydrocarbon Regulatory Advisory		2010	Client Document Review

Source: Ghana CAS and WB Business Warehouse Tables 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 12/19/2012

**Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Ghana, FY08-12**

Exit FY	Proj ID	Project Name	Total Evaluated (\$M)	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to Development Outcome *
2008	P050623	GH-Road Sec Dev Project (FY02)	258.6	Satisfactory	Moderate
2008	P069465	GH-Rural Fin Svcs SIL (FY00)	5.7	Moderately Satisfactory	Significant
2008	P103631	GH-PRSC 6 DPL (FY08)	98.1	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Significant
2010	P099287	Fifth Poverty Reduction Support Credit	110.0	Moderately Satisfactory	Significant
2010	P000970	GH-Trade Gateway & Inv SIL (FY99)	52.5	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderate
2010	P113301	GH-EGPRC (fast-track)	294.3	Satisfactory	Moderate
2011	P088797	Multi-Sectoral HIV/AIDS Program	20.0	Highly Unsatisfactory	High
2012	P050620	GH-Edu Sec SIL (FY04)	73.8	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Significant

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 4a.5 and 4a.6 as of as of December 2012.

\*With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

**Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Ghana and Comparators, FY08-12**

Region	Total Evaluated (\$M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (\$)	Outcome % Sat (No)	RDO % Moderate or Lower (\$) *	RDO % Moderate or Lower (No) *
Ghana	913.0	8	72.2	50.0	66.3	37.5
AFR	13,478.5	254	70.8	63.5	35.7	37.9
World	73,311.8	953	83.0	71.7	67.1	54.5

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 4a.5 and 4a.6 as of as of May 2013.

\* With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

**Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Ghana and Comparators, FY08-12**

Fiscal year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<b>World</b>					
# Proj	1,384	1,408	1,449	1,454	1,371
# Proj At Risk	250	310	328	302	304
% At Risk	18.1	22.0	22.6	20.8	22.2
Net Comm Amt	104,145.2	128,471.6	155,683.9	165,792.3	166,208.1
Comm At Risk	18,179.3	19,539.0	27,683.8	22,573.0	23,324.5
% Commit at Risk	17.5	15.2	17.8	13.6	14.0
<b>Africa</b>					
# Proj	388	400	418	434	418
# Proj At Risk	87	118	125	105	102
% At Risk	22.4	29.5	29.9	24.2	24.4
Net Comm Amt	22,896.6	27,703.8	33,745.8	37,010.2	38,492.7
Comm At Risk	5,827.3	6,823.4	9,358.4	7,801.2	6,223.2
% Commit at Risk	25.5	24.6	27.7	21.1	16.2
<b>Ghana</b>					
# Proj	17	18	18	19	21
# Proj At Risk	3	7	8	2	6
% At Risk	17.6	38.9	44.4	10.5	28.6
Net Comm Amt	792.0	1,297.0	1,198.8	1,422.6	1,595.7
Comm At Risk	177.0	333.0	383.0	77.0	435.3
% Commit at Risk	22.3	25.7	31.9	5.4	27.3

Source: WB Business Warehouse Table 3a.4 as of December 2012.

**Annex Table 8: IDA Net Disbursements and Charges Summary Report for Ghana (in US\$)**

FY	Disb. Amt.	Repay Amt.	Net Amt.	Charges	Fees	Net Transfer
2008	233,673,156.58	718,892.35	232,954,264.23	3,655,924.75	5,190,661.29	224,107,678.19
2009	142,522,822.92	1,193,529.21	141,329,293.71	0.00	10,055,239.84	131,274,053.87
2010	405,515,551.06	2,109,726.13	403,405,824.93	0.00	11,374,048.87	392,031,776.06
2011	417,628,013.46	3,533,734.62	414,094,278.84	0.00	13,245,376.73	400,848,902.11
2012	342,943,907.33	8,348,978.69	334,594,928.64	0.00	17,195,086.31	317,399,842.33
<b>Total (2008-2012)</b>	<b>1,542,283,451.35</b>	<b>15,904,861.00</b>	<b>1,526,378,590.35</b>	<b>3,655,924.75</b>	<b>57,060,413.04</b>	<b>1,465,662,252.56</b>

Source: WB Loan Kiosk, Net Disbursement and Charges Report as of December 2012.

