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**Report No.: 29581**

**PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT**

**GHANA**

**PRIMARY SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT  
CR. 2508-GH**

**BASIC EDUCATION SECTOR IMPROVEMENT PROJECT  
CR. 2885-GH**

**July 1, 2004**

*Sector, Thematic and Global Evaluation  
Operations Evaluation Department*

## Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

*Currency Unit = Cedis*

1994	US\$1.00	c. 957
1995	US\$1.00	c. 1,200
1996	US\$1.00	c. 1,637
1997	US\$1.00	c. 2,050
1998	US\$1.00	c. 2,314
1999	US\$1.00	c. 2,669
2000	US\$1.00	c. 5,445
2001	US\$1.00	c. 7,171
2002	US\$1.00	c. 7,933

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

BESIP	Basic Education School Improvement Program
CEDEP	Center for the Development of People
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EdSAC	Education Sector Adjustment Credit
EdSEP	Education Sector Project
EFA	Education For All
EMIS	Education Management Information System
FCUBE	Free, compulsory universal basic education
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GES	Ghana Education Service
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IEPS	Internal Initial Executive Project Summary
MOEYS	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports
MTR	Midterm Review
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PSDP	Primary School Development Project
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
PTA	Parent-Teacher Association
QUIPS	Quality Improvement in Schools
SIF	Schooling Improvement Fund

## Fiscal Year

Government: January 1 – December 31

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**OED Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation.**

### About this Report

The Operations Evaluation Department assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, OED annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The projects, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies.

A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by OED. To prepare PPARs, OED staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country for onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader OED studies.

Each PPAR is subject to a peer review process and OED management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

### About the OED Rating System

The time-tested evaluation methods used by OED are suited to the broad range of the World Bank's work. The methods offer both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. OED evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (more information is available on the OED website: <http://worldbank.org/oed/eta-mainpage.html>).

**Relevance of Objectives:** The extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

**Efficacy:** The extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

**Efficiency:** The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. This rating is not generally applied to adjustment operations.

**Sustainability:** The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. *Possible ratings:* Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable.

**Institutional Development Impact:** The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

**Outcome:** The extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Bank Performance:** The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project). *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Borrower Performance:** The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.



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## Principal Ratings

	<i>Primary School Development</i>		<i>Basic Education Sector Improvement</i>	
	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
Outcome	Unsatisfactory	Moderately unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory
Sustainability	Uncertain	Likely	Likely	Likely
Institutional Development Impact	Modest	Modest	Modest	Modest
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

\* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible operational division of the Bank. The ICR Review is an intermediate Operations Evaluation Department (OED) product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

## Key Staff Responsible

<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
<b>Primary School Development</b>			
Appraisal	Nicholas Bennett	Ian Porter	Edwin R. Lim
Completion	Josephine Woo	Helena Ribe	Peter Harrold
<b>Basic Education Sector Improvement</b>			
Appraisal	Josephine Woo	Ian Porter	Olivier Lafourcade
Completion	Eunice Yaa Brimfah Dapaah	Alexandre Abrantes	Mats Karlsson



## Preface

This project performance assessment report (PPAR) covers two operations in Ghana:

- The **Primary School Development Project (PSDP, Credit 2508)** for SDR 46.9 million, approved on June 10, 1993. The project closed on June 30, 1997.
- The **Basic Education Sector Improvement Program (BESIP, Credit 2885)** for SDR 34.7 million approved on June 18, 1996. The project closed on December 31, 2002.

The PPAR was prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), based upon Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs), project documents, and interviews with government officials and Bank staff with experience of the projects. It also draws on the OED impact study *Books, Buildings, and Learning Outcomes: An Impact Evaluation of Bank Support to Basic Education in Ghana*, including the fieldwork for that study which took place in September 2002 and January-March 2003. The collaboration of Bank operational staff, government officials, civil society and community representatives who assisted the two missions are gratefully acknowledged.

Following standard OED procedures, the draft of this PPAR was sent to the borrower for comments before finalization, but none were received.



## Summary

The Bank's involvement in the education sector in Ghana began as support for two sector adjustment credits - EdSAC I (1986-91) and II (1990-94) - which successfully supported a restructuring of the sector, reducing the length of pre-university education from 17 to 12 years and introducing greater cost recovery for the secondary and tertiary cycles. One objective of the reforms was to expand primary education. The concept of Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) was enshrined in the 1992 constitution and became the name of the government's sector strategy.

The two projects under review were investment projects aimed at improving the quality of school infrastructure and implementing changes in school management to improve learning outcomes. The Primary School Development Project (PSDP) was an interim measure to improve quality of the most disadvantaged schools while preparations were under way for the broader sector program which became the Bank's Basic Sector Improvement Project (BESIP).

Under PSDP pavilion classroom blocks were provided to 2,178 schools and just under 1,000 others benefited from re-roofing of classrooms. Houses for head teachers were also provided. School management focused on the role of the head teacher and supervisory staff. Although the number of visits by circuit supervisors increased and head teachers adopted some changes in school practices, many policy reforms were not fully implemented. Adoption of the longer school day was poorly enforced, and community involvement in school management remained negligible. Hence the main achievement of the project was the establishment of physical infrastructure, with civil works accounting for 86 percent of the use of funds. This focus was unchanged by the restructuring at mid-term review (MTR), which added some institutional development components but also expanded the civil works, so that there was not a substantial change in budget allocations.

BESIP was intended to be the Bank's contribution to a multi-donor program of the same name, the whole of which was situated with the government's FCUBE strategy. In the event, the other major donors (the U.S. and U.K.) did not join the program but financed their own basic education activities. One third of BESIP resources were used for civil works and one third for textbooks; just under 10 percent were spent on each of teaching materials and school furniture. So, as with PSDP, improving the quality of school infrastructure and availability of materials was a main achievement of the project. BESIP had many other components, but was simplified considerably at Midterm Review (MTR) restructuring. After restructuring, efforts at institutional development focused on the Education Management Information System (EMIS). EMIS has become a valuable tool in educational planning, though local capacity for management of the system is not deep.

That both projects required restructuring at the MTR stage raises questions about design – though in both cases restructuring was informal with the objectives remaining unchanged. Both, but in particular BESIP, had too many components, including some that proved difficult to implement in the changing context. The main feature of changing context was a lack of continuity in project staff on both the government and the Bank sides, which undermined understanding of, and commitment, to the projects. Government

capacity was also weakened by having to manage a number of different donor projects. The Bank had made a genuine effort to facilitate a coordinated donor program. That it did not come off can be attributed to donor competition, with this problem being exacerbated by high-level changes in the ministry coming at just the wrong time.

