Approach Paper

Evaluation of the World Bank Group's Early Response in Addressing the Economic Implications of COVID-19

October 22, 2021

1. Background and Context

1.1 Three factors distinguish the coronavirus (COVID-19) economic crisis from other crises: it has been exogenous, it has affected both firms and households, and it has hit most countries and sectors simultaneously. First, it was exogenous to economic policy in the sense that it did not arise because of unsustainable macroeconomic or financial imbalances, as is the case with many economic crises in the past. Second, the crisis has affected both supply and demand. Lockdowns, which prevented firms from operating and interrupted trade flows, created a sudden and deep supply shock. Household income also fell quickly in the face of lockdowns, constraining demand for goods and services. The two processes have been mutually reinforcing, creating a downward spiral. Finally, the COVID-19 economic crisis hit most countries and sectors of the economy simultaneously, if not equally. Together, these three factors make the COVID-19 economic crisis different from many other crises such as the 2008–09 global financial crisis.

1.2 Initial conditions, in terms of health and fiscal vulnerabilities, constrained the COVID-19 response in developing economies. The crisis has affected emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) more severely than advanced economies (IMF 2021b; figure 1.1). Initial conditions—including fiscal space and health preparedness—were important in shaping the COVID-19 fiscal response across countries. In EMDEs, fiscal space (as measured by credit ratings, public debt, fiscal balances, or spreads) limited both the total fiscal response and the nonhealth fiscal response (Hosny 2021). EMDEs had smaller total responses because of limited fiscal space. Moreover, because they had weaker initial health infrastructure and preparedness than advanced economies, they had to spend a greater proportion of their overall responses on health. Nevertheless, many of the lessons for advanced economies may well apply also to EMDEs and vice versa.

Figure 1.1. GDP Losses Relative to Pre-COVID-19 by Region



Source: IMF 2021b.
Note: The figure shows the percent difference between the International Monetary Fund's current projected 2022 level (as of January 2021) and its pre-COVID-19 projection (as of January 2020). AE = advanced economy; Em. Asia ex. CHN = emerging and developing Asia, excluding China; Em. Eur. = emerging and developing Europe; EMDE = emerging market and developing economy; GDP = gross domestic product; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MECA = Middle East and Central Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.

1.3 Macrofiscal and financial risks have remained high over the past year across the board, with some regions expecting risks to intensify further. Regional outlooks are expected to broadly deteriorate as all regions are grappling with the pandemic's impacts, though with differing emphasis (IMF 2021a). The depth of the recession, lockdowns, and increasing demands on public services have increased sociopolitical tensions in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East and North Africa. East Asia and Pacific shows relatively favorable macrofiscal and financial conditions supported by significant fiscal stimulus packages and initial successful containment policies, although the region has experienced a resurgence of cases in the summer of 2021, which has led to lockdowns and activity restrictions. Domestic lending and access to working capital within EMDEs were heavily affected by COVID-19–induced financial market volatility in March 2020. Although financial market sentiments have partly improved because of supportive central bank policies, the risk for new bouts of volatility is elevated, affecting EMDEs with higher external financing needs and thin domestic markets.

1.4 The economic problems intertwined with the COVID-19 pandemic threaten the realization of World Bank strategic goals and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). World Bank (2020a) estimates that between 88 million and 115 million people were pushed into extreme poverty in 2020 because of the pandemic, threatening its twin goals of poverty reduction and shared prosperity. Rising public debt resulting from the crisis likely threatens spending on the SDGs and potentially jeopardizes them all (Gaspar et al. 2019). The dramatic increase in poverty threatens SDG 1: end poverty in all its forms everywhere. Job losses and firm closures threaten SDG 8: promote sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment, and decent work for all.

1.5 An assessment of the Bank Group early response to the COVID-19 crisis, including the consistency of the Bank Group's response with its comparative advantages in addressing the crisis, is important to inform the next phase of crisis response. At the time of writing, the world is still in the first phase of policy response, where the aim is to preserve economic value to the extent possible and maintain physical capital and essential productive assets intact via macroeconomic, financial, and fiscal support. The spectrum of policy options is large. Some policy makers have advocated for centralized economic planning and control, resorting to direct state production (Gans 2020). Others are opting for measures to leverage the financial sector to support firms' working capital and liquidity. The Bank Group aspires to provide support in its early response that is exceptional in speed, scale, and selectivity (World Bank 2020b). This implies an increase Bank Group risk tolerance, which will affect project design and implementation, requiring innovation, fast-track delivery, frequent monitoring of progress, and project restructuring to ensure course correction based on early learning. Although the Bank Group response and the objectives of its projects vary by country and phase of the crisis within the country, the Bank Group's overall support efforts should be underpinned by its comparative advantages,[1] including its knowledge of the affected sectors, the experience it acquired in dealing with previous crises, and its ability to convene and work with partners. On this basis, a stocktaking of the Bank Group response at this stage—including early successes and failures and overall consistency between Bank Group interventions and its comparative advantages—is warranted to support the next set of support efforts.

2. Purpose, Audience, and Links with Other Evaluations

2.1 This evaluation's purpose is to foster learning and adaptive management to strengthen the Bank Group's response to the economic dimensions of the COVID-19 crisis: protecting livelihoods. *The Economic Implications of COVID-19* evaluation is part of the Independent Evaluation Group's (IEG) efforts to conduct an early assessment of the Bank Group's COVID-19 response to influence the design of crisis projects in the pipeline and to prepare for the restructuring and recovery phases of Bank Group support to protect livelihoods. Given that the COVID-19 response is ongoing, this evaluation is meant to be a process and learning evaluation primarily to address areas identified during stakeholder consultations in the Bank Group.

2.2 The evaluation's main audience is the Board of Executive Directors, the Bank Group management, and Bank Group operational staff involved in pandemic crisis response, implementation, and planning for recovery. The Committee on Development Effectiveness allows the Board to oversee the COVID-19 response and understand the relevance and quality of the response. In addition to the Board, World Bank management and staff from the regional vice presidencies and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) management are the main audience for this evaluation.

2.3 This evaluation will be developed in close coordination with a second, parallel IEG evaluation focused on protecting lives and with an International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluation on its early response to the pandemic. IEG is conducting a second evaluation that focuses on assessing the World Bank's early response to support governments' responses to the health, human capital, and social protection emergencies related to the COVID-19 crisis. The two IEG teams will collaborate closely, especially on country case studies, by jointly engaging with clients and stakeholders (for example, Senegal). This evaluation will also coordinate findings and messages, to the extent possible, with the IMF's review of its early response to the COVID-19 pandemic at the country level (for example, Ecuador) by jointly engaging with clients and stakeholders in the area of macrofiscal response.

2.4 The evaluation will add to previous Bank Group efforts to learn from crisis-related support efforts. These efforts include the synthesis report *Crisis Response and Resilience to Systemic Shocks: Lessons from IEG Evaluations* (World Bank 2017) and the evaluations that it cites, including *Evaluation of the World Bank Group's Response to the Global Economic Crisis: Phase I* (World Bank 2010) and *Phase II* (World Bank 2012) and *The World Bank Group and the Global Food Crisis: An Evaluation of the World Bank Group Response* (World Bank 2013). The evaluation will also leverage evidence gathered through just-in-time notes and validations on trade finance, support to small and medium enterprises in times of crisis, and distressed assets management. See appendix A for more details.

