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**PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT**

**HONDURAS**

**RURAL PRIMARY EDUCATION MANAGEMENT PROJECT (LN. 2804)  
BASIC EDUCATION (CR. 2694)**

**June 14, 2004**

*Sector and Thematic Evaluation Group  
Operations Evaluation Department*

## Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

*Currency Unit = Lempiras*

1990 L 5.3504	= US\$1.00	1995 SDR 1.00 = US\$1.50
1991 L 5.4001	= US\$1.00	2002 US\$1.00 = XDR 1.25
1992 L 5.5401	= US\$1.00	
1993 L 6.4067	= US\$1.00	
1994 L 8.5528	= US\$1.00	
1995 L 9.1445	= US\$1.00	
2002 L 16.21	= US\$ 1.000	

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ADEPRIR	Administración de la Educación Primaria Rural
AECOs	Parent School Associations (Asociaciones Educativas Comunitarias)
EFA	Education for All
FHIS	Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social
FTI	Fast-Track Initiative to achieve Education for All
GDP	Gross domestic product
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
LIL	Learning and Innovation Lending
KfW	Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (German Credit Institute for Reconstruction)
MIS	Management Information System
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PROMEB	Proyecto de Mejoramiento de Educación Básica
PROHECO	Honduras Community Based Education Program (Proyecto Hondureño de Educación Comunitaria)
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
SE	Secretaría de Educación (Ministry of Education)
TVET	Technical and vocational education and training
UMCE	Unidad de Medición Curricular Externa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

## Fiscal Year

Government: January 1 — December 31

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**OED Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation.**

### **About this Report**

The Operations Evaluation Department assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, OED annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The projects, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies.

A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and fieldwork conducted by OED. To prepare PPARs, OED staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country for onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader OED studies.

Each PPAR is subject to a peer review process and OED management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

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**Relevance of Objectives:** The extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

**Efficacy:** The extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

**Efficiency:** The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible. This rating is not generally applied to adjustment operations.

**Sustainability:** The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. *Possible ratings:* Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable.

**Institutional Development Impact:** The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

**Outcome:** The extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Bank Performance:** The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project). *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Borrower Performance:** The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

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## Principal Ratings

	<i>ICR*</i>	<i>ICR Review*</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
<b><i>Rural primary Education Management Project (Loan 2804)</i></b>			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Institutional Development	Modest	Modest	Modest
Sustainability	Uncertain	Uncertain	Likely
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance	Not rated	Not rated	Unsatisfactory
<b><i>Basic Education (Credit 2694)</i></b>			
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Institutional Development	Substantial	Substantial	Substantial
Sustainability	Likely	Likely	Likely
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

\* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible operational division of the Bank. The Evaluation Summary (ES) is an intermediate OED product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

## Key Staff Responsible

	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
<b><i>Rural Primary Education Management Project (Loan 2804)</i></b>			
Appraisal	Robert Ruiz-Esparza	Douglas Keare	Paul Knotter
Completion	John Helwig	Kye Woo Lee	Edilberto Segura
<b><i>Basic Education (Credit 2694)</i></b>			
Appraisal	Anna Sant'Anna	Kye Woo Lee	Edilberto Segura
Completion	Joel Reyes	Ana Maria Arriagada	Dona Dowsett-Coirolo

## **Preface**

Attached is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) on two education projects in Honduras. The Rural Primary Education Management Project (Ln. 2804-HO), approved for a loan of US\$4.4 million equivalent on May 5, 1987, closed on December 31, 1995, after extensions totaling 18 months. US\$0.08 million were canceled. The Basic Education Project (Cr. 2694-HO), approved for a credit of US\$30 million on July 12, 1994, closed as scheduled on December 31, 2001, and disbursed almost fully. Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW) provided cofinancing of US\$13.3 million.

The projects in Honduras were selected for assessment in order to study the effectiveness of Bank strategy in a country that has been declared ready for the Fast-Track Initiative in order to achieve Education for All by 2015. The assessment contributes to background work for an ongoing Operations Evaluation Department (OED) study of the Bank's assistance to basic education.

The PPAR is based on the following sources: Project or Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs), Staff Appraisal Reports (SARs), Loan Agreements for the projects, and project files, particularly the supervision reports. An OED mission visited Honduras in October 2003 to interview officials and beneficiaries, observe instruction in schools, and collect other pertinent information. Field visits took place in La Paz, Intibucá, Copan, Lempira, Cortés as well as 19 schools in the areas that had benefited from ADEPRIR or from PROMEB. The author thanks the government officials who received the mission for their extensive cooperation.

Following standard OED procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and comments. Comments received have been incorporated as changes in the text and are included as Annex D.





## Summary

This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) on two education projects in Honduras. **The Rural Primary Education Management project** (ADEPRIR) was approved for a US\$4.4 million loan in May 1987. After the project was restructured in 1993, total project costs were reduced from US\$6.9 to US\$5.3 million. The loan closed on December 31, 1995, and disbursed almost fully after extensions totaling 18 months; US\$0.08 was canceled. The **Basic Education project** (PROMEB), was approved for a credit of US\$30 million on July 12, 1994. The credit closed as scheduled on December 31, 2001, and disbursed fully.

While each project had its own specific objectives, the common goals were to increase quality of primary education, train teachers, and make the management of education more efficient. The Rural Primary Education Management Project carried out relatively few activities during most of its implementation period, was reduced in scope, and ultimately did not fulfill its objectives. The Basic Education Project succeeded in carrying out most of its planned activities and substantially achieved its objectives.

The Bank's education sector strategy in Honduras has been relevant to the human resource development needs of the country and the goals of the Education for All strategy. Though the projects faced multiple financial and implementation problems, they implemented several activities and provided inputs to the sector. The education budget has increased steadily. Access to education has been high since the 1980s and has improved somewhat, while overall dropout and repetition have decreased. Nevertheless, the projects had a limited impact on the quality of education, partly because they invested in areas (such as buildings and general teacher education) that are necessary but have been shown to bear little direct relation to achievement in Honduras. Standardized achievement test scores show very limited acquisition of curricular content, and international comparisons place Honduras below all other Latin American countries in this respect. For various reasons, classes are held about 60 percent of the mandated time, and the percentage of children completing the 6th grade (about 70 percent) has not changed significantly since 1994. Thus, achieving universal graduation from primary school under the Education for All Fast-Track Initiative requires that much more school time be spent in learning and early acquisition of fast and effortless reading.

The outcome of the **Rural Primary Education Management Project** is rated unsatisfactory because its management-oriented objectives were not achieved. Institutional development is rated modest. Sustainability is rated likely because most of the activities envisaged under this project are being implemented 10 years after its completion. Bank and borrower performance are rated unsatisfactory; the design was extremely ambitious given the US\$5.3 million project cost, and the government had little ownership and interest in it. The outcome of the **Basic Education Project** is rated satisfactory, and institutional development is rated substantial. Sustainability is rated likely, while Bank and borrower performance are rated satisfactory.

Experience with the assessed projects confirms a number of OED lessons from the education sector:

- Despite considerable quality-oriented investments by both the assessed projects, progress in student performance has been limited. Thus, educational project inputs and rising education budgets do not translate automatically into increased student performance. To increase performance, teachers and students must use inputs effectively and maximize the instructional time students are engaged in learning.
- Both assessed projects developed action plans, but their implementation was limited. Such actions must be feasible within the budget and human resources available, and Government officials must also clearly perceive the need for plans and the subsequent actions.
- The Basic Education Project (PROMEB) and its follow-through project successfully involved the communities in the management of rural schools. Decentralization of school management to the community level may mobilize local support for the schools and increase pride in achievement by students and teachers.
- The achievement tests developed through PROMEB provided valuable monitoring information to the government, but outcomes were not widely disseminated, and use was limited. The development of standardized achievement tests strengthens the capacity of institutions to obtain monitoring information. To be valuable, however, the information must be disseminated widely at the school level if possible, and actions must be carried out based on the feedback it provides.

Gregory K. Ingram  
Director-General  
Operations Evaluation

## 1. Background

1.1 Honduras is a Central American country with a population of about 6.3 million and a GDP per capita of \$920<sup>1</sup> that has devoted since the 1990s substantial public resources to education. In 2001, total public expenditure on education amounted to about 6.4 percent of GDP or 23.4 percent of total government expenditure. Between 1990 and 2000, 45 to 50 percent of the total education expenditure was for primary education, about 14 to 18 percent for secondary education, and 25 to 30 percent for higher education.<sup>2</sup> The large share of expenditure on primary education may have contributed to the provision of almost universal access to primary education since the late 1980s in both rural and urban areas (106 percent gross and 87.6 percent net enrollment rate in 2000).<sup>3</sup>

1.2 To educate rural populations in its mostly mountainous terrain, Honduras has followed a strategy of building small, multigrade schools. About 81 percent of the country's schools have fewer than six teachers and are mainly multigrade; 62.1 percent have three to six grades in one room.<sup>4</sup> However, standardized achievement test scores show limited acquisition of basic skills, partly because of very low instructional time. Schools should function for 200 days, but may be open for only about 110 days (average 3 to 4 hours daily).<sup>5</sup> Only about 70 percent of those enrolled in grade 1 graduate from primary school and most take longer than the expected 6 years.<sup>6</sup> Low performance has been to some extent related to centralized decision-making functions of the Ministry of Education (SE, Secretaría de Educación). Teachers in the past got little in-service training and could not deal with the challenges of teaching the poor. Therefore, the large amounts of money that the country in principle makes available to the students have not brought about commensurate educational benefits.

1.3 The country has had some unusual circumstances. To support guerrillas against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, considerable U.S. financing entered the country in the 1980s, partly in the form of aid through USAID. Nevertheless, in 1988 Honduras fell in arrears with respect to repayment of World Bank loans, and from being an IBRD country it eventually started borrowing on IDA terms. A "shock" treatment was introduced in 1990 along with a social investment fund (FHIS, Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social) to deal with the poverty that ensued. Finally, on October 26, 1998,

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1. World Bank, *Country at a Glance*, 2002.

2. Honduras-HN/Community-based education project. Project Appraisal Document, World Bank, Report No: 21851, 2001.

3. Gross enrollment rate was 86.5% in 1970, 98.3% in 1980, 108.4% in 1985, and 107.6% in 1991. The data available indicate net enrollment rates of 78% in 1980 and 89% in 1991 (Edstats-World Bank Educational Statistics; education expenditure data for 2001 from the Ministry of Education.) Gross enrollment refers to all school-aged children, whereas net enrollment refers to the ages that should be in a specific grade.

