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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

INDONESIA

EAST JAVA AND EAST NUSA TENGGARA JUNIOR SECONDARY EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 4042)

CENTRAL INDONESIA JUNIOR SECONDARY EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 4062)

SUMATRA JUNIOR SECONDARY EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 4095)

June 8, 2006

Sector, Thematic, and Global Evaluation Division
Independent Evaluation Group

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit =Indonesian Rupiah (IDR)

East Java and East Nusa Tenggara Junior Secondary Education Project

US$1.0 =	Rupiah 2,331	(at Appraisal, 1996)
	Rupiah 14,900	(at Loan Amendment, 1998)
	Rupiah 7,706	(at MTR, 1999)
	Rupiah 9,412	(at Closing, 2004)

Central Indonesia Junior Secondary Education Project

US$1.0 =	Rupiah 2,331	(at Appraisal, 1996)
	Rupiah 14,900	(at Loan Amendment, 1998)
	Rupiah 7,706	(at MTR, 1999)
	Rupiah 9,412	(at Closing, 2004)

Sumatra Junior Secondary Education Project

IDR 1.0=	US$.0001	(at Closing, 2004)
US$1.0=	Rupiah 2,331	(at Appraisal, 1996)
	Rupiah 14,900	(at Loan Amendment, 1998)
	Rupiah 9,412	(at Closing, 2004)

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
Ebtanas	Evaluasi Belajar Tahap Akhir Nasional, (National School Leaving Examination)
EFA	Education for All
FTI	Fast-Track Initiative to achieve Education for All
GDP	Gross domestic product
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
MIS	Management information system
MoNE	Ministry of National Education
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECF	Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (Japan)
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
PCR	Project Completion Report
PHRD	Policy and Human Resources Development
PIRLS	Progress in International Reading Literacy Study
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
SMP	Sekola Menengah Pertama
TIMSS	Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

Fiscal Year

Government: January 1 — December 31

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IEG Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation.

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The projects, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies.

A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by IEG. To prepare PPARs, IEG staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country for onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries

. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader IEG studies.

Each PPAR is subject to a peer review process and IEG management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

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Relevance of Objectives: The extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Efficacy: The extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Efficiency: The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. This rating is not generally applied to adjustment operations.

Sustainability: The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. *Possible ratings:* Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable.

Institutional Development Impact: The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Outcome: The extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project). *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. Possible ratings: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Contents

Tables

This report was prepared by Helen Abadzi, who assessed the project in February 2006. Pilar Barquero provided administrative support.

Figures

Principal Ratings

	*ICR**	*ICR Review**	*PPAR*
East Java and East Nusa Tenggara Junior Secondary Education (Loan 4042)			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Institutional Development Impact	Substantial	Substantial	Substantial
Sustainability	Likely	Likely	Likely
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Central Indonesia Junior Secondary Education Project (Loan 4062)			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Institutional Development Impact	Substantial	Substantial	Substantial
Sustainability	Likely	Likely	Likely
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Sumatra Junior Secondary Education Project (Loan 4095)			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Institutional Development Impact	Substantial	Substantial	Substantial
Sustainability	Likely	Likely	Likely
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible operational division of the Bank. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEG product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

Key Staff Responsible

	Task Manager/ Leader	*Division Chief/ Sector Director*	*Country Director*
East Java and East Nusa Tenggara Junior Secondary Education (Loan 4042)			
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Central Indonesia Junior Secondary Education Project (Loan 4062)			
Appraisal	Don Hamilton	Samuel Lieberman	Marianne Haug
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Sumatra Junior Secondary Education Project (Loan 4095)			
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Preface

This is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) on three junior secondary education projects in Indonesia.

The East Java and East Nusa Tenggara Junior Secondary Education Project (Loan 4042) was approved for a US$99 million loan in June 1996. The loan closed on June 30, 2004 after extensions totaling 24 months; US$11.7 million was canceled.

The Central Indonesia Junior Secondary Education Project (Loan 4062), was approved for a US$104 million loan in July 1996. The loan closed on June 30, 2004 after extensions totaling 24 months; US$14.7 million was canceled.

The Sumatra Junior Secondary Education Project (Loan 4095) was approved for a US$98 million loan in September 1996. The loan closed on June 30, 2004 after extensions totaling 24 months; US$5.5 million was canceled.

The projects in Indonesia were selected for assessment in order to study the challenges of providing universal lower-secondary education in the remote and rural areas of a middle-income country.

The PPAR is based on the following sources: Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs), Staff Appraisal Reports (SARs), Loan Agreements for the projects, and project files, particularly the supervision reports. An IEG mission visited Indonesia in February 2006 to interview officials and beneficiaries, observe instruction in schools, and collect other pertinent information. Field visits took place in east and central Java, Lampung, and West Nusa Tenggara. The author thanks the government officials who received the mission for their extensive cooperation.

Following standard IEG procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and comments. No comments were received.

Summary

In the 1990s, Indonesia implemented a series of secondary education projects that aimed to expand the provision of this educational level to lower-income populations. These included:

The East Java and East Nusa Tenggara Junior Secondary Education Project (Loan 4042) was approved for a US$99 million loan in June 1996. The loan closed on June 30, 2004 after extensions totaling 24 months; US$11.7 million was canceled.

The Central Indonesia Junior Secondary Education Project (Loan 4062) was approved for a US$104 million loan in July 1996. The loan closed on June 30, 2004 after extensions totaling 24 months; US$14.7 million was canceled.

The Sumatra Junior Secondary Education Project (Loan 4095) was approved for a US$98 million loan in September 1996. The loan closed on June 30, 2004 after extensions totaling 24 months; US$5.5 million was canceled.

All three projects aimed at improving access, quality, and management of junior secondary education (grades 7-9). They were regional projects that aimed to support the governmental goal of universalizing nine years of education by 2010. The projects also supported the decentralization of educational management to local levels and helped empower communities to make decisions about expenditures and construction. With the advent of the 1997 economic crisis, the government modified its goal to focus on sustaining enrollment gains and attaining an 80 percent gross enrollment rate by 2004. Project components were modified accordingly; the school construction program was reduced, and a multidonor school grants program was established to offer scholarships to the very poor and operation grants to hard-hit schools.

Ultimately, most of the planned project activities were carried out, and the government achieved its goal of 80 percent enrollment for junior secondary education by 2004. Despite some leakage to the non-poor, the school grants program succeeded in supporting the poorer students and schools and constituted a safety net against dropout. In most areas of the country, citizen committees were constituted to help manage schools, reducing the time needed to build new schools and make them operational from two years to 6 months. Much teacher training took place in order to improve quality, although achievement test scores do not show consistent improvements. The expansion and management objectives were fulfilled, and the quality objective was partly fulfilled; although many training activities were carried out, overall test scores did not show clear improvements over time.

The outcomes of all three projects are rated *satisfactory*. Institutional development for all three is rated *substantial*, because the provincial management and communities expanded their capacity to match implementation needs. Sustainability is rated *likely*; enrollment expansion has proved resilient over time. Bank and borrower performance are rated *satisfactory*.

This assessment confirms a number of IEG lessons from the education sector:

- It is possible to target successfully poor areas for interventions aimed at increasing enrollments, even in times of financial crises. Scholarships administered to the poor and disbursed to them promptly may be effective in sustaining enrollments and preventing dropout.

- Community involvement may be a cost-effective and reliable means to build and support schools, particularly when the population has basic education and poverty is not extreme. Nevertheless, school committee members may not be able or willing to keep school expenditures low, may not have much time to spend on school affairs, and may be unable to advise the principal effectively on educational matters.

- Decentralization promotes effective use of resources. However, not all local authorities are equally competent or interested in educating the poor. A central government may find it necessary to meet the basic educational needs of the poorest communities directly if national goals for basic education are to be achieved.

- International comparative assessments of student achievement may provide critical feedback to governments interested in increasing the competitiveness of their human capital. They may also provide means to help countries improve their performance.

Vinod Thomas
Director-General
Evaluation

1. Background

1.1 Investing in education has been one of the cornerstones of Indonesia's development policy. This country of 214.6 million inhabitants and a per capita income of US$1174[1] has an immense school system. In 2001/02, there were 28.9 million primary school students and 1.4 million primary school teachers in more than 171,000 primary schools across some 400 districts and municipalities. At the junior secondary level (grades 7 through 9), there were 9.4 million students and about 680,000 teachers in more than 31,000 public and private schools.[2]

1.2 Indonesia's primary-school gross enrollment rate had grown from 62 percent in 1973 to nearly universal coverage by 1983, and by the mid-1990s two-thirds of Indonesians had completed at least primary education.[3] Gender parity was also attained in the early 1990s, with girls accounting for 48-50 percent of enrolments (Table 1).[4] The gross enrollment rate for junior secondary education has also shown marked increases, rising from 18 percent in the 1970s to 66 percent in 1995.[5] The dropout rate that was 12 percent in 1988-89 decreased to 3 percent by 1995-96. By 2003, 90.4 percent of those aged 15 and above were literate and had about 7.1 years of schooling, while 36.2 percent had completed junior secondary school or higher.[6]

Table 1. Evolution of educational indicators in Indonesia

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Net enrolment ratio in primary education (age 7–12 years)			88.7		92.1	91.5	91.5	92.3	92.1	92.7	92.3	92.9	92.7
Net enrolment ratio in junior secondary education (age 13–15 years)			41.9		50	51	54.5	57.8	57	59.2	60.3	60.5	61.7
Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5	75.6	74.7	74.3	75.6	77.5	80.2	81	80.9	82.2	81.8	82.6	81.9	82.2
Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who complete primary school	62	62.6	63.4	64.4	66.1	68.1	70	71.3	71.9	73.3	74	75.1	74.4
Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who complete 9 yearsof basic education		32.1	30.7	29.6	32.3	33.6	32.3	36.6	40.2	45.3	44.4	45.7	46.8
Ratio of girls to boys in junior secondary education (13-15 years)			101		100	100	103	102	103	103	104	105	103

Source: UNDP 2004

1.3 Nevertheless, the country's 57 percent net enrollment rate at the junior secondary education level has lagged behind those of its neighbors (e.g. Malaysia 83 percent in 1990, Thailand 63 percent in 1994; Figures B-1 and B-2).[7] According to project documents, about 25 percent of primary school students in 1994 failed to complete primary and of those who did only 64 percent continued their education.

1. Atlas method, 2004 (World Bank 2005e).

2. World Bank 2004, p. 1.

3. World Bank 1998.

4. Project documents ; Staff appraisal report for Ln. 4042, p. 32.

5. World Bank 1998, p. 47.

6. Depdiknas 2005. (Susenas, BPS 2004 data).

7. World Bank 1998, p. 47.

1.4 This was unfortunate because expansion of junior secondary education has helped reduce disparity of labor incomes in 1976-1992.[8] Appraisal estimates showed that in 1992 employees with junior secondary education received 27 percent more than those with primary education, and those with senior secondary education earned 56 percent more than those of junior secondary education.[9] Reasons for lower school enrolment rates have included income inequity, a small number of public schools, and considerable tuition fees.[10] Two-thirds of the secondary schools were private (many of them religious), and entry remained competitive and expensive (about US$150 annually) even after entrance exams for 7th grade were abolished in 1994. Thus, children in the poorest income quintile were least likely to continue in secondary education and most likely to drop out. Poverty affected gender equity,[11] and only 80 percent of secondary-level students were female. [12]

1.5 In 1994, the government adopted a policy of universalizing lower secondary education by 2010.[13] The insufficiency of public schools, particularly in the poorer and rural areas of several provinces constituted an important obstacle. Therefore, the government requested donor aid; the World Bank financed provision of lower secondary education in target areas of 11 of the 27 provinces while the Asian Development Bank (ADB) financed it in 6 others.[14] OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund - Japan) financed construction of junior secondary schools in selected areas. The areas financed by each development bank were clearly delineated, and did not overlap. The project implementation units at the Ministry of education were closely linked, but there has been little direct coordination between these donors.

Bank Sector Strategy

1.6 Since 1971, the World Bank has invested at all levels and subsectors of Indonesian education through a large number of projects, 43 by 2006. Some of the earlier projects had limited development impact. A 1991 an OED review found that projects were overly complex, did not distribute benefits to the poor equitably, and paid little attention to community involvement, institution building, or private education. Extensive

8. World Bank 1998, p. 47.

9. Internal project documents; Staff Appraisal Report of Ln. 4095, p. 69.

10. World Bank 2004.

11. Alisjahbana 1999. Also, in Indonesia the poor are more likely to go to junior secondary private schools than the non-poor (World Bank 1998, p. 54).

12. World Bank 1997.

13. World Bank 1998, p. 46. The policy was announced in 1989 to be achieved by the end of the eighth five-year development plan (Repelita VIII). After the 1997 financial crisis, the goal was changed to 80 percent gross enrollment rate by 2008.

