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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION PROJECT
(P054937)

June 27, 2013

IEG Public Sector Evaluation
Independent Evaluation Group

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = Dominican Peso

2002	US$1.00	DOP$18.60
2003	US$1.00	DOP$30.83
2004	US$1.00	DOP$42.11
2005	US$1.00	DOP$30.51
2006	US$1.00	DOP$33.25
2007	US$1.00	DOP$33.31
2008	US$1.00	DOP$34.87
2009	US$1.00	DOP$36.12
2010	US$1.00	DOP$37.30
2011	US$1.00	DOP$38.23

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ECD	Early Childhood Development
EYE	Early Years Evaluation
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IRR	Internal Rate of Return
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
PREAL	Programa de Promoción de la Reforma Educativa en América Latina y el Caribe
TTL	Task Team Leader

Fiscal Year

Government: January 1 – December 31

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This report was prepared by Susan Ann Caceres who assessed the project in October 2012. The report was peer reviewed by Michelle J. Neuman and panel reviewed by Christopher D. Gerrard. Viktoriya Yevsyeyeva provided administrative support.

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Principal Ratings

	ICR*	ICR Review*	PPAR
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Low or Negligible	Low or Negligible	Moderate
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

* The Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) report is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEG product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

Key Staff Responsible

Project	Task Manager/Leader	Division Chief/ Sector Director	Country Director
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IEG Mission: Improving World Bank Group development results through excellence in independent evaluation.

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20-25 percent of the Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEG peer review, Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank department. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

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IEG's use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org).

Outcome: The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. *Possible ratings for Outcome:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High, Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Preface

This is a Project Performance Assessment Report of the Early Childhood Education Project in the Dominican Republic, financed through IBRD Loan No. 7144-DO in the amount of US$42.0 million equivalent and a Government contribution of US$20.07 million equivalent. The loan was approved on September 5, 2002, became effective on December 2, 2003 because of the delay in obtaining Congressional approval, and was closed on August 30, 2011, three years after the original closing date.

This report was prepared by Susan Caceres, Senior Education Specialist, IEG. The findings are largely based on a one-week mission to the Dominican Republic from October 21-26, 2012 conducted by Susan Caceres and Erik Bloom, Senior. Economist, IEG, as well as on survey data collected by a local researcher, Marie Claire Vasquez Duran, from October 22 to November 12, 2012. Ms. Vasquez Duran also mapped the project's civil works to the respective municipalities and gathered enrollment data from the Ministry of Education. The report was enriched by the contributions of Mr. Bloom and Ms. Vasquez Duran.

The mission met with education authorities in the implementing agency, the Ministry of Education, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations. The mission visited schools and organizations in Santo Domingo, Azua, and San Cristobal, while meetings in Monte Plata were cancelled due to Tropical Storm Sandy. The list of persons met is in Annex D. The mission also examined: (a) World Bank project files, (b) project related reporting documents and evaluations, and (c) education studies with data from the government and other development partners, as well as the relevant research literature.

The IEG team gratefully acknowledges the logistical assistance and support of the staff in the Santo Domingo Office of the World Bank and the support from the Ministry personnel, including the Implementing Agency.

Following standard IEG procedures, a copy of the draft report was sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and feedback. Their comments are presented in Annex E.

Summary

In the Dominican Republic there is inequitable access to education between urban and rural areas, at the initial (pre-primary) level (ages zero to six) and at the secondary level (grades 9 to 12). The net enrollment rate is similar at the basic level of education (grades 1 to 8) in rural and urban areas (89 percent). In contrast, there is a fifteen percentage point difference between the secondary enrollment rate in the urban (50 percent) and rural areas (35 percent). In 2004, 51 percent of the poorest five year-olds were enrolled in pre-primary, while the overall rate was 71.8 percent. These gaps in enrollment are strongly related to poverty. Similarly, districts with lower levels of poverty have a higher percentage of children attending private schools at the initial, basic, and secondary level.

Early Childhood Education Project

The objective of the $62 million Early Childhood Education Project (2002-2011), as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (p. 2), was to "increase access to early childhood development services for all children ages zero to five, as measured by pre-primary enrollment rates and the expansion of nonformal services provided by communities and agencies, and to strengthen the quality of early childhood education that is available to children ages zero to five." While similar, the objective noted in the Loan Agreement (p. 18), also emphasized focusing on educational services for the poor, stating, "to increase the access to, and strengthen the quality of, Early Childhood Education in the Borrower' s territory with a particular focus on the poor."

The activities to attain the objective of increasing access to early childhood development included constructing new classrooms/Centers, conducting information campaigns, educating parents, and providing grants to innovative projects. Several complementary activities were conducted to improve the quality of early childhood development services, particularly related to pre-primary education for five year-olds, including: establishing Education Resource Centers; providing training to teachers, district and regional coordinators, and principals; offering a standard set of pedagogical supplies and materials in every classroom; renovating 409 existing pre-primary classrooms; and improving cross-sectoral coordination.

The relevance of the objectives is high given that the Government's development strategy stressed early childhood development as part of the long-term strategy to alleviate poverty. The Bank's current Country Partnership Strategy (2010–2013) emphasizes access to better quality education at all levels and promotes increasing early childhood development enrollment of the poorest children.

The Ministry updated its pedagogical model during the project. Teacher training was provided to 3,931 teachers, fostered implementation of the pedagogical model, and changed teaching practices in terms of schedules and use of time and space. Every pre-primary classroom received the standard supplies. The pedagogical groups and the monitoring by district and regional coordinators supported the consistent application of the model. There was a reduction in the repetition rate by three percentage points at grade three for those children who attended pre-primary, compared to the rate for the total population in grade three. There was a reduction in the repetition rate by five percentage points at grade four for

children who attended pre-primary, compared to the rate for the total population in grade four. While the project created 19,500 new spaces for pre-primary students, there was a modest increase in enrollment and an underutilization of classrooms in Model Centers.

The project outcome rating is **moderately satisfactory**, based upon high relevance of the objectives, substantial relevance of design, substantial achievement in improving the quality of early child education, but modest achievement of greater access. Efficiency was also **modest.** The risk to development outcome is **moderate,** given that the government has a strong commitment to universalizing pre-primary education. The performance of the Bank is rated **moderately unsatisfactory** at entry, **moderately satisfactory** during supervision, and **moderately satisfactory** overall. There were strong efforts during supervision to counteract weaknesses at entry, but there could have been better coordination between the Bank's technical and procurement staff. The borrower's performance is rated **moderately satisfactory.** The Government remained committed to the early childhood subsector, but there was frequent turnover in staff, which negatively impacted implementation and slowed the pace of disbursements. Both Government and implementing agency performance were **moderately satisfactory.**

Lessons

Based on the experience of this project, several lessons can be drawn:

- **Lack of attention to country context in project design can lead to considerable delays and inefficiencies.** In the case of this project, there was a long delay in project effectiveness (15 months) linked to the need for legislative approval of the loan, followed by extensive delays in implementation tied to low procurement capacity and frequent turnover of staff linked to the political cycle. There was no specific action taken to mitigate the well-known risks from the political system with respect to delays and turnover. The solutions proposed by the Capacity Assessment conducted at appraisal were inadequate to mitigate the well known shortfall in procurement capacity, particularly in light of frequent staff turnover.

- **Greater proximity to pre-primary education is necessary but not sufficient for poor parents to enroll their children.** The project built new pre-primary classrooms in areas with large numbers of poor parents and launched a communications campaign – though it is unclear whether the latter targeted the poor. It also introduced quality improvements in public pre-school education. Yet, even though fewer classrooms were built than planned, there was under-enrollment of 5-year-olds in the new capacity. This suggests that there remain significant constraints to poor parents for the enrollment of their 5-year olds in pre-primary education. Informants noted that the fact that public pre-school is only half a day may be a factor: private schools provide all day programming either through a full day at school or combined with after school care, which is more convenient for working parents. This points to the importance of a good understanding of the most critical constraints affecting pre-primary enrollment.

- **In the absence of strong selection criteria and explicit mechanisms for evaluating new approaches, learning from innovation funds will be limited.** As designed and implemented, the Grant Fund was not a vehicle for innovation, learning, or sustained access. Without strong monitoring and evaluation, there was no way to identify projects worthy of replication and scaling-up, as well as to learn from the Fund.

- **Providing teachers with training, the necessary classroom supplies, and ongoing support from pedagogical groups, coupled with monitoring the implementation of the pedagogical model can improve quality in pre-primary classrooms**. In this project, pre-primary teachers were provided with classroom supplies, a new curriculum, and peer-to-peer learning from pedagogical groups, as well as follow-up support. Some teachers observed classrooms in Model Centers. Coordinators and pedagogical leaders visited teachers' classrooms to monitor quality. This resulted in teachers using the supplies and applying what they learned from the professional development in their classrooms.

Caroline Heider
Director-General
Evaluation

1. Background and Context

1.1 This report assesses the Dominican Republic Early Childhood Development Project, which was approved on September 5, 2002, and became effective on December 2, 2003 because of the delay in obtaining Congressional approval. The project was financed by an International Bank Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan of US$40.2 million equivalent, with a government contribution estimated at US$20.07 million equivalent. This project was selected for assessment because it was a free-standing early childhood education project, which was recently completed. This is the first assessment that IEG has done of an early childhood education project.

Socio-Economic Context of Dominican Republic

1.2 The Dominican Republic is a middle income country that has been able to maintain a good economic trajectory in recent years. There was an economic downturn in 2003 and 2004, which was overcome by 2005 (Table 1.). Direct investment declined in 2003 and 2004 during the economic downturn, and increased in subsequent years. Gross Domestic Product has grown at high annual rates in recent years, among the highest in Latin America, although it slowed during the global crisis of 2008 and 2009. In recent years inflation rates have been low, and lower than most Latin America and the Caribbean Region countries. Unemployment did not rise during the 2008 downturn, and has remained steady around five and six percent during this time period. Remittances as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product ranged from a high of 11.4 percent in 2004 to a low of 6.5 percent in 2010 (World Development Indicators 2012).

Table 1. Dominican Republic, Selected Economic Variables

Year	*GDP (%)*	*Inflation (%)*	*Net Direct Investment (US$ million)*
2002	4.2	10.5	2,156
2003	-1.8	42.7	613
2004	-0.2	28.7	909
2005	7.7	7.4	1,123
2006	9.1	5.0	1,085
2007	6.9	8.9	1,667
2008	3.8	4.5	2,870
2009	2.1	5.8	2,165
2010	7.5	6.2	1,626

Source: World Development Indicators

1.3 The rapid economic growth has implications for poverty reduction. Growth, aggregate demand resulting from remittances, and low rates of inflation have contributed to modest reductions in the poverty rate (Acosta 2007), from 47 percent in 2002 to 41 percent in 2009 (Table 2). However, a reduction in the poverty rate of only six percentage points, in the face of rapid economic growth, is low compared to recent Latin America standards, which may be explained by growing inequality. The Dominican Republic has a high concentration of income and a Gini coefficient that is one of the largest in the region, increasing from 0.537

in 2002 to 0.574 in 2009, while it decreased in all other countries in the region except in Guatemala and Costa Rica.

Table 2. The Poverty Rate in the Dominican Republic (percent)

Year	*Total*	*Urban*	*Rural*
2002	47.1	42.4	55.9
2008	44.3	42.0	49.5
2009	41.1	39.3	44.7

Source: ECLAC (2010)

1.4 Poverty is more concentrated in rural areas, as well as in provinces such as Elias Pina, Bahoruco, San Juan, Independencia, Monte Plata, and El Seibo. The poverty rate in these provinces is more than 70 percent of poor households (Focalizacion de Pobreza 2005). However, rural poverty is less pronounced in the touristic areas of Puerto Plata, La Romana, and Samana. Poverty is much deeper in the areas near Haiti, where the majority of these populations fall far below poverty thresholds. Localities near the Haitian border have lower human capital, poorer infrastructure, and are more prone to risks from natural disasters (World Bank 2006). In contrast, provinces at or near the large population areas of Santo Domingo and Santiago have the lowest percentage of poor households (19 and 27 percent) (Focalizacion de Pobreza 2005).

Education in the Dominican Republic

1.5 The education system in the Dominican Republic is comprised of four levels: Initial, Basic, Secondary, and Tertiary education. Initial relates to services for children age zero through six years. Within this level, pre-primary educational services provided to five year-old children in preparation for their entrance into the first cycle of basic education is compulsory. Early childhood education includes non-mandatory services for three and four year-olds of which there is no public provision. Basic education includes the first cycle (grades one to four) and second cycle (grades five to eight). Secondary education also has two cycles: general (grades nine and ten), which is compulsory, and specialized (grades eleven and twelve). Expenditures per student for public education vary considerably for each level as shown in Table 3. Reports have not analyzed the spending, but one explanation for the higher per pupil spending at the initial, technical, and tertiary levels could be the lower teacher-student ratios and/or the use of specialized equipment.

Table 3. Spending on Public Education per student for each Level (US$)

	Initial	*Basic*	*Secondary*	*Technical*	*Tertiary*
Amount per student (US$)	567	474	376	1, 072	876

Source: Programa de Promocion de la Reforma Educativa en America Latina y el Caribe [PREAL 2010]

1.6 There is inequitable access to education between urban and rural areas. The net enrollment rate is similar at the basic level of education in rural and urban areas (89 percent), but there is a fifteen percentage point difference between the secondary enrollment rate in the urban (50 percent) and rural areas (35 percent) (Programa de Promocion de la Reforma Educativa en America Latina y el Caribe [PREAL] 2010). The rural secondary enrollment

rate is one of the lowest in the Latin American and Caribbean region. The gap in enrollment and attainment is strongly related to poverty. In 2007 the number of years of schooling completed by the population of 15–24 year-olds is much lower in rural areas (8.7 years) than urban areas (10.2 years), although there are no gender differences in the amount of schooling completed (PREAL 2010).

1.7 The supply of private schools at the initial, primary, and secondary levels varies by district wealth. The percentage of students at all levels attending private schools in districts ranges from 2 percent in Bahoruco to 42 percent in Santo Domingo[1] (Ministry of Education, 2010). The municipalities with more than 20 percent private school enrollment are San Cristobal, San Pedro de Marcoris, Santiago, Santo Domingo, Puerto Plata, and Higuey, which are areas with lower rates of poverty. Barhouco, Monte Plata, Monte Cristi, and San Juan de la Maguana, which are areas with higher poverty rates, have five percent or fewer students attending private schools at all levels. Only middle and upper-income families can afford private education; however, attendance at private schools may also be facilitated by the inflow of remittances. It has been suggested that as the wealthy have exited public schools, this has lessened the incentives for this group to demand better quality public education at the initial, basic, and secondary levels (Di John 2007). The poor who attend public school have fewer means to pressure the Government to improve public education. This has created a reason for upper-income families to demand more funding be devoted to higher education, which their sons and daughters attend, and less reason to for them to pressure the government to reform the public education system (Di John 2007).