4. Secretaria de Educación. *Censo Escolar 2000 Sobre Maestros, Matricula e Infraestructura para los Niveles Preescolar, Primaria y Secundaria. Encuesta De Demanda no Cubierta En la Educación Preescolar y Primaria. Informe General Tegucigalpa, Honduras February 2001.*

5. A regional study estimated that if school were held all 200 days, student scores would rise by 10 percentage points (Secretaría de Educación. *Plan Todos con Educación - Honduras 2003-2015*, p. 6, study not cited).

6. Graduation rate up from 43 percent in 1993; Van Steenwyk, Ned. *Salvemos el Primer Ciclo en Comayagua*. USAID Proyecto No. 522-0388. Febrero 2002. Secretaria de Educación., Tegucigalpa, Honduras.) In some areas (e.g., Comayagua) Grade 1 repetition was 56 percent in 1993.

hurricane Mitch damaged a wide area of the country, including an estimated 17 percent of the country's primary schools that housed more than 170,000 students (10 percent of the basic education student population) resulting in further interruptions in service provision. Repair and replacement costs for schools and materials, estimated at US\$31.2 million, were largely covered through donor aid.

### **Donor Involvement in the Education Sector of Honduras**

1.4 Aside from the Bank, several international donors (USAID, GTZ, Canada, Sweden, Japan, Spain, UNICEF, Inter-American Development Bank) have been involved in Honduras since the early 1980s and have supported its education budget.<sup>7</sup> The main donor is USAID, which has had long-term technical presence in the country. It has financed textbook development, teacher training and a successful effort to make schools more efficient.<sup>8</sup> German organizations (KfW and GTZ) have financed constructions of classrooms and district offices, books and classroom libraries, financial management, and evaluation. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has mainly financed secondary and vocational education. In addition, the country benefits from the presence of large national and international nongovernmental organizations, such as Plan Honduras, Plan Internacional, Visión Mundial. These NGOs organize communities to support housing, health, school attendance, including distance education secondary schooling for rural students.

1.5 According to persons interviewed by the OED mission, the donor community supports the same objectives, collaborates well, and meets frequently. The donors have strongly encouraged educational reform to make the system more efficient and seem able to influence the government's decisions on policy issues. They provided critical and fast help after hurricane Mitch to rebuild schools and provide materials so that schools would open on schedule in February 1999. A group of donors has agreed to finance the budget necessary for the Fast-Track Initiative (FTI), which started in 2003.<sup>9</sup> Its goals include reaching a net enrollment ratio of 95 percent for primary education, with a 100 percent graduation rate of those reaching grade 6 by 2015.

### **Bank Sector Strategy**

1.6 Since the first World Bank-financed project in 1974, country dialogue has mainly focused on quality and administrative efficiency. All four completed Bank projects in

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7. Meza, M. P. Estudio Gasto Social en Servicios Sociales Básicos para Honduras. 1999. Specific donor investment amounts are not reported.

8. The USAID Educational Efficiency Project and distance education increased coverage by 22 percent over the previous rate, lowered repetition by 26 percent, and reduced dropout by 32 percent in project areas during implementation (about 20% of the country). The distance education project Educatodos improved test scores significantly over those of students in traditional programs. Another project trained 250 teachers of marginal areas in 2-3 months overseas to serve as trainers (Mayen et al., ADEPRIR evaluation, p. 12). In 2001 it started the project 'Salvemos el Primer Ciclo' in Comayagua to reduce repetition by helping teachers create curricular calendars and monitoring performance through its own test scores.

9. The fast-track initiative will be implemented by Education Secretariat teams rather than a project implementation unit. Very few actions had taken place at the time the mission was in the field, except for a planning exercise to combine smaller schools.

Honduras (including the projects evaluated in this report; see Table 1), tried to strengthen primary education, even at a time when vocational and secondary education were considered priorities by the Bank. They supported teacher training and improved infrastructure, primarily in multigrade schools: about 2,500 primary classrooms were built and more than 2,500 repaired.

1.7 The **First Education Project**<sup>10</sup> focused on teacher training at the primary, secondary, agricultural, and vocational level. It built or supported 25 institutions, including four primary teacher training schools and a secondary teachers' college that became the Universidad Pedagógica Nacional. In the first few years, enrollments in the training centers were only 70 percent of planned capacity (that is, 802 secondary-level teachers instead of the planned 1,400), but eventually capacity increased to double the estimates produced at appraisal. The **Second Education Project**<sup>11</sup> built about 550 rural primary schools and upgraded primary-school teachers as well as staff in teacher training colleges. It also supported agricultural and forestry schools, though these had enrollment shortfalls and high unit costs. The PPAR mentions that educational quality had improved. Aside from implementing two more projects (the subjects of this report), the Bank has also financed three **Social Investment Fund Projects** (Credits 2212-HO, 2401-HO, Cr. 2766-HO, approved in 1991, 1992, and 1995, respectively); they have devoted some resources to school construction. Ultimately, the implementing agency (Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social – FHIS) was selected by the government as the financial intermediary for investments in school construction. The project that currently supports rural primary schools is the Community Based Education Project (PROHECO,<sup>12</sup> Table 1). PROHECO is continuing the drive to make education accessible to the more remote areas while improving school-level management.

1.8 Sector work has been financed by various donors with extensive government participation. GTZ financed sectoral research in 1997. The Bank and USAID have carried out analytical and sector work on specific issues, such as research on the determinants of improved performance and reduced repetition.<sup>13</sup> The extent to which findings have been used to improve sector strategy is unknown.

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10. Project Performance Audit Report. Honduras First Education Project. (Loan 954/Credit 452-HO) May 21, 1982; Report 3936.

11. Project Performance Audit Report. Honduras — Second Education Project (Cr. 777-HO), May 29, 1987, Report no. 6793.

12. Proyecto Hondureño de Educación Comunitaria.

13. GTZ. "Estudio Sectorial, Plan Decenal de Educación", 1997. John H. Y. Edwards Bruce Fuller, and Suhas Parandenkar. 1997. Primary Education Efficiency in Honduras What Remains to be Done? LASHD Paper Series No. 7. Seely, Ned. Evaluación Final del Proyecto Eficiencia de la Educación Primaria. (Washington Creative Associates, SE and USAID, November 1995).

**Table 1. Education Lending in Honduras**

<i>Completed Projects</i>	<i>Project ID</i>	<i>Approval FY</i>	<i>Closing</i>	<i>Loan/ Credit Amt. US\$m</i>	<i>Project Cost US\$m</i>	<i>Canceled US\$m</i>	<i>PPAR outcome</i>
Education I (primary, vocational teacher training) - Cr. 452-HO, Ln. 954-HO	P007346	1974	1980	6.0	10.4	0.0	'Qualified success'
Education II - Cr. 777	P007453	1978	1984	5.0	8.5	0.024	Satisfactory
Rural Primary Education Management (ADEPRIR) - Ln. 2804	P007373	1987	1995	4.4	6.9 <sup>a</sup>	0.08	Unsatisfactory
Basic Education (PROMEB) - Cr. 2694	P007399	1995	2001	30	50.0	0.0	Satisfactory
<b>Total</b>				<b>45.4</b>	<b>74.2</b>	<b>0.1</b>	
<b><i>Ongoing Projects</i></b>							
PROFUTURO Project - Cr. 3250	P074323	1999	2004	12.3	13.9		
PROFUTURO Project (supplemental) - Cr. 3250	P074323	2001	2004	4.0	4.67		
Community-Based Education Project (PROHECO) - Cr. 3497	P007397	2001	2006	41.5	47.8		

a. The project was re-structured in 1993 and the total project cost was reduced to \$5.3 million.

## 2. Project Objectives and Description

2.1 The two projects under review, referred to in Spanish as ADEPRIR and PROMEB,<sup>14</sup> focused on improving the capacity of the Education Secretariat (SE) to manage schools more efficiently, so that the quality of education would improve. In contrast to earlier projects (see comparison of objectives in Table 2) these projects focused on primary education and on management improvement.

14. Proyecto de Administración Primaria Rural and Proyecto de Mejoramiento de la Educación Básica.

**Table 2. Main Objectives of Completed Bank Projects in Education**

Typology of Objectives/ Project Name	Access	Quality	Efficiency Management/ Planning
Education I		Support and strengthen the most critical areas of the Government's strategy for education, i.e. teacher training in primary, secondary, vocational areas; agricultural education including extension services.	
Education II	Increase supply of agricultural and related manpower through investments in the postsecondary National Schools of Agriculture and Forestry Science and a foreign fellowship program for veterinarians.		Develop rural primary education through assistance to a 'nuclearization' system (central primary schools serving as resource centers for a group of usually 10 to 15 smaller satellite schools)
Rural Primary Education Project (ADEPRIR)			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Enhance the capacity of the Secretariat for Education (SE) in inter-ministerial coordination, sector policy formulation, planning of education development, coordination of development assistance, and internal administration.</li> <li>- Prepare and test an effective system for administering rural primary schools, which would reduce recurrent expenditures, improve cost-effectiveness, and establish the basis for raising student achievement.</li> </ul>
Basic Education Project (PROMEB)	Reduce student dropout and repetition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Improve quality of learning and student performance</li> <li>- Increase school attendance</li> <li>- Create more effective learning conditions</li> <li>- Raise achievement</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strengthen the capacity of SE to deliver basic education at higher levels of efficiency and fiscal accountability</li> <li>- Reduce administrative costs</li> </ul>

2.2 *Rural Primary Education Management Project (ADEPRIR)*. This project of US\$6.9 million was to strengthen the technical capacity of the Secretariat of Education, evaluate its administrative organization, conduct studies on decentralization policies, and train and support staff. Through a three-phase process in each school district of six out of 12 selected departments, action plans for physical facilities, teacher training, and school management/supervision would be developed as well as operational plans that would integrate all the plans of the six departments (in Atlantida, Colón, Cortés, Gracias a Dios, Islas de la Bahia, Yoro). The proposed action plans would then be applied through a pilot subproject in 12 school districts. Through improved planning, the activities were to teach critical skills and to create a new attitude of the students toward themselves and the teachers.<sup>15</sup> It was unclear how the activities were meant to accomplish the goals.

15. Cabrera, M.A., Mayen, L., and Suazo, S. 1994. Organización de la Red Administrativa y experimentación de la propuesta de evaluación de los aprendizajes. Municipio Choloma, Cortés: Secretaria de Educación.

Nevertheless, components included (a) institutional strengthening and (b) regional planning and management. (See Annex A Table 1 for specific activities and targets).