14. In 1997, ADB financed secondary education access and quality improvement in 49 districts covering 549,000 students in 2350 schools of South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, Central Sulawesi, and Southeast Sulawesi. It built 356 new schools and 1032 new classrooms in existing schools (Second Junior Secondary Education Project, Loans 1573-INO for US$160 million and 1574-INO for SDR10.98 million). About 62 percent of the funds were for public schools, 20 percent private schools and 17 percent for madrasah. In 1995 it financed a Private Junior Secondary Education Project, (Loan 1359 for US$49 million, closed in August 2002).

mismanagement has undermined the Bank's efforts, and education projects often had unsatisfactory implementation outcomes.[15]

1.7 Subsequent lending has attempted to target projects more closely towards the needs of the poor and improve governance. Since 1990, the Bank has invested in secondary education through two management training projects and a education teacher development project. The first project was completed before the establishment of a rating system and appears to have performed satisfactorily, but the second and third have been rated by IEG moderately satisfactory because of failure to meet targets, implementation difficulties, and significant accounting problems. The Book and Reading Development Project (Ln. 3887-IND) was to complement the efforts to develop secondary education, but the project was terminated early due to large-scale misprocurement that rendered many textbook sellers in the country ineligible for Bank-financed contracts.

1.8 Despite governance problems and modest outcomes, the Bank continued to support government efforts to expand what is sometimes called "upper basic education" grades, which are considered minimum qualifications for many jobs and thus have a high poverty-alleviation potential[16] (Table B-1). The institution has also focused on quality and equity issues in primary education, which are reflected in the late entry, high rates of repetition, and unsatisfactory completion rates. Ultimately, Indonesia received for the secondary education subsector six projects amounting to US$593.6 million (13.8 percent canceled, Tables A-4, A-5). Following completion of the three projects under review, lending has focused on early childhood, primary education, library development, global learning, and higher education. Policy dialogue has focused on decentralization, improving delivery of services, governance, increasing the quality of education.[17]

1.9 The Bank has undertaken extensive sector work on Indonesia since the 1990s, including a 1998 study and a 2004 update focused on decentralization.[18] The country has also been the subject of much econometric research. Large and detailed datasets are maintained and analyzed, household and other types of surveys are administered on a regular basis. These data offer the opportunity of verifying some project outcomes independently or obtaining supportive evidence. However, data points are often inconsistent among various datasets, and interpretation or integration along multiple years is problematic. Data quality and quantity deteriorated after decentralization, and some figures are based on a limited number of schools. Also there is a large difference between gross and net enrollment rates due to repetition and overage enrollments in primary

15. OED 1991. The Operations Evaluation Department was renamed Independent Evaluation Group (IED) in November 2005.

16. Returns to secondary education have been estimated as 20.8 percent in 2002, whereas returns to primary education only at 4.5 percent (Van Leeuven 2005).

17. World Bank 2004. The projects under implementation in 2006 were Early Childhood Development, Ln. 4378; Sulawesi Basic Education, Ln. 4455; Sumatra Basic Education, Ln. 4456; Library Development, Ln. 3526; Global Development Learning, Ln. 4669; and Higher Education, Ln. 4789).

18. World Bank 2004.

school, and data interpretation is at times difficult. Attempts to reconcile the data are made whenever possible. [19]

2. Project Objectives and Implementation

2.1 An important lesson of earlier secondary-education investment in this large island country was the need for locally based supervision and execution. Therefore, three regional junior secondary education projects were appraised within a few months of each other. They were negotiated at the national level but implemented through a central, as well as provincial, project implementation units within MoNE. They supervised jointly, had a single task manager in the last three years of their implementation, and were completed at the same time.

2.2 The projects essentially had the same objectives and components (Table 2). They aimed at improving access and quality of education in remote and rural areas of 11 provinces with the lowest junior secondary gross enrollment ratio and the highest rate of 'backward' villages. All supported areas had a primary education gross enrollment ratio of 111 during appraisal, an indicator of overage enrollments and grade repetition. The East Java and East Nusa Tenggara Junior Secondary Education (Loan 4042) focused on the aforementioned two provinces, the Central Indonesia Junior Secondary Education (Loan 4062) focused on Central Java, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Java, and Yogyakarta, while the Sumatra Junior Secondary Education (Loan 4095) focused on Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Jambi, and Lampung. [20]

2.3 A general project design was adapted to local needs and fostered decentralized institution building through provincial project implementation units. Schools and localities were selected for inputs based on low enrollment and transition rates, poverty indicators, distance, and prospect of increasing student population. In building new schools, effort was made to provide a *complete school approach*. This approach featured a set of activities (with assigned responsibilities) according to an agreed-upon schedule, before a school could be established and brought on-line as a registered institution. Rather than a centrally managed school-building program, block grants were given to school committees where possible, and local workers built the school with some community input in the design and esthetics. Provincial and district governments supervised and collaborated to ensure all inputs were in place by the time the school was opened: buildings and furniture, teachers appointed, students enrolled, books, supplies, aids and equipment, provision of operational and maintenance costs) through additional block grants.

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19. Data used to be collected through mail-in surveys from schools, but after decentralization many of them did not fill them out. In 2003 a school census was done, and data collected in this way were not necessarily consistent with earlier trends. For example, for 2002/03, the Unesco Institute of Statistics reported gross enrollment rate for lower secondary as 76 percent and net enrollment rate of 54 percent, lower than data reportedly derived from other sources citing Ministry data (Unesco Institute of Statistics. 2005, p. 780).

20. The ADB financed schools in South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, Central Sulawesi, and Southeast Sulawesi.

2.4 *Monitoring and evaluation*. Institutional arrangements were made to collect data early on, but monitoring activities were scaled down due to the financial crisis, and a specialized monitoring unit was not set up as expected. At the end of the project, multiple private consultant firms were hired to carry out external evaluations that involved site inspections, interviews, and questionnaires at stratified random samples of about 10 target and five non-target schools in each province. (MoNE 2003a-2003e; results are integrated in findings and tables A1-A3.) The multiple reports are of varying quality and level of detail; some merely list conditions in the schools visited with little attempt at aggregation while others offer extensive questionnaire outcomes on teacher performance. The Implementation Completion Reports use the data of these reports, but these were not integrated in a single product. Interviews with officials suggest a limited use of these reports as feedback for improved future operations. Also, limited efforts have been made to compare the evolution of various indicators in target- and non-target areas in the various provinces.

2.5 Project implementation experience and results are presented below (Also see Tables A1-A3).

2.6 Early supervision reports show satisfactory progress, and execution of agreed work programs averaged 80-90 percent.[21] The projects were implemented through province-level project implementation units (PIUs). For district and local-level staff, they proved very complex to implement District staff in particular had limited formal education (with Bachelor's degrees as highest qualification), and many left after obtaining training and experience. Lack of disbursement experience slowed down implementation, and procurement issues created conflicts with the Bank. The higher pay of international consultants created resentments among some local staff and forced rearrangement of some work duties. Mismanagement concerns arose by 1997, at a time when the second secondary education management training project experienced similar problems. US$228,150 in the Sumatra project, US$1,128 in the Central Indonesia and US$3.9 million in the East Java and East Nusa Tenggara project were cancelled due to misprocurement. In East Nusa Tenggara and Aceh, implementation ended prematurely in 2003 due to mismanagement and to civil disturbances, respectively.[22] The task managers and the government devoted much time and energy pursuing these problems. (IEG was not made aware of additional mismanagement issues.)

21. World Bank 2005 a-c, p. 4. Though three different implementation completion reports have been issued, they share much common text.

22. See World Bank 2003a-2003c. In addition, excessive costs in school construction were reported in the evaluation reports of some provinces (MONE 2003a-e).

Table 2. Objectives of the Basic Education Quality Improvement projects

Objectives	*Components*
Access	
Expansion of access to junior secondary education in a cost-effective and equitable way	⇒ New schools in underserved rural areas ⇒ expand the out-of-school equivalency program through "open" (terbuka) and "small" (kecil) schools ⇒ assist communities to construct teacher and student accommodation in rural areas and provide contract teachers for rural areas ⇒ finance scholarships for poor students ⇒ give parents information on the benefits of junior secondary schooling.
Quality	
Improvement of teaching at junior secondary schools	⇒ Expand in-service and upgrading training programs to teachers to strengthen subject-matter knowledge and pedagogical skills, and support measures to bring qualified teachers to rural areas ⇒ provide new teaching rooms, library books, educational equipment, materials, and science teaching aids ⇒ support school-level initiatives to improve quality ⇒ develop tests, examinations and assessment systems.
Management	
Strengthening of the management capacity at all levels of the education system.	⇒ train school principals and other administrators in school management and providing pedagogical support to teachers ⇒ develop management and data analysis capacity for district and provincial staff to effectively handle increased responsibilities for education planning and management. ⇒ strengthen the institutional capacities of project management at the province, district and Directorate of Secondary Education at the national level ⇒ contribute to operational costs of project management.

Source: Technical and legal documentation of respective projects

2.7 After the first year of the project, the Asia economic crisis started, resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of poor households in Indonesia. Between 1996 and 1998, primary and lower secondary enrolments dropped by 6.2 percentage points in urban areas, arousing much concern (Annex Table B-2).[23] School operations became harder as government funds dried up. By 1998, the value of the rupiah to the US dollar dropped from 2,331 to 14,900, and the government modified the project design. The number of new schools was reduced to save on salaries, and additional classrooms were built in existing schools. Part of the civil works program was reallocated for additional scholarships and grants, partly towards a multidonor Scholarship and Grants Program to minimize the dropout of poor students. (See Annex C.) The government also modified its medium-term goal of universal primary education to attaining at least nine years of basic education for at least 80 percent of the age cohort by 2004. Project objectives were not formally revised, but at midterm review (1999) the components were more specifically focused on poverty and aimed to: (a) maintain enrollments at 1997 levels and increase

23. MONE 1999.The impact of Indonesia's economic crisis on education: Findings of a survey of schools. Preliminary Report No. 02-0299. Jakarta (cited in Manning, 2000, p. 73).

access in poor, rural communities; (b) improve the quality of public and private junior secondary schools especially in poor, rural communities; and (c) strengthen the management of the education system at all levels, especially for district and school managers, to retain students in school by implementing pro-poor strategies. The projects received a two-year extension, during which additional provinces were included: West Nusa Tenggara and South Sulawesi (for Ln. 4042), and North Sumatra (for Ln. 4095).

2.8 In 1999, a Decentralization law and a Fiscal Autonomy Law strengthened the role of district governments and weakened that of the provincial governments. In response to these changes, the projects focused training efforts on school managers and district staff and financed the provision of proposal-based school grants. In the early stages of decentralization process there was tension between district and provincial governments about roles and responsibilities, resource allocations, and monitoring functions. Many difficulties have been resolved, although considerable work remains to be done.

2.9 By project completion, about 94 percent of project-supported schools had received inputs (books, equipment, and training), though inaccurate cost estimates caused delays. According to evaluation reports, schools largely made effective use of the inputs in teaching and learning. Reportedly 77 percent received them on time and 82 percent used them adequately in East Java project; 74 percent received them on time and 77 percent used them adequately in the Sumatra project, while in central Indonesia, 85 percent of the target schools received the inputs on time and about 80 percent of the schools used the inputs adequately.[24] Nevertheless, there was often a lag of a year or more between ordering and receiving books; their level was sometimes unsuitable, and little importance was placed to selecting interesting books to encourage students' reading habits.

2.10 The IEG mission visited 40 target and non-target schools.[25] In two areas, provincial offices had decided beforehand which schools were to be visited, and the mission was expected in the schools. Target schools in West Nusa Tenggara were chosen at random from a list, and nearby non-target schools were visited. All schools visited were typically near main roads, and might be more frequently supervised. Subject-

24. MONE 2003 a-e.

25. Project schools visited in Lampung were: SMPN 3 Natar Lampung Selatan, SMPN 3 Batanghari, SMP Bina Putera Lampung Tengah; Non-Project Schools were SMPN 15 and SMP Terbuka Lampung Selatan, SMPN 11 Terbanggi Besar Lampung Tengah, SMP PGRI 11 Terbanggi Besar, SDN 1 Branti Kec. Natar, SMP Branti Raya Kec. Natar. In Central Java Project Schools were: SMPN 2 Bangsri Jepara, SMPN 2 Sumowono Semarang, SMPN 2 Pringsurat Temanggung, SMPN 3 Candimulyo Magelang. Non-Project Schools were: SDN Pasuruhan 2 Kec. Mungkid, Magelang, SMP Islam Sudirman Kec. Mungkid, Magelang, SDN 4 Kedungcina Kec. Kota, Jepara. In the Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta project schools were: SMPN 1 Piyungan Bantul, and non-project schools were: SMP Muhammadiyah Piyungan, SMP Muhammadiyah Delingo, MTs Hasyim Asari. In Jawa Timur the schools visited were: SMP Buana Wedoro Waru, Sidoarjo, SMPN 2 Candi, Sidoarjo, SMP Pandaan, Pasuruan, SMPN 2 Sukorejo, Pasuruan, SMPN 2 Tutur, Pasuruan, SMPN 1 Tutur, Pasuruan (Non Target), SMPN 1 Purwodadi, Pasuruan (Non Target), SMPN 16 Surabaya (Non Target). The mission also visited the inservice teacher training center in Surabaya and the district offices of Sidoarjo and province offices of East Java. In west Nusa Tenggara, schools visited were SMPN 1 Pemenang, Lombok Barat, SMPN 2 Lembar, Lombok Barat, SDN 1 Jelatang Sekotong, Lombok Barat, SMPN 1 Lembar, Lombok Barat (Non Target), SMP Terbuka Ampenan 2, SMPN 2 Pringasela, Lombok Timur. The mission also visited the Provincial Education Offices of Lampung, Central Java, Daerah Istimewa Yogya, East Java, and West Nusa Tenggara.

matter specialists and inspectors were invited to accompany the mission and offered their opinions of quality of classes they observed.

