



<b>1. CAS Data</b>	
<b>Country: Sierra Leone</b>	
<b>CAS Year:</b> FY10	<b>CAS:</b> FY10 – FY13
<b>CLR Period:</b> FY10-FY19	<b>Date of this review:</b> May 15, 2020

<b>2. Ratings</b>		
	<b>CLR Rating</b>	<b>IEG Rating</b>
<b>Development Outcome:</b>	<i>Not Rated</i>	<i>Not Rated</i>
<b>WBG Performance:</b>	<i>Not Rated</i>	<i>Not Rated</i>

### 3. Executive Summary

- i. This is a validation of the Completion and Learning Review (CLR) for the World Bank Group's (WBG) engagement in Sierra Leone covering the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, FY10-FY13). For completeness and learning purposes, and while the CAS formally expired in FY13, IEG has elected to examine the period FY14-FY19 as well as no CPF was in place to replace the CAS. Owing to data limitations and in line with relevant provisions of the Working Arrangements between the Independent Evaluation Group and WBG,<sup>1</sup> IEG's review does not rate the CAS's overall development outcome or the World Bank Group's performance.
- ii. At the outset of the FY10-FY13 CAS, Sierra Leone had a very high poverty rate, with a poverty headcount of 52.9 percent of the population based on the 2011 household survey (using the national poverty line). In the seven years after the end of the civil war in 2002, the economy had grown at about 10 percent a year on average, led by agriculture, construction, services, and mining. Sierra Leone was categorized as a Fragile and Conflict-Affected State until FY18. Corruption and poor governance remained major challenges. Youth unemployment was a problem for a generation of young people that received little if any schooling. Investing in people, particularly the poor, was essential for growth and poverty reduction. Therefore, upgrading skills and improving access to health and education were key priorities.
- iii. In 2008, the Government of Sierra Leone developed the "Agenda for Change 2008-12: Second Poverty Reduction Strategy," which emphasized human development and inclusive growth (the latter through investments in energy, agriculture and transportation). The WBG CAS centered on the same priorities as the Agenda for Change, with two focus areas: (a) human development, and (b) promoting inclusive growth. The CAS Progress Report (CASPR) in 2012 added a third focus area on managing the boom in the extractives industry (particularly iron ore). The WBG CAS was prepared jointly with the

<sup>1</sup> IBRD/IDA/IFC/MIGA "Working arrangements between Independent Evaluation Group and WBG" [EXC6.02-PROC.105](#). Country Engagement Guidance ([OPS5.01-GUID.110](#)).

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African Development Bank (AfDB). A joint strategy was seen as the most effective way for both institutions to support Sierra Leone and divide labor. AfDB would focus on developing the road network, and invest in water and sanitation, while IDA would focus on human development, youth employment and skills, public sector reform, and energy sector reforms and investments.

iv. The existing portfolio when the CAS was approved comprised seven IPF operations committed during FY05-FY09 amounting to US\$145 million. Two thirds of the existing portfolio were projects in Focus Area II, while one third went to Focus Area I. During the CAS period, new IDA commitments totaled US\$251 million. About 50 percent of investment lending went to Focus Area II, 45 percent to Focus Area I, and 5 percent to Focus Area III. During the CAS 30 trust-funded operations amounting to US\$173 million supported activities across the program objectives.

v. The FY10-FY13 CAS expired without a new WBG-supported strategy in place, and no strategy has been developed until now. Such a long delay (2014-19) was due to three reasons according to the CLR: (i) Ebola outbreak, (ii) downturn in international iron ore prices in 2013, and (iii) a catastrophic landslide in Freetown in 2017. However, it is not clear why the latter factor should have held up a new strategy nor why any of those factors would justify not extending the FY10-FY13 strategy. Without a CAS in place, a mix of inertia from the expired CAS and the need to respond to Ebola and other emergencies guided the Bank's engagement after the CAS period. IDA continued to support the three focus areas of the expired CAS, and IFC and MIGA continued to pursue opportunities. IDA support was also informally linked to the new government's pre-Ebola development program Agenda for Prosperity (PRSP-III).<sup>2</sup> Significant adaptations were made to the Bank program in the wake of the Ebola outbreak in December 2013, following the lead of government priorities that shifted towards health and social protection.

vi. Between FY14 and FY19, IDA approved new commitments for US\$494 million. This comprised 17 IPF operations (including four AF operations) and five DPOs. These operations supported the Ebola response (see below and Box 1) and focus areas I and II under the expired CAS. After the CAS period, 14 trust-funded operations amounting to US\$51 million supported activities in education, health, social safety nets, public financial management, agribusiness, and capacity building.