3. Evaluation Questions

3.1 The overarching evaluation question is, "How well is the Bank Group responding to client needs in addressing the economic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic?" The report seeks to address this overarching question by providing analysis and presenting evidence that will assess the *relevance* and *quality* of the Bank Group response in addressing the economic implications of COVID-19 for governments and firms. Accordingly, there are two main evaluation questions and several subquestions under each (table 3.1).

Table 3.1. Evaluation Questions and Subquestions

Questions	Subquestions
1. What has been the relevance of the World Bank Group COVID-19 response to address the economic needs of clients, and what lessons can be drawn?	Tailored approach: In what ways and to what extent did the World Bank Group tailor its response to country conditions?
	Design: To what extent was the World Bank Group support to help clients address economic vulnerabilities informed by timely diagnostics, lessons from past crises, and understanding of trade-offs?
	Comparative advantage: To what extent did the World Bank Group use its comparative advantages (for example, by developing and sharing knowledge; by leveraging internal synergies between the World Bank, IFC, and MIGA; and by convening partners) to tailor its client response?
2. What has been the *quality* of the early World Bank Group COVID-19 response to address the economic needs of clients, and what lessons can be drawn?	Influence: To what extent have World Bank Group interventions influenced government policies and the actions of governments and firms?
	Coordination: How well has coordination within the World Bank Group, between the World Bank Group and the IMF and between the World Bank Group and other partners supported the design and delivery of World Bank Group interventions?
	Monitoring and governance: To what extent do World Bank Group support efforts have adequate results frameworks, safeguards, and governance?

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: IFC = International Finance Corporation; IMF = International Monetary Fund; MIGA = Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.

4. Evaluation Scope

4.1 This evaluation will focus on Bank Group support that aims to help clients address economic implications arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. World Bank Group (2020b), the Bank Group COVID-19 approach paper, anticipates three phases of response across four pillars. The relief stage involves emergency response to the health threat posed by COVID-19 and its immediate social, economic, and financial impacts. As countries bring the pandemic under control and start reopening their economies, the subsequent restructuring stage focuses on strengthening health systems for pandemic readiness; restoring human capital; and restructuring, debt resolution, and recapitalization of firms and financial institutions. The resilient recovery stage entails taking advantage of new opportunities to build a more sustainable, inclusive, and resilient future in a world transformed by the pandemic. The pillars are (i) saving lives; (ii) protecting poor and vulnerable people from the impact of the economic and social crisis triggered by the pandemic; (iii) saving livelihoods, preserving jobs, and ensuring more sustainable business growth and job creation by helping firms and financial institutions survive the initial crisis shock, restructure, and recapitalize to build resilience in recovery; and (iv) providing focused Bank Group support for strengthening policies, institutions, and investments for resilient, inclusive, and sustainable recovery.

4.2 The evaluation will cover International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), and MIGA projects that relate to portions of pillars 3 and 4 in the relief and restructuring stages of the Bank Group COVID-19 response. Specifically, it will cover saving livelihoods, preserving jobs, and ensuring more sustainable business growth and job creation (pillar 3); and strengthening policies, institutions, and investments (pillar 4; see table 4.1.) The evaluation will not include recovery-stage projects because it is too early to assess them. On pillar 2 interventions, the evaluation team will collaborate particularly closely with the IEG team conducting the evaluation on protecting lives (*Early Evaluation of the World Bank's COVID-19 Response to Save Lives and Protect Poor and Vulnerable People*), which focuses on Pillar 1 and components of Pillar 2 and Pillar 4.

Table 4.1. Bank Group COVID-19 Response Plan and Focus of the IEG Evaluation

Pillar	Relief Stage	Restructuring Stage	Recovery Stage
Pillar 1	Public health	Restructuring health systems	Pandemic-ready health systems
Pillar 2	Social emergency	Restoring human capital	Building equity and inclusion
Pillar 3	Economic emergency	Firm restructuring and debt resolution	Green business, growth, and job creation
Pillar 4	Line of sight to goals	Policy and institutional reforms	Investment to rebuild better

Source: Independent Evaluation Group based on World Bank 2020b.
Note: This evaluation's scope is outlined in red.

4.3 The evaluation will assess early support on the economic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic provided by the World Bank, IFC, and MIGA since March 2020. The evaluation will focus on support efforts delivered to governments or firms by the World Bank–IFC Equitable Growth, Finance, and Institutions Practice Group; IFC's Financial Institutions Group; Manufacturing, Agribusiness, and Services; and Infrastructure and Natural Resources; and MIGA's Finance and Capital Markets. The evaluation will cover World Bank lending and IFC investment, MIGA guarantees, and World Bank and IFC advisory and analytical work. For World Bank lending and IFC investment, unlike ex post evaluations that study active and closed operations over the past five to 10 years, this evaluation will be reviewing operations approved by the Board since February 2020. More specifically, the evaluation will cover relevant interventions approved and refinanced, reprogrammed, or restructured from March 2020 through April 2021. Within the COVID-19 response portfolio identified by IEG with the support of the Bank Group staff, the evaluation will focus on *interventions aimed at improving macrofiscal, financial, and real sector policies and at increasing private investment to save livelihoods and ensure more sustainable business growth.*

4.4 The pandemic had deep economic impacts on governments and firms through constraints on governments' budgets and firms' liquidity. Lockdowns, which prevented firms from operating and interrupted trade flows, created a sudden and deep supply shock. Household income and investments fell quickly, constraining demand for goods and services. These massive, combined supply-and-demand shocks created a downward spiral, eventually affecting banks' balance sheets through the rise of nonperforming loans, some of which could become liabilities for governments. Government budgets have been affected primarily through the simultaneous drop in revenues and pressures to increase expenditures on social protection, unemployment benefits, and subsidy programs aimed at supporting recovery for the most-affected micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Many small countries and island nations relying heavily on tourism, for example, lost precious export earnings and government revenues at a time when their economies most needed fiscal support. Commodity exporters were affected similarly by the collapse of commodity prices.

4.5 A few brief examples will illustrate some mechanisms through which the COVID-19 pandemic has affected firms and governments and the transmission channels by which Bank Group activities aim to mitigate those economic effects. The final report will include a more detailed description of these transmission channels and their effects in selected countries.

4.6 In some instances, the World Bank provides emergency liquidity and credit to firms. In India, for example, the COVID-19 crisis created liquidity problems for MSMEs, risking insolvency, job losses, the termination of business relationships, and the destruction of productive capacity. The COVID-19 impact on MSMEs came through cancellation of orders, loss of customers and clients, and supply chain disruptions, causing a sharp fall in revenues. This created a cash flow shortage, liquidity constraints, and further inability to or difficulties in accessing finance, leading to potential solvency problems. The broad-based loss of cash flows triggered a chain of nonpayments throughout the economy, including to the financial sector. The World Bank emergency response development policy finance (DPF) operation provides $750 million to the Reserve Bank of India to support the government of India's program to provide MSMEs with liquidity. From the Reserve Bank of India, the funds flow through a number of existing intermediary programs to banks and nonbank financial companies,[2] to banks and nonbank financial companies, which then channel them to MSMEs. This operation addresses MSMEs' immediate liquidity and credit needs to keep operating, allow viable firms to survive, and save jobs.