RESULTS OF THE JUNIOR SECONDARY EDUCATION PROJECTS

Expansion of access to junior secondary education in a cost-effective and equitable way: Fully achieved

2.11 Trend data using Susenas sources[26] indicate that the share of the population having completed junior secondary has been rising (Figure 1). In 1995 gross enrollment was 66 percent and by 2002 it was about 80 percent. In the same period, the net enrollment increased by 10 percentage points - from 51 percent to 62.7 percent. Between 1997 and 2004, junior secondary education enrolments increased nationally by 3 percent from 2,667,022 to 2,815,690, and the numbers completing grade 9 increased by 35 percent from 1,774,681 to 2,398,200.[27] The rate of increase has been higher for rural areas than for urban areas, reducing the gap between rural and urban participation in junior secondary education. Between 1995 and 2002, net enrollments in rural areas increased from 42.65 to 54.3 percent, and in urban areas from 66.51 to 71.90 percent (Annex Table B-3). Thus, the government target to maintain enrolment levels at 1997 figures has been met and surpassed. According to MoNE data, the country also attained an 80 percent gross enrollment by the target date of 2004 (Table 3).

Figure 1. Indonesian enrolments at all educational levels



Gross Enrollment Rates, 1971-97 (World Bank 1998)
Note: Includes Ministry of Religious Affairs schools starting 1985 for primary and junior secondary, and starting 1980 for senior secondary. *Sources:* Statistik Persekolahan, Informatics Center, MOEC; MOEC Home Page (www.pdk.go.id)

26. World Bank 2004.

27. Data source: MONE 2004, World Bank 2005 a-c, p. 4.

Table 3. Rising Education Enrollment Rates at all Levels, 1995-2002

	1995	1997	1998	1999	2000	2002
Gross enrollment rate						
Primary level	107.0	108.0	107.6	108.0	107.7	106.0
Junior secondary level	65.7	74.2	73.4	76.1	77.6	79.9
Senior secondary level	42.4	46.6	47.4	48.4	50.2	48.2
Net enrollment rate						
Primary level	91.5	92.3	92.1	92.6	92.3	92.7
Junior secondary level	51.0	57.8	57.1	59.2	60.3	61.7
Senior secondary level	32.6	36.6	37.5	38.5	39.3	38.2

Data Sources: Pradhan (2001) and calculations using SUSENAS, 2002, World Bank 2004

2.12 The three projects altogether built 567 new schools and 1121 new classrooms in existing schools, to accommodate a total of 167,450 additional students (Table 4). These new school seats accounted for 3-21 percent of school places existing at the province level before project effectiveness. The provinces supported by the three projects showed annual increases considerably above the national average. In the East Java project, enrollments increased by 74 percent between 1997 and 2004, while in the Central Indonesia project they increased by 11 percent and in Sumatra project they increased by 21 percent. Data are not available at the district level, and without baseline monitoring information and it is not possible to assess whether areas with increased student places have higher enrolments over comparable areas without new student places. Factors other than the mere availability of class space may account for the enrolment demand. However, occupancy rates of the new facilities were high, 99-108 percent.[28] (ADB reports similar results with the provinces whose civil works it financed.[29]) Furthermore, research on the school construction programs of the 1970s also suggested that construction increases access and ultimately private rates of return to education.[30] Thus, the available school places seem to have contributed to enrolment increases. The schools visited by the IEG mission had attractive buildings and landscaping, in contrast with non-target schools of the area. Principals reported great eagerness by students to attend the new schools.

28. World Bank 2005a-2005c. For example, West Kalimantan had about 51,300 junior secondary education students in 1994, and the project built 5960 new seats; in Central Kalimantan there were 17,500 students before the project built 3680 more seats (21 percent). By contrast, Central Java had about 530,000 students, and the projects built 17,160 new places (about 3 percent).

29. The ADB project built a total of 690 new schools and 1032 new classrooms in existing schools. As with the World Bank projects, "open" schools and life skills programs facilitated entry into secondary education of almost 15,000 out – of-school youth and helped raise primary-to-secondary transition rates from 71-95 percent to 75-98 percent across project provinces (actual attendance and graduation rates are not discussed in the ADB documents). The project did not lower dropout rate to a target of 2.5 percent because of high madrasah dropout rates, but provincial dropout rates decreased from 6.3 to 5.1 percent (Appendix 5). ADB reports that the numbers of students enrolled in its project provinces increased by 13 percent between 1999/00 and 2003/04 compared with a national increase of only 2 percent (ADB 2005, appendix 4). ADB rated its project as 'highly successful.'

30. Duflo 2001.

Table 4. Numbers of school places built through the projects

	New Schools	New Classrooms	Total Places
East Java and East Nusa Tenggara	171	610	50936
Central Indonesia	164	117	48560
Sumatra	212	394	67954
Total	547	1121	167450

Source: ICRs; ADB financed 690 new schools and 1032 classrooms in existing schools

2.13 Despite this progress, there are still wide disparities in access to junior secondary education among provinces (Annex Table B-4, Figure 2). Several provinces show net enrolment rates below 60 percent, particularly in areas that were not aided by the World Bank or ADB projects, or where implementation ended prematurely: Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, East Nusa Tenggara, Gorontalo, Papua, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, South Sumatra, Southeast Sulawesi, West Kalimantan and West Nusa Tenggara.[31]

Figure 2. Enrollment Rates of Children Ages 13-15, By Province



Source: Susenas 1998 and 2002

Notes: Figure reflects provincial divisions in 1998; the provinces of Aceh, Irian Jaya, Maluku and North Maluku have been excluded because their sample sizes in 2002 were very much smaller and limited than in 1998. (cited in World Bank 2004, p. 73, vol. 2)

2.14 Overall, only about 70 percent of primary school graduates go on directly to the junior secondary level (Figure 3).[32] However, the percentage has increased substantially in many of the provinces that received additional school places (Annex Table B-5). Students who enter grade 7 tend to graduate. Nationally dropout rates have been reduced from 6.3 percent in 2000 to about 4 percent in 2004 (Figure B-3).[33] Repetition in junior

31. UNDP 2004. According to Susenas data, Papua in 2001 had a net enrollment rate of just 40.5 percent.

32. The large discrepancy between gross and net enrollment rates raises some questions about transition rates. Many students are overage in primary school, but it is unknown how many enter junior secondary schools after a break.

33. ADB 2005. This donor had a target of 2.5 percent dropout that was not met and a test score increase goal of 10 percent that was met.

secondary education is negligible because students with sufficient attendance get promoted to grade 9, where they take school leaving examination (ebtanas).

Figure 3. Transition rate from grade 6 in primary to grade 7



Source: MoNE (various years). Indonesia Educational Statistics in Brief. The data refers to JSS under MoNE only (excluding Madrasah; Hartono 2005).

2.15 Since the appraisal of the junior secondary projects, the educational system of Indonesia has become more equitable. Net enrollment rates have risen disproportionately among the poorest quintile of students aged 13-15 (Table 5); by 2002 they had doubled in comparison to 1993 (22.6 vs. 45.5 percent), whereas enrollments of the wealthiest students had only increased by 5 percentage points. The trend is consistent at all income and educational levels. Still, there are considerable disparities between rural and urban areas, and between poverty quintiles, with the net enrolment rate of the poorest quintile contrasting starkly with that of the richest quintile (49.9 vs.72.3 percent). The junior secondary gross enrolment rates also vary widely between rural and urban (69.7 vs. 93.5 percent), and poor vs. rich (64.8 vs. 94.6 percent) populations.

Table 5. Education Equality at the Primary Level and Increasing Equality at Higher Levels: Net Enrolment Rates by Income Quintile, 1993-2002

Income	Primary			Junior secondary			Senior secondary		
quintile	1993	1997	2002	1993	1997	2002	1993	1997	2002
Poorest	86.7	90.3	91.4	22.6	37.7	45.5	7.0	12.4	17.8
2	90.7	93.0	93.6	37.5	52.2	57.9	15.4	24.4	28.0
3	92.5	93.4	93.8	47.5	60.0	65.1	25.2	34.2	37.9
4	93.3	93.5	93.2	61.3	69.2	72.0	42.3	47.8	49.8
Richest	93.0	92.4	91.4	72.5	75.1	76.9	60.8	60.9	62.0
Q5/Q1	1.07	1.02	1.00	3.21	1.99	1.69	8.68	4.91	3.48

Data source: Calculations based on SUSENAS data, various years. Data exclude East Timor. 2002 exclude most of Aceh and Papua. (World Bank 2004, Table 1.3)

2.16 To encourage the working children or those living in remote areas, initially "small" schools (3-6 classrooms) were financed, but these were abandoned as unfeasible. The projects financed materials and training for an afternoon “open” program. An "open"

school concept, known as *Terbuka* (a formal junior secondary education implemented through afternoon tutoring sessions twice a week), that has mainly served girls. Appraisal project documents showed that sekolah terbuka students had much lower test scores than regular students, but limited measures have been taken to improve performance.[34] IEG mission visits found absenteeism rates approximating 50 percent. The instruction was limited, and teachers mainly stood by while students tried to study in groups. This program is unlikely to have the desired effect in increasing substantially access and teaching the desired skills to students.

2.17 *Did the School Grants Program Succeed in Reducing Dropout?* The Scholarship and Grants Program was launched in September 1998 to stem the tide of school closures and dropouts that were expected to result from the economic crisis that began in the second half of 1997.[35] After 1998, it was administered as a separate program and ended at the same time as the three projects, in June 2003. A total of US$350 million was dedicated to this program. Evaluation studies showed that it succeeded in softening the effect of the crisis, preventing a large drop in enrolments, and enabled thousands of poor children to remain in school. (Details in Annex C.)

Improvement of teaching at junior secondary schools: Partially achieved

2.18 The projects satisfactorily executed a series of activities intended at improving the quality of education and increasing student performance. Competency-based curricula were introduced, teaching materials were made available in schools, and over 35,000 teachers as well as 17,000 administrators received training on specific classroom behaviors. The external evaluations report that about 75 percent of the teachers have found the training useful and of good quality. Teachers reported that they had learned new behaviors (including cooperative learning), increased their use of teaching media and class discussions, encouraged students to raise questions and use their own language in replying, and expected that students had become more active learners. In East Java, 88 percent of the teachers believed that they had become better prepared, 94 percent thought that the students were more enthusiastic with new methods, and 70 percent thought the students asked more questions. In central Indonesia, 65 percent of teachers and 83 percent of students reportedly exhibited the target classroom behaviors.[36] Overall, the share of formally qualified public-school teachers has risen from 60 percent in 2001 to about 73 percent in 2004.[37] But no routine examinations of teacher competencies exist to assess improved competencies, although such an activity is planned.

2.19 An observational study conducted in East Java suggests that training outcomes may be more limited than self-reports suggest (Table 6). Teachers spent 27 percent of class time watching students do seatwork, an activity that has often been associated with

34. In junior secondary school-leaving examinations, regular students scored 51.3 percent, while sekolah terbuka students scored 34.3 percent. (SAR for Central Indonesia, Ln. 4062, annex 7 p. 79). Yet, project documents make a case that quality gives additional rates of return (SAR for Sumatra, Ln. 4095, p. 65).

35. World Bank 1998, p. 16-17, 21.

36. World Bank 2005b, p. 33.

37. Hartono 2005.

lower performance.[38] They rarely related the current topic of study with previous topics, a technique necessary to help students acquire connected knowledge rather than merely memorize a series of items. Though principals had been trained in classroom supervision, evaluators rarely found them doing this task in detail or using the required format. Facilitators had been hired and trained for more detailed supervision, but at 60-70 percent of the visits, they did not observe classes but only gathered the teachers in a room and spoke to them.[39]

2.20 Although the project made considerable efforts to provide textbooks, practically all schools visited by the IEG mission reported a scarcity of textbooks. The situation is reflected on a national scale, where the average ratio of books per student in lower secondary education is 0.85. Students often shared books after-hours or bought inexpensive exercise workbooks, but observations showed extensive writing and copying of texts on the blackboard, an activity that does not use class time well. One problem was that many schools had not yet adopted competency-based curricula and principals hesitated to buy textbooks that might become obsolete.

