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**Report No. 3681**

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

NIGERIA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT

(LOAN 814-UNI)

November 16, 1981

Operations Evaluation Department

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PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

NIGERIA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 814-UNI)

PREFACE

This is a performance audit of the Second Education Project in Nigeria for which Loan 814-UNI, signed in April 1972, provided US\$17.3 million. The Loan was fully disbursed on June 5, 1980.

The audit report comprises: (a) a Project Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and (b) a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated December 3, 1980 prepared, following a mission to Nigeria, by the Western Africa Projects Department. The PCR mission of February/March 1980 held discussions with Borrower officials and visited some of the project sites, while the mission architect also visited London for discussions with the consultant architects. Information was updated by a subsequent visit to Nigeria by the leader of the completion mission.

No field visit was undertaken by OED specifically for this audit. However, in January/February 1978, an OED mission visited Nigeria in connection with a seventeen-country study of Bank operations in the education sector. This mission visited Enugu and Lagos and held discussions on the three education projects in Nigeria with officials at State and Federal levels. The views expressed by these officials have been reflected both in the Report of that study<sup>1/</sup> and in the Project Performance Audit Report for the First Education Project in Nigeria<sup>2/</sup>. The PPAM is based on the findings of this mission as well as a review of the PCR, material in the Bank's files relating to the project, the Appraisal Report (PE-33a) dated March 9, 1972, the President's Report (P-1046) of March 16, 1972, the record of the Board's discussion of this project on March 28, 1972, and the Loan Agreement (814-UNI) dated April 18, 1972. The project experience has been discussed with Bank staff associated with the project.

As is customary in the preparation of PPARs, a draft of this Report was sent to officials of the Borrower for comment. The Borrower's comments are reproduced at pages 13 and 14 of this report.

The PCR, which has been revised after discussion with OED, achieves broad coverage of the project experience with varying depths of analysis of specific aspects. In the light of the unusual problems experienced in this project, the PPAM has found it necessary to analyze more thoroughly, and add some observations on, implementation time and cost overruns, building design and construction problems, and the educational aspects of project implementation. In addition, the PPAM draws some comparisons with the experience of the Nigeria First Education Project (Cr. 72-UNI).

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<sup>1/</sup> Report No. 2321 - Review of Bank Operations in the Education Sector, December 1978.

<sup>2/</sup> Report No. 2498 dated May 7, 1979.



PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET

NIGERIA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 814-UNI)

KEY PROJECT DATA		
	Appraisal Estimate	Actual or Current Estimate
Total Project Cost (US\$ M)	27.8	78.0
Overrun (%)		180%/a
Loan Amount (US\$ M)	17.3	17.3
Disbursed		17.3
Cancelled	-	-
Repaid	-	-
Outstanding	-	17.3
Date Physical Components Completed	3/31/75	12/30/80 (est.)
- Number of months since Loan Signature	35	104
Proportion Completed by above date (%)		98
Proportion of Time Overrun		197
Institutional Performance	Good	Fair

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

(US\$ million)

	FY73	FY74	FY75	FY76	FY77	FY78	FY79	FY80
Estimated	0.1	1.8	8.4	16.5	17.3	17.3	17.3	17.3
Actual	-	-	-	0.9	3.0	6.6	13.9	17.3
Actual/Estimated (%)	-	-	-	5.5	17.2	38.2	80.5	100.0

OTHER PROJECT DATA

	Original Plan	Revisions	Actual or Estimated Actual
First Mention in Files			09/10/70
Government application			04/70
Negotiations			09/13-23/71
Board Approval			03/28/72
Loan Agreement Date			04/18/72
Loan Effectiveness	07/18/72	09/30/72; 10/31/72	11/28/72
Closing Date	12/31/75	12/31/76; 12/31/78; 06/30/80	06/05/80
Borrower	Federal Republic of Nigeria		
Executing Agencies	Federal and State Ministries of Education		
Fiscal Year of Borrower	April 1 - March 31*		
Follow-on Project Name	Third Education Project		
Loan Number	929-UNI		
Amount (US\$ M.)	54.0		
Date of Loan Agreement	August 16, 1973		

\* After January 1981: January 1 - December 31

/a Overrun of 163% in Naira terms (see PCR, para. 7.02)





MISSION DATA

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Sent by</u>	<u>Month/Year</u>	<u>No. of Weeks</u>	<u>No. of Persons</u>	<u>No. of/a Man-weeks</u>	<u>Date of Report</u>
Reconnaissance/b	Bank/UNESCO	Oct/Nov 1970	3.0	5(2A,B,2C)*	1.0	Nov. 1970
Appraisal/c	Bank	March 1971/d	2.0	2(A,B)	4.0	March 1972
Post Appraisal I/c	Bank	July/Aug 1971	1.0	1(A)	0.5	Oct. 1971
Post Appraisal II	Bank	Oct/Nov 1971	1.7	1(A)	0.8	Nov. 1971
Post Appraisal III	Bank	March 1972	1.5	2(A,B,)	3.0	n.a.
Total					<u>9.3</u>	
Supervision I	Bank	Apr/May 1972	2.0	1(A)	1.0	05/26/72
Supervision II	Bank	Oct. 1972	1.0	1(A)	0.5	11/16/72
Supervision III/e	Bank	Aug. 1973	1.3	1(A)	0.7	10/09/73
Supervision IV (and sector review)	Bank	Feb. 1974	3.0	5(2A,B,C, F)	2.8	03/26/74
Supervision V	Bank	Apr/May 1975	1.1	2(A,D)	1.0	09/30/75
Supervision VI	Bank	July/Aug 1976	1.4	2(A,B)	1.0	08/13/76
Supervision VII	Bank	Feb/Mar 1977	5.0	2(C)	2.5	06/20/77
Supervision VIII	Bank	July/Aug 1977	1.4	1(E)	0.7	10/17/77
Supervision IX	Bank	Oct/Nov 1977	1.7	1(E)	1.7	01/04/78
Supervision X	Bank	Feb/Mar 1978	0.7	1(E)	0.7	06/22/78
Supervision XI	Bank	July/Aug 1978	2.5	1(E)	2.5	08/24/78
Supervision XII	Bank	Oct/Nov 1978	4.0	2(E,B)	1.0	01/17/79
Supervision XIII	Bank	Jan/Mar 1979	1.2	3(B,C,E)	3.6	03/19/79
Supervision XIV	Bank	June/July 1979	3.0	4(A,2B,C)	0.3	08/03/79
Supervision XV	Bank	Oct. 1979	3.0	2(A,B)	0.6	12/06/79
Total					<u>20.6</u>	
Completion	Bank	Feb/Mar 1979	2.2	3(A,B,G)	6.6	31/12/80

\* Note: A = architect; B = economist; C = general educator; D = technical educator  
E = civil engineer; F = facilities planner; G = linguistic specialist

/a Estimated man-weeks attributable to the project.

/b Supervised Cr. 72-UNI and discussed possibility of two education projects: one "crash" project to aid in reconstruction and another more comprehensive project.

/c This and supervision missions I-VIII also supervised Cr. 72-UNI.

/d Note: A UNESCO mission was in the field at this time for the more comprehensive project referred to in footnote (b) above.

/e This and all subsequent missions also supervised Ln. 929-UNI.



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COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES

Name of Currency	Abbreviation
Nigerian Pound (through 1972)	N£
Naira (from January 1973)	N

Exchange Rates	
Appraisal Year (1971)	N£1.00 = US\$3.04
Intervening Years (1974-78)	N£1.00 = US\$1.56
(1979)	N£1.00 = US\$1.59-1.74
(1980)	N£1.00 = US\$1.829

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ALLOCATION OF LOAN PROCEEDS (US\$)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Original Allocation</u>	<u>Actual Disbursement</u> (June 5, 1980)
I. Civil Works	6,750,000	14,709,910.87
II. Directly Imported Furniture and equipment	3,600,000	--
III. Locally Procured Furniture and equipment	1,000,000	--
IV. (i) Architectural services (ii) Consultant services (iii) Salaries and other Bank approved expenditures for technical assistance shown in Part B of the Project <sup>/a</sup>	1,500,000	2,139,123.39
V. Interest and Other Charges	1,500,000	450,965.74
VI. Unallocated	<u>2,950,000</u>	<u>--</u>
TOTAL	<u>17,300,000</u>	<u>17,300,000.00</u>

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<sup>/a</sup> For (i) the training of technical subject teachers for the project comprehensive schools, (ii) the development of curricula for the same schools and (iii) the Central Project Office.



PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

NIGERIA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 814-UNI)

HIGHLIGHTS

Following the Civil War in Nigeria (1967-70), Loan 814-UNI was approved in March 1972, to assist in rehabilitating and reconstructing war damaged educational institutions in the three Eastern States of Nigeria. The project--the Second Education Project in Nigeria--was aimed at expanding and strengthening secondary and primary teacher education by helping to rehabilitate secondary schools and primary teacher training colleges, reform them, and improve the quality of their instruction.

The project provided for constructing, furnishing and equipping new facilities at seven primary teacher training colleges and 23 secondary schools (of which one was new), as well as technical assistance for teacher training, curriculum development, and architectural support services. Facilities for pre-vocational instruction were scheduled to be provided in secondary schools. In some cases, it was intended that certain project secondary schools should be "matched" with neighboring schools, so as to share the use of these facilities.

The project has been worthwhile. In view of the difficulties confronting the Borrower during the reconstruction period, it has to be considered a remarkable achievement to have successfully expanded the facilities for primary teacher and secondary education. The educational objectives of the project are generally being achieved, except that the "matched" school concept has not been fully implemented, and many of the workshops are not yet functioning (PPAM, paras. 10 and 41). The project institutions have higher enrollments than those envisaged at appraisal (PPAM, paras. 35 and 36). New curricula have been developed (PPAM, para. 39).

The project took almost three times as long to implement as had been originally envisaged, largely because of institutional weaknesses of the States in the aftermath of the Civil War, particularly the shortage of qualified project management staff, and the Borrower's inadequate financial support of project implementation. However, the appraisal implementation schedule was unrealistically tight (PCR, para. 1.02). Cost overruns of some 180% resulted from (a) higher than expected rates of price inflation, especially in the context of overall delays; (b) the difficult circumstances of reconstruction, and (c) higher than expected costs of professional services (PPAM, paras. 16-20, 22-29; PCR, para. 1.02). During implementation, the Borrower undertook to build the new secondary school and to finance all equipment and furniture for the project schools without seeking reimbursement from the Loan proceeds.

The following points are of particular interest:

- (i) the insufficient involvement of educators in project appraisal, supervision and completion reporting (PPAM, paras. 6 and 34);
- (ii) the problems of procuring and distributing suitable instructional equipment for the project schools (PPAM, para. 25), and
- (iii) the problems experienced in connection with architectural designs and supervision of construction despite the use of consultant and executive architects (PPAM, paras. 15-21; PCR, paras. 5.01 and 5.03).

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

NIGERIA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 814-UNI)

I. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY

1. In January 1970, following the end of the Civil War (1967-1970) in Nigeria, the Federal Government requested assistance to help reconstruct and rehabilitate war-damaged and destroyed educational institutions, especially in the three States of the former Eastern Region--East-Central, Rivers and South-Eastern--by reopening that part of Credit 72-UNI which had been suspended by the Federal Government in those States when the Civil War began. The Government stressed the need for urgent action, and asked the Bank to consider giving additional assistance for school construction. In October/November 1970, the Bank sent a mission to (a) supervise implementation of the First Project, (b) reappraise the portion of the First Education Project applicable to the Eastern States and analyze reconstruction requirements and (c) discuss the possibility of having a "crash" project for assisting reconstruction as well as a more comprehensive nationwide project. This mission agreed that a "crash" project should be developed and recommended speedy identification, preparation and appraisal. In March 1971, a brief two-man mission (architect and economist) appraised the proposed Second Project. The Loan was negotiated in September 1971, signed in April 1972, and made effective in November 1972.