1.8 The government spends approximately 2.4 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on education, which is lower than the Latin American average (PREAL 2010). The largest percentages of government expenditures are directed to primary and tertiary, with smaller amounts destined for initial education (WDI). However, according to the government, it has allocated four percent of gross domestic product towards education this year.

Early Childhood Education in the Dominican Republic

1.9 A 1990 law (Ley General de Educacion, No 66–97) made the final year of initial education, pre-primary, mandatory for five year-olds. The law has been gradually implemented and enrollment has not become universal, despite being compulsory. According to project records, in 2004, 51 percent of the poorest five year-olds were enrolled, while the overall enrollment rate for 5-year-olds was 71.8 percent.[2]

1.10 The resources devoted to initial education are low, particularly when compared to other middle income countries in the Latin American region (PREAL 2010). The Dominican Republic has the second lowest enrollment rate for early childhood education (i.e. 3–5 year-olds) in the Latin American region, which is more than 30 percentage points behind the regional average (PREAL 2010). Enrollment in initial education increased from 35 percent in 2002 to nearly 40 percent in 2007 (PREAL 2010), which was mainly the result of the private

[1] District 15 in Santo Domingo has 42 percent, while District 10 in Santo Domingo has 38 percent.

[2] Ministry data show a lower overall rate (68.8 percent).

sector. During this time, there was an additional 21,000 students in the private sector, while the growth from the public sector was only 8,000 students (PREAL 2010).

1.11 Public schools operate two shifts for pre-primary, as well as the other education levels. In contrast, private schools run a full-day program, or a half day combined with child care, which makes it convenient for working parents who do not need to drop-off and pick up their children during working hours. Private schools also offer programs for children as young as three years old, while the public pre-primary classes are for five year-olds.

1.12 The low spending and limited access to initial education are seen as contributing to weaknesses within basic education. Students from poor families enter first grade lacking the requisite readiness skills, since few of them are provided services to stimulate development. As a result, many students often repeat or drop out, with only 80 percent of students completing basic education. The low repetition rate (5.6 percent) for basic education is largely related to the automatic promotion policies in first and second grade. As a result, these rates are kept low, but then rise sharply in third grade to 12.3 percent, when the automatic promotion policy is no longer applicable.

Early Childhood Education: International Evidence

1.13 Early childhood development (ECD) or early childhood care and education refer to the learning and development of the whole child from zero to eight years of age, according to the World Health Organization. This is the time of greatest opportunity, since interventions directly shape young children's future and they are most able to benefit from them. Early childhood development outcomes are measured in the cognitive, language, social, emotional, and physical areas. At the pre-primary level (five year-olds), this implies skills such as learning letters, basic mathematics, language, and social skills; children three and four years old are expected to listen and move to music, develop language, share, and draw. Infants (one and two year-olds) should explore and interact with the environment safely with caring adults.

1.14 The outcomes for young children depend on the influences of the family, early health, nutrition, and care, educational settings, as well as the community. Poverty, socio-cultural factors and psychosocial and biological risk factors all work together to influence child development and subsequent long-term adult productivity (Walker and others 2007). Figure 1 depicts a comprehensive model of early child development showing the multiple factors that affect a child's development, which itself is composed of age-appropriate goals relating to physical health, socio-emotional, language, and intellectual development.

Figure 1. Model of Early Childhood Development



Source: Author adopted from Child Trends, Inc. 2006

1.15 Early childhood education is an effective investment in human capital. Early childhood services devoted to education, health, and nutrition affect future education attainment and labor market outcomes (Smith 2009; Cunha and Heckman 2009). Low weight at birth and poor health during childhood, which can be prevented by adequate prenatal care and early childhood interventions, lead to future poor health during adulthood and low occupational status (Case and Paxson 2006). Children in the United States who participated in good quality pre-school programs had higher annual earnings and higher levels of employment at age 40, than those who did not attend pre-school (Schweinhart 2007). There is empirical evidence on the detrimental effect that vitamin and iron deficiencies during childhood have on subsequent cognitive ability and school desertion (Politt 1997; 2001). It has been estimated that the elimination of malnutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa would lead to increasing its annual growth rate between 0.34 and 4.63 percentage points (Arcand 2001). In low-income and middle-income countries high quality early childhood interventions have the greatest impact with disadvantaged children (Engle et al 2011). Integrated early childhood development programs may be one of the most effective interventions for helping poor children, families, and communities, and nations break the intergenerational cycle of poverty (Young 1996).

1.16 There are other benefits to good quality early childhood programs. Programs targeted to the poor or disadvantaged can help address inequalities. Long-term studies of pre-schools in the United States demonstrate that children who attended these programs (in comparison to those who did not attend) were better prepared for school, demonstrated better commitment to school at age 14, and had higher graduation rates from high school

(Schweinhart 2007). In developing countries[3] pre-school participation contributed to an increase in lifetime earnings by five to ten percent, not controlling for measurement error (Engle and others 2007). Belfied and others (2000) computed the benefits of the Perry Pre-school Program in the United States to be $150,000 (in 2000 dollars) per child through age 40, as a result of crime reduction. Donahue and Siegelman (1998) have estimated that early childhood development programs could pay for themselves through reduced crime rates alone. Increasing the pre-school enrollment rate in every low-income and middle-income country to 25 to 50 percent was estimated to have a benefit-to-cost ratio ranging from 6.4 to 17.6 (Engle and others 2011).

2. Objectives, Design, and Their Relevance

Objectives

2.1 The objective of the Early Childhood Education Project, as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (p. 2), was to "increase access to early childhood development services for all children ages zero to five, as measured by pre-primary enrollment rates and the expansion of nonformal services provided by communities and agencies, and to strengthen the quality of early childhood education that is available to children ages zero to five". The objective noted in the Loan Agreement (p. 18), while similar, also emphasized focusing on the poor and the educational services, stating, "to increase the access to, and strengthen the quality of, Early Childhood Education in the Borrower's territory with a particular focus on the poor". Given the substantive difference in these two versions of the objectives, this report will assess the project against the objective in the legal agreement, as they are legally binding.

Relevance of the Objectives

2.2 The relevance of project objectives is rated high. At the time of appraisal, only 80 percent of children completed basic education (grades 1–6), and lack of access to early childhood education was viewed as a major contributor to this low rate. The government promoted early childhood education services as a long-term strategy to reduce poverty in its Strategic Development Plan (Plan Estrategicio de Desarrollo de la Educacion Dominicana, 2010), since low educational attainment among the poor is one of the main obstacles to reduce poverty in the Dominican Republic. Attending pre-school has the potential to increase a child's earning capacity and income as an adult (World Bank 2002). The Government's most recent education plan (2008–2018) also emphasized increasing the coverage in early childhood education to improve education quality, as well as revising the curriculum to make it more relevant, increasing the resources devoted to education, and increasing civil society participation (PREAL 2010).

[3] Based on longitudinal data of 1471 Guatemalan adults and 152 Brazilian males, which included standardized assessments of preschool development and schooling attainment, as well as controls for maternal schooling, parental income and socio-economic status.

2.3 Given the low enrollment rate among the poor, the project's objective focused upon access to quality early childhood education for the poor. Both enrollment and quality were emphasized, since effective early childhood services have been shown to prepare students for school and are related to long-term outcomes and benefits to society such as: reduced repetition in school, increased cognitive achievement, higher likelihood of completing additional years of schooling, and decreased criminal behavior (Montie and others 2005).

2.4 The objective was consistent with the current Country Partnership Strategy (2010–2013) which emphasized access to better quality education at all levels and promoted increasing ECD enrollment of the poorest children (p. 15). While the Government's priority was five year-old children in pre-primary education, it was interested in increasing early childhood development to those under five years old. Thus, the objective was highly relevant to the Bank and Government's strategies during appraisal and continued to be until project closure.

Design

COMPONENTS

2.5 The project contained four components (Table 4). The first component was to expand pre-primary education enrollment by establishing 18 Regional Model Centers and creating new classrooms to serve five year-olds, with a focus on poor children. However, the appraisal document did not explain how underserved areas would be selected nor specify a strategy to ensure the poorest children were reached. During appraisal these activities were estimated to provide 40,000 new spaces to educate five year-olds.

2.6 The second component was aimed at improving the quality of pre-primary education. Quality was enhanced through teacher professional development, implementation of curriculum, establishment of regional resources centers in the Model Center, provision of education materials, and upgrading the lighting, ventilation, and sanitary facilities in existing classrooms (e.g. improving classrooms already in use). There were activities to increase public awareness of the importance of early childhood education and educate parents and caregivers in how to promote curiosity and learning. The Ministry of Education was to decentralize teacher training through the Regional Model Centers. Training was to be based on observation, reflection, demonstration, and discussion, which comprise the principles of adult learning (Garet and others 2001). These Centers were also meant to serve as laboratories for learning in modeling correct implementation of curriculum and instructional practices. Peer learning groups, which were called pedagogical groups, were formed to ensure continuity across the region through periodic observation of area classrooms. Administrative staff were also to be involved in the training, to ensure their development as instructional leaders in pre-primary education. Educational Resource Centers in each Regional Model Center also provided didactic materials and technology for teachers to borrow and use in their classrooms. Parent committees were strengthened to involve parents in the schools and Centers and advise school personnel on regional early childhood needs.

2.7 The third component promoted greater collaboration between the education sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), municipal governments, and the private sector

in relation to early childhood development. A grant program was established to fund projects to benefit children ages zero to five living in poor communities, as well as indirect beneficiaries, such as parents and caregivers, teachers, or public health promoters. Grants were awarded to NGOs, associations, community organizations, private sector, and municipal governments. The aim of the Grant was to identify and support community-based integrated early childhood development models that could be replicated on a larger scale (World Bank 2002). An independent Board, comprising public and private institutions, evaluated and selected proposals for funding. The criteria for funding projects were based on the institutional capacity of the organization, as well as technical and financial feasibility of the proposal. This was designed to promote local solutions to the shortage of early childhood services.

Table 4. Activities within each Component and Planned Costs

Component 1: Expanding Pre-primary Education Services (US$25.19 million equivalent)	***Component 2: Increasing ECD Education Quality (US$20.30 million equivalent)***	***Component 3: Institutional Strengthening in Education Sector (US$7.44 million equivalent)***	***Component 4: Project Administration and Monitoring (US$2.42 million equivalent)***
1a. 18 Regional Model Centers for pre-primary education to provide additional coverage for more than 4,000 children annually.	2a. Professional development activities to benefit 50 percent of pre-primary teachers.	3a. Studies, workshops, and seminars to build cross-sectoral coordination and cooperation among providers of ECD services.	4a. Project Coordination Unit
1b. Builds 600 new pre-primary classrooms to benefit 36, 000 children,[a] with a focus on rural areas and the most needy children.	2b. Implement pre-primary curriculum in Regional Model Centers and pre-primary teachers involved in pedagogical groups.	3b. Innovative projects, targeting educational quality, health, or other social services to benefit children ages 0–5 in poor communities.	4b. Project monitoring and evaluation activities, including an impact evaluation.
	2c. Education Resource Center in each Regional Model Center.		
	2d. Equip every pre-primary classroom with materials to implement curriculum.		
	2e. Renovate 600 existing pre-primary classrooms.		
	2f. Media campaigns to educate parents and strengthens parent committees.		

a. This is based on 600 new classrooms serving 30 children per classroom with double shifts.

Source: World Bank 2002

2.8 The fourth component supported the project administration and monitoring. This provided resources not only to the ongoing project management and monitoring through the implementation unit, but also to evaluation activities.

2.9 None of the components were revised during the project.

Implementation Arrangements

2.10 The Ministry of Education was the implementing entity with a Project Coordination Unit (Office of International Cooperation) within the Ministry. The Unit oversaw all activities under the project, with the assistance of five Technical Coordinators for the areas of: Education, Educational Infrastructure, Monitoring and Evaluation, Administration and Finance, and the Grant Program. Within the Office of International Cooperation, there were units in charge of procurement and finance. A Board was established to oversee the Grant Program.

Monitoring and Evaluation Design

2.11 The evaluation unit with the Office of International Cooperation was responsible for M&E activities.

2.12 The original M&E system was designed to track outcomes and outputs related to improvement in access and quality for pre-primary (five year-olds). One measure (i.e., decreasing the percentage of time during which children in pre-primary classrooms were not actively engaged) was not clear and difficult to measure. The target established for the overall increase in the pre-primary enrollment (86 percent) was appropriate, given the baseline and the number of spaces that the new classrooms would provide. However, the same target (86 percent) was set for increasing the enrollment rate of the poorest five year-olds, which was unrealistic given the trajectory from its baseline (51 percent).

2.13 With respect to improving the access and quality to early childhood development for 0–4 year-olds, the M&E design was inadequate. There were no outcome measures to show if the activities to educate parents were effective. There was no tracking of the activities of the projects awarded grants by the Grant Fund to ensure alignment with the development objective, and there were no outcome measures to determine if the Fund resulted in improved access and quality to nonformal early childhood services. There would also be no way to identify projects worthy of replication or scaling-up, which was its intent. The output measures of the Grant Fund simply tracked the number of grants awarded and beneficiaries, without monitoring geographical dispersion to ensure that the poor in rural communities were appropriately targeted.

Relevance of Design

2.14 The relevance of project design is substantial. Consistent with the government's priorities, there was a comprehensive design to improve pre-primary education through classroom/Center construction, classroom materials, teacher training, and strengthening parent committees. The activities were adequate to achieve the objectives of improving access and quality to early childhood education for 0–5 year-olds. However, the design did not specify a strategy for targeting and reaching poor children. As well, design did not consider other approaches outside of construction to increase access

2.15 The design included activities to benefit both public and private providers. The project design did not focus entirely on the public sector, and included private sector and

non-governmental organizations, because the government would not have sufficient resources to provide early childhood services for all children birth to five. Moreover, the private sector was already playing a large role in the delivery of pre-primary education, since 91.5 percent of private schools offering basic education also provided pre-primary services, while only 40.4 percent of public schools had pre-primary services (World Bank 2002). Private sector and local community participation were also consistent with the Government's efforts.