Table 6. Observed Teacher and Student Behaviors in East Java

Observed teacher behaviors after training		Observed student behaviors	
	% Events Observed		% Events Observed
Supervising students in daily exercise	15.7	Listening to teacher	20.2
Helping students in daily exercise	11.6	Using textbooks and other books	14.9
Elaborating orally	11.6	Answering question, individual, thinking	10.9
Giving question - other type	10.5	Group exercise	9.6
Writing on board	10.5	Presenting study result	8.5
Putting students in group	8.6	Creative excise, writing their perspective	7.4
Using textbook or other books	8.0	Student discussion	6.9
Giving question or information	5.5	Routine exercise	6.6
Relating lesson with real life	3.2	Paying attention to demonstration	4.3
Taking charge in class discussion	3.0	Answering question, individual, remembering	2.1
Relating current lesson to previous lesson	2.5	Asking, not for information	1.6
Making conclusion	2.0	Answering question in group	1.1
Demonstrating lesson	2.0	Doing research or experiment	1.1
Giving positive follow-up	1.6	Writing conclusion	1.1
Answering question - other type	1.4	Giving examples on topic	0.8
Answering question - information	1.4	Other activity	2.9
Other activity	1.0		
	100.1		100

Source: MoNE 2003b

2.21 The IEG mission witnessed similar events during classroom observations. In approximately 40 percent of the classes visited, the students were doing seatwork, while teachers passively watched them or did something else.[40] Practically no instructional

38. Fuller et al. 1999.

39. MONE 2003b, p. 43.

40. However, a video study classrooms in countries scoring high at TIMSS showed at least 80 percent of the time spent solving problems, with teachers speaking to students at 8:1 ratio. Lessons included some whole-class work, some individual work, and some group work. Effective teaching included reviewing content from earlier sessions and introducing new content (www.iea.nl/timss-r_video.html#301).

materials were used other than textbooks and workbooks; materials such as maps were rarely displayed in classrooms and geography lessons were conducted without them. In the 40 schools visited, the mission observed organized cooperative learning activities in only six classes. The school guest books showed that inspectors visited about every three months, but their notes suggested more concern with cleanliness than with instruction. They left behind brief notes such as 'good job, continue'. On the other hand, classroom time was found to be largely used for instruction. Earlier reports and a study that had documented considerable wastage of instructional time in primary school, but there were no prior measurements of time use in secondary school.[41] No differences in instructional methods were observable between target and non-target schools.

2.22 Higher quality inputs, such as textbook availability, teacher education level and whether teachers have second jobs promote higher test scores in junior secondary schools.[42] Not surprisingly, learning outcomes of the Ebtanas, the 9th grade school-leaving examination have been modest and uncertain. The provinces included in the Sumatra project showed increases, while the other two projects showed a pattern of small increases and reductions (Table 6).[43] The reason for the trends is unclear. Nationally, test scores have been rising (Table 7), but they are not equated from one year to the next or across provinces, so the actual direction of student performance is not well documented. In the 2005 national examination, about 22 percent of the junior secondary education students failed in the first administration. Test scores may be hard to interpret because the increased enrollments every year tend to come from rural and lower-income populations. At the junior secondary level, student absenteeism tends to be higher than in other levels. Rural students are more likely to be absent than urban students (Table B-6) may fail more often.

Table 7. Results of the 9th-grade school leaving examinations (Ebtanas)

Ebtenas test scores	1997	2003	1997	2003	Criterion at Completion
	Bahasa	Bahasa	Math	Math	
East Java	5.63	5.52	5.58	4.56	Met in math
Central Indonesia	5.27	6.00	5.01	4.70	Met in language
Sumatra	5.40	6.97	3.89	4.56	Met in both
National (2001–02)		4.99		4.70	

Source: ICRs; World Bank 2004, vol. 3 Table 15
Appraisal criterion to be met: Increase of 0.2 points in scores for satisfactory performance

41. World Bank 1998 p. 30; teacher absenteeism in primary education is about 19 percent, which is considerably higher than that of other developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (SMERU 2004). By comparison, absenteeism rates were: Peru 11 percent, Ecuador 14 percent, Papua New Guinea 15 percent, Bangladesh 16 percent, India 25 percent, and Uganda 27 percent (World Bank 2004, p. 39).

42. Newhouse and Beegle 2005.

43. Standardized achievement tests are not systematically used in Indonesia, and there is little hard evidence on achievement levels and trends for the education system. For primary schools, the tests are developed in each province or district on the basis of blueprints, so they are not statistically comparable. The junior secondary education uses test items from an item bank developed through the projects. However, the scoring and grading are based on the rank of the previous national exam results. The Ebtanas scores have a scale of 0-10, with a gradually increasing passing score, set at 4.25 (42.5 percent correct responses) in 2005. Though scores are low nearly everyone passes on the second try, and there are concerns about some weaknesses in the test administration. The graduation rate in 2000 was 98 percent (Oey Gardiner 2000).

2.23 The uncertain learning outcomes are also consistent with the modest Indonesian performance on the internationally comparative Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study for grade 8 (TIMSS; Table 8).[44] Its scores were below average and much lower than other Asian countries, such as Malaysia. Between 1999 and 2003, scores in math improved slightly (from 406 to 411), but in science they deteriorated by 16 points, and the ranking of Indonesia fell from 34th to 36th, below that of Egypt. In another assessment, the 2003 Programme International Student Assessment (PISA) for 15-year olds, Indonesia ranked 38th out of 41 countries in natural sciences and 39th in mathematics. By comparison, Korea ranked 6th in natural sciences, 7th in reading, and 3rd in mathematics.[45] There may be a tradeoff between the rapid enrolment increases and quality, particularly in science where equipment is needed for the more advanced levels.

Table 8. TIMSS scores in some East Asian countries

Country	Mathematics score & rank 1999	Mathematics score & rank 2003	Science score & rank 1999	Science score & rank 2003	No. of Annual math instructional hours gr. 1–9
Singapore	604 (1)	605 (1)	568 (2)	578 (1)	1440
Korea	587 (2)	589 (2)	549 (5)	558 (2)	814
Taiwan	585 (3)	585 (4)	569 (1)	571 (3)	-
Hong Kong	582 (4)	586 (3)	530 (15)	556 (3)	1122
Japan	579 (5)	570 (6)	550 (4)	552 (6)	915
Malaysia	519 (16)	508 (11)	492 (22)	510 (20)	1178
Thailand	467 (27)	-	482 (24)	-	-
Indonesia	403 (34)	411 (34)	435 (32)	420 (36)	1755
Philippines	348 (36)	378 (41)	345 (36)	377 (42)	1650

Data source: Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, 1999 and 2003

2.24 International test results are to some extent puzzling because the number of hours that Indonesian students study is very high. Schools function 223 days per year, 7-8 hours per day, 6 days a week and offer in grades 1-9 a total of 8,836 instructional hours. Indonesia reports to UNESCO that it teaches 25 percent more hours than the global average and 18 percent more hours than high-income OECD countries (Figures 4 and 5, B4).[46] Thus it will be important to understand better why these hours are not used as efficiently as they are in other countries.

44. Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) is an international mathematics and science assessment conducted every four years for grade 8. Besides assessing achievement, the test collects a rich array of information about the educational contexts for learning mathematics and science at the 8th Grade. From 2003, TIMSS has focused on analytical, problem-solving, and enquiry skills.

45. Depdiknas 2005.

46. In some schools, students in grades 1-2 may only study for 2.5 hours daily (525 hours per year), an issue that caused low achievement that carried over in secondary school (World Bank 1998, p. 30.) However, Indonesia reports to UNESCO a statutory number of instructional hours that is among the highest in the work in primary school (about 1260 vs. 800 OECD) and also above in higher secondary (738 vs. about 650; Siniscalco 2002).

Figure 4. Cumulative number of hours over the first nine years of schooling by EFA region	**Figure 5. Cumulative number of hours allocated to science for the first nine years of schooling by EFA region**
	
Source: Amadio and Truong 2006. (Total number of cases = 120). All figures are medians, excepting data for Indonesia which refer to the intended number of instructional hours.	*Source*: Amadio and Truong 2006. (Total number of cases = 120). All figures are medians, excepting data for Indonesia which refer to the intended number of instructional hours.

Strengthening of the management capacity at all levels of the education system: Fully achieved

2.25 The 1998 sector study, carried out as the projects became effective, described an overly centralized management for junior secondary education by the Ministry of National Education (MoNE). It hypothesized that decentralization if the public junior secondary system was necessary if the system were to expand for universal coverage, clear responsibilities among different levels of government and schools, and funding mechanisms that promote equity and efficiency.[47] The decentralization fiscal autonomy laws (nos. 22 and 25 of 1999, subsequently superceded) gave implementers the opportunity and obligation to develop schools in a decentralized fashion.[48]

2.26 The projects have carried out many training and organizational activities designed to strengthen management capacity at all levels of the education system, including private and religious schools (Tables A1-A3) Though objective measures are unavailable, school principals interviewed by external evaluators reported benefits of the training and greater ability to manage the schools. A school financing model for poor rural areas was based on awarding block grants and matching grants on the basis of proposals. Officials interviewed reported to the IEG mission that in most cases construction and provision of physical inputs proved to be more cost-effective than the contractors previously utilized by MoNE. Furthermore, principals and province staff interviewed often reported that construction quality had improved and better-looking schools had been built. Also the block grant model resulted in making a new school operational in less than six months from the start, compared to an earlier minimum of two years. Local governments in many cases provided supplementary funding for additional classrooms to accommodate

47 World Bank 1998, p. 40.

48. The two laws have been revised and superseded by Law no 32 (about local Government) and Law no 33 (about fiscal balancing between central and local Government).

more students, or to provide roads for easier access to the school location. External evaluations offer similar conclusions; they also suggest that community involvement may have improved teaching, but some principals and committees did not clearly understand procedures and sometimes submitted poorly designed proposals to local authorise that required assistance from the district offices. Disbursement of funds after project completion has often been late or lower amounts have been approved, and schools have been left with few operating funds. At the provincial level this has limited the ability of staff to carry out training and supervision.

2.27 Community involvement has been very encouraging, but progress was slower than expected. Community decisions on how to spend the money led to the establishment of school councils, meetings, and publicity on how much money each school receives and how it is spent. However, actual involvement has been sporadic. About 97 percent of schools in Indonesia had committees by 2004, but 80 percent of them met only every six months and played only a peripheral role in principals' decisionmaking [49] (Nearly all committee members are male.) Teacher training was sometimes not carried out as expected, but committee members interviewed by the mission did not know details about this educational area. An ethnographic study also found fewer meetings than expected and limited community involvement.[50] Members often rubberstamp the plans presented by principals.[51] For example, evaluation reports on school construction presented cost irregularities that communities were unable to prevent, or may have even caused them.[52] For example, teachers are sometimes hired from the community, and committee members may have conflicts of interest. (Similarly, community oversight in the scholarship award decisions for the very poor resulted in some leakage to those who were better off.[53]) The limited oversight that has been inherent with decentralization has made it difficult to monitor community decisions about schools.

Table 9. School Committees Still Not Fully Engaged

Percentage distribution by frequency of School Committee meetings	
Every week	0.5
Every two weeks	0.7
Every month	18.3
Every six months	43.7
Every year	20.5
Only once in awhile	16.3

Data source: Bali Impact Crisis Survey, 2003; cited in World Bank 2004 p. 31

49. World Bank 2004.

50 Bjork 2004.

51. Oey-Gardiner 2004.

52. For example, four schools in East Java were found to have paid for furniture at inordinately high prices from a specific supplier. Then they returned it and bought furniture elsewhere. It's unknown whether they were reimbursed or the terms of this transaction (MONE 2003b, p. 36-37).

53. CIMU, 2004.

3. Ratings

Project Outcomes

3.1 The three junior secondary education projects enabled the government to implement innovative strategies at this level of education and meet its enrolment goals. The decentralization policy, in conjunction with the whole-school approach made it possible to expand the system even in a time of financial crisis. The block grant mechanism was an innovative and ambitious strategy to increase school effectiveness and equity.

3.2 The outcomes of all three projects are rated *satisfactory* because the access and management targets were substantially met. The strategies and project designs were highly *relevant* to the country's needs and appropriate for its implementation capacity, despite some doubts during appraisal. Most activities were carried out despite various difficulties, and *efficacy was substantial.* The whole-school strategy to ensure that a full package of inputs would be in place before the school opened was to ensure sustainability of project inputs through community involvement, and this strategy overall proved effective. Average construction unit costs were not available, but officials reported that schools cost less to build through community involvement. *Efficiency* for all three projects is rated *modest.* The degree to which the interventions resulted in improved student learning is uncertain, particularly given the unusually large number of instructional hours that Indonesia offers its students; furthermore, all three projects faced governance problems, and execution had to be terminated early in some provinces because of misprocurement.

Institutional Development Impact

3.3 The projects were implemented within the framework of the 1999 "big bang" decentralization laws. The sudden devolution of considerable authority and responsibility to district levels with funding moving from direct channels to a system of block grants to district budgets forced local-level institutions to operate as never before. The effect was mixed. A study conducted six years after the legislation shows considerable inefficiencies resulting from confusion over roles and responsibilities between levels of government.[54] Some officials interviewed have stated that these are still in flux. Also monitoring systems in various ministries have broken down, since ministries no longer have direct control of district staff. Thus, data quality and quantity in various sectors has declined.