2. The project was formulated to: (a) rehabilitate, consolidate and expand 22 secondary schools and seven primary teacher training colleges into viable units and construct a new secondary school, and (b) strengthen science teaching and reform secondary school curricula. The project was intended to add 19,890 secondary and 4,200 teacher education places involving the construction of 1,095 teaching spaces comprising classrooms, workshops and communal buildings. The project included financing for a technical assistance program, in case this could not be financed through other sources. This program included teacher training experts (five man-years), curriculum development experts (three man-years), and fellowships to train teachers (15 man-years). In addition, architectural services to develop school building design guides and to monitor building design and construction were included for financing.

3. The establishment of a Central Project Office in the Federal Ministry of Education, with a full-time Project Director, and the appointment of a Project Manager for each State Project Unit were conditions of signature of the Loan Agreement.

4. The project has been completed with certain changes. During implementation, the Borrower undertook to finance, without reimbursement from the loan proceeds, the provision of the new secondary school and all furniture and equipment for the project schools. The Borrower undertook curriculum development without resort to technical assistance. Two technical teacher training

experts to train the technical teachers for one State were financed by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation. The project has therefore assisted the rehabilitation and expansion of 29 educational institutions--which have provided 21,570 secondary school places (about 8% more than planned) and 4,350 teacher training places (some 4% more than planned)--and financed fellowships to train technical teachers. Final disbursement was made in June 1980, 4-1/2 years after the originally planned Closing Date. An implementation time overrun of 197% and a cost overrun of 180% in US dollar terms (163% in Naira terms) were incurred.

## II. PRINCIPAL ISSUES

### (a) Project Generation

5. At the time of the generation of the Second Education Project, the Bank had had some six years' experience with the Nigeria First Education Project (Credit 72-UNI).<sup>1/</sup> The implementation of the First Project had already been delayed and was proceeding very slowly. There had been delays in concluding a contract with the consultant architects, shortages of personnel for project management, dislocation caused by the Civil War and shortages of construction materials. Some of these problems were continuing.

6. In some ways, the approach to the Second Project differed from the approach to the First. In order to improve the coordination of implementation, (a) the Borrower was required in the Second Project to establish project units in the States and (b) consultant architects were provided as technical assistance support for design and construction of buildings, instead of as overall coordinators of project implementation. Furthermore, the consultant architects were identified early and, at negotiations, it was agreed that they would be appointed within a month. Nonetheless, some of the shortcomings of project generation in the case of the First Project were repeated in the case of the Second. For example, the established sequence of steps in the project generation cycle--identification, preparation and appraisal--was, as in the case of the First Project, short-circuited. The Bank staff, doubtless influenced by the urgency of the situation, and believing that they had sufficient knowledge of the educational situation in the country, wished to accelerate the processing of the Second Project. Thus, project items were arrived at principally through correspondence--the Borrower supplying technical data and the Bank relying on this material and on its desk

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<sup>1/</sup> See Project Performance Audit Report - Nigeria: First Education Project (Credit 72-UNI) dated May 7, 1979 (Report No. 2498).



knowledge of the sector. Thereafter, an appraisal mission<sup>1/</sup>, comprising only an architect and an economist and not including the customary education specialists, spent only eleven days in the field--an unusually brief period. Hence, identification, preparation and appraisal were neither orthodox nor as thorough as usual, and it is to the unusual manner of generating this project that several of the subsequent misunderstanding (and consequent delays) can be attributed. In this respect the experience of the First Project was repeated.

7. Furthermore, the three State governments concerned were unfamiliar with Bank practices and were rebuilding their civil services and formulating policies to cope with the immense and complex task of reconstruction. The amount of time (three years) allowed in the appraisal report for project implementation was inadequate in these circumstances.

8. In a sense, this project did not represent a typical Bank intervention; its interim character was underlined by the fact that contemporaneously with the appraisal field visit--in February-March 1971--there was a ten-man UNESCO Project Identification mission in the field (for a total of 54 man-weeks) reviewing national needs and priorities in education<sup>2/</sup>. As the report of this UNESCO mission indicated, the needs of the three States of the former Eastern Region were far in excess of what was being financed under this Second Project. Project composition was as yet unsettled during negotiations. The question of the reallocation of US\$2.6 million from the First Education Project among the three Eastern States was still being discussed. As a result of the final decision on this matter, three schools were added to the South-Eastern State component of the Second Project at loan negotiations. By the end of December 1971, the Federal Government and two States (East-Central and South-Eastern) had approved the Draft Loan Agreement, but Rivers State had not.

9. The State Executive Council of Rivers State was prepared to approve the proposed Loan, provided the State was not bound to adopt the concept of comprehensive system of secondary education proposed by the Bank for this project. This concept was then being widely promoted by the Bank in education

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1/ The terms of reference of this mission refer to it as a post-appraisal mission for the Second Education Project. However, there is no record in the files of any previous appraisal mission. On its return to office, the mission reported that it had collected the information needed to complete the draft appraisal report for the Second Project. The mission is, therefore, regarded in this PPAM as an Appraisal Mission. A mission in October/November 1970 had been sent to Nigeria to supervise the First Project, reappraise First Project items in the Eastern States, and discuss the possibility of a "crash" project to assist in reconstruction as well as a nationwide project.

2/ This mission report was published by UNESCO in September 1971: Education in Nigeria. Educational Projects for External Aid. Two Vols.

projects. The State Government asked that the Bank be more flexible in its definition of comprehensive education, so as to enable secondary schools other than comprehensive secondary schools to be included in the project. Eventually, in late February 1972, Rivers State approved the draft Loan Agreement without reservation. However, this disagreement, on a substantial educational issue at such a late stage, illustrates the difference which existed between the Bank's assumptions and the State Government's position on project content.

10. The appraisal mission had proposed that small secondary schools located close to each other be placed under one administration, or "matched", so that they could achieve economies by sharing workshops and communal facilities. This was accepted and agreed to. However, the "matching" idea, although successful in some cases, has not proved practicable in all circumstances (PCR, paras. 3.01, 5.02 and 6.02). In some cases of heavy enrollment, "matching" was administratively difficult; in others, "matching" was impossible, either because the school principals were reluctant to merge facilities or because, in the case of Imo State, a policy decision was taken not to "match" boys' and girls' schools. In other cases where the sites were contiguous, sharing of facilities was not practicable, because of either physical features separating a site (e.g. a stream) or the long distances between the teaching facilities of the adjacent schools concerned. Thus, some schools have been left with facilities inadequate for self-contained independent operation while others have more facilities than originally expected because of duplication of facilities at each of the matched schools (PCR, para. 6.02). This was clearly a case where the idea needed to have been elaborated in greater detail at preparation and appraisal, and to have been more widely discussed for its practicability to have been fully assessed.

11. Another problem concerning the operation of the project schools was the availability of water. The audit was informed that all the sites visited by the completion mission and, to the best of the mission's knowledge, most of those not visited, were experiencing severe water supply difficulties. The project as originally designed included no remedial provision for this; such provision was added, however, during implementation. As a result, the completion of these works has experienced delays (see also PCR, para. 5.03).

(b) Project Management

12. In the First Education Project (Credit 72-UNI), project management was assisted by an expatriate firm of consultant architects whose task was to propose criteria and goals for economical school construction; to coordinate school planning and design; to advise on the employment of qualified architects, engineers and contractors; to supervise bidding, contract procedures and awards, and to supervise construction and disbursement. In practice, therefore, the consultant architects were the project managers. Ministries of Works were expected to provide executive architects' services, whether through their own staff or through employment of private architects. In the Second Education Project, the responsibility for implementation was more clearly vested in the Federal and State Ministries of Education, also

assisted by the same firm of consultant architects. The Borrower was required to establish a Central Project Office to provide overall financial control, to coordinate and guide the project units in the three States<sup>1/</sup>, and to appoint a Project Director and State Project Managers before Loan Signature.

13. As the PCR notes, the Project Director did not enjoy direct access to the head of the Federal Ministry of Education as the Loan Agreement had sought to ensure that he would (PCR, para. 4.02). Four different Project Directors held office between 1972 and 1980. The Project Office was never adequately staffed. The Federal Project Director was appointed on a full-time basis only in September 1973. The full-time Project Accountant, required under the Loan Agreement, was appointed only in September 1979, some 6-1/2 years after Loan Signature. The services provided by the consultant architects helped to compensate for these administrative and personnel handicaps of the Central Project Office. The consultant architects contributed architectural and accountancy services, participated in the administration of the architectural and construction aspects of the project, assessed instructional equipment needs, and undertook periodic progress reporting until April 1979, when their services came to an end. Since April 1979, the Project Office Architect has been supplied by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation.

14. The PCR also notes that the State Project Units, responsible for carrying out physical implementation with some assistance from the consultant architects, were hampered by insufficient staffing and support. The State Project Units in two States (Anambra and Rivers) each typically consisted only of a project manager who, contrary to the Loan Agreement, was not assigned full-time to the project. The division of East Central State into two new States in 1976 temporarily exacerbated the problem of organizing project management in these States. The Unit in Cross River State was better staffed and of higher status, achieved better inter-Ministerial coordination and was more effective than the Units elsewhere. Thus, throughout project implementation, despite commendable efforts of project unit staff, these project management units were never as effective as originally intended (PCR, paras. 4.04-4.06).

#### (c) Architectural Services

15. The PCR analyzes the reasons for the extensive time and cost overruns (paras. 7.01 and 7.02). Some further discussion is warranted in view of the unusual nature of these overruns.

16. In the First Education Project, the consultant architects prepared an architectural Design Guide for the school facilities on the basis of which the actual designs of project schools were prepared by executive architects;

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<sup>1/</sup> Subsequently, there were four State Project Units. After 1976, East-Central State was divided into Anambra and Imo States, and South-Eastern State was renamed Cross River State.

executive architects took prolonged periods of time to complete project designs, and also produced many alternative designs for largely identical facilities at different schools. This duplication of effort had entailed higher costs and implementation time than necessary. When the same firm of consultant architects was engaged for the Second Project, it was requested not only to produce a new and expanded Design and Procedures Guide but also to provide designs and full working drawings, structural details and bills of quantities for all "above ground" elements of all buildings common to most of the project institutions. This firm was also contracted to survey all sites, appraise existing facilities as to their suitability for reconstruction or rehabilitation, determine exactly the new building needs, establish cost limits for new and rehabilitated construction, and prepare briefs for the executive architects engaged by the State Project Managers.

17. The architectural work which was left to be undertaken by the firms engaged as executive architects was limited to: (a) the design of facilities (such as administration offices, libraries, dining or multi-purpose halls and kitchens) for which standardized drawings were not available; (b) such site specific tasks as the layout of buildings and design of foundations, and (c) the supervision of construction. This division of labor between consultant and executive architects had implications for implementation time and cost. However, the possibility of effecting economies in design work by using the structural modules of the standard designs in the preparation of designs of non-standard buildings, was not explored adequately in advance.

18. Seven local firms were engaged for projects implemented by the East-Central State (later Imo and Anambra States), one for Rivers State institutions, and two for Cross River State project items. The employment of no less than ten architectural firms to design the non-standard structures at 29 individual institutions reduced the scope for cost reduction attributable to replication.

19. Full bills of quantities for all "standard" buildings had been prepared by the consultant architects; nevertheless, all but one of the executive architectural firms employed quantity surveyors for their project institutions. The only structural design work not completed by the consultants was the work required for foundations and other below-ground elements of both "standard" and "non-standard" buildings. Nevertheless, only one executive architectural firm (employed by Rivers State) did this modest amount of remaining structural design work itself. The other States and their executive architects employed structural engineering firms to do the work; three such firms were employed on the project institutions in the other three States. Thus, a total of 19 professional firms--architects, quantity surveyors and structural engineers--provided the executive services for the 29 project institutions. Thus, the strategy adopted for obtaining the required professional services was not the most economical possible. The performance of these executive services was of varying quality in regard to layout of the buildings on site and site supervision.

