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The World Bank**

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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

MOZAMBIQUE

**EDUCATION AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(CREDIT 1907)**

**SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT
(CREDIT 2200)**

**CAPACITY BUILDING HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(CREDIT 2436)**

**EDUCATION SECTOR STRATEGIC PROGRAM
PROJECT (CREDIT 3172)**

JUNE 17, 2008

*Sector Evaluation Division
Independent Evaluation Group*

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = (metical)

Secondary Education I Project

AR\$1 = US\$0.5089 (February 2002)

US\$1 = AR\$1.965

Secondary Education II Project

AR\$1 = US\$0.33 (October 2004)

US\$1 = AR\$2.96

Secondary Education III Project

AR\$1 = US\$ 0.315(February 2003)

US\$1 = AR\$3.170

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
EFA	Education for All
ESSP	Education Sector Strategic Program
FTI	Fast-Track Initiative to achieve Education for All
GDP	Gross domestic product
GER	Gross Enrollment Rates
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
INDE	<i>Instituto Nacional do Desenvolvimento da Educação</i>
MEC	Ministry of Education and Culture
MIS	Management information system
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PARPA	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PRSC	Poverty Reduction Support Credit
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
PHRD	Policy and Human Resources Development
PIRLS	Progress in International Reading Literacy Study
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
SACMEQ	Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality
SWAp	Sector-wide Approach
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
TIMSS	Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

Fiscal Year

Government: January 1 — December 31

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IEGWB Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation.

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEGWB annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The operations, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies.

A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by IEGWB. To prepare PPARs, IEGWB staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with staff of the Bank and the government, other stakeholders, and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader IEGWB studies.

Each PPAR is subject to peer review and IEGWB management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEGWB Rating System

The time-tested evaluation methods used by IEGWB are suited to the broad range of the World Bank's work. The methods offer both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEGWB evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEGWB website: <http://worldbank.org/ieg>).

Outcome: The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance of objectives, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance of objectives* is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings:* High Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency performance. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

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<p>This report was prepared by Helen Abadzi, who assessed the project in September 2007. Marie-Jeanne Ndiaye provided administrative support.</p>

Principal Ratings

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
<i>Education and Manpower Development Project (Credit 1907)</i>			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome** (Sustainability)	--	--	Low
Bank Performance	Uncertain	Uncertain	--
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
<i>Second Education Project (Credit 2200)</i>			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome** (Sustainability)	--	--	Low
Bank Performance	Likely	Likely	--
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
<i>Capacity Building Human Resources Development Project (Credit 2436)</i>			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome** (Sustainability)	--	--	Moderate
Bank Performance	Likely	Likely	--
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
<i>Education Sector Strategic Program (Cr. 3172)</i>			
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome**	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible operational division of the Bank. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEG product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

** According to the 2006 harmonization guidelines, sustainability has been replaced with a "risk to development outcome" rating.

Key Staff Responsible

	<i>Task Manager/ Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
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Preface

This is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) on four education projects in Mozambique.

The Education and Manpower Development Project (Cr. 1907, known also as Education I) was approved for a credit of US\$15.9 million equivalent in May 1988. The credit closed on April 30, 1996 after extensions totaling 4 months and disbursed fully.

The Second Education Project (Credit 2200) was approved for a credit of US\$53.7 million equivalent in December 1990. The credit closed on December 31, 1998 after extensions totaling 26 months; US\$1.3 million was canceled.

The Capacity Building Human Resources Development Project (Credit 2436, often referred to as 'third project'), was approved for a credit of US\$48.6 million equivalent in November 1992. The credit closed on September 30, 1999 after extensions totaling 27 months; US\$2.6 million was canceled.

The Education Sector Strategic Program (ESSP; Credit 3172) was approved for a credit of US\$71.8 million equivalent in August 1998. The credit closed on June 30, 2006 after extensions totaling 24 months; US\$3.5 million was canceled.

The projects in Mozambique were selected for assessment in order to study the challenges of improving learning outcomes in a low-income country at a time of post-conflict reconstruction.

The PPAR is based on the following sources: Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs), Staff Appraisal Reports (SARs), Development Credit Agreements, task manager interviews, and project files, particularly the supervision missions aide-memoires. Also, IEG consulted the research literature and reports on Mozambique, and data on schooling trends. An IEG mission visited Mozambique in September 2007 to interview officials, donors, and beneficiaries, observe instruction in schools, and collect other pertinent information. Field visits and detailed school observations took place in the provinces of Maputo and Nampula. The author thanks the government officials who received the mission for their extensive cooperation.

Following standard IEG procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to government officials and agencies for their review and comments. However, no formal response was received.

Summary

Mozambique has implemented a series of four education projects that aimed to expand the provision of this educational level to lower-income populations. These included: (i) the Education and Manpower Development Project (Cr. 1907, approved in FY88); (ii) the Second Education Project (Cr. 2200, approved in FY91); (iii) the Capacity Building Human Resources Development Project (Cr.2436, approved in FY93); and (iv) the Education Sector Strategic Program (ESSP; Cr. 3172, approved in FY99).

To help rehabilitate the country's economy after the civil war, the Bank in the 1990s supported an economic rehabilitation program. This included expansion of primary education to alleviate poverty and expansion of higher education to enhance management capacity. Accordingly, the Bank's lending portfolio focused on improving access, quality, and management of primary and university education; secondary education received little attention. This strategy focused resources closest to the areas of immediate need in the early 1990s, but subsequent neglect may have affected long-term human resource development. The numbers of citizens qualified to become teachers are small, and this limitation adversely affects instructional quality at all levels.

The government used credit proceeds effectively to expand the education system, so gross enrollment rates in grades 1-5 have increased from about 60 percent in 1992 to about 103 percent in 2005. The progress has encouraged more donors to invest in the education sector (12 donors participated in the most recently completed sector-wide project and 21 in an ongoing project), so since 1999 the Bank has financed education through multidonor sector-wide approaches.

However, the educational system of Mozambique provides little knowledge, particularly to poorer and rural students. Official contact hours in schools with multiple shifts are only 700 per year, as opposed to 875 in single-shift schools. In cities, frequent teacher absenteeism reduces the already limited instructional time. The IEG mission also observed high student absenteeism, with half the class often missing in upper primary grades. In the approximately 45 classrooms visited by the IEG mission, little information was presented or elaborated; instead, primary-school children spent much time copying from the blackboard but many were illiterate and could not decipher their notes or learn information from the textbooks that had been provided at great cost. Students at all post-primary education levels (including the university classes visited by the mission) were also largely engaged in copying or taking word-for-word dictation, lacked textbooks, and had limited understanding of subjects such as mathematics or biology. At all levels, teachers interacted mainly with the few students able to keep up.

The limited instruction resulted in repetition rates that were about 25 percent until 2004. At that time, the government implemented a policy of semiautomatic promotion recommended by the Bank, which reduced repetition by about 50 percent. However, the policy allows students who are hardly literate to graduate from primary school and enter secondary. This has exacerbated a severe lack of prerequisite knowledge that impacts all levels of education. Lack of knowledge has been a long-standing concern in university faculties and teacher training colleges, but in the push to expand the system, this issue has received little attention.

Central and district officials interviewed by the IEG mission agreed that the system provides limited knowledge to students but expressed an inability to improve it. Some interviewees criticized donors for their interest in expanding enrollments without scrutinizing learning outcomes. Yet, some instructional problems have relatively simple solutions (such as revising the grade 1 textbook to teach reading more efficiently), but incentives to deal with this level of detail have been limited. The Bank and the other donors have largely focused on high-level policy issues and have not systematically collected first-hand information about instructional conditions, relying instead on data provided by the government. Furthermore, coordination and harmonization complexities have left donor staff little time to look into instructional issues.

The assessed projects are rated as follows:

<i>Project</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Risk to Development Outcome</i>	<i>Bank Performance</i>	<i>Borrower Performance</i>
Education and Manpower Development Project	Satisfactory	Low	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Second Education Project	Satisfactory	Low	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Capacity Building Human Resources Development Project	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderate	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Education Sector Strategic Program	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderate	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

The objectives of all four projects were highly relevant to the needs of the country. The outcomes of the first two projects are rated *satisfactory* in light of high relevance, substantial efficiency and modest efficacy, but the outcomes of the last two are rated *moderately unsatisfactory* because many activities were not carried out and quality objectives were not achieved. Risk to development outcome is rated *low* in the first two projects and *moderate* in the last two; the enrollment expansion has proved resilient over time, but poor quality results in premature dropout and limited schooling for about half the students. Bank performance was *satisfactory* in the first two projects but *moderately unsatisfactory* in the last two due to poor quality at entry and weak supervision of important activities. Borrower performance is rated *moderately unsatisfactory* in the Capacity Building project due to government-level conflicts and poor financial management and *moderately satisfactory* in the Education Sector Strategic Program project.

This assessment provides a number of lessons for the education sector:

- Very low-income countries receiving donor aid may succeed in providing broad access to education. But without a critical number of reasonably well educated teachers, interested administrators, and strong instructional supervision, the educational system may provide little learning to the students (para. 3.22);

- Monitoring of learning outcomes is critical in all education projects, particularly where very poor populations are involved. Without clear and monitorable targets, educational systems may enrol and graduate students who lack basic skills;
- It is not safe to assume that local educators alone will be able to produce effective training materials or disseminate effective methods. Transmission of durable knowledge to the poor involves technical issues and research that are relatively new and are little-known among government and donor staff or consultants. State-of-the-art technical assistance is needed to address learning issues (para. 3.17, 3.20);
- Textbooks (or organized printed materials) are needed for all students at all levels to take home. Without textbooks, valuable instructional time tends to be used for copying or word-for-word dictation. Instructional aids must also be provided so as to maximize the amount of information that can be learned by students (para. 3.20);
- Governments are likely to respond to donor priorities and informational requirements. If donors are perceived as focusing mainly on access, governments are less likely to focus on improving learning outcomes (para. 4.16);
- Cross conditionalities among donors may be best managed through sector-wide agreements and plans with partners. However, complex arrangements involving large numbers of donors require much foresight in terms of harmonization and agreement on sectoral strategy. The financing and planning complexities of donor harmonization may detract from attention to substance (para. 5.8); and
- Strategies aimed at increasing girls' enrolment require strong government commitment at a high level to be effective. Otherwise, activities may take place but prove unsustainable or ineffective in the long run (para. 3.7).

Vinod Thomas
Director-General
Evaluation

1. Background

1.1 Before the independence of Mozambique, the school system was designed to serve the white settlers, and space for the Africans was limited. At the time of independence in 1975, only about 30 percent of the school-aged children were enrolled in school, and only about 10 percent of the adult population was literate.

1.2 The government that took over after independence emphasized primary education, adult literacy, and basic health care. However, a civil war (1976-1992) destabilized the economy and destroyed or closed about 60 percent of the primary schools. Between 1975 and 1986 demand for education rose. Primary school enrollments grew from about 350,000 to 1.2 million, while secondary school enrollments rose from 26,000 to 136,000.¹ However, the schooling process in the 1980s was very inefficient. Classes of 60 or more students, triple shifts and short hours, and the continued use of Portuguese (this country of 19.8 million speaks 11 languages) made learning accessible only to the brightest or well off. Of about 500,000 children entering grade 1, only about 1,000 were left in grade 10 and only about 300 entered the university each year. Girls accounted for only about 44 percent of primary-level enrollment rates and were scarce in higher levels.²


1.3 To meet the country's human development goals, the rehabilitation of the education system was considered critical. The government requested help from the World Bank and other donors.

1.4 *Donor Coordination and Sectoral Financing.* A host of donors has assisted Mozambique since its independence. These include multilateral banks (African Development Bank-AfDB, the Islamic Development Bank), and many United Nations agencies (World Food Program, United Nations Development Program-UNDP, UNESCO, and the United Nations Population Fund-UNFPA). Bilateral aid includes the UK, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, United Kingdom, Ireland, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Finland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Japan, Canada, and Cuba. The multilateral banks and Japan have largely financed construction of buildings, whereas the bilaterals have financed technical assistance and instructional inputs such as textbooks. Some of these aid the central government, while others (such as Denmark and Germany) also work in specific provinces. Several donors have financed fellowships for higher education over the years, including the former socialist governments of Eastern Europe. Donor contributions constitute roughly 50 percent of the annual budget for Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC; Figure 1). Donor coordination challenges have necessitated financing through a sector-wide approach (SWAp). Funds are pooled, and the government provides monitoring data to donors who rarely carry out their own supervision missions (See more detail in the Issues section.).

¹ Average dropout was estimated at 9 percent in 1989 (Palme 1992). The per capita income of Mozambique was about US\$340 in 2006 (World Bank 2007). Enrollment data in Education I Staff Appraisal Report (7084-MOZ) obtained from UNESCO, March 1986 (Baudouin Duvieusart).

² Current statistics from Country at a Glance, 2007. In 1986, 36 percent of all fifth and sixth year students, as well as 30 percent of all secondary students were female (Education II Staff Appraisal Report, p. 22).

Figure 1.1: Total spending and share of external finance as percentage education budget, 1992-2004



Source: Virtanen and Ehrenpreis 2007. The bars represent total spending; the line is the share of the budget.

Bank Sector Strategy

1.5 The Bank's involvement in the education sector started in 1988 and initially focused on the economic rehabilitation of the war-ravaged country. The primary concern was the almost complete lack of trained persons who could staff public-sector institutions and carry out needed work, including the rehabilitation of the infrastructure. Therefore, for the first 15 years of Bank's involvement in the sector, the focus was on access to basic education to alleviate poverty and on higher or technical education to develop management capacity in the government and private sector.