4.7 In other cases, financial support to firms is combined with support to improve firms' ability to export and support to improve the transparency of macro and fiscal measures at the time of the COVID-19 crisis and beyond. The COVID-19 crisis in Madagascar caused problems for MSMEs similar to those in India. It also reduced access to markets when borders closed. Moreover, the need for massive health and fiscal spending raised questions about the transparency of the government's spending. A $75 million World Bank DPF combines similar access-to-finance aims as those in India with other prior actions to improve access to markets and support transparency of fiscal measures. The measures to support firms include enhancing access to finance and increasing access to domestic and international markets through communication and promotion actions. The measures to support fiscal sustainability through the COVID-19 crisis and beyond include expanding the content of public debt statistics to include debts of all majority-owned state-owned enterprises, the financial condition associated with each new external loan contracted, and the list of contingent liabilities related to onlending and public guarantees. These measures are critical at a time when the public sector's role is growing, both as a regulator and as a direct owner of productive assets.

4.8 In countries that had the conditions and capacity to weather the economic crisis well, the World Bank had the opportunity to support build back better reforms as components within the response operation. Serbia entered the COVID-19 crisis from a position of macro, fiscal, and financial strength, reflected in a fiscal surplus and a liquid and capitalized financial sector at the onset of the crisis. The crisis hit government revenues, public and private consumption, investments, and trade. However, the country was in a strong position to mount a large anticrisis response and continue with a strong public investment program. As a result, real gross domestic product in Serbia fell by only 1 percent in 2020—the smallest economic impact in the Balkan region—and Serbia is now experiencing a solid recovery. The World Bank adjusted its portfolio only at the margin, accelerating disbursements to ongoing projects, and it took the opportunity to focus the policy content of a new DPF toward green and resilient recovery. This helped usher in an important green reform (a law substantially limiting the sulfur content of gasoline used in the country), which was possible only in the context of building back better reforms prompted by the COVID-19 crisis.[3]

4.9 IFC has one financing facility for COVID-19 response targeting different transmission channels through four envelopes. The four IFC financing envelopes, developed with fast-track disbursement options, are the Real Sector Crisis Response Facility, the Global Trade Finance Program, the Working Capital Solutions Program (WCS), and an envelope combining the Global Trade Liquidity Program and the Critical Commodities Financing Program. For example, a recent $20 million investment provides working capital to the Coronation Merchant Bank in Nigeria under IFC's WCS. The WCS facility is designed to provide funding to existing IFC client banks in emerging markets that will then extend new trade-related or working capital loans to companies whose cash flows were disrupted by the global pandemic. It is thus similar to the types of loans provided in India and Madagascar but with an additional emphasis on trade.

4.10 MIGA guarantees also support liquidity. In one example, MIGA issued five guarantees for $800 million to Raiffeisen Bank International AG of Austria (RBI) for a period of up to three years. These guarantees provide coverage on mandatory reserves held by RBI’s subsidiaries in Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia in their respective central banks. MIGA’s capital optimization instrument will provide capital relief to a key lending institution in the Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe region in support of its continued operations in five of its subsidiaries at a time of severe economic stress and uncertainties because of the pandemic. MIGA’s guarantees reduce the regulatory risk weighting applied to the mandatory reserves of RBI’s subsidiaries, freeing up capital for lending. In the short term, these guarantees will help RBI navigate the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, build resilience, and support the continued supply of credit into the host countries’ economies. In the longer term, MIGA’s guarantees are expected to lay the foundation for credit growth to sustain both economic activity and employment in the host countries.

5. Evaluation Portfolio

5.1 Portfolio identification involved selecting COVID-19-related projects from the Bank Group portfolio. The selected portfolio included projects with the project tag “emergency response (COVID-19),” projects tagged 100 percent with the theme code tag “pandemic response,” projects with “COVID” or “corona” in their text attributes, and projects that were approved before 2020 but restructured after March 1, 2020.

5.2 Since March 2020, the Bank Group has been supporting clients by addressing the pandemic’s economic implications through 1,112 projects totaling $65.1 billion. An initial portfolio review of active projects, which included those approved or restructured because of the COVID-19 pandemic, identified 1,112 Bank Group projects for a total commitment of $65.1 billion. World Bank lending is the largest share of the portfolio (74.5 percent), followed by MIGA guarantees (9.5 percent), and IFC investment (6.8 percent; table 5.1). Most COVID-19 operations were concentrated in middle-income countries, which account for 78 percent of the operations by volume and 68 percent by number of projects. Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean received most of the support. Appendix B presents a more detailed portfolio review.

Table 5.1. Portfolio of Projects under Consideration (March 2020–April 2021)

Type	Projects (no.)	Share by Number (percent)	Volume (US$, billions)	Share by Volume (percent)
World Bank lending	391	35.2	48.46	74.5
Investment project financing	292		24.07	
Development policy lending	81		19.82	
Program-for-Results financing	17		4.55	
Special fund	1		0.01	
World Bank advisory services and analytics	450	40.5	0.04	0.1
IFC investment	82	7.4	4.45	6.8
IFC advisory	49	4.4	0.10	0.1
IFC Global Trade Finance Program	n.a.	n.a.	0.20	0.3
IFC restructuring	61	5.5	3.72	5.7
IFC CSO transfer	24	2.2	1.96	3.0
MIGA guarantees	55	4.9	6.16	9.5
Total	1,112	100	65.08	100

Source: Independent Evaluation Group preliminary portfolio review.
Note: For World Bank projects, expenditures are treated as a proxy for commitment volume. (The values are illustrative only.) Special fund refers to project P164412 with lending and grant commitment primarily through the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank. Restructured operations are not applicable for MIGA. CSO = special operation projects; IFC = International Finance Corporation; MIGA = Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency; n.a. = not applicable.

6. Evaluation Design and Evaluability Assessment

6.1 This evaluation will study the relevance and quality of the Bank Group response to the COVID-19 crisis at three levels: global, government, and firms. The evaluation will assess the quality of the Bank Group's global interventions and the relevance of its responses to governments and firms. The evaluation will not comprehensively assess the quality of the Bank Group responses to governments and firms because it is too early to do so. It will, however, provide evidence of quality when available for specific projects or countries.

6.2 At the global level, Bank Group global support efforts are the units of analysis, including establishment of partnerships and development of real-time knowledge on the economic implications of the COVID-19 crisis. The evaluation will assess these global support efforts and their contributions to the relevance and quality of the response across the Bank Group's three institutions.

6.3 The evaluation will use a mixed methods approach. Table 6.1 shows the methods the evaluation team will use to answer each evaluation question for the three units of analysis: global, government, and firm. The methods include a structured literature review, case-based analysis, informant interviews, and portfolio analysis. Case-based analysis will be particularly important, given that the portfolio is very recent.

