

June 30, 2000

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Burkina Faso—Country Assistance Evaluation

Attached is a Country Assistance Evaluation on Burkina Faso prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department.

Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita GNP in 1997 of US\$240. Per capita income growth is constrained by high rates of population growth and HIV prevalence. The country is landlocked, with poor soil and rainfall. In 30 years there have been nine political regimes, many coming to power following coups. Nevertheless, the country has maintained and, in some cases, improved basic living standards. Successive Governments have sought consensus through participatory dialogue, and the country enjoys a reputation for being relatively peaceful.

During the last decade, IDA's program in Burkina has focused on policy and institutional reform through structural and sectoral adjustment, and support for health, education and agricultural services. The program has had some important successes, including an improved fiscal position, a more rational tax and expenditure structure, banking sector reform, and the elimination, privatization or restructuring of some key parastatals. GDP growth has averaged over 5 percent p.a. since the devaluation of the CFAF, while inflation has been contained. IDA supported a reorientation of the national primary education system, resulting in higher school attendance, and budgetary allocations for education and health have risen. Urban projects in the two largest cities strengthened local capacity to build and maintain basic infrastructure and services and encouraged a dramatic increase in private sector and community participation. IDA's agricultural program helped build up national research and extension services. Gender issues were addressed via efforts to increase girls' participation in education and to improve women's access to credit and crop extension services. The participatory approach used to prepare a number of projects, while time consuming, paid off in relatively smooth implementation and enhanced social consensus.

Despite these achievements, the program's outcome has not been fully satisfactory. IDA's short term goals were too ambitious, given the country's weak institutional capacity, the political instability leading into the period, and the difficulty of moving from a socialist to a market economy. Reforms were also hampered by the slow process of achieving a consensus on the desired extent of private participation in the economy and lingering political opposition to reform.¹ Privatization, civil service reform, and trade and price liberalization have scored only partial success, and the critical areas of private sector development and rationalization of the public investment program (largely donor funded) have made little progress. IDA supported the decentralized health system advocated by the World Health Organization, but hasty project preparation, insufficient support from the ministry, and inadequate coordination among the different actors weakened project impact. The agricultural program neglected

¹ The Government notes that this is not a matter of lack of commitment, but rather reflects its desire to ensure that the pre-conditions for success of the reform measures are in place and to avoid excessive haste in their adoption, in order to ensure broad agreement on these measures.

dryland agronomy and left unresolved structural issues in the cotton sector, although cereals and cotton are the two most important agricultural sectors in Burkina.

Formal and informal economic and sector work, Country Assistance Strategies and Policy Framework Papers, helped coordinate IDA/IMF programs and Government perspectives. The public debate on poverty studies was recognized as “best practice” in using participatory dialogue to reach consensus among the different actors. The policy impact of the dialogue was weakened, however, by inadequate coordination among the many donors. Country Assistance Strategies have not fully recognized country constraints or sufficiently prioritized the proposed activities. Informal sector work has supported the dialogue, but more active dissemination could have increased its impact.

Taken as a whole, the outcome of IDA’s lending and non-lending program over the past decade has been marginally satisfactory—a commendable result given the tumultuous economic and political shifts and physical constraints in the country. The institutional development impact has been substantial, but sustainability is still uncertain for many key policy reforms and investments.

The focus of IDA’s program is generally appropriate. However, in the future, IDA could play a greater role in helping the Government establish a framework for integrating the activities of all donors. Family planning and AIDS control should be central to the macroeconomic dialogue. Among the many issues remaining in the area of adjustment, IDA should focus chiefly on reforming governance, particularly as it affects the environment for private sector development and the allocation of public resources. Intervention in the urban sector should focus on applying the lessons learned from projects in the two main cities to the development of provincial capitals in the next phase of urban decentralization, through projects financed by other donors. IDA has been particularly effective in education and can continue to be active in this sector, with a renewed emphasis on literacy training. It could be more effective in agriculture by shifting its attention to dryland agronomy and continuing to press for a reorganization of the cotton sector.

Report No.

Burkina Faso
Country Assistance Evaluation

June 30, 2000

Operations Evaluation Department

Acronyms

APPI	Aggregate Project Performance Index
ASAC	Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit
CAE	Country Assistance Evaluation
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
EMRSO	Economic Management Reform Support Operation
ERC	Economic Recovery Credit
ESW	Economic and Sector Work
NGO	Non-governmental organizations
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
PDSN	Health Services and Nutrition Project
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PFP	Policy Framework Papers
PNGT	Environmental Management Project
PPLS	Population and AIDS Project
SAC	Structural Adjustment Credit
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SOFITEX	Cotton parastatal
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union

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Alice Galenson was the Task Manager for this report, and acknowledges with thanks the contributions made by the following consultants: Della McMillan (education, health, urban development, gender, poverty), John Sanders (agriculture, natural resource use) and Derek White (macroeconomics, structural adjustment). A mission comprising the group mentioned above visited Burkina Faso during January 1999. The following consultants prepared background papers for the mission: Messrs./Mme. Denise Belemsahga, Issa Diallo, Paul Stanislaus Nebie, Robert Ouedraogo, Kimseyinga Savadogo, Jean-Pierre Sawadogo, Yamsekre Tiendrebeogo, and Abdoulaye Zonon. Souleymane Zerbo contributed background information and commentary on urban infrastructure. Christina Malmberg Calvo (EASTR) and Louis Goreux (OEDCR) were peer reviewers for the report. Geri Wise provided administrative support.

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Preface

This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) examines IDA assistance to Burkina Faso during the last decade. The CAE is a countrywide evaluation that concentrates on the relevance, efficacy, efficiency, sustainability and institutional development impact of IDA's program of assistance to Burkina. It is similar to project evaluations which review the relevance of the project objectives, the degree to which they were achieved (efficacy) and the cost effectiveness of the resources used (efficiency), but it takes the country as the unit of account.

The CAE is issues-oriented, is geared toward current decision-making, and is selective as to time span and issues covered; the focus is on issues which are important today. This review covers all instruments of IDA's assistance strategy since the late 1980s, including lending and non-lending services. Good practices in Bank assistance are highlighted in Box 4.1.

The CAE is based on Bank reports, including Country Assistance Strategy papers, economic and sector reports (both formal and informal), Project/Implementation Completion Reports, Performance Audit Reports, and project and general country files. It is also based on interviews with Burkinabè officials, private individuals, and representatives of other donors interviewed during a mission to Burkina in January 1999, and on interviews with Bank, IMF, and IFC staff, in Washington and in the Resident Mission. Their kind cooperation and valuable assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

The draft CAE was sent to the Government for comments. The Government's comments have been fully reflected in the report; their letter is attached to the report as Attachment 2. Comments from the Alternate Executive Director representing Burkina Faso on the Executive Board of the World Bank are presented in Attachment 3.

1. Background

The Economy

1.1 Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in the Sahel region of West Africa. It has a semi-arid climate, erratic rainfall, and limited natural resources. Burkina's GNP per capita of US\$240 (1997) makes it one of the poorest countries in the world; it is ranked 172nd out of 175 countries in the UNDP 1997 Human Development Index, and has the third highest Human Poverty Index in the world. Per capita income growth is severely constrained by a population growth rate of 2.8 percent p.a. Burkina's population of 11 million is heavily rural, and increasing population pressure is giving rise to growing environmental degradation. The main exports have been cotton, livestock and gold. Primary school enrollment is low (40 percent, and only 30 percent for girls) and adult illiteracy is estimated to be 80 percent. Close to half of the population cannot afford a minimum standard of nutritional intake. One in fourteen adults is infected with HIV.

1.2 Largely as a consequence of its heavy dependence on drought-prone agricultural output and its landlocked geographical position, Burkina experienced slow GDP growth for much of the past. In the 1980s, good weather and the opening up of land by the IDA-supported multi-country river blindness control program gave rise to strong agricultural output growth (6.1 percent p.a. over 1982-88). At the same time, rising government consumption and investment stimulated domestic demand. Nonetheless, real GDP rose only at a modest pace (3.7 percent p.a. from 1982 to 1990); state-led economic expansion, based on central planning and pervasive controls, and financed by foreign borrowing, proved unsustainable (see Box 1.1).

1.3 From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Burkina participated in the general economic slowdown in the CFA zone countries associated with a pervasive deterioration in terms of trade coupled with appreciation of the French franc, and exacerbated by a reduction in remittances from Burkinabè nationals working in neighboring countries. Following a hiatus in relations (Box 1.1 and para. 2.2), a renewed dialogue with IDA began in mid-1988, leading to a Country Economic Memorandum in December 1989. A worsening of Burkina's economic situation in 1989 led to the acceleration of the Government's reform efforts and the preparation of a first Policy Framework Paper (PFP) for 1991-93, for which the Government assumed much of the initiative and responsibility. One innovative feature of this process—which borrowed heavily from Burkinabè traditions—was the public debate of the proposed reforms in a series of provincial and national-level public fora to which all political and economic groups were invited. The PFP was accompanied by a structural adjustment credit (SAC, FY91) and IMF support.

1.4 GDP growth remained slow during 1992-94 (1 percent p.a., implying declining per capita incomes). However, since the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994, estimated GDP growth, led by rapidly rising cotton production and growing investment, has accelerated to an average of over 5 percent p.a. during 1994-97, while inflation has been successfully contained (Table 1.1).¹

¹ However, see para. 3.9 on the weakness of GDP estimates.

Table 1.1: Macroeconomic Indicators, 1991-97

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Real GDP Growth (%)	10.0	2.5	-0.8	1.2	4.0	6.0	5.5
BOP Current Acct Deficit (% GDP)*	11.3	8.9	9.7	8.7	11.3	13.4	13.3
Fiscal Deficit (% GDP)	8.2	9.1	10.4	11.0	9.3	8.9	9.8
Consumer Price Index (% change)	2.5	-2.0	0.6	25.2	7.4	6.2	2.3
Gross Investment (% GDP)	20.6	21.3	19.8	19.3	22.5	24.8	26.2

*Excluding official transfers.

Sources: World Bank, IMF.

Box 1.1: A Brief History of Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta) achieved independence from France in 1960. This was followed by six years of civilian, one-party rule under President Maurice Yameogo. President Yameogo was overthrown in 1966 in a popular, non-violent military coup that established Sangoule Lamizana as president. President Lamizana's rule lasted from 1966 to 1980. His introduction of "Voltatisation," whereby nationals were to hold a share of all businesses, created an urban elite, which led to resentment and political unrest. Lamizana's overthrow in 1980 in another bloodless coup led to three years of instability.

In 1983 Captain Thomas Sankara was installed as head of the National Revolutionary Council (CNR). The Sankara regime espoused strong state intervention to achieve economic and social development. The "self-imposed adjustment" policies included austerity measures and efforts to reduce government expenditures and raise revenues. Measures to promote social equity included a series of "commando campaigns" to mobilize the rural population to contribute labor and financial resources to the development of rural health and educational services and a massive program to expand the access of urban residents to land for construction. The short term effects were dramatic: distribution of 120,000 parcels of land and construction of 2,500 homes for low and middle income urban households; a sixfold increase in the number of village health posts; a rapid increase in vaccination rates; and construction of hundreds of rural schools. However, the scale of production outstripped the capacity of the Government to staff and maintain the facilities. Moreover, many donors, under attack as "enemies of the people" and "imperialists," withdrew their support. The ensuing financial pressure, combined with the Government's increasingly erratic economic policies, aggravated the resentment of the top-down approach to "popular participation."

In late 1987, a coup led to Captain Sankara's assassination and the installation of President Blaise Compaoré. The new Government phased out the mass mobilization institutions of the revolution and sought to reunite the country by increasing political openness, decentralizing political power, and adopting a more pragmatic and tolerant attitude towards the middle class, business leaders and the international donor community. The return of donor aid was further encouraged by the adoption of a new constitution guaranteeing democracy and multiple political parties in June, 1991.

Social Conditions

1.5 The 1997 poverty study noted that the Gini coefficient for Burkina is one of the highest in the world (.63, compared to .38 in Tanzania and .34 in Ghana), meaning that in a country with a high incidence of poverty—45 percent of the population in 1995—many of the poor suffer extreme levels of deprivation. Despite progress in recent years, the delivery of social services is weak: health personnel are insufficient, health centers are not properly equipped, and schools lack teaching materials. Social indicators are generally well below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa and other West African CFA countries (Table 1.2 and Annex Table 2). Girls receive far less education than boys, with a gross primary enrollment rate of only 30 percent, compared to 46 percent for boys, and female illiteracy is 91 percent, compared to a still high 71 percent for men.

Table 1.2: Social Indicators

	<i>Burkina, most recent estimate since 1989</i>	<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>
Life Expectancy at Birth (yrs.)	46	52
Total Fertility	6.7	5.7
Infant Mortality (per '000 births)	97	90
Access to Safe Water (% pop.)	78	44
Gross Primary Enrollment (% of age group)	38	75
Illiteracy (%)	81	43
Child Vaccination Coverage (%)	55	--
Poverty Incidence (%)*	45	--

*Based on minimum nutritional requirement.

Source: World Bank, Annex Tables 1 and 2.

Role of Aid

1.6 Burkina has attracted a large number of donors. Official development assistance (ODA) is higher than in the average CFA or sub-Saharan Africa country as a percentage of GDP, although not in per capita terms (Table 1.3). Donors have been active in many areas, with the greatest numbers in education and agriculture (Annex Table 3). Many NGOs, both international and domestic, are active as well. This large number of partners makes donor coordination and strategic selectivity particularly important. IFC had one investment which closed in 1988, and was not involved in Burkina again until very recently (Box 1.2).

Table 1.3: Official Development Assistance, annual average, 1990-96

	<i>ODA/GDP, (%)</i>	<i>ODA per capita (US\$)</i>
Burkina Faso	19.0	41
CFA Countries	10.6	55
Sub-Saharan Africa (non CFA)	15.3	39

Source: OECD, "Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients."

Box 1.2: IFC's Portfolio in Burkina

IFC's portfolio is small and recent, amounting to US\$1 million in loans and \$1.16 million in equity, all since 1997. The Corporation has invested equity in two banks, one a privatization and one a new bank, reflecting a conscious strategy to support financial sector restructuring. IFC has also invested in a small-scale gold mining operation. FIAS carried out a diagnostic in 1991, and has limited interaction with Burkina since. IFC sees limited but growing opportunities in Burkina, primarily for small-scale enterprises in agribusiness and other competitive sectors, continuing support for the financial sector, and investment and advisory services in the mining sector. Additionally, one expected by-product of IFC's banking investments is expected to be increased co-financing opportunities. Based on this, IFC expects a flow of 1 or 2 new small-scale investments each year, in addition to possible larger scale mining projects.

2. Evaluation of Country Assistance Strategy: Design

Objectives of IDA Assistance: Growth and Poverty Reduction

2.1 Burkina has had 50 IDA credits since 1969, with total commitments of US\$890 million. For the first 20 years, the program was directed towards alleviating constraints to rural development via investment in agriculture, infrastructure, rural education, and, starting in 1985, health (Table 2.1). One short-term impact of this investment was to reinforce the cotton boom which transformed the higher rainfall southwest into the country's main commercial agricultural zone in the mid-1970s, as well as to accelerate immigration from the central Mossi Plateau. The impact of the investment was further reinforced by the highly successful, Bank-supported collaborative grant program to control river blindness, which opened up large areas of river basin land in the south.

Table 2.1: IDA Commitments by Decade and Sector (%)

<i>Sector</i>	<i>1970s</i>	<i>1980s</i>	<i>1990s</i>	<i>1990s w/o adjustment</i>	<i>Total</i>
Agriculture, Env. Mgmt.	36	44	19	25	29
Human Resources	13	18	21	28	20
Infrastructure	48*	36	26	35	31
Mining	0	2	4	5	3
Adjustment	0	0	25	--	14
Other	3	0	5	7	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100

*Includes one credit from FY69.

2.2 Relations between IDA and the Sankara government (1983-87) were strained due to disagreements over priorities, as well as the regime's reluctance to incur external debt for internal investments (Box 1.1); no new credits were approved in FY86 or 87. Lending resumed in late FY88, and expanded rapidly in FY91, with the initiation of adjustment lending (Table 2.1). Gross IDA disbursements more than quadrupled in FY92 (Table 2.2), then fell below planned levels in the late 1990s because of the failure to reach agreement on sectoral reforms in agriculture and in response to weak implementation capacity.