vii. As a result of the Ebola outbreak (and the fall in iron ore prices), GDP contracted by 21 percent in 2015 and the outbreak put immeasurable strain on the country's government, health system, and society. The additional pressures on the budget required emergency financing. The Bank-supported program adapted quickly and flexibly by strengthening its engagement in the health sector and supporting the budget to deal with the associated fiscal pressures (see Box 1). The Bank was at the core of the response to the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone.

viii. The Bank response consisted of a two-pronged approach that addressed urgent needs of an overwhelmed health system coupled with emergency fiscal resources for the Ebola crisis. Fiscal controls were strengthened to ensure transparent use of resources. In addressing issues in the health system, the Bank recognized the regional dimension (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) of the crisis by approving the West Africa Ebola Emergency Response project (FY15, US\$28 million for Sierra Leone) and the Disease Surveillance and Response in West Africa project (FY16, 30 million for Sierra Leone). The projects supported the supply of personal protective equipment, medical supplies (including drugs), and medical personnel, and strengthened disease surveillance and response systems, fostered regional collaboration, coordination and resource sharing. In parallel, the Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2 (FY13, US\$30 million) was restructured to finance the contracting of international doctors and medical workers to support Ebola control efforts, provide back-up medical services, and provide hazard

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<sup>2</sup> Sierra Leone's Third Generation Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper (2013-2018): The Agenda for Prosperity, Government of Sierra Leone, 2013.



pay for increased exposure risk. In addressing fiscal risks, the Bank approved the Emergency Economic and Fiscal Support DPO (FY15, US\$30 million), which allowed adequate budgeting and transparent use of Ebola-related resources, although there were shortfalls in strengthening longer term fiscal management. The CLR did not assess the Bank's response to Ebola.<sup>3</sup>

ix. IFC had no active investments in Sierra Leone at the start of the CAS period. During the CAS period, IFC made two investments. After the CAS expired, IFC made three investments, two of which were later canceled. While the CAS did not set out a clear strategy for IFC investment, it mentioned a total of eight sectors relevant for IFC investment. Only one of the investments was in an identified sector, and it was later canceled. MIGA provided four guarantees in the period FY10-FY19. Only one was in a sector identified as a target for MIGA in the CAS.

x. Progress towards the objectives under the three focus areas was uneven both during the CAS period and subsequently. Focus Area I (Human Development) showed more solid results than Focus Area II (Promoting Inclusive Growth), where some objectives, such as objective 6 on agriculture and fisheries, showed meager progress. Focus Area III (Extractive Boom) was an add-on at the PLR stage (July 2012), and had only one objective about strengthening the capacity to manage the boom in the extractive sector, but its indicators had no target dates. For the most part, although a number of objectives were not met during the CAS period, particularly under Focus Area II, progress continued after the expiration of the CAS through ongoing or new lending and ASA, and the targets were eventually met with some exceptions (such as objective 4 on cash-for-work programs). There were also objectives where progress made during the CAS period was not sustained despite continued Bank engagement, such as girls' school enrollment rates and the Penta-3 vaccination of children, mainly due to the impacts of the Ebola crisis.

xi. The areas of engagement were appropriate for Sierra Leone's development needs, drawing from existing analytical work, and a number of technical assistance interventions intended to develop domestic capacity. While administrative capacity was developed—for example, for local councils to have integrated development plans and budgets—capacity still remained a significant constraint for program implementation. The results framework reflected reasonably well the links between the Agenda for Change 2008-12, the CAS outcomes, and the supporting World Bank Group interventions. However, the results framework was too complex, and the program was not selective considering the limited IDA envelope and the constraints on domestic absorptive and implementation capacity. Moreover, the results framework was not extended beyond the CAS period, which reduced accountability due to the lack of program-level targets, and made an objective assessment of the program's performance unfeasible.

xii. Although individual projects performed relatively well compared to Bank and regional averages, many objectives set out in the CAS were not fully achieved. Furthermore, the lack of a strategy in FY14-FY19 this time meant that the country program lacked an accountability framework with program-level targets. Without such a framework, it is not possible to objectively assess the performance of the overall country program. The lack of a strategy during this time also limited the WBG's ability to thoughtfully address fragility.