2.16 The design focused on the education sector and education services to impact child development. This seems reasonable, given the government's focus on pre-primary education and on the existing services provided in public elementary schools such as health services and daily snack with milk. A multi-sectoral approach was employed in the design through the *Mesa Consultiva*, a roundtable group composed of high-level stakeholders. This group met annually to build greater cooperation among providers, bring attention to the sub-sector, and increase collaboration within this cross-sectoral group. Moreover, innovative projects targeting education quality, health, or other social services to benefit children from birth to five years old living in poor communities were part of the design through the Grant Fund. Activities to educate and influence the behaviors of parents were also included, which was important given the large role parents play in their child's development. As well, the Ministry's assessment pointed to lack of parental awareness of the benefits of pre-primary education as the primary obstacle to services (World Bank 2002). Thus, the combination of inputs was appropriate to achieve the objective.

2.17 Overall, the Results Framework (described schematically in the Table 5) was adequate to achieve the objectives of improving access and quality of pre-primary education, but had shortcomings with respect to measuring improvements in the objective for those under five years and contained poorly defined measures. Project activities in relation to pre-primary education had a clear mapping to the objective and outcome measures. Outcome measures were lacking for institutional strengthening, grant program, family education initiatives, and parent committees, thus not permitting obtaining an understanding of their effectiveness or impact, as well as whether project activities resulted in expansion of nonformal services for those under five years old.

Table 5. Project Results Chain

	Access	***Quality***
Outcomes	• Increase the pre-primary enrollment rate of poorest five year-olds from 51% to 86%.[a] • Increase net pre-primary enrollment rate from 71% to 86%.[b]	• Increased socio-emotional and language development of children, as measured by the Early Years Evaluation (EYE) instrument. • Achieve significant difference in grade repetition and dropout rates in grades three and four for children that attended Regional Model Centers, as compared to those rates for the total population in grades three and four.
Intermediate Outcomes		• Decrease the percentage of time during which children in pre-primary classrooms are not actively engaged, by five percentage points.[c] • Pedagogical model in use in 100% of Regional

	Access	*Quality*
		Model Centers and 50% of all pre-primary classrooms.
Outputs	• Carry out 200 initiatives involving cross-sectoral and public-private collaboration in the provision of early childhood services, benefitting 20,000 directly and 80,000 indirectly and benefitting 80% of the municipalities classified as poor or extremely poor.[d] • 36,000 new spaces created from construction of 600 classrooms and construction of 17 Regional Model Centers.[e] • 36,000 improved spaces from rehabilitating 425 existing classrooms and 18 classrooms in regional model centers.[f] • 5 activities to enhance cross-sectoral collaboration.	• Fully equipped and operational Educational Resource Center. • All pre-primary classrooms in the country possess a minimum amount of classroom materials. • All Regional Model Centers and 50% of pre-primary classrooms will have a functioning committee or association. • 1,700 teachers (all teachers in Regional Model Centers and 50% of pre-primary classrooms) receive professional development. • Activities to strengthen parent committee and parent education campaign.

a. The target was lowered to 69%
b. This indicator was dropped because of difficulty attributing it to project activities.
c. This indicator was dropped, since it was poorly defined and difficult to measure and replaced with another.
d. The targets on this indicator were revised to only track the number of direct (50,000) beneficiaries and indirect beneficiaries (100,000) and not number of projects.
e. Due to increased construction cost, this target was lowered to 18,600.
f. This target was revised downward (26,580) due to increased construction cost.
Source: Derived by author from the Project Appraisal Document and ISRs

3. Implementation

3.1 The project was approved on September 5, 2002 and became effective 15 months later, on December 2, 2003. The delay was the result of the time it took to obtain approval from the Lower Chamber of the Legislature. This delay has been observed in other Bank loans in the Dominican Republic, and was not due to project issues. Given the lengthy delay, some preparatory activities were begun earlier, which demonstrated the high level of commitment from the Ministry of Education given to this project. For example, two pilot pre-primary teacher Centers were established in 2003.

Table 6. Appraisal and Actual Cost of the Project by Component ($ million)

Component	*Appraisal Estimate*	*Actual Cost*	*Actual as a Percent of the Appraisal Cost*
Expanding pre-primary education services	25.19	23.31	92.1
Increasing early childhood quality	20.32	27.20	133.8
Institutional strengthening	7.44	6.72	90.3
Project management and monitoring	2.42	4.42	182
Contingencies	6.21		
Total Project Cost	62.00[a]	62.07 [a]	

[a] Includes a front-end fee of $ 6.42.
Source: World Bank 2002, 2012.

3.2 Throughout most of implementation, the project was rated moderately satisfactory or satisfactory for implementation progress in the Implementation Status Reports. The exceptions were the reports in 2004 due to the lack of stable project management personnel and the lack of counterpart funds and so the rating was unsatisfactory, and one report on December 20, 2009 downgraded the project to moderately unsatisfactory at the recommendation of the region-wide portfolio review. Ratings for progress on the development objective were satisfactory across the life of the project, with ratings of moderately satisfactory in some of the reports in 2009 and 2011.

Implementation Experience

3.3 Disbursements were slower than expected throughout the project, which were related to procurement problems and personnel changes within the Project Coordinating Unit. These changes mainly coincided with the changes in Governments and Ministers.

3.4 Project objectives remained the same throughout, but during the first year of the project the Government emphasized that its priority was universalizing the enrollment of five year-olds and attaining this goal by 2008. The Government initiated its own parallel civil works projects to increase the access and enrollment of five year-olds. The number of additional classrooms created outside the project could not be confirmed. The Government on its own also created campaigns to stress the importance of pre-primary education. The World Bank was the only donor involved in nonformal early childhood development. Although the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was also involved in pre-primary education, there was no coordination with the IDB in this project, since the IDB did not have a project addressing early childhood development during this time (World Bank 2002).

3.5 Government counterpart funding, expected to be RD$40 million, was constrained during the first year of the project but in the context of tight macroeconomic constraints on public spending due to the economic downturn, only RD$ 16 million was allocated within the 2004 national budget. This constrained implementation and disbursements for the first year, since this amount was less than half of what was needed to complete the planned annual activities. In subsequent years, adequate counterpart funding was provided, demonstrating the strong commitment by the Government to the early childhood education sub-sector.

3.6 Another factor negatively impacting implementation was personnel changes at all levels of the project. There were three different Governments. Each election brought a new Minister and changes in key project personnel, as well as Ministry staff. For example, from the start of the project until the mid-term review in 2008, the Coordinator of the Implementation Unit changed three times, the Project Coordinator (Director of ECD in the Ministry) changed three times, and the Procurement Officer changed four times. The Minister of Education changed four times. The resulting firing of personnel negatively impacted the project, since the replacements needed training or initiated new procedures or processes. Time was needed during staffing transitions to get back to existing levels of capacity. The effects of the rotation of staff were directly evident upon project disbursements, as measured by their slow pace.

3.7 Because giving pubic money from the Grant Fund to private organizations was a controversial topic, a Board with multiple high-level stakeholders oversaw the Fund, instead of the implementing agency or Ministry. This enhanced its transparency. The Board took the selection of projects seriously, since only 60 projects were funded out of 230 submitted proposals (Grupo Gestion Moderna 2011).

3.8 Between August 23–31, 2005 there was a tropical storm in the Bahamas, which subsequently turned into Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast of the United States. While the Dominican Republic was not in the direct path of Katrina, there were significant impacts of this storm on the civil works activities of the project, since materials from the United States were not exported outside due to the Gulf Coast rebuilding. This resulted in a significant rise in the cost of materials. The unit cost of constructing a new classroom increased from the appraisal estimate of US$20,000 to $45,000 and rehabilitating a classroom rose from $5,500 to $12,000 (Secretaria de Estado de Educacion 2007). Additional financing to achieve PAD targets was needed, which was not possible for the Government. Thus, these higher per-unit costs lowered the number of classrooms built and rehabilitated.

3.9 There were two activities not originally envisioned that were implemented by the project. The Ministry implemented a pilot program on Information Communication Technology (ICT) that it established ICT Corners in selected pre-primary classrooms to promote technology use at this level. Teachers were trained in the technology (computer and software) and in using it for learning activities. The pilot was designed to see if this technology could be integrated into the pedagogical model and to determine its impact in education quality. The other activity was the inclusion of first and second grade teachers with the pre-primary teachers in the professional development activities. This served the purpose of familiarizing primary teachers of the pre-primary methodology so that they could incorporate these techniques in their classroom.

3.10 The mid-term review occurred in June 2007, at which time about 18 percent of the project had disbursed (Secretaria de Estado de Educacion 2007). Given the low disbursements and the procurement delays, it was suggested to add personnel to the Implementing Agency and strengthen its coordination with the technical unit with the Ministry of Education. Given the price escalation in materials, a plan was developed to reduce the number of classrooms constructed. Strategies to promote sustainability of the Grant Fund and Mesa Consultiva were also discussed.

3.11 The project closed three years later than originally planned. There were three extensions. The reasons for the first two were the slow pace of disbursements due to procurement difficulties and the longer than expected time period for firms to complete construction activities . The final extension was needed because construction began later and went into the rainy seasons, and because new awards were halted by the new Procurement Committee until its review was completed.

Safeguards

3.12 The project was classified category B for Environmental Assessment (Operational Policy 4.01). During preparation a social and environment assessment was carried out. A

Bank consultant monitored compliance with the environmental safeguard during construction. New classrooms were placed in existing school sites and no new land was needed. As well, school principals monitored construction activities to ensure student safety. The project adhered to Bank environmental guidelines. Satisfactory ratings for compliance were noted in each implementation report.

Fiduciary

3.13 Financial Management was rated satisfactory or moderately satisfactory throughout the project in Implementation Status Reports. The implementing agency performed according to Bank financial guidelines and had acceptable financial management arrangements. During the first two years, there were delays in processing the Bank's disbursements from the Central Bank to the Project Coordination Unit. The competency and skill of staff varied because they were reallocated and at times was replaced with less experienced staff. The implementing agency failed to update the counterpart funding between 2008 and 2011, which was remedied in the last months of the project, allowing for all funds to be spent.

3.14 Procurement management was weak throughout the project. There were slow bidding and contracting processes, which were the main reasons for project extensions. From 2009 through 2011, procurement was rated moderately unsatisfactory. Ratings in the prior years were either moderately satisfactory or satisfactory. Shortcomings were due to a turnover of committee members and significant delays with internal approval processes, which led to delays in awarding and signing contracts, as well as a general lack of willingness to effect the changes necessary to make the procurement process more efficient.

3.15 Bank actions contributed to delay in the procurement process. Project records indicated that during the early phase of the project the Bank did not respond within the two-week time period to "no objection" certification. This issue was eventually resolved. However, a larger issue occurred when the Bank required the Borrower to rebid a solicitation which it had already evaluated. When the Bank's procurement staff reviewed the government's request, the staff found that the Borrower had limited the number of contracts that firms could be awarded, which did not comply with the Bank's international competitive bidding procedures. The Borrower did this because the Bank issued the no objection to a document, where it had inserted the clause to limit the number of contracts each firm could be awarded, after it had a discussion with the Task Team Leader (TTL) and consultant. However, the Bank's procurement staff did not participate in this discussion with the Borrower. The Borrower did not alert the Bank's procurement staff of the inserted clause, and the procurement staff of the Bank did not fully read the document before giving the no objection. The rationale for making this change was to address the problem of firms not being able to complete the classrooms on time because of being awarded multiple contracts. Respondents estimated the Bank's decision resulted in three to nine months of time delay for the Borrower to re-do and re-evaluate the bid.

3.16 During the first two years of the project and the final year, the Project Coordination Unit requested an exemption for international competitive bidding of civil works procurement to accelerate implementation. With the approval of the Bank, the local shopping

method[4] was used to select contractors. Contracts were able to be processed more efficiently by the Project Coordination Unit, in comparison to international competitive bidding. Firms were selected based on their previous experience of timely completion.

3.17 Other performance weaknesses were inadequate internal control mechanisms and delays in submitting audit reports for FY2007 and FY2008 because of lack of timeliness in hiring the audit firm. Audit reports highlighted errors such as co-mingling of Bank and Government contributions and incorrect categorization of Bank disbursements. All issues were resolved before the end of the project.

Implementation of Monitoring and Evaluation

3.18 During the course of the project, some changes were made to the design of the M&E. A poorly defined outcome measure was replaced and two others were modified. Targets related to civil works were lowered because of the higher cost of materials. One outcome indicator (i.e., enrollment rate of five year-olds) was dropped, because it was not clear if it was also tracking children enrolled in first grade or just those in pre-primary. The target for one outcome measure — increasing the enrollment rate of the poorest five year-olds — was lowered from 86 percent to 69 percent. These changes were documented during two separate level two restructurings.

3.19 M&E was rated moderately satisfactory or satisfactory throughout the project, except for the first year when it was rated unsatisfactory because of the delay in conducting the Baseline Study. Even though Bank staff provided support to the evaluation unit (e.g. conceptualizing the design and developing the terms of reference), this study took considerable time and was not completed until 2006.

3.20 A large number of evaluations was completed. These included:

- Baseline for the Impact Evaluation;
- Final Evaluation of Component 1 – Expanding Pre-primary Education Services;
- Final Evaluation of Component 2 – Increasing ECD Education Quality;
- Final Evaluation of the Grant Program for Inter-Institutional Support;
- Evaluation of Implementation of the Information Communication Technology (ICT) Corners;
- Evaluation of the Systemization of the Implementation Process for the Project; and Financial Evaluation of the Project to Strengthen Pre-primary Education.

3.21 A supply and demand study was conducted during preparation, and two additional supply and demand studies were done during project implementation, one at the beginning of the project and the other when there were discussions about additional financing by the government to meet the PAD classroom targets. The Baseline Report was completed by consultants of the Bank's Human Development Team, which laid the foundation for an impact evaluation to track improvements in access and quality at the pre-primary level. Consultants hired by the Office of International Cooperation prepared the final report to

[4] The Implementing Agency selected firms, not based on competitive bidding.

assess improvements in quality, but this was not an impact evaluation.[5] Project indicators were regularly updated and tracked in the Bank's supervision reports.