1.6 To fulfill this two-pronged development objective, the Bank financed a series of education projects, four of which had been completed by September 2007 (Table 1.1). The first, second, and fourth projects primarily supported primary education, but all financed some higher education activities (Annex Tables A1-4.). The most recently completed project (Education Sector Strategic Program project, 1999-2006) was a sector-wide approach (SWAp) supported by 12 donors. Because about 21 donors are interested in primary education, the Bank does not finance the ongoing Education Sector Strategic Program II. However, it continues to support the Government's Strategic Plan for Education and Culture by actively participating in country dialogue and providing technical assistance in primary education. Also, it has financed a higher education project (Cr. 3609) and a technical-vocational education project (Cr. 4156) that also finances the subsector as a SWAp (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1: Education Lending in Mozambique

<i>Projects</i>	<i>Project ID</i>	<i>Approval FY</i>	<i>Closing</i>	<i>Loan no.</i>	<i>Loan amount US\$m</i>	<i>Project Cost US\$m</i>	<i>Cancel ed US\$m</i>
Completed							
Education and Manpower Development Project (Cr. 1907)	P001763	1988	12/31/1995	1907	15.9	17.9	0
Second Education Project (Cr. 2200)	P001776	1991	12/31/1998	2200	53.7	67.9	3.1
Capacity Building Human Resources Development Project (2436)	P001797	1993	09/30/2001	2436	48.6	60.3	2.6
Education Sector Strategic Program (Cr. 3172)	P001786	1999	06/30/2006	3172	71	72	3.5
Ongoing							
Higher Education Project (Cr. 3609)	P069824	2002	12/31/2007	3609	60	71.1	
Technical and Vocational Education and Training (Cr. 4156)	P087347	2006	10/31/2011	4156	30	37.5	
Total					279.2	326.7	9.2

1.7 Mozambique continues to suffer from a dramatic deficit of professionals with secondary and post-secondary education in all fields. Under the initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), the Bank has financed three poverty reduction support credits (PRSCs) aimed at critical sectors, including education.³ Funds are not earmarked and there are no triggers for education, but the PRSCs aimed at creating fiscal space for education expenditures. The funding has enabled the government to increase expenditures for primary education and devote an average of 20 percent of revenue — about 4.7 percent of GDP—to this sector (Table 1.2). Mozambique's percentage of GDP for education compares well with sub-Saharan Africa averages.⁴

Table 1.2: Government recurrent expenditures by functional classification (% GDP)

<i>Item</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>			<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2003</i>
			<i>Rec</i>	<i>Invest</i>	<i>Total</i>			
Total recurrent expenditures	11.2	12.2	13.5	10.6	24.1	14.5	15.8	15.9
General administration	2.3	2.6	2.2	1.7	3.9	1.9	2.0	2.0
Education	2.0	2.5	3.2	1.8	5.0	3.1	3.3	3.7
Health	2.1	2.4	2.8	0.6	3.5	3.6	3.8	3.8
Agriculture	0.2	0.3	0.3	2.9	3.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Roads	0.7	0.7	1.0	0.7	1.6	0.7	1.5	1.7
Water	--	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.8	0.1	--	--
Residual, plus all sector	3.9	3.6	3.9	2.2	6.1	4.9	5.0	4.6

Source: PER 2003, MoF and Bank calculations; World Bank 2004 (PRSP I project document)

1.8 As a result of donor investments, Mozambique has reached the Education for All goal of spending 20 percent of total budget revenue on education. Since 2002 primary

³ Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) I for US\$60m (Cr. 3950, P075805; 2005), PRSC II for US\$120m (Cr. 4111, P056201, 2006), and PRSC III for US\$70m (Cr. 4221, P095102; 2007).

⁴ PRSC III. The average percentage of GDP for education in sub-Saharan Africa is 4.0 percent (World Bank 2004, PRSC I, p. 16). In 2000, donor funding accounted for 46 percent of all spending on education, 70 percent in health, and 75 percent in roads and water, including recurrent expenditures such as drugs and road maintenance. (See more information in Table A-5).

education has received more than 50 percent of the education budget, and secondary roughly 14 percent. Furthermore, the government has developed a Strategic Plan for Education and Culture (2006-2011), whose central objective is the rapid progress towards universal primary education by 2015.⁵ To close the financing gap and fulfill this goal, Mozambique will receive funds from the Fast Track Initiative (US\$79 million in 2008-09).

Education Sector Policies Promoted Through Bank Lending

1.9 Lending activities over the years have supported the following policies and strategies:

- Enrollment expansion of primary education (particularly for girls) and consequent emphasis on expansion and rehabilitation of infrastructure;
- Capacity building through scholarships and training – but limited attention to content or quality of training received; no textbook provision for secondary or post-secondary education;
- Automatic promotion within “cycles of learning” (grades 1–2, grades 3–5, and grades 6–7) to reduce grade repetition that averaged about 25 percent.⁶ No specific policies aimed at reducing repetition through improved learning outcomes; and
- Abolition of school fees in 2004 and financial support to schools for operation expenditures.

1.10 Evidence in project documents (see section on Bank performance) suggests that the Bank’s strategy was driven by the implicit assumption that once inputs were provided, teachers would teach and students would learn. Thus, neither the government nor the Bank have monitored the extent to which instruction actually took place (e.g. through attendance data or instruments measuring instructional time use), and the methods of making students literate were not scrutinized. The monitoring indicators have been enrolment statistics (collected once early in the school year) and more recently, completion rates.

1.11 In its efforts to make the population literate while strengthening institutional management, the country has taken a rather unusual route of supporting only the two ends of education. The first two projects did so in order to meet urgent human resource needs, while the third intended to improve senior secondary education outcomes with limited inputs (Table 2.1, Annex Table A3). The documents of the fourth project show an intention to deal with future secondary education needs but this subsector finally received limited attention. Overall, the Bank only financed some buildings rather than learning-related inputs or a strategy for secondary education.⁷ Thus, secondary education is

⁵ Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (World bank 2004b)

⁶ Poverty Assessment (World Bank 2007)

⁷ The region reports that in preparation of the current Technical and Vocational Education Project, extensive consultation was conducted with government and partners on the extent to which support should be extended to general secondary education. However, in the absence of a secondary education policy, the government preferred not to expand the project’s scope. The Bank is currently involved in the development of secondary education policies through a separate technical assistance program.

available mainly in cities, so the candidates for university and other-post secondary institutions tend to come from families that are better off. This tendency may have exacerbated teacher shortages, given the multiple opportunities open to those who are better off and the small number of female graduates. (For example, in 2005, the teacher training colleges were producing only about 1,351 new qualified teachers per year; MEC 2005). The outcomes of the strategy to compress the middle level of education have not yet been dealt with in current lending or donor aid, though efforts were underway in 2008.

2. Project Objectives and Implementation

2.1 The four projects supported the government of Mozambique in its efforts to rehabilitate its economy through improved human capital and to alleviate poverty through education that would enable the population to locate information, understand it, and make appropriate decisions. All four projects aimed at improving physical facilities, the quality of education, and institutional effectiveness (Table 2.1).

2.2 The first three projects were ‘staggered’, and their implementation overlapped from 1993 to 1996. These were executed by a project implementation unit (PIU) that also implemented the projects of other donors. The last completed project was implemented directly by the Ministry of Education.

2.3 The projects had complex designs, involving multiple components and agencies. Execution faced continuous obstacles. Staff turnover in the PIU and a lack of experience with the Bank’s procurement rules and the country’s system of centralized contracting caused startup delays. A lack of coordination between the school and the university components caused duplication and further difficulties. There were political impasses and internal disputes during the third and fourth projects; there were also disputes among donors and the government regarding governance problems and textbook costs, as was the case with Swedish bilateral and the World Food Programme during the second project. In addition, floods and cyclones repeatedly delayed implementation or destroyed infrastructure. Sometimes it was necessary to divert money from quality inputs for the rehabilitation of more buildings (e.g. in the Education Sector Strategic Program project - ESSP).

2.4 The first project essentially closed as scheduled, but the other projects had delays of 24-27 months. Overall, the projects were largely implemented as designed, and most planned activities were carried out (Annex Tables A1-4).

2.5 To assess project effects on the instructional process, the IEG mission visited 12 schools in the Maputo and Nampula provinces,⁸ as well as the Instituto Comercial de

⁸ The schools visited in Maputo were: Estrela do Oriente, 25 de Setembro, escola Annexa to teacher training college, 3 de Fevereiro primary schools; Laulane, secondary school. Schools visited in Nampula were: Namigonha, Meconta district central primary school, Monape district central primary school, Lumbo bilingual primary education program, Muatal secondary school, and Ilha de Mozambique secondary school. Instruction was observed in about 60 classes. In the University Eduardo Mondlane, the mission visited the engineering, sciences, and economics faculties and observed instruction in four classes. The sample was purposive; schools were selected on a convenience basis and some were in rural but not very poor areas.

Maputo, the Eduardo Modlane University, and the Pedagogical University of Nampula. Most visits were planned in advance by the government, and many schools had been informed of the mission's arrival. Classroom instruction was observed to determine how the recent project inputs were used, and segments were videotaped for subsequent study by the mission and counterpart staff. Overall, about 38 government officials and school staff were interviewed regarding project outcomes and impacts. Individual and group interviews were also conducted with donor staff. (See list of persons met in Annex B.)

Table 2.1: Mozambique Education Projects financed by the World Bank

<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Components</i>
Education and Manpower Development Project	
(a) Improving the quality and efficiency of primary education in the City of Maputo	⇒ Expanding and improving school facilities, support of fellowships, in-country training of school managers and principals, providing school supplies, educational materials and equipment, curricular development, preparation of studies (US\$8.1m at appraisal, US\$11.6m actual)
(b) Filling critical manpower gaps (strengthening the quality and relevance of post-secondary training)	⇒ Strengthening training for accountants, office managers, bookkeepers, customs officials, economists and engineers (US\$3.6m at appraisal and actual)
(c) Strengthening educational management and planning	⇒ Improving education sector financial management, planning, and project implementation (US\$3.0m at appraisal, US\$2.8m actual)
Second Education Project	
(a) Improving the quality and efficiency of primary education;	⇒ Primary education quality improvement (training, distance education, civil works, mother tongue instruction; local language instruction, student evaluation, textbooks, book flooding, training demobilized soldiers; school rehabilitation and expansion (US\$28.5m at appraisal, US\$25.2m actual)
(b) Improving the quality and efficiency of the university;	⇒ Addressing critical areas of manpower shortage (university long range planning, physical sciences, engineering; (US\$10.4m at appraisal, US\$11.4m actual)
(c) Strengthening the management of the education sector;	⇒ Improving subsystems managed by MEC (US\$7.9m at appraisal, US\$22.5m actual)
Added during implementation:	
(d) Training demobilized soldiers and improving access to education for girls.	
Capacity Building and Human Resources Development Project	
Building and maintaining capacity in key public institutions and skill areas by:	
(a) increasing the quantity and improving the quality of university graduates;	⇒ University stabilization (US\$25.4m at appraisal, US\$35.8m actual): upgrading and construction of faculty apartments; staff development; institutional linkages to bolster key departments; supply of library materials, textbooks, computers and other teaching materials; enhanced management and accountability; expansion of student dormitories; and general upgrading of university physical facilities and development of a maintenance program.
(b) improving learning achievement in upper secondary education.	⇒ Improvement in upper secondary education (US\$18.1m at appraisal, US\$16.4m actual): accelerated teacher training; curriculum reform; supply of textbooks and teaching aids; school management training; establishment of a scholarship fund for girls; rehabilitation of six existing pre-university secondary schools; construction of staff housing and student residences.
Education Sector Strategic Program (ESSP)	
To provide increased and equitable access to higher quality education through improvement in the management of education in order to promote economic and social development in Mozambique	⇒ Quality of education to improve high repetition and low completion rates (US\$25.8m appraisal, US\$16.9m actual) ⇒ Access to education to increase access and ensure quality (US\$36.4m appraisal, US\$52.2m actual) ⇒ Ministry of Education institutional capacity (US\$8.3m at appraisal, US\$2.7m actual) ⇒ Vocational-technical education strategy US\$0.5m at appraisal, US\$0.4m actual) ⇒ Higher education strategy for expansion and quality improvement (no cost provided)

Source: Technical and legal documentation of respective projects. Total project costs appear in Table 1.1

The ESSP in this document refers to the project financed by the Bank and donors rather a strategic plan for the sector

3. Achievement of the Project Objectives

3.1 This section presents results and evidence regarding efficacy, that is the extent to which project activities and inputs may have contributed to outputs, outcomes, and impacts.⁹ All four projects aimed at improving physical facilities in schools, the quality of education, and institutional effectiveness. The objectives were stated somewhat differently in each project, but for brevity, similar objectives are treated under one heading. Objective-wise ratings are in Table 2.1 and Table A5.

Expansion of access and improved physical infrastructure

3.2 The projects built a large number of schools and staff houses in the country as well as laboratories and classroom buildings in the Eduardo Mondlane University. The first and second education projects built or rehabilitated about 2150 classrooms, while the third (Capacity Building) project built one secondary school and rehabilitated four. The fourth, ESSP, was expected to build 12,000 classrooms but fell far short of its targets due to intergovernmental disputes (Annex Tables A1-4).

3.3 All projects experienced difficulties with civil works. Few contractors were available and some of them built poor-quality buildings (e.g. during the Capacity Building project) and greatly delayed or abandoned civil works, particularly in rural areas. Because contractors had limited ability to build rural schools, efforts were made to involve communities. Communities could erect in a few months buildings made of thatched roofs and sun-baked bricks, but lacked the capacity to build solid buildings or provide windows, doors, and furniture. For example, only 17 of the 55 schools planned through a food-for-work program by the World Food Programme could be completed. During all projects the Bank emphasized maintenance capacity, but the effort was not sustained and the IEG mission observed that buildings were poorly maintained.


3.4 As a result of Bank and other donor financing, the number of public schools in grades 1-5 rose from about 3,556 to 10,217 between 1992 and 2005.¹⁰ Rural schools increased by about 88 percent over the period, while urban schools increased by 32 percent (Figure 3.1).¹¹ Infrastructure improvements have not kept up with surging demand, especially in underserved areas. The schools that were built quickly filled up, operating at least two shifts. Many operate in three shifts and some in Maputo operate in four.

⁹ Where clear data are unavailable for evidence, the degree of plausible association is discussed, based on a line of reasoning.


¹⁰ MEC 2006

¹¹ World Bank 2007

Figure 3.1: Number of Primary Schools in Urban and Rural Areas, 1996-2005



3.5 As a result of the infrastructure provision and teacher appointments, enrolments increased dramatically, and abolition of fees in 2004 further stimulated enrolment at all levels. In absolute terms, the number of students in primary school increased from 1.26 million in 1986 to 3.87 million in 2005 (Figure 3.2). From 1992 to 2005, the gross enrolment rate (GER) in grades 1-5 increased from about 60 to about 103 percent, and for grade 1 enrolments were 131 percent (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.2).¹² In upper primary grades 6-7, the gross enrolment rate increased from 13 to 47 percent in the same period. Construction of upper secondary schools (by the Capacity Building project and ESSP) led to enrolments of about 12,000 students by 2000 and about 25,000 by 2005 (Table 3.2).