Table 6.1. Methods by Evaluation Question and Units of Analysis

	Units of Analysis		
Evaluation Question	**Government**	**Firm**	**Global (partnerships and real-time knowledge)**
1. What has been the *relevance* of the World Bank Group COVID-19 response to address the economic needs of clients, and what lessons can be drawn?	• Literature review (government-led actions) • Case-based analysis (government cases) • Key informant interviews (relevance to governments) • Country-level project portfolio analysis (relevance to governments)	• Literature review (firm-led actions) • Case-based analysis (firm cases) • Key informant interviews (relevance to firms) • Firm-level project portfolio analysis (relevance to firms)	• Literature review (relevance of global support efforts) • Key informant interviews (relevance of global support efforts)
2. What has been the *quality* of the early World Bank Group COVID-19 response to address the economic needs of clients, and what lessons can be drawn?			• Key informant interviews (quality of global support efforts) • Global portfolio analysis (quality of global support efforts)

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.

6.4 **Literature review.** The purpose of the literature review is to create a synthesis of what works to limit the economic impact of epidemics or other crises, thereby providing a standard by which to judge the relevance of the Bank Group's support efforts. To create this synthesis, the team will review the internal and external literature on recent evidence regarding the effectiveness of relevant Bank Group global support efforts and government and firm actions to address crises. This review will include appropriate caveats on the extent to which one can extrapolate from previous crises to the current one.

6.5 **Case-based analyses.** The evaluation will conduct case-based analyses (case studies) at the government and firm levels to study the relevance of the Bank Group response. The case-based analyses will begin by purposively sampling government-level and firm-level cases to study. In contrast to random sampling, purposeful sampling is a technique widely used in qualitative research for the identification and selection of information-rich cases for the most effective use of limited resources (Patton 2005).

6.6 **Government-level case studies.** To help assess the relevance of Bank Group interventions to date, the team will identify case study governments to extract relevant lessons. An initial set of case study governments (table 6.2) was selected based on regional diversity, economic vulnerability in the face of COVID-19, World Bank commitment level, and country income level (see appendix C for details on the vulnerability index and case identification protocol.) The team prioritized lower-middle-income countries and low-income countries because they have had significant challenges in responding to COVID-19.

Table 6.2. List of Country Case Studies

Region	Country	Vulnerability Level	Bank Commitment Level	Income Level
AFR	Cabo Verde	High	Medium	LMIC
AFR	Nigeria	High	High	LIC
AFR	Senegal	High	Medium	LMIC
EAP	Lao PDR	High	High	LMIC
EAP	Philippines	High	High	LMIC
ECA	Georgia	Medium	Medium	LMIC
ECA	Serbia	Medium	Medium	UMIC
LAC	Ecuador	High	High	UMIC
SAR	Pakistan	High	High	LIC

Source: Independent Evaluation Group analysis of World Bank Group COVID-19 portfolio.
Note: Cabo Verde, Ecuador, Lao PDR, and Senegal are not commonly studied country case studies for Independent Evaluation Group thematic evaluations. AFR = Africa; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; LIC = low-income country; LMIC = lower-middle-income country; UMIC = upper-middle-income country; SAR = South Asia.

6.7 **Firm-level case studies.** The evaluation will include the findings of up to eight deep-dive case studies at the firm level. An initial set of case study firms (table 6.3) was selected based on client vulnerability to COVID-19, existing IFC and MIGA portfolio exposure (through loans outstanding, equity exposure, or guarantees issued), new commitment levels, and diversity of response by business lines such as credit to small and medium enterprises, working capital or liquidity support, or trade credit.

Table 6.3. List of Firm Case Studies

Firm	Country	Region	Portfolio Exposure	New Commitment
Ara Tiendas	Colombia	LAC	High	High
BNP	Panama	LAC	High	High
CI Bank	Egypt, Arab. Rep.	MENA	High	High
Banco DaVivienda	Colombia	LAC	High	High
First Rand	Multiple	AFR	High	High
Hikma Group	Multiple	MENA	High	High
Liquid Bond	Multiple	AFR	Medium	High

Firm	Country	Region	Portfolio Exposure	New Commitment
ProCredit	Multiple	ECA	High	High
Trans Corpora	Indonesia	EAP	High	High
VP Bank	Vietnam	EAP	High	Medium

Source: Independent Evaluation Group analysis of World Bank Group COVID-19 portfolio.
Note: Analysis of firms with projects across multiple countries may cover multiple business lines, such as small and medium enterprise finance, microfinance, and trade finance. AFR = Africa; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA = Middle East and North Africa.

6.8 **Project portfolio analyses (government and firm level).** To support the generalizability of the evaluation's findings and to identify unique actions worthy of replication, the team will use government- and firm-level project portfolio analyses to help assess the relevance of World Bank interventions supporting governments and IFC and MIGA interventions supporting firms. The team will classify the COVID-19 portfolio by transmission channels, including the broad types of Bank Group interventions used (for example, facilitating policy changes), the specific types of instruments and approaches employed (for instance, Contingent Emergency Response Component or Multiphase Programmatic Approach), the portfolio management and operational processes followed (such as fast-track approvals, restructuring, or due diligence), the types of outputs expected at the meso level, and results indicators and drivers of early success and failure (where available at this stage). The team will also combine the coded portfolio data with data from public sources on COVID-19 (on countries' situations and needs, including vulnerabilities, preparedness, capacities, socioeconomic impact, response, and spread of the virus). Using key informant interviews, the team will assess the Bank Group response, including whether sufficient attention has been paid to monitoring and supervision (appendix C). Together, this information will enable the team to evaluate the portfolio with respect to whether the Bank Group response has been relevant to governments' and firms' needs.

6.9 **Project portfolio analysis (global level)**. Beyond the specific interventions that the Bank Group makes to support governments and firms, it also makes a variety of efforts to support al" clients via global initiatives on knowledge sharing and other topics. An analysis of the portfolio of these broad global support efforts will be undertaken to help assess their quality.

6.10 **Key informant interviews (global, government, and firm level).** The team will conduct key informant interviews to help assess both the quality of Bank Group global support efforts and the relevance of the Bank Group interventions in case study countries and case study firms. Key informants such as Bank Group staff, client country representatives, client firm representatives, and potential beneficiaries will be engaged through interviews. Key informants can provide more detail about matters covered in project documentation and information that is not recorded in project documentation (because it is the wrong type of information, it might be politically sensitive, it was too detailed, and so on). To help evaluate the relevance of Bank Group interventions in case study countries and firms, the interviews will aim to understand whether the intervention involved such things as diagnosing economic needs, targeting and tailoring to needs and priorities, and choosing the right instruments in ways that were not recorded in project documents. Similarly, to help assess the quality of Bank Group global support efforts, the interviews will aim to understand whether the interventions in each project involved, for example, leveraging technology, systematic monitoring, and using evidence to make adaptive decisions in ways that were not fully recorded in project documentation.

6.11 **The evaluation will be participatory and modular.** This evaluation will follow a participatory approach involving consultations and active engagement with Bank Group management and operational teams to enhance the evaluation process and to ensure the relevance and timeliness of the findings. The evaluation will also follow a modular approach, for example, by producing brief presentations to Bank Group management and key operational staff, in addition to an evaluation report.

7. Limitations and Mitigation Measures

7.1 **Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the evaluation team will conduct all case study missions, field interviews, and consultations remotely.** The evaluation will use data and results from IEG validations, existing surveys, and publications (for example, industry and firm-level surveys and household surveys) that can inform the relevance of the COVID-19 response. Given that interviews with stakeholders must be conducted online, they may be implemented on a purposeful sample validated by a group of managers. For example, the online interviews of operational staff and task team managers could gather responses related to ex ante constraints on diagnostics, designing and implementing COVID-19 responses, portfolio management constraints, and the extent to which the internal constraints could be addressed.

