Approach Paper

Madagascar Country Program Evaluation

February 17, 2021

1. Introduction

1.1 This Country Program Evaluation will assess the development effectiveness of the World Bank Group's engagement in Madagascar between fiscal year (FY)07 and FY21. The evaluation will explore whether the Bank Group's $3 billion engagement was appropriate for the Malagasy context of weak governance, widespread poverty, and economic stagnation and adapted to changing circumstances, priorities, and lessons from experience. The evaluation covers the International Development Association's (IDA) Country Assistance Strategy for FY07–11, IDA's Interim Strategy Note for FY12–13 (which remained the guiding strategy document through FY14–16), and the Bank Group's Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY17–21. Starting from FY07 allows the evaluation to assess the impact of the Bank Group's response to the 2009 political crisis, which triggered Operational Policy (OP) 7.30 (dealing with de facto governments) and necessitated a restructuring of the Bank Group's engagement with the client.

1.2 This evaluation's main goal is to distill lessons from experience to inform future engagement. The evaluation is timed to inform the formulation of the new CPF with Madagascar. The evaluation also aims to derive significant lessons for the broader development community. To these ends, it will (i) assess the relevance and effectiveness of the Bank Group's support to Madagascar between FY12 and FY21 and (ii) examine the Bank Group's contribution to improving governance and fostering rural development during FY07–21.[1]

1.3 Governance and rural development are interconnected and cross-cutting themes, covering multiple sectors. Governance includes, among other things, public financial management and creating an enabling environment for private sector development, for example, through support to improving the investment climate. Rural development is defined as socioeconomic development in rural areas, that is, improving livelihoods and the quality of life of people living in rural areas. This definition includes agriculture, natural resources and the environment, roads, and other interventions to enhance rural development and reduce rural poverty, for example, increasing access to basic services (for example, health, education, social protection), improving food security, and improving productivity of economic activities. Connectivity infrastructure, human capital, and private sector development are dimensions included in the evaluation of rural development.

1.4 These two themes provide an opportunity to examine the application of the special themes of the 19th Replenishment of IDA. The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) will evaluate how well the Bank Group integrated environment, climate change, and gender considerations into its interventions. The evaluation will examine the Bank Group's strategies and programs of support in Madagascar—including lending, policy advice, and other analytical activities—and the quality of its partnerships in support of Madagascar's development objectives. The longer time period allows the evaluation to explore how the Bank Group adapted to changes in Madagascar's circumstances caused by frequent internal and external shocks, such as periodic political crises, donor flight, natural disasters, and the global coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19).

1.5 The remainder of the Approach Paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses Madagascar's development challenges, the Bank Group's objectives, and the Bank Group–supported program in Madagascar. Section 3 describes this evaluation's purpose and scope. Section 4 details the evaluation's design and the evaluability assessment. Section 5 notes the evaluation's limitations, in general, and the risks associated with conducting a desk-based Country Program Evaluation, for example, the inability to see results in the field or meet with beneficiaries. Section 6 details the IEG's quality assurance process for the evaluation. Section 7 includes the expected outputs and resources.

2. Context and Development Challenges

2.1 Madagascar is one of the poorest countries in Africa. According to World Bank estimates, in 2019 about 78 percent of the population lived on less than $1.90 a day at purchasing power parity. Real gross domestic product per capita has declined over time, making Madagascar one of only eight countries with lower real per capita income today than in 1960 (table 2.1). The average Malagasy is more than 40 percent poorer in 2020 than in 1961 (World Bank 2020a). There was moderate gross domestic product growth during the past decade, reaching 4.8 percent in 2019—the fastest pace in more than a decade. However, because of COVID-19, the projected 2020 growth rate was revised downward from 5.2 to −3.2 percent.

Development Challenges

2.2 Improving the economic and social well-being of Madagascar's population depends on addressing its most binding constraints to development. Limited progress on reducing poverty can be traced to three structural constraints: poor connectivity, low labor productivity, and political instability. To move Madagascar to a more inclusive, sustainable, and higher growth trajectory requires removing or relaxing these constraints by improving basic infrastructure (including roads and electricity) to connect people to markets and services, boosting farm and nonfarm labor productivity, and increasing political stability. To do so requires strengthening governance and institutions and developing rural areas to reduce rural poverty. It also requires boosting human capital, managing its natural resources, and increasing private sector–led growth (World Bank 2015, 2020a).