The main output of the projects has been better school infrastructure. The recent OED impact study of Bank support to basic education in Ghana shows that these investments have had a discernible impact on both enrollments and student learning outcomes. But the institutional impact of the two projects has been less positive. They have not affected the central ministry – other than EMIS – and played a limited role at local level. Moreover, the projects failed to mobilize communities in support of school building. And, importantly, many hoped-for changes in the classroom, in terms of better management of teaching and improved teaching methods, have not taken place.

The main findings and lessons learned are

- Over-ambitious project design results in slow implementation, and necessitates restructuring.
- A lack of staff continuity, on the side of both the Bank and the borrower, can undermine successful project implementation.
- Donor coordination is desirable, but this fact is insufficient to ensure that it will happen. A serious degree of commitment to a sector approach is required from both government and all important donors to ensure it happens. Project design should not be based on a sector approach until there is a clear indication that such an approach will actually be adopted.
- Attempts at community mobilization failed as the approach adopted fostered an insufficient sense of ownership in the community. This experience contrasts with that in some other African countries in which social funds have successfully mobilized communities to contribute to school construction and then maintain them.
- However, community financing for school facilities can create disparities in the quality of schooling – and has already done so in Ghana. Such biases need to be offset by direct support from the government.

Gregory K. Ingram  
Director-General  
Operations Evaluation

## 1. Background

1.1 Following independence in 1957 Ghana's education system expanded and became established as one of the best in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the economic downturn that began in the 1970s adversely affected the quality of schooling and parents' willingness and ability to send children to school. Absolute enrollments in basic education began to decline in the mid-1970s.<sup>1</sup> Government spending on education dropped from 6.4 percent of GDP in 1976 to just 1.5 percent by 1984. By the early 1980s school buildings were dilapidated and it was not uncommon for classrooms to have few if any desks and only one textbook to be shared by the whole class. The system was also beset with inefficiency. Both the school year and the school day were short (resulting in a school year of 610 hours compared to the international norm of 870 hours), but pre-university education could take up to 17 years.

1.2 The education reform program embarked on in 1986 aimed to restructure the system while expanding enrollments and introducing a greater degree of cost recovery for the secondary and tertiary cycles. The program also aimed to increase efficiency by increasing the proportion of trained teachers and increasing teaching time. The Bank supported the reform program through two sectoral adjustment credits: Educational Sectoral Adjustment Credits (EdSAC) I and II.<sup>2</sup>

1.3 The restructuring took place as planned. The decline in enrollments was reversed. The funds provided by the Bank played an important part in supporting the reforms by facilitating the turnaround in school quality. This period is covered in the OED impact evaluation of Bank support to basic education in Ghana.<sup>3</sup> EdSAC resources were directed largely toward the construction of classroom blocks and the purchase of textbooks. Nonetheless, concerns remained regarding the poor quality of instruction being received. Teacher absenteeism was common and many teachers appeared poorly motivated. Very many schools still suffered from poor infrastructure. The first of the two operations being assessed in this audit, the Primary School Development Project (PSDP), was identified in this context. The rationale for the project was to provide emergency support to the neediest schools while a broader multi-donor sector program was being put in place.

1.4 Once the new structure was in place, policy for the basic sub-sector was outlined in 1996 in the strategy document "Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE)," which stated the government's commitment "to making schooling from Basic Stage 1 through 9 free and compulsory for all school-age children by the year 2005... [and] to improving the quality of the education services offered" (GoG [MoE], FCUBE, April 1996: 1). In principle, this statement did not signal any change in policy, but was one of the

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1. Basic education in Ghana covers primary (6 years) and what was middle school (4 years) and is now Junior Secondary School (JSS, 3 years).

2. PPARs for these two projects have already been prepared: EdSAC, Report No. 13575, September 1994, and EdSAC II: Report No. 19077, December 1998.

3. *Books, Buildings, and Learning Outcomes: An Impact Evaluation of Bank Support to Basic Education in Ghana*, March 2003.

periodic attempts by government to abolish unsanctioned fees, which proliferate at the local level.<sup>4</sup>

1.5 The significance of FCUBE was twofold: (1) it provided a basis for a coordinated sector program providing a framework for donor support to education;<sup>5</sup> and (2) it laid out the institutional and other measures to support the nascent decentralization program, including increased community participation in school management. At the time of preparation, FCUBE and donor support to be provided through the Basic Education Sector Investment Program (BESIP) were seen to be synonymous (the FCUBE document had been sub-titled BESIP on the cover page).

1.6 FCUBE had three costed components:

- a) Improving quality of teaching and learning, consisting of (1) the review and revision of teaching materials in line with a revised, more focused, syllabus; (2) new measures on teacher incentives, including teacher prizes and teacher housing in rural areas; and (3) a shift to in-service teacher training using distance learning materials. The total cost of these three sub-components was US\$ 125.4 million.
- b) Strengthening management at both central and district level (US\$ 112.8 million).
- c) Improving access and participation through, *inter alia*, school construction and rehabilitation and pilot scholarship schemes to encourage girls' participation at primary level (US\$ 33.7 million).

In addition to the above, measures were to be undertaken to ensure the financial sustainability of the education sector.

1.7 The Basic Education Sector Investment Program was the donor support to the FCUBE policy. The FCUBE document gave a budget for FCUBE as a whole of US\$1,351 million for the period 1996-2000, showing a financing gap against existing resources of US\$241.6 million. This gap was to be filled by development partners, with the Bank taking US\$50 million. The Bank's BESIP was thus intended to be a contribution to a broader multi-donor program. However, as documented below, donor support did not materialize in this form.

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4. Primary school fees were first abolished on January 1, 1952. The Education Act of 1961 confirmed this position (though materials could be charged for) and made primary schooling compulsory, though the government at the time acknowledged this was not practical in all locations.

5. FCUBE covered only basic education, so it was a sub-sector strategy rather than sector strategy. However, since donors were most concerned to support basic education, this fact should not have been an impediment to adopting a sector approach.

## 2. Project activities, outputs and outcomes

### Primary School Development Project

2.1 PSDP was initially called the Primary School Instructional Time Project, illustrating the intended focus on a major perceived constraint on learning outcomes. This title was dropped as it was deemed too narrow, as the project contained components not directly related to learning time. However, moving away from the continued low learning time in basic schools in Ghana (see paragraph 1.1 above) remained an important part of the project, being contained in the specific objective.