3.4 However, the situation may be improving in the medium term. A survey showed that 60 percent of households perceived public education services to have improved since 2003. The households and individuals living within the districts surveyed saw significant improvement in enrollment rates of children aged 13-15, from 78 to 81 percent. About 36 percent of respondents perceived their own school quality to be improving; rural households were more likely to attest to improvements in the quality of teachers than urban households (23 versus 16 percent). By contrast, they were less likely to identify

54. Pradhan et al. 2006.

improvements in academic performance (7 versus 13 percent). On balance, most respondents viewed postdecentralization trends in public education (including junior secondary) to be positive.[55] This evidence is encouraging, given the large-scale of changes that have been made in the sector partly through project activities. Overall, the institutional development impact for all projects is rated *substantial*.

Sustainability

3.5 Overall sustainability for all three projects is rated *likely*. Government policies and strategies continue to target underserved communities in rural areas. Many of the national policy reform strategies that were applied under the project continue to be supported. These include the whole school approach and grants for underserved new schools.

3.6 Nevertheless, the resilience of some benefits to shocks is uncertain. The Bank's 2004 education sector review raises concerns about the level of financing for schools after the implementation and the sufficiency of the grant system to covering basic operations costs, let alone efforts to improve quality. The ability of district governments to provide adequate allocations and supervisions is variable, and the degree to which specific areas in the country will improve is unpredictable. Many junior secondary education schools have been receiving 50 percent or less than their pre-decentralization budgets. Support is particularly important for new schools that must cover start-up costs as each new grade is added. The central government plans to launch a textbook block grant that will cover all schools in three years and may stabilize support to schools.

Bank Performance

3.7 The bank has done extensive sector work and carried out much research in the education sector, including junior secondary education. Project appraisal was detailed and careful, with much beneficiary participation carried out thanks to a Japan Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) grant for technical assistance. The Bank's Quality Assurance Group (QAG) rated project quality at entry as satisfactory.[56] The Bank showed flexibility during the Asian crisis and made it possible to restructure projects rapidly as the need arose. Placing the projects under one umbrella simplified project management, and this helped the government focus on the overall goals for junior secondary education.

3.8 In many respects, the Bank became the agent of management change. It encouraged the country to adopt in all sectors policies such as decentralization and improved governance. To reduce dependence on the central government staff it promoted building through parent associations, autonomy, and accountability. Although on earlier occasions the Bank may not have considered mismanagement evidence sufficient for action, in these projects it did. The institution insisted on restitution and follow-up in the corruption cases related to these and other education projects (such as

55. World bank 2005d, 2004.

56. World Bank 2005a-c, p. 3.

the Book and Reading Development project) and now requires anticorruption plans by the government for new lending. In response, MoNE has launched a corruption resolution unit. The Bank's strategy has given a strong warning to the public that corruption, at least in projects involving the Bank, would not be tolerated. Several of the officials interviewed praised the Bank for its close monitoring and supervision. Overall, Bank performance for the three projects is rated *satisfactory*.

Borrower Performance

3.9 Overall, borrower performance is rated *satisfactory*. The central project implementation unit was staffed with qualified employees and was competently managed, although provincial units were less so. It implemented three complex projects and carried out most planned activities, particularly under the difficult circumstances of the Asian crisis and in a decentralization framework.

3.10 The Borrower has also adopted a number of suggested sector policy reforms[57] including the use of: (a) block grant funding; (b) scholarship programs for poor students; (c) contract teachers to provide short-term relief of teacher shortages; (d) direct financing of grants and scholarships to schools and students, respectively; and (e) government-financed, community-led new school construction and school rehabilitation programs. These procedures were innovations in Indonesia that were established during the projects and later became national policy. They signal a decision by the Government to manage the education sector more efficiently than it has in the past.

4. Issues and Prospects in Sectoral Strategy

4.1 In an effort to recuperate the educational losses of the 1997 economic crisis, the government has developed a new National Education Development Strategic Plan for 2005-2009.[58] The government is proceeding with the implementation of universal basic education (Education for All) and plans to expand gross enrolment increases from about 83.3 percent in 2005 to 96.6 percent in 2009 and net enrollment increses from 63.7 percent in 2005 to 75.5 percent in 2009. (For senior secondary education the enrollment target would be 69.9 percent or 7.5 million students people in 2009, up from 56.0 percent or 5.59 million students in 2005). Budget allocations for education have been low. The country in the past has spent 2.8 percent of per capita GDP on education compared to 2.2 percent for China, 2.8 percent of Vietnam, 3.1 percent for Singapore, 4.1 percent of India, and 5.4 percent of Thailand, and 7.9 percent of Malaysia.[59] The incremental costs associated with EFA would be 18 percent of the 2004 per-pupil cost of primary education at the district level and 35 percent for junior secondary education (Table B-5). The government has committed to increasing expenditures to the level needed for universal basic education. To increase expenditures in a decentralized framework, the government plans to expand the school grant subsidy policy (Financing of Operational Costs- BOS) to

57. World Bank 1998.

58. Depdiknas 2005.

59. World Bank 2004, p. 69.

provide gradually free basic education for all. The operational funds are to be given to both public and private, general and religious schools so that by 2009 every student in a basic education unit can receive the operational funds in the form of scholarship. New schools will continue to be built and those in bad condition will be refurbished.

4.2 Universal basic education is promoted in hopes that it will improve Indonesia's competitiveness in the global market. The country's modest performance in international assessments has received considerable attention. The government has decided that students must become better able to analyze and synthesize knowledge and make decisions on the basis of their knowledge. Currently salaries account for 85-90 percent of the budgets, so the government plans to increase expenditures on non-salary budget items such as staff development, maintenance and infrastructure, and to support expenditures aimed at improving quality. Quality improvement will mean identifying those institutional arrangements (such as standards, structures, and incentives) that will improve performance and accountability in the context of local autonomy. So, essential performance standards must be set, measured, and monitored throughout the education system. An important component is better teacher preparation.

4.3 The Indonesian parliament passed a new law about teachers and university lecturers in December 2005, whose implementation is to start in July 2007. Among other issues, the law declares that future teachers will be university graduates who will teach only the subject they have studied in the university and must be certified to teach. Through a process that is being determined in 2006, teachers will be certified according to their academic, social, and moral competencies. (It is estimated that 80 percent of the 2.37 million primary and secondary-level teachers will require some upgrading.) The country spends an inordinate amount of time educating students, but the payoff appears to be limited. Nearly half of the classrooms observed were engaged in "passive" tasks that provide much-needed practice in the reproduction of specific information, but may fail to connect it to other knowledge that will lead to deductive reasoning and use of the knowledge. There is a risk, therefore, that the certification process under current criteria will not reinforce the analytical skills that the country needs.

4.4 One means to specify the classroom behaviours teachers should demonstrate would be to study the effects of the most common classroom activities on the retention of factual information and creation of complex reasoning. (Some donors have promoted "active learning" and group work but without a body of research to show the effects of these activities on test scores.) Detailed classroom research could be conducted in Indonesia as it has been conducted in Germany, Japan, and other countries.[60] Such

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60. Class sessions have been videotaped and procedures coded for activities used teach math and science concepts (Stigler and Hiebert 1999). In the U.S. that scored low, students were more often taught definitions and practiced routine procedures; they learned specific rules rather than the underlying rationale. Japanese students scored much higher. Teachers taught the principles that would enable students to solve complex problems, and they often connected abstract math topics to historical discoveries and real-world use. Problems solved in class were linked, creating a coherent knowledge structure. Teachers also took advantage of students' ability to memorize, asking them to repeat rules that they immediately put into practice. Deductive reasoning (math proofs) were used in 53 percent of Japanese classes and not at all in the U.S. classes. The study may also demonstrate the effect of distractions on consolidation; Japanese classes were never interrupted, while 31 percent of U.S. classes were interrupted for extraneous reasons. Seatwork in both countries accounted for about 40 percent of class time; but in the low-scoring U.S., seatwork consisted of 96 percent practice, 3.5 percent application, and 0.7 percent inventive thinking, whereas

research would provide empirical evidence regarding the activities that improve the likelihood of high scores in TIMSS. Teacher training and certification could proceed on that basis. Training and teacher certification strategy could then be oriented towards the use of more cognitively efficient classroom activities.

4.5 An important issue that may undermine government efforts to increase teaching effectiveness is the number and salaries of junior secondary teachers. Although class sizes tended to be large (about 38 students), student-teacher ratios in schools visited by the IEG mission (particularly in East Java and West Nusa Tenggara) were low; they were 15.7, while in other areas schools were observed to have student teacher ratios of 2, 5, 7, 11, or 16. Teachers report working about 24 hours per week (Table B-7) and nominally they work in Indonesia about as much as in OECD countries (738 vs. 716 hours per year).[61] However, in the schools visited by the mission, teachers often reported working 15-18 hours per week. The reason given was that teachers should only teach in their specialty area, and only religion teachers should teach religion. Thus, many teachers in fact work part-time while getting paid for full-time jobs.

4.6 It appears that the government efforts to increase educational expenditures may have resulted in hiring teachers who are not necessarily needed. (According to government staff, approximately 25 percent of teachers are surplus.). Hiring teachers on temporary contracts is easy, and communities may support this trend to help employ residents. However, the large numbers of teachers keep the salaries low and raise a risk that the less competent ones tend to be attracted to schools. Also, the real per-hour pay of teachers may be distorting wage data.

4.7 Rather than employ many and poorly paid teachers with limited teaching competencies, Indonesia might profit from fewer, better-paid, more versatile teachers working full-time. Thus, the government might consider revising its policy of keeping salaries and official working hours low as well as the one-subject requirement. Instead, teachers can be trained to teach multiple subjects according to their interest and competency (This was a project activity that had limited implementation.) It would be advantageous to use the opportunity presented by the major expansion of the junior secondary system to redeploy teachers more flexibly in order to meet some of the additional demand.

4.8 Instructional issues are also evident in the after-hours “terbuka” schools that in effect serve fewer students than envisaged due to dropout. Many poor students are unable to learn the material by themselves while teachers stand by. Active engagement and improved instruction may produce higher attendance in this policy instrument of poverty alleviation. Quality-oriented grants might be given to districts who rationalize teacher deployment and demonstrate improvements in student grades or test scores.

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in Japan seatwork time consisted of 41 percent practice, 15 percent application, and 44 percent thinking (Sigler and Hiebert 1999, p. 71).

61. Data provided by the UNESCO International Bureau of Education.

5. Lessons

5.1 This assessment confirms a number of IEG lessons from the education sector:

- It is possible to target successfully poor areas for interventions aimed at increasing enrollments, even in times of financial crises. Scholarships administered to the poor and disbursed to them promptly may be effective in sustaining enrollments and preventing dropout (para. 2.17, Annex C)

- Community involvement may be cost-effective and reliable means to build and support schools, particularly when the population has basic education and poverty is not extreme. Nevertheless, school committee members may not be able or willing to keep school expenditures low, may not have much time to spend on school affairs, and may be unable to advise the principal effectively on educational matters (para. 2.27)

- Decentralization promotes effective use of resources. However, not all local authorities are equally competent or interested in educating the poor. A central government may find it necessary to meet the basic educational needs of the poorest communities directly if national goals for basic education are to be achieved (para. 2.26)

- International assessments may provide critical feedback to governments interested in increasing the competitiveness of their human capital. They may also provide means to help countries improve their performance (paras. 2.23, 4.3).