3.22 The project undertook additional evaluations of each of the project components (Pre-primary Coverage, Pre-primary Quality, Grant Fund), which overcame some of the previously noted shortcomings, since these evaluations provide some information about the results and effectiveness of project activities. However, it was envisioned that the project would conduct an impact evaluation with a longitudinal cohort design to collect the initial data from a sample of five year-olds attending pre-school and those that did not, and that subsequent data from these two samples would be able to attribute improvements in outcomes to the project (e.g. reduced drop-out, reduced repetition, and improved child development).

4. Achievement of the Objectives

Increasing Access to Early Childhood Education with a Particular Focus on the Poor

4.1 The objective of increased access to early childhood education services was **modestly** achieved. Activities to attain this objective were the construction of new classrooms/Centers, information campaigns, parent education, and the Grant Fund to provide innovative projects for early childhood development services for those 0–5 years old.

Outputs

4.2 **Communication Campaign**. Multiple activities were conducted to raise parents' awareness to counteract what was assumed to be the main barrier to access and attendance, lack of parental awareness of the importance of enrolling their child in pre-primary (World Bank 2002; Peguero 2011). Materials were disseminated by the Ministry about the importance of early childhood education, national policies, and educational options available to families. Information campaigns were conducted to give knowledge on how parents could improve learning and nurture their children's curiosity, as well as a national radio campaign "Take your five year-old to school". The Escuelas de Padres (Parents' School) program was revitalized, which school directors noted was helpful to teach parents about child development, addressing learning obstacles, and getting fathers to become more caring with their children. These are important activities, since parents are an important vehicle for improving child development. However, there was no tracking of the number of radio campaigns, their reach, or the number of materials distributed. Interviewees reported that some parents still did not understand the importance of sending their child to school for pre-primary. It is not clear how targeted or effective the campaigns were among the poor. The extent to which other constraints also hindered access is unknown.

[5] The evaluation was not clear on the sample selection criteria, nor the process to assure similarities between the groups, nor method to control for differences to assess the counterfactual. It did not calculate the double difference between the treatment and comparison group.

4.3 **Classroom Construction.** Because of price escalation, 245 of the planned 600 new classrooms were constructed. The project's civil works activities created 19,500 new spaces, rather than the planned 36,000. Observations by the IEG mission showed that classrooms provided good illumination and ventilation, and were furnished to children's size (tables, book shelves, sinks, lockers). Data were not available on the existing number of pre-primary classrooms and thus, it is not possible to determine what percentage of total supply these new classrooms represented.

4.4 One Center was constructed in each education district, which was expected to create spaces for 4,140 additional students annually. Construction was completed on all of the Centers. The Centers provided access for five-year olds, as well as established areas within each district for teachers to observe best practices.

4.5 Ministry of Education respondents reported that the criteria to select schools were: poverty; population density; and schools with space to add a new classroom. Most of the new classrooms were built in the provinces of Santo Domingo (84), San Cristobal (18), Distrito Nacional (17), San Juan de la Maguana (16), and San Pedro de Marcosis/La Romana (14) (See Annex B for distribution of new classrooms in relation to provincial poverty rates). All of these areas are near Santo Domingo, the capital, except for San Juan.

4.6 New classroom construction was mapped to each respective municipality to see if school sites were concentrated in municipalities with higher poverty. Municipal poverty rates were examined, since there are large differences in the poverty rate within provinces. For example, within the poor provinces of San Juan, Bahoruco and Azua, differences in municipal poverty rates reach up to 30 percentage points (World Bank 2006). At the municipal level, the five areas that had more classrooms built were Santo Domingo Este (29), Santo Domingo Norte (24), Distrito Nacional (17), San Pedro de Macoris (12), and La Romana (10) — all being areas where poverty is low (see Annex B). The correlation coefficient between the number of classrooms built and poverty rate at the municipal level was negative ($r = -0.52$), as shown in Figure 2. In other words, more classrooms were built in municipalities with lower poverty rates.

4.7 However, classroom construction was focused in the municipalities with the largest number of poor people. As Figure 3 shows, there was a positive relation between the number of classrooms built and the number of poor people residing in the municipality. The mapping exercise was not able to identify whether the classrooms were in the poorest areas of the municipality. Based on this evidence, the project focused on the poor in relation to civil works activities.

4.8 **Innovation Fund.** The Fund for Early Childhood Development Innovations was established by the project, which was the main activity to improve access for children under five years old. 54 organizations received grants and implemented 60 projects (Grupo Gestion Moderna, 2011). Grants ranged from RD$1.9 million (approximately US$48,000) to 8.3 million (approximately US$212,000), with most being funded around RD$3–4 million. Table 7 displays the annual planned and actual execution for the Grant Fund, which shows that each year a much lower amount disbursed than was planned.

Figure 2. Relationship between Number of Classrooms Built and Municipal Poverty Rate



Source: Annex C

Figure 3. Relationship between Number and Classrooms and Number of Poor People



Source: Annex C

Table 7. Grant Fund Amount Planned and Actual Execution (RD) 2004–2010

Year	*Planned*	*Actual*	*Percentage*
2004	2,765,955	1,887,399	68.3
2005	5,109,138	3,531,985	69.1
2006	8,336,650	3,440,261	41.3
2007	11,308,890	7,148,141	63.2
2008	11,971,139	6,433,881	53.7
2009	20,451,431	5,370,516	26.3
2010	13,604,357	7,375,149	54.2

Source: Grupo Gestion Moderna 2011

4.9 While projects were implemented in 22 provinces, approximately 42 percent of the funding was awarded for projects in the capital and nearby provinces. The provinces that received a higher percentage of funding were: Santo Domingo/Districto Nacional (20.86 percent), San Pedro de Macoris (10.72 percent), Santiago (10.34 percent), San Juan Maguana (8.44 percent), and Monte Plata (7.79 percent) (Grupo Gestion Moderna, 2011). The IEG Mission was told by grantees that their projects focused on the poor in the neighborhoods they operated.

4.10 The Grant Fund's operational manual established eight priority areas for which organizations could be funded (Table 8). While all of the topics relate to children, there were three areas (creative/recreation in community spaces, understanding rights of children, and strengthening community organizations) that do not appear to directly assist in achieving the project's development objective. When adding the number of proposals relating to the first four lines of action and the number related to parent education training, three quarters (41 of the 54 projects) supported the attainment of the project's development objective.

Table 8. Priorities Established by Grant Fund

Line of Action	*Number of Projects Funded*[6]
Increase access and/or quality of initial education	23
Implement community services for children or parents	8
Services for children with special needs	3
Public health services for children	1
Strategies to give creative expression or recreation in community spaces	5
Parent education/training	6
Understanding of rights of children	2
Strengthening community organizations	6

Source: Grupo Gestion Moderna 2011

4.11 The IEG mission distributed surveys to 48 grantees. From the analysis of 19 grantees who responded to IEG's survey[7] (Annex B), nearly all of the activities implemented were

[6] The Evaluation of the Grant Fund describes 54 projects, rather than 60 (Grupo Gestion Moderna 2011).

relevant to the project development objectives. Projects either provided direct services to children, their parents, or a combination of the two. Some projects also implemented training activities for the teachers working with the children. Parent education related to health, sanitation, nutrition, or violence reduction to improve children's development. Several grantees used funds to make physical infrastructure changes to their buildings. Organizations reported that the projects positively contributed to the beneficiaries' development, which were primarily the poor (Gestion Moderna, 2011) and reported similar results to the IEG Mission.

4.12 The 19 grantees that completed IEG's survey reported that 7,098 children were provided early childhood services that would not otherwise have received it without the grant. An evaluation of the Grant Fund estimated the number of direct beneficiaries from the grants to be 61,000 and indirect beneficiaries such as parents and teachers 195,735 (Grupo Gestion Moderna 2011).These figures are much higher than what survey respondents reported. This may be because IEG asked grantees the number of children (0–5) who were provided services that would not have been provided without the resources from the Fund. According to survey respondents, most children who received services were 3–5 years of age since fewer organizations addressed children 0–2 years of age. However, eight grantees also provided services to basic education age children (or adults), which was not the objective of this project.

4.13 The overall sustainability of the Grant Fund cannot be determined, as several grantee organizations no longer existed. Ten had no working website, email, or phone number.[8] This suggests that 10 out of 48 projects were not sustained. However, among those reached and still in operation, nearly every organization (18 out of 19) that responded to IEG's survey noted that some or all the activities of the project were continuing (Table 9), which was similarly reported in the project's evaluation of the Grant Fund (Grupo Gestion Moderna, 2011). Organizations have been able to continue the activities with other sources of funding, such as from the private and public sector, international organizations or by charging fees to parents. However, one consequence of charging a fee to parents is that financial resources will be a barrier for the poor.

Table 9. Summary of Grantee Survey Responses (n=19)

Sustainability at end of grant:	***Number of Respondents***
All activities continued	12
Some activities continued	6
All activities ended	1

Source: IEG Survey

4.14 One reason that these organizations sustained all or some of the activities might be related to the fact that more developed organizations were the ones most often selected by the

[7] The survey was sent to 48 grantees where there was contact information. From the 48, 10 were not able to be reached, since they appeared to no longer exist. The response rate was thus 40 percent.

[8] Multiple efforts were made by the local data collector for the survey, as well as the Bank's Santo Domingo office, to set up interviews for the Mission.

Board of the Grant Fund, since their proposals typically received higher ratings (Grupo Gestion Moderna, 2011).

Outcomes

4.15 The overall pre-primary enrollment rate was expected to increase from 71 percent to 86 percent as a result of the civil works and other activities of the project. The Ministry's goal was to universalize pre-primary education by 2008, through the efforts of this project, along with its additional efforts to build classrooms. No data were available on the number of classrooms constructed by the Government outside of the project. Labor survey data from the Central Bank estimated that the enrollment rate of five year-olds increased from 77 percent in 2008 to 84 percent in 2010 (Peguero 2011). Similarly, the public and private enrollment rate of five year-olds increased from 59.8 percent in 2003 to 80.4 percent in 2010, according to data supplied by the Ministry of Education. Table 10 shows the steady improvement in the rate of five year-olds enrolled from the start of the project until 2010, which is the most recent data. However, it should be pointed out that the Bank stopped collecting and monitoring the enrollment rate of five-year olds, given its concern that data may not solely reflect children in pre-primary, but could also include those in first grade.

Table 10. Enrollment Rate of Five Year-Olds (Public and Private) (percent), 2003–2010

Source	*2003*	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*
Ministry of Education	59.8	68.8	65.4	67.9	68.3	74.9	75.4	80.4
Central Bank Labor Survey						77		84

Source: Ministry of Education and Peguero 2011.

4.16 The number of children enrolled in pre-primary, as reported by the Ministry conflicts with its own enrollment rate for five-year olds (Table11). The number of children in pre-primary leveled off in 2007 and then declined. The data also suggest that pre-primary enrollment has been increasing in the private sector, rather than the public sector, despite construction of additional public classrooms by the project and other government efforts. Public sector enrollments decreased by more than 10,000 students and the private sector enrollment increased by 17,822 students. It is not clear why data from the Ministry show two different patterns.

Table 11. Pre-primary Enrollment Number of Students by Sector, 2003–2011

	Public	*Private*	*Semi-official*	*Total*
2003–04				121,660
2004–05				125,449
2005–06	98,020	33,653	2,536	134,209
2006–07	82,129	45,272	2,852	130,253
2007–08	100,546	43,933	2,598	147,077
2008–09	95,585	48,321	3,246	147,152
2009–10	87,118	51,776	3,015	141,909
2010–11	87,414	51,475	3,208	142,097

Source: Ministry of Education

4.17 Lower than expected enrollment was noted in schools with new classrooms visited, particularly the Model Centers. In talking with school principals, the IEG Mission was able to confirm this year's enrollment in 14 of the 18 Model Centers. Table 12 shows the expected and actual number of pre-primary students enrolled in Model Centers.

Table 12. Expected and Actual Enrollment in Model Centers, 2012 School Year

Model Center	*Expected Number of Pre-primary students*	*Actual Number of Pre-primary Students*	*Actual/Expected (%)*
A	240	155	65
B	240	130	54
C	240	141	59
D	240	120	50
E	240	74	31
F	240	160	67
G	240	163	68
H	180	115	64
I	240	233	97
J	180	62	34
K	240	180	75
L	240	145	60
M	240	114	48
N	240	89	37
Total # Students	**3,240**	**1,881**	**58**

Source: Principals' report to IEG via interview or telephone call

4.18 If these 14 Centers had been fully enrolled, there would have been 3,240 five year-olds attending pre-primary. Instead, only 1,881 children were enrolled, 58 percent of capacity. Thus, some of the new classrooms were vacant or under-utilized. The Ministry did not have enrollment data for the new classrooms constructed and thus, the total enrollment increase attributed to the project's civil works could not be determined. Considering all the evidence, it appears that there were modest increases in enrollment, but significant under-enrollment, which was similarly reported by teachers (Peguero 2011).

4.19 Principals reported that there were often other private or public schools near the Centers and so parents had options. The Mission was told that working parents preferred private schools because these schools operated for a full day or provided after school care.

4.20 The target for enrollment of the poorest five year-olds was initially 86 percent, but was revised downward to 69 percent in 2010 at restructuring. An evaluation reported that the project increased the pre-primary enrollment rate of poor five year-olds from 51 percent in 2002 to 71 percent in 2011 (Peguero 2011). This was an estimate based on a change in enrollment between the years 2006–2010 in a sample of 150 education centers where poor children attend. During this time and in these schools, the enrollment increased 20.26 percentage points. This number was then added to the project's baseline figure (51 percent), to arrive at the conclusion that enrollment among the poor had increased to 71 percent, despite the fact that the baseline utilized a different sample. Since schools do not collect demographic data, no other data were found to compare with this finding. In the schools

visited, it was reported that all the students were poor: "only the poor attend this school or enroll in public schools" was the answer provided.

Strengthening the Quality of Early Childhood Education with a Particular Focus on the Poor

4.21 The achievement of this objective is rated as **substantial**. Several complementary activities were conducted to improve the quality of pre-primary education (five year-olds), including: establishing Education Resource Centers; providing training to teachers, district and regional coordinators, and principals; offering a standard set of pedagogical supplies and materials in every classroom; renovating 409 existing pre-primary classrooms; involving and educating parents; awarding grants; and improving cross-sectoral coordination. Figure 3 depicts the project's theory of action related to pre-primary education to show how the inputs worked together to support teachers, since what teachers do (or how they instruct) is what improves children's development. The subsequent discussion relates to improving quality for five year-olds in pre-primary education. Given that all pre-primary classrooms received supplies, schools serving the poor benefited.