7.2 **The evaluation team may rely on online surveys and will conduct remote interviews that may be limited by response rates, stakeholder availability, and priorities during the COVID-19 crisis.** The team will consider new online surveys or a review of existing Bank Group client surveys to gather quantitative and qualitative data. The team will consider alternatives such as sentiment analysis (computationally identifying and categorizing opinions expressed in text, for example, by citizens) and social media analysis to gauge broader stakeholder influence of select projects and in countries.

7.3 **A limitation of the COVID-19 portfolio is that it identifies only projects with a tagged or documented explicit aim to support COVID-19 response.** It is anticipated that additional operational projects and advisory services and analytics will be identified through the country case studies conducted for the evaluation. Case studies will allow a deeper look at the repositioning of the portfolio in countries, including the activation of contingency emergency components of projects, and the adjustment and restructuring of operational projects that the global portfolio review might miss. Moreover, the financing commitment of the COVID-19 portfolio has currently taken the total amount allocated to the project financing, and this may be an overestimate in some cases.

8. Quality Assurance Process

8.1 **The Approach Paper and evaluation will undergo standard IEG quality assurance processes, including internal IEG and Bank Group management reviews and external peer review.** The following experts on macroeconomic issues and financial sector and private sector development issues will peer review this evaluation:

- Liliana Rojas-Suarez, director of the Latin America Initiative and a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development
- Afsaneh Beschloss, chief executive officer of Rock Creek Capital, Washington, DC, and former treasurer and chief investment officer of the World Bank
- Stijn Claessens, head of Financial Stability Policy and deputy head of the Monetary and Economic Department at the Bank for International Settlements
- David Ndii, managing director of Africa Economics (based in Kenya) served as a United Nations technical advisor on the Committee of Experts

Marialisa Motta, manager, IEG Financial, Private Sector, Infrastructure, and Sustainable Development; and José Carbajo, director, IEG Financial, Private Sector, and Sustainable Development, will provide guidance and internal departmental quality assurance.

9. Expected Outputs

9.1 **Three outputs are expected.** First, the evaluation team will share specific findings with a group of Bank Group colleagues (to be determined) through brief presentations during the evaluation's diagnosis and gap identification stage. Second, the team will use a presentation format to share with Bank Group colleagues emerging findings and recommendations from country and firm case studies. The final and main output will be a report to the Board's Committee on Development Effectiveness, which will contain the main findings, lessons, and strategic options for Bank Group management.

10. Staffing and Resources

10.1 A team of sector specialists, country economists, and data science experts will conduct this evaluation. This evaluation will be task managed by Raghavan Narayanan, senior evaluation officer, and co-task managed by Željko Bogetić, lead economist. The team includes Maria Elena Pinglo (senior evaluator), Melvin Vaz (senior evaluator), Madeleine Varkay (senior evaluation consultant), Fernando Montes-Negret (senior economist consultant), Virginia Ziulu (associate operations officer and data scientist), Isha Sharma (case consultant and research analyst), Dominik Naeher (senior economist consultant), Nana Sika Ahiabor (research and portfolio analyst), Aarre Laakso (senior consultant and editor), Emelda Cudilla (program assistant), and Wasiq Ismail (case consultant). The team may include additional IEG staff with expertise in specific areas (for example, social protection, DPFs, and IMF collaboration). The evaluation will benefit from input from Jozef Vaessen (IEG methods advisor).

10.2 This evaluation will be sent to Bank Group management for review in the second quarter of fiscal year (FY)22 and submitted to the Committee on Development Effectiveness in the third quarter of FY22. The proposed budget of $710,000 includes $35,000 for outreach and dissemination.

11. Outreach

11.1 The team will design an evaluation outreach strategy for both internal and external audiences. In addition to the final report, an outreach plan may be developed in close collaboration with the IEG communications team. Key internal audiences and stakeholders include the Committee on Development Effectiveness, Bank Group management and country economists, and staff from the Equitable Growth, Finance, and Institutions Practice Group, IFC, and MIGA. The external audience includes Bank Group development partners (such as the IMF and regional development banks).

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[1] There is no simple agreed-upon terminology for referring to “what the Bank Group does” as distinct from “what firms and governments do” in development. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Network on Development Evaluation uses the term “intervention” to cover both cases, but some feel that this obscures important differences between the two. This Approach Paper uses three terms: (i) ”Actions” refer to what firms and governments do, such as designing and implementing projects; (ii) “interventions” refers to what the Bank Group does to support governments and firms directly, such as providing loans and technical assistance; and (iii) “support efforts” refers more broadly to any kind of effort that the Bank Group makes, including not only interventions but also, for example, knowledge sharing and partnering.

[2] The Small Industries Development Bank of India (a dedicated micro, small, and medium enterprise development finance institution), the Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency (a wholly owned subsidiary of the Small Industries Development Bank of India dedicated to micro firms), and the Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro and Small Enterprises and the National Credit Guarantee Trustee Company, which are the two premier public sector credit guarantee programs dedicated to micro, small, and medium enterprise financing.

[3] This information is based on an ongoing pilot case study in Serbia.

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Appendix A. Lessons from Past Crises

The evaluation team conducted a desk review of past Independent Evaluation Group evaluations on crises response of the World Bank Group to mine lessons of experience that are key for addressing economic implications of the coronavirus pandemic. This evaluation will continue to build on the following set of lessons with a focus on the Bank Group's crisis response and aligned with the unique challenges posed by the pandemic crisis.

Table A.1. Lessons from Past Crises

Category	Lessons
Analytic underpinnings	Preparatory analytic work increases the likelihood of effective crisis support, but gaps exist in some areas. Advisory services and analytics (ASA) at the country level was an important part of the World Bank's response to the global crisis. High-quality analytic work was a common thread in many of the successful interventions. Country programs with solid ASA portfolios had the foundation in knowledge and relationships with the authorities necessary to put well-designed lending operations in place expediently when the need arose. However, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluations noted several gaps or weak areas in World Bank ASA that needed to be addressed. The crisis response evaluation found cases in which the ASA and related diagnostic work underpinning operations in the financial sector appeared insufficient, including in countries with financial sector development policy operations (DPOs). The DPO program objectives in those cases were vague and overambitious rather than specific and carefully articulated. This lack of effective ASA also constrained the design of appropriate social protection system responses to both the food price crisis and the global economic crisis. Similar observations apply in cases of country-specific terms of trade shocks. The Zambia Country Program Evaluation found that the World Bank did not consider the implications of alternative copper price scenarios for the country's economic management, even though this was clearly the fundamental risk facing the country at the time.
Lending instrument	Using financial intermediary loans (FILs) for crisis response appears to offer limited benefits. World Bank FILs prepared in the wake of the global crisis sought to ease borrowing constraints on the private sector because of lack of liquidity in commercial banks. IEG evaluation work suggests that FILs have major limitations as a crisis response instrument. Many FILs did not disburse to the most affected firms or quickly enough help much in crisis recovery. FILs to institutions with previous FIL experience, repeat FILs, and FILs directed to exporters appear to have provided timely support to affected segments in some cases. However, FILs directed at new entities and at infrastructure appear particularly unsuited to scaling up for crisis response.
Development policy operations	Budget support through DPOs has been a dominant and indispensable part of World Bank responses to shocks, but DPOs require follow-up for effective long-term resilience building. The DPO has been the workhorse of the World Bank's support for responses to shocks because it can be implemented relatively quickly and provides fungible budget support to governments. However, because they lack follow-up actions and do not track progress over time, stand-alone crisis response DPOs were not well suited to follow up on the sustained reform agendas that were crucial to building medium-term