Table 2.2: IDA Disbursements (US\$ million)

	<i>FY89</i>	<i>FY90</i>	<i>FY91</i>	<i>FY92</i>	<i>FY93</i>	<i>FY94</i>	<i>FY95</i>	<i>FY96</i>	<i>FY97</i>	<i>FY98</i>
Gross	19.4	22.3	14.5	67.6	49.6	65.3	89.8	71.5	41.9	36.2
Net	18.2	21.5	13.2	65.7	46.9	62.6	86.6	67.3	37.4	31.1

2.3 IDA strategy, articulated in 1992 and again in the 1994 CAS, was to help the Government achieve its goal of sustainable economic growth with equity and poverty alleviation through: the removal of long-term constraints to economic and social development; the creation of a policy and regulatory environment supportive of the private sector; and more effective management of public resources, including the reallocation of resources from ineffective government services to social and economic development. The Government reiterated these objectives in its development letter for the 1995 donors' Roundtable. The 1996 CAS emphasized similar themes: the need for a sound macroeconomic environment to enable equitable growth and poverty reduction and attract private investment; accelerated provision of social services, relying

more heavily on the private sector; and expanded opportunities for sustainable income, employment and growth. Within this framework, the CAS also stressed community based participatory approaches and environmental awareness.

2.4 IDA has attempted to translate its objectives into a reorientation of government activities through a combination of macro and micro level interventions. Adjustment lending addressed public sector reform and the environment for growth and private sector development, and incorporated targets for the share of public spending going to the priority sectors (education, health and basic urban and transport infrastructure). The number of and funding for projects in these sectors increased substantially (Table 2.1).

2.5 This CAE focuses on the areas most critical for Burkina's future. Economic growth is essential for poverty alleviation; hence the importance of structural adjustment and improved management of public resources. Investment in human capital is critical for both growth and equity. Education, particularly for girls is one of the highest priorities, as is raising health standards. Advances in agriculture, particularly in food production, and improved management of natural resources are necessary, both to improve the nutritional status of the population and to provide growing incomes for the large proportion of the population still engaged in this sector.² The review begins with economic and sector work and strategy formulation, which underpin the IDA program and determine its relevance.

Economic and Sector Work and Strategy Formulation

2.6 The last formal, comprehensive economic report appeared in 1989.³ IDA has relied since then on a combination of annual Policy Framework Papers (since 1991), Country Assistance Strategies (1994 and 1996), public expenditure reviews, and informal papers on specific issues. These vehicles have helped coordinate IDA policies and projects and harmonize IDA, Government and IMF perspectives, and public discussion of the 1991-93 PFP helped create public support for a fundamental change in the Government's development strategy. However, the absence of comprehensive economic work has contributed to the lack of a well-articulated development framework and to weak donor coordination.⁴ While the use of informal work to stimulate discussion and reach a consensus with the Government can be very effective, its drawback is limited dissemination and loss of potential impact. The CAE team encountered staff, both in the Bank and in the Government, who were not aware of key studies in their sectors. High staff turnover undoubtedly contributed to this situation (Annex Table 10). Other donors are even less likely to have been influenced by such reports.

2.7 Some sector work has had a very positive impact. The IDA-led **Public Expenditure Review** (PER) of 1993 demonstrated how quantitative analysis can clarify important issues. In the education sector, for example, it revealed the critical constraints imposed by the relatively high cost of teacher salaries. This has led to important policy changes. Since then, IDA has encouraged the Government to carry out its own PERs. A Burkina-led review in 1995, covering

² Transportation is also critical to the development of Burkina, a landlocked country. The CAE did not focus on this sector, since there are no major issues; the recent Bank program consists of a Transport Sector Adjustment Credit, which has been very successful in promoting privatization and improving the performance of the sector (para. 3.33).

³ Annex Table 11 lists formal and informal ESW.

⁴ The Client Feedback Survey conducted in October 1997 found that only about half of the Burkinabè respondents were satisfied that IDA contributed to development strategies.

health, education, agriculture and environment, provided useful factual information and identified key deficiencies in the sectors, but did not develop practical solutions to the problems identified.

2.8 The country team adopted a highly participatory process for reaching a consensus on the definition of poverty and actions to alleviate it. The key inputs were three **participatory poverty assessments**; a **poverty profile** based on a Living Standards Priority Survey; and a series of **PERs** that attempted to calculate the unit costs of services and their distribution. The poverty profile showed considerable disparities among regions, and between urban and rural areas in terms of income and food security. The preliminary results of linking the profile with the analysis of public expenditure patterns suggested that the latter tended to reinforce already existing inequities. For example, nearly half of the Ministry of Health personnel were concentrated in the two main cities; the ratio of health providers to population varied significantly by region, with the lowest ratios in the poorest areas; only about half of public education subsidies went to rural areas, although 84 percent of the population is rural; male students received two-thirds of public education subsidies; and the lowest expenditure quintile received 7 percent of the subsidies to education, while the highest quintile received 56 percent.

2.9 This information fed into discussions among the Government, civil society, unions, and donors that were organized in conjunction with preparation of the 1996 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). The latter document was considered an example of best practice in the Africa Region because of its participatory nature and focus on poverty. It identified targets for monitoring poverty reduction that were mutually acceptable to the Government and IDA. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the poverty reduction agenda for Burkina was impaired by a major turnover of the country team in 1997. Many current task managers and project directors have not even seen the participatory poverty assessments and profiles.

2.10 The strong support to poverty issues contrasts with a weaker commitment of the IDA program to **gender issues**. There does not appear to have been any formal sector survey or national analysis conforming to Bank criteria for gender assessment, and gender appeared only in a minor way in the CAS. EDI has supported a program to strengthen the capacity of government extension services and NGOs to offer grassroots management training to local women's groups, and a regional study (1995), supported by the Social Dimensions of Adjustment program, UNDP and other donors, examined ways to increase women's access to agricultural extension in the Sahel. However, on the project side, many task managers and local project managers are unaware of OD 4.20 on the gender dimension of development and other Bank literature on gender, and supervision reports tend to ignore gender impacts. Three sectors—education, health and agriculture—have project components designed to address some of the specific problems of women and girls in gaining access to social services and inputs they need to improve their living standards.⁵

2.11 It was clear by the early 1990s that any long-term attempt to sustain the types of lower cost participatory development initiatives being advocated by the Government with IDA support would have to be linked to the implementation of more complete administrative, financial, and rural **decentralization**. Since 1991, the Government has introduced a series of referenda and laws

⁵ In 1993 "Burkina Faso: Women in Development Assessment" was processed to yellow cover stage. One of its main recommendations, the improvement of the legal status of women, was incorporated into the 1994 Population and AIDS project, which has made a significant effort to disseminate the 1991 Family Code in several regions of the country. In addition, the project has opened legal clinics in urban and rural areas to assist women. UNICEF plans to expand this component to regions not yet covered. The project also provides support to the fight against excision, another important women's rights issue.

to create the legal, financial, and judicial framework needed to decentralize financial and administrative systems. The process is highly political, however, and still in flux, despite the formal adoption of a new decentralization law in August 1998. IDA has accompanied this process—without prejudging decisions of a highly political nature regarding the overall format of decentralization—by means of the demonstration effect and empowerment of local communities in projects such as Urban II, Environmental Management (PNGT) and Health Services and Nutrition; and support (through the Public Institutional Development project) to fiscal and administrative decentralization. The Bank has also supported ESW to help the Government in general, and Bank-supported initiatives in particular, provide a better framework for rural decentralization (CND, 1998).

2.12 The **CAS process** has provided the vehicle for IDA to integrate its macroeconomic, structural adjustment and sector programs and take stock of its activities. However, in the case of Burkina, the CAS appears to be trying to address all problems simultaneously, with inadequate identification of priorities, imperfect coordination of donor efforts, and insufficient recognition of the constraints imposed by Burkina's limited educational base, institutional capacity,⁶ and socio-political environment. While each of the programs and projects considered separately may appear desirable, the practicality of trying to achieve them all simultaneously is open to question. There are two aspects to this: whether IDA has the resources to design and supervise the range of projects undertaken, and whether the Government has the resources to implement them.

2.13 Some of these problems arise from the lack of a comprehensive analytical framework, accepted by the Government and donors, analyzing choices and establishing priorities.⁷ An example is the population/AIDS issue. The likely quantitative implications of lower population growth and reduced incidence of AIDS for enhanced per capita income growth and poverty reduction do not appear to have been analyzed, despite indications from rough calculations that they would be of major significance. Although IDA and the IMF have consistently drawn the attention of the Government to the importance of these issues, they have not presented compelling quantitative evidence to back their recommendations. In the absence of such evidence, the population/AIDS issue has not been at the center of the macroeconomic dialogue.⁸

2.14 In sum, **IDA strategy during the past decade** appears not to have evolved out of comprehensive economic analysis, but rather to have been defined implicitly, in large part through support for structural adjustment and associated projects. These projects, while quite comprehensive in coverage and broadly consistent with one another, have been conceived to a considerable extent independently, with little explicit analysis of potential trade-offs among them, and without clear priorities. The resulting program was broadly relevant, but could have been more so. The lack of an appropriate vehicle for coordinating efforts by the large number of donors further reduced the strategic relevance of IDA's contribution. The allocation of additional

⁶ The Client Feedback Survey reported that only one-third of the clients believed that IDA understood local institutional constraints.

⁷ Work has been done recently in a number of sectors, including education, mining and public finance, and within the last 6 months on agriculture and on long-term sources of growth and competitiveness. Work is under preparation or discussion in energy, transport and health. However, while the situation may change in the near future, there is at this point no strategy to integrate the sector strategies, identify priorities, underpin the development of a coherent public expenditure program, and serve as a vehicle for coordinating donor assistance.

⁸ This issue is being addressed in the context of the preparation of the new CAS, and a complete review of the portfolio is currently underway with a view to integrating AIDS in the portfolio and country program and to include AIDS in key non-lending services, such as public expenditure reviews and economic projections.

resources to the non-lending program would have permitted a more comprehensive ESW program and analytical framework, the sharpening of priorities and development of a longer term strategy, and the preparation and dissemination of documents that could serve as a focus for government and donor efforts.⁹ The following sections examine the relevance of the IDA program in selected sectors.

Stabilization and Structural Adjustment

2.15 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Government confronted some pressing problems. In the short term it needed to address a serious budget deficit and deal with accumulated arrears. At the same time it needed to reduce the excessive share of current expenditures going to the wage bill and to increase expenditures in priority areas such as health, education, and road maintenance. Longer term problems included reforming the large, inefficient public enterprise sector; encouraging efficient private sector activity; restructuring and rehabilitating the banking system; improving the allocation and efficiency of public recurrent and investment expenditures; and improving the financial management and effectiveness of the civil service. Adding urgency to the need to deal with these problems was the difficult economic situation confronting the entire CFA zone as a result of declining commodity prices and appreciation of the CFA franc vis-à-vis the dollar. The Government's willingness to embark on a fundamental program was expressed in the 1991 Policy Framework Paper and in its Letter of Development Policy. IDA responded with two structural adjustment credits,¹⁰ and the IMF also provided sustained support.

2.16 The adjustment program initiated in 1991 was highly relevant to the need to improve the longer-term efficiency of the Burkinabè economy and to gain control of the Government's finances. However, it was far less relevant to the immediate need to restore economic growth, which called for an adjustment of Burkina's real exchange rate. This could only have been achieved quickly, and at minimum social and economic cost, by a decisive nominal devaluation of the CFA franc, which did not occur until January 1994. The reliance on wage and price compression to improve external competitiveness and, combined with structural reform, rapidly restore economic growth, was unrealistic. Moreover, many of IDA's target dates for the implementation of reforms were highly optimistic, mainly because they did not allow adequately for Burkina's institutional and technical weakness and socio-political constraints.

Governance

2.17 A corollary to the adjustment process was the need to adapt the Burkinabè administration to the requirements of a decentralized, market-driven, private sector-dominated economy. This required substantial improvements in revenue collection; public expenditure budgeting and monitoring; public investment planning; the coordination of donor and NGO activity within a coherent framework; economic management and policy formulation; the management of human resource development; the judicial system; the provision and regulation of support services for private activity; the statistical system; and the overall structure, management and functioning of the public administration. The structural adjustment program, accompanied by the Public Institutional Development and Private Sector Assistance Projects (FYs 92 and 93), addressed

⁹ It is encouraging that the Region recently engaged some Burkinabè experts to work with the country team on identifying sources of future growth.

¹⁰ Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC, FY91), Economic Recovery Credit (ERC, FY94). An additional adjustment operation, the Economic Management Reform Support Operation (EMRSO) was approved in FY99.

most, though not all, of these requirements. However, the program did not emphasize improving governance as an explicit goal in its own right.

Urban Development

2.18 Since 1990, IDA's urban strategy has concentrated on three inter-related components: providing basic infrastructure; strengthening the capacity of the urban communes to collect user fees and taxes, work with local communities to build and maintain basic infrastructure, and carry out decentralized decision-making; and strengthening the capacity of small and medium scale enterprises to design and execute urban infrastructure and services through an AGETIP-type model. This strategy was highly relevant as Burkina emerged from a massive "commando" expansion of urban infrastructure that attempted to deal with more than 20 years of neglect of the country's urban areas. IDA focused on the two largest urban centers, leaving the smaller cities to other donors. The latter, while agreeing that long-term urban strategy must deal with infrastructure, institutions and local participation, have typically dealt with only one or two of these domains. IDA is also preparing a project for a dam at Ziga (60 km from Ouagadougou) that is designed to improve the city's water supply.

2.19 The main weakness of what was generally an effective strategy has been the failure to include at least one smaller urban center as a pilot for the next phase of urban development, that of extending the model to the secondary urban centers. This extension is particularly urgent in the light of the need to restrain immigration to Ouagadougou, which faces shortages of water and electricity. The Public Works and Decentralization project in the pipeline is designed to address development issues of secondary urban centers.

Human Resources

2.20 IDA provided a major incentive to sustain investment in the social sectors and protect them during the period of structural adjustment by making adjustment lending conditional on allocating a minimum proportion of the central government budget to education, health and basic infrastructure, and on progress on key indicators such as girls' school enrollment and the distribution of basic drugs. The HIPC Initiative (FY98) also sets targets for gradual increases in budget allocations, and the choice of Burkina for the Africa pilot for conditionality reformulated has further strengthened the Government's willingness to move forward on key reforms and budgetary commitments to these high priority sectors.

2.21 IDA's analytical support to **education** (through the use of a computer simulation model) appears to have been the catalyst for a reorientation of the national primary education system. The earlier model (supported under the First and Second Education Projects, FYs73 and 79) had encouraged the development of a trifurcated system that included three year "rural education" schools in parallel with the formal system of six year primary education and a small division of basic literacy training programs. The rural population never accepted the three year schools, considering them second class; this led to low enrollment (24 percent in 1985) and consequently high per student costs. "Commando" literacy campaigns undertaken under the Sankara regime increased basic literacy, but did not provide the training needed for villages to manage the institutions, such as new health committees and pharmacy banks, that were also expanded under the commando health campaign. Under the Third and Fourth Education Projects (FYs85 and 91) IDA helped reorient the Government's strategy toward mainstream primary education, along with infrastructure, materials, institutional strengthening and development of a model for community participation. Of particular note in a country where girls' enrollment lagged far behind that of

boys was a pilot program to increase school attendance by girls. The only lacuna in IDA's education strategy prior to 1993 was its failure to point out the constraint to higher enrollment rates created by the high teacher salaries.

2.22 The Government's new Basic Education Ten Year Program stresses consolidation of the gains in primary education; support for post-primary education to respond to the new opportunities created by increased primary school attendance; and strengthening of basic literacy programs. While IDA has excluded basic literacy from its programs since the mid-1980s, this was part of the effort to focus macroeconomic and political attention on primary education. It would be appropriate now to renew support for basic literacy training, given the fact that Burkina has an accepted model for such training¹¹ and that the spread of literacy among community leaders has been found to be the single most important factor influencing their ability to manage the local level institutions needed for rural decentralization (Donnelly-Roark, et. al., 1999; Easton, et. al. 1999).