4.22 As Figure 4 shows, teachers were provided with curriculum (pedagogical model), received training on the model, and given a set of pedagogical materials/supplies. Training was also provided to principals and district/regional coordinators so that they would be instructional leaders and monitor quality. The pedagogical model required assessing what students know three times a year. Literature suggests that monitoring students' progress or evaluating students is a classroom practice that raises achievement (Slavin 1986; Fuchs and Fuchs 1993). All of these activities worked together to support what the teacher did in the classroom to motivate and engage children, which would be expected to lead to improvement in social, emotional, physical, and language development. IEG (2011) found in its review of education projects, fewer Bank projects were able to substantially attain objectives of improving education quality in comparison to objectives related to access/enrollment.

Figure 4. Project's Theory of Action to Support Early Childhood Development



Source: Author

Outputs

4.23 A pedagogical model was updated during the project. The model contained a schedule that breaks the day into activities to address language, gross motor, and other skills within various groupings, making the model easier for teachers to apply. The model reflected the principles of how young children learn, emphasizing freedom for children to move, organizing the classroom into activity corners, such as dramatization, art, mathematics, science, and giving children time to play and make choices. Teachers also received a guidebook to be able to implement the pedagogical model. Figure 5 shows the typical organization of a pre-primary classroom.

Figure 5. Pre-primary Classroom

Source: IEG mission, October 2012

4.24 Teacher training was provided to all teachers in regional Model Centers and in over half of the pre-primary classrooms, which included 3,931 teachers. Training comprised pedagogical groups, classroom observations, reviewof classroom plans, coaching, and demonstration. This model of ongoing training is reflective of how adults learn and consistent with the characteristics of effective professional development (Garet and others 2001), where learning occurs via discussion, observation, and dialogue about subsequent applications. A total of 326 pedagogical groups were held, covering every district, except for one, over the course of the project. Each pedagogical group had approximately 10 participants. Teachers had favorable impressions of the usefulness of the pedagogical groups, which have continued after project closure (Grupo Gestion Moderna 2011), based on IEG Mission interviews. During sessions, topics such as developmentally appropriate child-centered curriculum and teaching methods were discussed and modeled. Three hundred and eighty (380) pre-primary teachers completed a specialization in early childhood education in the Teacher Training Institutes.

4.25 The training was successful in fostering implementation of the pedagogical model, and achieving changes in teaching practices in terms of schedules and use of time and space (Grupo Gestion Moderna 2011). There was evidence that the pedagogical model was implemented in the twelve classrooms selected[9] by the IEG Mission for observation, and was also reported in a project evaluation (Grupo Gestion Moderna 2011). Children were active and engaged (Figure 6). There were interactions between teachers and students. Teachers bent down to talk with students to be at their level. They spoke warmly to children. Music and singing were often used by teachers. The activities focused on content such as: letters, sounds, fine motor skills, and numbers. However, no reading activities were observed — either teachers reading aloud or children interacting with books. Teachers adhered to the schedule, which provided time for large-group, small-group, and individual activities. There were times allocated for children to select different educational activities. There were opportunities for indoor and outdoor play. The IEG Mission also visited first and second grade classrooms by way of comparison. The first and second grade classrooms visited operated in a traditional teacher-directed manner, in contrast to the new pedagogical model being implemented in pre-primary classrooms.

Figure 6. Children Utilizing Objects and Play to Learn

Source: IEG mission, October 2012

4.26 Every pre-primary classroom in the country received the standard minimum amount of classroom materials over the course of the project. This included classroom furniture and supplies, consumable materials, teacher resources, and didactic materials such as puzzles, games, blocks, books, and a CD of songs. These were vital to improving education quality, since children this age benefit from these resources. The project also financed the design and distribution of technical materials, which teachers reported to be important in supporting their training and implementation of the curriculum (World Bank 2012). A total of 625,276 workbooks for pre-primary were distributed and 3,519 sets of classroom education material were distributed (World Bank 2012). Observations showed that the materials reached classrooms and were being utilized. Centers were more fully equipped than classrooms and there were instances where not everything was received, but the missing items did not compromise quality. Consumable supplies were being replenished annually by the Ministry.

[9] IEG selected new and renovated classrooms to visit in Santo Domingo, San Cristobal, and Azua. Observations in Monte Plata and San Cristobal were not possible because of Tropical Storm Sandy.

Teachers effectively and creatively utilized the materials to develop hands-on learning experiences for the children.

4.27 Teachers had a protocol for evaluating pre-primary students three times each year. It is not clear how the results were shared with parents so that they would be able to interpret and understand them, since the evaluation had many groupings of knowledge and skills that were similar. In the literature, efforts to assess student's progress have been found to assist teachers in better diagnosing children's needs and informing their instruction (Slavin 1986; Fuchs and Fuchs 1993).

4.28 Training was also provided to 18 regional and 105 district education staff with the initial education unit of the Ministry. This allowed everyone working at the various levels of the Ministry to have a full understanding of the pedagogical model. Conversations with regional and district coordinators showed that they had technical knowledge of early childhood education. The strategy of training at all levels ensured that the coordinators and directors who monitored the implementation of the pedagogical model and assisted teachers were adequately trained. Thus, they appeared to provide a vital role of quality assurance.

4.29 A pilot project was implemented to use Information Communication Technology (ICT) Corners in 330 pre-primary classrooms (World Bank 2012). Teachers were provided training in basic aspects of the computer and the pedagogical use of it (Peralta, Riqelme, and Rivas 2010). Teachers reported that the computers were highly motivating for children and this was the first time they had used computers (Peralta, Riqelme, and Rivas 2010). However, the Mission observed in the twelve[10] classes it visited that many computers were not connected to the electricity, and none were connected to the internet. In two classroom observations the computers were being utilized by children to play educational games or by the teacher to write lesson plans. Based on the Mission observations and the basic level of application noted in project evaluation (Peralta, Riqelme, and Rivas 2010), the ICT corners did not appear to have improved the quality of pre-primary classrooms.

Outcomes

4.30 In terms of outcomes, a project evaluation reported that children who enrolled in public pre-primary education (five year olds) had significantly higher scores on the areas tested by the Early Years Evaluation (EYE) (that is, language and communication, self-knowledge and understanding, cognitive, social skills, and physical development) than those who did not attend public pre-primary (Grupo Gestion Moderna 2011This evaluation examined a group of students within a national sample of districts and schools that included 1,482 boys and girls from 187 teachers. However, the evaluation did not control for differences between the two groups of children so that other factors (such as family income, mother's education, parental involvement in education, or the nutritional status of children),

[10] ICT corner was not present in every classroom visited.

could also be responsible for the observed differences. It did not control for factors affecting for self-selection of children to attend pre-primary by their parents.[11]

4.31 Principals and teachers reported to the IEG Mission that differences were evident in primary school between children who had attended pre-primary and those who had not. Students who had participated in pre-primary had better fine motor skills and knew the alphabet, sounds, and numbers, while those who began school in the first grade had limited or no exposure to these skills. Principals, regional and district coordinators found pre-primary education to be a great investment, since it prepared students for first grade, which had an impact on subsequent learning.

4.32 Another evaluation conducted by the project found a reduction in the repetition rate by three percentage points at grade three for those children who attended pre-primary, compared to the rate for the total population in grade three (Peguero 2011). Similarly, there was a reduction in the repetition rate by five percentage points at grade four for children that benefited from the project, compared to the rate for the total population in grade four (Peguero 2011). These findings seem plausible, given the differences in readiness skills between those who had participated in pre-primary education and those who had not, as reported by school principals, which is also consistent with international evidence (Montie, Xiang, and Schweinhart 2006; Schweinhart and others 2005).

5. Efficiency

5.1 Efficiency is rated as **modest**.

5.2 **Benefit-cost analysis.** Interventions in the early years of life generate substantial economic and social benefits, such as increased school attainment, reduced dropout and repetition rates, improved health status and decreases in criminal activity (Montie, Xiang, and Schweinhart 2006; Schweinhart and others 2005). The economic benefits anticipated at appraisal for this project included: (a) reduction in grade repetition from increased school readiness, which limits inefficiencies in the education system and lowers household schooling expenses, (b) maximization of resources through integration of health, nutrition, and education, and (c) participation of mothers in income-generating activities and (d) enabling older siblings to attend school (World Bank 2002).

5.3 During appraisal, the internal rate of return IRR of the project was estimated to be 7.5 percent. This figure did not include the non-monetary benefits associated with a more educated Dominican population[12] (World Bank 2002) and was based on an expected 25 percent reduction in grade repetition and a 30 percent reduction in the dropout rates in the

[11] It did not take into effect the differences in background of parents who elected to enroll their children in pre-primary education, which may be systematically different than parents who do not enroll their children.

[12] The PAD proposed that including this would double the calculated IRR to 15 percent, but this calculation was not done.

first cycle of basic education. The total net present value of US$2.9 million was derived first, from "in school benefits" of lower expenditures per student due to lower repetition rates, and second from "out of school benefits" of higher labor market earnings when additional children reach adulthood due to lower repetition and lower dropout rates. The calculation included all project costs, which is not an accurate assumption, since some project costs attended children under five years old. However, the increased public enrollment was estimated to be 200,000 students annually, which is much higher than observed enrollment of both private and public pre-primary in any year.

5.4 The internal rate of return was recalculated at the end of the project, which was 8 percent, based on adjusted assumptions (for example, diminished impact per beneficiary, the increase in the number of beneficiaries, new labor market information, and the costs per student outside of pre-primary level) (World Bank 2012). These assumptions were adjusted since implementation extended beyond the original five years, which increased the number of project beneficiaries, as well as the infrastructure costs that reduced the number of new and rehabilitated classrooms. The updated estimate assumed a reduction of 12.5 percent in repetitions and 15 percent in the dropout rate between grades one to four.[13] This calculation also assumed that students exposed to the project would have an increase in 0.7 years of schooling, in comparison with those not exposed to early childhood education (World Bank 2012). Because of the increased human capital accumulation, it was assumed that these students would perform better in the labor market and thus increase their lifetime earnings by US$320. Decreasing the repetition and dropout rates was assumed to reduce the public costs in the education system by 3 percent (World Bank 2012). However, the number of children benefiting was assumed to be 1.37 million (over the course of the project), which is much higher than actual number of children enrolled in both public and private schools of the project and more than double actual public enrollment over the course of the project.

5.5 It is likely that both calculations overestimate the return, since the enrollment assumptions used in both were unrealistically high. It should also be noted that the actual enrollment includes the spaces created by the Government's own parallel construction program, thus, the benefits associated with this project are lower. However, the assumed benefits from the improved quality resulting from lower repetition and dropout rates are valid.

5.6 **Cost-effectiveness**. The examination of multiple rounds of competitive bidding revealed that the civil works cost more than double the original estimates (the unit cost for new classrooms was US$45,000 rather than US$20,000 and the unit cost for rehabilitated classrooms was US$12,000 versus US$5,500) (Secretaria de Estado de Educacion 2007). As previously noted, the rebuilding efforts in the Gulf Coast in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina meant that essential materials were no longer supplied from the United States, thus making these materials more scarce and costly. Higher fuel costs also drove up construction costs, which greatly affected construction prices. With the delays, contractors reported that they

[13] The original estimates were reduced by 50 percent to accommodate for the lower project expenditure per student given that the project was extended for three years longer, which raised the number of project beneficiaries.

were not able to finish the contract for their offer price and so the Government paid additional costs to some firms, outside of project resources and counterpart funding.

5.7 Classrooms included equipment and materials that were designed to reduce the recurrent maintenance cost to the schools. The project utilized toilets, sinks, partitions, windows, and roof materials that were 20–25 percent higher in costs, but were reported to reduce the replacement recurrence by three to five years, instead of each year. This would have positive financial benefits for the schools. However, the IEG mission observed problems with non-functioning toilets and lack of running water in 4 out of 7 schools. There were other deficiencies such as water damage to ceilings and cabinets. A stakeholder group of parents also expressed concerns with the quality of some of the construction materials (World Bank 2012).

5.8 The inefficiencies and bureaucracies within the implementing agency resulted in longer bidding processes and longer contract implementation. Project administrative costs were nearly double than what had been anticipated. This was due to the fact that the project was extended for three more years compared to the originally planned five years. The implementation unit hired more staff than previously planned to reduce procurement bottlenecks. It also conducted additional evaluations than were originally planned. When considering the total cost for project management divided by the number of project years, annual project management costs were US$68,500 higher each year than estimated at appraisal.

6. Ratings

Outcome

6.1 The project outcome rating is **Moderately Satisfactory**. This is based on high Relevance of Objectives; substantial Relevance of Design; modest achievement of the objective to increase access to early childhood education, especially among the poor, and substantial achievement of the objective to enhance the quality of early childhood education. Efficiency was modest. The project contributed to improving the quality of pre-primary education through teacher training, provision of materials, renovation of classrooms, and implementation of the new pedagogical model. Activities were also targeted to engage civil society and enhance the awareness of parents to get them more involved in their children's education. While new pre-primary classroom construction focused on the poor, there were only modest increases in enrollment and underutilization in Model Centers.

Risk to Development Outcome

6.2 The Risk to the Development Outcome is rated as **Moderate** because the Government has sustained many of the project activities and demonstrated a high commitment to early childhood education. Despite Government changes and replacements of the Education Ministers, there has been a consistent commitment from the Ministry of Education to universalize five year-old enrollment and support nonformal early childhood services from birth to four year-olds.

6.3 Many of the activities undertaken by this project to improve the quality of pre-primary education for five year-olds, have been sustained. District and regional coordinators visit pre-primary classrooms to monitor the application of the pedagogical model. Since October 2012, pedagogical groups have operated in 9 out of 18 districts. A local teacher training institute now offers the training course initiated under the project. The project has institutionalized a national forum, Mesa Consultiva, where 20 national and international, governmental and non-governmental institutions continue to work together to address early childhood development needs in regions with low access.

6.4 There has also been an emphasis by the Government to involve parents in the education process and create opportunities for children aged zero to five. The educational campaigns developed under the project are still being used, which is a way of continuing to bring awareness to parents. However, it is not clear how effective these campaigns were in removing, parental lack of awareness of the importance of pre-primary education, as a constraint to enrollment. It is not clear what other factors also constrain pre-primary enrollment among poor families.