20. The consultant architects assisted the Central Project Director and State Project Managers to supervise and coordinate project implementation. This involved assisting them to brief executive architects, to review sketch plans, working drawings and construction documents produced by the executive architects, to prepare schedules of equipment and furniture and advise on their procurement installation, to review and adjust tender and contract documents, and to prepare quarterly progress reports. In practice, the consultant architects performed a larger role in project management than was originally intended, and provided some training in project management (PCR, para. 4.03).

(d) Physical Implementation

21. Architectural Designs. The designs developed for the schools were functional and flexible, and the working drawings and bills of quantities were comprehensive and systematic. The design details were subsequently revised to take account of State Government revisions of the total student places requested at some institutions. This revision was not done in every case of change. When the "matched" school concept was not fully implemented, the accommodation schedules at the "matched" schools were not all readjusted; consequently, some of those project schools which no longer shared facilities did not acquire a full range of teaching facilities (PCR, para. 5.02). Thus, while in some cases the provision of teaching facilities was satisfactory, in other cases problems arose with regard to providing a sufficient number of laboratories and workshops to implement fully the kind of practical curricula originally envisaged (see also PCR, Annex 2).

22. Construction. Construction of all institutions was carried out under contracts awarded on the basis of local competitive bidding. At all but two of the 29 institutions, separate contracts were awarded for electrical installations; at 18 of these, independent contracts were awarded for internal and external electrical work; and, at 17 of the institutions, separate contracts were also entered into for the plumbing water supply and drainage installations--91 contracts in all for the construction program. Since the contracts awarded for electrical and plumbing work were not sub-contracts given out by the general contractors for work at the institutions concerned, the general contractors had no authority over the firms so contracted, and could not coordinate building activities on their sites. Construction contracts were awarded between February and October 1976, in Imo, Anambra and Rivers States--three years behind the appraisal schedule--and between July 1977 and June 1978 in Cross River State--between four and five years behind appraisal schedule.

23. Borrower Funding of Construction. Construction at project schools in Cross River State took about three years to complete--double the 18 months estimated at appraisal--and about four years in the other States. The principal reasons for the slowness of construction were (i) persistent shortages of funds at the State level, (ii) repeated failure of the States to make

timely budget allocations to cover anticipated project expenditures, resulting in the postponement of the awarding of contracts, and (iii) occasional suspension of work by contractors until their claims for payment had been met.

24. At the Bank's request, the Borrower made substantial transfers of funds to the States in 1977 to overcome this problem. But, except in Cross River State, these funds were not earmarked or placed in separate accounts; they were placed in the States' Capital Receipt Accounts and used for other purposes. In the view of the Borrower, as well as OED, had separate project accounts been established at the State level as in Cross River State, these delays in reimbursement would have been avoided and project implementation might have been improved (see also PCR, para. 7.01). In the view of the Borrower, this deficiency in financial management was mainly responsible for the serious implementation problems encountered. Covenants requiring the establishment of separate project accounts have been included in Loan Agreements relating to other sectors in Nigeria which were signed during the implementation period of Loan 814-UNI.

(e) Furniture and Equipment

25. Equipment and furniture lists for all institutions were prepared by equipment specialists employed by the consultant architects. Bank review of the equipment lists before the Borrower assumed responsibility for equipment procurement was advantageous, since it led to an appropriate adjustment in some lists to make them more suitable for the intended prevocational courses rather than for courses in more advanced skills. The equipment procured was less than planned and the procurement is as yet incomplete. This shortage was exacerbated by distribution problems. At the time of the completion visit, school principals were not aware of exactly what equipment their schools were to receive, and, therefore, what they could still expect to receive--a problem which has been widely observed in other audited education projects (see also PCR, para. 5.10).

26. In 1975, in response to evidence of rapidly rising construction costs, the Borrower requested that project furniture and equipment be procured by the Borrower without reimbursement by the Bank and that the funds so released be reallocated to civil works. One year later, the Bank agreed to the Borrower's request.

27. Furniture procurement--also as yet incomplete--was initially delayed. Once the orders were placed--generally only to local manufacturers--supply was rapid (see also PCR, para. 5.11).

(f) Project Costs

28. At appraisal, the project was estimated to cost the equivalent of Naira 18.28 million or about US\$27.8 million. As implemented, the total project cost was Naira 48 million, or about US\$78 million; about 163% more and in local currency terms, and 180% more in terms of US dollars. This actual cost figure includes the cost of furniture and equipment which was borne entirely by the Borrower.

29. This extraordinary increase in costs was due principally to (a) exceptional world-wide inflation of the 1970s, (b) escalating construction costs in the country, resulting from the post-war reconstruction and construction boom (financed in part by the high income from oil), and (c) the delays which exacerbated the impact of continuing price inflation (PCR, para. 7.02).<sup>1/</sup> The largest individual cost increase was that of 212%--in construction. In May 1977, the Bank staff had estimated that the cost of project schools was two to three times greater than the cost of similar institutions elsewhere in Africa. The next largest increase was for professional fees, mainly because the architectural consultants were employed for a considerably longer period than originally planned (PCR, paras. 5.04-5.07). The Loan Agreement provided for 12 man-years of services of a consultant architectural firm over roughly a four-year period. With successive delays in project execution, the consultants were involved over a seven-year period and costs exceeded appraisal estimates by about 153%.

(g) Bank Supervision and Completion Reporting

30. While there was consistent follow-up of implementation by the Bank, both from Washington and its Lagos office through missions, cables, letters and telephone calls, and good continuity in mission personnel, the audit draws attention to the following problems of organization and effectiveness of field supervision.

31. Given the geographical dispersion of the three Nigeria Education Projects, more time was needed for adequate field coverage of the items than was typically allowed to supervision missions. Few site visits were possible and missions concentrated their efforts, as with the First Project, on necessarily brief discussions in the State and Federal capitals. In addition, effective supervision was hampered between 1975 and 1977--when there were only three supervision missions--by the Borrower's refusal to accept supervision visits. In December 1976, the Bank's Regional Vice President for Western Africa wrote to the Commissioner in the Federal Ministry of Finance deploring this refusal, and the situation improved after December 1977.

32. Supervision missions visited Nigeria on the average, every four months between 1977 and 1980; site visits were, however, still minimal and this project continued to receive insufficient field time. Not all of these missions visited the States benefitting from the project.

33. Partly in consequence of these difficulties, supervision was less effective than is usual in education projects. During the first five years

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<sup>1/</sup> The costs of school construction increased by over 400% during 1973-79. By 1975, the price of concrete and other building materials had risen to such an extent that the States requested that funds for equipment and furniture under the project be reallocated to civil works (PPAM, para. 26).

there was insufficient initial briefing of, and assistance to, project management. Despite a Loan Agreement covenant which obligated the Borrower to make arrangements satisfactory for the Bank to provide funds for project implementation, the problem of funding project implementation persisted (PPAM, paras. 23 and 24). The Bank did not raise with the Borrower the questions of contract packaging and awards--for professional services and construction--which had implications for the time and cost of implementation (PPAM, paras. 17-19 and 22). The monitoring of (a) the layout of buildings on the sites, (b) education policies in the States, especially on the limited application of the "matched" school concept and its consequences for the project, and (c) the fellowship program was also not effectively performed (PPAM, paras. 19, 21 and 40; see also PCR, paras. 8.01 and 8.02).

34. Mission composition reflected some weaknesses shared by most of the education projects audited to date. Architects were members of 14 out of 15 supervision missions, but educators participated in only five. The project completion mission did not include education specialists.

### III. EDUCATIONAL IMPACT

35. As the PCR notes (para. 6.01), the provision of secondary school places exceeded the targets. The provision of more science facilities and the diversification of the curriculum to include workshop courses for the comprehensive schools were only partially achieved. Most of the science facilities are operating and suitable courses are offered.

36. The PCR notes that the number of places provided in the primary teacher training colleges and the enrollments have both exceeded appraisal estimates (PCR, para. 6.04). The PCR also mentions that in two men's colleges in Imo State, however, enrollments are below capacity, because of a Borrower decision to change certification requirements by increasing the length of courses by an additional year. More than one-third of the completed technical classrooms in secondary schools and some of the technical classrooms at the primary teacher training colleges provided are being used for activities not originally planned (PCR, paras. 6.05 and 6.07).

37. The goals of the secondary school program in the project were: (a) to provide for more students by rehabilitating war-damaged facilities and constructing new ones; (b) to diversify the curriculum by adding science facilities and workshops and by training teachers for workshop courses; and (c) to consolidate small schools into economically more viable institutions. In the original project design, nearly half of the secondary school places, and almost 75% of the primary teacher training places to be financed by the Loan were additional to pre-war enrollment capacities.

38. It is too early to assess the full qualitative impact of the project on secondary education and teacher training in the States. The PCR, in a preliminary assessment (paras. 6.06 and 6.07), notes that the pass rate for



project secondary schools and primary teacher training colleges is about 70%, well above the national average pass rates of 60% and 40% respectively. The PCR also notes that the contribution of workshop courses to the output of skilled workers cannot be assessed, not only because the workshops are not operational, but also because a tracer system does not exist (para. 6.07). The impact of the schools in this sense would best be assessed about five years from now.

39. With Bank agreement, the Borrower undertook the full task of curriculum development and did not use the funds provided by the Loan. The PCR indicates that well-designed and well-developed curricula have been produced by Nigeria's National Educational Research Council, and have been adapted by the States to suit their specific needs (para. 5.14). This was part of an extensive national effort which fully supported the idea of diversification of the secondary level curricula which was generally in keeping with the objectives of the Second Project. However, the shortage of equipment has adversely affected the amount of effective practical training in the project schools, the reinforcing of science teaching, and the full practical reform of secondary school curricula.

40. The PCR notes the successful outcome of the technical assistance expert services provided for training technical teachers (PCR, para. 5.12), the success of the fellowship program in Rivers State, and the comparative failure of this program in Imo and Anambra States, where only one of five fellows sent abroad for training had returned to Nigeria by June 1980; he was working as a technical educator (PCR, para. 5.13).

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

41. The most impressive outcome of the Second Education Project in Nigeria was the expansion of facilities for primary teacher and secondary education and the partial broadening of the curriculum of secondary schools. Given the state of the Borrower's economy and administration in the post-Civil War era, this was a major achievement. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the time and cost overruns were amongst the highest experienced in the sector, and that they reflect the extraordinary circumstances of implementation. The Completion Report draws sensible lessons from the experience of this project (paras. 1.04-1.08).

42. The unorthodox generation of the project, in particular its inadequate identification, preparation and appraisal, and the unrealistically low estimate of how long implementation would take, resulted in implementation delays (PPAM, paras. 7-10).

43. Project management was inadequately staffed, both at the Federal and State levels, and this resulted in implementation delays; much of the implementation management was actually left to the consultant architects (PPAM,

paras. 13, 14 and 20). Persistent and continuing shortages of State funds also contributed to the slowness of progress in construction (PPAM, paras. 23 and 24).

44. The engagement of a large number of executive architects reduced the scope for economies arising from replication of designs (PPAM, para. 18). The number of quantity surveyors and structural engineers contracted appears to have been high in the light of the limited quantity of work to be performed in these specializations (PPAM, para. 19). Construction contracts for individual sites, instead of being awarded to one general contractor (who would then subcontract parts of the work as needed and coordinate the whole), were divided into several separate direct contracts, making coordination on the site difficult (PPAM, para. 22). This strategy of contract awards does not appear to have been the most economical and efficient arrangement.