2.23 One major input of IDA's assistance to the **health** sector has been to facilitate the introduction of the decentralized system of health services advocated by the World Health Organization's Alma Ata and Bamako initiatives. IDA support followed the same four-pronged format as in education, including policy and planning, investment in infrastructure, institutional strengthening and enhanced community participation. The discussion of the AIDS epidemic in both the 1994 and the 1996 CAS was considered one of the best among the 25 most severely affected countries, because it included the key issues considered obligatory to a comprehensive treatment (Dayton, 1998). However, there was almost no mention of AIDS in the major economic analyses.

2.24 Unfortunately, the country has had more trouble introducing decentralized finance and administration in health services than in other sectors. The normal difficulties of decentralization were exacerbated by the hasty design of IDA-financed emergency programs connected with the devaluation, which forced the country to accelerate the carefully prepared plan to decentralize technical training, administration and financial services that had been approved by the Government, donors and NGOs the previous year.

2.25 These transition problems were further exacerbated by design problems in the Health Services and Nutrition Project (PDSN, FY95, which followed the Health Services Development Project, PDSS, FY85). These problems included insufficient consultation with district level health service leaders; too rapid deployment of health personnel from central to peripheral provincial health postings (a condition for credit signing); and the highly centralized financial system which hamstrung the operations of the newly created 51 health districts. Strategy focused on increasing the quality and supply of health services, with little attention to demand, and overestimated the ease with which the nascent health districts could collaborate with the Population and AIDS Project (PPLS, also FY95), located under a different ministry, to supply technical assistance for the AIDS initiative. Strong Ministry and IDA support for a mid-term restructuring of the PDSN that establishes a more decentralized financial system, should facilitate the formulation of district level action plans, improve collaboration between the PPLS and the health districts, and develop indicators needed to assess the project's impact.

¹¹ The impact of the widespread training does not appear to be reflected in the current literacy figures, which are drawn from the most recent census rather than from a more scientifically based sample survey.

Agriculture and Natural Resource Use

2.26 IDA has had 21 agricultural projects in Burkina. Initial activity stressed regional projects to accelerate the development of the cotton sector or to increase the welfare of the rural population through integrated rural development. In the late 1980s, attention shifted to national projects focused on strengthening research and extension services, reversing natural resource degradation, and sectoral adjustment; the most recent projects have added food security and a pilot program of private irrigation. However, IDA's agricultural lending program, which represents over one-quarter of the total, has weaknesses when it comes to the two most significant problems in the sector: it is deferring the program of reform in the cotton sector and it has not dealt adequately with the traditional cereals.

2.27 Cotton is the country's main export earner; it accounts for about 40 percent of the value of Burkina's exports, and it is the only commodity for which the share of West African countries in world exports has increased substantially over the last 30 years. It has thus been an important contributor to poverty reduction. The critical problem in the sector is the monopsonistic nature of the parastatal SOFITEX and the lack of bargaining power on the part of farmers. Without the resulting implicit taxes, producer prices in Burkina would be up to 80 percent above their current level. With a high share of the value of cotton production going to the Government, in addition to the high cost of technical and marketing services supplied by the French partner, cotton has not fulfilled its potential as an engine of development in the Southwest. IDA has tried to tackle this issue at both the country and the regional levels, but so far with few results.

2.28 Adjustment began in the agricultural sector in FY92, with an Agricultural Sector Adjustment Credit (ASAC). Although slow in starting, the ASAC made progress in liberalizing price and trade regimes, and dissolving, privatizing or restructuring a number of agricultural parastatals. Frequent turnover of IDA staff in the mid-1990s slowed the momentum, and two years of discussions ended in 1998 with the breakdown of negotiations of a second ASAC. Although the nominal reason for IDA withdrawal was the violation of an agreement on sugar prices, the discussions had been foundering. While dropping the credit was an appropriate response, the loss of this instrument makes it difficult for IDA to address the more serious issues in the cotton sector; hence it is important to continue to seek reform. The replacement of parastatals with private monopolies in the agricultural sector is a problem that calls for more attention by both IDA and the Government.

2.29 Cereals are responsible for 90 percent of the calories in the Burkinabè diet and nearly that share of total crop area. The traditional cereals—sorghum and millet—are well suited to Burkina, due to their tolerance for drought and low soil fertility. Burkina has been a model for the introduction for low input, labor intensive technology in semiarid cereal production, with substantial IDA support through research and extension. However, these technologies give only very low yield increases and are not sustainable in the longer run, due to their inability to supply sufficient nitrogen and phosphorous. Technologies are available which combine water retention and inorganic fertilizer for large potential yield increases; some of them have been used successfully in both developing and developed countries.¹² IDA's program in agriculture has not

¹² On some heavier soils near the Maradi region of Niger, farmers utilize improved water conservation technologies (ridging) combined with the use of inorganic fertilizers; and the Goberry region, also in Niger, has demonstrated the ability to introduce inorganic fertilizers on the sandy dune soils with low rainfall, demonstrating that risk and profitability are not constraining these farmers once they have seen demonstration trials. Experience in southern Mali has shown good potential for increased use of animal traction for ridging, leading to increased water retention.

been sufficiently aggressive in pursuing these potential gains in dryland agronomy and has been strategically weak in not looking ahead at likely demand growth for cereals and its consequences for accelerating technology growth in this sector.

2.30 On the demand side, the expected growth of traditional cereals is often underestimated. Given the current rate of population growth of 2.7 percent p.a., growth in the demand for cereals already exists. In addition, within 5 to 10 years, as incomes grow, the resulting dietary transformation toward animal protein, which raises the demand for feed grain, could result in a growth of demand for traditional cereals of over 5 percent p.a. for more than a decade. Finally, with 45 percent of the population below an adequate nutritional intake, demand constraints cannot be overlooked; efforts to increase purchasing power among the poor would lead to even higher growth of the demand for cereals.¹³

2.31 IDA programs in agriculture have had other shortcomings. They tended to become absorbed in process rather than products. Each emphasized the “fad of the moment”—farming systems in research and the training and visit system in extension. They succeeded in extending these processes, but had no well defined, measurable objectives, which would have facilitated evaluation, prioritization, and increased output.¹⁴ There is no clear evidence of the results of the T&V system in Burkina, but it has been shown to have been less successful than originally thought in other countries. Farming systems may have been useful in promoting communications with farmers, but this approach does not provide the necessary scientific basis for major improvements in output and productivity. Nor does it put enough attention on those scientific elements of yield increase more difficult for farmers and extension agents to understand, such as the multiplicative effects of combined inputs and hybrid vigor.¹⁵ Second, in spite of the fact that the public budgetary allocation for extension services barely covered salaries at the start of the project, there was little attention to the issue of the borrower’s financial capacity to carry out the proposed much-expanded extension service. Even accepting the need for continued heavy donor support, some effort should have been made to achieve financial sustainability, as well as some accommodation within the design made to the projected financial capacity of the borrower.

2.32 Third, the Environmental Management Project (PNGT, FY91) worked hard to develop a new bottom-up approach, but has not yet systematized it sufficiently to move the project out of the pilot stage. A follow-up project in preparation will support a participatory approach on a large scale. However, before scaling up, it will be important to clarify whether the focus is on natural resource management or community development, and, if the latter, whether IDA has the relevant expertise and whether the local committees will be able to obtain and administer the necessary resources. Fourth, despite increasing conflict between livestock herders and farmers, a decision on promoting regional decentralization of the stages of livestock production or supporting transhumance has been avoided. Fifth, several programs offered agricultural credit for women, but no research has been done to identify which of the many activities undertaken by women have the highest payoffs to their welfare and that of their children. Finally, the recently initiated Pilot Private Irrigation Development Project, while very innovative, addresses a small

¹³ There is a difference between an increase in demand and dealing with malnutrition. The latter would require increased purchasing power or entitlement of the poor. This is an income problem, rather than an agricultural output problem, as A. Sen has pointed out.

¹⁴ The Agricultural Services II project, now under implementation, puts more emphasis on monitoring and impact evaluation.

¹⁵ The Region notes that T&V gave reasonable results in Burkina and that farming systems continue to be highly relevant to the constraints facing small subsistence farmers under arid conditions.

client group and should extend its client definition to include those using water retention technologies.

3. IDA Assistance: Outcome, Institutional Development and Sustainability

Overview

3.1 OED findings to date suggest that IDA activity in Burkina has been relatively successful. Of the 36 evaluated projects—a total commitment of US\$513 million—the outcome of 84 percent (by value) has been rated satisfactory (Table 3.1). The sustainability of 43 percent was rated as likely, while institutional development impact was rated as substantial for 23 percent. (Table 3.2 shows the breakdown by sector.) The first two ratings compare favorably with those for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, and institutional development impact is about average. What is more, all but one of the projects approved since FY84 have had satisfactory outcome ratings. Even by Bankwide standards, the outcome ratings are high, although the other two ratings are both low. Three of the 11 projects under implementation (22 percent of commitments) are considered by QAG to be at risk. The Decentralization Law passed in 1998 is likely to complicate the implementation of some projects, but it also offers opportunities for innovative approaches to resolving some of the key institutional problems.

Table 3.1: OED Evaluation Findings

<i>Country</i>	<i>No. of Projects</i>	<i>Value (\$ million)</i>	<i>Satisfactory Outcome (%)</i>	<i>Likely Sustainability (%)</i>	<i>Substantial ID Impact (%)</i>
Burkina Faso	36	513	84	43	23
Africa Region	1,514	36,294	63	31	23
Bankwide	4,779	231,692	75	56	36

Source: OED.

Table 3.2: Sectoral Evaluation Findings

<i>Sector</i>	<i>No. of Projects Evaluated*</i>	<i>Net Commitments (US\$ million)</i>	<i>Satisfactory Outcome (% value)</i>	<i>Likely Sustainability (% value)</i>	<i>Substantial ID Impact (% value)</i>
Adjustment	2 (2)	105.0	100	24	0
Agriculture	18 (11)	180.6	88	37	50
Education	3 (1)	33.5	100	100	0
PHN	1 (1)	26.0	100	100	0
Urban, Public Works	3 (2)	59.5	100	61	39
Infra., Mining	8 (3)	104.8	45	33	8
Finance	1 (0)	3.2	0	--	--

* (for sustainability and ID impact)

Source: OED.

3.2 The Aggregate Project Performance Index (APPI) is a composite measure of the ratings on outcome, institutional development impact and sustainability.¹⁶ Burkina's APPI, for 11 credits exiting the portfolio between FY90 and FY98, is 7.08, well above the average for the Africa region of 6.10 and the Bankwide average of 6.78 (Annex Table 7).¹⁷

3.3 A closer look at the portfolio, including projects under implementation, reveals a number of weaknesses. OED audits of several projects done in parallel with this CAE have downgraded some of the ratings from satisfactory to marginally satisfactory; these ratings are not reflected in the above tables. Moreover, the CAE judgements also take into account lending that has not taken place: during the last three years, IDA lending has reached only the low scenario of the 1996 CAS due to the failure to agree on agricultural reforms, as well as continued weakness in implementation capacity.¹⁸

Structural Adjustment

3.4 The *implementation* of structural adjustment in Burkina has been *marginally satisfactory*. Burkina recognized the need for fundamental change, and the public was informed about the proposals. However, adjustment has proceeded far more slowly than expected due to unfavorable economic circumstances throughout the CFA zone prior to the 1994 devaluation, slow and cumbersome processes, lack of capacity,¹⁹ unsatisfactory institutional arrangements, and lingering political opposition.

3.5 The program has scored notable successes. The Government's overall financial position has improved (since 1994), military expenditures have decreased, budgetary management capacity has been greatly strengthened, a more economically rational tax and expenditure structure is in place, and appropriate priority has been accorded key sectors—education, health, road maintenance, and revenue collection. The 1994 devaluation was effective and subsequent inflation was contained. An ill-managed and bankrupt banking system has been restructured, rehabilitated, and substantially privatized, and is now one of the strongest links in the economy. Some key agricultural and transport parastatals were eliminated, privatized or restructured. These successes did not come quickly or easily. They entailed persistent efforts by the Government, with the support of IDA, the IMF and other donors, to overcome numerous obstacles.

3.6 Slow but significant progress has been made in privatizing public enterprises, but the program has not been adequately supported by the promotion of new private sector activities or by the removal of economic, institutional, legal, and regulatory bottlenecks to domestic and foreign investment. The emergence of monopolies and other forms of anti-competitive behavior threatens the realization of consumer benefits, the efficiency of resource allocation, and the credibility of the program with the public. Trade reform was undermined by the proliferation of tax and tariff exemptions, but is now proceeding swiftly with the introduction of WAEMU free trade and the common external tariff. Price liberalization has been less effective than hoped.

¹⁶ The methodology is explained in OED's 1998 *Annual Report on Development Effectiveness*. The score can range from 2 to 10. The numbers given here are the average for all evaluated projects, weighted by net commitments.

¹⁷ The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment ratings also find Burkina to rate "high" on the portfolio, and average on all other clusters.

¹⁸ The FY97-99 program has reached only US\$103 million, compared to a base case of US\$205-260.

¹⁹ The Capacity Building Initiative for Africa produced a report on Burkina in 1997. This report was distributed for comment within the three main stakeholder groups—civil society, the private sector, and the public administration—but the Government decided to collect comments more widely before revising it.

Civil service reform has been partly successful, with the wage bill under control, fundamental legislative changes enacted, an analytical basis established for reform, and a system of performance incentives introduced. The Decentralization Law presents a new challenge in staffing and financing the new, decentralized entities, as well as in assuring, through appropriate reporting requirements and monitoring, responsible discharge of their functions.

3.7 Little progress has been made in rationalizing the Public Investment Program, which, despite its relatively large size, appears not to be contributing as much as it might to raising overall productivity and per capita GDP. In addition, civil service structural reforms have yet to be implemented, although a good foundation has been laid.

3.8 The PFP for 1991-93 set a target for GDP growth of 4 percent p.a. during 1991-94. Although GDP grew very strongly in 1991, this was attributable to exceptionally strong increases in cereals production—a result of satisfactory rainfall. The average annual increase over 1992-94 was under 1 percent. The PFP was not only highly overoptimistic in suggesting such quick results from the SAC, but it also failed to take adequate account of the deepening regional depression associated with declines in agricultural commodity export prices and the appreciation of the CFA franc. Even now, in light of the incomplete character of the adjustment process, particularly the delay both in establishing a vigorous, competitive private sector and in realizing a significant expansion in investment, only a very limited impact from the structural adjustment program is to be expected.

3.9 Even if the adjustment process were much more advanced and exerting a significant impact, it would be extremely difficult to separate its effects from those of the 1994 devaluation, which was not part of the original adjustment agenda. In any event, Burkina's national accounts have been compiled in final form only up to 1993; provisional figures are available for later years, but are essentially projections incorporating assumptions about recent developments, including the impact of the devaluation. They therefore cannot be used with any confidence to provide verification of the impact of such developments.²⁰ Anecdotal evidence does, however, indicate a positive impact of the devaluation on cotton production, financing and exports, and also indicates an impact on some secondary manufacturing production.

3.10 The efficacy of the structural adjustment program should ultimately be judged by whether or not it has significantly improved the efficiency of Burkina's economy and contributed to output growth and poverty reduction. For the above reasons, this impact cannot be determined. From the narrower perspective of whether the individual components of the program have had positive, visible effects, the program has realized mixed results, with the most positive impacts on public finance and the banking system.

3.11 The program might have been more effective if the sequencing of the various elements of the reform package had been improved and closer attention paid to the interactions among them during implementation. Based on the experience in Burkina and elsewhere, privatization would probably have contributed more to the emergence of an efficient private sector had it been preceded or accompanied by the array of interlocking legislative, regulatory, institutional, judicial

²⁰ Estimates of agricultural, livestock, fishing, hunting and forestry production are particularly suspect (although statistics relating to cotton are reliable), and there are doubts as to the reliability of the balance-of-payments numbers. Exports and imports of goods and services are rough estimates. Mining production is estimated, as is private investment. Only about 60 percent of what is reported as public investment is, in fact, investment. The use of the Ouagadougou-based consumer price index as a general deflator introduces distortions into estimates of real output. Government financial statistics are regarded as reliable, although they do include some estimates.

and enforcement measures required to deal with monopolies, establish a level playing field for private activity and encourage new domestic and foreign investment. Earlier results from efforts to reduce utility costs and improve the efficiency of—or, preferably, eliminate—state monopolies would also have improved the survival prospects for existing private industry and supported new activity. Earlier introduction of tariff reform without the offsetting exemptions would have hastened the realignment of industrial output in line with the country's comparative advantage.