6.5 The Board of the Grant Fund is still in existence has sought funding from other sources, and continued to fund 18 projects after the project closed(World Bank 2012). However, IEG's survey found a mixed picture in relation to the sustainability of funded projects. Out of 48 organizations for which contact information was available, there were 10 organizations which appeared to have closed, since there was no working phone, email, or website. Even though sustainability was not a part of the selection criteria, a number of projects have continued either all their activities (12 out of 19) or some of their activities (6 out of 19), and only one reported that the project ended when the funds stopped. The projects have been able to continue with other sources of funding, such as from the private and public sectors, international organizations, or by charging fees to parents.

6.6 While many of the risks to the development outcome are likely to be minimized by actions undertaken to continue project activities, there is a moderate risk related to adequate future resources to maintain the benefits achieved in access and quality at the initial education level (0-5 year old). The Ministry reported that there are discussions that the upcoming budget will allocate resources for a Grant Fund, as well as more resources devoted to the subsector.

Bank Performance

QUALITY AT ENTRY

6.7 Quality at entry is rated **Moderately Unsatisfactory.**

6.8 The strategic relevance of the project was high and there was an analytical assessment of the subsector on which the preparation was based. There was adequate time allotted for the preparation phase and the creation of a good working relationship between the Bank and Borrower. However, there were a number of shortcomings that impacted subsequent project implementation.

6.9 One of the shortcomings in preparation was low ratings of known risks (e.g., procurement capacity and frequent personnel changes in the PCU). The Procurement Capacity Assessment identified weaknesses (e.g., personnel hiring based on political influence, lack of in-house capacity to prepare bidding documents for international competitive bidding, reliance on shopping method for procurement, inadequate use of procurement plan, etc.), which were evident from the Bank's experience with the previous education project. However, the recommendations of the Capacity Assessment were inadequate to address these shortcomings. As well, the project appraisal document stated, "no special procurement problems are anticipated while implementing this project. Satisfactory technical capacity already exists in the Project Coordination Unit" (World Bank 2002). Yet, procurement capacity was the reason for the slow project disbursement and project extensions.

6.10 The risk of instability and rotation of staff in the Project Coordination Unit was assessed as low, since it contained experienced financial management personnel and had a clear organizational structure. Yet, given the timing of the next election, there was a very high likelihood that personnel changes would occur, as well as a restructuring of the unit, which had been the pattern with the previous education project (World Bank 2003).

6.11 Given the above noted factors, the amount of planned civil works was ambitious and unlikely to be completed within five years. Instead, it was likely to require an extension to be able to complete. Parallel preparation with the Project Coordination Unit and Ministry was not done, which would have facilitated more rapid implementation (e.g. training of staff on Bank procurement procedures, developing bidding documents, identifying school sites for civil works, and developing terms of reference).

6.12 There were few details provided in the appraisal document about the Grant Fund. The aim of the program was to provide early childhood services to three-five year-olds, and identify and support community-based integrated early childhood development models that could be replicated on a larger scale (World Bank 2002). Yet, the PAD lacked details to give a strategy for how the program was to achieve its intent of expanding services and reaching the poorest children aged 0–5 years who were without care (World Bank 2002). The criteria noted in the program description were: (1) the amount of grants (80 percent of projects funded were $25,000 or less), and (2) the capacity and feasibility of the applicants to carry out the proposal. There was no description of the priorities of the program, description of calls for proposals, or strategy to reach poor and rural communities. Annex 11 (Social and Beneficiary Assessment) and Annex 12 (Poverty Assessment) indicated that this program would be prioritized to municipalities classified as poor or extremely poor to expand services to the most difficult to reach poor children, but this information was not included in the description of the program, nor was there an allocation of the amount of funding to the poorest provinces. Moreover, without appropriate M&E for the Grant Fund, it was not possible to identify promising early childhood development models worthy of replication and scaling up.

6.13 There were other shortcomings. The basis for determining that the planned number of spaces (40,000) would lead to the pre-primary enrollment target (86 percent) was not clear, since the PAD lacked details. The PAD did not specify the stock of existing

classrooms in each educational district or municipality, as well as census of five-year olds in municipality. It also did not state areas where pre-primary classrooms were over or under enrolled. The Ministry completed a Supply and Demand Study, which identified the lack of awareness among parents of the benefits of early childhood services as the primary obstacle to services (World Bank 2002). However, the PAD did not describe how the project's two pronged approach (i.e., educating parents on physical and emotional child development through the Escuelas de Padres program and strengthening the parent and community committees) addressed the main constraint. The weaknesses in M&E Design were addressed during supervision, as well as by the Borrower commissioning additional evaluation reports.

QUALITY OF SUPERVISION

6.14 Quality of supervision is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

6.15 Bank supervision was highly involved. The task team leaders tried to resolve problems, as well provide more structure to some of the areas not well defined in the PAD. For example, the TTL and the implementing agency developed an operational manual for the Grant Fund, to minimize applications for grants from "ghost organizations" and provide some structure in the use of resources and how the Fund would operate. The Bank TTL reviewed resumés of potential Directors for the Fund and worked with the Implementing Agency to select a candidate who was not politically tied to either party, so that the person would be able to maintain the position and make independent decisions when the Government changed. As a result, the Fund was noted to be transparent in its operation (Gestion Moderna 2011).

6.16 The Bank provided consultants related to improving Ministry collaboration/ communication, monitoring civil works, and early childhood development, among others. The Bank TTL reviewed the Supply and Demand Study, which was the basis for selecting schools for the civil works. Appropriate transition arrangements were made between the four TTLs over the course of the project. The first TTL was based in Santo Domingo, which allowed for close contact with the Implementing Agency and Ministry. The remaining TTLs were based in Washington. Regular missions occurred throughout the project, as well as video conferences. Strong technical guidance was provided by each of the TTLs. Project restructuring was used to improve project performance and enhance design weaknesses in the Results Framework.

6.17 Because of the slow disbursements and procurement difficulties, much of the supervision was focused on resolving procurement bottlenecks. Bank procurement staff provided training on procurement regulations and process. Given the revolving staff within the implementing agency, this training was provided at least two times each year. However, the Bank technical and procurement team could have worked more closely to come up with joint solutions to resolve the procurement problems[14].

6.18 Bank performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

[14] See the fiduciary discussion in Chapter 3.

Borrower Performance

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

6.19 The Government's performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**. The Government exhibited strong commitment to early childhood education and to the project's development objective that lasted across the changes in Governments and Ministers of Education. The Government provided counterpart funds in a timely manner every year, except the first, when there was an austerity budget.

6.20 There were some weaknesses in the Government's performance. There was a fifteen month delay in Congress approving the loan, which resulted in the Government paying additional commitment commissions. With each change in Government or Minister, several staff in the Ministry and Implementing Agency were removed; the infrastructure technical team was reorganized four times. There was a political component to the hiring and firing of personnel, which had a negative impact on project implementation. As well, the new administration taking office in the spring of 2011 introduced personnel changes in the Procurement Committee, which froze all contracts for further review. This resulted in delaying the construction and as a result, the final classrooms were not completed before the rainy season and not all civil works were completed by the closing date (World Bank 2012). There were inefficiencies in the Ministry, which made it difficult to expedite contract awards.

IMPLEMENTING AGENCY PERFORMANCE

6.21 The Implementing Agency's performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**. The Department of Initial Education within the Ministry of Education was the technical leader of the project and provided project execution in conjunction with the Office of International Cooperation, which managed the fiduciary and project implementation. The Director of Early Childhood Education and the Minister were actively involved in the monitoring and supervision of implementation of key milestones. They also revised the line of communication between the Ministry and Project Coordination Unit and Ministry to have clearer communication.

6.22 The Implementing Agency exhibited strong leadership throughout the project, even with the director of the Office of International Cooperation changing several times. It worked closely with the Bank team of procurement specialists, consultants, and the five TTLs from preparation to closure. There was a strong commitment to monitoring and evaluation. A large number of evaluations were conducted, which were used to inform project implementation. There was adherence with environmental guidelines.

6.23 The main performance weakness related to slow disbursements, resulting from frequent changes in personnel in the implementing agency. Disbursements were slow in relation to civil works and the Grant Fund.

6.24 There were several difficulties encountered with the implementation of the civil works. Bundling of procurement packages meant that some awarded firms had to complete schools in various parts of the island, which was inefficient. There was insufficient staff to

monitor and supervise the civil works activities. Some firms without the financial and logistical capacity to complete contracts were granted awards, since the bidding requirements were set too low. Some firms did not have the cash flow and so stopped working, which delayed the completion of classrooms. There were some instances where the implementing agency was late in paying contractors, which added to their cash flow problems. There were long, internal processes within the Ministry and implementing agency. The frequent turnover of staff in the implementing agency also had a negative impact, since replacements did not understand international competitive bidding procedures.

6.25 Borrower performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

Monitoring and Evaluation

6.26 The quality of M&E is rated **Substantial**.

6.27 **M&E Design**: There were shortcomings in the design of the monitoring and evaluation. The original M&E system was designed to track outcomes and outputs related to improvement in access and quality for pre-primary (five year-olds). An impact evaluation was planned. With respect to improving the access and quality for 0–4 year-olds, the M&E design was inadequate, since there were no outcome measures for this age group. Outcome measures were lacking for institutional strengthening, grant program, family education initiatives, and parent committees.

6.28 **M&E Utilization**: Data from the M&E system were regularly used by the Borrower and the Bank. The Ministry routinely tracked the project-related indicators. Outcome indicators were tracked by consultants who prepared the evaluations. Information from all of these reports was the basis for reporting project outcome indicator data and assisted in measuring the achievement of the development objectives. As well, the findings from the evaluations were used by the government to make evidence-based policy decisions and improve the quality of the pre-primary model. For example, it was reported to the IEG Mission that the evaluation of the Quality of Pre-primary Education was very useful and helped them understand the importance of investing early. It was also stated that the indicators and the various studies helped internal discussions in the Ministry about policies related to initial education and other levels.

7. Lessons

7.1 Based on the experience of this project, several lessons can be drawn:

1. **Lack of attention to country context in project design can lead to considerable delays and inefficiencies.** In the case of this project, there was a long delay in project effectiveness (15 months) linked to the need for legislative approval of the loan, followed by extensive delays in implementation tied to low procurement capacity and frequent turnover of staff linked to the political cycle. There was no specific action taken to mitigate the well-known risks from the political system with respect to delays and turnover. The solutions proposed by the Capacity Assessment conducted at appraisal were inadequate to mitigate the well known shortfall in procurement capacity, particularly in light of frequent staff turnover.

2. **Greater proximity to pre-primary education is necessary but not sufficient for poor parents to enroll their children.** The project built new pre-primary classrooms in areas with large numbers of poor parents and launched a communications campaign – though it is unclear whether the latter targeted the poor. It also introduced quality improvements in public pre-school education. Yet, even though fewer classrooms were built than planned, there was under-enrollment of 5-year-olds in the new capacity. This suggests that there remain significant constraints to poor parents for the enrollment of their 5-year olds in pre-primary education. Informants noted that the fact that public pre-school is only half a day may be a factor: private schools provide all day programming either through a full day at school or combined with after school care, which is more convenient for working parents. This points to the importance of a good understanding of the most critical constraints affecting pre-primary enrollment.

3. **In the absence of strong selection criteria and explicit mechanisms for evaluating new approaches, learning from innovation funds will be limited.** As designed and implemented, the Grant Fund was not a vehicle for innovation, learning, or sustained access. Without strong monitoring and evaluation, there was no way to identify projects worthy of replication and scaling-up, as well as learn from the Fund.

Providing teachers with training, the necessary classroom supplies, and ongoing support from pedagogical groups, coupled with monitoring the implementation of the pedagogical model can improve quality in pre-primary classrooms. In this project, pre-primary teachers were provided with classroom supplies, a new curriculum, and peer-to-peer learning from pedagogical groups, as well as follow-up support. Some teachers observed classrooms in Model Centers. Coordinators and pedagogical leaders visited teachers' classrooms to monitor quality. This resulted in teachers using the supplies and applying what they learned from the professional development in their classrooms.

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Annex A. Basic Data Sheet

EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION PROJECT (P054937)

Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million)

	Appraisal estimate	Actual or current estimate	Actual as % of appraisal estimate
Total project costs	62.00	62.00	100.00
Loan amount	42.00	41.99	99.97
Cancellation	-	0.90	-

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	FY03	*FY04*	*FY05*	*FY06*	*FY07*	*FY08*	*FY09*	*FY10*	*FY11*	*FY12*
Appraisal estimate (US$M)	1.16	6.11	16.20	27.16	34.94	42.00	42.00	42.00	42.00	42.00
Actual (US$M)	0.00	0.92	3.32	6.84	11.48	18.86	23.99	32.63	38.58	41.99
Actual as % of appraisal	0.00	15.05	20.49	25.18	32.85	44.90	57.11	77.69	91.85	99.97
Date of final disbursement: 01/20/2012										

Project Dates

	Original	Actual
Initiating memorandum	08/24/1999	01/08/2002
Negotiations	07/01/2002	07/01/2002
Board approval	09/05/2002	09/05/2002
Signing	12/05/2002	12/06/2002
Effectiveness	12/02/2003	12/02/2003
Closing date	06/30/2008	08/30/2011

ANNEX A

Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
Lending	No. of staff weeks	US$ Thousands (including travel and consultants costs)
FY04	12	133.85
FY05	-	0.98
Total:	**12**	134.83
Supervision/ICR		
FY05	6	45.89
FY06	13	56.79
FY07	31	104.98
FY08	31	114.96
FY09	45	166.55
FY10	37	126.68
FY11	14	22.14
Total:	**177**	**637.99**
TOTAL	**189**	**772.82**

Task Team Members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Alberto Rodriguez	Senior Education Specialist	LCSHE	Task Team Leader
Martha Laverde	Education Specialist	LCSHE	Education, Institutional Analysis/Implementation arrangements
Blanca Hermosilla	Early Childhood Education Specialist	Consultant	Early Childhood Education
Catherine Gibbons	Community-based Development Specialist	Consultant	Community-based Development
Tatiana Romero Rey	Early Childhood Education	Consultant	Social issues
Wendy Cunningham	Economist	LCSHS	Economic Analysis
Joshua Gallu	Project Preparation Associate	LCSHS	Mission logistics and support
Monica Penuela	Social Sector Specialist	Consultant	Social and Beneficiary Assessments
Veronica Jarrin	Program Assistant	LCSHE	Operational Lending Support