Category	Lessons
	resilience. Follow-up requires a continuous flow of analytical work, a series of programmatic DPOs with appropriate fiscal structural reform content, or both.
Private sector	The International Finance Corporation (IFC) can help mitigate disruptions in private sector access to financing after systemic shocks, but it has faced delivery challenges. IFC responded to the global crisis by implementing or adapting several innovative platforms targeting trade finance, bank capitalization, distressed assets management, infrastructure, and microfinance. However, implementation delays lessened the impact of these initiatives, which in several cases were too small to have systemic influence. Still, there were some beneficial effects. IFC's Microfinance Enhancement Fund helped instill confidence in the availability of rollover financing to microfinance institutions, contributing to the restoration of stability in microfinance lending after the global crisis. In trade financing, although program targets were not met initially, the IFC facility provided funding for trade finance in individual client banks once obstacles were overcome.
Multisector approach	The World Bank has attempted to grasp the synergies of a multisector approach to resilience in most instances, and it should work with its international development partners to continue emphasizing the need for a holistic approach to resilience and crisis management instead of a narrower sector-by-sector approach, particularly in small states. The Bank Group displayed a multisector approach to strengthening resilience in countries covered through IEG's cluster Country Program Evaluations, including Kazakhstan and Mongolia, and in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and Pacific island states. The crisis response evaluation noted that many DPOs initiated by the World Bank in the aftermath of the global financial crisis addressed more than one dimension of resilience, especially in the financial sector and in fiscal policy. Supporting measures to improve financial, fiscal, and social resilience simultaneously is highly relevant, given that financial and fiscal imbalances usually interact and can exacerbate each other, often with adverse social impacts. Banking crises can trigger debt crises as governments strive to recapitalize distressed banks, and debt crises can stress bank balance sheets if banks suffer significant losses on their holdings of government debt and if a loss of confidence triggers withdrawals of deposits. Therefore, addressing financial and fiscal vulnerabilities simultaneously can be mutually reinforcing by reducing the likelihood that financial and fiscal stress aggravate each other. A natural disaster compounds all of these impacts further, similarly underscoring the need to work on the various dimensions to enhance countries' resilience.
Internal coordination	The growing World Bank operational portfolio in resilience deserves a greater degree of internal coordination. Because almost every World Bank Global Practice is involved in work on one or more dimensions of resilience, the World Bank needs to ensure knowledge sharing across Global Practices and a concerted approach to identifying and filling knowledge gaps. Several IEG evaluations noted weaknesses in internal coordination, in some cases even identifying these as a cause of failure to achieve results in the field. The Bank Group could consider initiatives to enable more effective coordination and knowledge sharing in this area.
Long-term resilience and client ownership	The World Bank should use crises as an opportunity to build long-term resilience, and client ownership is an essential ingredient. Addressing underlying structural issues under crisis conditions is inherently difficult and can succeed only when there is careful preparation and a clear understanding among country stakeholders of the need for the changes. Advice on the subject in IEG evaluations is conflicted. Thematic evaluations tend to argue

Category	Lessons
	that the World Bank has not taken enough advantage of its operations during crises to build long-term policies and capacity. Conversely, Implementation Completion and Results Report Reviews of crisis response operations frequently note a lack of progress or success in components supporting long-term policies or capacity building attributable to dissipating ownership when crisis conditions subside. There is no simple answer. Making the best use of crisis response to launch sustainable long-term resilience building requires careful contextual and political economy analysis to determine what is appropriate.

Source: Independent Evaluation Group desk review.
Note: ASA = advisory services and analytics; DPO = development policy operation; FIL = financial intermediary loan; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; IFC = International Finance Corporation.

Appendix B. Description of Evaluation Methods and Case Identification through Vulnerability Index

Evaluation Methods and Approaches

COVID-19 Evaluation Database

The evaluation team will maintain a standardized and encoded database containing all relevant data for the evaluation. This will ensure that data can be easily consolidated and analyzed. The database includes two main components:

- World Bank Group portfolio data, composed of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association, International Finance Corporation, and Multilateral Investment Guarantee projects selected for the evaluation. These data were collected from the data provided by the institutions, the team's own research, and the use of semiautomatic portfolio techniques (for International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association data).

- Country-level indicators, including more than 100 microeconomic, macroeconomic, and financial indicators collected by the evaluation team from multiple sources (such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization, and Standard & Poor's)

The two components of the data set can be joined through a common key (country code), which allows mapping any variables across the tables.

Factor Analysis

Factor analysis is an unsupervised machine learning model used primarily for dimensionality reduction, with the aim of making complex data sets more understandable and more manageable. The key concept behind factor analysis is that multiple observed variables have similar patterns because they are all associated with a latent (that is, not directly measured) variable. One significant advantage of factor analysis over other techniques that analyze single variables lies in its ability to analyze all variables and their interactions simultaneously (versus looking at each variable independently, which could result in missing or omitting important interactions).

The Bank Group COVID-19 data set is well suited for this type of analysis because it includes more than 40 project-specific variables and more than 100 country-specific variables. This analysis is expected to help better understand the portfolio's key drivers and facilitate the selection of projects for the evaluation. Furthermore, factor analysis will help reduce data measurement and storage requirements, reduce time for both training and model use, and facilitate data visualization.

Although the most immediate use of factor analysis is at an exploratory stage to better understand the portfolio's key drivers and inform project and country selection, the identified factors can also be used to conduct additional analysis or predictions.

Text Analytics

The team will conduct a text analysis on project documents from specific countries to be selected based on their vulnerability to COVID-19 and the magnitude of Bank Group support they are receiving. The objective of the analysis will be to identify the common and specific themes related to COVID-19 response emerging from the text in project documents in the selected countries based on a vocabulary of key words and phrases.

Qualitative Assessment

To assess the quality at entry, implementation progress, and quality of supervision of the Bank Group's COVID-19 response projects, the Independent Evaluation Group will use templates from its 2018 *Results and Performance of the World Bank Group* flagship report and the Quality Assurance Group's Second Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio. The team will apply this qualitative methodology on a sample of projects selected from the identified portfolio.

This qualitative assessment will evaluate all projects by identifying key indicators across multiple dimensions that can be weighted and aggregated. To assess quality at entry, key dimensions include (i) strategic relevance and approach; (ii) technical, financial, and economic aspects; (iii) policy and institutional aspects; (iv) monitoring and evaluation; and (v) risk. Similarly, critical dimensions to assess the quality of supervision include (i) focus on development effectiveness; (ii) fiduciary, safeguard, and fraud and corruption aspects; and (iv) candor and realism of the Implementation Status and Results report.