2.3 *Basic Education Project (PROMEB)*. In contrast to the earlier projects, PROMEB was large, with a cost of US\$50 million, including parallel financing from KfW of US\$13 million. It was to continue the activities of the USAID educational efficiency project (1993-96) and emphasized learning achievement. Components included (a) improving the quality of basic education (US\$38.2 million) and (b) institutional strengthening (US\$14.9 million; see Annex A Table 2 for specific activities and targets). Coverage extended in principle to rural and remote areas of the entire country. A teacher performance incentive plan was replaced soon after effectiveness by a community-based integrated approach to retrain and improve the performance of teachers.

### **3. Implementation of the Assessed Projects**

#### **Rural Primary Education Management Project (ADEPRIR; Ln. 2804-HO; FY 87-95)**

3.1 Shortly after the loan became effective in April 1988, all operations in Honduras were suspended for 18 months due to the country's repayment arrears to the Bank (December 1988- June 1990). Work continued until the available tranche of funds was exhausted in 1989. The project was reactivated in 1991, but the government accorded some of these objectives a lower priority and did not allocate sufficient counterpart funds. At the same time, projects of other donors were being implemented (USAID, Japan, UNESCO, Holland, and Germany), some with similar components. In 1993, the project was amended. Objectives were not changed, but the regional planning and management components were scaled down; though the loan amount remained the same, project size was reduced to US\$5.3 million and only 2 of the 12 school districts originally proposed for the project benefited (the municipalities of Choloma in Cortés and Olanchito in Yoro). Project funds were used to build rural schools and provide textbooks in these districts, as well as prepare PROMEB, the follow-on project. To carry out these new activities, the completion date was extended three times for a total of 18 months. The government's project evaluation report expresses concern about a lack of follow-up and sustainability.<sup>16</sup>

#### **Basic Education Project (PROMEB; Cr. 2694-HO; FY95-02)**

3.2 Soon after effectiveness, the project became almost inactive and disbursed rather slowly until the time of hurricane Mitch in October 1998. At that time, the credit was quickly amended to include a 100-day recovery plan for the Secretariat, which had lost most of its equipment, files, and vehicles, as well as to repair 2,800 damaged classrooms. Expedited procurement procedures were approved. Thereafter implementation picked up, almost all planned activities were carried out, and the project disbursed completely.

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16. Mayen, L. Flores, O., Castro, R., Arita, A. Mondufar, H. 1995. Evaluación Final: Proyecto Administración de la Educación Primaria Rural (ADEPRIR). Tegucigalpa: Secretaría de Educación, p. 4.



## Implementation Experience

3.3 The two projects had some common activities and implementation problems, which are described in this section along with achievement of specific targets.

3.4 *Political economy.* The projects were subject to extensive political influence that hampered implementation.<sup>17</sup> During ADEPRIR implementation, all the project staff were fired after each of two government changes. Ministers also changed frequently. These constant changes disrupted project operations, undermined morale, and prevented the development of an institutional memory. PROMEB faced problems with competing personalities, and the project implementation unit (PIU) had six directors during the life of the project. The large project size made it a target of attempts for political favors, and salaries for people who contributed little. Both projects disbursed mainly during the last part of their implementation life. Financial audit reports of both projects found problems, such as incomplete records, disbursements for ineligible expenditures, and awards to favorite contractors.<sup>18</sup>

3.5 *Decentralization, planning, and institutional development.* Both projects focused on decreasing Secretariat administrative costs, promoting decentralization, and reducing administrative staff (about 19 percent of Secretariat employees). ADEPRIR was to study the administrative structure of the Secretariat of Education, conduct diagnostic surveys of rural schools, organize the school administration and supervision networks for rural schools, develop a student testing system, and prepare comprehensive operational plans to improve the quality of education. However, the government did not really want a reorganization and resisted project activities.<sup>19</sup> Thus, most ADEPRIR activities involving institutional development and decentralization were not carried out (Annex A Table 1).

3.6 The donors involved in the follow-on PROMEB insisted on a decentralization decree and a new organizational chart as a condition of disbursement. Thus, the project achieved the creation of departmental directorates with staff hired on the basis of a competition. Departmental directorates now carry out many of the functions once centralized in Tegucigalpa. Nevertheless, some important functions, such as teacher appointments and textbook decisions, are still centralized. Staff were not moved from the capital to other parts of the country as expected, but a few new positions were created in the central departmental directorates. Overall, however, activities involving institutional development were carried out as expected (Annex A Table 2) and the related PROMEB objective was achieved.

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17. As far back as Education II, the project implementation units suffered from frequent changes in management — they had a different director almost every year.

18. Maradiaga Fortin Lagos and assoc. Proyecto Administración de la Educación Primaria Rural. Estado de Origen y Aplicación de Fondos e Inversiones Acumuladas; Estado de Activos, Pasivos y Contribución Local e Información Financiera Compleme-ntaria al 31 de diciembre de 1993; same title for 1992 and 1994. During ADEPRIR, one contractor was paid an advance of 100 percent for furniture, which was then severely delayed, while another abandoned 16 school sites unfinished. For PROMEB, UNDP handled procurement bids. The Universidad Pedagógica sold syllabi that should have been given free, partly because the PIU delayed disbursements for them. Some of these instances could have been grounds for declaring misprocurement, but this did not happen.

19. Sources are interviews with project directors and World Bank archives.

3.7 School mapping did not succeed under ADEPRIR but partly did so under PROMEB. The school censuses conducted in 1995 and 2000 have provided information to help program interventions for the Education for All initiative. To manage the large numbers of small schools, efforts at networking<sup>20</sup> have been developed since Education II. However, the terrain and transport needs limit communication within networks and the schools continue to receive limited supervision. The projects did not focus on the activities supervisors should carry out to make learning more effective.<sup>21</sup>

3.8 *Civil works.* In both projects, only limited civil works were foreseen, but targets were exceeded as other activities were dropped. The schools built under ADEPRIR responded to 80 percent of the needs in Choloma and Olanchito municipalities,<sup>22</sup> and most are reported still to be sturdy 10-15 years after their construction. In 1997, responsibility for schools construction was removed from the Secretariat of Education school construction department. Almost all of the construction investment on education was transferred to FHIS, which had built schools since 1990. However, the Secretariat has not supervised adequately construction by FHIS or monitored costs. FHIS schools cost about twice as much as those built by the Secretariat of Education, and several had structural problems, such as non-functional toilets. Thus, about 15 percent fewer schools were built and 46 percent fewer repaired than expected under PROMEB.<sup>23</sup> However, the all 18 departmental offices were built as expected (Annex A Table 2).

3.9 *Community participation.* Like other Central American countries, Honduras has a tradition of community participation, and donors encourage it. Community participation with materials and labor started with Education II.<sup>24</sup> ADEPRIR formed 47 community support committees. Community participation, which initially started as an amendment to the PROMEB project, further evolved with PROHECO schools. Parents' associations (AECOs, or Asociaciones Educativas Comunitarias) receive training and are then entrusted with most school management functions, including the money to pay for teacher salaries and school expenses. According to staff interviewed by the OED mission, this '*auditoria social*' has increased involvement in school affairs and community management was expanded to all rural areas during the follow-on Community-Based Education Project (Cr. 3497-HO). About 1,663 schools are run by AECOs.

3.10 *Textbooks.* Since the 1970s, students have had access to textbooks that were initially developed with USAID assistance and revised through Bank financing.<sup>25</sup>

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20. School networks involve a nucleus school that has a full-time director for 5-10 satellite schools located within a few kilometers that may only have a few grades. The nuclear director is expected to visit the satellite schools on a regular basis, though lack of transport often makes that difficult. Supervisory and administrative services would link the network to the school district, departmental, regional, and central levels.

21. The government could study the feasibility of telecommunications devices to link networked schools and supervisors.

22. Mayen et al., ADEPRIR evaluation, p. 84.

23. Meza Palma, Miriam. 1998. Consultoria sobre Análisis y Evaluación Financiera del Subcomponente de Infraestructura Básica. Tegucigalpa: Secretaría de Educación.

24. Project Performance Audit Report. Honduras. Second Education Project, 1987. Report No. 6793, p. 21.

25. Ratios of students to textbooks have been unavailable. ADEPRIR provided textbooks only after the project was restructured.

ADEPRIR distributed an unknown number of textbooks in 75 schools (vs. 36 schools foreseen during appraisal). A revised set of 11.7 million textbooks (vs. 5.4 million expected at appraisal) was printed through German bilateral aid, and PROMEB distributed them. (The target was exceeded partly because extra textbooks were printed after hurricane Mitch.) The textbooks were given to schools, to be available to students only during class time. Having been printed overseas, there are no copies available for sale in Honduras, and when books are worn out they are not replaced. So, despite large numerical targets, this component has not proved very sustainable. The problems created by this deficiency are discussed at length in the issues section.

3.11 *Teacher training.* ADEPRIR financed meetings of teachers belonging to networks of about 75 schools, but these ceased after the end of the project. Under PROMEB (which initially trained at least 32,500 educators), in-service education moved from an informal basis to a degree-granting function carried out in the Universidad Pedagógica Francisco Morazán. Much education for teachers and the population in general is now available through distance education (including university programs for teachers, Maestro en Casa and Educadores for adult literacy, Telebásica, and radio programs). The quality of the programs and their effects on teacher and student performance are unclear. Though numerical targets have been met or exceeded, no study has been specifically undertaken to evaluate the effects of this investment. However, a study of factors affecting learning outcomes showed ambiguous relationships between teacher training and student performance (see para. 6.8). The recommendations of the study underline the need for more basic math, practical curricular monitoring, and increased use of students' time in learning.<sup>26</sup>

3.12 *Bilingual education.* PROMEB financed materials, dictionaries and grammars in languages for 8 ethnicities such as Miskito, Garifuna, Tawahka, Pech, and others. These languages were to be taught in order to improve quality of education of indigenous speakers, but activities have been limited to materials production and some distribution of materials. Almost no bilingual education is taking place, and the goal of teaching indigenous students in their language has not been achieved.

3.13 *Achievement testing.* Both ADEPRIR and PROMEB supported educational testing.<sup>27</sup> PROMEB financed an external evaluation unit, the Unidad de Medición Curricular Externa (UMCE), housed in the Pedagogical University, that has developed criterion-referenced tests. But although strategies and feedback forms have been developed,<sup>28</sup> results have been merely reported to the government,<sup>29</sup> and little action has been taken on the information provided through testing.