3.12 The efficacy of structural adjustment has been undermined primarily by the fact that it has been partial and slow. This is attributable in part to political opposition to the reforms, especially on the part of the unions. The cumbersome and inefficient privatization process has also been a central factor.

3.13 The *institutional development impact* of the adjustment program has been *substantial*. Its successes include the establishment of a coordinating unit in the Ministry of Finance to monitor and assure implementation of the SAC, the development of a transparent computerized expenditure budgeting and monitoring system, the establishment of a reliable inventory of civil service personnel and their functions, the passage of a new civil service law establishing a revised grading and incentive system, and the strengthening of the revenue collection system, including the computerization of customs collections.

3.14 Despite the slow pace of reform and the consequent delay in realizing tangible benefits, there is no evidence of government backsliding or of mounting opposition to the program. Slow progress continues. However, the lack of clearly visible, positive results remains a concern. Demonstration of positive results would be highly beneficial in consolidating political support for structural reform, adding needed momentum to the process. *Sustainability* of the adjustment program is *uncertain*.

3.15 Statistically, it is virtually impossible to establish **counterfactual propositions**, for reasons cited above: structural adjustment remains incomplete; it is impossible to separate the effects of the 1994 devaluation from any effects, so far, of other measures; and the national accounts are inadequate. Given these caveats, GDP growth during the first three years of the adjustment period was well below expectations, but since 1995 it is estimated to have picked up, averaging slightly above the 1996 CAS projections. Burkina's performance has been about the same as the average for CFA countries.

3.16 In terms of more qualitative measures, the relatively open public discussion in Burkina of the 1991-93 PFP resulted in somewhat higher public acceptance of structural adjustment than in some other African countries undertaking reform. Without structural adjustment, Burkina's public finances would not have improved, the tax structure would be far more biased against exports, the public expenditure process would be less transparent, and the Government would have considerably less control over its expenditures and less effective management control over the civil service. The banking system was bankrupt prior to the reforms initiated under structural adjustment in 1991; today, it is sound and increasingly competitive.

Governance

3.17 Progress in this area has been mixed, reflecting the absence of a unifying vision of the improvements required to realize good governance in a restructured economy. As noted, progress has occurred under the structural adjustment program in most areas of civil service reform, except basic structural reform. However, weaknesses remain in the establishment of a transparent and supportive legal framework for private enterprise, as well as in the provision of effective

institutional and financial support to the private sector. Little progress has been made in improving the Government's capacity for economic management and long-term policy formulation, in improving the statistical base, and in achieving effective donor coordination and economically rational investment selection. Major reforms are needed in the administration of justice: judicial infrastructure and the staffing of courts are inadequate, court case loads are heavy, and the publication of laws, regulations and legal decisions is erratic or non-existent. There is a perception in the country of growing corruption, particularly on the part of police and customs officials, and lack of transparency. It is important that the Government reassert its commitment to the traditional zero tolerance for corruption.

Urban Development

3.18 IDA's support to the urban sector since the late 1980s effectively translated the integrated strategy (para. 2.18) into the Second Urban Project (FY90) and the Urban Environment Project (FY95). Achievements include a substantial increase in the number of urban poor with reliable water, sanitation services, and access roads. Key factors contributing to this outcome include participation by national specialists, trained through earlier IDA and other donor-financed projects; the timely appointment of strong national directors; and good communication between the project directors and IDA task managers and sector leaders. Nonetheless, implementation was delayed by a lack of clear understanding and delineation of responsibility for different projects and project components; inadequate coordination with other donors; insufficient understanding of IDA procurement and disbursement procedures; and a lack of attention to the political and social implications of certain components. Moreover, monitoring and evaluation has been weak, one consequence of which has probably been to underestimate the global impact and, in particular, the impact on women and lower income groups. Despite these shortcomings, the *outcome* of IDA assistance for the urban sector is *highly satisfactory*.

3.19 The *institutional development impact* of the urban program has been *substantial*. The projects provided a forum for the Government to test new, more transparent mechanisms for competitive bidding and accounting; reinforced the technical capacity of major municipal services; strengthened the management and financial capacity of the communes; and built up the capacity of the private sector and local community organizations to undertake infrastructure construction and maintenance. As an added benefit, the new municipal administrative and financial structures created under the Second Urban Project have become the model for the gradual process of urban decentralization. Also of particular note is the support to the private sector through the AGETIP-like Faso Baara, which helped develop procedures to facilitate bidding by small and medium sized enterprises on government contracts and established the legal basis for sub-contracting to them.

3.20 The gradual process of urban decentralization, which started with municipal elections in 1995, will be key to the sustainability of IDA investments in the sector. However, many of the necessary changes are still in the early stages of implementation. The smooth transition of support for key project components between the Second Urban Project and the Urban Environment Project (FY95) has consolidated the gains made under the former. New initiatives under the latter, especially those to encourage greater community support for maintenance, user fees and taxes, will need similar consolidation. The country assistance strategy should concentrate on applying the lessons learned from the two major urban centers to the next phase of urban decentralization which focuses on the provincial capitals. Successful urban decentralization should eventually reduce the rapid growth of Ouagadougou which has exacerbated the city's historic problems with water and electricity. More effective collaboration with other donors and

with NGOs active in the secondary towns will be critical. *Sustainability* of the achievements in urban development will be *likely* if this collaboration takes place.

Human Resources

3.21 IDA support for **education** has had a *highly satisfactory outcome*. Between 1992 and 1997, current expenditures on primary education rose from 12.1 percent of the budget to 15.9 percent; primary enrollment rates rose from 23 percent in 1985 to 40 percent in 1997. The share of girls in enrollment in public primary schools increased from 31 percent in 1991 to 39 percent in 1997. Educational quality has improved: the success rate for the Certificate of Primary Education rose from 25 percent in 1985 to 53 percent in 1997, and the number of person-years required per certificate granted declined by one-third. To reduce the high recurrent teachers' salary cost, the Government is piloting, with IDA support, satellite schools which pay teachers half the salary paid to civil service teachers. Other cost saving measures, such as the combined system of double shift and multi-grade classes, and construction methods and bidding procedures that reduced classroom costs by half, have enabled the primary system to absorb 80,000 additional children and increased access for the poor.

3.22 The *institutional development impact* of IDA educational sector programs is *high*. The adoption of minimum budgetary allocations as a condition for adjustment and debt relief reinforced the effectiveness of IDA investments, and the latter strengthened the Government's capacity for planning, administering, and monitoring the sector. Although a lack of full communication between IDA and the national partners contributed to delays and other difficulties in the implementation of Education III, a highly participatory mid-term review of Education IV in 1995 appears to have increased the sense of ownership of the project by the Government. The participatory portfolio reviews organized by the Resident Mission have also promoted government participation in the identification and solution of problems.

3.23 *Sustainability* of the educational improvements is *likely*. Funding will be a critical factor; the inclusion of education funding in adjustment and debt reduction conditionality should help. Long-term sustainability is also enhanced by the reductions in cost and by an apparent increase in community input into maintenance of buildings and supplies, possibly due to the increased enrollments. Better data on attendance and success rates at the village level would help pinpoint successes and encourage complementary investment in educational infrastructure and pedagogical materials by NGOs and other donors

3.24 Following the recommendation by Stout, et. al. (1997) to use a dual system for ratings in the **health sector**, the CAE looked at the impact of IDA programs on health systems and on health outcomes. IDA was the major source of capital for the basic infrastructure, training and administrative models for the decentralized health system advocated by WHO. Successes include the formal introduction of health districts and the implementation of a generic drug delivery system. While the system is not yet fully operative, the infrastructure is in place; what remains is to follow through with the agreed restructuring of the Health Services and Nutrition Project to ensure that funds are delivered to and managed by the districts based on district-specific action plans. IDA also promoted an increase in the budget for health (as a percent of the national budget) and budget monitoring to sustain improved services. However, the share of recurrent budget resources allocated to the health sector in 1998 is only 8.9 percent, well below the HIPC target of 11 percent. The CAE rates the *outcome* of IDA's assistance to Burkina's *health system* as *marginally satisfactory*, due to its substantial impact on the institutions, but more limited impact on physician training, budget allocations, and monitoring.

3.25 The impact on *health outcomes* is also rated *marginally satisfactory*, although this is due partly to the lack of data to measure the impact. Indeed, recent figures collected by the E.U. show a steady decline in the utilization of health services in the decade up to 1996, a fact attributed to the poor quality of services found in a beneficiary assessment carried out in that year. However, early evidence indicates substantial improvements in certain areas (urban condom use, vaccination rates, introduction of and greater access to essential generic drugs, introduction of cost recovery, and a growing number of basic health care centers with adequate staffing), and recent data from a few sites even suggest that the spread of HIV may have been contained in the past few years. IDA helped Burkina develop one of the first multi-sector models for promoting AIDS awareness.

3.26 A major achievement of IDA's assistance to the health sector has been its support to the Ministry of Health in developing a more favorable policy, legal and regulatory framework. The Government has shown strong commitment to the institutional arrangements and incentives developed in the project restructuring workshop and supervision missions. However, *sustainability is uncertain*, because it depends on steps still to be taken: more effective arrangements for decentralized finance and administration; improved monitoring; better coordination between the Population and AIDS Project and the district-level health services; improved budgeting and financial analysis to increase cost-effectiveness and determine future budgetary needs; better coordination between the Ministry of Health and other ministries and donors; and initiatives to improve the quality and availability of health services based on demand. Especially important is IDA support for formulation of the first Ten Year National Health Sector Plan which attempts to develop an integrated model for increasing the demand for and supply of health services through public and private institutions and community based organizations across several sectors, including agriculture, water and education, as well as health. Care must be taken to integrate these efforts with the health component of the proposed rural development project which is still being designed.

Agriculture and Natural Resource Use

3.27 The *outcome* of IDA's agricultural program was *marginally satisfactory*. The research program claimed a doubling of yields over about 10 years for maize and upland rice in regions with adequate water, and Burkina became a regional leader in introducing low input, labor intensive technologies for natural resource conservation in semiarid regions. However, yield gains for the latter were so small as to be obscured by weather, area expansion and measurement problems. Obtaining aggregate yield gains of 3 to 4 percent for the traditional cereals will require inorganic fertilizers and the use of water retention techniques during the crop season with animal traction implements. The insufficient focus on cereals and on the functioning of input markets made investments less efficient than they might have been. The extension system greatly expanded its coverage, and impact studies show greater increases in yields for participants than for the control group.

3.28 The program achieved *substantial institutional impact*. A national research system emerged from dependency on expatriates, and the infrastructure facilitated regional decentralization. Similarly, the extension service grew from a number of programs to a unified service composed of village agents, regional specialists, and a national administration.²¹ Human

²¹ There is a question of whether the staff-intensive, top-down T&V approach to extension was the appropriate form of institutional change, even by the standards of the time. Nonetheless, some of the institutional structure and processes put in place are also appropriate for other extension approaches.

capital development was central. The veterinary service was reorganized and largely privatized, and put on a fee for services basis.

3.29 The scale of institutional development would have been much lower in the absence of IDA financing. IDA had a comparative advantage in facilitating the evolution of research and extension through the provision of technical services. The fact that these institutions did not address adequately the most pressing problems in the agricultural sector during this evolution is not surprising, as the ability to respond to difficult research-developmental problems is associated with a more mature system. Nevertheless, a greater emphasis on product rather than process in both the design and implementation stages by IDA would have resulted in a more rapid focusing of activities and probably more progress on agronomic technology development for increasing the productivity of the traditional cereals, sorghum and millet. Moreover, the impact on the cotton sector could have been much greater if the program has succeeded in restructuring the cotton sector so as to give a higher share of the earnings to producers.

3.30 The experimental Environmental Management Project (PNGT, FY91) created village land management committees to define and implement their priorities. This was a major reorientation from the traditional top-down approach, and it has been imitated by bilateral donors and NGOs. However, administrative costs were high, and the project reached only about 6 percent of the villages in Burkina. Only very late did it respond to village infrastructure priorities—in water, health, education and transportation—outside the natural resource categories. The next project will again encourage natural resource investments, but will broaden the allowed investments, and will help the communities obtain funding for other priorities from other donors and NGOs. Without considerably increased decentralization of the project, administrative costs are likely to be inordinately high.

3.31 Implementation of agricultural projects showed flexibility in responding to problems and opportunities that arose. For example, Agricultural Services I shifted funds from a poorly functioning literacy training program to credit for women's groups. The mid-term review of the PNGT led to an acceleration of village coverage and a broadening of lending activities to respond to village priorities.

3.32 Financial *sustainability* of research, and particularly of extension, is *uncertain*. The research program has moved the farthest toward establishing independent funding, due in part to substantial financing by the cotton parastatal. The consolidation and reduction of scope of research activities within Burkina, supplemented by improved collaboration with other countries in the region, could further improve their financial position. Sustainability is less certain for the extension services, which may continue to depend on long term donor support. NGOs mobilize additional financing for local level extension services. However, technical planning would be needed to integrate and maximize the efforts of the NGOs and the national extension service.

Other Sectors

3.33 A landlocked country, Burkina is highly dependent on its transport system. Transport costs are high. IDA lending for transportation was second only to agriculture in the 1970s and 1980s, but outcomes were poor, with only one of four completed road projects rated satisfactory. The outcome of a joint credit with Cote d'Ivoire for the jointly owned railway, was also unsatisfactory.²² The experience in the last 10 years has been far more positive, however. A

²² Transport corridor issues have not been addressed as was suggested in "Bank Lending for African Transport Corridors: an OED Review."

sector adjustment credit (FY92) assisted in privatizing or increasing private sector participation in the railway, the urban transport company, road maintenance and the airline (in preparation). Although data are limited, the results so far indicate improvements in transport efficiency. Moreover, the small and medium enterprise sector now carrying out road maintenance has blossomed, with over 1,000 enterprises, and thousands of jobs created. The credit aimed to improve the efficiency of infrastructure investment, with conditions on the minimum required rates of return; this did not prevent donor funding of low priority road projects, at the expense of more critical expenditures, such as road maintenance.

3.34 Gold mining has potential for growth in Burkina, and could add significantly to export earnings. It could also attract significant foreign investment. However, the slow progress toward achieving a consensus on the issue of private sector participation in the country has constrained its development. The Mining Capacity Building Project (FY97) should improve the enabling environment for private investment, as should actions taken under the Private Sector Assistance Project.

3.35 Despite efforts under the Private Sector Assistance project, IDA has not yet succeeded in reducing the high costs of utilities in Burkina (electricity, telecommunications and water). These are being addressed only now, possibly too late to prevent loss of industry as West African Economic and Monetary Union free trade goes into effect.

Efficiency of IDA Assistance

3.36 Annex Table 9 shows the costs of IDA's lending and ESW program. Costs for project preparation and for ESW are well below the average for Africa and for the Bank as a whole; Burkina's budget is also slightly below the country norm.²³ In this sense, the program is efficient. Supervision costs are somewhat higher than average. The relatively low cost of bringing projects to the Board (86 percent of the African average over the last 10 years) may result from the participatory approach used in Burkina and the substitution of local expertise for IDA staff (the cost to the Borrower is not included). On the other hand, the higher than average cost of supervision (25 percent above the average) could reflect problems arising from shortcomings in preparation. The very low average cost for ESW (28 percent of Africa as a whole) probably reflects the fact that for the period under review, ESW has consisted of specialized reports, some of them very useful, but has been less helpful in providing a comprehensive development framework (see paras. 2.6-2.14).

3.37 The efficacy of Burkina's lending program was probably reduced by the very high turnover in the country team during the last 10 years, due in part to the series of reorganizations in the Region. There have been 5 directors in the last 8 years, and 4 country economists, in addition to a six-month hiatus between appointments (Annex Table 10). These changes caused disruptions in the continuity of the dialogue and in project preparation and supervision. Moreover, the resulting short institutional memory meant that much of the informal economic and sector work was "lost." It should be noted that turnover among government counterparts has also been high.

²³ Based on data for FY97.