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Annex A. Implementation of project components

Table A-1. East Java and East Nusa Tenggara Junior Secondary Education (Loan 4042)

Components/ subcomponents	*Activities*	*Targets to be achieved*	*Outputs*	*Outcomes Info obtained during mission*
Expand Access (US$84.3m, actual US$105.7 m)	Provide 55% of needed classrooms in East Java 13% of needed places in East Nusa Tenggara West Nusa Tenggara added	E. Java: 56,000 new places in remote, 50->75% enrollment ENT: 39,000 new places -> 60% enrollment E. Java - 120,000 additional graduates in 15 years ENT: 102,000 additional graduates in 15 years	50,936 new seats Enrollment 2,117,531 in 2003/04 35,325 east Java 13279 E. Nusa Tenggara 969 West Nusa Tenggara South Sulawesi 1363 new seats	Enrollments increased as expected, utilization rate was 108%
	new schools in underserved rural areas	E. Java 169 schools, 13% of total provincial needs, i.e. 35,000 new places ENT: 763 new classrooms, 55% of province needs, 30,520 new places	171 new schools (61% of target) 610 new classrooms to Existing schools (212% of target)	Schools overall in good condition and largely built by communities; however, some prices for construction were unusually high
	expand the out-of-school equivalency program	Learning materials for sekolah terbuka; 10-day training for tutors	56,8000 modules provided and 4557 teachers trained in their use (113% of target)	Only about 50% of those enrolled complete studies Very small schools have been abandoned as ineffective
	Accommodations	56 teacher dorms for E. Java and 56 for ENT	138 new teacher and principal housing units (93% of target)	Housing in use, unknown if teachers would work without it
	Information to parents	Posters TA for 5 months	Posters used	Specific benefits unknown
	Scholarship program	E. Java To 35,350 students (2% of enrollment) ENT 5350 (3% of enrollment) 25,000 Rp x 12 months x 3 years	About 400,000 students received scholarships	Scholarships effective in preventing dropout of students already enrolled in schools Students largely continued on to higher secondary schools
	specialist teachers in underserved schools	About 150	275 (183% of target)	Benefits unknown
Improve Quality (US$31.6m; actual US$ 28m)			764 public and private schools received block and matching grants in 2000	93% of schools received inputs and 70% used them effectively, held regular committee meetings
	Inservice upgrading 50% of E. Java and 80% of E.NT teachers lack 3-year post-secondary	Train E. Java 9360, NTT 2990 unqualified teachers Support E. Java 37,330, NTT 4990 teachers Hire 100 contract teachers in E. Java, 50 in ENT.	9635 teachers trained (78% of target) 7627 teachers attended training, 3514 peer-oriented training and 1124 received specialist training Class action research in 442 clusters involving 2544 teachers	Class action program was considered of limited effectiveness (government comments in the ICR)
	New teaching rooms, library books	231 library rooms in E. Java, 40 in ENT Materials set for each Teaching aids	77% of target schools have 1 textbook per student for each subject	Though teachers reported using instructional materials to external evaluators, the PPAR

Components/ subcomponents	***Activities***	***Targets to be achieved***	***Outputs***	***Outcomes Info obtained during mission***
		packages: E. Java 169 to new schools, 350 in existing schools, 50 to private; ENT 50	979 teaching aid sets and 843 office equipment sets distributed to schools	mission found limited use Most schools had inadequate numbers of textbooks for their students
	Science education	Science kits to teachers Innovative methods in 60 schools, compare with 20 controls	18 teachers, 5874 students A curricular experiment was carried out	Students following a new integrated curriculum had slightly higher scores than others, but difference was small
	School-level initiatives	Class action research to be undertaken	6 of 10 sampled schools reported activities	Teachers satisfied with activities, but follow-up limited at project end.
	Develop tests	Improved testing	Activities limited	Benefit unknown
Strengthen Education Management (US$6.2m, actual US$ 5m)	Train principals	2240 principals to be trained 2500 sets of 10 booklets on management issues distributed	7000 trained and received materials 212 were trained in school maintenance 2240 participated in interschool forums	Principals reported satisfaction and new behaviors to external evaluators
	Develop management and data analysis capacity for districts	E. Java - 50 kanwil staff, 340 kandep staff in planning, policy analysis, monitoring ENT: 40 kanwil and 74 kandep staff;	Training activities took place, numbers unspecified	Decentralization increased the need for competent and trained staff, but outcomes of this activity are unknown
	strengthen the institutional capacities at district level	Training in forecasting, data processing, data management	Monitoring activities limited during project life	Data management and forecasting benefit limited
Support Project Management (US$3.4m; actual US$ 3m [component 4]		Managed project at province and central level		Over 90% of the work was executed as agreed

Source: Project documents and information obtained during the assessment mission; comments and outcomes obtained from external evaluation documents (MoNE 2003a-2003e)

Table A-2. Central Indonesia Junior Secondary Education (Loan 4062)

Components/ subcomponents	*Activities*	*Targets to be achieved*	*Outputs*	*Outcomes Info obtained during mission*
Expand Access (US$60.3m, US$, US$88m actual)	Central Java, Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, Yogyakarta Special District	45,000 new places in remote areas Total beneficiaries in 30 years 6.3m	48560 new places 108% utilization rate	Enrollments increased as expected, utilization rate was 108%
	new schools in underserved rural areas	C. Java 77 schools for 28,000 new places C. Kalimantan 53 schools for 8400 students W. Kalimantan 70 schools for 14,000	164 new schools (67% of target) 117 new classrooms in existing schools (212% of target)	Schools overall in good condition and largely built by communities; however, some prices for construction were unusually high
	expand the out-of-school equivalency program	Alternative education for 11,000 Learning materials for sekolah terbuka; 10-day training for tutors 53 sekolah kecil for C. Kalimantan	56,800 modules provided About 4557 tutors trained in their use (113% of target)	Only about 50% of those enrolled complete studies Very small schools have been abandoned as ineffective
	Accommodations	40 dorms C. Kalimantan, 160 residences W. Kalimantan 20 dorms, 34 residences	138 new teacher and principal housing units	Housing in use, unknown if teachers would work without it
	Information to parents	Posters TA for 5 months		Benefits unknown
Aceh, W. Sumatra, Jambi, South Sumatra, Lampung,	Scholarship program	34,000 students 25,000 Rp x 12 months x 3 years	300,000 students received scholarships over 2-3 years 96% of target met	Scholarships effective in preventing dropout of students already enrolled in schools
Improve Quality (US$58.2m; actual US$30.6m)			1704 public and private schools (679) received block and matching grants	Amounts have been reduced, leaving many schools in shortfalls
	Inservice upgrading	Train approximately 30,000 teachers through 10-day courses and periodic peer-group meetings Hire contract teachers	6935 teachers trained (78% of target) 6182 attended peer training 2500 temporary teachers hired	Due to inaccurate costs only 85% of schools received inputs in time 80% of those that did reportedly used inputs satisfactorily (MoNE 2003 a-e)
	specialist subject teachers for underserved schools	About 150	275 (183% of target)	Benefits uncertain
	New teaching rooms, library books	library rooms 3.6 million reference books Materials set for each Teaching aids packages	About 80% of schools have 1 textbook per student, 8 subjects	Though teachers reported using instructional materials to external evaluators, the PPAR mission found limited use Most schools had inadequate numbers of textbooks for their students
	Science education	Science kits to teachers Innovative methods, compare with controls	Curriculum implemented	Students following a new integrated curriculum had slightly higher scores than others, but difference was small
	School-level	Class action research	Class action	Class action program was

Components/ subcomponents	*Activities*	*Targets to be achieved*	*Outputs*	*Outcomes Info obtained during mission*
	initiatives		program involved 2554 teachers	considered of limited effectiveness (government comments in the ICR)
Strengthen Education Management (US$5.9m, US$3.3m)	Computers in schools	Introduce information technology	70 schools equipped with computers, 40 with modems, 20 got matching grants	Project implemented, students and schools report much satisfaction
				1704 school grants provided, 679 of these for private schools.
	Train principals	Target numbers unspecified in the Staff Appraisal Report.	430 trained 5900 school team members were trained in school-based management	80% of schools provided effective quality inputs, held regular committee meetings
Component 4: Support Project Management (US$7m; actual US$13.2m)	Develop management and data analysis capacity for districts		Training activities took place, numbers unspecified	Decentralization increased the need for competent and trained staff, but outcomes of this activity are unknown
	strengthen the institutional capacities for other Bank projects	Training in forecasting, data processing, data management		Over 90% of work programs implemented as agreed
		Develop tests TA	Test items developed	Implementation limited to pilots

Source: Project documents and information obtained during the assessment mission

Table A-3. Sumatra Junior Secondary Education (Loan 4095)

Components/ subcomponents	*Activities*	*Targets to be achieved*	*Outputs*	*Outcomes Info obtained during mission*
Expand Access (US$78.5.3m, US$120.1 m)	Province-wise seats to be added: Lampung 16,400 Sumsel 14,420 Jambi 6,720 Sumbat 9,640 Aceh 16,040 North Sumatra 3600	53,520 new places in remote areas 27,600 in alternative programs Revision: 66,640 seats Student enrollment 998,527 in 1996/97 North Sumatra added target of 3600 seats added during implementation	Total 65,695 seats (99% of target) Student enrollment 1,210,579 in 2001/02 North Sumatra 2259 seats (63% of target)	Schools in Sumatra were used 99% or so vs. 75% expected in the SAR
	new schools in underserved rural areas	223 schools, about 15% of total provincial needs	Built 212 new schools and 394 new classrooms	Classroom use was 99% vs. expected 75%
	expand the out-of-school equivalency program	Learning materials for sekolah terbuka; 10-day training for tutors to support 27,600 students	607,700 modules provided 1000 teachers trained 39 motorbikes for tutors	Program operational, but attendance and dropout rates around 50%. Formal evaluation needed. Very small schools have been abandoned as ineffective
	Accommodations	132 teacher houses, 68 dorms	335 teacher and student houses and dorms	Housing in use, unknown if teachers would work without it
	Information to parents	Posters TA for 5 months		Specific benefits unknown
	Scholarship program	30,800 students Revised to 130,400 25,000 Rp x 12 months	410,000 students received scholarships	Scholarships effective in preventing dropout of students already enrolled in schools. Students

Components/ subcomponents	*Activities*	*Targets to be achieved*	*Outputs*	*Outcomes Info obtained during mission*
		x 3 years		largely continued on to higher secondary schools
	Contract specialist teachers	Hiring 997 contract teachers Revised target about 2982 teachers	4036 (135% of revised target)	Benefits unknown
Improve Quality (US$35.2m; actual US$28.9)			749 matching grants were given to public schools and 190 to private schools	
	Inservice upgrading	Train about 4000 unqualified teachers Support about 12,000 teachers in peer group training	6373 teachers received upgrade training 11,508 teachers and 869 specialist teachers trained in peer groups	Training approach changed to include more training days, focus on target schools. Teachers report satisfaction with methods
	New teaching rooms, library books	library rooms Materials set for each of 4078 schools Teaching aids packages	1502 sets of teaching aids to teachers 117 sets of office equipment to schools 2400 schools received sets of books based on student ratio	Though teachers reported using instructional materials to external evaluators, the PPAR mission found limited use; 66% of target schools have textbooks, 1 per student for 8 subjects
	Science education	Science kits to teachers	Included in teaching aids kits	Students following a new integrated curriculum had slightly higher scores than others, but difference was small
	School-level initiatives	Class action research to be undertaken	6 of 10 sampled schools reported activities	Teachers satisfied with activities, but follow-up limited at project end.
Strengthen Education Management (US$5.1m, US$1.34m)	Train principals	Train 5251 principals. sets of 10 booklets on management issues distributed	8617 principals were trained and received materials 363 principals were trained in maintenance	ICR (p.9) reports significant improvement in the quality of managers since 1998. 65% of schools provided effective quality inputs, held regular committee meetings; 35% did not
	Develop management and data analysis capacity for districts	710 district and province staff in planning, policy analysis, monitoring	Training activities took place, numbers unspecified	Decentralization increased the need for competent and trained staff, but outcomes of this activity are unknown
Component 4: Support Project Management (US$7.3m; actual US$9.59m	strengthen the institutional capacities at district level	Training in forecasting, data processing, data management	Extensive training and local technical assistance services provided	Over 90^ of annual work programs implemented and budgets disbursed; No special M&E unit was established

Source: Project documents and information obtained during the assessment mission

Table A-4. Secondary Education Lending in Indonesia

Completed Projects	*Project ID*	*Approval FY*	*Closing*	*Loan Amt. US$m*	*Project Cost US$m*	*Canceled US$m*
East Java and East Nusa Tenggara Junior Secondary Education Project (Ln. 4042)	P037097	96	6/30/2004	99	146.4 (actual 142.64)	11.7
Central Indonesia Junior Secondary Education Project (Ln. 4062)	P003987	97	06/30/2004	104	154.1 (actual 135.9)	14.7
Sumatra Junior Secondary Education Project (Ln. 4095)	P041894	97	06/30/2004	98	144 (actual 160)	5.5
Secondary School Teacher Development (Ln. 3979)	P004003	96	12/31/2001	60.4	87 (actual 53.6)	32
Second Secondary Education and Management Training Project (Ln. 3158)	P003873	90	12/31/97	154.2	223.4 (actual 201.7)	16.8
First Secondary Education and Management Training Project (Ln.2472)	P003842	84	9/30/1990	78	129.9 (actual 106.1)	1.3
Total				593.6	884.8 (actual 799.9)	82.3

Table A-5. ICR Review Ratings of Completed Secondary Education Projects

Completed Projects	*Approval & Completion FY*	*Outcome*	*Institutional Development*	*Sustainability*	*Bank Performance*	*Borrower Performance*
Secondary School Teacher Development Project (Ln. 3979)	96-02	Moderately Satisfactory	Substantial	Non-evaluable	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Project developed new curricula, assessment materials, redeployed trainers to secondary schools.						
Second Secondary Education and Management Training Project (Ln 3158)	90-98	Moderately Satisfactory	Modest	Uncertain	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory
The project upgraded the skills of teachers, trainers and mentors and the examination system, provided science equipment						
First Secondary Education and Management Training Project (Ln 2472)	84-91	Not rated (satisfactory)	Not rated (modest)	Not rated	Not rated (satisfactory)	Not rated (satisfactory)
The project financed the training of teachers and supervisors, upgraded equipment, and developed an examination system						

Annex B. Supplemental Tables

Figure B-1 and B-2: Gross and Net Enrollment Rates in East Asian Countries, 2000





Notes: GNP per capita data (in parenthesis) are for 2002

Data sources: UNESCO, 2003 and World Bank Edstats (http://www1.worldbank.org/education/edstats) Reported in World Bank 2004

Table B-1. Perceived Lowest Level of Education Needed for a Decent Job by Sex (%) – in 2003

	Women	Men	Total
Primary school	1.6	1.3	1.5
Junior/senior high school	35.6	41.9	38.9
Diploma programme	14.4	11.9	13.1
Undergraduate degree	24.4	20.7	22.5
Postgraduate degree	3.5	1.9	2.7
Professional education	1.8	3.4	2.6
Technical/vocational education	17.9	17.5	17.7
Others	0.8	1.4	1.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Gyorgy Sziraczki and Annemarie Reerink (2004). Report of survey on the school- to-work transition in Indonesia. to-work transition in Indonesia. Hartono 2005

Table B-2. Percentage change in enrollments in primary and lower secondary schools (JSS) in Indonesia, 1996-98

	Rural	Urban	Jakarta	Total
Primary				
1996-1997	-0.6	-2.1	-2.2	-0.9
1997-1998				
Total	-1.7	-1.1	-0.1	-1.6
Public	-1.4	0.1	0.6	-1.1
Private	-4.0	-4.3	-2.0	-4.1
Lower Secondary				
1996-1997	1.3	-6.2	-5.1	-0.7
1997-1998				
Public	2.8	-2.0	-1.9	1.9
Private	-7.3	-10.0	-16.0	-8.3
Boys	-0.3	-7.0	-8.9	-2.0
Girls	0.2	-5.5	-8.2	-1.2
Poorer sub-districts	-1.6	-7.3	-10.8	-2.7
Total	**0**	**-6.3**	**-8.6**	**-1.6**

Source: MoNE (February 1999). The impact of Indonesia's economic crisis on education: Findings of a survey of schools. Preliminary Report No. 02-0299. Jakarta (cited in Manning, 2000, p. 73).