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26. Secretaría de Educación. 2002. Informe Nacional de Rendimiento Académico 2002. Tercero y Sexto Grados. Tegucigalpa. USAID has provided an effective methodology, curricular calendars.

27. The ADEPRIR evaluation report (Mayen et al.) showed results of tests given around 1994 (p. 19-20) in Choloma suggestive of high achievement and no failures. The tests were not the same as those financed under PROMEB.

28. Secretaría de Educación. 1998. Estrategias Didácticas para el Aprendizaje del Español en la Escuela Primaria. UMCE. Tegucigalpa. Secretaría de Educación. Análisis de Reactivos y Estrategias Sugeridas. Español Tercero y Sexto Grados. UMCE. Tegucigalpa 1998.

29. Secretaría de Educación. 2001. La UMCE y sus Comienzos. Tegucigalpa. Secretaría de Educación. 1998. Rendimiento en Matemáticas — 2º, 3er, 4to y 6º Grados. Segunda Evaluación. Tegucigalpa. Secretaría de

3.14 *Project evaluation.* Honduras has the capacity to evaluate and monitor its educational programs. ADEPRIR had a final evaluation carried out by a local consultant and PROMEB had one conducted by an international consultant.<sup>30</sup> Both reports were informative and based on focus group responses, but neither used robust research designs to assess project impact quantitatively. The ADEPRIR evaluation focused on how the project changed the relationship between students, teachers, parents, and other community members. The responses indicated that there was greater communication among these groups, but the evaluation design did not permit a study of the impacts of the inputs or their significance in increasing performance. Neither of the reports received wide dissemination or discussion, so their findings were not used extensively for improving subsequent operations.

### **Mission Observations**

3.15 The OED mission visited departmental directorates in La Paz, Intibucá, Copan, Lempira, Cortés and interviewed 5 district directors, approximately 50 teachers (14 individually and 36 in one group), and 16 current or former government officials and staff who had worked in the implementation units of the two projects. District staff expressed satisfaction with the activities of both projects. Staff in Choloma had a high regard for the educational inputs given through the pilot micro-planning project of ADEPRIR in that area (Annex B).

3.16 The mission also visited 19 schools<sup>31</sup> in the areas that had benefited from ADEPRIR or from PROMEB. The schools were 1 to 2 kilometers from a highway and might therefore have been of better quality than more remote schools. Observations (carried out at the end of the school year) were as follows:

- Construction seemed to be of adequate quality. However, some teachers complained that the FHIS had made building errors, such as disconnected bathroom tubes. Many buildings are used only in the morning. Rather than hold some classes in the afternoon, a district director reported that teachers prefer to crowd the schools in the morning or demand more construction.
- Most of the textbooks financed by PROMEB (Escuela Morazánica) are still available, but in most grades several students had to share books or do without more advanced modules that were not available. Small school libraries had been

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Educación. 1998. *El Lenguaje Oral y Escrito en 2º y 4º Grados de la Escuela Primaria de Honduras*. Tegucigalpa. For the ADEPRIR evaluation see Mayen et al.

30. Forster, Pannell Kerr and Martínez, Jorge. 2002. *Evaluación de Impacto del Proyecto de Mejoramiento de la Educación Básica*. (PROMEB). Informe Final. PKF Worldwide, Fairfax, Virginia.

31. Escuela Dionisia de Herrero, Nueva Alianza (La Paz), Escuela Morazánica, Paula Palacios de Pineda (Intibucá, Gracias, Lempira), Escuela Rodolfo Cortes (Refugio-Gracias), Escuela Petronio Muñoz (Gracias), Escuela San Jose, Nicomedes Toro, José Cecilio del Valle, Juan Ramón Cuevas, José María Orellano (Copan), Francisco Muñoz (El Pedernal, Sta Rita, Cortés), Escuela Armando Guel (Choloma), San Francisco de Stribon (Choloma), Oscar Armando Avila, Edilberto Solan, Escuela ADEPRIR, escuela rural mixta la Libertad (Choloma), Sendero de Saber in Cerro Verde (private). Through field visits, OED collects qualitative information, which is integrated with quantitative data where available. The limited time to assess projects (approximately one week per project) means that missions have limited time in the field, and that travel to very remote areas is often not possible.

distributed, but students reported that they were rarely used. The children were not allowed to take the books home to read.

- In modestly efficient schools, students should read relatively fluently by the end of grade 1, at a speed of about 30 to 70 words per minute.<sup>32</sup> However, the approximately 70 randomly chosen students who were asked to read and solve simple problems did so slowly and with many errors. Grade 1 children mainly read individual letters, and many students were still not fluent by grade 3. Several in grades 4 and 5 understood little of passages they read and merely reread sections when asked about their meaning. Several children in grades 3 and 4 could not understand the mathematical problems they were reading in order to solve them. This was particularly the case with multigrade classes, where students get only a fraction of the instruction they should get and must study partly on their own. Some districts offer remedial courses between grades, but this practice is limited.
- Teachers seemed unaware and unconcerned about their students' limited skills. Those interviewed by the OED mission often attributed students' low performance to poverty and malnutrition.<sup>33</sup> They maintained that students were at the curricular level they should be at that time of the year, although quick checks showed that students had not mastered prerequisites.
- Interviews with teachers indicated that the supervisors rarely visit, partly because of limited travel resources. When they visit, they focus on school necessities rather than students' basic skills.
- Parents indicated that they were able to carry out the school management functions entrusted to them, pay the teachers, and buy materials for the school. Despite a few incidents of funds stolen by outsiders and initial difficulties in the provision of funds, community management seems to have been satisfactory.

## 4. Results

4.1 This section provides data on changes of important educational indicators during the 1990s. It is difficult to separate the effects of the two projects under review from those financed by other donors and effects of government policies. However, observations about the evolution of the sector suggest some possible outcomes of the Bank's work.

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
32. Harris, M. and G. Hatano (Eds) *Learning to Read and Write: A Cross-Linguistic Perspective*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press; p. 25. Barr, R; C. Blachowicz; C. Katz; and B. Kaufman. 2002. *Reading Diagnosis for Teachers: An Instructional Approach* (4th ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon; p. 76. Silent reading norms are: Second grade 60-100 words per minute, third grade 90-120, fourth grade 110-140, fifth grade 140-170, and six grade 160-190 words per minute.

33. Developmental delays caused by environmental and nutritional deprivations may to some extent account for reading problems. These may improve through school lunches and preschool programs, whose coverage has increased to 29 percent of the population. But more will be needed to enable children to perform at grade level.

4.2 The extensive dialogue with the donor community in the 1990s brought about policy changes with respect to decentralization, financial efficiency, and management. The Bank's human resource development strategy for Honduras and the objectives of the projects it supported have been relevant to the economic needs of the country. The government has sufficient evaluation capacity and its policy over time shows evidence of learning from the lessons of the past. Also, officials involved with the two projects evaluated in this report feel very positively about the actions and outcomes of those projects (Annex B). According to government officials interviewed by the mission, the investments enabled the country to make progress toward improved quality.


4.3 *Improved access to education.* Enrollments have increased steadily over the past 30 years. The gross enrollment ratio rose from 87 percent in 1974 to 101 percent in 1984 and 110 percent in 1990, dropping to 106 percent in 2000 as the number of overage children was reduced.<sup>34</sup> The net enrollment ratio (ages 7-12) is approximately 95 percent (Annex A Table 3). The dropout and repetition rates have shown a steady reduction to 3 and 8 percent respectively,<sup>35</sup> particularly in the period of PROMEB, 1996-2000 (Annex A Table 4). Preschool enrollments have risen from 29.7 percent in 1995 to 38.9 percent in 1999 (Figure 1). Because repetition and dropout were reduced as access rose, there does not appear to be a tradeoff between quality and access in Honduras, as in some countries with low enrollment ratios. However, reaching the last 5 percent of students who do not attend is expected to be the challenging job of the Education for All initiative.

**Figure 1. Gross Enrollment Rates**



Source: Ministry of Education 2000

**Figure 2. Promotion Rates by Grade**




Source: Ministry of Education 2000

34. Education II PPAR, p. 19, ADEPRIR Staff Appraisal Report, p. 23. The increase of the 1980s was only partly due to schools built by the Education II project; social demand and government investments seem to have played a more important role. At appraisal of Education II, there were 34,000 primary school students, and by closing they had increased by 50 percent to 50,000, but the new student places provided by this project were much fewer.

35. Seely, Ned. Evaluación Final del Proyecto Eficiencia de la Educación Primaria. (Washington Creative Associates, SE and USAID, November 1995).

4.4 *Stagnating graduation rates.* One measure of a system's success is graduation from primary school. Despite high enrollment, low overall dropout rates, and improvement in promotion rates in the 1990s, this goal remains problematic and inequitable. Grades 1-2 still have high repetition rates that set children back, and about 30 percent still fail to graduate (Figure 2). The percentage of children completing the 6th grade increased from 53.5 percent in 1985 to about 70 percent in 1994 and has been static ever since (Annex A Table 5, Figure 3). Based on population projections, the percentage completing the 6th grade is expected to decline somewhat in 2004. Teachers' inconsistencies in applying promotion criteria may be in part responsible, but quality issues are prominent.<sup>36</sup>

**Figure 3. Number of Students Graduating from Primary Schools**



Source: Ministry of Education 2000

### Quality of Education - Very Limited Basic Skills

4.5 The UMCE achievement tests, given to grades 3 and 6 since 1997, show low performance: overall; only 12.6 percent of students achieve sufficient mastery of the curriculum content and only 17.7 percent of 6th graders reached the acceptable 60 percent math score in 1998 (Tables 3-4).<sup>37</sup>

**Table 3. Students Demonstrating Mastery Criteria in Standardized Achievement Tests**

Mastery criterion	60%
Grade 3	
Language (reading)	9.6%
Math	15.9%
Science	14.9%
Grade 6	
Language	10.2%
Math	8.2%
Science	17.2%

Source: UMCE 2002.

According to interviews with UMCE staff, some of this evaluation result can be attributed to teachers' academic weaknesses and to the tests themselves, which focus on nonessential points, such as grammatical nomenclature. There was some improvement in math test scores in grades 3 and 6 from 1997 to 1998 and stagnation thereafter (See Table 4). USAID tests indicate that there has been greater progress in basic skills than UMCE tests suggest.<sup>38</sup>

36. Van Steenwyk 2002. Criterion-referenced tests applied by USAID showed that about 40% of children who had failed them passed the grade, but also 25% of children passing were repeating grades.