2.3 The capacity of Madagascar's institutions remains low and governance is weak. The restoration of constitutional order is an indication that governance may be improving. Still, Madagascar's institutions and its public sector management are weaker than those of the average Sub-Saharan African country and are consistently worse than they were in 2007. For example, Madagascar's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment score is lower than the regional average (2.8 compared with 3.0) on institutional capacity and governance indicators, such as rule-based governance; quality of financial management; quality of public administration; and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector. Madagascar's Worldwide Governance Indicators percentile rank on government effectiveness in 2019 was 12 (out of 100, down from 38 in 2007), far behind the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 26.4. On rule of law, Madagascar's percentile rank was 16 (down from 43 in 2007), well behind the regional average of 29.0. Weak governance prevents the state from mobilizing enough revenue to finance needed social services and investments; it also prevents the effective and efficient spending of resources. Since 2016, Madagascar witnessed improvements in decentralization, revenue mobilization, and public financial management, with help from the Turnaround Allocation (formerly Turnaround Regime), which led to mainstreaming governance into the World Bank's country portfolio to address Madagascar's weak governance.

2.4 Poverty is concentrated in rural areas, where about 80 percent of Madagascar's population lives. Recent estimates indicate that urban poverty is decreasing while rural poverty is increasing. Between 2005 and 2012, the urban poverty rate fell from 41 percent to 30 percent. Over the same period, the rural poverty rate increased from 77 percent to 80 percent (World Bank 2016). Similarly, social indicators associated with poverty are lower in rural areas—infant mortality rates are higher, life expectancy is shorter, illiteracy is more widespread, malnutrition is more prevalent, and access to services (such as clean water, improved sanitation services, and electricity) is disproportionately lower in rural areas (World Bank 2014a, 2014b). For example, less than 1 percent of the rural population had access to electricity (in 2018) compared with 70 percent of the urban population (table 2.1).

Table 2.1. Key Economic and Social Indicators, Madagascar, 2007–19

Indicator	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015	2019
GDP growth (annual percent)	5.7	−4.0	1.6	2.3	3.1	4.9
GDP per capita growth (annual percent)	2.7	−6.7	−1.2	−0.4	0.4	2.1
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current $)	380	470	480	520	490	520
Net ODA received (percent of GNI)	10.6	4.6	3.9	4.1	6.2	6.1
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing, value added (percentage of GDP)	28.1	30.5	29.1	26.5	25.7	24.6
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP; percentage of population)	72.0[a]	—	78.5[b]	77.6[c]	—	—
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	62.1	62.9	63.8	64.7	65.5	66.3
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	51.6	48.1	45.3	42.8	40.7	38.5
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	77.3	71.1	66.0	61.7	57.9	54.1
Prevalence of stunted growth of children, height for age (percentage of children under five)	—	49.4	—	48.9[c]	—	—
Prevalence of undernourishment (percentage of population)	32.4	31.9	32.1	35.7	41.1	44.4
People using at least basic sanitation services (percentage of population)	6.8	7.5	8.3	9.0	9.7	10.5
Access to electricity, rural (percentage of rural population)	0.08[a]	—	—	—	—	0.02[d]
School enrollment, primary (percent, net)	66.2[a]	—	—	—	—	96.6[d]
School enrollment, primary (percent, gross)	139.2	149.3	143.4	143.9	147.3	—

Source: World Development Indicators.
Note: Missing data were replaced by the latest year available. GDP = gross domestic product; GNI = gross national income; ODA = official development assistance; PPP = purchasing power parity; — = not available.
a. 2005 data (latest year available).
b. 2010 data (latest year available).
c. 2012 data (latest year available).
d. 2018 data (latest year available).

2.5 Madagascar's human capital development is low and stagnant. The dearth of public financing for basic social services contributed to the lack of progress in human development. Most human capital development indicators are at or below the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa and IDA countries. Madagascar has the fourth-highest rate of stunted growth of children under five (42 percent), which is twice the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (21 percent). The Malagasy people have much lower rates of access to basic sanitation (11 percent) than Sub-Saharan African countries (31 percent) or IDA countries (36 percent). Reported primary school enrollment rates are high, about 97 percent net enrollment rate, but educational attainment is low (table 2.1). Malagasy children complete five years of schooling (proxied by years of compulsory education), on average, which is below the Sub-Saharan Africa average (seven years). Human capital estimates suggest that a child born in Madagascar in 2018 will reach 37 percent of their potential, given current rates of chronic malnutrition in children, poor health, and poor quality of education.

Bank Group Strategic Objectives and Country Engagement

2.6 The government of Madagascar's development goals remained broadly consistent over the evaluation's time period. Issues of governance, rural development, human development, and growth are important. The Madagascar Action Plan 2007–12 and the National Development Plan 2015–19 maintained strategic focus in these areas. Appendix C presents the alignment between the government's objectives and the Bank Group's objectives.

Bank Group Objectives, FY07–21

2.7 Three strategy documents guided Bank Group support during the evaluation period. These documents were the Madagascar Country Assistance Strategy for FY07–11, the Interim Strategy Note FY12–13, and the CPF FY17–21. Table 2.2 summarizes the main challenges to development in Madagascar and the Bank Group's strategic objectives. Figure 2.1 visualizes the main challenges to development in Madagascar and the Bank Group's objectives in FY12–21. Appendix B provides a detailed presentation of the strategic objectives.