45. Educators were insufficiently involved in appraisal, supervision and completion reporting in regard to this project (PPAM, paras. 6 and 34). The problems posed by the Borrower's temporary refusal to admit supervision missions were exacerbated by the Bank's failure to devote sufficient time and manpower in the field to supervising this project. Supervision did not successfully address the problems of (i) monitoring the evaluation of education policies, in particular as they affected the concept of sharing school facilities; (ii) the review of designs and tender and contract documents for professional services as well as construction, and (iii) the fellowship program (PPAM, paras. 31-33). The issue of government funding of implementation was also not fully resolved until late in the implementation period, despite the efforts of Bank staff (PPAM, paras. 23 and 24).

46. In quantitative terms, both for primary teacher training and secondary education, the provision of facilities and actual enrollments have significantly exceeded appraisal estimates (PPAM, paras. 35 and 36; PCR, paras. 6.01-6.05). With examination pass rates well above national levels, the project secondary schools and primary teacher training colleges have achieved good results (PPAM, para. 43) but the lack of equipment (PPAM, para. 26) has militated against the full achievement of broadening science and pre-vocational education at the secondary level.

COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER  
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

PERMSEC'S OFFICE

~~XXXXXXXX~~

Ahmadu Bello Way, Vic. Island

When replying, please quote earlier reference

P.M.B. No. 12573

Telegrams. SECEDUCATE

Telephone 612828



Ref. No. ICA 97/2/GEN/T/8

Date 16th September, 1981

Mr. Shiv S. Kapur,  
Director,  
Operations Evaluation Department,  
The World Bank,  
1818 H Street, N.W.,  
Washington D.C. 20433, U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Kapur,

RE: PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ON NIGERIA  
SECOND IBRD EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 814 - UNI)

I must thank you immensely for your letter forwarding a copy of the Draft Completion Report on the Second IBRD Education Project. I have gone through the Report and found it, in the main, analytic and objective, identifying probable causative factors responsible for the delay and other concomitant problems in the management and implementation of the Second Education Project.

I have noted the lessons drawn from the implementation of this Project. I must confess elements of the problems identified are also manifest in the execution of the Third Education Project (Loan 929-UNI). We are already making efforts to correct some of the mistakes made at the planning phase of the Project Cycle of both Second and Third Education Projects. One of these we consider to be the most vulnerable factor responsible for the sad end in the implementation of the Second Project.


This factor of omission is considered very relevant to sound financial management of the Second Project. Had both parties (The World Bank and the Nigerian Government) ensured the opening and operation of a designated Bank Account at the negotiation stage, the Second, and indeed the Third Project would have:-

- (a) been completed as originally scheduled;
- (b) cost less in human and material resources; and
- (c) achieved, with certainty, the objective for which the Project was designed.

As you are aware, sufficient funds as operational grants-in-aid were made available to the participating States by the Federal Government for the specific purpose of executing the Second Project. Unfortunately, this grant went into the State's Capital Receipt's Account rather than a designated Bank Account for the Project. It is our considered view that non-compliance with this pre-requisite in project financial management is mainly responsible for the serious problems identified in the execution of the Second Project.

I do hope that this lesson will be emphasized in the final copy of the Completion Report in the interest of future IBRD Projects which the World Bank in collaboration with the Nigerian Government, would wish to operate. I am earnestly looking forward to reading the fair copy of the Second IBRD Education Project Completion Report.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'F. I. Adesanoye', written over a circular stamp or seal.

(F. I. ADESANOYE)  
Permanent Secretary  
Ministry of Education

NIGERIA  
SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT  
LOAN 814-UNI

COMPLETION REPORT

December 31, 1980

Projects Department  
Western Africa Regional Office  
Education Division



## I. SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED

### Summary

1.01 While the loan for the Second Education Project (Ln. 814-UNI) has been fully disbursed, the project is not yet completed; some civil works and equipment procurement remain which the Government will finance entirely with its own resources. The goals of the Second Education Project were to (a) reconstruct secondary schools damaged by the civil war, (b) introduce workshop subjects into their curricula and strengthen science teaching, and (c) consolidate or "match" small inefficient schools into larger units (para. 3.01). The first of these goals was not only accomplished but exceeded. More facilities were constructed and more student places provided than were anticipated at appraisal (paras. 6.01, 6.02 and 6.04). The second and third goals were more difficult to accomplish. Many of the project schools do not offer workshop courses because the equipment is not yet available (paras. 5.09-5.10, 6.03 and 6.05). To expedite the delivery and use of the equipment, the school principals should be given equipment lists to verify its delivery, and the suppliers' contracts should stipulate that they are responsible for installing special equipment and for training personnel in its use (para. 5.10). The project provided for the training of technical teachers for the workshop courses, but half of the fellowship recipients have not returned to their States to teach (para. 5.13). While, in theory, "matching" small schools to produce larger, more efficient schools was a good idea, in practice it proved unworkable in many schools (para. 5.02). The decision to "match" schools may not have been made if a more thorough appraisal had been done which included visits to the sites of the project schools and consultations with State authorities (paras. 5.02 and 8.01).

1.02 The project has already taken five years longer to implement than was originally anticipated. In part, this was due to the unrealistic assumption at appraisal that it could be implemented in three years. Factors external to the project contributed to the delays, such as political reorganizations (para. 2.01), communication difficulties between the Federal Government and the four States (para. 4.02), and an economic boom which created a scarcity of the goods and manpower needed for construction (paras. 2.01 and 5.03). At the Federal level, the Project Office had inadequate resources with which to manage the project (para. 4.02); hence there was heavy reliance on the consulting architects. While the Project Office successfully assumed responsibilities from the consulting architects when their contract expired, the reliance on the consulting architects might have been reduced if there had been a provision in their contract to give continuous managerial training to key Project Office staff (para. 4.03). At the State level, project management was difficult because a large number of contracts had to be supervised. This number could have been reduced if contracts for external and internal works had been consolidated (para. 4.06). However, the major cause of delay was the lack of commitment to the project by the States. There were often insufficient funds to pay contractors even after the Federal Government had made a lump sum grant to the States and, as a result, some contractors abandoned the sites. The diversion of funds from the project might have been avoided if a special fund had been created for the project. (paras. 4.02, 5.03 and 7.01). Further,

three of the four States did not allocate sufficient staff resources to project management (para. 4.04). The fourth State hired a full-time Project Director at a salary several levels higher than the salaries of the Project Directors in the other States and gave him adequate staff, with the result that project management was greatly facilitated (para. 4.05). For example, he set up an Implementation Committee of State Ministers who expedited project management. He was also able to involve the principals of the project schools and they provided valuable on-the-spot surveillance of progress on their schools.

1.03 It is difficult to evaluate the educational impact of this project because it made no provision to build the institutions necessary to collect this information. The quality of the project schools as compared with other schools in Nigeria is difficult to assess, as there are no facilities to collect dropout, repeater and examination pass rates. The degree to which the workshop courses provided pre-vocational training cannot be determined, not only because many of the workshops are not yet operational but also because there are no provisions to trace the employment patterns of the graduates (paras. 6.06, 6.07).

#### Lessons Learned

##### 1.04 Lessons Learned for Project Management

- (a) The formation of implementation committees composed of senior officials from Ministries should be explored as they may facilitate decision making.
- (b) The school principals of existing project schools should be kept informed on the plans for their schools so they can provide on-the-spot surveillance of progress.
- (c) Wherever possible, a single contractor should be responsible for all external and internal works.

##### 1.05 Lessons Learned for Equipment Procurement and Technical Teacher Training

- (a) The school principals should be given equipment and furniture lists to verify their delivery.
- (b) Whenever appropriate, suppliers should be responsible for the installation of equipment and for the training of personnel in its use and maintenance.
- (c) Students should be closely monitored when they are trained outside the country; perhaps when they receive their fellowships they should sign a contract requiring them to return to Nigeria and teach for a specified number of years.



1.06 Lessons Learned for Project Financing

- (a) Federal grants to the States should be disbursed after verification has been received that the States have actually spent their funds for the project, as was stated in the Loan Agreement (Article III Section 3.01(d)).
- (b) In future projects, a separate revolving fund should be considered for financing project expenditures. This matter has already been discussed with the Government which accepts the proposal in principle and is willing to establish a single fund to finance Bank-assisted projects in all sectors.

1.07 Lesson Learned for Project Evaluation

Nigerian institutions to collect and evaluate educational statistics are needed to determine the impact of educational investments.

1.08 Follow-up. During the supervision of the ongoing Third Education Project (Ln. 929-UNI), the Bank should continue to monitor the work remaining to complete the Second Education Project.

## II. PROJECT BACKGROUND

### Country Setting

2.01 Three factors shaped the environment in which the Second Education Project was designed and implemented. First, the project was appraised in 1972 when eastern Nigeria was recovering from the devastating effects of the civil war (1967-70), during which many public buildings, including a large number of schools, were damaged and in some cases became unusable. Second, petroleum production in Nigeria began to expand dramatically in 1970, greatly increasing public revenues. The war's physical devastation, coupled with the growth in revenues, resulted in a construction boom that created a heavy demand for construction materials and skilled labor. Third, the administrative structure of eastern Nigeria underwent changes that complicated project administration. In 1967 the Eastern Region was divided into three States -- East-Central, River and South-Eastern State. In 1976, East-Central State was divided into Anambra and Imo States and South-Eastern State was renamed Cross River State. Creation of Imo State necessitated the construction of a new capital and this severely over-extended that State's financial resources. Moreover, a new Project Unit had to be created in Imo State in the middle of project implementation.

### Project Identification

2.02 This project grew out of a reappraisal of the components of the First Education Project (Cr. 72-UNI) which were originally identified in eastern Nigeria and the need for reconstruction of schools in that region following the civil war. The objectives of the first project, which was completed in 1977, were to emphasize science and workshop subjects in

secondary schools and teachers colleges. Additional rooms were to be built at secondary schools and teachers colleges in all the Regions to house science laboratories and workshops. But when the civil war began in July 1967, the Federal Military Government brought the project to a halt in the Eastern Region by suspending its authority to make withdrawals from the IDA credit. When the war ended in January 1970, the Government lifted the suspension and requested that the Bank Group reactivate the credit and consider giving additional assistance for school reconstruction. In the autumn of 1970, a Bank mission to reappraise the First Education Project in the eastern States and to study reconstruction needs in that area found that most of the schools that were identified in the original appraisal had been severely damaged. These findings, coupled with those of the UNESCO sector mission which visited Nigeria in February/March 1971, led to the reidentification of the first project and to the identification of a second project in the eastern States which would reconstruct damaged secondary schools and primary teachers colleges and strengthen science and vocational training in these schools. The Second Education Project was hastily appraised in March 1971 because there was pressure from the Nigerian Government to begin rehabilitating Eastern Nigeria. The total estimated project cost was US\$27.8 million and the amount of the Bank loan was US\$17.3 million. The Loan Agreement was signed on April 18, 1972 and became effective on November 28, 1972.

### III. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

#### Project Objectives and Description

3.01 The project had three main objectives: to reconstruct and rehabilitate the war-damaged secondary and primary teacher training schools, to expand the facilities and curricula of these schools to include more science courses and vocational training, and to combine or "match" small secondary schools so that they could share facilities (para. 5.02). At appraisal, the project was estimated to cost US\$27.8 million and consisted of:

- (a) Reconstruction, expansion, furnishing and equipping of the following institutions:
  - (i) East-Central State (in 1976 divided into Anambra and Imo States). Ten secondary schools to provide a total of approximately 11,230 student places, and seven primary teachers colleges to provide a total of approximately 4,200 student places. Estimated cost: US\$16.1 million.
  - (ii) Rivers State. Five secondary schools to provide a total of approximately 3,700 student places. Estimated cost: US\$4.2 million.
  - (iii) South-Eastern State (in 1976 renamed Cross River State). Eight secondary schools to provide a total of approximately 4,960 student places. Estimated cost: US\$6.4 million.