**Annex Table 9: Total Net Disbursements of Development Assistance and Official Aid, 2008-2011 (in US\$ million)**

Development Partners	2008	2009	2010	2011	2008-2011
<i>Bilaterals</i>					
Australia	0.16	0.47	0.49	3.23	4.35
Austria	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.07
Belgium	15.1	..	25.41	..	40.51
Canada	64.67	87.28	97.92	55.63	305.5
Denmark	92.97	88.38	96.83	67.94	346.12
Finland	0.12	0.16	0.31	0.9	1.49
France	54.17	61.18	45.27	..	160.62
Germany	61.56	53.27	50.81	91.43	257.07
Greece	0.02	0.01	..	0.02	0.05
Ireland	0.15	1.68	0.33	..	2.16
Italy	3.08	1.08	1.01	16.01	21.18
Japan	47.5	53.49	69.01	31.56	201.56
Korea	2.51	2.47	4.36	4.93	14.27
Luxembourg	0.06	0.19	0.14	0.16	0.55
Netherlands	119.58	97.71	72.82	62.92	353.03
New Zealand	..	0.05	0.16	..	0.21
Norway	0.99	2.44	3.35	7.93	14.71
Portugal	..	..	..	..	0
Spain	15.86	20.64	18.2	..	54.7
Sweden	1.1	1.25	0.32	..	2.67
Switzerland	6.79	10.74	13.39	16.56	47.48
United Kingdom	144.25	148.64	160.45	..	453.34
United States	70.07	145.59	207.32	..	422.98
<b>DAC Countries, Total</b>	<b>700.73</b>	<b>776.75</b>	<b>867.91</b>	<b>359.23</b>	<b>2704.62</b>
Cyprus	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05
Czech Republic	0.11	0.18	0.15	0.13	0.57
Hungary	..	..	0.01	0.01	0.02
Israel	0.16	0.57	0.63	0.58	1.94
Kuwait (KFAED)	3.35	4.67	3.67	0.58	12.27
Poland	0.23	0.13	0.16	0.12	0.64
Romania	..	..	0.01	0.03	0.04
Slovenia	0.01	0.02	..	..	0.03
Thailand	..	0.01	..	0.01	0.02
Turkey	0.47	0.06	0.21	0.39	1.13
United Arab Emirates	2.16	0.89	0.32	0.8	4.17
<b>Non-DAC Countries, Total</b>	<b>6.51</b>	<b>6.54</b>	<b>5.17</b>	<b>2.66</b>	<b>20.88</b>
<i>Multilaterals</i>					
AfDF	89.14	101.85	134.82	135.72	461.53
BADEA	5.48	4.48	4	4.76	18.72
EU Institutions	118.41	164.13	102.85	..	385.39
GAVI	7.12	12.79	6.89	26.34	53.14
GEF	0.53	3.31	..	..	3.84
Global Fund	37.54	73.06	57.32	35.21	203.13
IAEA	0.4	0.66	0.62	0.47	2.15
IDA	273.78	248.68	321.39	428.49	1272.34
IFAD	5.93	8.24	11.58	7.62	33.37
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	..	104.32	124.35	188.13	416.8
Isl. Dev Bank	..	..	0.15	..	0.15

Development Partners	2008	2009	2010	2011	2008-2011
Nordic Dev. Fund	6.93	3.77	7.72	4.91	23.33
OFID	3.65	5.42	4.14	3.34	16.55
UNAIDS	0.43	0.64	0.8	0.94	2.81
UNDP	7.78	7.66	6.7	..	22.14
UNFPA	3.19	3.05	4.16	3.2	13.6
UNICEF	9.39	8.1	9.47	10.1	37.06
UNTA	0.9	..	..	..	0.9
WHO	..	..	..	0.9	0.9
<i>Multilateral Agencies, Total</i>	<i>570.6</i>	<i>750.16</i>	<i>796.96</i>	<i>850.13</i>	<i>2967.85</i>
<b>All Development Partners Total</b>	<b>1277.84</b>	<b>1533.45</b>	<b>1670.04</b>	<b>1212.02</b>	<b>5693.35</b>

Source: OECD DAC Online database, Table 2a. Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid - Disbursements, as of 12/20/2012.