3.6 Though the student numbers show dramatic improvements, they are still very low. There is a large difference between gross and net enrolment rates because children start primary school late and often repeat classes (Tables A-6 to A-9). As a result, students are about four years overage. Due to the extensive dropout and failure (Table 3.2, see

¹² The series attempts to capture enrollment before, during, and after the projects ended. The enrollment ratios reported in various documents at various dates differ significantly, and their accuracy is unclear given a lack of updated census data. This report presents figures from various sources that seem most consistent. Since student ages are often uncertain, it reports mainly gross rather than net enrollment figures. The ESSP ICR reports gross enrollment rate of 86 percent for 2003, but just one or two years later, various reports show rates of 103 percent or higher (e.g. the PRSC project documents and the 2004 Poverty and Social Impact Analysis). The higher figures are inconsistent with earlier estimates.

subsequent sections), only about 58 percent of Mozambique's children are finishing five grades of school.¹³

Table 3.1: Student Statistics for the Academic Year 2005

Grades	Number of Schools	Enrolled on March 3			Passed (%)	Dropout (%)	Gross Completion Rate	
		All Students	% Female	Graduates			All Students	% Female
1-5	8,701	3,392,494	46.3	284,545	84	7.9	58	49.5
6-7	1,325	448,838	40.9	161,891	80.9	8.4	33.7	27.2
8-10	156	206,461	41.3	29,328	63.4	6.6	7.4	5.4
11-12	35	25,737	37.8	4,931	67.3	6.9	1.4	0.9
Night Students		202,729	43.0	41,706	55	16.7		
Total	10,217	4,276,259						


Source: MEC statistical yearbook

3.7 Increasing female participation. Starting with the second project (which had an explicit gender objective), efforts were made to improve girls' enrolments through community awareness campaigns and scholarships. However, only a total of about 1,670 girls got scholarships (Annex Tables A-3 and A-4). The government reduced scholarship amounts from US\$50 to US\$15 per month and gave some scholarships to boys, but ultimately the banking network was too limited for a broad use of this scheme. Overall, few initiatives for girls were implemented, and they had a limited effect. Female participation has increased to some extent, particularly in grades 1-5, from 41.2 percent in 1999 to about 46 percent in 2005. Overall girls' participation in upper primary and lower secondary remained constant from 1994 to 2001.¹⁴ Though enrolments tripled in upper secondary education (from 1271 in 1994 to 4301 in 2001), the female participation rate during the same period stagnated (from 25.8 percent in 1994 to 26.4 percent in 2001), and few girls graduate. The gender gap is greatest in the north, while it has nearly disappeared in the south. Girls start school later than boys and drop out earlier, so they get very little education (Figure 3.4). Sexual harassment and teachers' demands for fees may adversely affect female school attendance.¹⁵

¹³ MEC statistical yearbook, 2006


¹⁴ ESSP Implementation Completion Report (World Bank 2005) and Capacity Building Project ICR (World Bank 2002).

¹⁵ World Bank 2005

Figure 3.4: Enrollment of Boys and Girls by Age, 2003

Source: IAF 2002/3 (Family Life Survey, World Bank 2007)

3.8 Growing demand has resulted in classes that are very crowded, at least at the beginning of the school year. Student-teacher ratios in grades 1-5 increased from 54 in 1992 to 74 in 2005 (Figure 3.5). Although more teachers have been hired, the ratio is still very high in the northern provinces, where the poverty rate is highest, although it is falling in the southern provinces.¹⁶

Figure 3.5: Pupil-Teacher Ratios in Grades 1-5, Rural and Urban Areas, 1996-2005

Source: MEC database (World Bank 2007)

3.9 Enrolments have substantially increased at the Eduardo Mondlane University which is the largest higher education institution in the country. They had risen to about 6,800 by 1999, and new admissions doubled from about 1,000 in 1992 to 2,155 in 1999.¹⁷ As dormitory space increased, the number of live-in students rose from 696 in 1994 to 1,063 in 2001 (Female live-in students increased only from 107 to 141 because only one of the dormitories planned for girls was built.) The numbers of students enrolled in public and private universities have continued to rise and stood at about 30,000 in 2006.

3.10 *Nonformal education.* The second education project financed vocational training for about 2,183 demobilized soldiers (Figure 3.10), while ESSP financed the provision of adult literacy. However, the ESSP documents had no targets or details about the adult literacy program, which in 2005 was reaching 375,939 adults.¹⁸ The program has received technical assistance from Cuba that also helped launch innovative radio component.

¹⁶ World Bank 2007

¹⁷ Higher Education Project PAD, 2002 . The Eduardo Mondlane University has provided about 75 percent of higher education places, 25 percent for women.

¹⁸ MEC 2006

However, the IEG mission observed very poor reading performance among second-year students.

Improved Quality of Education

3.11 The projects financed many inputs and activities aimed at improving quality of education at all levels:

3.12 *Curriculum development.* The projects supported curriculum development for all levels of education including technical assistance and fellowships for university curricula. Primary school curricula were repeatedly revised, and new textbooks were produced with each revision. Revisions were seen as necessary partly because time wastage and poor learning outcomes led to the conclusion that the curriculum was too demanding.¹⁹

3.13 *Textbooks.* The projects supported the provision of free textbooks for every primary-school student. (No textbooks were planned for post-primary education, except for libraries of schools or universities.) The projects procured at least nine million textbooks, partly financed with bilateral funds (Annex Tables A1-A4). Textbook provision was a difficult task, given the limited printing capacity in Mozambique. During the first and second projects they were imported from India, and disputes ensued between donors and providers over quality of binding and high cost. Distribution proved difficult given the poor transportation network, and contractors sometimes preferred to abandon the books destined for inaccessible sites. During ESSP, procurement and distribution of books to districts was decentralized. Up to about 2003, about half the students lacked textbooks, but the distribution system has since improved. The IEG mission found that most students in the schools that were visited did have textbooks, although many could not read them and (as noted in the Capacity Building project ICR) teachers hardly used them. Local printing capacity has also improved, but costs remain twice as high as book costs in countries like India and Malaysia.

3.14 *Mother tongue instruction.* In 1986, only 1 percent of the population were native Portuguese speakers, and about 25 percent of the population were conversant in Portuguese. A mother-tongue pilot in two languages was introduced in the early 1990s through the second project, and another pilot was done during ESSP. Though results were encouraging, 15 years after the first pilot there were only 63 schools teaching in native languages. One problem has been the challenge of writing books in 11 rarely written languages and training teachers to use them. Books in local languages have particularly high costs, given the limited printing amounts, and the existing programs have faced scarcity.


3.15 *Health and nutrition activities.* The second project introduced various health initiatives, such as deworming, vitamin A, and iron supplementation (administered by a local non-governmental organization). Snacks were also given in some schools up to 1992. The efforts did not prove sustainable in the long term, but deworming has become a country-wide program that is carried out every year.

¹⁹ E.g. Luoma et al. 2001, p. 36.

3.16 *Teacher training.* All projects built or strengthened training colleges for primary- and secondary-school teachers. In-service and pre-service training was provided to many untrained teachers and administrators who were hired to help expand the system (Annex Tables A1-4). As a result, the number of teachers who are considered trained increased, although their proportion decreased as enrolments increased (Figure 3.6; nationwide, the absolute number of qualified teachers for senior secondary schools increased from 140 in 1996 to just 368 in 2001.) Completion documents describe training as weak and lacking a focus or strategy, but project files show little concern with content. During ESSP, the two-year pre-service training (after 10 years of schooling) was reduced to one, with little discussion about what educators should know or how their classroom behavior should be most efficiently modified. The skills that teachers acquired during the various training events was never tested.

3.17 The IEG mission examined the materials of the Instituto de Educação Aberta e a Distancia (IEDA) that are used to train and promote teachers through distance education. The modules contained little factual information and had several mistakes. Furthermore, they made no mention of issues that are critical in effective instruction: time to be spent on various topics, textbook use, students' literacy, classroom management, assessing students' comprehension from oral responses, or making and controlling groups in large classes. In May 2007 there were 10,294 teachers registered in the basic course, and 7,231 had recently graduated. However, due to quality concerns, it is difficult to consider graduates of these courses as 'trained' teachers.

Figure 3.6: Total Number of Teachers and Proportion of Trained Teachers in grades 1-5, 1996-2005



Source: MEC database (World Bank 2007)

3.18 *Zones of pedagogical influence.* The projects also tried to group schools in a given area and put one administrator in charge of the group. Centrally located schools also have received resource materials. This grouping strategy has had limited results thus far, partly because directors do not have a means of transport to various schools. Only 15 percent of teachers reported using the resource materials located in the central schools.²⁰

3.19 *Testing and Examinations.* The National Institute of Educational Development (INDE) tested grades 2-5 in three provinces in 1998-2000.²¹ The tests were administered for research rather than monitoring purposes to a small sample and did not track long-term outcomes. Unfortunately, the projects did not provide any support for the high-

²⁰ Passos et al. 2005, p. 83

²¹ Sample-based assessments started in 1994 with a sample of about 82 students in math (Luoma et al. 2001, Assis et al. 1999). Test scores cannot be efficiently summarized and are not presented in this report.

stakes examinations that are conducted at the end of grades 5, 7, 10, and 12. These all-important examinations are created in the Ministry of Education but scored in schools, which only transmit to the Ministry the percentage of students obtaining school completion certificates. (The examination results contribute only 33 percent towards the decision to promote students.) These percentages are the closest approximation on the monitoring of learning outcomes. However, there are concerns with regard to shifting evaluation criteria and corruption in obtaining diplomas (see next section).

3.20 Mission visits to schools. Despite the many quality-oriented inputs from the projects, Mozambican schools provide very few opportunities for learning. During visits to schools, the IEG mission observed the following:

- Mozambican schools in principle operate for 175 days a year; the schools operate about 875 hours for two-shift schools, and 700 hours for three-shift schools.²² Much of the time available for instruction was wasted. In urban schools, many teachers were absent or had come to the school and abandoned the classrooms. The principals and the pedagogical directors (who exist in most schools) were apparently unaware of the number missing or of classroom activities.²³ In one large Maputo school, for example, the director mentioned that of 12 sections only two teachers were absent, but in fact only two sections were found operational. In a large new senior secondary school of Nampula, four of the 15 teachers were absent (three taught science), and the director was unaware of this fact. Students without teachers strolled the grounds noisily disturbing the few classes that were working. One possible reason for the high absenteeism rate is that secondary education teachers in urban areas are very few and work three shifts, while some are still university students. Scarcity combined with modest salaries has resulted in a shortage of qualified personnel in the numbers required;²⁴
- The instructional activity observed in the vast number of classes was *copying*; the teacher wrote on the board or waited for the students to copy. Primary-level students could sketch letters (Figure 3.7) but were unable to read what they had copied. In secondary schools and in teacher training colleges, copying was supplemented by word-for-word dictation of texts, since students get no textbooks. For example, when asked to explain plant reproduction that they had just copied (Figure 3.9), 10th graders merely read back the dictated passage. Students in the secondary grades studied Portuguese, mathematics, physics, and chemistry without textbooks. Without

²² The international mean is 850 hours in primary school (see Abadzi 2007). During 2007, over a month was taken up with census registration, during which the schools were closed. Agreement was reached during the appraisal of the second project that the number of hours would increase from 600 hours and this was accomplished (Education II SAR p. 40.) Schools that have two shifts are supposed to have five instructional hours per day, but schools that have three shifts have only four, and there are no provisions to make up for the lost time.



²³ Yet 95 percent of teachers reported in the SACMEQ survey that they receive advice 'often' or sometimes from their directors. (Passos et al. 2005, p. 85).

²⁴ Capacity Building project ICR (World Bank 2002). The mission heard repeated concerns that salaries were too low for teachers to work, but they are over 3.5 times the per capita income. The international research has not found consistent linkages between teacher salaries and absenteeism (the more highly educated or paid teachers are often absent), but has found clear linkages between supervision and absenteeism (Muralidhara and Sundararaman, 2006).

textbooks, reading speed does not rise, so several 10th graders still read only 80-110 words per minute;²⁵ and

- Most students, who were observed, aside from two middle-class schools of Maputo, were unable to read until grade 5, and even at that grade many read haltingly. Some teachers expressed the belief that students knew how to read because they could copy the letters or repeat passages in unison. The grade 1 textbook contributed to this problem, because it was developed using the whole-word approach; it does not teach individual letters or syllables, and introduces calligraphic letters along with standard letter forms. The many students who remained illiterate after whole-word literacy instruction cannot learn from the primary school textbooks that have been provided with much effort and expense.²⁶

Figure 3.7: Grade 1 textbook – Demonstrates assumptions that learner can automatically decompose and quickly memorize complex visual patterns

	
<p>Book introduces connected calligraphic forms and assumes students can derive them from the unconnected printed forms</p>	<p>Child sketching calligraphic letters without knowing their sounds: “a panela” (kettle) “o sapo” (frog)</p>

- Absenteeism or informal dropout among students was high; in one school at the outskirts of Nampula, for example, only about a third of the class was present in grades 3-4 (Figure 3.11). The teachers were observed covering the curriculum, although most of their students could not read or follow. By grade 4, in effect teachers were conducting classes with just the 3-4 brightest students, while others sat uninvolved;²⁷
- District offices in Manpula and Maputo were found to be operational and to collect enrolment data as expected. Directors were informed about civil works needs and other logistical issues concerning their schools. Also, trimester tests and reports were

²⁵ To comprehend text students need a minimum speed (45-60 words per minute) and to comprehend more complex text or scan texts, the reading speed must be higher. The median reading speed of US students in grades 4-6 is 150 words per minute (Hasbrouck and Tindal 2006). Because of working memory limitations, students taking dictation slowly or copying letter-by-letter from the blackboard may be unable to understand what they copy.

²⁶ Research in Kenya has shown no benefits for students who have textbooks but cannot read them (Kremer et al. 2007)

²⁷ This phenomenon of teachers doing ‘triage’ and focusing just on those who can follow has been observed repeatedly (Lockheed and Harris 2005, OED 2005).


received from schools. Paradoxically, the vast majority of students (e.g. 85-96 percent) were found to be progressing ‘positively’ and got passing grades (Figure 3.8). The school and local authorities did not seem to question the evaluation criteria or discrepancy between the high illiteracy rates and the high percentage of passing grades;²⁸ and

- Following these observations, the IEG mission visited a training event for new inspectors in Nampula. The training curriculum consisted of legal and safety issues, school and financial management, and personnel issues. But the curriculum did not include any training for monitoring literacy or improving learning outcomes. The trainer in charge of the event stated that inspectors were already experts in this area, and it was not necessary to train them further.

Figure 3.8: Trimester sheets showing high pass rates for students

Source: district office

Figure 3.9: Student notebook showing the extensive copying necessary for study in grade 10



Source: author

3.21 Evidence for *learning outcomes* in Mozambique is sparse. The following sections present the existing data.

3.22 The sample-based tests given in 1998-2000 showed extensive deficiencies in Portuguese as well as in math, with students showing a limited understanding of concepts like place value of numbers. Higher grades scored better, particularly in science, but the surviving population represented about a third of the students who had started in grade 1. (The scores cannot be efficiently summarized and are not presented in this report.)