Table 2.2. Madagascar's Development Challenges and the World Bank Group's Strategic Objectives, FY07–21

Objectives		Challenges	Objectives
CAS FY07–11	ISN FY12–13	SCD FY15	CPF FY17–21
Remove bottlenecks to growth	Improve governance and public sector capacity	Poor governance	Increase resilience and reduce fragility
Improve access and quality of services	Promote employment and competitiveness	Low public sector capacity to deliver services	Promote inclusive growth
	Promote resilience and reduce vulnerability	Low private sector development	
		Low human capital	
		High rural poverty and vulnerability	

Sources: World Bank 2007, 2011, 2015, 2017b.
Note: CAS = Country Assistance Strategy; CPF = Country Partnership Framework; FY = fiscal year; ISN = Interim Strategy Note; SCD = Systematic Country Diagnostic.

Figure 2.1. Mapping the World Bank Group's Objectives to Madagascar's Development Challenges, FY12–21



Sources: World Bank 2011, 2015, 2017b.
Note: FY = fiscal year.

2.8 The Bank Group's development focus in Madagascar remained about the same in FY07–21. During the evaluative period, engagement focused on three areas: strengthening governance and public sector capacity, generating economic opportunities and livelihoods, and improving human development to increase resilience. These strategies cover two important periods of instability and fragility in Madagascar: the political crisis from 2009 to 2013, which triggered the Bank Group's OP7.30 on dealing with de facto governments, and the period during which Madagascar was classified as a fragile country (from 2014 to 2017), after significant declines in its governance indicators.

2.9 The Bank Group's strategy FY07–11 was formulated when economic development was relatively strong. The strategy focused on removing critical barriers to sustainable and shared growth, improving human welfare, and ensuring good governance. The Bank Group identified ways to leverage its comparative advantages to best support the government of Madagascar in achieving its development goals. For example, the Bank Group acted as a convener and catalyst to leverage additional resources, coordinated with other donors, and used multiple instruments to target high-priority intervention areas (World Bank 2007).

2.10 The coup d'état in early 2009 disrupted the Bank Group's FY07–11 strategy. The Bank Group disengaged in Madagascar for a short period after the military-supported coup d'état, citing the OP7.30. By late 2009, disbursements for five projects resumed on humanitarian and safeguard grounds, and in May 2010, an exception was granted to resume disbursements for more projects, for example, to pay arrears and to fund project implementation units. In 2011, as the country made efforts to restore a constitutional government and in response to the significant costs of the disengagement, IDA developed an Interim Strategy Note, authorized a major restructuring of its projects, and resumed project implementation.[2] Madagascar's status under OP7.30 was lifted in 2014 after the return to constitutional order. This evaluation will examine the application and implementation of OP7.30 in Madagascar. It will evaluate the impact of engagement, disengagement, and subsequent reengagement on Madagascar's development and draw lessons to help teams working in countries with similar circumstances. It will integrate and build on the findings of relevant IEG evaluations, such as the forthcoming evaluation *World Bank Engagement in Situations of Conflict*.[3]

2.11 The World Bank's interim strategy for FY12–13 focused on addressing Madagascar's fragility and vulnerability. The Interim Strategy Note aimed to meet the country's immediate needs and positioned the World Bank to support Madagascar's medium-term growth and longer-term development goals. The strategy recognized that poor governance and low public sector capacity constrained Madagascar's development. The strategy emphasized the necessity of improving governance to reduce vulnerability, improve resilience, achieve sectoral results, and establish a business-friendly investment climate to create jobs. The strategy recognized that poverty reduction requires improving earnings and income generation opportunities in rural areas, and especially those of women living in poverty (World Bank 2011).

2.12 The CPF FY17–21 focused on addressing the structural causes of fragility to reduce poverty and increase resilience. The Bank Group's strategic objectives attempted to build a strong foundation for growth with stronger public institutions, access to basic infrastructure, and delivery of key services. Two principles guided the Bank Group's strategic engagement: selectivity and mobilizing private finance. Selectivity was based on the Bank Group's comparative advantage, the comparative advantages of other donors, and donor coordination. For example, in governance, the Bank Group focused on decentralization and community engagement and fair competition in the private sector. Other donors addressed different key governance challenges. To mobilize private finance, the Bank Group's strategic engagement relied on a "one World Bank Group" (Cascade approach), which required participation of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and strong internal coordination. For example, increasing private investment participation in critical areas, such as infrastructure and agribusiness, requires improving the investment climate. IDA would focus on regulatory reforms and complementary government investments to improve the investment climate, and IFC and MIGA would use instruments to foster private sector participation through advisory services and to reduce the risk of investing in Madagascar, for example, by leveraging finance from the 18th Replenishment of IDA Private Sector Window to de-risk investments (World Bank 2017b).