xiii. The CAS overestimated the capacity of the country to deliver on public sector reforms, particularly in areas such as public finance management, which usually takes longer and where the policy environment was not very supportive. The CAS identified risks correctly, with the exception of the downside risk of mining prices, but mitigating measures were inadequate. In particular, measures to mitigate the lack of domestic administrative capacity—such as developing a cadre of professional civil

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<sup>3</sup> In line with the Working Arrangements between Independent Evaluation Group and WBG, the draft CLR was submitted to IEG in February 2020, before the Covid-19 crisis came to the forefront. The final CLR was dated April 20, 2020 but did not include such an assessment.



servants and strengthening local council capacity—were insufficient. IDA and IFC worked on improving the business environment (objective 7) through parallel engagements, but the CLR does not elaborate on the mechanisms through which the two institutions collaborated. While it is notable that IFC found opportunities to invest in this low-income and crisis-affected environment, there was no over-arching strategy for these investments. Overall, the IDA portfolio performed well based on project ratings at exit, except in areas such as public sector management and public sector pay and performance, where project design was far too ambitious and government ownership weak. A multi-sector power and water sector project also performed poorly in part owing to poor government ownership. The Bank had significant contributions in transport infrastructure, electricity services, and mining sector governance.

xiv. The lessons are not spelled out clearly in the CLR. Still, the CLR suggests that close collaboration with development partners, a sound understanding of the country's political economy, and a simplified project design are all important drivers of implementation success in a fragile institutional environment, such as in Sierra Leone. In addition, the CLR points to the importance of making proper adjustments to the CAS results framework at the PLR stage in order to maintain the usefulness of the results framework for evaluating progress under the program.

xv. In summary, during FY10-FY19, the WBG supported Sierra Leone to implement interventions addressing the country's development goals. The FY10-FY13 program was not selective considering the limited IDA envelope and the constraints on local absorptive capacity, and CAS government ownership was uneven. Bank portfolio performance at exit was good, especially considering the disruption caused by the Ebola crisis on project implementation. Despite the lack of selectivity, the Sierra Leone experience suggests that the Bank can maintain a higher than average portfolio quality—most projects were rated MS or above—in a low capacity environment. Projects that did better had a simpler design and, especially, proactive supervision to bring projects back on track following slippages.<sup>4</sup> The latter—exemplified for example by the Mineral Sector Technical Assistance project (FY10) and the Energy Access project (FY13)—was critical after the disruptions caused by the Ebola outbreak. The Bank helped the country respond to the Ebola crisis by supporting public health and mitigating the fiscal impact.

xvi. IEG has identified the following lessons:

- New modalities may be needed to maintain accountability during times of turmoil in low-income countries.
- The response to the Ebola outbreak suggests the need for a multipronged approach: (i) alleviate the scarcity of human resources in the public health system by hiring properly trained international medical workers; (ii) ensure hazard pay to health workers for increased exposure risk; and (c) support technically and financially budget operations to back the campaign to fight the Ebola epidemic, and ensure readiness and control of and accountability for resources.
- The experience of individual projects in weak areas of the program such as public financial management indicate the importance of taking into account client incentives.
- Developing appropriate policy environments is key for the success of investment projects.
- Reforming the energy sector may require changes in policies governing the sector in addition to infrastructure investments.
- The overriding consideration in countries such as Sierra Leone is to design projects with country constraints in mind.

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<sup>4</sup> The Bank kept its program going even in difficult times primarily through Project Implementation Units (PMUs) that are outside the normal civil service.