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Evelyn Jorge Team	Assistant	DR Country Office	Operational Lending Support in the Dominican Republic
Mary Lucy Giraldo	Procurement Specialist	LCOPR	Procurement
Patricia Hoyes	Financial Management Specialist	LOAG3	Financial Management
Edward Daoud	Disbursement Officer	LOAG3	Disbursements
Reynaldo Pastor	Senior Legal Counsel	LEGLA	Legal
Pilar Gonzalez	Legal Counsel	LEGLA	Legal
Rajeev Swami	Financial Management Specialist	LOAG3	Financial Management
Kirsten Oleson	Environmental Specialist		Environmental Engineer
Jackson Morrill	Environmental Specialist, Consultant		Environmental Analysis
Marito Garcia	Senior Education Specialist		Peer Reviewer
Elizabeth King	Senior Education Specialist		Peer Reviewer
Mary Eming Young	Early Childhood Specialist		Peer Reviewer
William Experton	Senior Education Specialist		Country Sector Leader
Supervision/ICR			
Samuel Carlson	Sr. Social Protection Spec.	LCSHS	Task Team Leader
Raja Bettaouet Kattan	Senior Operations Officer	LCSHE	Task Team Leader
Cynthia Hobbs	Sr. Education Specialist	LCSHE	Task Team Leader January 2010 – September 2011
Martha Laverde	Education Specialist	LCSHE	Institutional and Implementation Arrangements
Karla McEvoy	Social Protection Specialist	LCSHD	Task Team Leader ICR
Luis Gazoni		Consultant	
Erika Dunkelberg	Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist	Consultant	Monitoring and evaluation
Mariana Montiel	Senior Counsel	LOA	Legal Counsel
Fabiola Altimari	Senior Counsel	LOA	Legal Counsel
Fabienne Mroczka	Financial Management Spec	LCOAA	Financial management
Svetlana Klimenko	Financial Management Spec	LCOAA	Financial management
Guido Paolucci	Senior Procurement Specialist	LCSPT	Procurement

ANNEX A

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Maritza Rodríguez de Pichardo	Financial Management Specialist	LCSFM	Financial Management (DR Country Office)
Catherine Abreu	Procurement Specialist	LCSPT	Procurement (DR Country Office)
Maria Elena Paz	Language Program Assistant	LCSHE	Mission logistics support
Judith Marcano Williams	Project Assistant	LCSHE	Project support
Javier Luque	Senior Education Economist	LCSHE	Economic Analysis
Patricia Hoyes	Senior Financial Management Specialist	LCSFM	Financial management
Javier Acosta	ECD Specialist	Consultant	Early Childhood Development
Jorge Mesa	Architect	Consultant	Civil works and environmental safeguards
Viviana Gonzalez	Program Assistant	LCSHE	Operations Support
Julie B. Nannucci	Sr. Language Program Assistant	LCSHE	Operations Support

Annex B. Mapping Classrooms with Provincial Poverty

Figure 7. Percentage of Poor Households and Number of Classrooms Built by the Project by Province



Source: Targeting Poverty in Dominican Republic 2005

Annex C. Mapping Classrooms with Municipal Poverty

A process was used to map renovated and constructed classrooms to their respective municipal or municipal district to determine the disaggregated poverty and population size. This was needed since there are 95 school districts and 155 municipalities. Google map was used to find the exact location of schools. If the online search did not yield results, newspaper clips, blogs, government documents, yellow pages were consulted. In a few cases, where the location could not be precisely pinpointed the municipality that matched the school district was then assigned.

Table 13. Classroom, Poverty and Population

	Number of CMEIs	Number of class-rooms Built	Number of classrooms rehabil-itated	Province	Munici-pality, DM	Region	Absolute Poverty	% in absolute poverty	Extreme Poverty	% in extreme poverty	Popula-tion	Younger than 5
	1	1	3	Azua	Azua	Valdesia	10,453	53.4	2,446	12.5	56,453	6,622
	0	0	1	Azua	Estebania	Valdesia	1,309	74.7	653	353	7,677	1,001
	0	0	3	Azua	Pueblo Viejo	Valdesia	1,618	64.5	261	10.4	7,056	869
	0	0	2	Azua	Villa Tabare Arriba	Valdesia	1,718	61.9	407	14.7	3,709	361
Total Azua	**1**	**1**	**9**				**29,485**	**62.0**	**10,282**	**21.6**	**208,857**	**25,281**
	0	2	1	Bahoruco	Galvan	Enriquillo	2,605	80.3	994	30.6	12,064	1,620
	1	0	0	Bahoruco	Neiba	Enriquillo	3,895	70	1,988	35.7	25,420	3,265
	0	2	2	Bahoruco	Tamayo	Enriquillo	1,511	64.7	527	22.6	6,609	830
	0	1	0	Bahoruco	Villa Jaragua	Enriquillo	2,117	82.5	1,153	44.9	11,437	1,628
Total Bahoruco	**1**	**5**	**3**				**15,785**	**75.6**	**6,606**	**31.6**	**91,480**	**12,373**
	1	1	2	Barahona	Santa Cruz de Barahona	Enriquillo	9,605	54.3	2,588	14.5	72,924	9,349
	0	0	3	Barahona	Cabral	Enriquillo	2,442	73.5	990	29.8	13,907	1,888
	0	0	3	Barahona	Enriquillo	Enriquillo	2,359	71.4	835	25.3	10,564	1,437
	0	1	2	Barahona	Jaquimeyes	Enriquillo	549	57.8	71	7.5	3,013	388

	Number of CMEIs	Number of class-rooms Built	Number of classrooms rehabil-itated	Province	Munici-pality, DM	Region	Absolute Poverty	% in absolute poverty	Extreme Poverty	% in extreme poverty	Popula-tion	Younger than 5
Total Barahona	**1**	**2**	**10**				**26,411**	**63.3**	**9,011**	**2.6**	**179,239**	**23,009**
	0	1	1	Dajabon	Dajabon	Cibao Noroeste	3,120	47	518	7.8	23,244	2,720
	0	1	1	Dajabon	El Pino	Cibao Noroeste	1,012	58.3	274	15.8	4,485	455
Total Dajabon	**0**	**2**	**2**				**8,969**	**56.2**	**2,430**	**15.2**	**62,046**	**6,980**
	1	3	0	Duarte	San Francisco de Macoris	Cibao Noreste	15,231	38.3	1,650	4.1	138,167	14,764
	0	2	0	Duarte	Villa Riva	Cibao Noreste	3,099	63.3	508	10.4	9,488	984
Total Duarte	**1**	**5**	**0**				**36,087**	**49.6**	**4,933**	**6.8**	**283,805**	**30,184**
	0	0	1	El Seibo	El Cedro	Yuma	.	.	.	.	7,639	957
	0	2	7	El Seibo	El Seibo	Yuma	12,853	74	4,931	28.4	50,432	5,813
	0	0	5	El Seibo	Miches	Yuma	2,904	55.6	572	10.9	10,545	1,348
	0	0	2	El Seibo	San Francisco Vicentillo	Yuma	.	.	.	.	2,829	276
	0	0	1	El Seibo	Santa Lucia	Yuma	.	.	.	.	10,423	1,418
Total El Seibo	**0**	**2**	**16**				**16,697**	**40.9**	**5,882**	**24.7**	**89,261**	**10,617**
	0	1	1	Elias Pina	Comendador	El Valle	4,297	74.8	2,115	36.8	18,936	.
	0	1	2	Elias Pina	El Llano	El Valle	1,586	85.5	899	48.4	8,151	.
	1	2	3	Elias Pina	Hondo Valle	El Valle	2,158	89.5	1,217	50.5	7,213	.
	0	0	2	Elias Pina	Pedro Santana	El Valle	728	81.5	583	65.3	4,043	.
	0	0	1	Elias Pina	Sabana	El Valle	.	.	.	.	1,966	.

ANNEX C

	Number of CMEIs	Number of class-rooms Built	Number of classrooms rehabil-itated	Province	Municipality, DM	Region	Absolute Poverty	% in absolute poverty	Extreme Poverty	% in extreme poverty	Population	Younger than 5
					Larga							
Total Elias Pina	**1**	**4**	**9**				**11,962**	**82.4**	**6,911**	**47.6**	**63,879**	**.**
	0	3	4	Hato Mayor	El Valle	Higuamo	1,529	69.7	566	25.8	7,966	934
	0	1	2	Hato Mayor	Guayabo Dulce	Higuamo	1,423	71.6	399	20.1	7,600	838
	0	0	3	Hato Mayor	Hato Mayor	Higuamo	6,035	54	1,716	15.4	43,544	4,623
	0	2	5	Hato Mayor	Sabana de la Mar	Higuamo	2,474	61.6	707	17.6	14,676	1,576
	0	0	1	Hato Mayor	Yerbabuena	Higuamo	722	83.7	272	31.5	3,397	315
Total Hato Mayor	**0**	**6**	**15**				**14,675**	**63.5**	**4,574**	**19.8**	**87,631**	**9,669**
	0	3	0	Independencia	Jimani	Enriquillo	1,831	70.2	502	19.2	5,901	794
	0	1	0	Independencia	La Descubierta	Enriquillo	1,180	71.1	408	24.6	6,939	888
Total Independencia	**0**	**4**	**0**				**7,820**	**70.2**	**2,665**	**23.9**	**50,833**	**6,812**
	1	3	4	La Altagracia	Higuey	Yuma	17,991	45	3,056	7.6	128,120	15,413
	0	1	2	La Altagracia	San Rafael de Yuma	Yuma	3,354	70.1	1,056	22.1	14,983	1,668
	0	1	1	La Altagracia	Veron-Punta Cana	Yuma	.	.	.	.	15,241	1,668
Total La Altagracia	**1**	**5**	**7**				**25,345**	**49.1**	**4,849**	**9.4**	**182,020**	**21,694**
	0	0	1	La Romana	Cumayasa	Yuma	.	.	.	.	8,738	1,200
	0	1	0	La Romana	Guaymate	Yuma	3,185	68.1	1,027	22	17,324	2,467
	0	10	7	La Romana	La Romana	Yuma	21,836	40.8	2,500	4.7	130,842	14,562

	Number of CMEIs	Number of class-rooms Built	Number of classrooms rehabil-itated	Province	Munici-pality, DM	Region	Absolute Poverty	% in absolute poverty	Extreme Poverty	% in extreme poverty	Popula-tion	Younger than 5
	0	3	3	La Romana	Villa Hermosa	Yuma	.	.	.	.	59,372	7,907
Total La Romana	**0**	**14**	**11**				**25,021**	**43.0**	**3,527**	**6.1**	**219,812**	**26,507**
	0	1	2	La Vega	Jarabacoa	Cibao Sur	7,035	49.9	1,611	11.4	42,395	4,376
	1	9	9	La Vega	Concepcion de La Vega	Cibao Sur	21,152	38.4	1,934	3.5	210,736	21,855
Total La Vega	**1**	**10**	**11**				**41,463**	**43.2**	**5,221**	**5.8**	**385,101**	**40,402**
	0	1	1	Maria Trinidad Sanchez	Arroyo Salado	Cibao Noreste	1,057	56	146	7.7	7,253	787
	0	0	8	Maria Trinidad Sanchez	Cabrera	Cibao Noreste	1,474	41.2	226	6.3	12,994	1,129
	0	0	3	Maria Trinidad Sanchez	El Pozo	Cibao Noreste	1,690	56.8	235	7.9	11,970	1,290
	1	2	5	Maria Trinidad Sanchez	Nagua	Cibao Noreste	7,447	49.6	1,352	9	31,881	2,997
	0	2	4	Maria Trinidad Sanchez	Rio San Juan	Cibao Noreste	2,408	56.7	472	11.1	15,092	1,574
Total MTS	**1**	**5**	**21**				**19,683**	**54.2**	**3,348**	**9.2**	**135,727**	**13,928**
	0	5	7	Monsenor Nouel	Bonao	Cibao Sur	9,363	32.7	991	3.5	75,879	.
	0	1	2	Monsenor Nouel	Maimon	Cibao Sur	2,071	48.7	314	7.4	17,439	.
	0	1	3	Monsenor	Piedra	Cibao Sur	1,560	51.4	261	8.6	12,174	.

ANNEX C

	Number of CMEIs	Number of class-rooms Built	Number of classrooms rehabil-itated	Province	Munici-pality, DM	Region	Absolute Poverty	% in absolute poverty	Extreme Poverty	% in extreme poverty	Popula-tion	Younger than 5
				Nouel	Blanca							
Total Monsenor Nouel	**0**	**7**	**12**				**15,574**	**37.7**	**2,010**	**4.9**	**167,618**	**.**
	1	0	0	Monte Cristi	Monte Cristi	Cibao Noreste	3,885	53.5	729	10	25,776	2,567
Total Monte Cristi	**1**	**0**	**0**				**17,951**	**57.1**	**4,278**	**13.6**	**111,014**	**11,690**
	0	2	3	Monte Plata	Bayaguana	Higuamo	6,348	68.4	2,240	24.1	33,122	3,955
	0	0	1	Monte Plata	Los Botados	Higuamo	2,939	82.9	580	16.4	13,950	1,973
	1	0	6	Monte Plata	Monte Plata	Higuamo	6,580	64.8	1,506	14.8	24,863	2,773
	0	1	4	Monte Plata	Peralvillo	Higuamo	3,385	80.9	1,132	27	17,284	2,103
	0	2	1	Monte Plata	Sabana Grande de Boya	Higuamo	4,684	73.8	1,699	26.8	24,357	3,075
	0	1	8	Monte Plata	Yamasa	Higuamo	6,949	75.3	2,405	26.1	37,453	4,756
Total Monte Plata	**1**	**6**	**23**				**34,682**	**73.3**	**11,061**	**23.4**	**180,376**	**21,969**
	0	3	14	Peravia	Bani	Valdesia	12,089	45.6	2,112	8	87,941	10,097
	0	0	2	Peravia	Matanzas	Valdesia	1,686	45.5	136	3.7	14,783	1,840
	0	0	1	Peravia	Paya	Valdesia	1,462	46.3	287	9.1	13,090	1,555
	0	1	0	Peravia	Santana	Valdesia	679	41.5	89	5.4	6,426	880
	1	0	0	Peravia	Villa Fundacion	Valdesia	1,092	51.6	158	7.5	8,550	1,029
	0	0	1	Peravia	Sabana Buey	Valdesia	360	60.9	67	11.3	2,217	187
Total Peravia	**1**	**4**	**18**				**19,013**	**45.7**	**3,062**	**7.4**	**169,865**	**20,104**
	1	0	0	Puerto Plata	Puerto Plata	Cibao	14,936	36.7	2,105	5.2	122,186	12,252