Aid Coordination²⁴

3.38 Eighty percent of Burkina's public investment program is donor-funded, and the number of donors is large, but, as noted above, aid coordination is weak. The Government does not have a coherent development strategy linking sectoral plans to macroeconomic policies, and projects tend to support donor, rather than government, priorities. Inadequate coordination both stems from and contributes to the absence of sector strategies. In the health sector, for example, there are several bilateral donors, as well as about 200 NGOs; many of them have their own priorities, and it is extremely difficult to reach a consensus. The education sector has had similar problems, but made a concerted effort to develop a single sector strategy after the mid-term review of the Education IV project in 1994. In the transport sector, the failure of the Government to apply minimum rates of returns to some donor-supported road construction led to delays in disbursement of the last tranche of IDA's Transport Sector Adjustment Credit. Burkina's selection as a pilot country for the harmonization of conditionalities under the Strategic Partnership with Africa should help resolve some of these problems.

3.39 Burkina is a UNDP roundtable country. The last Roundtable was held in 1995. Donor coordination in the country takes place by sector, with different donors organizing each sector. Meetings are quite regular, but they tend to consist of exchanges of information, rather than a consideration of priorities. IDA is criticized for not consulting with its partners, but rather informing them after the fact of its decisions. The 1997 Client Feedback Survey revealed that 50 percent of donors and partners found their relationship with IDA to be simply reactive; none felt there was a partnership, and only 10 percent were satisfied with IDA.²⁵ The large number of donors present in Burkina makes coordination and strategic selectivity by the various partners particularly important.

3.40 The Government has undertaken a study of the Public Investment Program, which will develop an analytical framework for public investment. This would be a major step in improving aid coordination. The strategies prepared recently or under preparation in a number of sectors should greatly facilitate this exercise, but the continued absence of a framework integrating the sector strategies may make it difficult to complete this exercise.

Global Ratings

3.41 Based on the above findings about achievements and shortcomings of lending, aid coordination and economic and sector work, IDA's program in Burkina over the last decade has had, on balance, a *marginally satisfactory outcome*. This rating reflects the program's high levels of achievement in the education, urban, and transport sectors, but more mediocre performance on structural adjustment, health and agriculture. The outcome is actually quite commendable in the context of the physical constraints facing the country and the major economic and political shifts that occurred during the period. The program is noteworthy for its participatory approach to achieving a consensus on project and policy goals. *The institutional development impact has been substantial* in all but a few areas. *Sustainability is still uncertain*, and will depend on whether the still needed reforms receive sufficient political support. In addition, Burkina will continue to need continued support from IDA in order to complete the adjustment program and continue to progress in the social sectors.

²⁴ Annex Table 3 shows the actors that have been involved in each activity in Burkina.

²⁵ The donors faulted IDA particularly with respect to its lack of flexibility and beneficiary participation and its work on poverty, the environment, the private sector and strengthening of the public sector.

4. Lessons and Recommendations

4.1 A central lesson from IDA's experience in Burkina is that *careful, participatory preparation of projects pays off*. This lesson emerges strongly from a comparison of projects in the agricultural, education, health and urban sectors. Regular communications between the country economist and the task manager and between the resident member of the country team and the Borrower were critical in permitting loan objectives to adjust to new opportunities and constraints. *Extended dialogue for consensus building was a major factor in the lengthy preparation period for some of the projects, but their implementation tended to be smoother as a result.*

4.2 Even with careful preparation, *development is a slow process, and expectations should be realistic about both the time required to implement change and that required to realize visible results*. In the case of structural adjustment, notwithstanding close cooperation and intensive discussion with the Government, and strong efforts to ensure public support for the program, the implementation of reforms remains slow, difficult and highly demanding. In retrospect, it is apparent that the strength of the Government's commitment to adjustment—particularly to privatization and civil service reform—was less than appeared to be the case at the outset, and the difficulties confronting it considerably more severe. IDA expected too much, too soon, partly because it did not take adequate account of Burkina's social, political, and institutional constraints; this was true in sectoral interventions as well (e.g., health). *The identification of such constraints, and of measures to deal with them, should be an integral part of project preparation.*

4.3 A key lesson for the Bank, in recognition of the length and difficulty of policy reform and the degree of persistence, skill and detailed knowledge required to carry it out successfully, is to ensure *continuity in the country team*. For such an important and (in the case of structural adjustment) massive undertaking, intermittent monitoring and supervision directed primarily at determining the fulfillment of project conditionality, and particularly if accompanied by frequent staff changes, is inadequate.

4.4 *On the job training of Burkinabè staff and consultants on IDA projects and studies has enabled them to make major contributions to the quality of subsequent operations*. This effect can be seen in the increase in Burkinabè input into recent urban and education projects. In the health sector, a series of events which limited the training of physicians under the Health Services Project was a key factor in their lower than ideal levels of input into the design and implementation of the Health and Nutrition Project.

4.5 *Integration of critical sectoral issues into the macroeconomic policy dialogue has provided important support to some sectors*. Setting targets for public expenditures on health and education as conditionality for adjustment and debt relief lending reinforced the projects in those sectors and should help ensure their sustainability.

4.6 *Focusing on poverty benchmarks in adjustment and debt relief operations was a critical factor in gaining the attention of the Government and IDA task managers on these issues. Gender issues could be similarly incorporated*. Interventions to alleviate poverty should be reinforced with analytical assistance and training for national teams to conduct poverty monitoring and research.²⁶

²⁶ This lesson was also noted in OED, 1996.

4.7 *IDA analytical support has in some cases played a catalytic role in generating political support for a shift in strategy. The computer simulation model of the education sector led to a major reorientation of the national system for primary education. Similarly, IDA support helped the Government conceptualize a new model for urban services linking basic infrastructure investments to the strengthening of the communal government's ability to manage the infrastructure.*

4.8 *Decentralization continues to be a major issue that will need to be addressed in every project. IDA should continue to support the ongoing Burkinabè processes of decentralizing the country's financial and administrative systems and its institutions (rural and urban) through support to individual projects and to more broadly based administrative reforms.*

4.9 *A critical need identified across all sectors is for better statistics for monitoring and evaluation. From national accounts to school enrollments, to costs of health care, to agricultural yields, better data would permit the measurement of achievements and identification of the more successful strategies.*

4.10 *Another finding common to many sectors was the lack of familiarity of staff, in the Bank and in the Government, with key pieces of recent World Bank work on their sectors, as well as with much of the literature available on Burkina itself. There is no central library or annotated bibliography of key IDA or other studies on Burkina, and the CAE team itself found it difficult to find relevant economic and sector work. *More active dissemination, documentation (through hard copy and electronic annotated bibliographies) and discussion of the literature, in both the Bank and the country, and in French, as well as in English, is essential to ensure that experience from Burkina and other countries informs the design of future efforts.**

Strategic Considerations

4.11 *IDA could play a bigger part in establishing the analytical framework within which the Government can integrate the activities and investments of all donors. IDA's involvement in a broad range of sectors and issues in Burkina make it the logical focus for efforts to provide an objective analysis of Burkina's long-term development needs and identify priorities. The IMF has a comparative advantage in advising the Government on the management of public finances and in monetary matters, but would need to continue to work with IDA to harmonize short-term fiscal and balance of payments objectives with the longer term need to promote efficient resource allocation.*

4.12 *At the sectoral level, population and AIDS control must be at the center of the agenda because of the overriding economic and humanitarian importance of these issues, and the fact that no other donor is tackling them effectively. IDA has been particularly effective in education, and can continue to play a role in this sector, with a renewed emphasis on literacy training. In the agricultural sector it should emphasize the promotion of appropriate technology for fertilization and water retention for dryland agronomy and continue to stress the need to reorganize the cotton sector to ensure a higher share of earnings for producers. Future intervention in the urban sector should concentrate on the consolidation of gains in the two major cities and an analysis of the lessons learned for application (with financing by other donors) to the development of provincial capitals for the next phase of urban decentralization. Finally, among the many issues to be followed up in the area of adjustment, IDA should give particular emphasis to privatization, private sector development, factor costs, regulation of monopolies, and reform of governance.*

Box 4.1: Burkina Faso - Good Practices



Urban Development: IDA's support to the urban sector has led to a substantial increase in the number of urban poor with reliable water supply, sanitation services and access roads. The projects provided a forum for the Government to test new, more transparent mechanisms for competitive bidding and accounting; reinforced the technical capacity of major municipal services; strengthened the management and financial capacity of the communes; and built up the capacity of the private sector and local community organizations to undertake infrastructure construction and maintenance. The new municipal administrative and financial structures created under the Second Urban Project have become the model for the gradual process of urban decentralization.

Participation: The IDA country team adopted a highly participatory process for reaching a consensus on the definition of poverty and actions to alleviate it. The information collected from participatory poverty assessments, a poverty profile and a series of public expenditure reviews was fed into discussions among the Government, civil society, unions and donors that were organized in conjunction with preparation of the 1996 Country Assistance Strategy. Preparations for the upcoming CAS have been similarly participatory.


Burkina Faso at a glance

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
POVERTY and SOCIAL	Burkina Faso	Sub-Saharan Africa	Low-income		
1997					
Population, mid-year (<i>millions</i>)	10.9	614	2,048		
GNP per capita (<i>Atlas method, US\$</i>)	240	500	350		
GNP (<i>Atlas method, US\$ billions</i>)	2.6	309	722		
Average annual growth, 1991-97					
Population (%)	2.8	2.7	2.1		
Labor force (%)	2.1	2.6	2.3		
Most recent estimate (latest year available, 1991-97)					
Poverty (% of population below national poverty line)		
Urban population (% of total population)	17	32	28		
Life expectancy at birth (<i>years</i>)	46	52	59		
Infant mortality (<i>per 1,000 live births</i>)	97	90	78		
Child malnutrition (% of children under 5)	33	..	61		
Access to safe water (% of population)	78	44	71		
Illiteracy (% of population age 15+)	81	43	47		
Gross primary enrollment (% of school-age population)	38	75	91		
Male	46	82	100		
Female	30	67	81		
KEY ECONOMIC RATIOS and LONG-TERM TRENDS					
	1976	1986	1996	1997	
GDP (<i>US\$ billions</i>)	0.87	1.9	2.5	2.4	
Gross domestic investment/GDP	25.8	21.6	24.8	25.4	
Exports of goods and services/GDP	9.3	9.4	12.2	13.8	
Gross domestic savings/GDP	6.5	-1.4	7.5	9.2	
Gross national savings/GDP	6.5	9.4	12.7	14.1	
Current account balance/GDP	-13.4	-12.2	-12.0	-11.4	
Interest payments/GDP	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.6	
Total debt/GDP	9.9	34.3	51.0	54.2	
Total debt service/exports	3.0	10.1	11.3	11.2	
Present value of debt/GDP	25.9	..	
Present value of debt/exports	152.5	..	
	1976-86	1987-97	1996	1997	1998-02
(<i>average annual growth</i>)					
GDP	3.6	3.0	6.0	5.5	5.6
GNP per capita	1.2	0.0	3.2	2.9	3.0
Exports of goods and services	2.6	0.4	1.8	14.2	5.5

**STRUCTURE of the ECONOMY**

	1976	1986	1996	1997
(% of GDP)				
Agriculture	34.8	33.4	34.8	32.1
Industry	30.1	22.1	25.2	26.8
Manufacturing	19.6	16.2
Services	35.1	44.5	40.0	41.0
Private consumption	82.0	86.9	79.3	78.5
General government consumption	11.4	14.5	13.1	12.3
Imports of goods and services	28.5	32.4	29.5	30.1



	1976-86	1987-97	1996	1997
(<i>average annual growth</i>)				
Agriculture	2.2	3.6	7.4	0.7
Industry	2.0	1.1	3.3	10.6
Manufacturing	2.6
Services	7.6	2.9	6.5	8.0
Private consumption	3.1	2.6	2.6	5.7
General government consumption	7.3	1.6	2.6	5.7
Gross domestic investment	5.4	2.4	35.0	0.2
Imports of goods and services	3.8	0.4	9.8	0.9
Gross national product	3.7	2.8	6.0	5.7



Note: 1997 data are preliminary estimates.

* The diamonds show four key indicators in the country (in bold) compared with its income-group average. If data are missing, the diamond will be incomplete.

Annex Table 2: Economic and Social Indicators: Burkina Faso and Comparators

	<i>Per Capita GNP (\$m), 1997</i>	<i>GDP Growth Rate, 1990-97 (% p.a.)</i>	<i>Life Expectancy at Birth, 1996</i>	<i>Total Fertility Rate (Births per Woman), 1996</i>	<i>Under 5 Mortality Rate (per '000), 1996</i>	<i>Adult Illiteracy Rate (% of pop. 15 and over), 1995</i>		<i>Access to Safe Water (% of pop.), 1995</i>	<i>Access to Sanitation (% of pop.), 1995</i>	<i>Urban Population (% of total), 1997</i>
						<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>			
Burkina Faso	240	3.3	46	6.7	158	71	91	78	18	17
Benin	380	4.5	55	5.9	140	51	74	50	20	40
Côte d'Ivoire	690	3.0	54	5.1	150	50	70	72	54	45
Mali	260	3.3	50	6.7	220	61	77	37	31	28
Niger	200	1.5	47	7.4	n.a.	79	93	53	15	19
Senegal	550	2.4	50	5.7	88	57	77	50	58	45
Togo	330	2.2	50	6.2	138	33	63	n.a.	22	32

Source: World Bank.

Annex Table 3: Burkina Faso: Comprehensive Development Framework

		Structural			Human		Physical					Specific Strategies		
		(1) <i>Good and Clean Governance & Justice System</i>	(2) <i>Financial System</i>	(3) <i>Social Safety Net & Social Programs</i>	(4) <i>Education</i>	(5) <i>Health & Population</i>	(6) <i>Water & Sewerage, Urban</i>	(7) <i>Energy</i>	(8) <i>Transport & Telecoms</i>	(9) <i>Environmental & Cultural Issues</i>	(10) <i>Agric. & Rural Development</i>	(11) <i>Industry & Mining</i>	(12) <i>Urban Strategy</i>	(13) <i>Private Sector Strategy</i>
The Activities of Partners in the Development Process	Government:													
	National	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Local			✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	
	World Bank	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Other Multilateral & Bilateral Institutions	Netherlands SDC Belgium UNDP EU France Germany Denmark ADB UNICEF Canada BADEA BID	BOAD		Luxembourg Netherlands Norway SDC Austria Belgium France Denmark Germany Taiwan ADB BID UNICEF	Netherlands Belgium Norway Japan EU France Germany Denmark Taiwan ADB BID UNICEF	Netherlands Belgium France Germany Canada Switzerland Denmark Taiwan EU ADB BID BADEA UNICEF	Netherlands France EU Denmark Germany BID BADEA	Belgium Denmark France Netherlands Germany Taiwan Arab funds ADB BID BADEA EU	Luxembourg Netherlands	Luxembourg Netherlands NORAD Belgium Canada Finland France E.U. U.S. IFAD FAO Germany Denmark ADB BID UNICEF	Belgium	Netherlands	Luxembourg SDC
Civil Society, NGOs	✓			✓	✓					✓	✓	✓		
Private Sector		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓			✓			

BADEA = Banque Arabe pour le Développement Economique en Afrique (Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa)

BID = Banque Islamique de Développement (Islamic Development Bank)

BOAD = Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (West African Development Bank)