3.23 The only performance data available on the schools of Mozambique come from participation in SACMEQ, an international comparative assessment (Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality). In this test, Mozambique performed well compared to other area countries, scoring above the mean of 500 (516 in reading and 530; Annex Table A-10). However, this is a single measure whose results cannot be attributed to the projects. Furthermore, government staff involved in the testing process expressed concerns about sampling bias. The sixth graders who were tested constituted only 25 percent of the cohort that had entered in grade 1, and

²⁸ A study in Pakistan found that teachers who were absent often tended to give passing grades, but their students were less likely to continue, since they lacked knowledge (King et al. 1999).

the frequent absences of poorly performing students made it likely that those who were present on the day of the test were the better performers. (By comparison, countries such as the Seychelles, Mauritius, and South Africa retain and test most students.) Even in self-selected Mozambican sample, only 62 percent reached the SACMEQ minimum level of mastery, and only 8 percent reached the desirable level of mastery. In addition, some comparison countries include very low-income countries using English as a language of instruction, where literacy acquisition is very difficult because of English spelling irregularities.²⁹

3.24 The ESSP had stipulated targets for increasing school completion rates (from 54 to 74 percent in primary and from 58 to 66 percent in secondary). These are determined through tests developed by MEC but scored in schools (see para. 3.19). The targets were nominally met,³⁰ but they had remained stable until the year of project completion. (Similarly in senior secondary education, average examination pass rates improved from 58 to 66 percent, and graduation rates increased from 40 to 54 percent.) The ESSP ICR expressed doubts about the data quality and attainment of targets, since more than half the students lacked textbooks. One potential reason for the increased pass rates was the semi-automatic promotion³¹ instituted in 2004 to reduce the high repetition rate (see para. 1.9). Through this method, the average repetition rate of about 25 percent was reduced by 50 percent between 1998 and 2005. As a result, completion rates have increased over the years (Table 3.2). It is uncertain, however, whether students learn more and perform better or whether teachers promote them more easily.

Table 3.2: Completion rates in primary and secondary education as a percent of the initial cohort

Completion Rate	Grades 1-5	Grades 6-7	Grades 8-10	Grades 11-12
1997	22	7.3	2.0	0.6
2003	48	29	5	1
2005	58	33.7	7.4	1.4

Source: MEC 2006, World Bank 2007, Virtanen and Ehrenpreis 2007

3.25 Though data are sparse, the very limited education offered in schools coupled with a semi-automatic promotion policy suggests that schools *allow a number of students to graduate from primary school functionally illiterate*. Those students may aspire to enter secondary and higher education but are unprepared to study the subject matter. The effect reverberates through the school years. Many secondary school graduates have too little knowledge to perform at the university. This has been noted since the first project,³² and efforts were made to improve the performance of incoming students with remedial

²⁹ The difference between high and low socioeconomic status Mozambican students was limited, 523 vs. 511 points in reading and 533 vs. 528 points in math. Teachers were also tested, who scored rather satisfactorily, 716 points in reading and 782 points in math (Passos et al. 2005).

³⁰ Key indicators of Education II ICR, p. 19. In 2000 the pass rate rose to 67 percent and remained stable until 2005 when it rose to 75 percent attaining the target (ESSP ICR, p. 10).

³¹ According to the ESSP project appraisal document (Annex 2 p. 3) these “strategies will allow for longer periods for children to absorb material”. The line of reasoning for this assumption was not apparent.


³² Staff Appraisal Report: Mozambique: Education and Manpower Development Project. 1988, Report no. 1907-MOZ (p. 6).

classes. However, professors reported to the IEG mission their frustrations and difficulties in dealing with poorly qualified students, who pass entrance examinations but lack sufficient knowledge to deal with freshmen courses. The teacher training center in Nampula also reported the same difficulty.

3.26 Paradoxically a survey has shown that the population is relatively satisfied with the current provision of education.³³ About two-thirds of urban households—but only half of those in rural areas—perceived an improvement in education over 2001–06. Two thirds of those who did cited expansion of the school network as the chief reason for the perceived improvement. Actually, in rural areas almost a quarter of households perceive that conditions have worsened, and female-headed households in rural areas express the most dissatisfaction. The dissatisfaction was due to a need for bribes and distance from schools. While better-off households in urban areas express more satisfaction, the poorest households in rural areas complain the least about recent developments.

3.27 At the Eduardo Mondlane University, graduation rates have steadily increased. Partly through fellowships and staff development during the Capacity Building project, the percentage of Mozambican staff with graduate degrees rose from 17 percent in 1992 to 46 percent in 1999. Students' examination pass rates improved from 39 percent in 1994 to 53 percent in 2000, the number of graduates rose from 148 in 1994 to 695 in 2000, and the percentage of graduates who completed degree requirements during the prescribed time increased from 5 percent in 1997 to 53 percent in 2000. However, the limited performance of entering students continues to be a problem.

Figure 3.10: Demobilized soldiers building a school (Education II project)



Source: Instituto Nacional de Emprego e Formação Profissional

Figure 3.11: 19 4th grade survivors in a class of 45



Source: author

Strengthening management capacity

3.28 The projects provided much training and technical assistance to develop a management information system and to obtain and update educational data. Also, studies were financed to help MEC and the university plan for systemic expansion. Donor aid and government commitment have resulted in a functional administrative system of

³³ Poverty and Vulnerability Survey of 2006 (World Bank 2007). However, residents have a very limited frame of reference. This phenomenon has been shown to exist among residents of some areas in Brazil where schools are known to perform poorly (Abadzi 2007).

schools. Overall, capacity has increased, and institutional change has brought about education studies and strategies, curricular development, girls' education, and support for advanced degrees. Pedagogical directors, supervisors, and inspectors have been appointed and some are well qualified. However, they rarely monitor instruction in schools at this time and are not accountable for learning outcomes. And when they do write monitoring reports, it is unclear who (if anyone) reads them and what actions are taken. The supervision chain is broken, and MEC managers do not receive reliable feedback on quality.

3.29 With fellowships and technical assistance, the projects have been more successful at building capacity at the levels of various institutions, but less so at the MEC organizational level. The attempts to improve the MEC financial management had modest results. Since about 2006, MEC has started to use an integrated financial management system (SISTAFE) with aid from the budget support projects³⁴ but outcomes are unknown.

3.30 There is evidence that the system could deliver better education if it were specifically asked to do so. The IEG mission observed data entry for enrolments and trimester grades in district offices of Nampula and Maputo. Staff mentioned to the mission that the Ministry and the university have gained a lot in management capacity since development started during the first education project. Nevertheless, efforts to decentralize management to the district level under ESSP have not been successful; district staff are prepared to provide material inputs but lack the capacity to make systemic decisions about quality of education in their areas. Given the limited interest shown in learning outcomes at the district level, decentralization may be limited to issues for which local staff have skills, such as school construction and maintenance.

3.31 . *Direct support to schools.* After tuition fees were abolished in 2004, schools received grants to replace the loss of income. The amount in 2004 was approximately \$0.50 per term per primary student and was calculated on the basis of school enrolments (as reported once early in the academic year). The funds are to be used for non-salary expenses, including purchasing essential teaching and learning materials and repairing school buildings. School committees, the director, and district staff are authorized sign to cash the checks provided by MEC, and then the essential supplies can be purchased. For financial control, half the schools are audited every six months.

3.32 The grants have been well received, and the mechanism has achieved some positive outcomes.³⁵ However, the annual amount is too little for the smaller schools, and directors may not manage it well. Since enrolment is the criterion, enrolments could be inflated. Community involvement has been weak, and communities may be ineffective at stopping small-time corruption. However, the mechanism is new and is expected to evolve as the time passes.

³⁴ PRSC I, II project documents

³⁵ Ayako 2006

4. Ratings

Project Outcomes

4.1 The objectives of the four projects were *highly relevant* at the time of appraisal and have remained relevant for the country's development goals. The first and second education projects were largely post-conflict reconstruction operations and built much-needed infrastructure. Learning outcomes were to be achieved through access that was at the time very limited. The projects were designed to deliver inputs efficiently, and though impact expectations were unclear, the input-oriented design was common in that period of time and appropriate. The third (Capacity Building) project was closely linked to the Country Strategy Paper and the Social and Economic Rehabilitation Program of 1991. (Its design, involving multiple committees and two independent institutions, appeared relevant at the time but proved hard to implement; see Bank performance.) Similarly, the objectives and design of the ESSP were in line with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Mozambique, which emphasized the expansion of human capital and with the 1990 Paris Declaration, which mandated donor partnerships and streamlined coordination of aid. The Action plan for the reduction of Absolute poverty (PARPA 2001-2005) has continued to support the objectives of expanded and equitable access. However, the complex SWAp design of the ESSP may have modest relevance when learning outcomes are very low.

4.2 The *first and second education* projects largely aimed to improve quality by rehabilitating the prerequisite infrastructure and providing materials and inputs to expand enrolments in schools, university faculties, and post-secondary institutions. Despite difficulties, and a lack of management capacity in Mozambique, the inputs were delivered relatively *efficiently*.³⁶ *Efficacy* was substantial for the second project but only modest for the first due to the lack of evidence of improved learning outcomes and modest performance in filling manpower gaps (see Table A-5). Enrolments increased dramatically and targets were met, although learning outcomes in that period are uncertain. Nevertheless, relevance for both projects was high and efficiency substantial, so their *outcomes are rated satisfactory*. The *Capacity Building project* was high in relevance of objectives but modest in terms of design relevance, efficacy, and efficiency; it succeeded in increasing the quantity and quality of university graduates by providing civil works, fellowships for professors, and support for university publications. However it failed to improve the learning achievement of senior secondary education, and many of the activities directed towards that objective (including increased enrolments for girls) were not carried out. Its outcome is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

4.3 Through a sector-wide approach, ESSP brought together multiple donors in a rather complex financing scheme. This was an important donor harmonization achievement, but design and outcomes were less impressive. The project aimed to "improve access to higher-quality education through improved management" (Table 2.1). This was an overly ambitious and complex objective that could not be attained

³⁶ Project documents and mission information offered limited evidence with respect to efficiency. It was difficult to assess clearly whether inputs were provided efficiently, given limited alternatives and the economic condition of the country. Rates of return were provided in some project documents, but their rationale was unclear, and savings as a result of repetition reduction did not take into account the mission finding of widespread illiteracy.

efficiently. Few activities actually aimed at improving management; to the contrary, financing was diverted from quality inputs into civil works. And while most “hardware” activities were completed, activities for girls’ scholarships and for special education were not implemented. Little attention was given to adult literacy and secondary education, as well as to instructional issues at any level. Reductions in repetition rates were attained through semi-automatic promotion rather than improved learning outcomes. This promotion policy risks creating cohorts of students who graduate without literacy or other skills associated with schooling and for whom education funds have essentially been wasted. Not coincidentally perhaps, primary-school pass rates increased across the board on the year that ESSP ended, but the improvements were difficult to explain. Overall relevance was substantial, but efficacy and efficiency were modest. For these reasons, project outcome is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

Risk to Development Outcome

4.4 Overall, the risk that the development outcome will not be maintained is rated low for the first and second education projects, since their infrastructural inputs continue to be used. It is rated *moderate* in the Capacity Building project; although the inputs to the university are likely to be sustained, capacity in higher secondary education is precarious given the large deficiencies in materials and teaching staff, and instructional time.

4.5 For the ESSP, the risk to development outcome is also rated moderate; it is unclear how much knowledge students obtain through the educational system and how much they will retain later and use for decision-making. Furthermore, it is unknown how sustainable enrolments are when students drop out without obtaining the expected knowledge from schools. Also, further development of the sector depends on the continued collaboration of multiple donors, which has been quite complex.

Bank Performance

4.6 Bank performance is rated *satisfactory* for the first and second education projects in terms of quality at entry and supervision. The design of the second project was complex, but some of its components were pioneering and perspicacious, and task managers were diligent in pursuing their implementation. In general, the Bank’s diagnostic work has been good at identifying sector development needs and constraints, but less good at assessing and following up on the required organizational change.³⁷

4.7 The Capacity Building project had serious design problems, and an unsatisfactory quality at entry. The Bank did not foresee the difficulties that interministerial councils would have in promoting project activities; it did not sufficiently prepare components such as the girls’ scholarship scheme, despite the highly publicized experiences of the similar lending in Bangladesh. Preparation also failed to pay sufficient attention to the systemic needs of senior secondary education. For example, the project omitted inputs in the Pedagogical University, so the number of qualified senior secondary teachers did not increase substantially over the years and the scarcity contributes to the instructional time wastage observed by the IEG mission. Large cost overruns resulted from poor appraisal

³⁷ OED 2005

cost estimates. Supervision reports show much concern about the political problems created by interministerial conflicts and civil works implementation but show little concern about how students would learn. For example, new senior secondary education curricula were partly developed, but the project did not include textbooks or teacher training. Without the necessary preparation and safeguards, girls' scholarships proved difficult to administer and some were given to boys. For all these reasons, Bank performance is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

4.8 Overall, the Bank failed to pay attention to instructional delivery and to learning outcomes. In particular, the Capacity Building and the ESSP projects made no attempts to form a line of reasoning that would lead from inputs to outcomes. Specific instructional problems and deficiencies were attributed to general economic conditions, poverty, or classroom crowding. Despite concerns in project documents that students were not learning the required material, the Bank equated enrolments with basic skills acquisition and built rate-of-return assumptions on the basis of enrolments.³⁸ The alternative of going to school but remaining illiterate was not examined, and there has been no debate on whether this is an acceptable option compared to not going to school at all. Similarly there has been no economic analysis of the instructional time wastage or the opportunity costs of students who remain illiterate despite years of school attendance.

4.9 Borrower and donor staff interviewed during the PPAR mission repeatedly mentioned the inattentiveness to learning outcomes. One person interviewed felt that the donors had a "gentleman's agreement" with the government, that enrollments would show increases but that learning outcomes would not be studied too closely. Another stated that school enrollments were a "mentira colectiva" (a collective lie) in Mozambique because of limited attendance. It was also felt by some that the Bank was very diligent until projects became effective but less so thereafter.