Bank Group–Supported Program

2.13 Bank Group support to Madagascar amounted to $2.9 billion during FY07–21. The Bank Group–supported program included (i) $2.7 billion in IDA grants and credits, of which $1.7 billion was investment project financing, $700 million was development policy financing, and trust funds financed $220 million (figure 2.2); (ii) $100 million in IFC investments, including long-term financing, swaps, and rights issues; and (iii) $100 million in MIGA's maximum gross exposure at issuance (appendix E lists the Bank Group lending and nonlending portfolio). Commitments dropped in the second half of FY09 after the triggering of OP7.30, but they increased significantly in FY16 with the leveraging of additional IDA support through the Turnaround Regime.[4]

Figure 2.2. IDA and Trust Fund Commitments to Madagascar, FY07–21



Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: FCS = fragile and conflict-affected situation; FY = fiscal year; IDA = International Development Association; OP = Operational Policy.

2.14 Between FY07 and FY21, the Bank Group provided a substantial program of advisory services and analytics work support to Madagascar. The Bank Group's advisory and analytics program played a critical role in helping maintain its presence during the 2009–13 crisis. This included 17 IFC advisory services (mostly in financial markets, agribusiness, and infrastructure) and 76 World Bank advisory services and analytics reports.[5] Critically, the latter included two high-profile, multisectoral policy notes. One note, written shortly after the Bank Group temporarily froze disbursements and halted all new lending, took stock of the situation in critical sectors (World Bank 2010). The other note was written shortly before new lending was scheduled to resume, with the lifting of OP7.30 (World Bank 2014b).

3. Purpose and Scope

3.1 The evaluation's purpose is to distill lessons from experience to inform the next CPF for Madagascar and draw implications for countries facing similar challenges.

3.2 The evaluation will explore two themes that constrain Madagascar's development: weak governance and rural development. The Bank Group identified these themes as binding constraints on Madagascar's development. The themes were validated in discussions with the Bank Group's Madagascar country team, interviews with relevant Bank Group staff, and reviews of country strategies and analytical work, and from external literature.

3.3 Better governance is crucial to enabling the delivery of critical public services in Madagascar and breaking the cycle of political crises. Madagascar's weak institutions and rule of law prevent public resources from being used to address the country's poor social outcomes more effectively and limit the opportunities for greater private sector involvement in development. Its cyclical political crises discourage longer-term investment and undermine development gains.

3.4 Weak governance constrains development by preventing the state from mobilizing the resources necessary to deliver basic public services. Madagascar's net tax represented only 10 percent of its gross domestic product in 2019, among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa (IMF 2020; OECD, ATAF, and AUC 2019). This resulted from capacity constraints and weak governance within the tax administration, according to the Bank Group (World Bank 2015). The resulting lack of revenue starves growth-enabling investments and the provision of the public services needed to address Madagascar's low human development, particularly in rural areas.

3.5 Madagascar's weak governance also leads to ineffective and inefficient government expenditure. In Madagascar, there are minimal institutional checks on accountability at the central level (Marcus 2016; Morisset 2010b; Kwant, Lefebvre, and Andrianasy 2014).[6] This centralization of power contributes to personalized politics, with state institutions serving the interests of elites rather than the broader population; as a result, government expenditure is not aligned with the needs of Madagascar's people living in poverty. A disproportionate amount of the state budget pays for the salaries of public servants or regressive subsidies and transfers to state-owned enterprises, like Malgache Power and Water (Jiro sy Rano Malagasy), crowding out critical capital investments in health and education.

3.6 Weak institutions limit the state's capacity to deliver quality public services. Although personal networks capture central-level institutions, subnational institutions suffer from low capacity and insufficient financing. Decision-making is concentrated in the central government, preventing crucial resources and services from reaching people living in poverty, particularly in rural areas far from the capital (World Bank 2015). Poor governance in the natural resource sector (particularly rosewood, gold and precious stones, and valuable biodiversity) has allowed trafficking in these goods and corruption to flourish, undermining the rule of law and preventing the state from collecting much-needed revenue. Informality encourages money laundering and illicit financial flows. Trafficking and concomitant overexploitation also have a direct impact on rural poverty because an estimated 80 percent of citizens depend on natural resources for their livelihood.

3.7 Weak governance also contributes to policy and political instability. Powerful political and business interests operate above the law and extract rents from the state for private gain at the expense of the population and broader economy (World Bank 2015). Elite alliances and the balance of power often shift; in the past, this has led to periodic and unconstitutional changes of government (Morisset 2010a, 2010b). This instability weakens the investment climate and discourages longer-term investment. The country has experienced recurrent political crises since its independence; although the crises' onset is positively correlated with periods of economic growth, the crises themselves reverse past economic gains. Each of the country's four major political crises has led to economic contractions (figure 3.1). The last political crisis (2009–13), which led the Bank Group to disengage temporarily (after triggering OP7.30) along with many development partners, reversed significant gains in social and economic indicators (World Bank 2012, 2013).