- (b) Fellowships for the training of technical teachers, and technical assistance to (i) train technical teachers, (ii) develop a curriculum for the secondary schools to include workshop subjects, and (iii) provide support to the Project Unit. Estimated cost: US\$1.1 million.

#### Changes in the Project

3.02 Three changes in the project were made during the course of implementation. First, soon after the signing of the Bank loan the Government assumed full responsibility for construction of the only totally new secondary school. Second, as costs began to rise the Government were faced with a choice of either reducing the scope of civil works financed by the Bank loan, or financing a component of the project themselves. In 1976 they proposed to the Bank that they assume responsibility for the purchase of all furniture and equipment, amounting to US\$4.6 million, so that these funds could be reallocated to Civil Works, and this was approved by the Bank. Third, the Borrower assumed responsibility for the development of curricula for the teaching of science, mathematics and practical subjects in the new secondary comprehensive schools without resorting to the technical assistance provision in the loan.

#### IV. PROJECT ADMINISTRATION

4.01 In the First Education Project (Cr. 72-UNI) the Ministries of Works in the States and in the Federal Territory of Lagos were given the responsibility for implementing the project components in their geographical areas, but project management was poor because responsibility for the project was diffused within these Ministries. The result was that much of the project implementation was done by the architectural consultants. To avoid this problem in the Second Education Project, project management was centralized by creating a Project Office within the Federal Ministry of Education, and Project Units in the Ministries of Education of the participating States. The same architectural consultants provided architectural and managerial expertise for the second project.

#### Federal Project Office

4.02 The Federal Project Office was responsible for (a) supervising the Project Managers in the States; (b) preparing progress reports for the Bank; (c) keeping financial and other records on the execution of the project; and (d) handling all matters involving other Federal Ministries, including the Ministry of Finance. A number of factors hampered the Project Office in carrying out these responsibilities. First, it was difficult to supervise the State Project Managers because communications were so poor: telephones frequently did not operate, mail was slow and travel funds were scarce. Second, inadequate resources were allocated to project management and therefore staffing problems plagued the Project Office. The Loan Agreement stipulated that there should be a Federal Project Office staffed with a full-time Project Director, a full-time accountant and adequate support staff; however,

the Project Director was unable to devote his full attention to the project because he was also responsible for implementation of the First Education Project until 1977 and also the Third Education Project (Ln. 929-UNI) after 1973. The accountant, who was not hired until the summer of 1979, was subsequently transferred to other tasks, and access to support staff was inadequate because the Project Office had to share them with other Federal offices. Third, the Loan Agreement stipulated that the Project Director should be responsible to the Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Education, but his actual position is three levels below the Permanent Secretary. To gain access to the Permanent Secretary's office, the Project Director must go through the Secretary of the Bureau of External Aid for Education, the Assistant Director of Education for Student Affairs and Foreign Aid, and the Director of Education. The bureaucratic distance of the Project Director from the Permanent Secretary left the Project Director with insufficient authority and access to the decision-making levels of Government. Finally, there has been a high turnover of Project Directors--four over the life of the project.

4.03 These handicaps under which the Project Office operated made it difficult to supervise the State Project Units, prepare progress reports, maintain its own records and handle its coordination responsibilities with other Federal ministries. In fact, most of these responsibilities were assumed by the consulting architects (paras. 5.04 - 5.07) until the expiration of their contract in April 1979. The Federal Project Office might have been more actively involved in project management if the consultants had been contracted to provide ongoing managerial training to the staff. However, the consultants did spend several weeks prior to their departure giving intensive training to the Project Office staff. After their departure, a fulltime accountant was hired and an architect was provided from the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation. The Project Office has now successfully assumed responsibility for issuing progress reports, handling financial matters and coordinating with other Federal ministries.

#### State Project Units

4.04 The Project Units were responsible for site supervision, preparation of reports, and procurement of civil works, furniture and equipment. As they were under the State Ministries of Education, they did not have access to the architectural services of the State Ministries of Public Works and therefore they used the consulting architects to help them select executive architects and supervise the project sites. The Project Units experienced managerial problems similar to those of the Federal Project Office: they were inadequately staffed and the State Project Managers did not have sufficient authority to carry out their responsibilities. The Loan Agreement stipulated that full-time Project Managers and adequate support staff should be appointed for the Project Units, but in three of the four States the Project Managers could not devote full time to project implementation as this responsibility was simply added to their regular duties. In Imo State, for example, the Project Manager said that he was able to devote only 20% of his time to the project. As was the case with the Federal Project Office, adequate support staff were not made available and the Project Managers had to compete for support services with other offices

within the State Ministries of Education. The Loan Agreement also stipulated that each Project Manager should be given the powers necessary to effectively implement the project. In Rivers, Anambra and Imo States, this was not done and the status of the Project Managers was not high enough to enable them to expedite the decision-making process. The Government policy of rotating personnel frequently resulted in discontinuous management of the Project Units. Anambra and Imo States have each had four Project Managers, including two when they were combined in East-Central State.

4.05 The situation was better in Cross River State, where a full-time Project Manager was appointed and given authority commensurate with his responsibilities. He was also two or three levels higher in the bureaucracy than the other Project Managers, and was able to set up an Implementation Committee which included the Governor of the State and the Ministers of Finance and Education. This Committee met at least once a month to resolve problems and make decisions to expedite project implementation. One of its decisions was to open a special account for the project, and this avoided the delays caused by inadequate State funds which were experienced in the other States (para. 7.01). The Project Manager was also able to enlist the support of the principals of the project schools, who provided valuable on-the-spot project supervision.

4.06 The consulting architects gave substantial managerial assistance to the Project Units, as there were an unusually large number of contracts to supervise, both because there were many executive architects and because separate contracts were awarded for water and electrical services. Ten executive architects were hired in addition to six quantity surveying and three structural engineering firms. Separate contracts were awarded for water supply and electrical works in all but two of the 29 project schools, making a total of 91 contracts for the State Project Units to supervise.

## V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

### Civil Works

5.01 Goals and accomplishments. The physical goals of the project were to reconstruct and expand war-damaged schools. At appraisal it was decided that 1,095 educational facilities, which included classrooms, workshops and communal buildings, would be provided. The completion mission found that this goal was exceeded, as 1,117 of physical facilities were provided (see Annex 2). Most of these facilities (68%) are being used for their intended purposes. However, 13% are not being used as originally planned, largely because some of the workshop furniture and equipment has not been delivered and over one-third of the workshops are being used as regular classrooms (paras. 5.09-5.10). Despite the fact that eight of the 29 project schools are completely finished, only 19% of the physical facilities are not yet in use. In general, the physical facilities are serviceable, but many have rough finishes and some are not well placed on the sites. In one case poor construction led to the collapse of a roof, which is being repaired. It is anticipated that all the project schools will be operational by the end of 1980 (see Annex 2).

5.02 At appraisal, it was proposed that small secondary schools located near each other be placed under one administration or "matched" so that they could share workshops and communal facilities (para. 3.01). This idea was successfully implemented in some schools but met with resistance in others. In some cases, the schools were not "matched" because each school's enrollments increased so much that it became administratively difficult to merge them. In other cases there was no possibility that the schools designated at appraisal to be matched could be jointly administered, either because the principals were unwilling to merge their facilities or because, in the case of Imo State, a policy decision had been made not to match boys and girls schools.

#### Delays in Construction

5.03 Although more facilities were produced than anticipated at appraisal, it has taken over eight years to implement what was expected to be a three-year project. There are several reasons for the delays. First, the establishment of the State Project Units was difficult in the post civil war environment in which staff and office space were in short supply. Second, the inadequate allocation of State resources for the project was a major cause of delay during project implementation (paras. 4.02 and 7.01). Frequently the contractors were not paid and some of them abandoned their sites until they were paid, which in some cases was up to six months. Third, delays occurred because the working drawings for electrical works and water supply were late and this held up the bidding process for these contracts. In six schools, all new construction and rehabilitation have been completed, but the external water or electrical works are still not completed (see Annex 2). Further, the enthusiasm of the executive architects who supervised these contracts waned because the post civil war economic boom provided them with more attractive opportunities. Fourth, obtaining Government approval of contracts was a time-consuming process because the State Military Executive Councils, which were the highest State authority at that time, had to give their approval. Finally, the postwar boom generated a heavy demand for skilled workers; realizing that they were in demand and that wages were increasing, they had frequent strikes which delayed construction and increased costs.

#### Consulting Architects

5.04 The consulting architects who were used for the First Education Project (para. 4.01) were also retained for the Second Education Project and they worked on both projects simultaneously. The agreement for continuation of their services was signed on March 23, 1972, almost a month before the signing of the Loan Agreement, and they provided good managerial and architectural support to both the Federal Project Office and the State Project Units until the expiration of their contract in April 1979.

5.05 Services to the Federal Project Office. The consulting architects provided managerial support to the Project Office by (a) helping to supervise bidding contract procedures and awards, (b) preparing documents for the Bank, and (c) assisting the Project Director with the preparation of progress reports. They provided good managerial expertise and the necessary continuity for the project.

5.06 The consultants' architectural services to the Federal Project Office included (a) surveying all sites to assess existing facilities to determine which could be rehabilitated and which should be replaced, (b) establishing cost limits for construction and rehabilitation, and (c) preparing a design and procedures guide for all "standard" buildings which were required in every school (i.e. classrooms, science laboratories, workshops and home economics blocks). Their designs for the "standard" buildings were functional, flexible and well suited to Nigeria's needs.

5.07 Services to the State Project Units. The consultants contracted to give technical support to the State Project Units by (a) helping the Project Managers with the pre-qualification, bidding and contract award process, (b) advising on the selection of executive architects and preparing technical terms of reference, and (c) providing advice to the executive architects when requested by the Project Managers. They did provide these services, but it was difficult to provide ongoing technical support because the Project Managers and the executive architects were located in the east and the consultants were based in Lagos.

#### Furniture and Equipment

5.08 At appraisal, furniture and equipment for the project schools were to be financed by the Bank loan, and the consulting architects prepared the lists for the States in April 1975. As project costs began to escalate, the States sought ways to preserve the scope of the project and proposed that they assume responsibility for financing furniture and equipment (para 3.02). This request was granted in April 1976, but because each State was responsible for procuring its own equipment, the rate at which furniture and equipment have been acquired has varied from State to State.

5.09 Equipment. The acquisition of equipment is important to project implementation because without it the workshop courses cannot be offered. The most critical factor has been the inadequacy of State funding, since without funds in the budget, acquisition procedures cannot begin (para. 7.01). In Anambra and Cross River States where funding has been available for equipment, all contracts have been awarded, the equipment is being delivered, and school principals are supervising the deliveries. In Imo and Rivers States, the State budgetary estimates for 1980/81 had not been released as of June 1980. Imo is waiting for its budgetary estimates before selecting a firm, but Rivers has gone ahead and selected a Canadian firm. Imo and Rivers States estimate that their equipment can be delivered within six months after the funds become available.

5.10 Several problems have arisen with regard to the ordering, delivery and use of equipment for the project schools and some solutions have been found. Anambra State experienced delays in delivery because of import restrictions, while Cross River State found that if State Government importers were used they could obtain exemption certificates when equipment was not available domestically. Both Anambra and Cross River found that using school principals to verify equipment deliveries was very helpful.

However, even in schools where equipment has been delivered, this equipment sometimes is not used because it is not properly installed or maintained. This could be resolved if the contract for the supply of special equipment made the supplier responsible for installation and for training local staff in its use and maintenance.

5.11 Furniture. Furnishing the project schools was less complicated than equipping them because furniture is produced locally. Cross River and Anambra States used their School Boards and Schools Service Commissions to order all furniture, and most of the furniture has been delivered in these two States. Imo State has ordered its furniture and some has already been delivered, and Rivers State is purchasing its furniture from local companies as the school facilities are completed. The Federal Project Office is encouraging all States to use their school furniture purchasing unit because they are familiar with the procedures for purchasing furniture.