**Annex Table 10: Economic and Social Indicators for Ghana and Comparators, 2008 – 2011**

Series Name					Ghana	Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels)	World
	2008	2009	2010	2011	Average 2008-2011		
<b>Growth and Inflation</b>							
GDP growth (annual %)	8.4	4.0	8.0	14.4	8.7	8.8	10.0
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	5.9	1.5	5.5	11.8	6.2	6.2	7.4
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	1,490.0	1,540.0	1,610.0	1,810.0	1,612.5	1,643.1	1,668.9
GNI, Atlas method (current US mil. \$)	27,039	28,444	30,483	35,110	30,269	31,077	31,735
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	16.5	19.3	10.7	8.7	13.8	13.1	11.6
<b>Composition of GDP (%)</b>							
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	31.0	31.8	29.8	25.6	29.5	29.2	28.5
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	20.4	19.0	19.1	25.9	21.1	21.3	21.8
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	48.6	49.2	51.1	48.5	49.4	49.6	49.6
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	16.7	23.8	23.0	18.6	20.5	21.5	20.9
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	-2.7	13.9	16.2	5.4	8.2	11.0	10.2
<b>External Accounts</b>							
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	25.0	29.3	29.4	38.0	30.4	31.8	32.4
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	44.5	42.3	41.2	51.1	44.8	44.9	45.5
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-11.7	-7.3	-8.5	-8.9	-9.1	-8.5	-8.8
External debt (% of GDP)	22.4	27.8	29.4	29.8	27.4	28.6	28.8
Total debt service (% of GNI)	1.1	1.1	1.2	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.0
Total reserves in months of imports	1.9	3.8	4.3	3.4	3.3	3.7	3.7
<b>Fiscal Accounts /1</b>							
Central government revenue (% of GDP)	13.3	13.4	15	16.9	14.7		
Central government expenditure (% of GDP)	24	20.4	23.5	24.1	23.0		
Central government balance (% of GDP)	-8.5	-5.8	-7.7		-7.3		
Net Public Debt (% of GDP)			-7.2	-7.5	-7.4		
<b>Social Indicators</b>							
<b>Health</b>							
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	62.9	63.4	63.8	64.2	63.6	63.8	63.9
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	93.0	94.0	94.0	91.0	93.0	93.0	92.8
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	13.0	14.0	14.0	..	13.7	13.9	13.9
Improved water source (% of population with access)	82.0	84.0	86.0	..	84.0	84.7	84.9
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	54.9	53.7	53.0	51.8	53.4	53.0	52.8
<b>Population</b>							
Population, total (in millions)	23	24	24	25	24	24	24
Population growth (annual %)	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4
Urban population (% of total)	49.8	50.5	51.2	51.9	50.9	51.1	51.3
<b>Education</b>							
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	101.4	105.0	..	..	103.2	104.1	103.7
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	107.3	106.3	..	107.3	107.0	106.8	107.0
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	56.3	59.1	..	58.1	57.8	58.3	58.1

1/ IMF. Ghana Article IV Consultations.

Source: WB World Development Indicators as of December 2012 for all indicators excluding Fiscal Accounts data.

**Annex Table 11: Ghana - Millennium Development Goals**

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
<b>Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</b>					
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%)	68	69	67	67	67
Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, total (%)	43	43	45	39	36
GDP per person employed (constant 1990 PPP \$)	2,746	2,787	2,880	3,205	3,711
Income share held by lowest 20%	7	..	6	5	..
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)	24	25	20	14	14
Poverty gap at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (%)	17	..	14	10	..
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)	49	..	39	29	..
Vulnerable employment, total (% of total employment)	..	..	..	75	..
<b>Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education</b>					
Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24)	..	..	65	..	79
Literacy rate, youth male (% of males ages 15-24)	..	..	76	..	81
Persistence to last grade of primary, total (% of cohort)	63	..	59	..	72
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group)	65	..	71	75	94
Total enrollment, primary (% net)	..	..	65	67	84
<b>Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women</b>					
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)	..	..	9	11	8
Ratio of female to male primary enrollment (%)	85	91	94	97	100
Ratio of female to male secondary enrollment (%)	66	73	82	84	91
Ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment (%)	30	31	..	56	62
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of total nonagricultural employment)	..	..	31.7	..	..
<b>Goal 4: Reduce child mortality</b>					
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)	61	70	98	83	93
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	76	70	64	58	53
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)	121	109	99	88	80
<b>Goal 5: Improve maternal health</b>					
Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	..	90	84	75	66
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	40	44	44	50	57
Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)	17	20	22	17	24
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	580	590	550	440	350
Pregnant women receiving prenatal care (%)	82	86	88	92	90
Unmet need for contraception (% of married women ages 15-49)	..	37	34	34	35
<b>Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases</b>					
Children with fever receiving antimalarial drugs (% of children under age 5 with fever)	..	..	61	61	43
Condom use, population ages 15-24, female (% of females ages 15-24)	..	..	..	19	17
Condom use, population ages 15-24, male (% of males ages 15-24)	..	..	31	45	40
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	155	167	152	119	86
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)	..	..	..	..	1.3
Prevalence of HIV, male (% ages 15-24)	..	..	..	..	0.5
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)	0.3	1.7	2.3	2.0	1.8
Tuberculosis case detection rate (% , all forms)	28	30	37	47	70
<b>Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability</b>					
CO2 emissions (kg per PPP \$ of GDP)	0	0	0	0	0
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	0	0	0	0	0
Forest area (% of land area)	32.7	..	26.8	24.2	21.7
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	7	9	10	12	14
Improved water source (% of population with access)	53	62	71	79	86
Marine protected areas (% of territorial waters)	0	0	0	0	0
Net ODA received per capita (current US\$)	38	38	31	53	69
<b>Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development</b>					

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010
Debt service (PPG and IMF only, % of exports, excluding workers' remittances)	36	22	24	11	3
Internet users (per 100 people)	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.8	9.6
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	0	0	1	13	71
Telephone lines (per 100 people)	0	0	1	1	1
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)	6	5	5	4	4
Other					
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	400	370	340	460	1,250
GNI, Atlas method (current US\$) (billions)	5.8	6.3	6.5	10.0	30.5
Gross capital formation (% of GDP)	14.4	20.0	24.0	29.0	26.8
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	57	58	58	61	64
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)	..	..	58	..	67
Population, total (billions)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Trade (% of GDP)	42.7	57.4	116.0	98.2	70.6

Source: World Development Indicators database as of December 2012.