**SUMMARY OF
PROJECT INFORMATION:
4. Proj. Info.**

TOTAL APPROVED PROJECTS*					TOTAL APPROVED PROJECTS, BY PERIOD (FY)					
	Number	Percent	Value \$m	Percent	Period	Number	Percent	Value \$m	Percent	
Adjustment Loans	4	8%	148.0	16%	1969-1982	21	43%	235.6	26%	
Non-Adjustment Loans	45	92%	762.1	84%	1983-1986	7	14%	87.8	10%	
TOTAL	49	100%	910.1	100%	1987-1990	3	6%	82.1	9%	
OED OUTCOME RATINGS					1991-1999*	18	37%	504.6	55%	
	Number	Percent	Value \$m	Percent	TOTAL	49	100%	910.1	100%	
<i>Satisfactory Outcome</i>					OED SATISFACTORY OUTCOME RATINGS BY PERIOD**					
Adjustment Loans	3	100%	133.0	100%		Loans Rated	% Satisfact.	Value \$m	% Satisfact.	
Non-Adjustment Loans	25	76%	297.8	78%	1969-1982					
Total	28	78%	430.8	84%	Adjustment Loans	0		0.0		
<i>Unsatisfactory Outcome</i>					Non-Adjustment Loans	22	68%	200.1	62%	
Adjustment Loans	0	0%	0	0%	Period Total	22	68%	200.1	62%	
Non-Adjustment Loans	8	24%	81.6	22%	1983-1986					
Total	8	22%	81.6	16%	Adjustment Loans	0		0.0		
TOTAL RATED	36		512.5		Non-Adjustment Loans	7	86%	68.5	93%	
OED SUSTAINABILITY RATINGS					Period Total	7	86%	68.5	93%	
	Number	Percent	Value \$m	Percent	1987-1990					
<i>Likely Sustainability</i>					Adjustment Loans	0		0.0		
Adjustment Loans	2	67%	53.0	40%	Non-Adjustment Loans	3	100%	90.9	100%	
Non-Adjustment Loans	9	53%	124.1	44%	Period Total	3	100%	90.9	100%	
Total Likely Sustainability	11	55%	177.1	43%	1991-1999					
<i>Uncertain Sustainability</i>					Adjustment Loans	3	100%	133.0	100%	
Adjustment Loans	1	33%	80	60%	Non-Adjustment Loans	1	100%	20.0	100%	
Non-Adjustment Loans	5	29%	141.1	50%	Period Total	4	100%	153.0	100%	
Total Uncertain Sustainability	6	30%	221.1	53%	All:1969-1999					
<i>Unlikely Sustainability</i>					Adjustment Loans	3	100%	133.0	100%	
Adjustment Loans	0	0%	0	0%	Non-Adjustment Loans	33	76%	379.5	78%	
Non-Adjustment Loans	3	18%	15.3	5%	TOTAL RATED	36	78%	512.5	84%	
Total Unlikely Sustainability	3	15%	15.3	4%	ARPP RATINGS OF ONGOING PROJECTS (3/5/99)					
TOTAL RATED	20	100%	413.5	100%		Number	Percent	Value \$m	Percent	
OED INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT RATINGS					<i>Development Objectives</i>					
	Number	Percent	Value \$m	Percent	Satisfactory	9	75%	254.7	80%	
<i>Substantial ID</i>					Unsatisfactory	3	25%	62.5	20%	
Adjustment Loans	0	0%	0.0	0%	TOTAL	12	100%	317.2	100%	
Non-Adjustment Loans	5	29%	97.2	35%	<i>Implementation Progress</i>					
Total Substantial ID	5	25%	97.2	23%	Satisfactory	11	92%	310.2	98%	
<i>Moderate ID</i>					Unsatisfactory	1	8%	7.0	2%	
Adjustment Loans	1	33%	28.0	21%	TOTAL	12	100%	317.2	100%	
Non-Adjustment Loans	9	53%	127.5	45%	DISCONNECT FOR BURKINA FASO					
Total Moderate ID	10	50%	155.5	38%	<i>No. of projects</i>	ARPP % Sat	OED % Sat	<i>Net disc. at exit*</i>		
<i>Negligible ID</i>					Since FY80:	31	93%	74%	19%	
Adjustment Loans	2	67%	105	79%	Last 5 FYs:	9	100%	100%	0%	
Non-Adjustment Loans	3	18%	56	20%	(*) The net disconnect (based on ARPP FY exit) is an indication of the optimism in supervision ratings. The number of projects for which both the OED and ARPP ratings are available may differ from the total number of projects evaluated by OED.					
Total Negligible ID	5	25%	161	39%						
TOTAL RATED	20	100%	413.5	100%						

*as of March 11, 1999.

**Based on FY of Board approval.

Note: includes projects evaluated through January 31, 1999.

Sources: OED, OPR, CTR..

OEDCR/GW

OED Evaluation Findings: Africa Region

Country	Total Approved Projects \$ million (***)	FY 99 Actual Commit.\$ million (***)	OED Rated Projects					Projects Under Supervision (3/5/99)(*)				Past Disconnect (**)	
			Number of Projects	Value \$ million	Satis. Outcome (%)	Likely Sustain. (%)	Subst. Instit. Devt. (%)	Total Number of Projects	Total Value \$ million	Satisfact. Development Objectives (%)	Satisfactory Implement. Progress (%)	Since FY80 (%)	Last 5 FYs (%)
Burkina Faso	910	20	36	513	84	43	23	14	337	80	98	19	0
AFR	60,047	973	1514	36,294	63	31	23	424	15,687	83	85	22	15
Bank-wide	452,879	18,588	4,779	231,692	75	56	36	1,668	137,399	90	87	18	11

(*) Totals for number/value of projects; percentages based on rated projects only.

(**) Based on projects evaluated by OED through January 31, 1999. The disconnect (based on ARPP FY exit) is the difference between the share of projects rated satisfactory during their last supervision year and the share of the same projects rated satisfactory after completion. Thus, it is an indication of the optimism in supervision ratings.

(***) Through March 11, 1999.

Annex Table 6: BURKINA FASO - OED Evaluations through January 31, 1999

<i>Ln./Cr.</i>	<i>Project Name</i>	<i>INV/ADJ</i>	<i>Net comm. (US\$m)</i>	<i>Approval date</i>	<i>ARPP exit FY</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Sust</i>	<i>ID Impact</i>	<i>Latest Report Type</i>	<i>Latest Report Number</i>	<i>Latest Report Date</i>
AGRICULTURE											
C0225	West Volta cotton project	Investment	6.2	#####	1978	S			PAR	01188	02-Jun-76
C0317	Rural development fund project	Investment	2.2	6/8/1972	1977	S			PAR	02793	28-Dec-79
C0442	West Africa - Drought relief fund	Investment	2.0	#####	1978	S			PAR	03528	24-Jun-81
C0496	Bougouriba agricultural development	Investment	8.0	5/28/1974	1981	S			PAR	02651	04-Sep-79
C0557	Livestock development project	Investment	6.0	5/27/1975	1984	U			PAR	03839	01-Mar-82
C0640	Second rural development fund	Investment	9.4	6/8/1976	1983	S			PCR	04499	17-May-83
C0706	West Volta agricultural development	Investment	3.6	5/3/1977	1983	S			PAR	02639	23-Aug-79
C0982	Forestry project	Investment	6.7	2/12/1980	1986	U	UNL	NEG	PAR	04547	15-Jun-83
C1013	Nièna Dionkele rice development	Investment	3.7	4/29/1980	1987	U	UNL	NEG	PCR	06737	16-Apr-87
	Second Bougouriba agricultural development										
C1097		Investment	12.3	1/28/1981	1989	S	LIK	SUB	PAR	05234	17-Aug-84
C1218	Third rural development fund	Investment	16.0	3/30/1982	1990	S	UNC	MOD	PAR	04541	15-Jun-83
C1284	Boucle du Mouhoun agricultural develop.	Investment	2.5	7/27/1982	1988	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	04494	16-May-83
C1285	Hauts-Bassins agricultural development	Investment	1.8	7/27/1982	1988	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	05175	20-Jun-84
C1293	Koudougou agricultural pilot	Investment	5.0	9/21/1982	1989	U	UNL	MOD	PCR	06977	15-Oct-87
C1550	Fertilizer project	Investment	7.6	2/26/1985	1993	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	07032	01-Dec-87
C1896	Agricultural Research	Investment	17.9	4/19/1988	1997	S	UNC	SUB	PAR	07251	24-May-88
C1979	Agricultural Services	Investment	41.7	1/17/1989	1998	S	UNC	SUB	PCR	08358	06-Feb-90
C2381	Agric. Sector Adj.	Adjustment	28.0	6/9/1992	1996	S	LIK	MOD	PAR	13226	28-Jun-94
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>180.6</i>								
EDUCATION											
C0430	Education project	Investment	2.9	6/21/1973	1980	S			PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
C0956	Second education project	Investment	10.4	#####	1986	S			PCR	12001	30-Jun-93
C1598	Primary Education Dev.	Investment	20.3	5/21/1985	1994	S	LIK	MOD	PAR	13225	28-Jun-94
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>33.5</i>								
FINANCE											
C0759	Artisan and small and medium scale enterprise project	Investment	3.2	#####	1986	U			PCR	09167	30-Nov-90
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>3.2</i>								
MINING											
C1482	Mining Exploration & Technical Assistance	Investment	5.3	5/24/1984	1992	S	LIK	SUB	PAR	09699	28-Jun-91

<i>Ln./Cr.</i>	<i>Project Name</i>	<i>INV/ADJ</i>	<i>Net comm. (US\$m)</i>	<i>Approval date</i>	<i>ARPP exit FY</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Sust</i>	<i>ID Impact</i>	<i>Latest Report Type</i>	<i>Latest Report Number</i>	<i>Latest Report Date</i>
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		5.3								
MULTISECTOR											
C2281	SAL 1	Adjustment	80.0	6/27/1991	1995	S	UNC	NEG	PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
C2590	Economic Recovery Credit	Adjustment	25.0	3/29/1994	1995	S	LIK	NEG	PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		105.0								
POPULATION, HEALTH AND NUTRITION											
C1607	Health Services Development	Investment	26.0	6/11/1985	1995	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	11289	16-Oct-92
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		26.0								
SOCIAL SECTOR											
C2282	Public Works & Employment	Investment	20.0	6/27/1991	1996	S	UNC	SUB	PCR	13817	29-Dec-94
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		20.0								
TELECOMMUNICATIONS											
C0141	Telecommunications project	Investment	0.8	2/11/1969	1975	S			EVM	15503	29-Dec-95
C0431	Second telecommunications	Investment	4.5	6/21/1973	1979	S			EVM		20-Jun-96
C1235	Third telecommunications	Investment	17.0	4/27/1982	1989	S	LIK	MOD	EVM		06-Oct-97
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		22.3								
TRANSPORTATION											
C0316	Cotton road project	Investment	4.2	6/8/1972	1980	U			ES		14-Aug-98
C0579	Rural roads project	Investment	7.5	6/26/1975	1982	U			ES		08-Jun-98
C0653	Third highway project	Investment	20.0	7/1/1976	1981	S			EVM		28-Jun-96
C1164	Fourth highway project	Investment	45.5	6/16/1981	1989	U	UNC	NEG	EVM		10-Sep-97
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		77.2								
URBAN DEVELOPMENT											
C0766	Urban development project	Investment	8.2	1/31/1978	1986	S			EVM		31-Dec-96
C2067	Urban 2	Investment	31.3	#####	1997	S	LIK	MOD	EVM		28-Jun-96
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		39.5								
GRAND TOTAL:	36 operations		512.5								

**Annex Table 7: Average APPI, Burkina Faso & Selected Comparators, ARPP Exit Years
FY90-98**

(standard deviation in parentheses)

	<i>Simple Average (by project)</i>	<i>Weighted Average (by Net Commitments)</i>	<i>Number of Projects</i>	<i>Total Net Commitments (Million US\$, FY96)</i>
Burkina Faso	7.23 (0.74)	7.08 (0.73)	11	366
Africa	5.81 (1.80)	6.10 (1.80)	542	23,621
Bank	6.43 (1.87)	6.78 (1.85)	1,667	145,119

Annex Table 8: Burkina Faso: Active Loans as of end-February 1999

Project ID	Fiscal Year of Approval	Name of Project	Commitment Amount	Undisbursed	Difference between expected and actual disbursements ^a	Last ARPP Supervision Rating ^b		Project At Risk
						Dev. Obj.	Imp. Prog.	
BF-PE-301	1992	PUBLIC INSTITUTIONAL	15.00	6.60	0.00	S	S	Nonrisky
BF-PE-276	1992	TRANSPORT SECAL	66.00	15.57	8.99	S	S	Nonrisky
BF-PE-303	1993	FOOD SECURITY	7.50	.59	0.00	S	S	Nonrisky
BF-PE-289	1993	PRIVATE SECTOR ASSIS	7.00	3.93	0.00	U	U	Actual
BF-PE-308	1994	POPULATION/AIDS CONT	26.30	12.95	0.00	U	S	Actual
BF-PE-287	1994	HEALTH/NUTRITION	29.20	15.44	0.00	U	S	Actual
BF-PE-297	1995	URBAN ENV	37.00	26.15	10.58	S	S	Nonrisky
BF-PE-304	1997	POST-PRIMARY EDUC.	26.00	22.84	0.00	S	S	Nonrisky
BF-PE-283	1997	MINING CAPACITY BUIL	21.40	19.37	0.00	S	S	Nonrisky
BF-PE-296	1998	AG SERVICES II	41.30	40.08	.58	S	S	Nonrisky
BF-PE-50886	1999	PRIVATE IRRIGATION	5.20	5.18	0.00			Nonrisky
Total			281.90	168.70	20.15			

a. Intended disbursements to date minus actual disbursements to date as projected at appraisal.

b. S = Satisfactory; U = Unsatisfactory. Ratings as of March 4, 1999.

Sources: OPR (CAS Annex B8) & QAG.

Annex Table 9: Country Assistance Cost Indicators

<i>Period:</i>	<i>Average completion cost (\$000 per project)</i>		<i>Supervision intensity: Direct cost inputs divided by the no. of projects under active supervision (\$000)</i>		<i>Average cost per dropped project (\$000)</i>		<i>Cost per scheduled ESW report (\$000)</i>		<i>Cost per unscheduled ESW report (\$000)</i>	
	<i>FY94-98</i>	<i>FY89-98</i>	<i>FY94-98</i>	<i>FY90-98</i>	<i>FY94-98</i>	<i>FY90-98</i>	<i>FY94-98</i>	<i>FY89-98</i>	<i>FY94-98</i>	<i>FY89-98</i>
Bank-wide	353.0	323.7	63.4	52.7	94.1	81.4	181.7	163.1	70.3	61.5
Africa	355.0	314.7	64.9	55.2	90.3	72.5	169.2	155.0	76.9	62.8
Burkina Faso	238.9	272.1	78.2	68.9	56.8	26.5	-	44.1	31.2	26.2

Source: PBD

Annex Table 10: Bank's Senior Management and Country Team Responsible for Burkina Faso in Last Ten Years

<i>FY</i>	<i>Vice President</i>	<i>Director</i>	<i>Division Chief</i>	<i>Res. Representative</i>	<i>Country Officer</i>	<i>Country Economist</i>
1990	Kim Jaycox	Mike Gillette	Lawrence Hinkle	Claude Delapierre	Joe Ingram	Olga Jonas
1991	Kim Jaycox	Mike Gillette	Lawrence Hinkle	Claude Delapierre	Joe Ingram	Olga Jonas
1992	Kim Jaycox	Mike Gillette	Lawrence Hinkle	Claude Delapierre	Whitney Foster	Olga Jonas/Anne Doize
1993	Kim Jaycox	Katherine Marshall (7/92)	Jean-Louis Sarbib	Albert Osei	Whitney Foster	Anne Doize/Olga Jones
1994	Kim Jaycox	Katherine Marshall	Jean-Louis Sarbib	Albert Osei	Whitney Foster	Anne Doize
1995	Kim Jaycox	Olivier Lafourcade (7/94)	Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (7/94)	Albert Osei	Whitney Foster	Hans Martin Boehmer
1996	Kim Jaycox	Olivier Lafourcade	n.a.	Albert Osei (to 11/96)	Whitney Foster	<i>6 mo. hiatus; temp. arrangements</i>
1997	Kim Jaycox	Serge Michailoff (7/96)	n.a.	Manga Kuoh (5/97)	Francoise Perrot*	Celestin Monga
1998	Jean-Louis Sarbib	Hasan Tuluy (5/97)	n.a.	Manga Kuoh	Francoise Perrot	Celestin Monga
1999	Jean-Louis Sarbib	Hasan Tuluy	n.a.	Manga Kuoh	Francoise Perrot	Celestin Monga

*Program Officer (country officer position abolished in 11/96).