2.2 The overall objective of PSDP was to increase learning achievements and enrollments in primary schools throughout the country. In order to accomplish this, the project had the specific objective of increasing the amount and improving the quality of instructional and learning time in primary schools, particularly as far as 1,983 of the least well endowed primary schools are concerned which were to be the direct beneficiaries of the physical infrastructure component.

2.3 Two main areas of activity were identified:

- Policy and management changes: (1) increased instructional time, (2) reduced student fees and levies, (3) improved skills and motivation of head teachers, (4) community involvement in selection of head teachers, (5) orientation of district officials and community leaders, (6) support to school supervision, and (7) school mapping.
- Investment in physical infrastructure: (1) construction of classrooms, (2) construction of head teachers' housing, (3) provision of roofing sheets for schools. Communities were to be responsible for building the external walls ("cladding") for pavilions constructed by the project.

Physical infrastructure was planned to consume 78 percent of the project budget (Table 2.1).

**Table 2.1: Allocation of resources under PSDP**

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>		<i>Actual costs</i>	
	<i>US\$ millions</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>US\$ millions</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Civil works	55.6	76.9	46.2	81.7
School pavilions	38.6	52.7	35.7	63.1
Head teachers houses	17.0	23.2	10.5	18.6
Roofing materials	0.5	0.7	2.3	4.1
Vehicles and office equipment	0.2	0.3	0.9	1.6
Technical assistance and studies	3.1	4.2	4.1	7.2
Local training and training materials	1.8	2.5	2.1	3.7
Incremental operating costs	1.1	1.5	0.7	1.2
Duties and taxes	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.5
Unallocated	10.7	14.6	0	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>73.3</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>56.6</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: ICR Table 7A p. 19

2.4 An initial list of over 3,500 potential schools that might be supported by the project was identified through discussions with District Education Officers, Circuit Monitoring Assistants, and other officials. All 3,532 of these schools were surveyed in February 1993. Of the 3,532 schools, 1,300 had primary enrollments of less than 100 pupils, and were excluded from the project on the grounds that they may be closed following a rationalization exercise. It was also decided that any school that already had six good classrooms (or rooms that could be made into good classrooms with the provision of roofing sheets) would not be provided with pavilions. From the data collected it was thought that in many cases existing classrooms could be turned into effective teaching spaces by providing roofing sheets. Following this exercise, it was decided that improved physical infrastructure, comprising head teacher housing and new or rehabilitated classroom blocks, were planned to be provided to 1,983 schools.

2.5 The number of schools covered by the project was later increased (at the mid-term review, MTR) from 1,983 to 2,178 in response to pressure from Ministers of Parliament. In 1994 there were 11,218 public primary schools in Ghana, so that the project reached nearly one in five of these schools. The scale of the project was thus substantial and reached across the whole country. The targeting mechanism used, identifying the neediest schools, was also a sound one and preferable to geographical targeting since there is a high degree of intra-district variation in school quality.

2.6 Civil works and roofing sheets accounted for 86 percent of PSDP funds (Table 2.1). Close to two thirds was used for the construction of 3,727 school pavilions (Table 2.2), which was 708 more than planned in the appraisal report on account of the increased number of schools covered by the project and the decision to construct new pavilions after all in some cases where re-roofing had been planned. The target for head teacher housing was also exceeded – 2,178 rather than the planned 1,983, corresponding precisely to the increased number of schools. However, cladding fell short since some communities were not in a position to do this. Unclad pavilions are an improvement over the previous community-built structures<sup>6</sup> but suffer from problems of disruption by noise both externally and from the next classroom and cannot be used during heavy rain. The OED impact study showed that these features of school quality have a significant impact on learning outcomes.

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6. In rural areas community-constructed facilities are either mud walls and thatch or wooden pavilions, both of which are liable to collapse in severe weather.

**Table 2.2: PSDP outputs: planned and actual**

	<i>Units</i>	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>	
			<i>Amount</i>	<i>As % of planned</i>
Training program				
General orientation training for				
	Participants	600	787	131
	Participants	6,000	5,949	99
	Participants	500	503	101
	Participants	2,000	2,619	131
	Participants	350	749	214
Construction program				
	Classroom block	3,019	3,727	123
	Classroom block	3,659	2,908	79
	Houses	1,983	2,178	110
	Classrooms	1,546	999	65
Materials				
	Copies	3,000	3,000	100
	Copies	2,500	2,500	100

Source: PSDP ICR: p. 17

2.7 In return for the accommodation, the head teacher was to sign an agreement with the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) and District Education Oversight Committee committing to holding meetings out of school time, providing teacher training, attending training, and improving school-community relations. The communities were to sign contracts to clad the pavilion within six months of completion. However, as noted above, despite the attention paid to the issue in the SAR, the project failed to mobilize a significant proportion of the beneficiary communities. This issue is discussed in the next section.

2.8 The project was restructured at the Midterm Review (MTR) in December 1995 to better support the FCUBE, incorporating the Education Management Information System (EMIS), provision of teaching materials, a Schooling Improvement Fund (SIF), and an information, education, communication program. These changes made little difference to the allocation of funds. An unallocated amount of \$US10.7 million in the original budget was able to absorb the expanded civil works program and the, relatively small, additional amounts for technical assistance, studies and teaching/training materials (Table 2.1).

2.9 While components may be important even if they do not have much money spent on them, the ICR rated the project as unsatisfactory noting that many required reforms had been only partially implemented. For example, schools did not provide the required length of instructional time, community involvement was negligible other than in some SIF schools, and there was little impact from orientation and training of officials, community leaders, and teachers. As described below, EMIS has proved important in time, having received further support under BESIP. However, PSDP's main achievement was the provision of physical infrastructure.

2.10 OED's impact study of Bank support to basic education in Ghana casts some new light on this finding. That study showed the clear positive effects that improvements in school

infrastructure have had on both enrollments and learning outcomes. While it remains the case that the process aspects of the project were largely unsatisfactory, PSDP did have a positive impact on the main educational outputs of student attainment and achievement.

### **Basic Education Sector Improvement Program (BESIP)**

2.11 The objectives for BESIP mirrored exactly the planned components of FCUBE (paragraph 1.6 above). Helping the Government of Ghana to implement FCUBE was given as the project's objective, specifically: (a) improve the teaching process and learning outcomes; (b) strengthen management of the basic education system through better planning, monitoring and evaluation by MOE/GES at central, regional and district levels, and by promoting active involvement of communities in the management of schools; (c) improve access to basic education, especially of girls, the poor and other disadvantaged segments of the population; and (d) ensure financial sustainability of the Government program for basic education over the longer term.