Figure 3.1. Correlation between Political Crises and Real GDP Growth in Madagascar



Source: World Development Indicators.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.

3.8 Rural development is critical to reducing poverty in Madagascar. About 80 percent of Madagascar's population lives in rural areas, and a greater proportion of rural Malagasy lives in extreme poverty than urban dwellers. In 2012, the rural poverty rate was 80 percent, compared with the 30 percent urban poverty rate.

3.9 Rural people living in poverty depend on subsistence agriculture. Agriculture, including livestock and fisheries, is the rural population's largest employer. About 90 percent of rural households depend on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods and well-being. Subsistence agriculture increases the vulnerability of the rural population. Rural development is critical to increasing the resilience and well-being of the rural population.

3.10 Increasing agricultural productivity is, therefore, essential for rural development. The agricultural sector lacks up-to-date technology, including limited uptake of high-yielding seeds, fertilizer, and agricultural machinery and high dependence on rainfall irrigation. It faces insecure land tenure arrangements (traditional tenure arrangements), inadequate transportation infrastructure, and incentives that contribute to environmental degradation. Farmers also lack access to credit. Enhancing the agriculture sector's productivity will require a shift of labor resources from subsistence agriculture to more productive agricultural activities and to different sectors with higher productivity.

3.11 Population growth and natural disasters also affect rural livelihoods. Subsistence agricultural techniques, combined with high population growth, are a major threat to Madagascar's environmental resources. Additionally, climatic events that curtail development—such as cyclones, floods, droughts, and locust infestation—disproportionately affect rural people living in poverty and agricultural production. The locust infestations in 2013 and 2020 reduced livelihoods and increased food insecurity among rural households. Weak governance in the National Office of Risk and Disaster Management (Bureau National de Gestion des Risques et des Catastrophes) and the lack of infrastructure and other public services constrain disaster risk management. Climate-related disasters are expected to increase with deforestation and forest degradation. Illegal trafficking of rosewood and other precious woods and the slash-and-burn agriculture used by rural people living in poverty contribute to deforestation.

3.12 Given these challenges, the evaluation will address two questions: (i) How successful was the Bank Group in addressing weak governance and adapting its efforts to political instability? and (ii) How successful was the Bank Group in improving rural development? In addressing these questions, the evaluation will explore the extent to which the Bank Group's approach evolved over time in response to lessons learned from experience and changes in external conditions. These overarching questions will be answered through a series of subquestions, as shown in table 3.1 (see appendix A for associated data sources and methods).

Table 3.1. Questions and Subquestions of the Country Program Evaluation

Overarching Questions	Subquestions
How successful was the World Bank Group in improving governance?	How relevant was the Bank Group's support to improving governance? How did its approach and support adapt and respond to emerging challenges, including political instability?
	To what extent did Bank Group support contribute to improving governance?
	How effectively did the Bank Group coordinate its engagement with development partners and relevant stakeholders in addressing weak governance?
	What lessons can be learned from the Bank Group's support to improving governance? What lessons can be learned from the application and implementation of OP7.30 and the Bank Group's engagement, disengagement, and reengagement in Madagascar?
How successful was the Bank Group in improving rural development?	How relevant was the Bank Group's support to rural development? How did its approach and support adapt to emerging challenges, including natural disasters?
	To what extent did Bank Group support contribute to rural development?
	How effectively did the Bank Group coordinate with development partners and relevant stakeholders to foster rural development?
	What lessons can be learned from the Bank Group's support to rural development?

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: OP = Operational Policy.

4. Evaluation Design and Evaluability Assessment

4.1 The evaluation will be conducted without mission travel to Madagascar because of COVID-19-related restrictions. It will rely on desk reviews, data analysis, and semistructured interviews and will, to the extent possible, seek external sources of data and information, including data that incorporates civil society's views. The team will explore additional methods, as appropriate. The design matrix in appendix A includes the methods outlined in the rest of this section.

4.2 Portfolio review and analysis. The team will conduct a portfolio review and analysis of project and analytical work. The portfolio review will identify all lending and nonlending operations and activities across all sectors—for example, private sector development, environment, and education—that are relevant to the two special themes of weak governance and rural development. The team will conduct a structured review of the lending and nonlending portfolios based on a standard but focused protocol for extracting, coding, and analyzing qualitative data.

4.3 Structured and semistructured interviews. Structured and semistructured interviews with relevant stakeholders will complement the portfolio review. Structured interviews will allow the team to identify patterns in responses. Including semistructured interviews will allow the team to obtain broader insights on the country context and relevant issues while maintaining the ability to triangulate data.

4.4 Geospatial analysis of World Bank interventions. The team will explore the potential to conduct geospatial analysis of World Bank activities to determine the extent to which rural poverty rates and associated factors changed in areas of World Bank engagement.[7] The team will use both the World Bank project geocoding database and the Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision data set to assess the extent to which World Bank activities may have contributed to spatial dimensions of poverty reduction, such as in project areas.