Annex Table 11: Burkina Faso: ESW List since January 1989

<i>Report title</i>	Type of Report	Date	Report #
Agriculture (2)			
Analyse Economique de la Competitivité des Filières Agricoles et des Sources Potentielles de Croissance du Secteur Agricole au Burkina Faso (Nicolas Gergely)	SR	1/99	Informal
Rural Women in the Sahel and their Access to Agricultural Extension	SR	06/95	13532
Decentralization (1)			
Local Level Institutions, Rural Decentralization, and Poverty Alleviation in Burkina Faso (P. Donnelly-Roark, K. Ouedraogo, and Xiao Ye)	SR	1999	Informal
Education (2)			
Public Expenditure Review for Primary Education: Alternative Policy Simulations	SR	02/99	Informal
The Dynamics of Education Policymaking	EDI Case Study	05/94	13481
Environment (1)			
National environmental action plan	EAP	8/1/93	E12
Multisector (4)			
Country Assistance Strategy	CAS	6/13/96	15740
Country Assistance Strategy	CAS	5/9/94	10315
Economic Memorandum	ER	12/05/89	7594
Rapport de Synthèse de la Mission de Consultation sur l'Evaluation des Capacités au Burkina Faso	SR	—	Informal
Power (3)			
Note sur le Secteur de l'Energie	SR	01/99	Informal
Secteur Electrique: Programme de Développement au Moindre Cout – Production et Transport	SR	06/98	Informal
Electric power sector development review	SR	02/28/94	11703
Public Sector Management (2)			
A Preliminary Investigation of the Impact of UEMOA Tariffs on the Fiscal Resources of Burkina Faso (Douglas Addison)	SR	04/03/98	Informal
Public Expenditure Review	ER	05/26/93	11901
Social (3)			
Poverty in Burkina Faso: Building Consensus for Action — A Progress Report	SR	06/97	Informal
Evolving Participation — Institutional Issues in Participatory Development: Case Study: Burkina Faso (Della McMillan, Sylvestre Bangré Ouedraogo, Fernand Sanou, Michel Sombié, André Roch Compaoré, Abdou Salam Drabo)	SR	05/94	Informal
Burkina Faso: Women in Development Assessment	SR	1993	Informal

Annex Table 6: BURKINA FASO - OED Evaluations through January 31, 1999

<i>Ln./Cr.</i>	<i>Project Name</i>	<i>INV/ADJ</i>	<i>Net comm. (US\$m)</i>	<i>Approval date</i>	<i>ARPP exit FY</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Sust</i>	<i>ID Impact</i>	<i>Latest Report Type</i>	<i>Latest Report Number</i>	<i>Latest Report Date</i>
AGRICULTURE											
C0225	West Volta cotton project	Investment	6.2	#####	1978	S			PAR	01188	02-Jun-76
C0317	Rural development fund project	Investment	2.2	6/8/1972	1977	S			PAR	02793	28-Dec-79
C0442	West Africa - Drought relief fund	Investment	2.0	#####	1978	S			PAR	03528	24-Jun-81
C0496	Bougouriba agricultural development	Investment	8.0	5/28/1974	1981	S			PAR	02651	04-Sep-79
C0557	Livestock development project	Investment	6.0	5/27/1975	1984	U			PAR	03839	01-Mar-82
C0640	Second rural development fund	Investment	9.4	6/8/1976	1983	S			PCR	04499	17-May-83
C0706	West Volta agricultural development	Investment	3.6	5/3/1977	1983	S			PAR	02639	23-Aug-79
C0982	Forestry project	Investment	6.7	2/12/1980	1986	U	UNL	NEG	PAR	04547	15-Jun-83
C1013	Niena Dionkele rice development	Investment	3.7	4/29/1980	1987	U	UNL	NEG	PCR	06737	16-Apr-87
	Second Bougouriba agricultural development										
C1097		Investment	12.3	1/28/1981	1989	S	LIK	SUB	PAR	05234	17-Aug-84
C1218	Third rural development fund	Investment	16.0	3/30/1982	1990	S	UNC	MOD	PAR	04541	15-Jun-83
C1284	Boucle du Mouhoun agricultural develop.	Investment	2.5	7/27/1982	1988	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	04494	16-May-83
C1285	Hauts-Bassins agricultural development	Investment	1.8	7/27/1982	1988	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	05175	20-Jun-84
C1293	Koudougou agricultural pilot	Investment	5.0	9/21/1982	1989	U	UNL	MOD	PCR	06977	15-Oct-87
C1550	Fertilizer project	Investment	7.6	2/26/1985	1993	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	07032	01-Dec-87
C1896	Agricultural Research	Investment	17.9	4/19/1988	1997	S	UNC	SUB	PAR	07251	24-May-88
C1979	Agricultural Services	Investment	41.7	1/17/1989	1998	S	UNC	SUB	PCR	08358	06-Feb-90
C2381	Agric. Sector Adj.	Adjustment	28.0	6/9/1992	1996	S	LIK	MOD	PAR	13226	28-Jun-94
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>180.6</i>								
EDUCATION											
C0430	Education project	Investment	2.9	6/21/1973	1980	S			PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
C0956	Second education project	Investment	10.4	#####	1986	S			PCR	12001	30-Jun-93
C1598	Primary Education Dev.	Investment	20.3	5/21/1985	1994	S	LIK	MOD	PAR	13225	28-Jun-94
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>33.5</i>								
FINANCE											
C0759	Artisan and small and medium scale enterprise project	Investment	3.2	#####	1986	U			PCR	09167	30-Nov-90
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>3.2</i>								
MINING											
C1482	Mining Exploration & Technical Assistance	Investment	5.3	5/24/1984	1992	S	LIK	SUB	PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>5.3</i>								
MULTISECTOR											

<i>Ln./Cr.</i>	<i>Project Name</i>	<i>INV/ADJ</i>	<i>Net comm. (US\$m)</i>	<i>Approval date</i>	<i>ARPP exit FY</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Sust</i>	<i>ID Impact</i>	<i>Latest Report Type</i>	<i>Latest Report Number</i>	<i>Latest Report Date</i>
C2281	SAL 1	Adjustment	80.0	6/27/1991	1995	S	UNC	NEG	PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
C2590	Economic Recovery Credit	Adjustment	25.0	3/29/1994	1995	S	LIK	NEG	PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>105.0</i>								
POPULATION, HEALTH AND NUTRITION											
C1607	Health Services Development	Investment	26.0	6/11/1985	1995	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	11289	16-Oct-92
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>26.0</i>								
SOCIAL SECTOR											
C2282	Public Works & Employment	Investment	20.0	6/27/1991	1996	S	UNC	SUB	PCR	13817	29-Dec-94
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>20.0</i>								
TELECOMMUNICATIONS											
C0141	Telecommunications project	Investment	0.8	2/11/1969	1975	S			EVM	15503	29-Dec-95
C0431	Second telecommunications	Investment	4.5	6/21/1973	1979	S			EVM		20-Jun-96
C1235	Third telecommunications	Investment	17.0	4/27/1982	1989	S	LIK	MOD	EVM		06-Oct-97
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>22.3</i>								
TRANSPORTATION											
C0316	Cotton road project	Investment	4.2	6/8/1972	1980	U			ES		14-Aug-98
C0579	Rural roads project	Investment	7.5	6/26/1975	1982	U			ES		08-Jun-98
C0653	Third highway project	Investment	20.0	7/1/1976	1981	S			EVM		28-Jun-96
C1164	Fourth highway project	Investment	45.5	6/16/1981	1989	U	UNC	NEG	EVM		10-Sep-97
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>77.2</i>								
URBAN DEVELOPMENT											
C0766	Urban development project	Investment	8.2	1/31/1978	1986	S			EVM		31-Dec-96
C2067	Urban 2	Investment	31.3	#####	1997	S	LIK	MOD	EVM		28-Jun-96
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>39.5</i>								
GRAND TOTAL: 36 operations			512.5								

Annex Table 6: BURKINA FASO - OED Evaluations through January 31, 1999

<i>Ln./Cr.</i>	<i>Project Name</i>	<i>INV/ADJ</i>	<i>Net comm. (US\$m)</i>	<i>Approval date</i>	<i>ARPP exit FY</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Sust</i>	<i>ID Impact</i>	<i>Latest Report Type</i>	<i>Latest Report Number</i>	<i>Latest Report Date</i>
AGRICULTURE											
C0225	West Volta cotton project	Investment	6.2	#####	1978	S			PAR	01188	02-Jun-76
C0317	Rural development fund project	Investment	2.2	6/8/1972	1977	S			PAR	02793	28-Dec-79
C0442	West Africa - Drought relief fund	Investment	2.0	#####	1978	S			PAR	03528	24-Jun-81
C0496	Bougouriba agricultural development	Investment	8.0	5/28/1974	1981	S			PAR	02651	04-Sep-79
C0557	Livestock development project	Investment	6.0	5/27/1975	1984	U			PAR	03839	01-Mar-82
C0640	Second rural development fund	Investment	9.4	6/8/1976	1983	S			PCR	04499	17-May-83
C0706	West Volta agricultural development	Investment	3.6	5/3/1977	1983	S			PAR	02639	23-Aug-79
C0982	Forestry project	Investment	6.7	2/12/1980	1986	U	UNL	NEG	PAR	04547	15-Jun-83
C1013	Niema Dionkele rice development	Investment	3.7	4/29/1980	1987	U	UNL	NEG	PCR	06737	16-Apr-87
	Second Bougouriba agricultural development										
C1097		Investment	12.3	1/28/1981	1989	S	LIK	SUB	PAR	05234	17-Aug-84
C1218	Third rural development fund	Investment	16.0	3/30/1982	1990	S	UNC	MOD	PAR	04541	15-Jun-83
C1284	Boucle du Mouhoun agricultural develop.	Investment	2.5	7/27/1982	1988	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	04494	16-May-83
C1285	Hauts-Bassins agricultural development	Investment	1.8	7/27/1982	1988	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	05175	20-Jun-84
C1293	Koudougou agricultural pilot	Investment	5.0	9/21/1982	1989	U	UNL	MOD	PCR	06977	15-Oct-87
C1550	Fertilizer project	Investment	7.6	2/26/1985	1993	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	07032	01-Dec-87
C1896	Agricultural Research	Investment	17.9	4/19/1988	1997	S	UNC	SUB	PAR	07251	24-May-88
C1979	Agricultural Services	Investment	41.7	1/17/1989	1998	S	UNC	SUB	PCR	08358	06-Feb-90
C2381	Agric. Sector Adj.	Adjustment	28.0	6/9/1992	1996	S	LIK	MOD	PAR	13226	28-Jun-94
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>180.6</i>								
EDUCATION											
C0430	Education project	Investment	2.9	6/21/1973	1980	S			PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
C0956	Second education project	Investment	10.4	#####	1986	S			PCR	12001	30-Jun-93
C1598	Primary Education Dev.	Investment	20.3	5/21/1985	1994	S	LIK	MOD	PAR	13225	28-Jun-94
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>33.5</i>								
FINANCE											
C0759	Artisan and small and medium scale enterprise project	Investment	3.2	#####	1986	U			PCR	09167	30-Nov-90
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>3.2</i>								
MINING											
C1482	Mining Exploration & Technical Assistance	Investment	5.3	5/24/1984	1992	S	LIK	SUB	PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>5.3</i>								
MULTISECTOR											

<i>Ln./Cr.</i>	<i>Project Name</i>	<i>INV/ADJ</i>	<i>Net comm. (US\$m)</i>	<i>Approval date</i>	<i>ARPP exit FY</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Sust</i>	<i>ID Impact</i>	<i>Latest Report Type</i>	<i>Latest Report Number</i>	<i>Latest Report Date</i>
C2281	SAL 1	Adjustment	80.0	6/27/1991	1995	S	UNC	NEG	PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
C2590	Economic Recovery Credit	Adjustment	25.0	3/29/1994	1995	S	LIK	NEG	PAR	09699	28-Jun-91
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>105.0</i>								
POPULATION, HEALTH AND NUTRITION											
C1607	Health Services Development	Investment	26.0	6/11/1985	1995	S	LIK	MOD	PCR	11289	16-Oct-92
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>26.0</i>								
SOCIAL SECTOR											
C2282	Public Works & Employment	Investment	20.0	6/27/1991	1996	S	UNC	SUB	PCR	13817	29-Dec-94
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>20.0</i>								
TELECOMMUNICATIONS											
C0141	Telecommunications project	Investment	0.8	2/11/1969	1975	S			EVM	15503	29-Dec-95
C0431	Second telecommunications	Investment	4.5	6/21/1973	1979	S			EVM		20-Jun-96
C1235	Third telecommunications	Investment	17.0	4/27/1982	1989	S	LIK	MOD	EVM		06-Oct-97
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>22.3</i>								
TRANSPORTATION											
C0316	Cotton road project	Investment	4.2	6/8/1972	1980	U			ES		14-Aug-98
C0579	Rural roads project	Investment	7.5	6/26/1975	1982	U			ES		08-Jun-98
C0653	Third highway project	Investment	20.0	7/1/1976	1981	S			EVM		28-Jun-96
C1164	Fourth highway project	Investment	45.5	6/16/1981	1989	U	UNC	NEG	EVM		10-Sep-97
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>77.2</i>								
URBAN DEVELOPMENT											
C0766	Urban development project	Investment	8.2	1/31/1978	1986	S			EVM		31-Dec-96
C2067	Urban 2	Investment	31.3	#####	1997	S	LIK	MOD	EVM		28-Jun-96
	<i>Subtotal:</i>		<i>39.5</i>								
GRAND TOTAL: 36 operations			512.5								

Government's Comments on the Draft CAE
(translation of French letter)

**MINISTRY OF THE ECONOMY
AND FINANCE**

BURKINA FASO
Unity – Progress – Justice

THE MINISTER OF THE ECONOMY AND FINANCE

TO: Ms. Alice Galenson,
Mission Leader, OED
World Bank, Washington, D.C.

Ouagadougou, Sept 21, 1999

SUBJECT: Comments by the Government of Burkina Faso on the draft report
entitled *Burkina Faso: Country Assistance Evaluation*.

REF.: OED letter of September 1, 1999.

Dear Madam:

I have received your letter of September 1, together with the draft report referred to above, provided for my comments.

I greatly appreciate the high technical standard of this document, which is the outcome of rigorous studies undertaken to evaluate the impact and efficacy of the World Bank's program of assistance to Burkina Faso, and from which lessons are to be drawn that can help the Bank and the Government increase the effectiveness of such assistance in the future.

While I am gratified by the high quality of the dialogue between the Bank and Burkina Faso, the purpose of which is to bring together all the actors in the country's economic life, I attach a number of comments that we would like to have taken into account when the final version of the report is prepared.*

Sincerely,

/s/ Tertius Zongo

Enclosure: Comments

CC: Mr. Bassary Touré, Executive Director of the World Bank
Mr. Hassan Tuluy, Country Director, Burkina Faso, World Bank
Ms. McAllister, Director, OED, World Bank
Mr. Manga Kuoh, Resident Representative, World Bank

*The Government's comments have been fully taken into account in the revised version of the report.

COMMENTS FROM THE BURKINA FASO AUTHORITIES¹

CODE MEETING OF MAY 3, 2000

BURKINA FASO: COUNTRY ASSISTANCE EVALUATION

We welcome this Country Assistance Evaluation on Burkina Faso and would like to commend the staff for this exhaustive report. The report takes good stock of relevant achievements as well as challenges required to promote a sustainable development of Burkina Faso's economy. In that vein, our Burkinabé authorities are appreciative for the work undertaken by the staff to reveal an exhaustive picture of the impact and efficacy of World Bank's program of assistance to Burkina Faso. Needless to underscore that, despite the comment that we would like to make regarding a few statements in the report, my authorities find most of the recommendations very enlightening. These will be of great guidance in the process used to design macroeconomic and sectoral strategies conducive to sustainable growth that are required to reduce poverty in Burkina Faso. However, my authorities also recognize at the outset that challenges underscored in the report should be dwelled with, in both senses, with bilateral partners in their assistance program to the country.

We appreciate the document candidness about the natural constraint challenging the country's achievements. The CAE rightly focussed on areas most critical for Burkina development like "drought prone agriculture", health (namely HIV, malnutrition), education (girls literacy, gross primary enrollment), volume of aid versus donor coordination, appropriate macroeconomic and sectoral strategy framework.

The general tone of the report seems to underscore that, while the government has succeeded in achieving some reforms - **improved fiscal position, more rational tax and expenditure structure, reduction in military spending, banking sector reform, education sector reform, liquidation, privatization or restructuring key agricultural and transport parastatal- in a participatory way**, social indicators are worrisome and need to be addressed in order to achieve a sustainable growth. We do acknowledge that there is still a long way to go to reach the desired level of growth. Nevertheless it should be admitted that achievements need to be assessed against the appropriate geographical endowment and natural resource base of the countries as well as its dotation in qualified human and financial resources.