2.12 BESIP was strongly embedded in FCUBE, which was meant to provide the basis for a sector approach. From the Bank's side, project documents indicate that it had always been intended that its credit should be part of coordinated sector program with other donors and referred to co-financing from USAID, UK ODA, UNICEF, and KfW. The aide-memoire following the preparation mission listed these same donors. The government also appeared to subscribe to the sector approach.

2.13 However, this identification of the Bank's support with the broader donor program, also referred to as BESIP, resulted in some ambiguity as to what the Bank would actually be funding. The SAR for BESIP identified "betterment activities" in FCUBE with a budget for \$241.6 million which were intended to be covered by BESIP, with \$50 million coming from the Bank. However, the financing plan for the project showed donors to be financing a slice of the total FCUBE budget of \$1,351.2 million, without explicitly identifying exactly what donors would be paying for. There was thus a lack of clarity as to the intended use of the Bank's US\$50 million contribution to BESIP.

2.14 In the event, most BESIP funding went for civil works and textbook supply. This is despite the fact that the BESIP SAR stated that "despite increased resource inputs and enrollments, the reform movement has had very limited success so far in improving the quality of teaching and learning outcomes" (p.5) so that "more attention has to be paid to software" (SAR: 14).<sup>7</sup> The Bank's focus on hardware and instructional materials was especially pronounced following the MTR in April 1999, when the project was restructured to focus on three components: (1) civil works, (2) textbook supply, and (3) EMIS. As a result, the allocation to civil works and goods increased by about \$19 million, giving rise to the large share devoted to hardware and materials in project expenses: \$15.4 million of the total budget of \$47.9 were spent on civil works and a further \$25.8 million on goods (presumably mostly textbooks and furniture, though also including vehicles and other

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7. Textbook supply can improve learning outcomes both through improving the quality of textbooks and providing the books themselves. Although the Bank supported curriculum development under BESIC, textbooks for this new curriculum were not developed within the lifetime of the project. The books distributed were ones that already existed.

equipment). Approximately one third was spent on school building and rehabilitation, just over another third on textbook supply and just under 10 percent on school furniture (Table 2.3): in total 77 percent of the project budget was spent on hardware and materials inputs. Just over five percent was used for training and training materials, and the remainder on unspecified other expenses, which include support to the project implementation unit and EMIS-related activities. The table shows actual spending only since, as explained above, the appraisal document did not explicitly identify the intended use of the Bank's resources under BESIP.

*Assessment by objective*

**2.15 Improve the teaching process and learning outcomes:** The main impetus for better learning outcomes has come from the provision of close to 35 million textbooks financed by the project. There has been less progress with respect to teacher training, and hence the teaching process. The GSS/OED survey data collected for the OED impact evaluation show that less than 5 percent of basic schoolteachers receive in-service training on a regular basis. In-service training is a focus in the government's new strategy. To be successful there must be proper understanding of the very limited success of efforts to date. This appears to be an area in which more could usefully be learned.

**Table 2.3: Allocation of BESIP resources**

	<i>US\$</i>	<i>Percent</i>
School building and rehabilitation	16.3	34.2
Training materials	1.3	2.7
Training	1.3	2.7
Teaching materials	2.0	4.3
School furniture	4.2	8.9
Textbook supply	16.4	34.3
Other expenses	6.2	13.0
Total	47.8	100.0

**2.16 Strengthen management of the basic education system through better planning, monitoring and evaluation by MOE/GES at central, regional and district levels, and by promoting active involvement of communities in the management of schools:** At the central level efforts have focused on EMIS, which is discussed below. At local government level there has been progress with respect to decentralization, but the Bank's involvement with this has been somewhat limited. The Local Government Acts of 1988 and 1993 shifted responsibility for the administration of education to the districts, and the 1995 Ghana Education Service Act created District Education Oversight Committees as well as community-level School Management Committees (SMCs). Whereas PTAs had been expected to play a largely revenue-raising function, the SMCs were to act like school boards, which already existed at secondary level. Annual School Performance Assessment Meetings were to be key events at which the SMC, teachers, the rest of the community could meet together. Armed with data from the most recent Performance Monitoring Test, which ranks each school in the district based on test results, SMCs are to prepare a plan to improve school performance. The project supported improved management efficiency through the enhanced role of circuit supervisors and expanded role of districts in civil works. However, these components were reduced at the Midterm Review (MTR) restructuring, partly in consideration of district-level capacity-building efforts that had been launched by DFID.

**2.17 Improve access to basic education, especially of girls, the poor and other disadvantaged segments of the population:** The project's main achievements were improved

access through classroom rehabilitation and equipment, as well as better learning outcomes from both infrastructure improvements and textbook supplies. Whilst the project's objectives also referred to increasing access for girls and the disadvantaged neither group was explicitly targeted. Yet it is girls and the disadvantaged who are disproportionately absent from school. Hence rising enrolments will more than proportionately benefit these groups. Analysis of enrolment data for the OED impact study showed a convergence of female primary enrolment toward the male enrolment rate, and that enrolment growth has been most rapid amongst the lowest income groups.

2.18 Ensure financial sustainability of the Government program for basic education over the longer term: No specific activities were carried out under the project in relation to this objective. Throughout the period the government has paid teachers' salaries and continues to do so. But financial support for many school supplies and furniture will continue to depend on donors and communities for the foreseeable future. This state of affairs is not uncommon in Africa and it not generally taken as an indication of a lack of sustainability.

2.19 Overall, despite the shift in the project's focus, the objective of promoting learning outcomes was still met. Classroom construction and rehabilitation contributed to higher enrolments and better learning outcomes. Although activities oriented toward improving classroom practice were cut back, the project financed 35 million textbooks, which played an important part in improving the quality of instruction.

#### *Development and use of the Education Management Information System (EMIS)*

2.20 EMIS data have been used in several ways for sectoral policy and resource allocation. Both the government's new sector strategy finalized in late 2003 and Ghana's proposal for the EFA Fast Track Initiative made heavy use of EMIS data. The Bank's new EdSEP project will target resources to the 40 districts with the most deprived schools.<sup>8</sup> The targeted districts were identified using EMIS data based on a ranking of an index calculated from 11 indicators in EMIS. EMIS will also be used to track improvements in school quality. After two years, a new ranking will be made to re-identify the 40 target districts. Government's own spending allocation of educational resources will also utilize EMIS data, including an additional flat payment to these same 40 districts. It is also planned to use EMIS data in the allocation of teachers, school furniture, and textbooks. These are positive achievements. However, there are shortcomings with respect to local capacity to manage the system. Staff of the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports can now manage data collection and entry. But ability at data management and analysis, and management of the software itself, is more limited.