#### Teacher Training

5.12 The Bank loan provided for the training of technical teachers for workshop courses in the project schools. There were two approaches to this training requirement: Cross River State added technical teacher educators to the faculty of the College of Technology in Calabar, while the other three States provided fellowships. The Cross River approach proved to be quite successful. The two technical educators, who were provided by grants from the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, were able to train technical teachers to conduct courses in woodworking, metalwork, electricity and general mechanics during their respective two and two-and-a-half years' stay.

5.13 The other three States have found it difficult to ensure that their fellowship recipients will return to Nigeria and will be appropriately placed. Of the ten recipients from Rivers State sent to England for nine months of training in 1974, seven have returned and six are technical educators in the State. In 1973 when Imo and Anambra States were the East-Central State, five fellowship recipients were sent to the United States but only one has returned to Nigeria and is working as a technical educator. State officials and principals in all four States have expressed their confidence that the Technical Teachers Colleges and the College of Technology will be able to supply a sufficient number of technical teachers to meet the needs of the project schools when they become fully equipped.

#### Curriculum Development

5.14 To help each State develop and adapt curricula, the project provided three man-years of specialist services, one year in each of three subject areas -- science and mathematics, social studies, and workshop. In 1976 the Federal Government, with the consent of the Bank, assumed full responsibility for the development of its own curriculum in these three



subject areas. Nigeria has a well-developed capacity for curriculum development. The National Educational Research Council regularly produces curriculum guidelines in all subject areas for secondary schools and primary teachers' colleges, which are intended to be adapted by the States to their particular educational needs. The Council's curriculum development efforts are supplemented by the summer seminars for science teachers given by the Comparative Education Study and Adaptation Center, located at the University of Lagos.

## VI. PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS

### Secondary Comprehensive Schools

6.01 For the secondary schools in the project, there were three basic goals: (a) to provide for more students by rehabilitating war-damaged facilities and constructing new ones; (b) to diversify the curriculum by adding science facilities and workshops and by training teachers for workshop courses; and (c) to consolidate small schools into economically viable units (para. 5.02). The goal to provide secondary education for more students has been exceeded. At appraisal, it was anticipated that 880 facilities to provide for 19,890 student places would be created by the project and the completion mission found 896 facilities for 21,570 student places (see Annexes 1 and 2). The demand for these facilities has been great and at present the student enrollment of 29,121 exceeds the 21,570 student places which have been made available. While this confirms a demand for more secondary schools, it has resulted in some crowding and the use of double shifts which may adversely affect learning. However, there appear to be enough teachers for this level of enrollment, as the average present teacher/student ratio is 1:31.

6.02 There are three reasons for this increase in facilities and the subsequent increase in student places. First, the facilities in some schools were not "matched" (para 5.02), each one was provided with facilities that were to have been shared by the combined school. Second, most of the sites were not visited at appraisal and in some cases a number of existing physical facilities were under-estimated. Third, some rehabilitation and temporary construction work has been done by the parents and States independently of the project.

6.03 The goal to provide more science facilities and diversify the curriculum to include workshop courses has been more difficult to achieve. While most of the planned science facilities are operating and the courses offered, the experience with workshop courses has been poor, mainly because the workshop equipment has not been delivered and the courses cannot be offered without it (paras. 5.09-5.10). Over one-third of the completed technical classrooms are being used for regular classrooms or for other purposes while the equipment is being procured (see Annex 2). The curricula for the workshop courses are available and an adequate number of teachers for these courses, some of whom were trained under the auspices of the project (para. 5.13), are expected to be available when the workshops become operational.

### Primary Teacher Training Colleges

6.04 The goals for the primary teacher training colleges were similar to those for the secondary schools: (a) to provide more student places, and (b) to diversify the curriculum to include workshop courses and more science courses. The outcomes are also similar. At appraisal it was anticipated that 4,200 student places would be provided, compared with 4,350 now provided. Enrollments are 5,275, which exceed the number of student places. Despite this large enrollment, the teacher/student ratio is 1:23. However, in two colleges the enrollments are lower than the number of student places; both are men's colleges in Imo State and their enrollments have been adversely affected by new certification requirements in that State. These requirements have added a year to previous one- and two-year programs and the students do not want to spend the additional time. One college plans to accept women students next year to increase enrollments.

6.05 There have been delays in accomplishing the goal of expanding the science and workshop facilities. As in the case of the secondary schools, over one-third of the technical classrooms have been completed, but they are being used as regular classrooms or for other purposes because they lack equipment (see Annex 2).

### Project Efficiency

6.06 It is difficult to assess the quality of the project schools as compared with similar schools in Nigeria, because information on dropout and repeater rates is not systematically collected in Nigeria and no provision was made in this project to develop institutions for this purpose. The only information on school quality that exists on a national basis is the examination pass rates; for secondary school the pass rate is 60% and for primary teacher training colleges, 40%. Of the 15 schools visited by the completion mission, only two of the primary teacher training colleges and four of the secondary schools were able to provide pass rate information on their schools. This scanty information indicates that the average pass rate for secondary schools and for primary teacher training colleges is about 70%, well above the national average.

6.07 Facilities for tracing the career patterns of graduates do not exist. Only three primary teacher training colleges and four secondary schools were able to provide any information on their graduates. The three primary teacher training colleges reported that all their graduates accepted positions as primary school teachers. Most of the secondary school graduates have tried to continue their studies, as salaries for those with post-secondary school training are more attractive. From 5% to 10% of the graduates go on to university, 25-50% get more technical training, and the remaining graduates join the work force. As most of the workshops are not yet operational their impact upon the curricula cannot be assessed at this stage.

## VII. PROJECT FINANCING AND COST

### Financing

7.01 Delays and inadequacies in State funding for the project (para. 5.03) comprised the major problem in project implementation. Delays in the initial stages occurred because most of the Project Managers found it difficult to have funds allocated to the project in the State budget estimates. As contracts could not be awarded until funds were available, there was a two-year delay between the preparation of bills of quantity in 1974 and the award of contracts in 1976. During this time, construction costs increased substantially but the contractors were held to the original prices. They objected, particularly those in Imo State, and many abandoned the sites. Throughout the implementation of the project there were persistent difficulties because the States would not allocate funds and contractors would abandon the sites. The situation became so serious that the Federal Government stepped in and gave the States a US\$31,635,000 grant to enable them to complete the project. However, these funds were not distinguished from general State revenues and sometimes were not used for the project. Only in Cross River State, where the Project Manager opened a special account, were the funds used for the project (para. 4.05).

### Costs

7.02 Delays in project implementation occurred at a time when worldwide inflation was increasing and construction costs in Nigeria were also rapidly increasing as a result of the post-war reconstruction and the construction boom. Hence, the total project cost is expected to be about US\$78.0 million, compared with US\$27.8 million, or about 180% higher than anticipated. The largest increase was the 212% increase in the cost of construction, from an estimated US\$17.0 million to US\$53.0 million. The next largest increase (152%) was for professional fees. This occurred because the architectural and managerial support that the architectural consultants contracted to provide to the Federal Project Office and the State Project Units was more extensive than anticipated and lasted over a considerably longer period (paras. 5.04-5.07). The cost of furniture and equipment has also increased dramatically (139%) because inflation increased the cost in the interim between the appraisal cost estimates in 1972 and payments made between 1978 and 1980 (paras. 5.08-5.11). The lowest cost increases were for technical assistance (36%) because the fellowships were used in 1973 and 1974 and the two technical teacher trainers were financed by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (para. 5.12).

Project Costs in Millions

Category of Expenditure	<u>Appraisal Estimates</u>				<u>Actual Costs 1/</u>		<u>% Difference</u>	
	<u>Base Cost</u>		<u>Base Cost + Contingencies</u>					
	<u>N</u>	<u>US\$ 1/</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>US\$ 1/</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>US\$ 2/</u>		
1. Buildings and Site Development	8.5	13.0	11.2	17.0	32.6	53.0	+191	+212
2. Equipment and Furniture	3.8	5.8	4.6	7.0	10.3	16.7	+124	+139
3. Professional (architectural) Fees	1.4	2.1	1.8	2.7	4.2	6.8	+133	+153
4. Technical Assistance	0.6	0.9	0.7	1.1	0.9	1.5	+29	+36
5. Contingencies	<u>4.0</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	<u>18.3</u>	<u>27.8</u>	<u>18.3</u>	<u>27.8</u>	<u>48.0</u>	<u>78.0</u>	<u>+163</u>	<u>+180</u>

1/ These costs were calculated by the completion mission in March 1980; some additional costs will be incurred as the remaining tasks are completed.

2/ Exchange rate during appraisal (1971): N1.00 = US\$3.04 equivalent to N1.00 = US\$1.52

Exchange rates during active implementation: 1976-1978, N1.00 = US\$1.56; 1979, N1.00 = US\$1.59-1.74; 1980, N1.00 = US\$1.829.

VIII. THE BANK'S PERFORMANCE

8.01 While the rehabilitation and expansion of these schools in the post-war environment of Nigeria represents quite an achievement, hindsight reveals a few lessons which could expedite project implementation in the future. The project was hastily appraised because the Government was very anxious to begin the reconstruction and reintegration of eastern Nigeria. The project was appraised before the sites were visited and before costs were detailed. This led to an overly optimistic project implementation schedule, low cost estimates and project designs which in some cases were unrealistic. If the appraisal had taken place after an assessment of the number and condition of the physical facilities had been made, the extent of the damage to these schools would have been known, making it possible to do more realistic estimates of costs, a more thorough assessment of the necessary physical facilities, and better project design. For example, in theory, economies of scale could be obtained by combining inefficient small schools into larger comprehensive schools.

However, this idea proved to be very difficult to implement (para. 5.02). The First Education Project also suffered because lending took place too early in the project cycle, but the consequences of lending early in the project cycle were not yet clear because the First Education Project was only in the initial stages of implementation when the second project was being identified.

8.02 Closer supervision, particularly in the initial stages of project implementation, might have reduced some of the problems. During the first three years there were four supervision missions, only two of which visited the sites in the eastern States. From 1975 to 1977 there were only three supervision missions because the Government was reluctant to approve missions. The infrequency of Bank missions during this initial period had two results. First, Bank personnel were not available to discuss with State officials the need to allocate State funds to the project (para. 7.01). Second, the absence of Bank personnel put an additional burden on the architectural consultants because they had to explain Bank procedures and interpret Bank policies--duties normally performed by Bank staff. After 1977, supervision missions visited Nigeria about every four months; however, only three missions (including the completion mission) visited the sites. Closer supervision of the fellowship program might have encouraged the Federal Project Unit to monitor the recipients more carefully and ensure that they returned to Nigeria and were well placed. A strength of the Bank's supervision of this project was the continuity of mission personnel; on 13 of the 16 missions, one or more members had been on a previous mission.