4.5 Analysis of existing project-level data. The review of project documents will search for baseline, indicator, and impact evaluation data collected by the Bank Group and other credible sources to conduct secondary data analysis. The team will compile and analyze lessons learned at the project and portfolio levels for consistency and relevance and to explore the extent to which the Bank Group incorporated lessons learned from experience into new engagements. Additionally, the team will conduct an evidence gap map analysis, compiling existing evidence of what works (in several sectors) and mapping Bank Group–supported outcomes.

4.6 Existing evaluative evidence. The evaluation will build on existing internal and external evaluations, including Implementation Completion and Results Reports and IEG's Implementation Completion and Results Report Reviews of World Bank projects and operations; Expanded Project Supervision Reports; IEG's Evaluation Notes of IFC investments; self-evaluation and IEG validations of IFC advisory services; and self-evaluation and IEG validation of MIGA projects. The evaluation will also draw on the Bank Group's self-evaluation of the implementation and impact of its support to Madagascar (2016, validated by IEG in 2017) and several Project Performance Assessment Reports, Learning Products, and relevant case studies on Madagascar conducted for IEG thematic evaluations (box 4.1).

Box 4.1. Relevant Independent Evaluation Group Evaluations, Products, and Reports

Learning products and working papers

Tax Revenue Mobilization: Lessons from World Bank Group Support for Tax Reform

Reliable and Affordable Off-Grid Electricity Services for the Poor: Lessons from the World Bank Group Experience

Natural Disaster Response: Lessons from Evaluations of the World Bank and Others

Phase II: The Challenge of Low-Carbon Development: Climate Change and the World Bank Group

Project Performance Assessment Reports

Emergency Support to Critical Education, Health, and Nutrition Services Project and Additional Financing

Second Phase Environment Program Project

First and Second Structural Adjustment, Public Management Capacity Building, and Private Sector Development and Capacity Building Projects

Third Environmental Program Support Project

Madagascar country case studies

World Bank Engagement in Situations of Conflict (forthcoming)

World Bank Group's Support for Domestic Revenue Mobilization (forthcoming)

Evaluation of the World Bank's Support to Improving Child Undernutrition and Its Determinants (forthcoming)

Creating Markets' to Leverage the Private Sector for Sustainable Development and Growth

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.

5. Limitations and Risks

5.1 A limitation of this evaluation in providing an assessment of Bank Group engagement in Madagascar is its inability to cover all development areas in depth. This evaluation will assess the Bank Group's portfolio using deeper analyses of critical themes that cut across the Bank Group's portfolio. By focusing on rural development and weak governance, the evaluation will assess the extent to which the Bank Group's engagement contributed to improving outcomes in these areas or intermediate outcomes along the results chain.

5.2 COVID-19 prevents fielding a mission. Research for the evaluation will be limited to desk reviews and virtual interviews because of COVID-19-related travel restrictions. The evaluation team will leverage digital technologies to contact the Bank Group and other stakeholders, but accessing some government officials and Malagasy stakeholders could be challenging, particularly contacting stakeholders outside the capital city of Antananarivo, including project beneficiaries and representatives of civil society. Given the importance of rural development to the Bank Group–supported program in Madagascar, this has potential to inject a degree of bias in the findings.

6. Quality Assurance Process

6.1 Quality assurance will take place through peer-review arrangements, regular meetings with the Bank Group country team, and close collaboration with IEG management. To validate many of the findings, the team will convene a workshop of country and sector experts to review emerging findings. This Approach Paper and the final report will be peer-reviewed by Professor Chris Barrett (Stephen B. and Janice G. Ashley Professor of Applied Economics and Management and International Professor of Agriculture, Cornell University), Mr. Abdelkerim Bendjebbour (former resident representative, Madagascar, African Development Bank), Mr. Lars Engstrom (senior economist, International Monetary Fund), and Dr. Ketakandriana Rafitoson (executive director, Transparency International Initiative Madagascar). The work will be conducted under the guidance and quality assurance of Jeff Chelsky (manager), Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez (director), and Alison Evans (Director-General, Evaluation).

7. Expected Outputs and Resources

7.1 This report is being developed for the Bank Group's Madagascar country team to use to inform preparation of the next Madagascar CPF. As such, the evaluation team will collaborate with the country team and Bank Group staff to ensure maximum relevance and usefulness to the Bank Group's future engagement in Madagascar. Appendix D presents the detailed timeline.

7.2 Ann Elizabeth Flanagan (senior economist) and Daniel Nogueira-Budny (public sector specialist) will lead the evaluation team. Ruben Lamdany (former deputy director, Independent Evaluation Office, International Monetary Fund) will be the adviser to the team. Team members are David Adamson (consultant), Anna Amato (consultant), Agathe Christien (consultant), Carla Fabiola Coles (program assistant), April Connolley (senior natural resource management specialist), Paul Holden (consultant), Malathi Jayawickrama (senior public sector specialist), Ebru Karamete (evaluation analyst), Daniel Palazov (consultant), and Kevin Russell (consultant).