2.21 The contribution of EMIS is a major direct way in which the Bank's support has facilitated Ghana's proposal to be included for the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) of the Education for All (EFA) initiative.<sup>9</sup> Without EMIS Ghana could not have prepared the necessary documentation for a sound plan to achieve EFA, as required by the FTI. The

8. PAD, Education Sector Project, February 2004, Report No. 26090 GH.

9. EFA is an international initiative supported by several major international organizations, including the Bank (<http://www.unesco.org/education/efa/index.shtml>).

projects also supported Ghana's inclusion in the FTI in other ways. First, the books and learning materials provided have, as shown in the OED impact evaluation, contributed to increased enrolments and better learning outcomes. These improved educational outputs have helped give Ghana sufficient progress in basic education to warrant potential inclusion in the FTI. Second, the experience at attempting donor coordination laid a firmer basis for it actually taking place over the last year, enabling the sector program to materialize. Finally, the government's FTI submission lays great stress on school rehabilitation, confirming the relevance of the substantive focus of these two projects.

### **3. Implementation Issues**



#### **Disbursement Lags and Restructuring**

3.1 The disbursement profile for PSDP (Figure 3.1a) shows disbursements to have been only 20 percent of the planned amount in the first year of the project and 40 percent in the second. The profile seems to fit the picture of a "problem project" that only attained a higher rate of disbursements following restructuring at MTR.<sup>10</sup> But the disbursement profile is misleading in this case. About \$12 million of PSDP civil works activities were charged to EdSAC II in order to use the balance of that credit. This \$12 million was cancelled from PSDP, which explains how the project's physical targets were exceeded while the budget for civil works was under-spent. Allowing for these \$12 million in the first two years of the project gives a much healthier picture of disbursements in those years.<sup>11</sup>

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10. The disbursement profiles show the tendency of MTRs to take place about one-third through the life of the project. This happens because of project extensions. For example, PSDP began in January 1994, and was intended to close December 1997, so the MTR took place in December 1995, i.e. two years into a four year project. In the event the project closed one year late with the final disbursement taking place in May 1999.

11. Supervision reports confirm this more positive picture. The main delay noted was one of six months in appointing a project manager, but by the end of 1994 good progress was being made with respect to construction (though less so with the other project components).

**Figure 3.1: Disbursement profiles****(a) PSDP (millions SDRs)****(b) BESIP (millions SDRs)**

3.2 The BESIP profile is similar to that for PSDP: slow initial disbursements which accelerate following restructuring at MTR. In this case the characterization of a problem project cured by restructuring is a correct one. BESIP had many components (on one reckoning there were 97 separate components in the project), which proved impossible to manage and resulted in slow disbursement. As outlined above, following the MTR in April 1999 it was decided to focus on just three activities, allowing much more rapid disbursement.

### Project Design and Implementation

3.3 Both projects were restructured at the Midterm Review, suggesting either changing circumstances or poor initial design. Both factors come into play. Two sets of circumstances were changing. Following the design of PSDP, the FCUBE document was completed; so there may have been some need to “bring the project into line,” which is the reason the ICR gives for restructuring. But this argument appears overstated as there was little if anything in the original project design not compatible with the objectives of FCUBE. The second changing circumstance was a combination of declining motivation in the ministry and changes in Bank personnel. The period of reforms covered by EdSAC I and II (1986-94) was one of remarkable continuity in Bank staff, notably the education specialist resident in Accra, and in the higher levels of the ministry, notably the deputy minister responsible for the reforms. A close working relationship had emerged which facilitated implementation, including ensuring that resources were used in a reasonably timely manner. The later period, since the mid-90s, was characterized by a rapid turnover of both task managers from the side of the Bank and high-level staff, including ministers, on the side of the government. The relationship became more strained as a result of these frequent changes, with the lack of continuity undermining understanding of the projects and commitment to them. Under such

circumstances it is only feasible to implement a small number of well-defined components. Institutional development activities, especially of a general nature, and policy-related work are unlikely to meet with much success in these conditions.

3.4 But even in the best of circumstances a strong case can certainly be made that BESIP was over-designed with too many components. This problem arose in part from the fact that it was meant to be a multi-donor program in which, in the end, only the Bank took part. But even the activities intended to be carried out with Bank support were too many. The changes at MTR were to some extent “rationalization,” cutting back where other donors had stepped in (e.g., DFID was training district-level officials, so the Bank scaled that back), but also a necessary response to the fact that many components would not be able to use the funds.

### **The Failure of Donor Co-ordination**

3.5 Although there was already a donor co-ordination group in the mid-1990s the planned sector program failed to materialize. In the event, BESIP was financed by only the Bank with other donors having their own projects. Having been at the forefront of donor co-ordination in the early 1990s,<sup>12</sup> Ghana has had no education sector program in recent years, although the sector strategy which has been prepared during 2003 appears to be providing the basis for a more coordinated approach in the coming years. Rather, it has had three large donors (World Bank, U.S., and U.K.) with remarkably similar projects under different management systems with an undoubted increase in transaction costs for government.<sup>13</sup> How did this situation arise when the structure appeared to be in place for a sector program?

3.6 The sector approach largely foundered on donor competition, despite the efforts of the Bank to encourage a government-led process. In July 1994, the Bank’s education specialist in Accra wrote to the Minister of Education referring to discussions they had had on developing a new approach to donor financing of basic education in Ghana and proposing that the government invite donors to preliminary assessment of the sector later that month. The letter emphasized the importance of Government being seen to be firmly in charge of developing the comprehensive basic education program. The letter went on to suggest a Ghanaian-led analysis to develop strategy with a meeting in November to get donors on board. Initially it seemed as though a sector approach would be adopted. The appraisal mission for BESIP included staff from UK ODA (now DFID), USAID, and UNICEF. But, whereas in 1987 other donors had no experience in education in Ghana and were willing to follow the Bank’s lead, this was not the case nine years later. The crucial episode appears to have been a workshop in London (supported by UK ODA) to develop a sector strategy. This meeting took place despite the fact that a strategy already existed

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12. EdSAC I was co-financed by several donors and so, given the context of a government-led reform program, effectively a sector program before the term came into usage.