37. Unidad de Medición de la Calidad de Educación. Resolución de Problemas Matemáticos en Sexto Grado. Tegucigalpa 1998, p. 18. Secretaría de Educación. 2002. Informe Nacional de Rendimiento Académico 2002. Tercero y Sexto Grados. Tegucigalpa.

38. Van Steenwyk 2002. The variation in the UMCE tests may be to some extent due to measurement error.

their specific effects are unclear. The UMCE has considerable technical capacity that will be useful in the complex monitoring tasks required for the fast-track initiative.

4.6 Research carried out through PROMEB and USAID suggests that the Bank has invested in areas that are necessary but have a limited direct relation to student performance. The physical characteristics and condition of schools were found to have no relationship to achievement, and teachers' educational level has limited effect.<sup>39</sup> More important are school size (that is, multigrade or otherwise), textbook availability, teacher training for textbooks and knowledge of subject, whether teachers and principals live in the community, parental involvement in students' learning, and interventions such as a curricular calendar and charts to keep track of student progress.<sup>40</sup> Bank projects and policy dialogue have not specifically dealt with classroom instruction issues.

**Table 4. Standardized Test Scores in Spanish and Math for 3rd and 6th Graders**

	1997	1998	1999	2000
Spanish - 3 <sup>rd</sup> grade	40	41	42	41
Spanish - 6 <sup>th</sup> grade	46	47	-	46
Math - 3 <sup>rd</sup> grade	36	43	43	43
Math - 6 <sup>th</sup> grade	35	40	-	39

Source: UMCE, 2002

4.7 PROMEB included measures to increase effective classroom time by a minimum of 64 percent (from 110 to 180 days of instruction per year),<sup>41</sup> such as by paying teachers through bank deposit. However, subsequent reports mention nothing about progress on this goal. It is not known whether PROMEB succeeded in increasing instructional time; in 2001, schools were open only 114 days due to strikes and elections<sup>42</sup> (Annex A Tables 7-8). Government staff reported that schools managed by parents increased the number of days open as well as teachers' punctuality over 1999 baseline data, but the mission could not find specific data.<sup>43</sup>

### Administrative Efficiency

4.8 Government spending on education has increased considerably (average 3.1 percent annually in 1990-1997; Figure 4), and the rate of increase has accelerated since 1998, after hurricane Mitch.<sup>44</sup> It is not known how well these funds were used towards instructional purposes.

39. Secretaría de Educación. 2002. Informe Sobre los Factores Asociados al Rendimiento Académico 2002. Tercero y Sexto Grados. Tegucigalpa.

40. USAID. Escuelas con Exito: Los Resultados. September 1999 Tegucigalpa. Van Steenywk, Ned. USAID Proyecto No. 522-0388. Lecciones Aprendidas: Reprobación y Rendimiento Académico en el Primer Ciclo. USAID Contrato No. 522-C-00-01-0296-00, Marzo de 2003.


41. PROMEB Project Appraisal Document, p. 13. About 40-50 days were lost in matriculation and examinations.

42. Secretaría de Educación. Salvemos el Primer Ciclo en Comayagua. USAID Proyecto No. 522-0388. February 2002.

43. Honduras-HN/Community-based education project. Project Appraisal Document, World Bank, Report No: 21851, 2001, p. 42.


44. Meza 1999.



**Figure 4. Public Expenditures in Education**

Source: Ministry of Education. Honduras — Proposal for the Fast-Track Initiative, 2003, p. 25

4.9 Many functions have been decentralized to provinces, but important functions such as teacher appointments and pay are still processed in Tegucigalpa, causing delays and loss of class time for collection. (An effort is underway to pay teachers electronically or through a visiting cashier.) Direct Secretariat administrative costs decreased by 47 percent between 1996 and 2001 (Figure 5). However, other local governments have assumed some of these costs. Secretariat staff were not moved from Tegucigalpa to other regions, nor have significant numbers of staff retired early to reduce personnel.

**Figure 5. Secretariat of Ed. Administrative Costs**

Source: World Bank Implementation Completion Report, 2003.

4.10 Primary school teachers seem to be paid adequately, around four times the per capita income, approximating the fast-track initiative framework parameter of 3.5 times the per capita income. (However, three teachers reported to the mission that they must often spend their own money for school supplies.) Teachers participate regularly in in-service training sessions and receive a salary increase of about 69 percent if they complete a university degree. Bank financing and government policies brought about considerable investment in pre-service and in-service teacher training. However, the mission heard concerns regarding the quality and effect of this training, particularly on student achievement.

## 5. Ratings

### Project Outcomes

5.1 The management-related objectives of ADEPRIR were substantially *relevant* to the human capital development needs of the country, but during the project period the government was not prepared to carry them out. Project objectives were extremely ambitious given its small lending amount, and remained unchanged after the scope was reduced. They were not achieved. Project design was complex and hard for the borrower to understand and its *efficacy* was negligible. Limited funds were earmarked for the activities subsequently deemed most useful by officials interviewed, that is, school construction, textbook distribution, and teacher training; thus *efficiency* was modest. Overall, the outcome of ADEPRIR project is rated **unsatisfactory**.

5.2 The outcome of PROMEB is rated **satisfactory**. The project supported several reforms, including decentralization, achievement measurement, attention to multigrade schools, and teacher training, particularly degree-oriented training. Thus, *relevance* and *efficacy* were substantial. Persons interviewed were uniformly positive on project outcomes and achievements. Although improvements in outcomes were modest (suggesting modest *efficiency*), much progress was made in providing the inputs and increasing efficiency that should lead to improved learning achievement if attention to some basic issues increases.

### Institutional Development Impact

5.3 Institutional development for the ADEPRIR project is rated **modest**. In pilot areas, activities were carried out such as school networks, decentralized supervision, and development of student tracking forms in two districts. However, there was no follow up at the end of the project, and the systemic improvements planned for rural schools did not materialize.

5.4 Institutional development for the PROMEB project is rated **substantial**. A financial tracking system was created, many Secretariat functions were decentralized to geographical departments, and trained professionals were made available to schools.

### Sustainability

5.5 Sustainability for both projects is rated **likely**. PROMEB has laid the basis for institutions that already sustain the activities and policies that contribute to the achievement of EFA. At the same time, most of the activities envisaged under ADEPRIR are being implemented 10 years after its completion: school networks with decentralized supervision and group teacher training, school governments, community participation, and micro-planning.

## Bank Performance

5.6 Bank performance for PROMEB is rated **satisfactory** while that of ADEPRIR is rated **unsatisfactory**. The Bank did not realistically plan many of the actions to be executed by ADEPRIR. Project files show no evidence that the Bank was aware of or dealt with the government reluctance to improve sectoral management. Though there were 27 supervision missions in the project's nine years many lasted 2-3 days and involved one person. The design defects were addressed only toward the end of the project, when its scope was reduced.

5.7 The designs of both projects were complex and challenging for the government to implement. World Bank task managers changed frequently, particularly for PROMEB. During the late 1990s supervisions became infrequent, and persons interviewed voiced concerns that at times the Bank seemed to neglect the two projects. However, the Bank is also seen as an institution that pushed hard for educational reform, was frank with the government, and brought on board consultants and staff of quality. Its evaluations are public, interesting, and widely read. The government has learned from Bank procurement practices and uses them for other bids. The Bank proved flexible and extremely helpful after hurricane Mitch and its financing made education expansion possible during the recent economic crisis. With its project size and involvement in the FHIS, the Bank has invested in cross-sectoral inputs and, according to some government staff, has emerged as the leader in the educational donor community.

5.8 However, the mission also heard criticism that the Bank pushes the same policies in different countries with limited differentiation, and it does not sufficiently appreciate contextual differences.

## Borrower Performance

5.9 Borrower performance is rated **unsatisfactory** for ADEPRIR and **satisfactory** for PROMEB. There was limited ownership for ADEPRIR and few of its activities were fully implemented. Ownership for the PROMEB was high, and most activities were carried out despite size, complexity, and political interference. Many technically capable staff worked on the project and learned. Counterpart funds were available, and officials expected staff to carry out activities competently.

5.10 Audit reports for both projects were qualified and indicated difficulty in obtaining proof of expenditures. Despite the competent handling of procurement by UNDP, the mission heard references to fixed bids, though no persons were willing to provide specific evidence. Though several meetings took place between the Bank and government in efforts to reconcile accounts, it is unknown to what degree accounts of the current project have improved.

## 6. Issues for Future Consideration

6.1 Government strategy continues to focus on educational quality. To bring about EFA, the government has adopted a five-pronged strategy to improve: (a) student promotion and retention, (b) preschool education to prepare students who will enter primary education, (c) quality and efficiency of teachers, (d) demand for education and participation of disadvantaged communities, and (e) participation of dispersed rural communities. The EFA fast-track initiative proposal<sup>45</sup> outlines means and goals, including the merger of small multigrade schools where possible. However, the lessons of past projects suggest that some obstacles have been hard to overcome. To implement the fast-track initiative and achieve EFA by 2015, the government of Honduras and donors must focus on these more specifically and prioritize improvement if students are to complete primary schools and acquire basic skills.

### Continued Emphasis Needed on Basic Skills Acquisition

6.2 Because children in the numerous multigrade schools of Honduras must rely on reading to learn other subjects, early skills are very important. Test scores, mission observations and discussions with teachers highlighted the incidence of limited reading and math skills.<sup>46</sup> The limited access to textbooks and to easy reading materials makes it hard for poor readers to get the practice needed for fluency.<sup>47</sup> Consequently, children are often unable to read the supplementary books provided through PROMEB and increase reading speed. Staff of other donors interviewed by the mission have advised the government to improve learning conditions by procuring copies of existing textbooks. However, the government has embarked on an extensive curricular revision and plans to provide a new set of textbooks to students. These are still under development, and a trial set was to reach schools in March 2004. This goal was not achieved, and delivery dates are uncertain. This means that children will continue to have limited opportunities for reading, and their valuable school time may be lost. This may reduce the probability of achieving EFA.

6.3 Methods such as “direct instruction”<sup>48</sup> have proved effective with some poor US populations. However, Honduras is moving in the opposite direction. The new curriculum

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45. Ministry of Education. 2003. Honduras. Fast Track Initiative, Education for All Proposal. The government will receive US\$50 million for 3-4 years and must show improvements in test scores of Spanish and math by 2005, 2007, and 2011.