Country NIGERIA  
Ed. Project No. II  
Loan/Credit No. 814-UNI

COMPLETION STUDY

IBRD/IDA Ed. Projects

Completion Form IV

COMPARISON OF  
STUDENT PLACES ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR,  
STUDENT PLACES ACTUALLY MADE AVAILABLE  
AND ACTUAL ENROLLMENTS

PROJECT ITEM (School/Institution)	STUDENT PLACES PLANNED FOR ( Appraisal ) ( Worksheets ) 1	STUDENT PLACES MADE AVAILABLE ( Completed ) ( Construction ) 2	% DIF. 2/1	ACTUAL CURRENT ENROLLMENT 3	% DIF. 3/1	% DIF. 3/2
A. IMO State						
1. Ihie PTTC *	600	600	0	800	+33	+33
2. Afikpo PTTC	600	600	0	600 1/	0	0
6. Orlu PTTC *	600	600	0	412	-31	-31
7. Nsu PTTC *	600	700	17	520	-13	-26
8. Aba Sec. School *	1,200	1,350	+13	2,712 2/	+126	+101
13. Awo-Omana Sec. Sch.	1,200	1,200	0	1,824	+52	+52
14. Ihube Sec. School	800	800	0	800 1/	0	0
16. Egbu Sec. School	1,200	1,200	0	1,700	+42	+42
17. Umuahia Sec. Sch.	1,410	1,410	0	1,410 1/		
Sub-Total IMO	8,210	8,460	+3	10,778	+31	+27
B. Anambra State						
3. Enugu WTTC *	600	600	0	1,162	+93	+93
4. Adazi PTTC	600	600	0	856	+43	+43
5. Nsukka PTTC	600	650	+8	925	+54	+42
9. Abaka Mk Sec. Sch.	800	800	0	1,094	+37	+37
10. Awkunanaw Sec. Sch.	1,200	2,150 1/	+79	2,372 2/	+98	+10
11. Abagana Sec. Sch.	1,000	1,000 1/	0	1,497 2/	+50	+50
12. Nsukka Sec. Sch. *	1,010	2,050 1/	+103	2,062	+104	+1
15. Onitsha Sec. Sch.	1,410	1,410 2/	0	2,182 3/	+55	+55
Sub-Total Anambra	7,220	9,260	+28	12,150	+68	+31
C. Rivers State						
18. Yenagoa Sec. Sch.	740	600	-19	600 1/	-19	0
19. Buguma Sec. Sch.	740	600	-19	896	+21	+49
20. Ikwerre/Etche Sec. School	740	600	-19	824	+11	+37
21. Oporoma Sec. Sch.	740	600	-19	600 1/	-19	0
22. Okrika Sec. Sch.	740	660	-11	1,401	+89	+112
Sub-Total Rivers	3,700	3,060	-17	4,321	+17	+41

IBRD/IDA Ed. Projects

COMPARISON OF  
STUDENT PLACES ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR,  
STUDENT PLACES ACTUALLY MADE AVAILABLE  
AND ACTUAL ENROLLMENTS

D.H.Lewis/January 1977      3/ Combined places - 3 originally      Sheet 2 of 2 Sheets  
\* Schools visited by Completion Mission      matched schools.



NIGERIA

SECOND EDUCATION REPORT (LOAN 814-UNI)

ANNEX 2

COMPLETION REPORT

STATUS OF PHYSICAL FACILITIES AND ENROLLMENTS AS OF MAY 1980

STATE				Regular Classrooms					Technical Rooms					Communal Facilities				
	Code No.	Est'd. Compl. Date	% Compl.	No. of Items	No. of Items	Not in Use	In Other Use	In Planned Use	No. of Items	No. of Items	Not in Use	In Other Use	In Planned Use	No. of Items	No. of Items	Not in Use	In Other Use	In Planned Use
<b>RIVERS</b>																		
YENAGOA Sec. School	18	Completed 1/	100	15	11			11	16	10		10		8	8			8
BUGUMA* Sec. School	19	Oct. 80 1/	95	15	11			11	16	16	16			5	5	1	1	3
IKWERRE/ETCHE Sec. School	20	Completed 1/	100	15	11			11	16	10		10		7	7			7
OPOROMA Sec. School	21	Dec. 80	75	15	11			11	16	11		11		5	5			5
OKRIKA* Sec. School	22	Completed 1/	100	15	13		2	11	16	7		7		5	5	1		4
<b>IWO</b>																		
IHE* PTTC	1	June 80 1/	95	16	20		1	19	9	9	6		3	5	5	1	1	3
AFIKPO PTTC	2	June 80	85	16	16			16	9	9		9		10	10			10
ORLU* PTTC	6	Aug. 80	85	16	16			16	9	7	7			5	4	3		1
NSU* PTTC	7	Completed	100	16	20			19	9	9	6		2	5	5	3	1	1
AWO-OMAMA* Sec. School	13	June 80	75	21	21			21	25	17	1	6	10	5	5			5
IHUBE Sec. School	14	June 80	98	15	15			15	14	13		13		11	11			11
EGBU COMP. SCH.*	16	July 80	80	21	16	5		11	17	14	2	9	3	5	5	3		2
UMAHIA Sec. School	17	June 80	95	22	27			27	17	17		17		5	5			5
ABA* Sec. School	8		75															
a) Boys				15	15		1	14	25	14	11		3	8	4		2	2
b) Girls				12	12			12		7	5		2		2	1		1
		April 80																
<b>ANAMBRA</b>																		
ENUGU WTTIC*	3	Completed 1/	100	16	17			17	7	8	4		4	7	8	2		6
ADAZI PTTC	4	Dec. 80	70	16	12			12	7	7	5		2	7	9	4		5
NSUKKA PTTC*	5	Dec. 80	75	16	18			18	7	7		7		7	7	3		4
ABAKALIKI Sec. School	9	Completed	100	15	15	7		8	14	13	7	2	4	8	10	4		6
AWKUNANAW* Sec. School																		
a) Boys )	10	July 80	99	21	( 24	12		12	18	( 13	11		2	10	( 6	6		2
b) Girls )					( 27			27		( 5			5		( 4	2		
ARAGANA Sec. School																		
a) Boys )	11	Completed	100	17	14			14	17	17		15	2	10	12			
b) Girls )																		
NSUKKA* Sec. School																		
a) St. Teresas )	12	Completed	100	19	( 21			21	15	( 9	5		4	10	( 5			5
b) Nsukka High )					( 28			28		( 6			6		( 5			5
ONITSHA Sec. School																		
a) Grammar )	15	Completed	100	27	22			22	21	16		11	5	15	13			13
b) Modebe Mem. )																		
c) Comprehensive)																		
<b>CROSS RIVER</b>																		
IKOT ANSA* Sec. School (St. Patrick's)	23	June 80	98	19	21			21	14	15	5		10	9	11	2		9
ETINAN* Sec. School	25	Sept. 80	80	15	19			19	11	12	5		7	8	11	7		4
OGOJA Sec. School	26	Sept. 80	90	11	15			15	8	9	7		2	8	9	6		3
UYO Sec. School	27	June 80	95	12	11			11	12	9	5		4	7	9	1		8
ORON Sec. School	28	July 80	96	15	15	12		3	11	10	2		8	8	9	7		2
IBIAKU* Sec. School	29	June 80	96	11	19	8		11	8	10	4		6	7	7	5		2
IKOM Sec. School	30	Completed 1/	98	11	12			12	8	9			9	7	8	1		7
PTTC's				112	119		1	118	57	54	22	21	11	46	48	16	2	30
Sec. Schools				374	426	44	3	379	335	289	86	111	92	171	181	47	3	131
GRAND TOTAL				486	545	44	4	497	392	343	108	132	203	217	229	63	5	161

\* Schools visited by Completion Mission

1/ All construction for new and rehabilitated work is completed but some water or electrical work needs to be done.

NIGERIA

SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 814-UNI)

COMPLETION REPORT

COMPARISON OF

A ORIGINALLY FORECAST AND

B ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS

ACTIVITY	STARTING DATES		COMPLETION DATES	
	A APPRAISAL SCHEDULE	B ACTUAL OR PRES. EST.	A APPRAISAL SCHEDULE	B ACTUAL OR PRES. EST.
I. <u>CONSTRUCTION</u>				
A <u>Imo State</u>				
1 Ihie PTTC	Phased: July, '73 to Oct., '73	April, '76	Phased: Dec., '74 to March, '75	June, '80
2 Afikpo PTTC		"		June, '80
6 Orlu PTTC		March, '76		Aug, '80
7 Nsu PTTC		Feb., '76		Jan, '79
8 Aba Sec. School		March, '76		April, '80
13 Awo Omana Sec. S.		"		June, '80
14 Ihube Sec. Sch.		"		June, '80
16 Egbu Sec. Sch.		Feb., '76		July, '80
17 Umuahia Sec. Sch.	March, '76	June, '80		
B <u>Anambra State</u>				
3 Enugu WTTC	Phased: July, '73 to Oct., '73	March, '76	Phased: Dec., '74 to March, '75	May, '80
4 Adazi PTTC		July, '77		Dec, '80
5 Nsukka PTTC		"		Dec, '80
9 Abakaliki S.S.		Sept., '76		May, '80
10 Awkunanaw S.S.		April, '76		July, '80
11 Abagana S.S.		"		Sept, '78
12 Nsukka S.S.		July, '76		"
15 Onitsha S.S.		March, '76		April, '73
C <u>Rivers State</u>				
18 Yenagoa S.S.	Phased: July, '73 to Oct., '73	April, '76	Phased: Dec., '74 to March, '75	May, '80
19 Buguma S.S.		Aug., '76		Oct, '80
20 Ikwerre/Etche		"		May, '80
21 Oporoma S.S.		Oct., '76		Dec, '80
22 Okrika Sec. Sch.		Aug., '76		Dec, '79

ACTIVITY	STARTING DATES		COMPLETION DATES	
	A APPRAISAL SCHEDULE	B ACTUAL OR PRES. EST.	A APPRAISAL SCHEDULE	B ACTUAL OR PRES. EST.
<b>D</b> <u>Cross River State</u>				
23 Ikot Ansa S.S.	Phased: July, '73 to Oct., '73	June, '78	Phased: Dec., '74 to March, '75	June, '80
24 Eket Sec. Sch.		-		-
25 Etinan Sec. Sch.		July, '77		Sept, '80
26 Ogoja Sec. Sch.		"		"
27 Uyo Sec. School		June, '77		June, '80
28 Oron Sec. Sch.		July, '77		July, '80
29 Ibiaku S.S.		June, '77		June, '80
30 Ikom Sec. School		July, '77		May, '80
<b>II</b> <u>EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT</u>				
A Imo State	Phased: March, '73 to April, '74	March, '78 April, '80 April, '78	Phased Oct., '73 to March, '75	Sept., '80
B Anambra State				Sept., '80
C Rivers State				Dec., '80
D Cross River State				June, '80
<b>III</b> <u>FURNITURE PROCUREMENT</u>				
A Imo State	Phased: March, '73 to April, '74	June, '80 July, '79	Phased: Oct., '73 to March, '75	Dec., '80
B Anambra State				
C Rivers State				
D Cross River State				June, '80
<b>IV</b> <u>TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE</u>				
<b>A</b> <u>Teacher Training</u>				
1 Specialists	Earliest: Aug., '72	(i) Sept., '77 ii) Dec., '78	Latest: Jan., '75	(i) Sept., '79 ii) Dec., '79
2 Fellowships	"		"	
B Curric. Dev. Spec.	"	-	Latest: July, '73	-
C Proj. Unit Support	April, '72	Consulting (i) Architects ii) Com. Fund Arch: April, '79	Dec., '75	(i) April, '79 ii) April, '80

Covenant Status: M = met  
N = not met  
P = pending

Country: Nigeria  
Project: Loan 814-UNI  
Date: December 1980

EDUCATION DIVISION - WESTERN AFRICA PROJECTS

Compliance with Credit/Loan Agreement Covenants

I. Major Covenants

Section No. of Credit/Loan Agreement	Covenant	Status	Comments	Action Taken, or Required
3.01(a)	Borrower to exercise every recourse to encourage the States to implement project efficiently in conformity with sound administrative, educational, financial and engineering practices.	M	The Federal Government has made a grant to the States to finance local costs and has monitored the programs of the States.	The Federal Project Office will continue to monitor the progress of the States.
3.01(b)	Loans to be made available to the States benefiting from the project on conditions satisfactory to Bank.	M	Allocations have been made on the basis of the estimated cost of project items in each State.	Bank has formally agreed to the changes in the original allocations required by the readjustment of State boundaries.
3.01(c)	Borrower to ensure States fulfill their obligations.	M	The Federal Government has given the States full financial support.	The Federal Project Office will continue to monitor the progress of the States.
3.01(d)	Borrower responsible for supplement funding where loan allocation inadequate.	M		The Federal Government has provided the States with grants sufficient to complete the project.
3.02	Borrower to establish Project Office in Ministry of Education, staffed with Project Director, accountant and adequate supporting staff.	M	The Project Office was established. The post of accountant has only recently been filled.	The accountant, appointed in July 1979, started work in Sept. 1979.
8.01	Borrower to appoint Project Director;	M		Project Director has been appointed.
8.01(c)	States to appoint Project Managers.	M		Project Managers have been appointed.