Table B-3. Gross and Net Enrollment Rates by Location of Residence in Junior Secondary Education

	Net Enrollment Rates							Gross Enrollment rates							
	1995		1998	2000		2002		1995		1998		2000		2002	
Provinsi	Urban	Rural	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Jrbar	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Aceh	69.16	48.7	55.39			80.19		88.62	60.89	93	66.94			100.01	
North Sumatra	69.81	55.95	60.33	74.1	62.95	73.96	65.5	87.45	70.15	92	77.08	95.1	76.9	96.1	82.28
West Sumatra	70.72	53.61	58.53	70.03	60.78	73.5	62.93	97.89	70.24	94	76.96	95.09	80.52	100.23	85.04
Riau	70.67	41.77	52.79	73.32	56.08	76.57	56.12	91.58	54.39	91	64.77	95.35	75.33	98.18	74.39
Jambi	73.39	36.93	45.84	72.9	50.82	73.72	55.97	94.45	48.18	97	64.78	100.87	70.87	100.37	71.49
South Sumatra	62.47	36.21	48.35	67.19	55.8	70.72	44.89	82.95	48.07	90	61.94	88.96	69.57	99.65	58.39
Bengkulu	70.53	43.63	44.71	70	52.23	68.5	55.14	91.59	58.25	94	58.58	90.46	70.06	94.41	69.98
Lampung	65.79	51.07	54.36	66.09	57.53	69.7	61.07	80.59	66.24	94	72.17	86.42	75.29	93	79.22
Bangka Belitung						64.16	30.96							87.27	39.01
Jakarta	71.99			77.01		77.49		95.48		99		97.78		100.55	
West Java	64.44	35.25	43.08	68.15	48.12	70.08	50.05	81.34	44.19	84	53.07	86.67	58.71	89.45	60.39
Central Java	63.54	46.91	56.19	69.6	58.22	70.28	60.76	81.01	59.7	87	71.12	89.92	74.6	90.92	76.84
DI Yogyakarta	72.89	65.38	63.26	78.85	71.46	78.55	74.26	92.05	84.27	98	79.94	96.44	86.26	100.5	100.39
East Java	66.37	45.13	51.91	74.15	55.88	73.42	56.68	82.58	58.89	92	66.47	94.97	75.44	96.19	74.56
Banten						76.51	44							91.4	56.33
Bali	68.76	59.02	63.68	73.77	68.1	73.18	63.66	89.87	73.43	93	83.48	91.93	80.34	99.18	79.55
West Nusa Tenggara	53.92	36.63	48.32	59.83	57.31	61.82	54.97	70.68	46.34	68	60.34	78.95	70.59	77.81	67.72
East Nusa Tenggara	64.45	21.48	27	68.17	27.21	68.19	32.68	90.74	32.4	90	40.83	94.98	42.5	95.99	51.9
West Kalimantan	61.13	26.08	36.77	66.65	40.13	66.5	37.97	86.09	41.38	86	53.87	90.81	57.46	93.21	53.66
Central Kalimantan	73.68	43.77	41.47	71.99	56.99	66.74	47.87	99.53	57.18	89	57.22	91.3	74.69	92	60.1
South Kalimantan	65.61	37.47	45.52	66.08	44.8	72.51	48.38	80.44	47.1	90	60.96	83.22	56.54	97.12	65.34
East Kalimantan	72.28	43.12	47.05	65.43	53.45	67.77	56.63	93.14	57.61	91	63.48	87.78	73.92	95.23	78.4
North Sulawesi	63.15	47.35	50.97	74.24	58.44	70.76	64.23	86.36	61.59	87	61.84	97.08	72.2	96.23	82.39
Central Sulawesi	69.6	35.59	42.71	66.57	43.96	67.14	47.52	85.5	43.69	84	55.95	82.35	58.82	96.88	64.7
South Sulawesi	61.1	38.83	41.66	62.58	48.53	66.27	48.04	75.8	50.48	80	53.33	79.69	62.97	88.48	60.95
Southeast Sulawesi	70.33	42	53.98	66.32	59.22	76.08	53.91	88.25	55.53	84	70.35	91.17	75.75	99.8	73.59
Gorontalo						61.42	34.5							79.99	49.32
Maluku	69.41	38.79	50.62			73.15	71.37	94.46	53.76	105	67.21			96.83	109.37
Irian Jaya	68.1	30.73	31.66	66.69	24.57	84.5	57.22	95.3	49.77	103	50.96	103.84	37.91	97.4	114.6
North Maluku	68.1	30.73				72.74	68.87							93.66	75.15
INDONESIA	**66.51**	**42.65**	**49.63**	**70.53**	**53.44**	**71.9**	**54.13**	**85.19**	**55.21**	**89**	**63.78**	**90.82**	**68.83**	**93.53**	**69.74**

Source: SUSENAS. Various years
Note: missing values due to political and civil problems

Table B-4: Inequality in Enrollment Rates: Wider Gaps within than between Provinces, 2002

	Source of inequality	Primary	Junior secondary	Senior secondary
Gross enrollment rates	Between provinces	30.5	29.2	27.5
	Within province	69.5	70.8	72.5
Net enrollment rates	Between provinces	39.2	35.8	29.9
	Within province	60.8	64.2	70.1

Notes: The coefficients of variation for enrollment rates across the years are small at the primary level (ranging from 4 to 7 percent for net enrollment rates), as compared with those at the junior secondary level (22-28 percent) and at the senior secondary level (41-46 percent).

Data sources: District-level database for ESR, using data from various years of SUSENAS.

Table B-5. Cost estimates to attain Education for All

	Primary		Secondary	
	2004/5	2008/9	2004/5	2008/9
Per-pupil cost (Rp thousands)				
Incremental cost of EFA	179	209	509	834
Current cost	966	966	1,449	1,449
Total	1,145	1,175	1,958	2,283
Total cost (=per-pupil cost x students enrolled) (rp billions)				
Incremental cost of EFA	5,061	5,702	5,331	10,245
Current cost	27,255	26,397	15,476	18,049
Total	32,316	32,099	20,807	28,418

Source: World Bank 2004 (citing McMahon (2003)
Note: All estimates are in 2003 prices.

Figure B-3. Net enrolment rates by income quintiles



Note: Data reported in Depdiknas 2005

Table B-5. Primary to Secondary Education Transition Rates

		1993/1994	1994/1995	1997/1998	1998/1999	1999/2000	2000/2001	2001/2002	2002/2003	2003/2004	change
	Province	*%*	*%*	*%*	*%*	*%*	*%*	*%*	*%*	*%*	*1997-2004*
East Java and East Nusa Tenggara Junior Secondary Education Project											
6.	East Java	63		69.09	73.45	77.14	84.2	75.07	71.59	73.87	4.78
28.	West Nusa Tenggara			59.46	55.36	54.16	57.85	59.51	53.9	59.94	0.48
29.	East Nusa Tengg	72		56.42	64.2	75.03	66.36	76.17	68.74	64.6	8.18
23.	South Sulawesi			65.1	76.09	67.04	69.1	71.16	79.82	71.07	5.97
Central Indonesia Junior Secondary Education Project											
4.	Central Java		68	70.43	69.33	71.73	70.19	72.28	69.97	70.84	0.41
5.	DI Yogyakarta		90	88.8	101.45	106.1	119.4	95.97	95.57	92.88	4.08
16.	West Kalimantan		64	53.02	67.82	63.53	65.41	63.8	73.63	72.5	19.48
17.	Central Kalimantan		76	82.74	67.49	63.36	67.7	63.86	48.4	63.44	-19.30
Sumatra Junior Secondary Education Project											
7.	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam		78	83.45	81.28	79.92	71.1	75.28	75.63	72.2	-11.25
9.	West Sumatra		71	72.51	72.23	73.65	72.63	69.39	76.1	75.39	2.88
8.	North Sumatra			72.25	75.26	78.08	76.52	76.44	77.03	74.3	2.05
12.	South Sumatra		64.9	66.12	73.78	70.14	80.62	66.73	70.58	75.38	9.26
15.	Lampung		65.1	69.34	71.17	67.39	69.08	68.62	74.46	65.89	-3.45
11.	Jambi		64.8	61.46	62.67	66.09	66.3	64.11	68.01	67.7	6.24
Asian Development Bank											
18.	South Kalimantan			55.94	59.52	59.82	57.07	53.76	52.86	56.45	0.51
19.	East Kalimantan			67.74	77.15	74.49	83.79	74.28	71.87	78.24	10.50
20.	North Sulawesi			70.57	86.81	85.37	130.7	93.06	95.36	104.4	33.86
21.	Gorontalo			...	...	...	...	63	60.39	49.59	
22.	Central Sulawesi			57.7	57.53	62.26	65.04	64	69.18	59.57	1.87
24.	Southeast Sulawesi			71.7	73.87	73.79	80.65	76.64	79.34	87.86	16.16
Not supported by a multilateral project											
10.	Riau			63.7	62.94	65.9	59.57	61.4	66.57	61.95	-1.75
13.	Bangka Belitung			...	...	...	...	72.41	73.49	86.8	
14.	Bengkulu			79.01	82.77	84.84	77.77	71.54	71.06	56.9	-22.11
1.	DKI Jakarta			98.8	103.66	102.1	107.3	106.6	95.99	104.6	5.78
2.	West Java			52.02	57.15	61.17	76.09	61.31	58.61	59.89	7.87
3.	Banten			...	...	...	...	52.17	54.67	50.15	
25.	Maluku			58.59	77.34	82.3	127.6	69.08	89.64	76.8	18.21
26.	North Maluku			...	...	...	...	61.08	51.67	49.07	
27.	Bali			83.26	85.92	83.99	83.63	89.18	76.81	90.28	7.02
30.	Papua			84.17	89.8	82.88	80.94	87.68	93.58	94.19	10.02
	Indonesia	**64**	**66.8**	**67.01**	**70.47**	**71.83**	**72.12**	**70.52**	**69.95**	**70.02**	

Notes: Data is not available.
*Transition rates in schools under MoNE only
Source: MoNE (Various years). Indonesia Educational Statistics in Brief; Depdiknas 2005

Figure B-4. School Dropout Rate by Education level and Gender, 2004



Source: Depdiknas 2006

Table B-6. Level of Absenteeism (%) by School Level and Rural Urban Residency and Regions - 2005

School Level	National	Residency		Region	
		Rural	Urban	Java	Outside Java
Primary school	11.2	20.2	2.2	7.7	12.5
Lower secondary school (JSS)	14.4	21.5	10.8	5.9	17.1
Upper secondary school (SSS)	5.3	9.2	4.1	1.2	6.9

Source: GDS Indonesia (2005). Governance and Decentralization Survey 2005; Hartono 2005.

Figure B-5. Numbers of primary-level instructional hours in various countries



Source: Siniscalco 2002.

Table B-7 Average Number of Hours Worked per Week

	Non-Teachers	Teachers
All workers (SAKERNAS 2000)	44.7 (13.1)	34.0 (8.5)
Public school teachers (IFLS 2000)		
Primary schools	--	33.6 (7.4)
Junior secondary schools	--	24.1 (7.9)
Private school teachers (IFLS 2000)		
Primary schools	--	29.6 (10.3)
Junior secondary schools	--	21.8 (9.8)

Source: Filmer, 2002. World Bank 2004, Table 4.2

Notes: Data derived from SAKERNAS 2000 and from the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS) 2000.