4.10 The appraisal of the ESSP through a sector-wide approach and donor coordination posed new complexities and difficulties. Much preparation and supervision time was taken up by the logistics of this financing instrument, so important subsectors were not sufficiently financed, and chains of causality were not established. As with the previous project, the girls' scholarship scheme did not benefit from earlier experiences in Mozambique or in other countries. (See para. 4.3 on Outcomes.) A supervision review by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) in 2002 rated supervision satisfactory but considered quality at entry unsatisfactory and criticized the task team for failing to pay attention to content. During supervision missions, field visits were reduced because the government had the role of giving progress updates (a policy which risks a conflict of interest). Thus, the Bank had little fist-hand knowledge about intermediate outcomes and

³⁸ The ESSP ICR estimated that an extra year of education would increase wages by about 3% in the agriculture sector and between 5% and 15% in non-farm work. "Higher labor productivity will result from improved quality of education, and increased number completing schooling. Comparing the proposed program to the without-program situation, it can be shown that an additional 260,000 workers (those graduating from upper primary) will increase their lifetime earnings by 18.5%, and another 15,000 workers will increase their lifetime earnings by 14% (those graduating from lower secondary). Overall, compared to the current enrollment, an estimated 1.4 million primary students and about 560,000 girls will be absorbed into the system between 1999 and 2003 as a direct result of the program." The PRSC I project document maintains this assumption: "Public activities in the social sector have a direct redistributive effect on income and wealth. They also foster the development of human capital, which is a fundamental asset in all spheres of society, with an unlimited demand on the part of individuals and institutions (public and private). Education has an important place in this context, directly impacting on the creation and expansion of human capacities and abilities and contributing decisively to inclusive and broad-based economic growth."

a limited say over activities that were deleted or neglected. Staff worked hard to make this instrument effective, but overall, Bank performance in the ESSP is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

Borrower Performance

4.11 Over the long term, the government has made good use of donor funds. It has shown a sustained commitment to the cause of increasing access in education and has devoted substantial expenditures towards serving poor areas and excluded populations. In its efforts to implement multiple projects at the same time, the government implementation capacity has been stretched to the limit.³⁹

4.12 Government performance fluctuated during various periods. It was relatively strong during the first education project, despite the many difficulties and financial management problems of the era.⁴⁰ Commitment flagged during the second project. The PIU performed satisfactorily, and most planned activities were carried out. However, the PIU interacted mainly with the Bank rather than MEC, and there was a perception that the projects had been conceived by donors. (This is why the Bank supported integration with Ministry activities as government capacity increased.) Overall, borrower performance for these two projects is rated *satisfactory*.

4.13 The Capacity Building project was faced with political issues that impeded implementation, partly due to infighting in the inter-ministerial committee that was overseeing it. The implementing agencies also had serious financial management deficiencies, such as large cost overruns for civil works and pending fellowships at closing without sufficient funds for disbursement. Project staff gave girls' scholarships to boys and allowed persons who were not teachers to live in staff quarters, thus reducing the effectiveness of these measures in expanding senior secondary education. Borrower performance is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

4.14 The ESSP was implemented by MEC departments rather than a PIU, which should have enhanced ownership. Shortly after effectiveness, however, the government changed, and implementation stagnated for the next two years. Subsequently, government personnel and procedures were supportive, and civil works were implemented relatively smoothly despite precarious performance by contractors in the north of the country. Borrower performance is rated *moderately satisfactory*.

Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation, and Utilization

4.15 Monitoring and evaluation designs for all projects are rated **modest**. The first project was appraised before the Bank-wide adoption of monitoring indicators and did

³⁹ In 2006 about 35 percent of the pooled donor funds were not spent, and it is unclear whether more donor funds can be spent effectively.

⁴⁰ Some financial audits were qualified. For example, an audit of the first education project by Ernst and Young of Maputo (dated 6/28/96) showed that funding for furniture exceeded sources without authorization, while some replenishments were made twice to the special account. Other audits found payments that were not reflected in the project accounts or bank statements as well as payments of US\$20,000-47,000 that were not approved by IDA. Project records did not discuss the extent to which the Bank followed up on the issues.

not collect outcome data. The second and third projects collected data on pass rates and enrolments. (Both the first and the second project documents stipulated annual evaluation reports, but none could be located in the files.) Monitoring implementation was modest in all projects. As mentioned above, achievement tests were developed and were administered on a sample basis repeatedly. However, the results were not compared or reported extensively, and there is no evidence that they were used for decision-making. A project completion seminar was held at the end of the Capacity Building Project, but there is no evidence that it influenced the design of the next project or the long-delayed secondary education strategy.

4.16 The project appraisal document of the ESSP outlined an extensive plan for monitoring and evaluation that was implemented to a considerable extent. Ministry of Education units were to develop monitoring instruments relevant to their respective components, and financial monitoring reports were to consolidate statistical, financial and physical data on the rate of implementation. The donor group was to monitor and evaluate their respective components and provide their own reports. However, as is so often the case with monitoring and evaluation, the plan proved too complex, and did not appeal to everyone. Some donor staff stated to the IEG mission that donors should not be involved in quality control, so donor reports were not generated. The Ministry has provided timely and comprehensive financial monitoring reports on the physical progress of the implementation but no field observations or reports on outcomes and component implementation. Learning outcomes are still not being monitored, and without such information, monitoring-related decisions are limited.

4.17 The projects missed opportunities to track learning outcomes across time. The school leaving examination results were not used for monitoring, although it would have been possible to obtain scores and monitor them. An easily obtainable monitoring indicator for learning would be the percentage of students who read fluently (45-60 words per minute minimum) in all grades. One would expect the PRSC to focus on this issue, but PRSCs in Mozambique have no triggers for education and use a single indicator, primary school enrolment.⁴¹ This indicator is of questionable reliability because enrolment statistics pertain to the beginning of the school year (on or about March 3), after which the majority of students in some areas may stop attending. The tendency of PRSC to use oversimplified indicators of little value is an issue that deserves closer attention.

5. Issues and Prospects in Sectoral Strategy

Buying Learning Time for Students through the Fast-Track Initiative

5.1 The government is working hard to overcome the many obstacles it faces and to maximize donor support. This is why Mozambique has submitted an Education Strategic Plan for 2006-2011 to achieve universal primary school coverage and Education for All by the year 2015. The plan was endorsed by the donors and by representatives of

⁴¹ The project document (PRSC III) furthermore confuses enrollment with actual attendance, for which data are not collected at the Ministry level. ("education and health indicator surveys found strong improvements, particularly in the areas of primary school attendance.. over 1996-2003").

Mozambican civil society in June 2006. To deal with the inefficiencies of the system, the country will receive US\$79 million from the Catalytic Fund of the donor-financed Fast-Track Initiative for 2008/2009. This new pledge is additional to US\$70 million in foreign funding already granted and brings the total for the year to US\$105 million. How much learning can this money buy for the students of the country?

5.2 The findings of this report raise concerns that, without changes, this investment may have a limited impact on learning outcomes. Quality improvement is a key priority in the Plan, but instructional improvements and learning outcomes are not sufficiently detailed. Funding ultimately translates into time and opportunities for students to learn. If, for example, only 10 percent of the available time is used for this purpose, then roughly 10 percent of the funding is efficiently used. In the current instructional conditions the donors could be financing a very inefficient system.

5.3 With targeted attention, donor funding could be used to help students catch up and improve use of the officially available instructional time. Some options include the following, starting in the next academic year.

5.4 Conducting a **reading fluency campaign**, whose monitoring indicator would be that all students in 2008 will read at least 60 words per minute by the end of grade 2 and 109 words by the end of grade 5. The campaign could be extended to include 124 words per minute by the end of grade 8, and 150 words per minute by the end of grade 12).⁴² Activities that could be considered:

- Measuring reading fluency and instructional time use throughout primary, secondary, and tertiary education to establish a baseline and to monitor progress;
- Holding teachers, school directors, pedagogical directors, supervisors, inspectors, district directors, and provincial directors accountable for delivering learning outcomes (that may start with reading fluency and basic calculations). Requesting detailed reports regarding the number of fluent readers, and teacher absenteeism up the supervisory chain and *taking action* on the basis of the reports. Inspectors would check to verify how much time is in fact used for learning tasks and how well students read;
- Making the supervisory chain function. Holding meetings at the school, district, province levels to determine and evaluate establish goals, expect outputs, provide feedback on reports up and down the supervision chain. Asking principals and pedagogical directors to supervise closely the teachers of grades 1-2 and ensure that they teach students how to decipher text (not merely to copy letters), and to report results to their superiors;
- Adding extra tutoring for those who have already fallen behind; hiring secondary and post-secondary students to read with lower-grade students after school hours; (the materials may be local newspapers and also the textbooks themselves, since many students cannot read them.) Since schools are crowded, tutoring sessions may be

⁴² These indicators correspond to the 25th percentile of US oral fluency norms (Hasbrouck and Tindal 2006). For the research linking speed to comprehension, see Abadzi (2006).

arranged in the open air, churches, mosques, or other buildings. School-level competitions could be organized on reading and math fluency;

- Giving intrinsic as well as extrinsic incentives (praise and bonuses⁴³) to administrators and teachers including bonuses to teachers in grades 1-3 who make everyone able to read fluently. Conversely, enforcing the regulations and deducting the salaries of the teachers of all levels who fail to show up; and
- Acquiring the materials necessary to teach basic reading efficiently during class. The time left to the beginning of the next school year is short, but the Progresso materials in Portuguese and local languages could be reproduced and distributed, albeit at a higher cost. Teacher training on making students literate would be highly desirable, but merely following the books could enable untrained teachers to carry out the task.

5.5 During the next calendar year, the following actions could be considered:

- Modifying the curricula to specify a daily hour of explicit reading instruction and practice in grades 1-3. Revising the grade 1 book on reading (in Portuguese and in local languages) to add explicit instruction on letter sounds and to omit the calligraphic forms until students are fluent readers (eg. Grade 5); increasing the availability of books in local languages in all schools. (NGO staff report that the local printing industry has sufficient capacity to print books in national languages). Disseminating viable means for teachers to monitor student progress, such as hearing every child read for one minute per day (as practiced in a successful NGO of Bangladesh);
- Revising teacher and administrator training in the institutes and in the distance education mode to reflect the real issues seen in classrooms and research-based solutions to these issues: using instructional time efficiently, managing crowded classes (e.g. through grouping), distributing topics through the school year, teaching phonics and fluency, as well as the rationale for these methods. Videos are a more effective means of demonstrating problems and solutions than the usual lecture- and dictation-based methods. A 3-minute supervision technique could be taught to principals and inspectors;⁴⁴
- Informing communities regarding expected achievements at school through radio and television announcements (e.g. reading fluently by the end of grade 2); and
- Piloting conditional cash transfers to bring girls to school instead of scholarships, since there are now no school fees to pay.

5.6 Thus far, the government has met donor expectations for increasing enrolments and reporting relevant data. If the donors demand more learning, the government may rise to the occasion. To make funds use more efficient, the donors might consider making disbursements conditional on learning improvements.

⁴³ Research suggests that teacher bonuses are effective in raising student achievement (E.g. Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2006, Podgursky and Springer 2007).

⁴⁴ Downey et al. 2004

5.7 The cohort of students progressing through secondary and higher education in the current conditions may not be sufficiently well prepared to teach secondary school. Shortages of qualified teachers may continue for the foreseeable future. To prepare students at all levels better, it may be necessary to import secondary-education teachers as well as higher-education professors. There are many young European or Brazilian graduates with science and math background looking for employment in international education, who may be willing to work in Mozambique for limited salaries on a semi-volunteer basis.

Sector Wide Approaches and Surveillance of Educational Quality

5.8 SWAp arrangements have been viewed as necessary, given the large number of donors involved in education. Overall, the SWAp has been expected to achieve (a) smaller transaction costs for the government while addressing the information needs of the donors as a group, (b) harmonization of procedures and efficient utilization of donor funds to reduce duplication, and (c) attention to the education sector as a whole through large-scale consultations and involvement of multiple agencies and departments. To what extent have these goals been achieved?

5.9 Government officials stated that the SWAp has to some extent reduced transaction costs by obviating the need to deal with donors individually. However, the World Bank, Japan, and some other donors also work outside the SWAp (e.g. in certain provinces), so they require extra government attention, particularly the World Bank. But addressing donor needs formally also has a cost. The government must write a detailed and formal monitoring report every year and make preparations that are time-consuming. Government staff must also attend donor meetings regularly. On an hourly basis, it is unclear which approach consumes more time.

5.10 Coordination has transaction costs for the donors themselves. Many staff have moved to the field and participated in weekly or biweekly meetings. During these meetings disagreements arise, and their resolution may cost staff time. However, the issues are mainly related to financing and disbursements. Some donor staff mentioned to the PPAR mission that the donors concentrate so much on general policies or on financing and procurement complexities that they rarely deal with the substantive issue of ensuring the acquisition of basic skills. Thus, the SWAp process may take precedence over substance.

5.11 In principle, the government must be allowed to implement its policies. However, donors have opinions about government policies, which they make known, sometimes forcefully. Donors have equal voting rights, regardless of the amount they donate. But donor staff are not equally knowledgeable; some are diplomats with limited knowledge about education, particularly in the state-of-the-art neurocognitive research that has implications for the education of the poor. Sometimes they pressure the government to undertake activities that are not conducive to efficient learning for the poor.

5.12 SWAp complexity showcases the dedication and organizational ability of donor staff, but it affects project outcomes. Under project-based lending, a single task manager is ultimately responsible for project design and for the integration of the various components. However, SWAps have wide participation, and there may not be a single

overseer other than a government functionary. For example, the ESSP project had 7 working groups, while the SWAp process had 10 (based on the thematic areas of the strategic plan). Perhaps sub-sectors such as secondary education had poor outcomes in ESSP because they got limited attention. For matters requiring technical expertise, participatory decision-making may not be the most efficient way to bring results.⁴⁵ Therefore, a SWAp in which everyone participates but no single person is accountable may defeat the purposes for which it was intended.

5.13 Supervision of a SWAp involves the same issues. Since the government is in control, the donors no longer supervise project components. It is not strange, therefore, that the limited learning outcomes were not identified in detail, as might have happened during supervision of individual projects. This may also apply to province-level projects that some donors have traditionally financed.

5.14 Mission findings suggest some potential courses of action that could be explored further:

- *Focusing on the substance.* Appointing a quality coordinator among knowledgeable donor staff (or consultants) to review outputs on a regular basis and to see how they are used in schools. One important item would be to obtaining external reviews of materials that the government develops and that donors finance for dissemination (e.g. the distance education modules) and to provide feedback to the relevant government agencies;
- *Increasing accountability among donors.* Making specific knowledgeable donor staff (or consultants) specifically responsible for monitoring various activities and conducting supervision visits on a regular but decentralized basis (i.e. interacting directly with the schools and institutions rather than with the overstretched Ministry staff); collect and evaluate materials have been developed and attend various training events with a view to critically evaluating the quantity and validity of information provided therein.

6. Lessons

6.1 This assessment provides a number of lessons for the education sector:

- Very low-income countries receiving donor aid may succeed in providing broad access to education. But without a critical number of reasonably well educated teachers, interested administrators, and strong instructional supervision, the educational system may provide little learning to the students (para. 3.22);
- Monitoring of learning outcomes is critical in all education projects, particularly where very poor populations are involved. Without clear and monitorable targets, educational systems may enrol and graduate students who lack basic skills;

⁴⁵ White 2007. Psychological research on “diffusion of responsibility” (e.g. Latané and Darley 1976) would predict that donors operating in a large group would have a limited individual initiative.