13. The midterm review for QÜIPS states, “donor co-ordination under the FCUBE has been characterized as fragmented and lacking collective consultation on strategic plans and financing... between donors there has been little regular sharing or coordination of the key elements of their programs” (Bonner *et al.*: 11) and “the lack of coordination of donor activities at the district level is negatively affecting DEO operations and attitudes” (*ibid*: 48).

(FCUBE) and that no other donors were invited to the meeting.<sup>14</sup> From this time onward first DFID and then USAID went their own way with programs to finance basic education. Only within the past year, with the new government strategy providing a basis, is a stronger degree of donor coordination emerging.

3.7 A further contribution to the failure of the sector program was made by changes in the Ministry of Education. The minister at the time of the preparation of BESIP was committed to a coordinated approach within FCUBE and played a strong role in providing government leadership. However, he departed the ministry at a critical time and his successor did not push through in bringing donors together under BESIP, certainly not resisting pressures for separate donor activities. Indeed, it was government that asked USAID to finance three model schools per district, the basis of USAID's Quality Improvement in Schools project, although this activity did not fall within the BESIP framework.

### **Community Involvement**

3.8 PSDP had a poor performance at mobilizing communities, which were expected to provide cladding for the pavilions provided by the project. A partial exception was the School Improvement Fund, which financed community-based proposals for school improvements. The program was started as a pilot in three districts following the MTR for PSDP, and planned to be scaled-up to national level under BESIP. In fact the scaling up did not take place and this component was cancelled at the BESIP Midterm Review. BESIP supported greater community involvement in school management, but data collected by OED show fairly limited involvement by most community members in School Performance Assessment Meetings.

3.9 The difficulties of community mobilization were noted in the appraisal report for PSDP. The report noted that Ghana had a tradition of community construction activities in the 1960s which fell into abeyance at the end of the first republic. There were attempts to revive it under the Program of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), which provided support to Community Initiative Projects which included schools. The appraisal report suggested four lessons need be learned from the experience with these community projects: (1) approval and payment process should not be centralized, (2) delays in payments to communities often destroy the motivation of the communities, (3) all projects should be designed to be completed quickly, and (4) only very limited cash involvement from most communities can be expected. However, these lessons seem not to have been fully carried across to project design. The Midterm Review prepared by the Project Management Unit found that only 48 out of 276 pavilions had been clad, a major reason being given that districts were still waiting for the buildings to be "handed over."

3.10 The pilot of SIF under PSDP was operated by an NGO, CEDEP. CEDEP staff say that they did more actual implementation than had been expected. The reason they gave for

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14. Source: interview with DFID education advisor based in Accra at the time. The incident is also reported in DFID's *Development Effectiveness Report*, which notes that both heavy DFID involvement in drawing up the strategy and the bilateral nature of the meeting undermined the sector-wide approach (DFID, 2002, p.26 Box 5).

this was that they were under pressure to meet targets, hence they became heavily involved in implementation at the expense of focusing on community participation.<sup>15</sup>

3.11 This poor showing regarding community mobilization, which was a function of the project design, contrasts with the success of social funds in mobilizing communities in support of school construction elsewhere in Africa, such as Malawi and Zambia. Under PSDP the schools were constructed by an external contractor in a “top down” manner, with the communities then told it was “their school” and they should take care of it. In social funds the initiative comes from the community, they provide building materials upfront and are involved in hiring and monitoring the contractor for supervision. The greater sense of ownership given by this approach has resulted in the construction of many thousand school buildings which are maintained by their communities. These social funds use local government official in a supervisory capacity.

3.12 In retrospect, Ghana was perhaps unfortunate in having one of the very first social funds, which used a model very different from that applied in the “third-generation” social funds operating today.<sup>16</sup> OED’s review of social funds<sup>17</sup> suggests reasons why Ghana’s was relatively unsuccessful: (1) the process should be decentralized with local personnel, preferably existing district officials, playing a supervisory role, (2) proposals come directly from communities rather than being mediated through NGOs (or local government, which can facilitate, but not prepare, proposals), (3) traditional structures of authority (chiefs and headman) should be part of the process since they have the legitimacy to mobilize community labor, (4) rural communities can contribute in kind but not in cash, and (5) clear technical guidelines, backed up by training support if necessary are required. It may also be the case that the process is perhaps best not handled centrally by a line ministry but by a dedicated agency, as has been the case for social funds. The success of community action elsewhere suggests that there was potential in the SIF that was not realized.

3.13 However, there is also a danger inherent in community-based resourcing of educational provision, which is that such mechanisms result in poorer communities having less-good schools. This tendency was noted some years ago in a report entitled *A Tale of Two Ghanas*,<sup>18</sup> and confirmed by OED’s own analysis for the impact evaluation of support to basic education. The expenditure targeting in both government’s own expenditure and the Bank’s new EdSEP project toward the 40 districts with the least well provisioned schools, noted above, is therefore to be welcomed. However, the OED study found that there is considerable variation within districts,<sup>19</sup> so that geographical targeting of the type proposed

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15. Ann Condy, 1998. “Improving the quality of teaching and learning through community participation: achievements, limitations and risks. Early lessons from the schooling improvement fund in Ghana.” *Social Development Working Paper*, Social Development Division, DFID, London.

16. It is also unusual that PAMSCAD closed after the intended period of operations. Virtually all other social funds have had their lives extended. Had this happened to PAMSCAD it may have transformed into a decentralized based fund.

17. *Social Funds: A Review*, see also *Designing Social Funds: Key Questions and Options*, OED, 2004.

18. Kraft, Richard, B.K. Adipah, J.M. Dzinyela, K. Anku, K. Gala, F. Godwyll, E. Goody, L. Larcom and B. Okyere (1995) *A Tale of Two Ghanas: The View from the Classroom*, Accra: MOE/USAID.

19. Formerly speaking, an analysis of variance using various measures of school quality showed greater variation within than between geographical areas. Impressions from the field confirm this, with dramatic discrepancies in the quality of public school facilities within distances of less than one mile.

is prone to quite large errors of both types: Type I, that deprived schools are missed (all deprived schools in the other 70 districts will not be helped) and Type II, that non-deprived schools will be helped (there is a danger that it is the least deprived schools in the 40 districts will be most successful in obtaining funds; safeguards can and should be put in place to prevent this from happening).