46. To be understood, an average sentence must be processed within the limits of the verbal short-term memory that lasts about 12 seconds and holds only seven items. Thus, a word must be read on average in 1-1.5 seconds. It must also be read accurately and effortlessly to allow the brain to focus on the message rather than individual letters. A specific pathway in the brain makes this possible by enabling recognition of entire words. To activate this pathway, much practice is needed in pairing consistently sounds with word appearance. Unless children are dyslexic, they read automatically much of the pertinent vocabulary by the end of grade 1. However, many poor children apparently get insufficient practice to activate this pathway or may require more practice than middle-class children due to developmental delays. Thus, they read with effort and errors and fail to understand the text. (For a review see Abadzi, H. 2003. *Improving Adult Literacy Outcomes*. Washington, DC: World Bank.)

47. Shaywitz, Sally. 2003. *Overcoming Dyslexia*. New York: Alfred Knopf.

48. This method prescribes in considerable detail what teachers say to students and the responses expected; it has raised test scores in poorer Spanish-speaking districts of the US (for information see the National Association for Direct Instruction, [www.nifdi.org](http://www.nifdi.org), [www.adihome.org](http://www.adihome.org)).

is based on the “constructivist” philosophy, which allows children to find out answers for themselves and construct their knowledge networks. Accordingly, teachers are supposed to be merely facilitators of learning. While this philosophy is laudable, it is time-consuming and may result in low reading skills among the poor.<sup>49</sup> Classes in poor Honduran schools do not have the sufficient amount of time required for this methodology. The mission repeatedly observed children laboriously writing answers to questions rather than being taught, a practice that is related to lower test scores.<sup>50</sup>

6.4 A clear and finite set of quality-oriented actions for training and classroom implementation needs to be developed with the agreement of all donors to implement through the EFA actions. To improve basic skills of poor students, the government might consider offering summer classes, supplementing the existing textbooks (through photocopies, for example), reducing the other subjects for grades 1-2, and ask teachers to provide a lot more reading practice. The **priority would be fast and effortless reading by the end of grade 1, fast basic math calculations, and effective student and curricular monitoring by teachers**. When children become proficient readers, then it will be possible to implement multigrade teaching and the constructivist philosophy more fruitfully.

### **Instructional Time is Important to Achieve EFA**

6.5 Fulfilling the prescribed days of instructional time continues to be an EFA objective. However, classes continue to be canceled for minor reasons. The mission received an estimate in one school that out of 200 days, 10 were spent in training, 4 in strikes, 5 in extra vacations, 5 in network meetings for quality, 9 for getting paid. When classes are held, they often start late or finish early. (Teacher absenteeism is informally estimated at 20 percent.) Class time includes collecting and handing out books or copying. Writing takes a long time when children have limited reading skills, and a few sentences and can take an entire hour.

6.6 Given the various reductions on instructional time, the efficiency of the system may be only about 12 percent.<sup>51</sup> However, the government and the donor community in the Fast-Track Initiative pay 100 percent of the costs of the wasted time. Actions must be developed to increase instructional time at every stage. The donor community should make this a priority issue.

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49. These curricula have been extensively implemented in Latin American countries, such as Brazil and Panama. Despite discouraging anecdotal observations, there have been no rigorous impact evaluations. Some evidence is presented in Nykiel-Herbert, Barbara. 2004. “Lost in translation: Implementing a learner-centered curriculum in South Africa.” Paper presented at the Comparative and International Education Society, March 9-12, 2004.

50. Fuller, B. Dellagnelo, L, Strath, A, et al 1999. How to raise children’s early literacy? The influence of family, teacher, and classroom in Northeast Brazil. *Comparative Education Review*, 43, 1-35. Based on research reports, such as: Portela, A. L., et al., *Conhecendo o Universo da Sala de Aula*. Brasilia: Ministry of Education, 1998.

51. Considering 60% of school days in operation, 20% teacher absenteeism, and an estimated 25% use of class time engaged in learning (empirically estimated from observations).

## **The Benefits of Teacher Training are Unclear**

6.7 Since 1974, the Bank's strategy in emphasizing teacher training has encouraged the government to make training a priority. Most teachers are involved in training activities, ranging from distance education for a Bachelor's degree to meeting in networks. Some of the formal teacher study takes place because teachers with Bachelor's degrees receive a 69 percent salary increase.

6.8 As the UMCE studies have shown, training has some negative consequences; a study has found that teachers' study toward a degree is negatively associated with students' achievement in some subjects.<sup>52</sup> Schools close for teacher training for 10-15 days a year, partly a result of locally operating NGOs deciding that teachers in their areas must be trained in certain subjects. Efforts are being made to streamline activities and coordinate with the government. However, the knowledge and behaviors acquired in training have not been evaluated. It is unclear how important the topics are and whether they are taught in a way that will improve teacher behaviors in class. Furthermore, the new curriculum will require extensive teacher training throughout the country. Even if done largely during vacations, the training may reduce the amount of time teachers spend in class.

6.9 The hypothesis that teachers become more effective with training remains largely untested in Honduras. The types and topics of training associated with improved student performance need to match closely the areas in which students have deficient skills. Regardless of effectiveness, however, the salary increases to degreed teachers are certain to increase the already high wage bill. Teacher training (degreed or otherwise) should address clearly delineated deficiencies rather than be provided as a general and undefined set of activities. A study of the skills acquired and not acquired during training would serve to direct future investments in this area.

## **7. Lessons**

7.1 Experience with the assessed projects confirms a number of OED lessons from the education sector:

- Despite considerable quality-oriented investments by both the assessed projects, progress in student performance has been limited. Thus, educational project inputs and rising education budgets do not translate automatically into increased student performance. To increase performance, teachers and students must use inputs effectively and maximize the instructional time students are engaged in learning.
- Both assessed projects developed action plans, but their implementation was limited. Those actions must be feasible within the budget and human resources available, and Government officials must also clearly perceive the need for plans and the subsequent actions.

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52. Secretaria de Educación. 2002. Informe Sobre los Factores Asociados al Rendimiento Académico 2002. Tercero y Sexto Grados. Tegucigalpa, p. 70.

- PROMEB and its follow-through project successfully involved the communities in the management of rural schools. Decentralization of school management to the community level may mobilize local support for the schools and increase pride in achievement by students and teachers.
- The achievement tests developed through PROMEB provided valuable monitoring information to the government, but outcomes were not widely disseminated, and use was limited. Thus, the development of standardized achievement tests strengthens the capacity of institutions to obtain monitoring information. To be valuable, the information must be disseminated widely to school level if possible, and actions must be carried out based on the feedback it provides.

## Annex A. Project Activities

**Table A-1. Rural Primary Education Management Project (ADEPRIR; Ln. 2804; 1987-95)**

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>
Institutional strengthening	Civil works	200 classrooms 75 built 75 repaired 50 undecided	89 built 169 repaired 43 kitchens- storerooms	Classrooms functional
	Furniture	1000 items	11,520 items	Most furniture functional
	Teaching materials	36 schools 75 teachers	75 schools 150 teachers	USAID textbook series 'Mi Honduras' used for several years
	Incremental Secretaria staff		Few staff were reallocated	No results
	Travel, per diems	1300 weeks	Use uncertain	Counterpart funds limited
	Vehicles	20	20	Number still functional unknown, if any
	Strengthen capacity of UCCE external assistance coordinating unit	87 local and 51 foreign months consultant services for planning and budgeting	Limited foreign TA	TA helped carry out the studies and planning, but long-term effect limited
	Evaluate organization		Not reported	Unknown
	Decentralization policies	2 studies	Carried out	Effect of studies unknown Decentralization occurred subsequently
Train supervisors, teachers, directors	10 workshops	Number carried out unreported	Favorable reports on training experiences	
Regional planning and management	In Atlantida, Colon, Cortes, Gracias a Dios, Islas de la Bahia, Yoro	Resource surveys Growth projections Reorganization into networks		Revised, not carried out
Micro-planning	Diagnostic, forecast enrolments	12 districts (revised to 2) 155 schools, 40,000 students	2 district plans done, one lost	No long-term results
	Action plans: In-service Cost estimates, Provisions for community contributions Development and validation of achievement tests		No testing of action plans carried out  Student testing began in 1994	Student testing was revamped and continued through the follow-on project. Community initiatives increased in subsequent years Cost estimates and reduction not effective
Comprehensive plan	Operational plans for each of the 6 depts by 1990			Not carried out
Pilot subproject	Test the results of the micro-planning process	12 districts	2 districts after restructuring. Pilot revised to provide standard school inputs	Micro-planning not effectively carried out
	Establish school management network	6 networks	2 networks (revised) Manual produced	Reports of meetings taking place; efforts to establish networks continue



**Table A-2. Basic Education Project (PROMEB, Cr. 2694; 1985-2001)**

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>
Quality of Basic Education (US\$38.2 m, 72% of total project costs)	Quality inputs to all public primary schools included in the project	1,000,000 children benefiting from inputs	Target no. of beneficiaries met  1600 new teachers were hired	Net enrollment about 95%
	Training, assistance to upgrade the skills of preprimary and primary teachers, principals and supervisors	136,812 persons trained	95,805 persons trained	Outcomes not measured
	Improvements to pre-service teacher training and accreditation by the Universidad Nacional Pedagógica Francisco Morazán	At 4 of the 12 escuelas normales curriculum reform, teaching practice, library books, test development; 480 hrs training each. 22,000 primary teachers 1400 preprimary 2500 principals 600 supervisors	Established 1449 local centers of continuous teacher training 2800 preprimary 27,000 primary teachers 1168 principals 1765 supervisors 120 normal school teachers (total 32853)	Some teacher training topics were useful, others not. Benefits unclear, but teachers close schools to attend, resulting in loss of time.
	Educational materials including textbooks, didactic materials, classroom for 22,000 libraries  Improved distribution facilities	5.4 million textbooks	11.7 million produced 48,160 school supply units 4270 classroom libraries Developed new curricula	After project end, textbooks were not distributed Libraries are used little, books not given out for fear of wear
	Bilingual education in indigenous areas for the Garifuna and Miskito communities	Curricula, teacher training	8 ethnicities from 2 dictionaries, grammars, textbooks	Classes were not actually taught in local languages
	External evaluation of students' academic achievements	Design Spanish and math tests for gr. 2-6	Tests administered repeatedly, achievement low	Results not disseminated extensively, little remediation
	Infrastructure improvements for overcrowded rural schools, including additional teachers	Classrooms in 660 multigrade schools: 290 rural classrooms built 290 rehabilitated 290 teachers assigned	146 built 290 furnished 290 new teachers 107 new classrooms in 71 new schools through FHIS 39 classrooms rehabilitated 144 classrooms furnished 18 new dept. offices; maintenance committee for each school	High costs reduced the number built
	Infrastructure improvements for overcrowded rural schools, including additional teachers	Classrooms in 660 multigrade schools: 290 rural classrooms built 290 rehabilitated 290 teachers assigned	146 built 290 furnished 290 new teachers 107 new classrooms in 71 new schools through FHIS 39 classrooms rehabilitated 144 classrooms furnished 13 new dept. offices; maintenance committee for each school	High costs reduced the number built
	Access to community-run preschool	1200 preschool classrooms	2508 preschool classrooms,	Poor children expected to be