- It is not safe to assume that local educators alone will be able to produce effective training materials or disseminate effective methods. Transmission of durable knowledge to the poor involves technical issues and research that are relatively new and are little-known among government and donor staff or consultants. State-of-the-art technical assistance is needed to address learning issues (para. 3.17, 3.20);
- Textbooks (or organized printed materials) are needed for all students at all levels to take home. Without textbooks, valuable instructional time tends to be used for copying or word-for-word dictation. Instructional aids must also be provided so as to maximize the amount of information that can be learned by students (para. 3.20);
- Governments are likely to respond to donor priorities and informational requirements. If donors are perceived as focusing mainly on access, governments are less likely to focus on improving learning outcomes (para. 4.16);
- Cross conditionalities among donors may be best managed through sector-wide agreements and plans with partners. However, complex arrangements involving large numbers of donors require much foresight in terms of harmonization and agreement on sectoral strategy. The financing and planning complexities of donor harmonization may detract attention from substance (para. 5.8); and
- Strategies aimed at increasing girls' enrolment require strong government commitment at a high level to be effective. Otherwise, activities may take place but prove unsustainable or ineffective in the long run (para. 3.7).

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Annex A. Implementation of project components

Table A 1: The Education and Manpower Development Project (Cr. 1907)

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes Info on outputs obtained during mission</i>
Raising the quality and efficiency of primary education	Expanding and improving school facilities in Maputo	Construct 14 schools Rehabilitate, expand 11 250 classrooms For 26,000 new students Refurbish about 100 schools	294 classrooms built 300 classrooms refurbished in periurban areas of Maputo Poorly performing contractors, contract delays	Learning objective was defined as provision of access to education It is likely that some students entering school learned basic skills. Project reduced 3 shifts into 2, later increased again as population rose.
	Training school managers and principals in school operation	30 1-week courses for 50 participants 1500 participants	250 principals trained in maintenance, supervision, finance, health, nutrition	Instituto Superior Pedagógico Much training was too theoretical, only partly useful
	Providing children with essential school supplies	Basic kit for 300 classrooms every year	Supplies and learning materials for 300,000 children in 2000 schools	Positive beneficiary assessments reported in ICR
Strengthening the quality and relevance of training for accountants, office managers, bookkeepers, customs officials, economists and engineers		Small library of 50 titles, maps, metric set to each school	Unclear if these were distributed	Impact unknown, if any
	Instituto Comercial de Maputo	Provision of educational materials and equipment: Reference materials Textbooks Microcomputers Software packages Furniture for computer room	Equipment provided only	No real impact on teaching performance Textbooks in the library were locked and not being used
	Curricular development Examinations Textbooks development	10 curricular seminars 72 months of fellowships (6 years)	Delayed, not completed by project end	Curriculum developed in the 2 nd education project
	Fellowships to train local staff and replace foreign teachers	12 staff months 18 months study tours	Not given to the teachers of the Instituto Comercial	No effect
	Management support	Administrative manual	Not implemented	
	Eduardo Modlane U. Faculty of engineering Faculty of economics Provision of civil works, educational materials and equipment	Electronics lab Mechanical workshops Computers Audiovisual equipment Vehicles	Labs and equipment provided	Revenues created by selling testing services to the private sector Practice continues, e.g. studies by the population center, printing office, computer services
Curricular development for faculty of economics Examinations	Library books Computers software TA for 70 staff months	Provided in library only	Curricula updated on repeated occasions	

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes Info on outputs obtained during mission</i>
	Support of fellowships	3 for doctorates	Provided	The vast majority of these and other scholars returned and are teaching
Improving education sector planning and financial management	Technical assistance In-country training in financial planning, budgeting, accounting	Courses for 50 officials Vehicles for planning unit 24 months TA	Innovative seminars and consultations 30 budget officers trained	FUNDAP from São Paolo provided satisfactory consultancy, many recommendations adopted
	Use manpower planning model in cooperation with ILO	12 months TA to project manpower needs in various sectors	DANIDA financed a study completed in 1994	Orientation changed, project resources reallocated
	Preparation of studies	-system financing - mother tongue instruction -sector management School maintenance	3 completed in 1992 (2 merged in one)	Gave input for education II Helped start mother-tongue pilot
	Evaluation studies	4 annual evaluations, final evaluation	Unknown if conducted	Studies could not be located
	Strengthen planning unit (PROFORMA) for procurement	Furniture, materials Accountant services Salaries	Provided The unit worked as a PIU	Despite delays, most work was carried out

Source: Project documents and information obtained during the PPAR mission

Table A 2: Second Education Project (Cr. 2200)

Components/ subcomponents (revised)	Activities	Targets to be achieved	Outputs	<i>Outcomes Info on outputs obtained during mission</i>
Quality and efficiency improvement of primary education Quality and efficiency improvement of university	Pre-service teacher training for primary and lower secondary	80 teacher trainers trained in Portuguese and math methods 160 instructors in other courses Curricula developed Audiovisual equipment Vehicles	Inputs provided 240 teacher trainers trained at the Matola training institute	Trainers formed the nucleus of subsequent training efforts Audiovisual equipment still in use at the Matola institute
	In-service teacher training.	Upgrade all unqualified primary teachers with 6 years of education; 600 through 1-year self-instruction courses, 3 short residence courses	Over 600 teachers got short-term training	Training effectiveness was not evaluated
	Pedagogical support to teachers	Reinstate pedagogical zones Cascade training for 44 provincial staff to train directors in 300 schools	158 staff trained Materials provided, but support to teachers was limited	Impact on quality of instruction limited
	Distance education for teacher training	Train specialists in distance education Develop materials Train 3000 teachers with grade 4-5 education Program of radio and correspondence Evaluate impact	3000 teachers enrolled every year, over 15,000 enrolled Radio use was canceled	Teachers were promoted upon course completion Highly successful participation, government continues to use this mode. PPAR mission found poor-quality modules Evaluation not located Quality and learning unknown
	School rehabilitation and expansion Primary and secondary schools in Maputo, Beira, Dondo, Nascala	Rehab 763 classrooms Construct 97 existing Expand 11 primary schools (53 classrooms) Build 19 new schools Globes, maps, metric set Repair 125 classes in 6 secondary schools	Construction delays, some problem contractors Sanitary facilities rehabilitated 1550 classrooms in 410 schools built and rehabilitated	Schools rehabilitated to above prewar levels Communities could not finish schools High costs, US\$48,000 for urban and US\$27,000 for rural schools
	Local language instruction	Teach and test in 2 languages Train teachers Study tours in neighboring countries 60 teachers trained	Pilot for about 357 students in Gaza and Tete provinces Teacher training 12 booklets published	357 children participated but performed no better in language and math than Portuguese language students, but transition rate was 70% compared to 50% of others
	Participation in international student achievement tests	In 1992 and 1994 First local test to be done in 1990 Staff training	In 1994 math and science testing for 8 and 13 year olds (Swedish aid)	Findings illustrated innate use of math functions; not used for further monitoring
	Book flood pilot	250 books per class in 3 cities and 34 districts	50,000 books were distributed to grades 4-5 Some cost US\$6.5 each	Students not tested Effect and sustainability unknown
	Testing extramural programs	Reading and art in open air spaces	Not implemented	
	Testing student health interventions	Tests for worms and anemia Deworming and iron supplies All urban schools in 3 cities and participating districts Studies	1614 students in 3 provinces got iron and micronutrients Coordinated latrine rehabilitation program	Pilot successfully implemented through a national NGO Government eventually expanded deworming as a national program, but iron use was not expanded

Components/ subcomponents (revised)	Activities	Targets to be achieved	Outputs	<i>Outcomes Info on outputs obtained during mission</i>
	Girls' activities Added during project	Books with women in roles of wisdom and leadership. Adjustments in the schedule of initiation rites and timing of marriages; potential rewards for those sending girls to school	Seminar on girls' education A study on promotion of girls' education in 1996.	Reduced activities, limited impact Activities led to further planning in subsequent projects
	Textbooks	Activity added during project	4.35 million distributed Grade 1-2 books through Caixa Excolar, grades 2-7 through the project	Textbooks distributed mainly in larger areas, limited distribution in remote areas Govt prepared textbook policy that eventually became sustainable
	Technical training for employment of demobilized soldiers	National Institute of Employment and Professional Training (Added during project)	trained 2130 persons in Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Sofala, Nampula	Survey conducted, 2130 reintegrated
	Development of strategic management capacity	Studies on registration, computerization, manpower development plan	Limited activities, only up to 1992 Continued with higher education project	Poor coordination with MEC, university activities were conducted as a separate project
	Support to physical sciences (science, math, biology)	Provide facilities Books, materials (staff support from other donors)	Facilities built for the natural science faculty	Buildings in fair condition and continued use
	Continuing support in engineering	Expand laboratories in thermodynamics, electrical engineering, machines TA and short-term scholarships	Inputs delivered	Laboratories in continued use
	Continuing support in economics	Furniture, minivan Books, software 3 doctoral fellowships	Inputs delivered	Through various donors and projects, about 21 instructors got advanced degrees. Most returned
Strengthening sectoral management	MEC planning, financial monitoring, control	Improve working conditions, data use Courses for 45 participants from central and province areas (UNDP offered financial training)	Computerized budgeting developed, but contract for completion was not extended, and program could not be used	Subsequent programs were supposed to be used
	Studies	High unit costs Unit costs of boarding and alternatives Public expenditures and impact Existing staff inventory Textbooks	4 completed, 1 canceled	Govt launched 10-year sector development plan And education sector strategic program
	Capacity to deal with reconstruction needs	New national school construction unit in MEC School mapping Rural reconstruction pilot US\$100 per sm	Capacity inadequate for rural school construction Only 17 of 55 schools built (with food for work under the World Food Program)	Dispute delayed disbursements Communities could not provide doors, windows, furniture
	Strengthen provincial and municipal school maintenance units	Expand school maintenance to Beira, Dondo, Nascala, about 2600 classrooms	Maintenance units set up In Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane, Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Sofala by PIU, MEC did not participate	No provision for maintenance budget There is no regular school maintenance
	Support efficient project management	Vehicles Study trips	Vehicles obtained Consultants hired	MEC capacity did not improve

Source: Project documents and information obtained during the PPAR mission

Table A 3: Capacity Building Human Resources Development Project (Cr. 2436)

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes Info obtained during mission</i>
Eduardo Modlane University stabilization US\$30 million)				Graduates increased from 145 in 1994 to 605 in 2000
	Textbooks, study materials, acquisitions		Provided for the library only	Examination pass rate improved from 30% in 1994 to 53% in 2000
	Local textbook publications		Some undertaken University press established	University press functional, some treatises published
	Library space	Expansion of reading space		Reading space used by students
	Curriculum studies		2 reforms through the years of Bank support	Unclear how these have changed learning outcomes
	Computer training program			Inputs and outcomes unclear
	Apartments for staff	92	189 built by other donors	Reportedly used appropriately
	Housing units renovation	108?	108 built by other donors	Reportedly used appropriately
	Staff development and retention through graduate training abroad	Target 32% staff with advanced degrees	128 fellowships were granted, several donors supported initiative	Full time staff with advanced degrees increased from 17% in 1992 to 46% in 1999.
	Student residences	7 needed (2 by SIDA, 3 by USAID)	6 buildings rehabilitated for 717 students 176 beds for girls only	Space for girls was insufficient
	Rehabilitation of university physical plant		Selective rehabilitation	Buildings are in reasonable condition
	Accountability and management	Technical assistance	24 courses 1993 participants	Effects could not be verified
	Flexible fund for contact with other universities	US\$3 million for travel, communications, research	Funds disbursed	Reportedly spent for attendance at conferences and to produce publications
	Technical studies	Study of poor academic performance causes, particularly among women	Study conducted but could not be located	Low reading skills and lack of textbooks in school years are one likely reasons for failure
	Study to initiate distance education		Distance education to start with 250 students in 2008	
	Increasing autonomy Costs and benefits to move offices		Increased autonomy in terms of getting government financial support in a lump sum rather than monthly	
		Did capacity building sector study Did policy framework paper	Used as basis for the higher education project	
Upper secondary education improvement (US\$18.1 million)				There were 5 schools in 1992, 23 in 2001
	New curriculum		Partly developed	Effects unclear without textbooks and teacher training
	Examination system			"It was felt that examinations questions have improved" (ICR p. 9)
	Textbook availability and learning materials		8140 textbooks and 130 encyclopedias	Book use among students is very limited No book production, costs prohibitive
	School rehabilitation	6	Rehabilitation of 4 Construction of 1 emergency rehabilitation after cyclones in 2000	1 rehabilitated under Education II project schools are being used
	Dormitories for boys and girls	Rehabilitate 4 dorms Build 1 dorm	2 completed 3 canceled due to costs, ownership	455 students in Quelimane and 256 in Xai Xai
	Staff housing		Constructed in some schools	Some were occupied by technical or university teaching staff rather than teachers, while housing scarcity made it hard to recruit teachers.