## 4. Ratings

4.1 This section rates the projects according to the OED criteria of relevance, efficacy, efficiency, sustainability, institutional development impact, and outcome, as well as Bank and borrower performance. These ratings are summarized in Table 4.1 below.

**Table 4.1: Performance ratings**

	PSDP		BESIP	
	OED	ICR	OED	ICR
Relevance	High	n.a.	High	n.a.
Efficacy	Substantial	n.a.	Substantial	n.a.
Efficiency	Modest	n.a.	Modest	n.a.
Sustainability	Likely	Likely	Likely	Likely
ID Impact	Modest	Modest	Modest	Modest
Outcome	Moderately unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Bank performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

4.2 **Relevance:** Both projects score highly on relevance. In 1986 Ghana embarked on an ambitious program of educational reform combined with a commitment to expand primary enrollments. This commitment was backed up by putting free, compulsory universal basic education (FCUBE) in the new 1992 constitution. FCUBE became the name of government's strategy for the sector. A more general context was given by the document *Ghana: Vision 2020*, which outlined a national development strategy for the coming decades.<sup>20</sup> Its goals are accelerated economic growth, improved quality of life for all Ghanaians, and reduced poverty. *Vision 2020* places emphasis on the role of the education sector in the skills development required for growth, and the Ministry of Education's strategy is said to be rooted in *Vision 2020*.<sup>21</sup> Both projects were strongly aligned with the ministry's strategies, which in turn reflect national priorities.

4.3 **Efficacy:** Both projects produced physical outputs as planned. The performance with respect to other outputs was rather more patchy. Under PSDP, planned reforms did not take

20. The strategy was prepared over the period 1991-94, although it only became known as *Vision 2020* in 1996.

21. "The Ministry of Education's vision for the future is patterned on the educational element of Ghana's long-term development plan, known as *Vision 2020*. At the basic level, it is embodied in the program for Free, Compulsory, Universal, Basic Education." MoE website: <http://www.ghana.edu.gh/prospects/vision.html>

place and community involvement in school management remained weak. The start of EMIS, which has been strengthened under BESIP is a partial exception to this point. As noted above, the scale of support to school building (PSDP) and textbook supply (BESIP) has been quantitatively very significant, allowing for a “substantial” rating for efficacy.

4.4 Efficiency: Although outputs have been produced, other activities were not implemented, meaning that not all expected benefits will be realized. Efficiency is thus rated as modest.

4.5 Sustainability: Three aspects of sustainability are assessed (technical, financial and institutional) and may vary between the various components of the project. The main points are:

- a) The technical aspects of the main activities supported by the projects appear sound. Few technical problems were noted with the construction of civil works and these are still being used.
- b) Financially the education sector continues to depend on donor finance for many key activities, mostly covering development costs. However, the importance of a functioning education system in which the government assumes responsibility for salaries at existing and new schools should not be under-estimated. This combination of local financing for recurrent expenditures and donor financing for most investment and some recurrent obligations ensures the financial sustainability of the activities supported by the projects. The reliance on external finance for the functioning of the education system is common in Africa, and not taken as an indication of a lack of sustainability.
- c) ID activities have been the weakest components of the projects. Even in areas of success – notably EMIS – questions can be raised as to the technical ability of the MOEYS staff to truly manage the system. Another exception was the Project Management Unit in the Ministry, established during EdSAC and which became responsible for implementation of all donor projects. This unit oversaw the construction of the school pavilions. But its establishment predates the projects under review in this report. Finally, the OED report points to the improved distribution of school materials such as textbooks and chalk. Decentralization has helped improve distribution. The Bank has provided some training to local government, but largely stepped aside from this once DFID became more involved in the same activity.

4.6 In accordance with the comments above regarding institutional development, ID impact is rated as modest for both projects.

4.7 Bank and borrower performance: There were strengths and weaknesses to both Bank and borrower performance for each of the two projects. Both accepted over-designed projects that needed restructuring and both allowed frequent changes in leadership to undermine implementation. Despite these shortcomings, substantial achievements were made under both projects. For these reasons a rating of moderately satisfactory appears appropriate, but is not provided for under the four-point scale. Hence the Bank is rated as

satisfactory under both projects as is the borrower for BESIP. However, borrower performance under PSDP is rated as unsatisfactory owing to the failure to implement key reforms, notably the longer school day, that were central to the project.

## 5. Findings and Lessons

5.1 The findings of this review imply a number of lessons. Some of these lessons are common ones applying to projects in all sectors. But they are nonetheless true and bear repeating.

- Both projects, but especially BESIP, suffered from an over-ambitious project design being heavily laden with too many components. This problem was exacerbated in the later period by reduced capacity in the ministry linked to personnel changes. The lesson here is the common one of keeping project design realistic given the capacity of the implementing agency. The design should not be over-burdened with too many components.
- Frequent changes in Bank staff (and on the government side) meant there was little continuity undermining commitment to, and understanding of, the projects. Both Bank and borrowers need to appreciate the contribution that continuity of project management can make to satisfactory implementation and outcomes.
- Donor coordination is desirable, but this fact is insufficient to ensure that it will happen.
- This point has implications for adopting a sector approach: a serious degree of commitment to a sector approach is required from both government and donors to ensure it happens. If the Bank pushes the approach too much it may end up being the only donor in the program. The lesson for the Bank may appear to be to be sure of the seriousness of the commitment of other donors before proceeding with a project design based on a sector approach. In this case it might be argued that other donors did appear serious. Hence it might be argued that a multi-donor design should only be put forward once there are concrete commitments from other donors.
- In both cases good choices were made in project restructuring which “saved” the projects to a considerable extent. Both projects disbursed most their funds,<sup>22</sup> and both exceeded their main physical targets. The lesson is that restructuring should always be on the agenda at MTR, or before, for poorly performing projects.
- The failure of community mobilization to clad schools contrasts with the success of social funds elsewhere in Africa where communities have contributed to school construction and become actively involved in maintenance and management. The

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22. As explained in the text, the shortfall in PSDP expenditure occurred since financing for some of the early civil works under the project was charged to EdSAC II instead. The \$5 million shortfall for BESIP was the result of exchange rate fluctuations.

conditions in Ghana – the traditional social structures in rural areas and decentralization - provide a favorable context for third-generation social fund-style, although an agency other than the Ministry of Education may be better placed to manage it.