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[1] The Independent Evaluation Group validated the World Bank Group's country-level performance between fiscal years 2007 and 2013 (World Bank 2017a).

[2] The protracted political crisis, which resulted in bilateral and multilateral donors temporarily halting or scaling back development lending, exacerbated poverty and led to the decline of human development indicators. According to a World Bank analysis, from 2008 to 2013, the percentage of the population living in poverty increased more than 10 percentage points; the number of out-of-school children increased by more than 600,000; acute child malnutrition increased in some areas by more than 50 percent; and numerous health care centers closed (World Bank 2012, 2013).

[3] The forthcoming evaluation *World Bank Engagement in Situations of Conflict* is evaluating Operational Policy 7.30 as a policy, with cross-country comparisons.

[4] The Turnaround Regime is an International Development Association allocation that supports countries emerging from periods of conflict, social or political crises, or disengagement, where there is a window of opportunity to pursue reforms that can accelerate transition out of fragility.

[5] International Finance Corporation advisory services include client-facing or market and client development operations only.

[6] The judicial branch is not independent of the executive branch, and the legislative branch is not able to constrain presidential authority. Presidents have sweeping legislative powers, such as the ability to amend the constitution, rule by decree, and introduce legislation. Presidents also have nonlegislative powers, for example, appointing and dismissing cabinet members and dissolving the assembly.

[7] World Bank projects are geocoded at approval, but International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency investments are not.

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Appendix A. Evaluation Design Matrix

Table A.1. Evaluation Design Matrix

Key Questions	Data Sources	Methods
How successful was the World Bank Group in improving governance?		
How relevant was the Bank Group's support to improving governance? How did its approach and support adapt and respond to emerging challenges, for example, political instability?	Government strategies, Bank Group strategies, Bank Group project data, Bank Group advisory services and analytics data, internal and external analyses, internal and external intervention-level evidence	Document analysis; portfolio review; semistructured interviews with Bank Group staff, development partners, client, and civil society
To what extent did Bank Group support contribute to improving governance?	Strategic documents and thematic analyses from partners, Bank Group strategies, Bank Group project data, Bank Group advisory services and analytics data	Analysis of development partner portfolios, semistructured interviews with development partners
What lessons can be learned from the Bank Group's support to improving governance? What lessons can be learned from the application and implementation of OP7.30 and the Bank Group's engagement, disengagement, and reengagement in Madagascar?	Bank Group documents, documents from development partners, government strategies, Bank Group strategies, Bank Group project data, Bank Group advisory services and analytics data, internal and external internal CPEs, internal and external intervention-level evidence	Document analysis; portfolio review; semistructured interviews with Bank Group staff, client, and civil society
How successful was the Bank Group in improving rural development?		
How relevant was the Bank Group's support to rural development? How did its approach and support adapt to emerging challenges, for example, natural disasters?	Government strategies, Bank Group strategies, Bank Group project data (in relevant sectors), Bank Group advisory services and analytics data, donor strategies, projects, and analytical work	Background paper on the relationship between rural poverty and rural development in Madagascar; structured literature review; review of strategic documents; analysis of development partner portfolios, semistructured interviews with development partners, clients, and civil society

Key Questions	Data Sources	Methods
To what extent did Bank Group support contribute to rural development?	Bank Group project data (in relevant sectors), Bank Group advisory services and analytics data, donor strategies, projects, and analytical work; internal and external internal CPEs, internal and external intervention-level evidence	Project portfolio review and analysis (lending and nonlending); geospatial analysis of rural poverty estimates, outcomes, and outputs in project areas; country- and intervention-level gap map evidence, analysis of development partner portfolios, semistructured interviews with partners, clients, and civil society
How effectively did the Bank Group coordinate with development partners and relevant stakeholders to address rural development?	Bank Group documents, documents from development partners; Bank Group project data (in relevant sectors), Bank Group advisory services and analytics data, donor strategies, projects, and analytical work; internal and external internal CPEs, internal and external intervention-level evidence	Document analysis, semistructured interviews with development partners, Bank Group staff, clients, and civil society
What lessons can be learned from the Bank Group's support to rural development?	Bank Group documents, documents from development partners; Bank Group project data (in relevant sectors), Bank Group advisory services and analytics data, donor strategies, projects, and analytical work; internal and external analyses, internal and external intervention-level evidence	Document analysis, portfolio review, semistructured interviews with Bank Group staff, client, and civil society

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: CPE = Country Program Evaluation; OP = Operational Policy.