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>
	education in poor rural areas	To 75% of poor communities From 34,200 children to 60,000	teachers are 15,700 community volunteers	better nourished be more ready grade 1 (results not measured).
	Design and execution of school census for facilities		Done in 2001	Micro-planning possible with these data
Institutional Strengthening (US\$14.9 million, 28% project cost)			SEC Reorganization action plan completed; 47% cost reduction	Reorganization partly implemented
	Management information systems	TA to expand statistics database		
	Restructuring and decentralization of the SE	Simplifying structure, eliminating redundant units, reforming salary regimes Strengthening decentralized services at 18 department directorates	Reduction of admin. divisions from 80 to 20 18 dept. offices created to process local functions new teacher statutes, manuals of functions created	Excess staff were not moved to the provinces  Teachers lose less class time following their paperwork in the capital
	Restructuring and decentralization of the SE	Simplifying structure, eliminating redundant units, reforming salary regimes Strengthening decentralized services at 18 department directorates	Reduction of admin. divisions from 80 to 20 18 dept. offices created to process local functions new teacher statutes, manuals of functions created	Excess staff were not moved to the provinces  Teachers lose less class time following their paperwork in the capital
	Improved supervision	Training of supervisors	Contents and activities not reported	Benefits unknown
	A pilot program of teacher performance incentives (changed to community-managed schools)	Changed to PROHECO (initially 7% salary increases for reduced absenteeism in 500-3000 schools)	1020 schools in rural areas 7100 parents organized in 1284 community associations monitoring 1300 teachers 650 teachers posted in rural areas	Access to 40,000 students Reduction of 50% in repetition Many teachers live nearby
	Project administration, monitoring and evaluation	10 small studies  Studies on factors affecting achievement	The 10 studies were not done, but other evaluations took their place: e.g. 'Diagnóstico de las Funciones Relacionadas a un Sistema Financiero de la Secretaría Gestión Comunitaria de PROHECO — UNDP'	Impact unknown
	Studies on textbook use, community participation, school performance, teacher performance, impact of training, preschool, and bilingual education	8	6 completed Important factors identified in relation to achievement	Results printed, dissemination limited; Impact unknown
Hurricane Mitch US\$1.1 million	Direct transfers for emergency education projects at the community level			
	School repair, reconstruction,	1000 schools	Target achieved	Schools functional

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>
	new schools			
	Education system	Equipment, regional offices, rent offices, communication system	Targets achieved Offices functional	Dept. offices housing directors and staff of rather high caliber
	Educational materials	5.4 million textbooks Books for 22,000 libraries	11.5 textbooks million printed	Materials used in schools
	Vehicles	42	Delivered	Impact unknown
	School lunches		Held marathons for fund raising	Available in most rural schools
	Mental health		Limited activities	Impact unknown
	Education by radio and TV		Extensive programs implemented by various donors	Programs likely to increase schooling level in population
	Home construction loans to affected teachers, targets unknown		Extent accomplished not reported	Impact unknown

**Table A-3. Student Enrollments**

<i>Preschool (4-6 years)</i>		<i>Primary (7-13 years)</i>	
<i>Gross enrollment rate</i>		<i>Gross enrollment rate</i>	<i>Net enrollment rate</i>
<i>Year</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>
1995	29.7	97.4	86.4
1996	32.6	98.3	88
1997	43.2	98.8	89.1
1998	35.4	98	89
1999	38.9	97.2	89.8

Preliminary enrollment figures. Source: ESA consultants. 'Ex-post Economic Evaluations of PROMEB. Honduras 2002.

**Table A-4. Dropout and Repetition**

<i>Impact Indicators</i>	<i>Baseline (1988)</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1998</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>
Dropout Rate %	N/A	8.95	9.53	N/A	N/A	3.0
Repetition Rate %	28.0	9.8	9.4	9.6	9.2	8.0

Source: For net enrollment rate and repetition rate, see Darlyn Meza. Informe ICR-Honduras, February 2002. For dropout rate see PKF Worldwide. Evaluación del Impacto del Proyecto de Mejoramiento de la Educación Básica, 2002.

**Table A-5. 12 Year-Old Population and No. of Students Finishing 6<sup>th</sup> Grade**

<i>Year</i>	<i>12 Year-Old Population</i>	<i>6<sup>th</sup> Grade Graduates</i>	<i>Percentage Finishing 6<sup>th</sup> Grade</i>
1988	115200	69338	60.2
1989	118650	75080	63.3
1990	122800	74639	60.8
1991	127100	83013	65.3
1992	130830	86484	66.1
1993	135400	90614	66.9
1994	140140	98566	70.3
1995	145050	100800	69.5
1996	148760	102101	68.6
1997	152780	103403	67.7
1998	156905	106568	67.9
1999	160969	107620	67.0
2000	165140	113078	68.5

Source: Calculations based on information from the Computer Services Department, Ministry of Education.

**Table A-6. Student Achievement in a First International Comparative Study, 1998**

<i>Country</i>	<i>LANGUAGE scores</i>		<i>MATHEMATICS scores</i>	
	<i>Third Grade</i>	<i>Fourth Grade</i>	<i>Third Grade</i>	<i>Fourth Grade</i>
Honduras	216	238	218	231
Cuba	343	349	351	353
Mexico	224	252	236	252
Bolivia	232	233	240	245

Source: UNESCO/OREALC, 2000, Latin American Laboratory of Education Quality Assessment 1998

Note: The Language test was applied to 3,746 pupils, while the Mathematics test was applied to 3,801. Data correspond to each country standardized median to a regional average of 250.

**Table A-7. Incidence and Cause of Closings in a Sample of 24 Primary Schools, 1998**

Days open during the last week (average)	3.75
Reasons for Closing	%
Sickness of Staff	11
Staff Training	18
Staff Vacations or Leave	25
Holiday	22
Parent Strike	25

*Source:* Survey of 24 schools programmed for support from FHIS, with a total of 7,600 pupils and 249 staff members, ESA Consultants, 1998

**Table A-8. Distribution of children absent from primary school the previous week by reason of absence (N=356)**

<i>Reason</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Household-related, of which	48
Illness	17
Working	9
Refused to go	9
Removed from school	6
Away from home	5
Helping at home	2
School-related, of which	53
Unplanned closure	22
Teacher absent	13
Holiday	11
Intimidation	1
Other	6

*Source:* Household survey; sample of 806 children at Primary Schools chosen to receive investment from FHIS. ESA Consultants, 1998

## **Annex B. Statements and Issues Raised in Mission Interviews**

Interviews took place individually or in small groups as the circumstances dictated. The table below reflects the number of respondents who indicated a view on each question; persons could raise one or more issues. Not all staff had opinions about all questions and sometimes only one person in a group expressed opinions, so reply statistics are approximate. Teachers were only asked questions regarding inputs and effectiveness, since most did not know who had paid for the inputs they had received. The questions posed to respondents were:

- What were the benefits of the project in your school, geographic or sectoral area?
- What problems did you face in implementing the project? What were its disadvantages?
- Which components worked best in bringing about results, which did not? (some persons interviewed were asked about specific components, as appropriate).
- How effective were the Bank staff or consultants who worked on the project?
- What training did you receive through the project? Did it teach you what it was supposed to?
- The project had some qualified audits. What financial irregularities were there in your area of jurisdiction?
- What would be different in education sector of your state if the project had not existed?
- Other issues and observations

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Frequency of response</i>	
	<i>Rural Primary Education</i>	<i>Basic Education</i>
<b>Project benefits</b>		
Very successful project	5	8
Project was stuck quickly, disbursed little until the end	3	5
Project nearly as good as the USAID efficiency project		3
Project brought money at a time of crisis		5
Carried out important research, achievement measurement	3	7
Without PROMEB classes would not have started after Mitch		4
<b>Project problems, disadvantages</b>		
Functions decentralized were mainly those the government did not want		6
PROMEB did not increase quality of education, USAID more effective		2
Project ineffective since graduation rates did not increase		2
M and E results not used for decisionmaking	6	9
<b>Most and least effective components</b>		
All PROMEB components were good		6
Good that district directors were chosen by competition		8
Bilingual education activities interesting and good		4
Bilingual education activities ineffective, money spent for no reason		3
Teacher networks still function in some places	3	
Micro-planning was ineffective, materials lost	6	
Distance education had stagnated, but coverage was tripled		1
Instead of giving coloring pencils project should provide books		1
Teacher training most effective, changed teacher attitudes		2
Bank-financed evaluations are interesting and widely read		1
<b>Effectiveness of Bank staff, consultants</b>		
All staff who worked on these projects were competent	4	7
Bank ambivalent about decentralization-task managers centralistic		3
Bank presents the same remedies to different countries		3
Supervision was inadequate	5	6
Government often stated agreement with Bank but then did nothing	3	5
Bank is consistent, will do what it says		2
<b>Qualified audits, mismanagement</b>		
Multiple instances of irregularities, mainly small-scale	4	5
Many persons hired for political rather than project reasons		4
IDB has stronger presence, better financial control		1
UNDP was competent in procurement, but irregularities still happened		2
<b>Counterfactual — if project had not existed</b>		
Choloma area would have fewer schools, nuclei	5	
Another donor would have done what Bank has done, no problem		6
<b>Issues and observations</b>		
EFA not yet well known		1
Decision-making use of M and E expected to increase		1
Decentralization needed for textbooks, salaries, hiring		5
With constructivist curriculum, children will not learn reading in gr. 1		3
<b>Total number of comments received</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>121</b>

## Annex C. Basic Data Sheet

### RURAL PRIMARY EDUCATION MANAGEMENT PROJECT (LOAN 2804)

#### Key Project Data (amounts in US\$ million)

	<b>Appraisal Estimate</b>	<b>Actual or current estimate</b>	<b>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</b>
Original commitment	4.4	4.3	97.7%
Total project cost	6.9	5.01	72%
Cancellation	0.83		