The level of institutional capacities, the limited formal private sector, the pace of the liberalization suggested are referred to as a challenge and we agree. The document seems in that line to underscore the limited success of the adjustment process, privatization, civil service reform, trade and price liberalization (cotton sector in particular), private sector development

¹ These comments were conveyed by the Alternate Executive Director representing Burkina Faso on the Executive Board of the World Bank. Some of the comments refer to an earlier draft and have been taken into account in the text of this version.

and donor coordination. Of course, we can always do better, but are somewhat puzzled by a few contradictory statements in the document. In some paragraphs, the government's commitment to the reform process is clearly underlined, in others it is the contrary. We do not catch if the limited achievement is due to the design of credit, the commitment of the Burkinabé authorities or the natural dotation in qualified human and financial resources as well as appropriate geographical endowment.

We would like to reiterate that the report should not conclude to a lack of commitment in a country that has achieved in a truly participatory approach most of its reforms, with scarce resources (human, financial and natural).

Since the document itself acknowledges that there was an acceleration of government reform after 1991, an overemphasis on the pre-91 period misleads the appreciation of the government commitment. Simultaneously referring throughout various paragraphs to both the statistics of pre- and post-91 period distorts the general appreciation that can be drawn from this report as well as the effectiveness of the suggested recommendation. Likewise, while paragraph 1.2 draws growth GDP from 82-90, to underscore that Burkina has historically experienced slow GDP growth, paragraphs 1.3 and 1.4 illustrate different trend for the post-devaluation period.

Regarding structural adjustment issue. While in some part of the report, it is stated that the process has been slow (para. 3.6), paragraph 3.5 underlines the team effort made by government to improve the overall expenditure, to strengthen budgetary management capacity, to revise tax and expenditure structure, and to give appropriate attention to key priority sectors: education, health, road maintenance and revenue collection. This underscore the commitment of the government to undertake appropriate reforms leading to the sustainable growth of the Burkinabe economy. Moreover, the report is also candid to recognize that the success of these reforms entailed persistent effort by the government to overcome numerous obstacles. *We would like to underline that these reforms cannot be achieved successfully with a quick process if we expect to get the vast majority of stakeholders to subscribe to these required reforms.*

On several issues, we can share the recommendation of the report, but we would like to emphasize that it is rather important to recognize the joint effort done by IDA and the government to undertake an interim PRSP which underlined the key elements required to address poverty reduction goal in IDA countries. It is also encouraging to note that the Burkinabe experience is being presented throughout various forums as one of the reference case of best practice.

Donors coordination. In term of donors coordination, Burkina Faso shows its ability to nurture a more coordinated approach among donors in designing its integrated strategy of poverty reduction. The challenge are huge but authorities remain committed to address this issue so that it does not hamper future reforms programs.

Private Sector: As far as the private sector is concerned, I think that it would have been appropriate to flag more explicitly in the recommendation how IFC and MIGA interventions could be addressing some obstacles underlined in the report. The report had one box on IFC, which I think doesn't give the flavor of the appropriate interventions that could complement Bank and donors assistance in setting a conducive environment to private initiative.

Economic and Sector work: As far as economic and sector work is concern, we agree with the report that they should benefit from a wider dissemination and that appropriate resource allocation should be considered to permit on a regular basis a more comprehensive economic and sector work.

Infrastructure: Infrastructure is crucial namely transportation system. I think that it is too easy for OED to underline (paragraph 3.33) the fact that, in infrastructure investment, donors have funded low priority road projects at the expense of more critical expenditures such as road maintenance. OED should be neutral, this is the Bank staff and their consultant position. We should also give credit to what other donors are undertaking in the fields with their own experts. OED should not draw a similar conclusion without undertaking a comprehensive study of the issue.

Social sector: The document rightly underlines the challenge facing the social sector in Burkina. While we have some specific comments about a few conclusions and recommendations drawn at this level, we can go along with the broad comments aiming at confirming the crucial importance of reversing the trend hampering the performance of this sector. My authorities have committed substantial resources to improve the Health sector performance. More needs to be done as the document referred to. But many actions are underway to address epidemic diseases as well as the endowment of health units with appropriate material. In the rural sector, some actions are being carried out to address the lack of appropriate health care system as well as to implement the information campaign required to fight against infectious diseases like malaria and HIV/AIDS.

As far as education is concerned, we have to acknowledge that this sector has always been among the top priorities of the government. *We cannot concur with the statement of the report stressing that, and I quote, "Traditionally, the ministries of Education have had relatively weak bargaining position with the ministry of finance". It should not be interpreted that it is the inclusion of education funding and other social sectors in the debt reduction conditionality that brought this sector among the priorities of budget allocation.* On a other side we are under the impression that advocating for a recommendation seeking to reduce teacher' salary could be translated by an adverse impact on the Education system as a whole. **How come we can expect to see an education sector performance output being improved if we are not designing an appropriate incentive to retain the best teachers but instead recommending a decrease of the already limited level of teachers' salaries?**

On the agriculture sector, we agree with the strategic direction of the paper and would like to underline that the cotton sector reform is of crucial importance to the Burkina authorities. The same goes for the mining sector which is attracting more and more foreign partner interest (mainly Canadian and Australian). A lot of regional initiatives, under the UEMOA umbrella and, at a larger scale, under the whole region auspices, are being undertaken to harmonize the investment regime in the sector.

More specifically, I would like to draw your attention to a few sentences, which either need to be rephrased or deleted:

- It is also stated that the ruling CDP dominates the Parliament and the State apparatus? Is it a bad thing? The report did underscored the strong participatory process that authorities

follow to reach final public investment program. We therefore don't think that the CDP party domination as it is referred to in the report hampers this democratic process of participation. It is even stated that, in preparing reform project, Burkina has had a tradition to have in a provincial and national level public to debate where all political and economic groups are invited?

Paragraph 3 of the Executive Summary seems to state that reforms were hampered by slow process of achieving a consensus on the desired extent of private participation in the economy and by lingering political opposition to reform. We would like to reiterate that we cannot expect a government to give appropriate attention to the right inclusion in the reform through a participatory approach and expect a speedy pace of the reform (para. 3.12) at the same time.

In paragraph 2.32, what is the rationale for questioning the government willingness to empower local community to obtain and administer necessary resources to orient their development strategy under the environmental management project?

I would like to know what is meant by “...Burkina will continue to need strong intellectual inputs from IDA in order to complete the adjustment program”? Is it on capacity building side or otherwise?

I would like to know what have been the criteria for choosing the private sector, which participated to this study, because it seems that one of the leading entrepreneurs in infrastructure investment, Kanazoe Oumarou, was omitted? He seems to be a big player among private sector investors in the country.

M/ALLSHARE/FDSTATEMENT/BURKINACAECODE1.DOC

Burkina Faso CAE Mission : List of People Met

(Jan. 11-28, 1999)

Premier Ministre, Programme d'Appui a l'Administration

Marie Therèse Drabo, Coordination Nationale

Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances

Tertius Zongo, Ministre

Patrice Nikiema, Directeur Général, Direction Générale de la Cooperation

Dieudonné Goungounga, Direction Générale de la Cooperation (Banque Mondiale)

Bissiri Joseph Sirima, Secrétaire Executif, Secrétariat Technique pour la Coordination des Programmes de Développement Economique et Social (STCPDES)

Siaka Coulibaly, Deputy Executive Secretary, STCPDES

Maimouna Sangaré, Chef, Département du Suivi des Politiques Sectorielles, STCPDES

Tibila Kaboré, Conseiller des Affaires Economiques, Directeur Générale, Direction Générale du Budget

Rolf Meier, Conseiller Technique

Ministère de l'Agriculture

Martin Bikienga, Secrétaire Général; Board of Advisors for Bank Services projects

Robert Bonkounaou, Chef de Service, DVA (Agricultural Extension Service)

Rose Marie Sandwidi, Responsable du Bureau Promotion des Activités des Femmes, DVA

Saga Pascal Ilboudo, Chef, Coordination Unit, Agricultural Services II

Francois B. Keré, Chef, Monitoring Unit, Ag. Services II

Alfred Sawadogo, Coordinateur, Food Security and Nutrition project

Christophe Yameogo, Directeur, Cellule de Coordination, Agricultural Sector Adjustment Program

Ministère de l'Enseignement de Base et de l'Alphabétisation

Adama Jean-Pierre G. Coulibaly, Secrétaire Générale

Yelemou Bougui Robert, DEB Public

Aissata Céline Coulibaly, DPEBA-DREBA

Madou Alphonse Traoré, Inspecteur de l'Enseignement du 1er Degré, Directeur Général de l'Enseignement de Base

Zoundi Tanga Paul, Chef de Projet Ecoles Satellites et Education de Base non Formelle, DEP, Interim Directeur, DEP

Zala Lagnonon, Directeur, de la Recherche de la Programmation de l'Evaluation et du Suivi, Direction Générale de l'Institut National d'Alphabétisation (DGINA)

Catherine Kabore, DGINA/ZANU

Jean-Baptiste Zongo, DAFPA/DGINA

Jean-Baptiste Kaboré, DPD/ENA

Servace Maryse Dabou, Attaché de Presse

Issa Joseph Diallo, DEP

Gouem Idrissa Célestin, Directeur des Affaires Administrative et Financière

Ministère de l'Enseignement Secondaire et de la Recherche Scientifique

Michel Sédogo, Delegué Général, CNRST (National Center for Scientific and Technological Research)

Paco Sereme, Directeur Général, INERA (National Agricultural Research Institute)

Francois Lompo, Agronomist (natural resources), INERA, Kampoinse

Georges Yamago, Forester (PNGT), INERA, Kampoinse

Souleymane Ouedraogo, Economist, INERA, Kampoinse

Ministère des Infrastructures, de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme

Gilbert Kiptonré, Directeur, Troisième Projet Urbain, Amélioration des Conditions de Vie Urbaines (PACVU)

M. Alain S. Bagré, Directeur, Direction Générale de l'Urbanisme et des Travaux Fonciers (DGUTF), Direction de l'Analyse et Des Statistiques Urbaines (DASU)

Tiemtore P. Victor, Directeur Général, Direction Générale de l'Urbanisme et de la Topographie

Ministère de la Santé

Maurice Yien, Directeur National de la Santé, Coordinateur, Cellule d'Appui à la Décentralisation des Services de Santé (CADSS)

Roland Koudouyamba Kaboré, Directeur, Projet de Développement Santé et Nutrition (PDSN)

Seydou K. Kabré, Coordinateur, Projet Population et Lutte Contre le SIDA (PPLS)

Stanislaus Paul Nebié, Ancien Directeur de la Planification Familial

Ministère du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat

M. Geneviève Compaoré, Coordinateur du Projet d'Assistance au Secteur Privé

Ministère de la Promotion de la Femme

Céline Yaouda, Secrétaire Generale

Mariame Ouattara, Directrice des Affaires Juridiques et Habilitation des Femmes

Ministère de la Fonction Publique et du Développement Institutionnel

Youma Zerbo, Secrétaire Général

Transport Sector Adjustment Program, Coordination Unit

Sidiki Sidibé, Coordinator

Commission National de la Décentralisation, Premier Ministère

Innocent Couliadiati, Secrétaire Permanent

Claude Ouattara, Responsable Service Socio-Economique

Commission de Privatisation

Dié Roger Paré, Président

Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest

Sosthene Boureima Bambara, Directeur de l'Agence Principale

Private Sector

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Robert Ouedraogo, Assistant Professor

Jean-Pierre Sawadogo, Assistant Professor

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Abdoulaye Zonon, Assistant Professor

Private Schools

M. Sandwidi Yamba, Directeur/Fondateur, Ecole Primaire Privée Mixte St. Joseph

Kafando Issou, Directeur, Ecole Wend la Mita le Savoir

Donors

H. Liljeborg, Chargé d'Affaires, Embassy of Denmark

Anne Pellier, Economist, European Commission

Francoise Desmazères, Agence Française de Développement (AFD)

Christian Diou, Division Infrastructures et Industries, AFD

Freddy Filippi, Division Infrastructures et Industries, AFD

M. Bressat, Chef de Mission, Embassy of France

Dia Timmermans, First Secretary, Conseillère Santé et Population, Embassy of Holland

Richard Dion, Directeur de Projet, Projet d'appui à la consolidation de la décentralisation, Fédération canadienne des municipalités

Denise Belemsagha, Coordinatrice Technique, Fédération canadienne des municipalités, Projet d'appui à la consolidation de la décentralisation, Ancien Directeur Deuxième Projet Urbain

Diene Keita-Djermakoye, Deputy Res. Rep., UNDP

Luc-Joel Gregoire, Economiste Principal, UNDP

Sylvestre Ouedraogo, Chargé des Programmes, UNDP

Harouna Ouedraogo, Economist National, UNDP

Paul Hubert, Programme d'Appui Intensifié au Burkina, World Health Organization

World Bank Resident Mission, Ouagadougou

Manga Kuoh, Resident Representative

Yildiz Goetze, Economist

Ibrahim Nebié, Agricultural Extension Specialist (former Director of DVA during much of Ag. Services I)

Celestin Bado, Operations Officer

Emmanuel Nikiema, Natural Resources Management Specialist (formerly with PNGT programs in Ministry of Agriculture)

Korka Diallo, Operations Officer

Makha Ndao, Sr. Education Specialist

Bruna Vitagliano, Sr. Health Specialist

Souleymane Zerbo, consultant, urban sector

In Kaya/Demesma

Madou Alphonse Traoré, Inspecteur de l'Enseignement du 1er Degré, DG de l'Enseignement de Base, Ministère de l'Enseignement de Base et de l'Alphabétisation

Adlaye Ouedraogo, Instituteur, Damesma (Ecole construit par projet Education III et servi par CSPS)

Daouda Ouedraogo, Chef Coutumier, Damesma

Hati Raymond Sawadogo, DG, Association pour le Développement de la Région de Kaya (ADRK)

Daniel Zongo, ADRK

Adelai Ouedraogo, Treasurer, Comité, CSPS (Delga)

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Burkina Faso: Country Assistance Evaluation

MANAGEMENT ACTION RECORD

Major OED Recommendations	Preliminary Management Response	OED Comments
Burkina's population is growing at close to 3% p.a., and 7% of the population is infected with HIV, facts with major implications for growth and poverty reduction. Family planning and AIDS control should feature prominently in the macroeconomic dialogue.	The Department is conducting a portfolio review to identify opportunities for intensifying actions against AIDS by retrofitting existing projects or incorporating AIDS activities in new operations. AIDS will also be incorporated into key non-lending services, such as PERs and economic projections.	Including AIDS control and family planning in the macro-economic dialogue will help convince the Government of the critical importance of these measures.
Progress in reforming governance has been mixed; remaining weaknesses affect the environment for PSD and the capacity for rational allocation of public resources and aid coordination. The adjustment agenda should highlight reform of governance and PSD.	Governance and PSD issues will be developed in the new CAS and the program for the next three years.	These issues should feature prominently in the dialogue and program.
Cereals supply 90% of the calories in the Burkinabè diet and are tolerant of drought and low soil fertility. Within the agricultural sector, IDA should shift its focus to the promotion of available appropriate technologies for fertilization and water retention for dryland agronomy, along with continued attention to the reorganization of the cotton sector, which produces Burkina's most important export.	Work in the cotton sector is linked to progress of the dialogue at the regional level with other donors. Given the importance of cotton exports in the Burkinabè economy, this issue will remain a priority in the regional dialogue with the authorities. Issues such as soil fertility improvement, food security and agriculture modernization will be developed in discussions with Government on the implementation of their newly adopted operational strategic plan for agriculture.	OED agrees with the continued emphasis on the cotton sector, and also stresses the need to rethink the approach to dryland agriculture.

Major OED Recommendations	Preliminary Management Response	OED Comments
<p>In the urban sector, IDA has developed an effective strategy to provide and maintain basic infrastructure, strengthen local capacity and increase private sector participation. In the future, IDA should work with the Government and donors to ensure that the lessons of projects in the two main cities are applied to secondary and tertiary centers, through projects funded by other donors.</p>	<p>Lessons of past urban projects relating to local capacity building, maintenance of basic infrastructure and private sector participation are being applied to the Urban Environment project currently under implementation and will be taken into account in the design of the future Public Works and Decentralization project.</p>	<p>OED believes that this is one area in which the expertise and funding of other donors should be tapped.</p>