Appendix B. World Bank Group Country Strategies

Table B.1. World Bank Group Country Strategies and Objectives, Madagascar, FY07–21

CAS FY07–11	ISN FY12–13	CPF 17–21
Pillar I. Remove bottlenecks to investment and growth in rural and urban areas • Improve governance in natural resource sectors • Improve voice and accountability • Improve business environment • Increase economic outcomes in “growth poles” areas • Improve access to finance • Increase competitiveness and diversification in agriculture • Improve accessibility and reliability of roads • Improve efficiency and reliability of railway operations along the corridor between the capital and Toamasina port • Improve competitiveness of air transport • Improve efficiency of power supply • Improve management of the environment • Increase natural disaster preparedness **Pillar II. Improve access to and quality of services to people** • Improve effectiveness and fairness of revenue collection system • Increase efficiency of public expenditure management • Improve public service delivery • Improve access to, and quality of, primary and postprimary education • Increase effectiveness of health service delivery Control incidence of HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections	**Pillar 1. Improve governance and public sector capacity** • Improve broad understanding of governance issues and governance • Improve public service delivery in pilot areas • Improve community participation in governance **Pillar 2. Promote employment and competitiveness** • Improve business environment • Improve agricultural productivity • Address emergency repairs and accessibility of transport network **Pillar 3. Promote resilience and reduce vulnerability** • Continue to protect environment • Improve protection of the vulnerable • Improve preparedness to deal with natural disasters • Improve monitoring of education sector performance • Improve mother and child health services and HIV prevention • Improve nutrition for children under two years of age (in target areas) Increase number of children 0–24 months who obtain monthly adequate minimum weight (in project areas)	**Focus area 1. Increase resilience and reduce fragility** • Strengthen children’s human development • Enhance resilience of livelihoods of vulnerable households in rural and urban areas • Enhance and increase effectiveness of decentralization • Improve transparency and accountability **Focus area 2. Promote inclusive growth** • Increase fiscal capacity to finance priority social and infrastructure spending • Improve business environment and access to finance • Strengthen rural productivity Improve access to energy and transport

Source: Independent Evaluation Group.
Note: CAS = Country Assistance Strategy; CPF = Country Partnership Framework; FY = fiscal year; ISN = Interim Strategy Note.

Appendix C. Madagascar's National Development Strategies

Table C.1. Madagascar's National Development Strategies

			Country Assistance Strategy, FY07–11		Interim Strategy Note, FY12–13			Country Partnership Framework, FY17–21	
Madagascar Action Plan, 2007–15	**National Development Plan, 2015–19**	**Madagascar Emergence Initiative, 2019–23**	**Remove bottlenecks to investment and growth**	**Improve access and quality of services to the people**	**Improve governance and public sector capacity**	**Promote employment and competitiveness**	**Promote resilience and reduce vulnerability**	**Increase resilience and reduce fragility**	**Promote inclusive growth**
Responsible governance	Governance, rule of law, security, decentralization, democracy, and national solidarity	Digital innovation and good governance	MAP, NDP, MEI	MAP, MEI	MAP, NDP, MEI	MAP, NDP	MAP, NDP	MAP, NDP, MEI	MAP, NDP, MEI
High growth economy	Preserving macroeconomic stability and supporting development	Economic and financial emergence, and international trade	MAP, NDP, MEI	NDP, MEI	MEI	MAP, NDP, MEI	NDP	NDP	MAP, NDP, MEI
		Economic emergence and international relations							
Connected infrastructure Rural development and a green revolution	Inclusive growth and local roots of development	Territorial planning, infrastructure, and decentralization	MAP, NDP, MEI	NDP, MEI	MAP, MEI	MAP, NDP, MEI	MAP, NDP, MEI	MAP, NDP, MEI	MAP, NDP, MEI
		Social protection and human rights							

			Country Assistance Strategy, FY07–11		Interim Strategy Note, FY12–13			Country Partnership Framework, FY17–21	
Madagascar Action Plan, 2007–15	**National Development Plan, 2015–19**	**Madagascar Emergence Initiative, 2019–23**	**Remove bottlenecks to investment and growth**	**Improve access and quality of services to the people**	**Improve governance and public sector capacity**	**Promote employment and competitiveness**	**Promote resilience and reduce vulnerability**	**Increase resilience and reduce fragility**	**Promote inclusive growth**
Cherished environment	Valorization of natural capital and strengthening resilience to natural disasters	Environmental emergence and sustainable development	MAP, NDP, MEI			NDP	MAP, NDP, MEI	MAP, NDP, MEI	MAP, NDP, MEI
Education transformation Health, family planning, and fighting HIV/AIDS	Adequate human capital for the development process	Educational innovation, human capital, sports, and culture		MAP, NDP, MEI			MAP, NDP, MEI	MAP, NDP, MEI	NDP

Sources: Madagascar 2007, 2015; 2019; World Bank 2007, 2011, 2017b
Note: FY = fiscal year; MAP = Madagascar Action Plan; MEI = Madagascar Emergence Initiative; NDP = National Development Plan.