Covenant Status: M = met  
N = not met  
P = pending

Country: Nigeria  
Project: Loan 814-UNI  
Date: December 1980

EDUCATION DIVISION - WESTERN AFRICA PROJECTS

Compliance with Credit/Loan Agreement Covenants

II. Other Covenants

Section No. of Credit/Loan Agreement	Covenant	Status	Comments	Action Taken or Required
2.04	Closing Date December 31, 1979.		The loan may not be fully disbursed by December 31, 1979.	The BEA is to monitor disbursement claims.
2.06	Borrower to pay 7-1/4% interest.	M	Payments are being made.	Controller's Department to monitor.
2.07	Payment dates February 15, August 15.	M	Dates of payment are being observed.	Controller's Department to monitor.
2.08	Payment of principal.	P	Starts August 15, 1982; ends February 15, 1997.	Controller's Department to monitor.
3.03	Borrower to appoint consultants under technical assistance to: (i) train technical teachers; (ii) develop curricula for the comprehensive schools.	M	The Borrower has developed the capability to develop curricula for the comprehensive schools without Bank assistance.	No action required.
3.04	Appoint Architectural Consultants to prepare standard designs and bidding documents.	M	The firm of Robert Matthew, Johnson Marshall and Partners, Consultants for the first project, was appointed for this purpose. The project office has taken over this responsibility.	The standard designs and bidding have been completed.

Section No. of Credit/Loan Agreement	Covenant	Status	Comments	Action Taken or Required
3.05(a)	Borrower to ensure that States insure against all risks.	M	Contractors have undertaken to ensure their works.	
3.05(b)	Borrower to ensure that all goods and services financed with loan funds are used for this project.	M		The Project Office to record the uses of loan funds.
3.06(a)	Borrower to submit documents to Bank for comment.	M		Bank reviewed and approved documents.
3.06(b)	Borrower to:			
	(i) Maintain records of progress and identification of goods and services;	M	Progress reports are done.	From April 1, 1979, the Project Office has assumed responsibility from the consultants.
	(ii) Allow Bank representatives to inspect records and documents;	M	Project Office is cooperative.	
	(iii) Provide information to Bank on the loan and project.	M	Relevant information is available.	From April 1, 1979, the Project Office has formulated Quarterly Reports.
4.02	Borrower shall maintain records with sound accounting practices relating to operations, resources and expenditures in respect to the project.	M	Records have to be updated by the newly appointed accountant.	From April 1, 1979, the Project Office has been responsible.
4.03	The Borrower shall operate project institutions with sound administrative and educational policies so as to further the educational objectives of the country.	M	The institutions which are in operation are being soundly administered. The educational goals are expected to be met when equipment for the workshops is in use.	The Federal Project Office will continue to monitor the progress of the States.
5.01	Bank and borrower to cooperate to assure purposes of loan will be accomplished.	M		Cooperation is maintained through visiting missions, regular correspondence and the Resident Mission.
5.03	Borrower to afford opportunity to Bank to visit country for purposes of Loan	M	This has been accomplished, except during 1976 when missions were postponed on Government's request.	There have been frequent missions during the past two years.

Section No. of Credit/Loan Agreement	Covenant	Status	Comments	Action Taken or Required
8.01(a)	Execution and delivery of State Undertakings;	M		All done by Date of Effectiveness, which was postponed from 7/18/72 to 11/28/72.
8.02	States to ratify their undertakings.	M		The undertakings have been modified to cover the States as they are presently established.

Country NIGERIA  
 Education Project No. II  
 Loan/Credit No. 814-UN1

COMPLETION STUDY

IBRD/IDA Education Projects

COMPARISON OF ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED COSTS AND ACTUAL COSTS

Completion Form VII

PROJECT ITEM	COSTS IN '000 OF Naira <sup>1/</sup>																			
	CONSTRUCTION & SITE DEV.				FURNITURE & EQUIPMENT				PROFESSIONAL FEES				TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE				TOTAL			
	*Appraisal Est.		Est.	%	Appraisal Est.*		Est.	%	Appraisal Est.*		Est.	%	Appraisal Est.*		Actual	%	Appraisal Est.*		Actual	%
	Excl.	Incl.	Actual		Excl.	Incl.	Actual		Excl.	Incl.	Actual		Excl.	Incl.	Cost		Excl.	Incl.	Cost	
Code No.	Conting	Conting		Dif.	Conting	Conting		Dif.	Conting	Conting		Dif.	Conting	Conting		Dif.	Conting	Conting		Dif.
	1	2	3	3/2	1	2	3	3/2	1	2	3	3/2	1	2	3	3/2	1	2	3	3/2
A. IMO State																				
1. Ihie PTTC	322	422	985	+133	90	110			52	68	125	+83					464	600		
2. Afikpo PTTC	310	406	972	+139	100	122			50	64	120	+87					460	592		
6. Orlu PTTC	286	374	995	+166	102	124			46	60	125	+108					434	558		
7. Nsu PTTC	324	424	1,242	+193	102	124			50	68	160	+135					478	616		
8. Aba Sec. Sch.	278	364	1,319	+262	166	202	3,000		44	58	170	+193					488	624		
13. Awo-Omana S.S.	292	382	1,498	+292	126	154			46	60	195	+225					464	596		
14. Ihube Sec. Sch.	430	562	1,663	+196	128	156			68	88	215	+87					626	806		
16. Egbu Sec. Sch.	294	384	1,665	+334	194	236			48	62	215	+182					536	682		
17. Umuahia S.S.	488	638	809	+26	172	210			78	102	105	+3					738	950		
Sub-Total IMO	3,024	3,956	11,148	+182	1,180	1,438	3,000	+109	484	630	1,430	+127					4,688	6,024	15,578	+159
B. Anambra State																				
3. Enugu WTTC	244	318	504	+58	98	118			40	52	65	+25					382	488		
4. Adazi PTTC	298	390	950	+144	102	124			48	62	125	+102					448	576		
5. Nsukka PTTC	280	366	893	+144	104	126			44	56	115	+105					428	548		
9. Aba S. Sch.	316	414	1,122	+171	124	150	2,200		50	64	145	+127					490	628		
10. Awka S. S.	132	172	1,140	+563	170	206			22	28	150	+436					324	406		
11. Alagbana S. Sch.	204	266	1,226	+360	162	196			32	42	160	+280					398	504		
12. Nsukka S. Sch.	256	336	1,024	+205	134	164			40	52	135	+160					430	552		
15. Itshin S. S.	386	506	2,144	+324	216	262			62	80	275	+244					664	848		
Sub-Total Anambra	2,116	2,768	9,003	+225	1,110	1,346	2,200	+63	338	436	1,170	+168					3,564	4,550	12,373	+172
C. Rivers State																				
18. Yenagoa Sec. S.	400	524	1,333	+154	126	154			64	82	170	+107					590	760		
19. Buguma Sec. S.	284	372	1,331	+258	122	148			46	60	170	+183					452	580		
20. Ikwerre/Etche	124	162	1,275	+687	122	148			20	26	165	+535					266	336		
21. Oporoma Sec. S.	298	390	1,482	+280	124	150	1,700		48	62	190	+206					470	602		
22. Okrika Sec. S.	282	368	872	+137	120	146			46	60	110	+83					448	574		
Sub-Total Rivers	1,388	1,816	6,293	+247	614	746	1,700	+128	224	290	805	+176					2,226	2,852	8,798	+208

D.H. Lewis - January, 1977

1/ Exchange Rate - Original : US\$1.00 = N. 3.04 or 1.52  
 Current : US\$1.00 = N 1.829

Sheet 1 of 2 Sheets

\*Amounts in Naira are equivalents of original estimates in Nigerian ₦ (@ Nig. ₦ 1.00 = Naira 2.00)



Country NIGERIA  
 Education Project No. II  
 Loan/Credit No. 814-UN1

COMPLETION STUDY

IBRD/IDA Education Projects

COMPARISON OF ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED COSTS AND ACTUAL COSTS

Completion Form VII

PROJECT ITEM  Code No.		COSTS IN '000 OF Naira <sup>1/</sup>																			
		CONSTRUCTION & SITE DEV.				FURNITURE & EQUIPMENT				PROFESSIONAL FEES				TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE				TOTAL			
		*Appraisal Est.		Actual Cost	% Dif.	*Appraisal Est.*		Actual Cost	% Dif.	*Appraisal Est.*		Actual Cost	% Dif.	*Appraisal Est.*		Actual Cost	% Dif.	*Appraisal Est.*		Actual Cost	% Dif.
		Excl. Conting	Incl. Conting			Excl. Conting	Incl. Conting			Excl. Conting	Incl. Conting			Excl. Conting	Incl. Conting			Excl. Conting	Incl. Conting		
		1	2	3	3/2	1	2	3	3/2	1	2	3	3/2	1	2	3	3/2	1	2	3	3/2
D. Cross River State																					
23. Ikot Ansa		324	424	1,194	+182	148	180	613	+241	52	68	155	+128					524	672	1,962	+192
24. Eket		502	656	-	-100	176	214	-	-100	80	104	-	-100					758	974	-	-100
25. Etinan		220	288	1,138	+295	108	132	622	+371	36	46	150	+226					364	466	1,910	+310
26. Ogoja		144	188	708	+277	82	100	581	+481	24	32	90	+181					250	320	1,379	+331
27. Uyo		220	288	678	+135	106	128	216	+69	36	46	85	+85					362	462	979	+112
28. Oron		220	288	846	+194	108	132	581	+340	36	46	105	+128					364	466	1,532	+229
29. Ibiaku		188	246	644	+162	92	112	216	+93	30	38	80	+111					310	396	940	+136
30. Ikom		188	246	929	+278	92	112	555	+396	30	40	120	+200					310	398	1,604	+303
Sub-Total Cross R.		2,006	2,624	6,137	+134	912	1,110	3,384	+205	324	420	785	+87					3,242	4,154	10,306	+148
E. Technical Assistance																					
Teacher Training																					
Specialists														125	148	2/23	-84	125	148	2/23	-84
Fellowships														75	89	42	-53	75	89	43	-53
Curric. Dev. Specs.														75	89	-	-100	75	89	-	-100
Project Units Support														323	380	3/887	+133	323	380	3/887	+133
Sub-Total Technical Assistance														598	706	952	+35	598	706	952	+35
TOTAL																					
All Project Items		8,534	11,164	32,581	+192	3,816	4,640	10,284	+122	1,370	1,776	4,190	+136	598	706	952	+35	14,318	18,286	48,007	+163

D.H. Lewis - January, 1977

1/ Exchange Rate - Original : US\$1.00 = N 3.04 or \* 1.52  
 Current : US\$1.00 = - \* 1.829  
 2/ Bulk of Specialists' costs met by Commonwealth Fund.  
 3/ Until April, '79: RUM, From June, '79: Commonwealth Fund Architect

Sheet 2 of 2 Sheets

NIGERIA

SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 814-UNI)

COMPLETION REPORT

DISBURSEMENTS

Fiscal Year	<u>Cumulative Disbursements</u>		Percentage Actual of Appr. Est.
	<u>Appraisal Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u>	
	US\$ M	US\$ M	%
FY 1973	0.1	-	0
FY 1974	1.8	-	0
FY 1975	8.4	-	0
FY 1976	16.5	0.9	5.5
FY 1977	17.3	3.0	17.2
FY 1978	17.3	6.6	38.2
FY 1979	17.3	13.9	80.5
FY 1980	17.3	17.3	100.0