Components/ subcomponents	Activities	Targets to be achieved	Outputs	Outcomes info obtained during mission
	Scholarships for girls	280 of \$50 monthly in 4 schools Target expanded	1158 students, stipend reduced to \$15 monthly to expand coverage Boys and non-poor students were included. Banking network limited, bureaucratic problems	70 girls in 1994, 335 in 2000. Effect on girls' attendance unknown, but numbers were too small to make a difference nationally
	Community awareness programs		Specifics unknown	No effect likely
	Increasing number of female teachers		None hired % Female teachers dropped from 16% to 6% between 1994 and 2001	Girls' percentage has remained stagnant at 26%
	Staff training		25 school directors	Training effects unknown

Source: Project documents and information obtained during the PPAR mission

Table A 4: Education Sector Strategic Program (Cr. 3172)

Components/ subcomponents	Activities	Targets to be achieved	Outputs	Outcomes Info obtained during mission
Main monitoring Indicators	Increased proportion of students passing key primary and lower secondary examinations:	Grade 5 54%-74% Grade 7 37%-60% Grade 10 33%- 55%	In 2000 2005 67% 75% 53% 75% 45% 60%	Data unreliable, objective not considered attained 48% complete lower primary 29% complete upper primary 5% complete lower secondary
Beneficiaries 10,000 schools, 3.4 million students, 60,000 teachers	Reduce repetition rates for primary and lower secondary levels	50% reduction in repetition rate	EP1: 24% in 1999, 11% in 2005. EP2 12%-> 6% ESG1 25%-> 19% ESG2 12%-8%	Reduction was achieved through establishment of semi-automatic promotion rather than improved performance
	Increase gross enrollment rates	Grade 1-5 67%-86% Grades 6-7 5%-30%	131%, NER 50%->83% 47%, NER 2.5->6.7% EP1: 2 m students in 1999, 3.4m in 2005 EP2: 186,000->450,000	Still very few students continue to grade 5
	Increase enrollments in districts where classrooms are build	75% increase in schools (75% of the new capacity created.)	Achieved	Enrollment increase does not guarantee skills acquisition
Quality of education	Annual program work executed by physical targets, budget spent, routine activities	80%	Not achieved in the first 3 years Exceeded 80% in later years	Most planned activities were completed
	Construction of teacher training institutes	5	5 constructed by other donors (AfDB, Japan), one teacher training institute, rehabilitated continuing education centers World Bank built housing	Centers functional
	Upgrading unqualified teachers, partly through distance education	15,000	18464 pre-service and upgrading teachers 17,680 in-service	Many modules unsuitable for teacher training, unclear what the students actually learn to do
	Hire and train new teachers from grade 10 10+1+1 program	8,500	8,563 (includes above)	Program in early implementation stage, results unknown
	Pedagogical support for teachers	Enhance and revitalize 75% (840) zones of pedagogical influence	ZIP plan completed in 2001 Materials given but no full-time staff , no accountability	Little expansion due to a lack of a legal framework, incentives
	Curriculum transformation	Integrate grades 1-7, materials across grades Cultural sensitivity	Successful development but curriculum developed for 5 hours a day, not for 3-4 shifts	Unclear if new curricula were needed instead of some revisions and new textbooks
	Improve book distribution Develop commercial publications	Supply about 43 million textbooks and other materials	Target number not achieved Textbooks ordered every 3 years, but ½ the students at the end of the project did not have textbooks	After many efforts, books being distributed to more remote areas; but since many students are illiterate, they may have limited utility
Access to education	Assessments and exams Improved classroom assessments, end of cycle examinations	Introduce assessment system for monitoring	No in-class evaluation work	Apparently little real skills evaluation, despite near-universal pass rates (e.g. 85%)
	Direct support for schools Grants for school quality improvement fund	US\$0.50 per student for eligible supplies	24,500 schools benefited Amount increased from US\$5m to US\$12m Important supplies for urban schools are ineligible	Program largely working as expected, though the amounts are insufficient for smaller and larger schools
	Training of school directors in accounting, teacher supervision, data collection, community relations	Provincial-level training of 6000 directors	About 70% of directors received some training from various donors	Results are not evident in school visits
	School construction and rehabilitation	Build and rehabilitate 12,000 primary classrooms 25 lower sec. schools 4 higher sec. schools 373 staff houses	650 primary classrooms constructed 6 higher secondary schools 6 rehabilitated 236 staff houses Delays due to disputes	Government used funds to build secondary schools, since other donors were financing primary

Components/ subcomponents	Activities	Targets to be achieved	Outputs	Outcomes info obtained during mission
	Community school construction project	5000 classrooms	Did not take place	Adequately skilled groups could not be organized (It did not work well in education II)
	Girls education initiatives	22,000 scholarships	Almost no activities for girls 1158 scholarships given	Effect on girls' attendance unlikely
		Gender sensitive curriculum Community awareness for girls' education	No activities for girls	Limited impact on girls education; participation rose by 4 percentage points in lower primary and 1 point elsewhere
	Nonformal education	Complete and implement strategy	Strategy completed in 2001; pilot in 3 provinces 3096 classes in 2005, 17.5% stopped; served 3769397 learners in years 1 and 2 (78% pass)	Most of those observed by the mission could not read in 1 or 2.
	Special education model	Test model in 4 schools Build 3 special ed. Schools Rehabilitate 11 Train teachers	Not implemented	
Ministry of education institutional capacity	Organizational structure and decentralization for ESSP		Little institutional development took place, so direct support to schools was implemented	Decentralization of management unclear
	Policy and planning ability in districts		Seminars given	No follow-up
	Financial management – establish improved procurement system	Training, computerized recordkeeping 3 pilot provinces managing their own procurement	Decentralized financial management partially implemented in Nampula, Cabo Delgado	Not possible to disburse Bank funds directly to provinces with existing arrangements
Vocational-technical education strategy (US\$42 million)	Monitoring and evaluation – information processing systems	Establish monitoring indicators	Implemented to some extent	Enrollment and school characteristic data collected, other information is scarce
	Vocational technical ed	Operate the vocational education system	Developed sector work “skills development in Mozambique: Issues and options”	Used to prepare the technical and vocational education project
	HIV/AIDS and education national workshop		Limited activities and follow up	Effects of this activity unclear
	Deworming for lower primary school children		Delivered by the Ministry of health	Program was expanded nationally, but some students became ill
Strategic planning for higher education (US\$0.5m)	Enhance quality and efficiency	Study about costs and financing of higher ed.		Study useful for ongoing efforts to strengthen higher education

Source: Project documents and information obtained during the PPAR mission

Table A-5. Evidence Chain for Objective-wise Ratings



Project	Objective	Evidence for Efficacy Rating – Plausible Association	Outcomes	Efficacy
Education and Manpower Dev't (1987-1995)	Improving the quality and efficiency of primary education in the City of Maputo	Basic skills for students expected through existence of schools, distribution of school supplies, and teacher training; no achievement data.	Civil works and training satisfactorily provided, enrollments increased, students entering school possibly got basic skills (Table A-1)	Substantial
	(b). Fill critical manpower gaps (strengthening quality and relevance of post-secondary education)	Improved manpower expected through improved training, equipment, materials; no outcome data	Satisfactory inputs to university, limited inputs to the Commercial Institute (Table A-1)	Modest
	(c) Strengthen educational management and planning	Better management expected through training; no outcome data	Extensive training provided (Table A-1)	Substantial
Second Education Project (1990-98)	(a) Improve the quality and efficiency of primary education	Basic skills for students expected through increased enrollments and teacher training; outcome data limited to a few schools	Civil works and training satisfactorily provided, enrollments increased, students entering school possibly got basic skills (Table A-2)	Substantial
	(b) Improve the quality and efficiency of the university	Expected through improved training, equipment, materials; no outcome data	Satisfactory inputs to university (Table A-2)	Substantial
	(c) Strengthen the management of the education sector	Better management expected through training, no outcome data	Training provided, implementation and maintenance capacity limited (Table A-2)	Substantial
	(d1). Train demobilized soldiers (<i>added during implementation</i>)	Training programs for demobilized soldiers; no achievement data	Programs carried out, numbers trained small by comparison to soldier numbers (Table A-3)	Modest
	(d2) Improve access to education for girls (<i>added during implementation</i>)	Activities aimed at increasing access, convincing parents to send girls to school	Only a seminar on girls' education conducted (Table A-3)	Modest
Capacity Building and Human Resources Dev. Project (1992-2001)	(a) Increase the quantity and improve the quality of university graduates	Extensive training to faculty, civil works and houses for professors to stay; no achievement data	Faculty obtained degrees, could live closer to campuses, university had suitable buildings (Table A-3)	Modest
	(b) Improve learning achievement in upper secondary schooling	Students should access, textbooks, trained teachers; no achievement data	Aside from civil works, few other activities were carried out (Table A-3)	Negligible

Project	Objective	Evidence for Efficacy Rating – Plausible Association	Outcomes	Efficacy
Education Sector Strategic Program (1999-2006)	(a1) To provide increased and equitable access	Access would increase through civil works and girls' scholarships	Fewer than expected schools were built, scholarship scheme did not function well (Table A-4)	Modest
	(a2) To provide higher-quality education through improved management	Line of reasoning is vague; achievement data unreliable	Activities had ambiguous outcomes (Table A-4)	Modest

Table A 5: Mozambique: Expenditure in Poverty-Oriented Priority Sectors, 2004-2007**(in millions of meticaís, unless otherwise indicated)**

	2004	2005	2006	2007
	(Est)	(Est)	(Est)	(Est)
Total revenues	16,838	21,418	26,997	31,941
Total expenditure, excluding bank restructuring costs and net lending	31,549	34,063	46,810	63,508
Total expenditure (excl. bank restruct. Costs, net lending, and interest payments)	30,228	32,815	45,430	61,270
Interest payment on public debt	1,321	1,248	1,380	2,238
Total expenditure in PARPA priority sectors	19,033	21,756	29,575	41,719
In percent of GDP	14.3	13.8	15.3	19.0
In percent of total expenditure (excl. bank restruct. costs, net lending, & interest payments)	63.0	66.3	65.1	68.1
Education	6,317	6,542	9,109	12,508
Primary	5,325	5,572	7,556	12,407
Health	3,183	4,159	6,628	8,011
HIV/AIDS	123	218	665	850
Infrastructure Development	3,982	6,131	7,435	11,440
Roads	3,112	4,641	4,501	7,361
Sanitation and public works	870	1,490	2,742	2,730
Agriculture and rural development	1,322	1,290	1,522	3,774
Governance and judicial system	2,936	2,913	5,671	4,021
Security and public order	1,753	1,453	1,943	2,597
Governance	483	601	2719	343
Judicial system	699	859	1,009	1,081
Other priority areas	1,170	727	510	970
Social actions	201	210	329	527
Labor and employment	123	108	181	198
Total PARPA expenditures in percent of GDP				
Education	4.7	4.2	4.7	5.7
Primary	4.0	3.5	3.9	5.6
Health	2.4	2.6	3.4	3.6
HIV/AIDS	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4
Infrastructure Development	3.0	3.9	3.8	5.2
Roads	2.3	2.9	2.3	3.3
Sanitation and public works	0.7	0.9	1.4	1.2
Agriculture and rural development	1.0	0.8	0.8	1.7
Governance and judicial system	2.2	1.9	2.9	1.8
Security and public order	1.3	0.9	1.0	1.2
Governance	0.4	0.4	1.4	0.2
Judicial system	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
Other priority areas	0.9	0.5	0.3	0.4
Social actions	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
Labor and employment	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Total PARPA expenditures in percent of total expenditures				
Education	20.9	19.9	20.1	20.4
Primary	17.6	17.0	16.6	20.3
Health	10.5	12.7	14.6	13.1
HIV/AIDS	0.4	0.7	1.5	1.4
Infrastructure Development	13.2	18.7	16.4	18.7
Roads	10.3	14.1	9.9	12.0
Sanitation and public works	2.9	4.5	6.0	4.5
Agriculture and rural development	4.4	3.9	3.4	6.2
Governance and judicial system	9.7	8.9	12.5	6.6
Security and public order	5.8	4.4	4.3	4.2
Governance	1.6	1.8	6.0	0.6
Judicial system	2.3	2.6	2.2	1.8
Other priority areas	3.9	2.2	1.1	1.6
Social actions	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.9
Labor and employment	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3

Tables A 6 to A 9: Intake and net enrollment rates



Source: Ministry of Education, Planning Department
 Note: EP1 refers to grades 1-5; EP2 refers to grades 6-7






Table A 10: SACMEQ Results

Country	SACMEQ 1		SACMEQ 2	
	2000	2005	2005	2005
	Reading	Reading	Math	
Botswana		521.1	512.9	
Kenya	543.3	546.5	563.3	
Lesotho		451.2	447.2	
Malawi	462.6	428.9	432.9	
Mauritius	550.2	536.4	584.6	
Mozambique		516.7	530	
Namibia	472.9	448.8	430.9	
Seychelles		582	554.3	
South Africa		492.3	486.1	
Swaziland		529.6	516.5	
Tanzania		545.9	522.4	
Uganda		482.4	506.3	
Zambia	477.5	440.1	435.2	
Zanzibar	489.2	478.2	478.1	
Zimbabwe	504.7			

Source: www.sacmeq.org

Annex B. List of Persons Met in Mozambique

Government

- Carlos Bernardo, Assistant Director, Instituto Nacional de Desenvolvimento Educacional (INDE)
- Rafael Lambo Bernardo, Assistant Director, INDE
- Albertina Bila, Permanent Secretary in charge of financial and personnel issues
- Aurelio Fernando Chema, Instituto Nacional de Emprego e Formacao Profissional
- Abel de Assis, Director, INDE
- Raimundo Francisco, Assistant Director, Matola Teacher Training College
- Manuel Lobo, to the Minister of Education
- Jafete Mabote, Director, Examinations and Certification Department
- Zacarias Manjate, Instituto Nacional de Emprego e Formacao Profissional
- Massias Matusse, Director, Educacao Aberta e a Distance (IEDA)
- Dra. Eulalia Maximiliano, Advisor to the Minister of Education
- Adolfo Baltazar Miti, Assistant Director, School Construction Unit
- Americo Muchanga, Director of Planning, University Eduardo Mondlane
- Armando Mutimba, Pedagogical Director, Instituto Comercial de Maputo
- Palmira Palma Pinto, Assistant Director, General education
- Raquel Raimar, Provincial Director, Maputo
- Manuel Rego, Director of Planning, Ministry of Education
- Asane Sufiane, Director, DINAME
- Pedro Fernandes, Chief Inspector, Nampula
- Hasan Huseini Director, Teacher Training Center, Nampula
- Adelino Zacarias Ivala, Director, Universidad Pedagogica, Nampula

Donors

- Gloria Argulo, Spanish Technical Cooperation
- Manuel Lopez , German Technical Cooperation
- Lidia Meque, Irish Technical Cooperation
- Lucia Nhampossa, staff, Italian Cooperation
- Julie Reviere, German Technical Cooperation
- Jeannette Vogelaar, First Secretary, Netherlands Embassy (coordinator of the donor coordination group)
- M. Relano, UNICEF
- T. Shibuya, UNICEF
- Raisa Inkeri Venelainen (formerly Finish Aid)
- Three technical advisors of the Cuban Government

NGOs

- Frouke Dreisma, Educator, "Progresso"
- Elizabeth Sequeira, Director "Progresso"

Annex C. Basic Data Sheet

EDUCATION AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1907)

Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	17.8	17.9	105
Loan amount	15.9	16.3	102
Cofinancing ⁴⁶	1.9	1.6	84
Cancellation		0	

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements⁴⁷

	<i>FY89</i>	<i>FY90</i>	<i>FY91</i>	<i>FY92</i>	<i>FY93</i>	<i>FY94</i>	<i>FY95</i>	<i>FY96</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	1.6	3.2	6.2	9.7	13.2	15.9		
Actual (US\$M)	1.1	1.7	5.3	8.5	10.5	13.5	14.8	16.3
Actual as % of appraisal	68.7	53.1	85.4	87.6	79.5	84.9	--	--

Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Initiating memorandum		
Negotiations	December 1987	March 1988
Board approval	January 1988	05/17/1988
Signing	February 1988	06/16/1988
Effectiveness	May 1988	10/12/1988
Closing date	12/31/1995	12/31/1995

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	<i>FY87</i>	<i>FY88</i>	<i>FY89-96</i>	<i>Total</i>
Preappraisal	93.9			93.9
Appraisal		28.9		28.9
Negotiations		8.9		8.9
Supervision			82.9	82.9
Completion			9.0	9.0
Total	93.9	37.8	91.9	223.6

Source: Information taken from Tables 3 and 12 of Part II – Statistical Tables of the ICR

⁴⁶ Government's contribution

⁴⁷ Information on Actual could not be found because this is on old project. Thus, the team used the ones provided in the ICR.