Interactive Dashboard

As an outcome of the evaluation, the team proposes to create an interactive dashboard that will integrate the multiple data sources collected during the evaluation. Given that the team will have collected a unique data set with multiple indicators on the economic, fiscal, and financial implications of COVID-19, it is intended to summarize and make this information available interactively. The dashboard will allow simultaneously manipulating both the spatial and temporal dimensions of the data and overlaying COVID-19-specific indicators on more traditional indicators (for example, macroeconomic data). Furthermore, the interactive dashboard will also highlight the conclusions and lessons learned from the evaluation and aims to be a useful tool to guide future projects at the recovery stage.

Case Selection

As noted in the section on evaluation design, the evaluation will conduct case-based analyses at the country and firm levels to study the quality of the Bank Group response and implementation. The evaluation will purposively sample country-level cases to study based on vulnerability—including economic vulnerability—to COVID-19, among other factors, as described on the following pages.

COVID-19 Vulnerability Index

The World Bank's COVID-19 Vulnerability Index provides an overview of COVID-19 vulnerabilities by country. The index was derived from nearly 50 indicators on six dimensions: (i) COVID-19 exposure and response (composite indicator summarizing COVID-19 cases and crisis response indexes); (ii) health score (composite indicator summarizing health system and preparedness indexes); (iii) commodity exposure (composite indicator summarizing commodity exposure indexes); (iv) fitness and trade exposure (composite index summarizing economic fitness, trade, and global value chain exposure indexes); (v) internal vulnerability (gauges the overall macroeconomic health and potential internal imbalances in the economy, such as gross domestic product growth, inflation, and government debt); and (vi) external vulnerability (gauges the overall macroeconomic health and potential external imbalances in the economy, such as current account balances, debt service, and reserves).

The score assigned to each of these six dimensions was combined (by an unweighted average) to derive a composite index reflecting each country's level of vulnerability to COVID-19.

Vulnerability Mapping and Country Selection

The maps that follow represent each country's vulnerability to COVID-19, considering the composite index and dimension score described. Countries are colored in a gradation of four shades representing the level of each dimension (0–25, 25–50, 50–75, and 75–100). Countries in darker shades have higher vulnerability.

The circles overlaid on the map represent the level of Bank Group engagement in number of projects. The radius of the circle is proportional to the number of projects, including active, closed, and pipeline projects.

The countries selected as potential cases of interest for the evaluation meet the following two criteria: high vulnerability (a value of 50 or higher in the chosen dimension), and high Bank Group engagement (top two quartiles).

The matrix at the end of this appendix lists the countries selected as potential countries of interest when applying each of the criteria.

Criterion 1: Countries with High Vulnerability to COVID-19 and High Bank Group Engagement

Vulnerability to COVID-19 was measured as the average of country rank in COVID-19 exposure and response, health score, commodity exposure, fitness and trade exposure, internal vulnerability, and external vulnerability.

Map B.1. Countries with High Vulnerability to COVID-19 and High World Bank Group Engagement



Table MB.1.1. World Bank Group Engagement in Countries with High Vulnerability to COVID-19

				Project count by Institution			Project count by Type					
Country	Income Level	# WBG Projects	Volume WBG Projects	# IBRD/IDA Projects	# IFC Projects	# MIGA Projects	# WB - Advisory & Analytics	# WB - Lending	# IFC - Investment	# IFC - Advisory	# MIGA - NH	# MIGA - PRI
Brazil	UM	22	1,785,186,128	14	8	0	8	6	8	0	0	0
Colombia	UM	15	1,826,409,877	8	6	1	5	3	4	2	1	0
Ecuador	UM	13	1,409,068,027	9	4	0	4	5	4	0	0	0
Ethiopia	L	13	953,929,864	9	4	0	4	5	1	3	0	0
Indonesia	LM	15	2,607,599,904	11	3	1	6	5	2	1	1	0
Kenya	LM	22	878,347,221	15	7	0	9	6	3	4	0	0
Mexico	UM	15	2,845,641,336	10	4	1	8	2	4	0	1	0
Morocco	LM	15	791,585,248	12	3	0	7	5	1	2	0	0
Nigeria	LM	23	3,464,974,211	7	15	1	3	4	8	7	0	1
Pakistan	LM	24	1,542,328,068	21	3	0	7	14	1	2	0	0
South Africa	UM	13	950,389,968	6	7	0	5	1	4	3	0	0
Turkey	UM	19	1,621,673,000	13	6	0	7	6	6	0	0	0
Totals		209	20,677,132,852	135	70	4	73	62	46	24	3	1

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.

Note: LIC = low-income country; LMIC = lower-middle-income country; UMIC = upper-middle-income country.

Criterion 2: Countries with Poor COVID-19 Response and High Bank Group Engagement

Poor COVID-19 response was measured using the COVID-19 exposure and response dimension (that is, a composite indicator summarizing COVID-19 cases and crisis response indexes).

Map B.2. Countries with Poor COVID-19 Response and High World Bank Group Engagement



Table MB.2.1. World Bank Group Engagement in Countries with Poor COVID-19 Response

				Project count by Institution			Project count by Type					
Country	Income Level	# WBG Projects	Volume WBG Projects	# IBRD/IDA Projects	# IFC Projects	# MIGA Projects	# WB - Advisory & Analytics	# WB - Lending	# IFC - Investment	# IFC - Advisory	# MIGA - NH	# MIGA - PRI
Brazil	UM	22	1,785,186,128	14	8	0	8	6	8	0	0	0
Colombia	UM	15	1,826,409,877	8	6	1	5	3	4	2	1	0
Ecuador	UM	13	1,409,068,027	9	4	0	4	5	4	0	0	0
India	LM	22	3,563,291,823	9	13	0	4	5	12	1	0	0
Indonesia	LM	15	2,607,599,904	11	3	1	6	5	2	1	1	0
Mexico	UM	15	2,845,641,336	10	4	1	8	2	4	0	1	0
Nigeria	LM	23	3,464,974,211	7	15	1	3	4	8	7	0	1
South Africa	UM	13	950,389,968	6	7	0	5	1	4	3	0	0
Totals		138	18,452,561,274	74	60	4	43	31	46	14	3	1

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: LIC = low-income country; LMIC = lower-middle-income country; UMIC = upper-middle-income country.

Criterion 3: Countries with Poor Health Systems and Preparedness and High Bank Group Engagement

Poor health systems and preparedness was measured using the health score dimension (that is, a composite indicator summarizing health system and preparedness indexes).

Map B.3. Countries with Poor Health Systems and Preparedness and High World Bank Group Engagement



Table MB.3.1. World Bank Group Engagement in Countries with Poor Health Systems and Preparedness

				Project count by Institution			Project count by Type					
Country	Income Level	# WBG Projects	Volume WBG Projects	# IBRD/IDA Projects	# IFC Projects	# MIGA Projects	# WB - Advisory & Analytics	# WB - Lending	# IFC - Investment	# IFC - Advisory	# MIGA - NH	# MIGA - PRI
Bangladesh	LM	22	2,185,497,957	12	10	0	4	8	7	3	0	0
China	UM	15	945,915,141	6	9	0	5	1	9	0	0	0
Colombia	UM	15	1,826,409,877	8	6	1	5	3	4	2	1	0
Ecuador	UM	13	1,409,068,027	9	4	0	4	5	4	0	0	0
Ethiopia	L	13	953,929,864	9	4	0	4	5	1	3	0	0
India	LM	22	3,563,291,823	9	13	0	4	5	12	1	0	0
Indonesia	LM	15	2,607,599,904	11	3	1	6	5	2	1	1	0
Kenya	LM	22	878,347,221	15	7	0	9	6	3	4	0	0
Mexico	UM	15	2,845,641,336	10	4	1	8	2	4	0	1	0
Morocco	LM	15	791,585,248	12	3	0	7	5	1	2	0	0
Nigeria	LM	23	3,464,974,211	7	15	1	3	4	8	7	0	1
Pakistan	LM	24	1,542,328,068	21	3	0	7	14	1	2	0	0
Philippines	LM	21	1,916,494,585	16	5	0	11	5	3	2	0	0
Turkey	UM	19	1,621,673,000	13	6	0	7	6	6	0	0	0
Totals		254	26,552,756,262	158	92	4	84	74	65	27	3	1

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: LIC = low-income country; LMIC = lower-middle-income country; UMIC = upper-middle-income country.