	Number of CMEIs	Number of class-rooms Built	Number of classrooms rehabil-itated	Province	Munici-pality, DM	Region	Absolute Poverty	% in absolute poverty	Extreme Poverty	% in extreme poverty	Popula-tion	Younger than 5
						Norte						
Total Puerto Plata	**1**	**0**	**0**				**39,258**	**44.7**	**7,462**	**8.5**	**312,706**	**32,515**
	0	0	1	Samana	Las Galeras	Cibao Noreste	.	.	.	.	6,305	764
	0	1	1	Samana	Las Terrenas	Cibao Noreste	1,943	56.9	246	6.3	13,869	1,744
	0	1	1	Samana	Santa Barbara de Samana	Cibao Noreste	7,598	58.1	1,330	10.2	30,973	3,554
	0	3	3	Samana	Sanchez	Cibao Noreste	3,902	56.2	530	7.6	26,505	2,808
Total Samana	**0**	**5**	**6**				**13,443**	**56**	**2,106**	**8.8**	**91,875**	**10,492**
	0	2	5	San Cristobal	Bajos de Haina	Valdesia	6,606	32.1	478	2.3	80,841	10,624
	0	0	1	San Cristobal	Caballero	Valdesia	.	.	.	.	.	.
	0	1	4	San Cristobal	Cambita Garabitos	Valdesia	5,057	71.4	1,905	26.9	20,533	2,597
	0	1	1	San Cristobal	Hato Damas	Valdesia	.	.	.	.	11,602	1,615
	0	1	0	San Cristobal	Los Cacaos	Valdesia	1,422	81.8	751	43.2	8,822	958
	0	0	1	San Cristobal	Sabana Grande de Palenque	Valdesia	1,174	31.5	72	1.9	15,691	1,927
	0	5	8	San Cristobal	San Cristobal	Valdesia	22,137	41.9	2,238	4.2	209,165	25,598
	0	4	6	San Cristobal	Villa Altagracia	Valdesia	11,201	57.9	1,814	9.4	50,957	7,372
	0	4	10	San Cristobal	Yaguate	Valdesia	5,285	55.6	654	6.9	39,594	5,045
Total San	**0**	**18**	**36**				**59,583**	**45.9**	**8,331**	**6.4**	**532,880**	**68,714**

ANNEX C

	Number of CMEIs	Number of class-rooms Built	Number of classrooms rehabil-itated	Province	Munici-pality, DM	Region	Absolute Poverty	% in absolute poverty	Extreme Poverty	% in extreme poverty	Popula-tion	Younger than 5
Cristobal												
	0	0	7	San Jose de Ocoa	San Jose de Ocoa	Valdesia	5,090	57.4	1,777	20.1	24,032	2,686
Total San Jose de Ocoa	**0**	**0**	**7**				**10,643**	**66.2**	**3,990**	**24.8**	**62,368**	**7,177**
	0	4	9	San Juan de la Maguana	El Cercado	El Valle	4,873	87.7	2,400	43.3	15,348	1,908
	0	4	11	San Juan de la Maguana	Las Matas de Farfan	El Valle	6,242	68.8	2,592	28.6	35,497	4,061
	0	0	1	San Juan de la Maguana	Pedro Corto	El Valle	1,318	84.1	521	33.2	6,699	742
	1	8	14	San Juan de la Maguana	San Juan de la Maguana	El Valle	19,918	63.5	7,553	24.1	89,931	10,277
Total SJdLM	**1**	**16**	**35**				**40,766**	**70.4**	**16,900**	**29.2**	**241,105**	**27,929**
	0	1	6	San Pedro de Macoris	Consuelo	Higuamo	4,194	51.9	678	8.4	31,405	3,798
	0	1	2	San Pedro de Macoris	San Jose de los Llanos	Higuamo	4,299	73.6	1,130	19.3	18,282	2,276
	1	12	8	San Pedro de Macoris	San Pedro de Macoris	Higuamo	23,477	41.6	2,244	4	205,091	23,612
Total SPdM	**1**	**14**	**16**				**37,847**	**47.8**	**5,562**	**7**	**301,744**	**35,875**
	0	0	3	Sanchez Ramirez	Angelina	Cibao Sur	.	.	.	.	12,014	.
	0	1	3	Sanchez Ramirez	Cevicos	Cibao Sur	1,687	72.8	554	23.9	9,475	.
	1	5	9	Sanchez Ramirez	Cotui	Cibao Sur	9,398	52.1	2,254	12.5	61,845	.
	0	0	6	Sanchez	Fantino	Cibao Sur	2,462	45.9	257	4.8	22,675	.

	Number of CMEIs	Number of class-rooms Built	Number of classrooms rehabil-itated	Province	Munici-pality, DM	Region	Absolute Poverty	% in absolute poverty	Extreme Poverty	% in extreme poverty	Popula-tion	Younger than 5
	0	0	2	Ramirez Sanchez Ramirez	Hernando Alonzo	Cibao Sur	.	.	.	.	5,851	.
	0	1	1	Sanchez Ramirez	La Bija	Cibao Sur	.	.	.	.	9,323	.
	0	3	2	Sanchez Ramirez	La Mata	Cibao Sur	5,128	54.2	568	6	13,368	.
	0	1	0	Sanchez Ramirez	Platanal	Cibao Sur	.	.	.	.	4,030	.
	0	0	1	Sanchez Ramirez	Quita Sueno	Cibao Sur	.	.	.	.	3,197	.
Total Sanchez Ramirez	**1**	**11**	**27**				**19,510**	**53.4**	**3,849**	**10.5**	**151,179**	**.**
	0	1	1	Santiago	Guayabal	Cibao Norte	.	.	.	.	10,908	1,080
	0	2	1	Santiago	Janico	Cibao Norte	2,387	62.6	566	14.8	9,376	907
	1	7	6	Santiago	Santiago	Cibao Norte	32,217	19.9	2,373	1.5	553,091	58,091
	0	3	1	Santiago	Villa Gonzalez	Cibao Norte	3,415	44.4	402	5.2	24,542	2,675
Total Santiago	**1**	**13**	**9**				**64,601**	**27.6**	**7,282**	**3.1**	**908,250**	**95,964**
	0	9	12	Santo Domingo	Boca Chica	Ozama	10,891	41.2	965	3.6	60,844	8,076
	0	1	2	Santo Domingo	Guerra	Ozama	6,158	64.2	796	8.3	31,292	3,919
	0	6	7	Santo Domingo	Los Alcarrizos	Ozama	18,636	37.7	1,528	3.1	171,074	23,644

ANNEX C

	Number of CMEIs	Number of class-rooms Built	Number of classrooms rehabil-itated	Province	Munici-pality, DM	Region	Absolute Poverty	% in absolute poverty	Extreme Poverty	% in extreme poverty	Popula-tion	Younger than 5
	0	6	3	Santo Domingo	Pedro Brand	Ozama	5,827	50.1	721	6.2	26,493	3,751
	1	29	42	Santo Domingo	Santo Domingo Este	Ozama	38,081	19.1	1,676	0.8	732,593	82,572
	0	24	22	Santo Domingo	Santo Domingo Norte	Ozama	24,833	30.9	1,912	2.4	321,178	40,595
	0	9	12	Santo Domingo	Santo Domingo Oeste	Ozama	14,984	20.7	582	0.8	284,376	3,445
Total Santo Domingo	**1**	**84**	**100**				**184,011**	**.**	**8,936**	**.**	**1,821,218**	**220,917**
	0	1	1	Valverde	Esperanza	Cibao Noroeste	6,380	51.6	1,106	8.9	44,218	.
	1	0	1	Valverde	Mao	Cibao Noroeste	5,391	42.1	823	6.4	49,475	.
Total Valverde	**1**	**1**	**2**				**21,370**	**51.3**	**4,497**	**10.8**	**158293**	
	1	17	26	Distrito Nacional	Distrito Nacional	Ozama	48,405	19.7	2,845	1.1	910,076	88,541
Total Distrito Nacional	**1**	**17**	**26**				**48,405**	**19.7**	**2,845**	**1.1**	**910,076**	**88,541**

Source: Classroom Construction/Renovation from Ministry of Education; Poverty Rates: UNDP's Focalizacion de la Pobreza en Repulica Dominicana 2005; Population: 2002 Census of the National Office of Statistics

Table 14. Grantee Respondents to IEG Survey

Survey Respondent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Province/ Municipality	Santo Domin-go	Santo Domin-go	San Pedro de Maco-ris	Santo Domin-go	Santo Domin-go Norte	San Pedro de Maco-ris	La Vega	Monte Plata y Santo Domin-go	Azua de Composte-la	Santiago y San Cristo-bal	San Juan de la Magu-ana	San Cristo-bal	Santiago	Monte Plata	Santo Doming. Distrito Nacional	Sánchez Ram-írez	Santia-go	Santo Domingo	Monte Plata
Grant Amount, RD$ (000)	3,500	8,380	3,439	2,368	N/A	6,410	3,423	3,449	1,984	5,917	7,793	2, 441	3,139	2,999	2,846	3, 290	4,166	4,905	1,219
Ages of children	3-4, 5	0-5	3-4	3-4, 5	2-5	0-7+	5,6	3-4	0-5	5-7+	5	0-5-7+	5, 7+	5-7+	3-4	3-4	0-5	3-5	0-2,3-4. 5
Beneficiary: parents	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Teachers	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Increase in number of children received ECD services because of the grant	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of children (0-2)	0	250	0	10	-	0	0	Yes	0	0	0	932	0	0	0	0	0	0	27
Number of children (3-4)	0	300	253	50	-	-	84	-	0	0	0	764	0	0	200	1040	695	-	54
Number of children (5)	0	550	0	30	-	-	221	0	0	200	582	102	0	0	0	0	0	0	59
When the grant ended, did all the activities continue?	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes

Source: IEG Survey

Annex D. List of Persons Met

World Bank Staff and Consultants

Eduardo Velez Bustillo, Sector Manager

Raja Bentaouet Kattan, Senior Education Specialist

Cynthia Hobbs, Senior Education Specialist

Samuel Carlson, Senior Human Development Economist

Jorge Mesa, Consultant

McDonald Benjamin, Country Manager

Catherine Abreu Rojas, Procurement Specialist

Myrna Machuca-Sierra, Education Specialist

Ministry of Education Staff

Fernando Ogando, Director International Cooperation Office [Oficina Cooperación Internacional]

Evelyn Paula Bonifacio, Interim Director Early Childhood Development Ministry of Education

Clara Baez, Director Early Childhood Development Ministry of Education

Guadalupe Valdez, Former Vice Minister Ministry of Education and Director Grant Program

Ministry of Education District and Regional Staff

Ximara Calzado, Coordinator Region 15

Raquel Vallejo, District Technical Region 15

Alba Estela Segura, Coordinator Region 03

Andrea Palmero Casillo, Coordinador Regional 04

Pedro de la Cruz, SubDirector District 04

Dignora Cabrera Criquet, Director Region 04

Center and School Staff

Deyamina Souano Beltre, Coordinator Model Centerl Barolome Olegario Perez

Yselsa Margarita Ramirez Pereyra, Librarian Model Center Barolome Olegario Perez

Maribel Diaz Castello, Model Center Barolome Olegario Perez

Denny Agramente, Orientadora, Model Center Barolome Olegario Perez

Berkis Nidia Orozco Aybar, Teacher Model Center Barolome Olegario Perez

Rosa Margarita Nunez Jimenez, Teacher, Model Center Barolome Olegario Perez

Olga Lidia Diaz Filpo, Teacher Model Center Barolome Olegario Perez

Rosangela Melo Hidalgo, Secretary Model Centerl Barolome Olegario Perez

Teresa del Jesus de los Santos Pineda

Fabio Antonio Cordero de Leon

Cruz Maria Rodriguez, School Principal Rotary

Flaria Valquez, School Principal Basica Sterling

Ana Octavia Segura, School Principal Basica Jose Pena Gomez,

Francisca Jimenez Payano, School Principal Escuela Jesus Maestro

Ivelisse Cruz Reinoso, Teacher and Coordinator Pedagogical Groups

Grantee Organizations

Lenor Brito, Financial Coordinator Azua Organization Ana Fabal Rivera, Accountant Azua Organization

Santo Hipolito Guerrero, First Advocate Azua Organization Altagacia Biltie, Vice President Azua Organization Eunice Feliz Perez, Coordinator for the Dominican Rehabilitation Association

Dora Peralta, Arts Program for the Dominican Rehabilitation Association

Esleivin Martinez, Occupational Therapist for the Dominican Rehabilitation Association

Dario Carvajal Urena, Coordinator Aide et Action

Julio Cesar Benitez, President Agricultural Association

Jose Antonio Munoz, Education Coordinator Agricultural Association

Marcelino Cruz Perez, Secretary Agricultural Association

Ramonita Dominguez, Pedagogical Institute

Annex E. Borrower Comments

Ministerio de Educación
REPUBLICA DOMINICANA
Oficina de Cooperación Internacional

OCI-MINERD-0267-2013

Santo Domingo, D. N.
17 de junio de 2013

Señora
Navin Girishankar
Gerente Interino Encargada División de Evaluación Sectorial
Oficina de Evaluación Principal
Banco Mundial
Su Despacho

Distinguida Señora Girishankar:

Agradecemos su comunicación d/f 11 de junio de 2013, en la cual nos remite el Borrador de Informe de Evaluación de Resultados del Proyecto para el Fortalecimiento de la Educación Inicial (BIRF 7144). En este sentido, no tenemos observación alguna al informe, excepto, llamar su atención sobre el acápite 1.8 de la página 15 sobre el establecimiento del 4% para la Educación, que ya es una realidad para este año.

Atentamente,

Fernando A. Ogando, PhD
Coordinador General

FAO/cj

MINISTERIO DE EDUCACION * Ofic. de Cooperación Internacional *

RECIBIDO
CIAV
18 JUN 2013
Ofic. del Banco Mundial en la Rep. Dominicana

Av. Máximo Gómez No. 19, esq. Bolívar, Santo Domingo, República Dominicana
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Translation: We acknowledge your communication dated June 11, 2013 where we received the Project Performance Assessment Report for the Early Childhood Education Project. In this sense, we have no comments about the information, except that we would like to call your attention to the fact that the government has in fact allocated four percent of GDP to education this year (paragraph 1.8).