#### Project Dates

	<b>Original</b>	<b>Actual</b>
Preparation	09/85	
Appraisal	04/86	12/01/86
Negotiations	01/87	03/23/87
Board presentation	03/87	05/05/87
Signing	08/27/87	08/27/87
Effectiveness	11/27/87	04/05/88
Project completion	12/31/93	12/31/95
Loan Closing	06/30/94	04/30/96

#### Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

	<b>Actual/Latest Estimate</b>	
	<b>N° Staff Weeks.</b>	<b>US\$('000)</b>
Preparation to Appraisal	56.9	90.1
Appraisal	6.6	10.5
Negotiations through Board Approval	3.7	7.7
Supervision	99.7	246.6
Completion	10.0	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>176.9</b>	<b>357.8</b>



## Mission Data

	Date (month/year)	No. of persons	Staff days in field	Specializations represented <sup>a</sup>	Performance Rating <sup>b</sup>		Types of problems <sup>c</sup>
					Implementation Status	Development Objectives	
<b>Through Appraisal</b>							
Identification	04/85	1	5	A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Identification/ Preparation	09/85	2	20	A(2)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Preparation	12/85	3	23	A, B, E	N/A	N/A	N/A
Preparation	02/86	4	14	A(2)M B, D	N/A	N/A	N/A
Preparation	04/86	2	10	A(2)	N/A	N/A	N/A
Preparation/Pre- appraisal	07/86	2	15	A, B	N/A	N/A	N/A
Pre-Appraisal	10/86	4	40	A, B, C, F	N/A	N/A	N/A
Appraisal	12/86	2	10	A, D	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Appraisal through Board approval</b>	03/87	2	8	A, B	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Supervision</b>							
Supervision 1	11/87	2	10	A, B	2	1	M
Supervision 2	06/88	1	3	A	2	1	M
Supervision 3	07/88	2	10	A, B	1	1	N/A
Supervision 4	08/89	1	5	A	3	2	F
Supervision 5	04/90	2	5	B	3	2	IP
Supervision 6	11/90	2	10	A, B	3	2	IP
Supervision 7	01/91	3	15	A(2), B	2	2	R
Supervision 8	04/91	4	12	A, B, G, I	2	2	R
Supervision 9	07/91	2	2	B, G	3	2	R
Supervision 10	09/91	1	1	C	3	2	M, F
Supervision 11	10/91	3	14	A, G, H	3	2	F
Supervision 12	01/92	2	20	A, G	3	2	F
Supervision 13	08/92	1	5	A	2	2	
Supervision 14	10/92	1	5	A	2	2	M
Supervision 15	03/93	1	10	A	2	2	M
Supervision 16	07/93	1	5	J	2	2	M
Supervision 17	11/93	2	10	A, J	2	2	M
Supervision 18 <sup>d</sup>	02/94	1	10	C	2	2	M
Supervision 19 <sup>e</sup>	04/94	3	15	A(2), C	2	2	
Supervision 20 <sup>f</sup>	08/94	1	2	C	S	S	N/A
Supervision 21	04/95	2	10	A, C	S	S	N/A
Supervision 22	05/95	1	7	A	S	S	N/A
Supervision 23	06/95	1	2	A	S	S	N/A
Supervision 24	08/95	1	3	A	S	S	N/A
Supervision 25	09/95	3	15	A, C, E	U	S	P
Supervision 26	11/95	1	5	A	S	S	N/A
Supervision 27	12/95	1	5	A	S	S	N/A
Completion	01/96	1	3	A	N/A	N/A	N/A

a. A=Educator; B=Economist; C=HR Specialist; D=Div.Chief; E=Auditor; F=Sociologist; G=Operations Assistant; H=Disbursement Analyst; I=Architect; J=Operations Analyst

b. 1=Problem Free; 2=Moderate Problems; 3=Major Problems; S=Satisfactory; U=Unsatisfactory

c. M=Management; F=Financial; IP=Inactive Project; R=Reactivation in progress; P=Procurement

d. Joint mission with Honduras Basic Education Project (Preparation);

e. Joint mission with Honduras Basic Education Project (Preparation);

f. Joint mission with Honduras Basic Education Project (Appraisal)

**BASIC EDUCATION (LOAN CREDIT 2694)****Key Project Data** (*amounts in US\$ million*)

	<b>Appraisal Estimate</b>	<b>Actual or current estimate</b>	<b>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</b>
Original commitment	30	28.90	96.3%
Total project cost	53.10	50.5	95%
Cancellation	1.10		

**Project Dates**

	<b>Original</b>	<b>Actual</b>
Appraisal		08/08/94
Board approval		03/28/1995
Signing		06/21/1995
Effectiveness	09/19/1995	12/27/1995
Midterm Review	2/25/1997	7/01/1997
Closing date	12/31/2000	12/31/2001

**Staff Inputs** (staff weeks)

	<b>Actual/Latest Estimate</b>	
	<b>N° Staff weeks</b>	<b>US\$('000)</b>
Identification/Preparation	n.a	162.73
Supervision	n.a	475.74
ICR	n.a	54.24
Total	n.a	692.71

The number of staff weeks is not recorded in the historical budget system. ICR figures are estimated, as the historical budget system does not distinguish between supervision and ICR expenditures.

## Mission Data

	<i>Date (month/year)</i>	<i>No. of persons</i>	<i>Specializations represented</i>	<i>Performance rating</i>	<i>Rating trend</i>
Identification/ Preparation	08/01/1995				
<b>Supervision</b>					
Supervision	09/01/1995	1	Task Manager	S	S
Supervision	03/23/1996	4	Task Manager, Economist, Educator, Financial Analyst	HS	S
Supervision	09/30/1996	1	Education Specialist	S	S
Supervision	12/05/1996	3	Sr. Operations Officer, Education Specialist, Procurement Specialist	S	U
Supervision	07/10/1997	1	Sr. Education Officer	S	S
Supervision	11/28/1997	5	Team Leader, Procurement Specialist, Financial Specialist, Social Scientist, Bidding Analyst	S	S
Supervision	03/19/1998	5	Team Leader, Procurement Specialist, Financial Specialist, Accounting Specialist, Social Scientist	S	S
Supervision	06/03/1998	1	Team Leader	S	S
Supervision	08/10/1998	3	Task Manager, Operations	S	S
Supervision	10/09/1998	4	Team Leader, Procurement Analyst, Financial Analyst, Monitor/Evaluation Consultant	S	U
Supervision	04/27/1999	7	Team Leader, Consultant, General Educator, Procurement Specialist	S	U
Supervision	06/13/1999	4	Team Leader, Social Scientists, Education Sector Management	S	S
Supervision	09/22/2000	2	Institutional Development Specialist	S	S
Supervision	09/22/2000	3	Task Manager, Consultant, Education Specialist	S	S
<b>ICR</b>					
	01/2002	13	Sr. Institutional Development Specialist, Consultants		
	02/2002	4	Sr. Institutional Development Specialist, Consultants	S	S

## **Annex D. Comments from the Borrower**

### **Specific Comments on Project Performance Assessment Report Honduras**

#### **Rural Primary Education Management Project (LN.2804) and Basic Education (Cr. 2694)**

Paragraph 1.3 Line 6: It should read Honduran Social Investment Fund instead of Emergency Social Fund (FHIS).

Paragraph 1.5 Line 8: The goal of 100% for graduation rate should specify that it corresponds to the year 2015.

Paragraph 1.6 Line 6: The 2,500 classrooms referred to, were not only built for preschool level. The majority were built for basic education level.

Paragraph 1.7: The Distance Education and Cultural Heritage Project (PROFUTURO) does not finance primary rural schools.

Paragraph 1.8 Line 1: Why does the document state that the large-scale sector work was carried out by GTZ? Is it referring to the analytical research of education? For example, the research on Basic Social Services was financed by UNICEF and UNDP, as well as other key research activities on expenses were financed by the World Bank, in some cases through Social Route. GTZ only financed the Sectorial Research on Education in 1997. We also have to consider the Government's contribution with its counterpart funds in staff, physical areas and equipment. In the year 2000, Dr. Jorge Sanguinetty of Devtech Systems carried out a study about the impact of research on the educational policy of Honduras. Several initiatives considered in the efforts of educational reform have been based on the studies of education (including the public consultation on the topic through the FONAC) during the 90s.

Paragraph 2.3, line 3, the complementary financing was granted by KfW not by GTZ.

Paragraph 3.2, line 1: During 1996, its initial year, the Project had a drop in its execution. However, in 1997, all its components and subcomponents were in full execution. The PFC, had begun. The texts were being elaborated, the classrooms and Departmental Offices were being built and the first Departmental Directors of Education had been appointed by a decree emitted in 1996. By the time Hurricane Mitch struck the country, PROHECO had already begun its implementation.

Paragraph 3.8, line 4: The responsibility of transferring the construction of schools to the FHIS was not in fact due to mismanagement in the Ministry of Education. Instead, it was a strategy used in order to speed up the social investment (of health, education and others) and generate employment to reduce the impact of the structural adjustment measures of the economy.

In the last line, the document should refer to the construction of the Departmental Offices, which included 18 as it had been planned.

Paragraph 3.9: The social audit has expanded to the whole country but in the rural area through the AECOs and the ADELS.

Paragraph 3.10: lines 4 5. The texts and notebooks of the “Mi Honduras” series were revised with funds of the World Bank, which later became another series called Morazánica School. The printing of the texts was financed by KfW.

Paragraph 3.11, line 5: The programs EDUCATODOS and Maestro en Casa are adult literacy programs. It would be necessary to mention other distance education programs for primary education teachers of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (UNAH) as well as the Universidad Pedagógica Nacional Francisco Morazán (UPNFM).

Paragraph 4.6, last line: It is uncertain to what extent this statement is acceptable: “The Bank projects and policy dialogue have not specifically dealt with instructional issues”. Maybe the educators have something to say to this respect. Aren’t the texts, the Basic National Curriculum (BNC) and other instruments a form of dealing with the topic?

Paragraph 6.2, line 9: The government, knowing that a modernized curriculum didn't exist, proceeded to take the decision that the educational materials should respond to the focus established in the National Basic Curriculum. It has been established that in the year 2004, the Rendimientos Básicos will be used and starting on 2005, Spanish and Mathematics for grades 1-3 will be prioritized.

Paragraph 6.4: This observation is extremely strong for our country when its implementation is being analyzed. Its implementation should not be seen as "pure constructivism", instead it should be seen as preventive because the pertinent adaptations will be made. For such reason, joint efforts of all the programs and projects are being made in order to achieve the EFA goals.