- Community financing for school facilities brings with it the danger of creating disparities in the quality of schooling. Direct support from the center can overcome this bias. Recent initiatives in this direction are welcomed. However, both theory and evidence from elsewhere show that the approach taken, i.e. broad geographical targeting, is prone to substantial Type I and II targeting errors. The latter can be avoided by safeguards for the within district allocation of funds.

## Annex A. Basic Data Sheet

### PRIMARY SCHOOL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 2508-GH)

#### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	Appraisal estimate	Actual or current estimate	Actual as % of appraisal estimate
Total project costs	73.3	56.6	77%
Loan amount	65.1	53.2	82%
Cofinancing	0.0	0.0	n.a.
Cancellation		11.9	

#### Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	FY94	FY95	FY96	FY97	FY98	FY99
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	12.8	36.6	54.8	64.1	65.1	n.a.
Actual (US\$M)	2.5	11.7	32.0	47.2	53.1	53.2
Actual as % of appraisal	5%	22%	60%	89%	99%	100%

Date of final disbursement: June 18, 1999

#### Project Dates

	Original	Actual
Initiating memorandum	n.a.	
Negotiations	n.a.	April 26, 1993
Board approval	n.a.	June 10, 1993
Signing	n.a.	July 26, 1993
Effectiveness	July 1993	January 21, 1994
Closing date	December 31, 1997	December 31, 1998

#### Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	Total
Preappraisal	17.2
Appraisal	10.1
Negotiations	19.2
Supervision	244.8
Completion	8.0
Total	321.3

## Mission Data

	Date (month/year)	No. of persons	Staff days in field	Specializations represented	Performance rating		Types of problems
					IP	DO	
Identification/ Preparation							
Appraisal							
Supervision 1	08/93	3		OA; PP; PO	2	1	None recorded
Supervision 2	08/94	3	12	PO; ES; PP	2	2	None recorded
Supervision 3	11/94	3	12	PO; ES; PP	2	2	None recorded
Supervision 4	03/95	3	13	SOO; PO; HRE	2	2	None recorded
Supervision 5	06/96	4	10	SOO; PO; HRE; PS	2	2	None recorded
Supervision 6	06/97	7	10	ES; A; SPO; TTS; PO; HRE; PS	2	2	None recorded
Supervision 7	11/97	4		TM; PO; HRE; ES	2	2	None recorded
Supervision 8	4/98	4	6	TM; ES; PO; FA	2	2	None recorded
Supervision 9	9/98	4	8	PO(2); ES; FA	2	2	None recorded
Completion	9/98	5	3	LSE; TM; PO; ES; FA	2	3	None recorded

**Specializations:** ES: Education Specialist; FA: Financial Analyst; HRE: Human Resource Economist; LSE: Lead Specialist education; OA: Operations Analyst; PO: Project Officer; PP: Principal Planner; PS: Procurement Specialist; SOO: Snr. Operations Officer; SPO: Snr. Project Officer; TM: Task Manager (Project Officer); TTS: Teacher Training Specialist; (2): Two people with the same specialization

**Performance Rating:** IP: Implementation status; DO: development objectives; 1: Highly satisfactory; 2: Satisfactory; 3: Unsatisfactory; 4: Highly Unsatisfactory.

## BASIC EDUCATION SECTOR IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 2885-GH)

### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	241.6	47.5	19.7
Loan amount	50.0	45.0	90.0
Cofinancing (including government)	191.6	2.5	1.3
Cancellation		0.0	

#### Institutional performance

Notes: The appraisal estimate includes donor cofinancing which did not materialize. Actual disbursements were less than estimated owing to appreciation of the SDR/US\$ exchange rate, there was no cancellation.

### Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	<i>FY97</i>	<i>FY98</i>	<i>FY99</i>	<i>FY00</i>	<i>FY01</i>	<i>FY02</i>	<i>FY03</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	2.5	14.2	27.5	42.3	50.1	50.1	50.1
Actual (US\$M)	1.1	2.7	3.9	16.4	27.0	37.8	45.1
Actual as % of appraisal	44.0	19.0	14.2	38.8	53.9	75.4	90.0

Date of final disbursement: June 12, 2003

### Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
PCD		06/14/1995
Board approval		06/18/1996
Effectiveness	10/11/1996	10/11/1996
Closing date	06/30/2001	12/31/2002

### Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	<i>Total</i>
Preappraisal	28
Appraisal and negotiations	128
Supervision	278
Completion	10
Total	436

## Mission Data

	Date (month/year)	No. of persons	Staff days in field	Specializations represented	Performance rating	
					IP	DO
Identification/ Preparation	06/95					
Appraisal	02/96					
Supervision 1	02/97	6	n.a.	TM; PO(3); EC; CON	S	S
Supervision 2	05/97	7	n.a.	PO(2); FA; PS; HRE; ES; FA	S	S
Supervision 3	11/97	5	n.a.	PO(2); ES; FA; OA	S	S
Supervision 4	04/98	7	n.a.	PM; PO(2); ES; PGS; FA; OA	U	U
Supervision 5	009/98	4	n.a.	TL; ES; PO; HRE	U	U
Supervision 6 (MTR)	04/99	5	n.a.	TL; ES; PO; PS; FA	U	U
Supervision 7	12/99	6	n.a.	TL; MS; PO; PS; FA; IS;	S	U
Supervision 8	05/00	6	n.a.	TL; IN; CW; PS; FA; IS	S	S
Supervision 9	12/00	5	n.a.	TL; HRE; CAP; IS; AR	S	S
Supervision 10	03/01	5	n.a.	TL; IS; ES(3)	S	S
Supervision 11	06/01	6	n.a.	TL; ES(2); IS; FA; CON	S	S
Supervision 12	11/01	7	n.a.	TL; ES; OA; EC; PS; IN; FA	S	S
Supervision 13	03/02	6	n.a.	TL; ES(2); OA; IN; PS	S	S
Supervision 14	11/02	6	n.a.	TL; ES(2); OA; PS; FA	S	S
Completion		3	n.a.			S

Specializations: ES: Education Specialist; FA: Financial Analyst; HRE: Human Resource Economist; LSE: Lead Specialist education; OA: Operations Analyst; PO: Project Officer; PP: Principal Planner; PS: Procurement Specialist; SOO: Snr. Operations Officer; SPO: Snr. Project Officer; TM: Task Manager (Project Officer); TTS: Teacher Training Specialist; (2): Two people with the same specialization

## Other Project Data

Borrower/Executing Agency:

### FOLLOW-ON OPERATIONS

Operation	Credit no.	Amount (US\$ million)	Board date
Education Sector Project	38650	78.00	March 9, 2004