#### 4. Strategic Focus

##### Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

1. **Congruence with Country Context and Country Program.** Sierra Leone is a low-income country with a GNI per capita of US\$1,460 (average 2010-18) in PPP current dollars, compared with an average per capita GNI of US\$3,515 for Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Excluding iron ore production, annual GDP growth averaged 5.5 percent in the 2010-13 CAS period, driven mainly by agriculture and services. Iron ore production started in 2012 and was contributing 70 percent of exports by 2013, leading to overall GDP growth rates of 15-20 percent in 2012-13. The most recent poverty data available (2011) shows a poverty headcount of 52.9 percent of the population based on the national poverty line. Although this represents a significant decrease from 66.4 percent in 2003—the previous poverty measurement—Sierra Leone remains close to the bottom of the UN Human Development Index, ranking 181 out of 189 countries and territories. Health outcomes are a significant explanation for this ranking. Infant mortality (78.6 per 1000 births in 2019) is one of the highest in the world and life expectancy at birth one of the lowest (54.3 years in 2018). One in three children is out of school, and large gaps remain in both education access and quality for those in rural areas and for girls at higher levels of education. Significant increases in food and fuel prices in 2011<sup>5</sup> led to a widening of the external current account deficit and put pressure on the budget, which had to pay higher subsidies. The Ebola crisis (2014-15) retarded Sierra Leone’s achievement of human development objectives, such as school enrollment rates and children vaccinations.
2. Corruption is a substantial problem in Sierra Leone. The Global Competitiveness Report ranks the country 109 out of 140 countries on the incidence of corruption. Surveys for the Global Corruption Barometer in 2016 show that 41 percent of users of public sector services participating reported paying a bribe in the past 12 months, the fourth highest rate of the 29 African countries surveyed.
3. The country prepared a development strategy (“Agenda for Change 2008-12”: Second Poverty Reduction Strategy) which emphasized human development and inclusive growth. The growth agenda would be supported through investments in agriculture, energy, and transport infrastructure. Human development would focus on improving basic services in education, health, and water/sanitation. The strategy emphasized private development, good governance, prudent management of natural resources, and macroeconomic stability.
4. The WBG CAS was prepared jointly with the African Development Bank (AfDB). A joint assistance strategy (JAS) was seen as the most effective way of both institutions to support Sierra Leone and divide up labor. AfDB would focus on developing the road network, and invest in water and sanitation, while IDA would focus on human development improvements, youth employment and skills, public sector reform, and energy sector investments. The CAS was congruent with country development challenges, and concentrated activities on two focus areas: human development and inclusive growth. The human development focus area would address issues that determined Sierra Leone’s low ranking in human development, such as access to health, education, and water supply and sanitation. It also aimed at developing further social protection programs. Recognizing the role of growth in poverty reduction, the CAS also would support government efforts in infrastructure development and agriculture, which still accounts for 60 percent of GDP. A third focus area on managing the extractive boom (primarily in iron ore mining) was added at progress report stage, reflecting the need to address the boom’s opportunities and risks as well of new PRSP-III priorities.

<sup>5</sup> In 2011, the FAO food price index increased by 22.3 percent and Brent crude prices by 38.8 percent, respectively





5. The FY10-FY13 CAS expired without a new WBG strategy in place. The CLR attributes this to disruptions caused by the Ebola crisis (2014-15), economic shocks (fall in iron ore prices in 2014-15),<sup>6</sup> and a catastrophic landslide in Freetown (2017). However, these reasons are unconvincing for not having a strategy in place for 2014-19. The WBG remained engaged by addressing ongoing challenges in education, health, social environment, economic growth, and infrastructure. Although growth resumed in 2016 after a 21 percent GDP contraction in 2015, the economy remained subdued largely reflecting weaker performance in the iron ore sector culminating in the shuttering of the main loss-making mine in 2018.

6. **Relevance of Design.** The CAS focus areas addressed country challenges and were in line with the country's priorities under PRSP-II (Agenda for Change 2008-12). The objectives under the CAS were supported by WBG lending operations and ASA, and for each objective other development partners<sup>7</sup> contributed through parallel efforts. The program was quite complex with three focus areas, nine objectives, and 40 results indicators. IDA used a mix of IPF and development policy operations combined with ASA to support the CAS objectives. IPFs supported objectives across the program. Development policy operations—all part of a Governance Reform and Growth Grant series—were concentrated on supporting governance reforms under Focus Area 1. IFC participated in the program, targeting advisory services on business climate, tax administration, and private-public partnerships (particularly in energy and ports), and seeking investment or long-term financing opportunities for SMEs, commercial agribusiness, mining, and hospitality. The main change at PLR stage was the addition of the extractive boom focus area. This addition recognized the significance of properly managing mineral wealth, but there was no explicit objective under the focus area and the indicators lacked dates for the targets. Trust funds also made a substantial contribution to the program's objectives (there were US\$173 million in trust funded operations during the CAS, compared to US\$251 million in IDA financing).

7. The design of the program following the CAS was a mix of inertia from the CAS FY10-FY13 framework and responses to emergency needs. One of the lessons of IEG's evaluation of programs in low-income fragile states<sup>8</sup> is that to be effective, Bank Group support for state-building needs to be sustained through careful sequencing, better use of political economy analysis, and prioritization of long-term reforms. This is best achieved by a mix of predictable, programmatic budget support, investment projects and technical assistance to build country capacity and country ownership for reforms. The lack of a strategy between FY14 and FY19 likely limited the WBG's ability to take such an approach.