Criterion 4: Countries with High Commodities Exposure and High Bank Group Engagement

The commodities exposure dimension was measured using a composite indicator summarizing commodity exposure indexes.

Map B.4. Countries with High Commodities Exposure and High World Bank Group Engagement



Table MB.4.1. World Bank Group Engagement in Countries with High Commodities Exposure

Country	Income Level	# WBG Projects	Volume WBG Projects	Project count by Institution: # IBRD/IDA Projects	# IFC Projects	# MIGA Projects	Project count by Type: # WB - Advisory & Analytics	# WB - Lending	# IFC - Investment	# IFC - Advisory	# MIGA - NH	# MIGA - PRI
Brazil	UM	22	1,785,186,128	14	8	0	8	6	8	0	0	0
Colombia	UM	15	1,826,409,877	8	6	1	5	3	4	2	1	0
Ecuador	UM	13	1,409,068,027	9	4	0	4	5	4	0	0	0
Ethiopia	L	13	953,929,864	9	4	0	4	5	1	3	0	0
Indonesia	LM	15	2,607,599,904	11	3	1	6	5	2	1	1	0
Kenya	LM	22	878,347,221	15	7	0	9	6	3	4	0	0
Malaysia	UM	17	0	17	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0
Mexico	UM	15	2,845,641,336	10	4	1	8	2	4	0	1	0
Nigeria	LM	23	3,464,974,211	7	15	1	3	4	8	7	0	1
South Africa	UM	13	950,389,968	6	7	0	5	1	4	3	0	0
Totals		168	16,721,546,536	106	58	4	69	37	38	20	3	1

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: LIC = low-income country; LMIC = lower-middle-income country; UMIC = upper-middle-income country.

Criterion 5: Countries with Low Rankings in Economic Fitness, Trade, and Global Value Chain Exposure and High Bank Group Engagement

This criterion was measured using the fitness and trade exposure dimension (that is, a composite index summarizing economic fitness, trade, and global value chain exposure indexes).

Map B.5. Countries with Low Rankings in Economic Fitness, Trade, and Global Value Chain Exposure and High World Bank Group Engagement



Table MB.5.1. World Bank Group Engagement in Countries with Low Rankings in Economic Fitness, Trade, and Global Value Chain Exposure

				Project count by Institution			Project count by Type					
Country	Income Level	# WBG Projects	Volume WBG Projects	# IBRD/IDA Projects	# IFC Projects	# MIGA Projects	# WB - Advisory & Analytics	# WB - Lending	# IFC - Investment	# IFC - Advisory	# MIGA - NH	# MIGA - PRI
Malaysia	UM	17	0	17	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0
Morocco	LM	15	791,585,248	12	3	0	7	5	1	2	0	0
Vietnam	LM	14	227,665,867	9	5	0	8	1	4	1	0	0
Totals		46	1,019,251,115	38	8	0	32	6	5	3	0	0

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: LIC = low-income country; LMIC = lower-middle-income country; UMIC = upper-middle-income country.

Criterion 6: Countries with Internal Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities and High Bank Group Engagement

The internal macroeconomic vulnerability dimension gauges the overall macroeconomic health and potential internal imbalances in the economy, such as gross domestic product growth, inflation, and government debt.

Map B.6. Countries with Internal Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities and High World Bank Group Engagement



Table MB.6.1. World Bank Group Engagement in Countries with Internal Macroeconomic Vulnerabilities

				Project count by Institution			Project count by Type					
Country	Income Level	# WBG Projects	Volume WBG Projects	# IBRD/IDA Projects	# IFC Projects	# MIGA Projects	# WB - Advisory & Analytics	# WB - Lending	# IFC - Investment	# IFC - Advisory	# MIGA - NH	# MIGA - PRI
Brazil	UM	22	1,785,186,128	14	8	0	8	6	8	0	0	0
India	LM	22	3,563,291,823	9	13	0	4	5	12	1	0	0
Kenya	LM	22	878,347,221	15	7	0	9	6	3	4	0	0
Mexico	UM	15	2,845,641,336	10	4	1	8	2	4	0	1	0
Nigeria	LM	23	3,464,974,211	7	15	1	3	4	8	7	0	1
Pakistan	LM	24	1,542,328,068	21	3	0	7	14	1	2	0	0
South Africa	UM	13	950,389,968	6	7	0	5	1	4	3	0	0
Turkey	UM	19	1,621,673,000	13	6	0	7	6	6	0	0	0
Totals		160	16,651,831,755	95	63	2	51	44	46	17	1	1

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: LIC = low-income country; LMIC = lower-middle-income country; UMIC = upper-middle-income country.

Criterion 7: Countries with External Macroeconomic Vulnerability and High Bank Group Engagement

Map B.7. Countries with External Macroeconomic Vulnerability and High World Bank Group Engagement



Table MB.7.1. World Bank Group Engagement in Countries with External Macroeconomic Vulnerability

				Project count by Institution			Project count by Type					
Country	Income Level	# WBG Projects	Volume WBG Projects	# IBRD/IDA Projects	# IFC Projects	# MIGA Projects	# WB - Advisory & Analytics	# WB - Lending	# IFC - Investment	# IFC - Advisory	# MIGA - NH	# MIGA - PRI
Colombia	UM	15	1,826,409,877	8	6	1	5	3	4	2	1	0
Ecuador	UM	13	1,409,068,027	9	4	0	4	5	4	0	0	0
Pakistan	LM	24	1,542,328,068	21	3	0	7	14	1	2	0	0
Turkey	UM	19	1,621,673,000	13	6	0	7	6	6	0	0	0
Totals		71	6,399,478,973	51	19	1	23	28	15	4	1	0

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: LIC = low-income country; LMIC = lower-middle-income country; UMIC = upper-middle-income country.

Summary Matrix

The numbers on the top of the matrix (figure C.1, 1 to 7) refer to each of the mapping criteria. The numbers inside the matrix (0 or 1) indicate whether each country was picked (1) or not (0) by each mapping criterion.

Figure B.1. Summary Matrix

Country	Mapping Criteria 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Sum
Bangladesh	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Brazil	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	4
China	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Colombia	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	5
Ecuador	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	5
Ethiopia	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	3
India	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3
Indonesia	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	4
Kenya	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	4
Malaysia	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
Mexico	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	5
Morocco	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	3
Nigeria	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	5
Pakistan	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	4
Philippines	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
South Africa	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	4
Turkey	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	4
Vietnam	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.