Annex C. A Review of the Student Grants Program

The Bank restructured six loans to reallocate funds and support this initiative. Through a Memorandum to the President of the Board in 1998, a new category was added to the projects in order to allocate funds to the Government's national Scholarship and Grants Program. The Royal Netherlands Government provided an initial grant of US$28.8 million to assist schools in Indonesia coping with an influx of students who were internally displaced by social conflict or natural disasters, who were among the poorest 10 percent in the poorest 10 percent of districts in the country.[62] The funds broadened an existing program to finance scholarships as well as grants for the operational costs of primary and secondary schools in poor communities. The junior secondary students received directly 20,000 rupiahs monthly for 12 months, an amount ample for covering all school-related costs, extended upon satisfactory performance. The size amounted to 7-18 percent of average per capita household consumption. Communities and schools chose the recipients.

A total of about 4 million scholarships were awarded, of which about 1,010,000 for junior secondary education vis-à-vis to about 100,000 foreseen during appraisal. The program aimed to reach 6 percent of enrolled students at primary schools, 17 percent at junior secondary, and 10 percent at senior secondary schools. A special monitoring unit was set up for the program[63] and found that it undoubtedly encouraged community participation in schools. The scholarships largely went to the poorest, though there was some leakage to wealthier groups. Although many community members attended only once or twice per year, they expressed satisfaction with their involvement in the selection of scholarship recipients.[64]

A survey of 600 primary and junior secondary schools in five provinces in Indonesia in 1998 showed that the education safety net programs were starting to take effect. Overall, smaller declines were registered than the 24 percent quoted in newspapers. Primary and junior secondary education enrollments fell by 1.6 percent in 1998/99, with a much larger decline of 6.3 percent noticed in urban areas, large declines for poorer areas and girls' entry into junior secondary education (19 percent) as well as large variations.[65] By 2001, the primary-level enrollment decline registered between 1995/6 and 1999/0 was basically to be in line with the population decline for 7-12 year olds during that period, and for junior secondary education, the overall decline over the same period was insignificant (0.3 percent). Enrollments increased in rural areas and decreased in urban areas (8.4 and 7.0 percent during the two crisis years). Private school enrollment declines were steeper than those for public schools, and religious school enrolments declined more than those of secular schools; particularly in urban areas these

62. Independent Monitoring Unit 2002.

63. CIMU 2004. Complementary programs included "stay in school" campaign through media, community awareness, and mobilization campaigns, such the "I am a School Student" (Aku Anak Sekolah) campaign supported by UNICEF (Manning, 2000; Polling Center, 1999).

64. CIMU 2004.

65. Filmer et al. 1998.

declined by 25 percent or more. Gender differences in enrollment declines ultimately were minor.[66]

Towards the end of the program two other econometric studies were conducted and found out that the program apparently helped return enrolment to pre-crisis levels. One study found out that primary school enrolments remained stable in the long term, and junior secondary enrolments declined slightly and temporarily. [67] Large decreases in enrollment rates were avoided even though real household education expenditures—and the share of education expenditures in total household expenditures—declined by about one-third from 1998 to 2000.[68] One study used household data to estimate a double difference impact on dropouts through propensity score matching, and regression-based estimates of the same.[69] Both approaches find that scholarships reduced the probability of dropping out at junior secondary level by between 3-4 percent. (The second study found no significant effect at primary or senior secondary levels). Dropouts would have been 9.7 percent in the absence of the program and 7.3 percent with it, a 24 percent decrease in the dropout rate. However, giving grants to schools had no effect on enrolments.

After project completion, scholarships are no longer given for the poor (only for the meritorious). Instead, schools in poor areas receive block grants, and the students pay little or no tuition. (Tuition rates were reduced from 30,000 rupiah per month to 10,000 or 15,000). In areas that are better off schools receive matching grants and ensure that the very poor are alleviated from this burden.

66. Filmer et al. 2001.

67. Sparrow 2004.

68. Pradhan, 2001.

69. Cameroon 2002; her study found a reduction of 3 percentage points or 38 percent in the dropout rate.

Annex D. Basic Data Sheet

EAST JAVA AND EAST NUSA TENGGARA JUNIOR SECONDARY EDUCATION (LOAN 4042)

Key Project Data *(amounts in US$ million)*

	Appraisal estimate	*Actual or current estimate*	*Actual as % of appraisal estimate*
Original commitment	99	87.3	88
Total cancellation		11.7	
Total project cost	146.4	142.64	88

Project Dates

	Original	*Actual*
Board approval	06/18/1996	06/18/1996
Signing	08/12/1996	08/12/1996
Effectiveness	10/16/1996	10/16/1996
Closing date	06/30/2002	06/30/2002

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	Actual/Latest Estimate	
	N° Staff weeks	*US$('000)*
Appraisal/ Negotiations	N/A	628,941
Supervision	N/A	305,218
ICR	N/A	
Total	N/A	934,159

Mission Data

	Date (month/year)	No. of persons	Specializations represented	Performance rating	
				Implementation Progress	Development Objective
Identification/ Preparation	5/30/1995	5	Mission Leader (1); Project Implementation Specialist (1); Consultant/Educator (1); Consultant/Economist (1); Consultant/Statistics & GIS (1)	S	S
	10/16/1995	5	Mission Leader (1); Project Implementation Specialist (1); Consultant/Economist (1); Consultant/Educator (2)	S	S
	1/17/1996	2	Mission Leader (1); Consultant/Educator (1)	S	S
Appraisal/Negotiation	04/03//1996	4	Mission Leader (1); Educator (1); Fin. Mgmt. Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1).	S	S
Supervision	08/01/1996	1	Education Specialist (1)	S	S
	08/01/1996	2	Educ. Mgmt. Specialist (1); Education Specialist (1)	S	S
	04/17/1997	1	Education Specialist (1)	S	S
	10/10/1997	2	Educator (1); Mission Leader (1)	S	S
	08/07/1998	3	Task Team Leader Educator (1); Mission Leader (1); Consultant (2)	S	S
	02/18/1999	2	Task Team Leader Educator (1); Consultant (1)	S	S
	11/04/1999	4	Procurement Specialist (1); Financial Mgmt. Spec. (1); Architect, Consultant (1); Teacher Training Spec. (1)	S	S
	03/11/2000	1	Operations Officer (1)	S	S
	10/04/2000	2	TTL/Mission Leader (1); Ex-Post Rev. Consultant (1)	S	S
	10/13/2000	6	Sector Director (1); Task Team Leader (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Consultant (3)	S	S
	10/13/2000	4	Task Team Leader (1); Financial Mgmt. Officer (1); Construction Consultant (1); Team Assistant (1)	S	S
	10/13/2000	8	TTL-Loan 4042 (1); Educ. Specialist/Const. (2); TTl – Loan 4095 (1); Financial Mgt. Spec. (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Sr. Disbursement Off. (1); Sr. Educ. Specialist (1)	S	S
	05/14/2003	7	Task Team Leader (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Financial Mgt. Spec. (1); Construction Specialist (3); Education Specialist (1)	S	S
	Several intermittent joint missions within 2003 for implementation support	6	Task Team Leader (1); DPS (1); FMS (1); Construction/ Community Dev. Spec (1); Education Specialist Consultant (1); Construction Consultant (1)	S	S
ICR	08/31/2004	3	Task Team Leader (1); Sr. Education Specialist (1); as a primary author; Consultant (1)	S	S

CENTRAL INDONESIA JUNIOR SECONDARY EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 4062)

Key Project Data *(amounts in US$ million)*

	Appraisal estimate	*Actual or current estimate*	*Actual as % of appraisal estimate*
Original commitment	104	89.3	85.6
Total cancellation		14.7	
Total project cost	154.1	135.9	88.15%

Project Dates

	Original	*Actual*
Board approval		07/02/1996
Signing		08/12/1996
Effectiveness	10/16/1996	10/16/1996
Closing date	06/30/2004	06/30/2004

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	Actual/Latest Estimate	
	N° Staff weeks	*US$('000)*
Appraisal/ Negotiations	N/A	554,137
Supervision	N/A	
ICR	N/A	640,293
Total	N/A	1,194,430

Mission Data

	Date (month/year)	No. of persons	Specializations represented	Performance rating	
				Implementation Progress	Development Objective
Identification/ Preparation	5/30/1995	5	Mission Leader (1); Project Implementation Specialist (1); Consultant/Educator (1); Consultant/Economist (1); Consultant/Statistics & GIS (1)	S	S
	10/16/1995	5	Mission Leader (1); Project Implementation Specialist (1); Consultant/Economist (1); Consultant/Educator (2)	S	S
	1/17/1996	2	Mission Leader (1); Consultant/Educator (1)	S	S
Appraisal/Negotiation	4/03/1996	4	Mission Leader (1); Educator (1); Fin. Mgt. Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1)	S	S
Supervision	04/17/1997	1	Mission Leader (1)	S	S
	10/10/1997	2	Educator (1); Mission Leader (1)	S	S
	08/07/1998	3	Task Manager (1); Educator (2)	S	S
	10/11/1999	7	Task Team Leader (3); Education Specialist (1) Arch. Consultant (1); Procurement (1); Fin. Mgmt. Specialist (1)	S	S
	11/02/1999	7	Task Team Leader (3); Education Specialist (1) Arch. Consultant (1); Procurement (1); Fin. Mgmt. Specialist (1)	S	S
	11/03/2000	5	Task Manager (1); IT Specialist (1); Project Consultant (1); Fin. Mgmt Specialist (1); Project Coordinator (1)	S	S
	05/30/2001	6	TTL (1); IT Specialist (1); Consultant (1); Project Management (1); Fin Mgmt. (1); Procurement (1)	S	S
	05/30/2001	2	Quality Assurance Cons (1); Task Team Leader (1)	S	S
	04/10/2002	7	TTL (1), Sr. Edu. Specialist (1); FM Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Const. Specialist (1); Education Specialist (2); Sr. Disbursement (1)	S	S
	Several intermittent joint missions within 2003 for implementation support	6	Task Team Leader (1); DPS (1); FMS (1); Construction/ Community Dev. Spec (1); Education Specialist Consultant (1); Construction Consultant (1)	S	S
	05/07/2004	6	Task Team Leader (1); DPS (1); FMS (1); Construction/ Community Dev. Spec (1); Education Specialist Consultant (1); Construction Consultant (1)	S	S
ICR	08/31/2004	4	Task Team Leader (1); Sr. Education Specialist (2) as primary authors; Consultant (1)	S	S

SUMATRA JUNIOR SECONDARY EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 4095)

Key Project Data *(amounts in US$ million)*

	Appraisal estimate	*Actual or current estimate*	*Actual as % of appraisal estimate*
Original commitment	98	92.5	94
Total cancellations		5.5	
Total project cost	144	160.04	111

Project Dates

	Original	*Actual*
Board approval	09/17/1996	
Signing		11/07/1996
Effectiveness	10/16/1996	10/16/1996
Closing date	06/30/2002	06/30/2004
Board approval		09/17/1996

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	Actual/Latest Estimate	
	N° Staff weeks	*US$('000)*
Appraisal/ Negotiations	0.00	383,232
Supervision	62.60	328,676
ICR	1.20	
Total	63.80	711,908

Mission Data

	Date (month/year)	No. of persons	Specializations represented	Performance rating	
				Implementation Progress	Development Objective
Identification/ Preparation	5/30/1995	5	Mission Leader (1); Project Implementation Specialist (1); Consultant/Educator (1); Consultant/Economist (1); Consultant/Statistics & GIS (1)	S	S
	10/16/1995	5	Mission Leader (1); Project Implementation Specialist (1); Consultant/ Economist (1); Consultant/ Educator (2)	S	S
	1/17/1996	2	Mission Leader (1); Consultant/Educator	S	S
Appraisal/ Negotiation	4/03/1996	4	Mission Leader (1); Educator (1); Fin. Mgt. Specialist (1); Procurement Specialist (1)	S	S
Supervision	04/09/1997	2	Mission Leader (1); Educator (1)	S	S
	09/19/1997	2	Task Manager (1); Operations Officer (1)	S	S
	08/07/1998	3	Task Team Leader (1); Educator (2)	S	S
	02/18/1999	2	Task Team Leader (1); Consultant (1)	S	S
	11/04/1999	2	Operations Officer (1); Team Leader (1)	S	S
	10/13/2000	6	Task Team Leader (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Procurement Officer (1); FM Specialist (1); Construction Consultant (2)	S	S
	04/11/2002	10	EDUC. Specialist/Conslt (1); SR.EDUC. Specialist (1); TTL/Mission Leader (1); Procurement Specialist (1); Financial MGT. Spec. (1); Construction/Conslt (2); Education/Conslt (1); TTL-Loans 4042, 4062 (1); Sr. Disbursement Offic (1)	S	S
	04/11/2002	7	TTL, Education Spec. (1); Procurement Specialist (1); FM Specialist (1); Construction Specialist (3); Education Specialist (1)	S	S
Several intermittent joint missions within 2003 for implementation support	05/07/2004	6	Task Team Leader (1); FMS (1); Construc/Community Spec (1) Education Spec. Consult (1); Construction Conslt (1); Educ Specialist (1)	S	S
	05/07/2004	7	TTL, Education Special (1); Procurement Specialist (1); FM Specialist (1); Construction Specialist (3); Education Specialist (1)	S	S
ICR	08/31/2004	4	Task Team Leader (1); SR. Education Specialist (2) as Primary authors; Consultant (1)	S	S