Mission Data

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Staff days in field</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	<i>Rating trend</i>	<i>Types of problems</i>
Identification/ Preparation	10/1985	1	7	Economist			
Appraisal	10/1987	4	15	Educ. Spe., Econ, Architect, Lawyer			
Supervision	08/1988	3	10	Architect, Engineer	n/a		Proc. progress
	11/1988	4	15	Proj. Officer, Architect, Radio Educ. Specialist	1	1	Proc. Progress, Financial
	04/1989	2	5	Proj. Officer, Architect	2	2	Proc. Progress, Financial, Proj. Mgmt Perform
	10/1989	2	5	Proj. Officer, Architect	n/a	n/a	Financial, Proj. Performance Mgmt
	11/1989	2	5	Proj. Officer, Architect	n/a	n/a	Proc. Progress, Financial
	02/1990	2	5	Proj. Officer, Architect	n/a	n/a	Proc. Progress, Financial
	11/1990	3	5	Proc, Econ., Proj. Implementation Off.	2	2	Proc. Progress
	02/1991	1	5	Econ.	2	2	Proc. Progress
	05/1991	1	5	Econ.	2	2	Legal Covenants
	09/1991	1	10	Econ. Proc. Spec	2	2	Civil Work Delay
	02/1992	2	4	Econ. Architect	2	2	Legal Covenants, Civil Work Delay
	09/1992	1	4	Econ.	1	1	Legal Covenants
	03/1993	2	5	Econ. Architect	1	1	none
10/1993	2	5	Econ. Architect	1	1	none	
05/1994	1	4	Econ.	1	1	none	
05/1995	3	4	Econ., Proc. Educ P	1	1		
Completion	12/1995	3	7	Economist, Operations Analyst, Architect	1	2	none

SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 2200)

Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	67.9	63.6	93.6
Credit amount ⁴⁸	53.7	54.1	100.7
Cofinancing ⁴⁹	4.8	4.7	97.9
Government Contribution	9.4	4.8	51
Cancellation		1.3	

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	<i>FY91</i>	<i>FY92</i>	<i>FY93</i>	<i>FY94</i>	<i>FY95</i>	<i>FY96</i>	<i>FY97</i>	<i>FY98</i>	<i>FY99</i>	<i>Total</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	3.2	7.5	16.1	26.8	37.6	45.6	53.7			53.7
Actual (US\$M)	0.0	0.0	2.8	6.1	16.6	34	46.2	52.1	54.1	54.1
Actual as % of appraisal	0.0	0.0	17.3	22.7	44.1	74.5	86	--	--	101

Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Initiating memorandum ⁵⁰		
Negotiations	October 1990	October 1990
Board approval	September 1990	12/20/1990
Signing		03/28/1991
Effectiveness	February 1991	07/26/1991
Closing date	10/31/1996	12/31/1998

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	<i>FY89</i>	<i>FY91</i>	<i>FY92-99</i>	<i>Total</i>
Pre-appraisal	116.6			116.6
Appraisal		29		29
Negotiations		19.4		19.4
Supervision			180.1 ^a	180.1
ICR			12.3	12.3
Total	116.6	48.4	192.4	357.4

a. Information could not be retrieved from SAP. According to the ICR this includes TF.

⁴⁸ Difference between appraised and actual can be explained by the fluctuation between the US\$ and the SDR exchange rate.

⁴⁹ UNDP

⁵⁰ Concept Note

Mission Data

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Staff days in field</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	<i>Rating trend</i>
Identification/ Preparation	12/1988	n/a	n/a	n/a		
	04/1989	5	5	Task Manager, Texbook Specialist, Educ. Sp. Architect, Science & Tech. Sp		
	10/1989	n/a	15	n/a		
Appraisal	10/1990	3	04	Task Manager, Econ. Architect		
Supervision	05/1991	1	n/a	Econ	n/a	n/a
	07/1991	1	n/a	Econ	U	U
	08/1991	2	20	Econ, Architect	S	S
	10/1991	5	n/a	Econ, Proc, Public Finance Spec, Tech. Educ. Spec		
	02/1992	02	4	Econ, Architect,	U	U
	03/1992	2	10	Econ, Architect,		
	04/1992	2	15	Econ, Architect,		
	08/1992	2	2	Econ, Architect,	S	S
	12/1992	3	15	Econ, Public Health Spec, Social Anthropologist	S	S
	01/1993	2	n/a	Econ, Architect		
	03/1993	2	9	Econ, Architect		
	06/1993	n/a	15	Econ, Architect	U	U
	10/1993	n/a	n/a	n/a	U	U
	06/1994	n/a	n/a	n/a	U	U
	06/1995	5	18	Pro, Educ. Planner, Texbook Editor, Econ, Children's Lit. Spec	S	S
	06/1995	n/a	n/a	n/a	S	S
	01/1996	2	8	Econ, Architect	S	S
	06/1996	6	30	Task Manager, Texbook Editor, Educ Spec, Econ, Texbook Spec, Architect	S	S
	01/1997	6	4	Educ Planner, Architect, Econ, Text Editor, Educ Spec, Econ	S	S
	06/1997	n/a	20	Econ, Educ Planner, Architect	S	S
	03/1998	3	15	Econ, Educ Spec, Proc, Architect, Public Finance Spe	S	S
	09/1998	2	15	Econ, Educ Spec	S	S
Completion	03/1999	2	10	Econ, Educ Spec	S	S

CAPACITY BUILDING HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 2436)

Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	Appraisal estimate	Actual or current estimate	Actual as % of appraisal estimate
Total project costs	60.28	48.22	79.9
Loan amount	48.59	44.23	91
Cofinancing ⁵¹	10.07	3.99	69
Beneficiaries	1.62		
Cancellation		2.6	

Source: Data taken from the project ICR; however, it should be noted that there is a discrepancy in the project total cost between the table on Project Cost and Financing (US\$54.16 M) and the one on Project Financing by Component (US\$48.22 M)

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99	FY00	FY01	FY02	Total
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	2.1	7.4	18.1	29.5	38.3	44.2	48.6				48.6
Actual (US\$M)	0.0	0.7	2.9	6.6	12.3	20.1	29.6	39.9	42.2	44	44.0
Actual as % of appraisal	0.0	9.4	16	22.4	32.1	45.4	60.9	--	--	--	90.5

Date of final disbursement: 06/28/2007⁵²

Project Dates

	Original	Actual
Initiating memorandum ⁵³	11/14/1990	11/14/1990
Negotiations	07/20/1992	07/20/1992
Board approval	11/19/1992	11/19/1992
Signing	01/29/1993	01/29/1993
Effectiveness	12/01/1993	12/01/1993
Closing date	06/30/1999	09/30/2001

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	FY92	FY94	FY95-02	Total
Pre-appraisal	37.2			37.2
Appraisal and Negotiations		68.0		68.0
Supervision			204.2	204.2
ICR			10.0	10.0
Total	37.2	68.0	214.2	319.4

⁵¹ Government Contribution

⁵² Final recovery of the Special Account

⁵³ Concept Note

Mission Data

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Staff days in field</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	<i>Rating trend</i>
Identification/ Preparation	05/1991	13		Sr. Econ, Econ, Higher Educ Spec, Public Sector Reform Spec, Educ Training Spec,		
	09/1991	5		Sr. Prog. Officer, Econ, Educ, Higher Educ Spec, Public Admin. Spec		
	02/1992	1		Secon. Educ. Spec.		
Appraisal/Negotiations	03/1992	12		Sr. Prog. Officer, Econ, Counsel, Educ, Higher Educ Spec, Lawyer, Legal Spec, Public Admin Spec, Architect		
	07/1992	8		Country Officer, Sr. Prog. Officer, Econ, Higher Educ Spec, Counsel, Educ, Disb. Officer, Second Educ Spec.		
	06/1993	6		Sr. Prog. Officer, Econ, Counsel, Higher Educ Spec. Financ Mgmt Spec, Legal Spec		
Supervision	03/1994	1		Educ Training Spec,	S	S
	05/1995	3		Educ Training Spec, Architect	S	S
	12/1995	1		Educ. Training Spec	U	S
	02/1996	1		Educ. Training Spec	U	S
	11/1996	5		Second Educ Spec, Sr. Educ. Spec, Educ Training Spec, Architect, Educ Spec	U	U
	09/1997	3		Sr. Educ Spec, Architect, Educ. Spec	S	S
	02/1998	2		Sr. Educ Spec, Architect	S	S
	10/1998	2		Sr. Educ Spec, Architect	S	S
	04/1999	2		Princ Educ Spec, Architect	S	S
	09/1999	4		Educ Econ, Econ, Architect, Disb Officer	S	S
	05/2000	4		Educ Econ, Second Educ Spec, Architect, Educ Spec,	S	S
	03/2001	4		Second Educ Spec, Gender Spec, Disb Analyst, Architect	S	S
	Completion	12/2001	2		Educ Econ, Second Educ Spec	

EDUCATION SECTOR STRATEGIC PROGRAM PROJECT (CREDIT 3172)

Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	717.2	N/a	
Loan amount	71	72.20 ^a	106
Cofinancing ⁵⁴	646.2	n/a	
Cancellation		3.5	

a. Difference can be explained by the fluctuation of the dollar-SDR exchange rate

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	<i>FY99</i>	<i>FY00</i>	<i>FY01</i>	<i>FY02</i>	<i>FY03</i>	<i>FY04</i>	<i>FY05</i>	<i>FY06</i>	<i>FY07</i>	<i>Total</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	1.0	12.0	32.0	53.0	71.0					71.0
Actual (US\$M)	0.0	1.3	1.8	5.1	16.9	34.1	51.5	68.8	69.9	69.9
Actual as % of appraisal	0	11	6	10	24	--	--	--	--	98

Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Initiating memorandum ⁵⁵	4/16/97	4/16/97
Negotiations	12/14/98	12/14/98
Board approval	2/18/99	2/18/99
Signing	3/04/99	3/04/99
Effectiveness	8/02/99	8/02/99
Closing date	6/30/2004	6/30/2006

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	<i>FY92</i>	<i>FY98</i>	<i>FY99</i>	<i>FY00-06</i>	<i>FY07</i>	<i>Total</i>
Pre-appraisal	n/a					n/a
Appraisal		n/a				n/a
Negotiations			n/a			n/a
Supervision				299		299
ICR					8	8
Total	n/a	n/a	n/a	299	8	307

Source: Data taken from the ICR. Prior to FY00 SW data for old projects were stored in FACT which is phased out now. For some reason those data were not transferred to SAP, the legacy system.

⁵⁴ Government (US\$444.6), Cofinanciers (US\$118.8), NGO (US\$30), Community (US\$5), Contingencies (US\$47.8)

⁵⁵ Concept Note

Mission Data⁵⁶

Names	Title	Unit
Lending (from Task Team in PAD Data Sheet)		
Donald Hamilton	Cluster Leader/TTL	AFTH1
Ricardo Silveira	Sr. Economist	LCSHD
Soren Nellemann	Economist	AFTH1
Lavinia Gasperini	Education Specialist	LCSHD
Maria Madalena Dos Santos	Sr. Education Specialist	LCSHD
Inacio Manecas	Social Sector Program Officer	RM
Natalia Moncada	Team Assistant	
Lydia Tabi	Team Assistant	
William Saint	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTI2
Cecilia Valdeviso	Sr. Education Specialist – Girls Education	PGP
Kishor Uprety	Lawyer	LEGAF
Hovsep Melkonian	Sr. Disbursement Officer	LOAAF
Steve Gagine	Sr. Disbursement Officer	LOAAF
Marcus Sugar	Sr. Disbursement Officer	LOAAF
Anthony Hegarty	Financial Management Specialist	AFTS1
Stravos Apergis	Economist, Consultant	AFTH1
Seljan Riddle	Budgeting and Planning Specialist	AFTR1
Peter Morrison	Consultant	AFTH1
Iziane Silva	Education Specialist, Consultant	AFTH1
Gus Raposo	Disbursement Analyst	LOAAF
Pieter Smoor	Architect, Consultant	
Andre Cosino Tolentino	Sr. Education Policy Maker, Consultant	AFTH1
Supervision		
Xiaoyan Liang ¹	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTH
Noel Kulemeka ¹	Sr. Economist	AFTH1
Joao Tinga	Financial Management Analyst	AFTFM
Isabel Duarte Mutambe	Program Assistant	AFTH1

⁵⁶ Based on the new ICR format which become effective in FY07. All ICRs submitted to the Board in FY07 onward use this format.

Names	Title	Unit
Mmantsetsa Marope ¹	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTH1
Aidan Mulkeen	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTH1
Alexandra Valerio ¹	Sr. Education	AFTH1
Isabel Nhassengo	Disbursement Assistant	AFCO2
Marito Garcia	Lead Economist	AFTH1
Francisco Ayala	Consultant	AFTH1
Salma Chande	Team Assistant	AFCO2
Adriaan Verspoor	Education Advisor, Consultant	AFTH1
Donald Bundy	Lead Specialist	HDNED
Lesley Drake	Partnership for Child Development, Consultant	
Michael Drabble	Education Specialist	AFTH2
Louise Fox	Lead Specialist	AFTPM
Elena Bardasi	Consultant	PRMPR
Mafalda Duarte	Consultant	
Manolo Sanchez	Consultant	
Manuel Sumbana	Procurement Analyst	AFTPC
Odete da Conceicao	Team Assistant	AFCO2
Arvil Van Adams	Lead Social Protection Specialist	AFTHD
Juan Prawda	Lead Education Specialist	LCSHD
Carlos Rojas	Sr. Education Specialist	LCSHD
Sabine Cornelius	Sr. Economist	AFTH1
Jon Lauglo	Sr. Education Specialist	AFTH1
Oey Meesook	Sector Director	AFTHD
Dzingai Mutumbuka	Sector Manager	AFTH1
Alain Mingat	Lead Education Specialist	AFTHD
Alfonso de Guzman	Sr. Education Specialist	EASHD
Manolo Sanchez	Education Policy, Consultant	
Kamal Desai	HIV/AIDS Consultant	
Soren Nellemann	Operations Officer	AFTH1
Tony Hegarty	Lead Specialist	AFTQK
Jose Janeiro ²	Disbursement Officer	LOAAF
Liba Strengerowski-Feldblyum ²	Disbursement Analyst	LOAAF

Names	Title	Unit
Diek Meiners	Architect, Consultant	AFTH1
Lawrence Dowdall	Architect, Consultant	AFTH1
Seung Lee	School Health Specialist, Consultant	AFTH1

1. The TTL successive of the project, from bottom-up
2. Provided technical inputs. Were in Maputo conducting a Financial Management and Disbursement mission for several projects while a supervision mission (April 28-May 4, 2002) for the ESSP were being carried out.