#### Selectivity

8. The objectives were focused on important country priorities and reflected WBG comparative advantage. However, the program was not selective considering the limited IDA envelope (about US\$70 million for FY10, and indicative US\$22-26 million yearly for the FY11-FY13 period) and constraints on domestic absorptive capacity. An initial program with nine objectives and 36 indicators that was augmented to 40 indicators at PLR stage ("CAS Progress Report") was excessively broad for a country with limited local capacity. By comparison, a high middle-income country with strong domestic capacity such as Mexico had a program with seven objectives and 25 indicators. The CAS for Sierra Leone had 12 new operations for US\$191 million over a three-year period (excluding a regional project on energy connectivity), while Mexico had 15 new operations for US\$3.4 billion over a five-year period. Moreover,

<sup>6</sup> Iron ore prices fell from \$136/MT in December 2013 to \$39.5/MT in December 2015. Prices of iron ore have recovered since to a range of \$85-95/MT in September-December 2019.

<sup>7</sup> JAS partners (AfDB, IDA, IFC) had other development partners supporting program implementation: DfID, EC, German Development Cooperation, United Nations agencies, Government of Italy, Irish Aid, Australian Development Agency, and JICA.

<sup>8</sup> IEG, World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, Washington DC, January 2014.



the joint nature of the strategy in Sierra Leone and the associated division of labor, was a missed opportunity to more narrowly focus the use of IDA resources, to ensure their impact.

#### Alignment

9. The program had a broad focus on reducing poverty and improving shared prosperity. Given the high poverty rate in the country and the alignment between the CAS and the country's Second Poverty Reduction Strategy, the three pillars of the CAS could all conceivably be linked to reducing poverty and promoting shared prosperity.

### **5. Development Outcome**

#### Overview of Achievement by Objective:

#### **Focus Area I: Human Development**

10. Focus Area I had five objectives: (i) improve capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver education, (ii) improve access to basic health services, (iii) increase household access to safe drinking water and sanitation, (iv) improve capacity to manage social risks, and (v) improve predictability, expenditure control and transparency in decentralization and public resource management.

11. ***Objective 1: Improve capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver education.*** This objective was supported by the Education for All Fast-Track Initiative Program (EFA FTI, FY09) and the Higher and Tertiary Education Sector Policy Note (FY12) ASA.<sup>9</sup> Objective 1 had two indicators:

- Increase the primary completion rate from 67 percent in 2010-11 to 70 percent. The Implementation Completion Report Review (ICRR) of the EFA FTI program (FY09) reports that the primary school completion rate was 76 percent in 2011. According to the World Development Indicators, the completion rate fell to 63 percent in 2013, the last year of the CAS period. Progress was made following the CAS period, and the World Development Indicators show that the completion rate improved from 59.8 percent in 2015 to 81.8 percent in 2018. However, according to the Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD),<sup>10</sup> despite the country's progress, education remains one of the most significant constraints to growth and shared prosperity.
- Increase enrollment for girls at Junior Secondary Schools (JSS) from 40.9 percent in 2008 to 43.9 percent in 2013. The ICRR of the EFA FTI program (FY09) reports that the percentage of girls enrolled in junior secondary schools was 45 percent in 2011. However, this progress was not sustained after the CAS period, and the World Development Indicators show that the enrollment rate of females in secondary schools declined to 41.1 percent in 2017. Moreover, the SCD notes that by the last year of high school, only 35 percent of boys and 25 percent of girls are still enrolled.

<sup>9</sup> In addition, a number of reports—in some cases prepared jointly with other organizations—contributed to the objective: Education Country Status Report (with UNICEF and Pole de Dakar) (FY14), Education Sector Plan (2018-2020), A Study on the Completion and Transition from the Primary to the JSS Secondary School Level in Sierra Leone (World Bank commissioned study, 2013), SABER Country Report on Early Childhood Development (2013), SABER Country Report on Teachers (2013), SABER Country Report on Engaging the Private Sector in Education (2014), and Updating the Education Sector Capacity Development Strategy for the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (2014).

<sup>10</sup> Republic of Sierra Leone: Priorities for Sustainable Growth and Poverty Reduction, World Bank Group, February 6, 2018.



12. **Some progress was made, but education remains a critical constraint to growth according to the 2018 SCD.** While the increase in the primary completion rate was short of target during the CAS period, subsequent progress led to a rate of primary completion of over 80 percent in 2018. However, the increase in girls' enrollment in JSS during the program period was not sustained, in part reflecting the effects of the Ebola crisis (2014-15), and the enrollment rate in 2017 remained at the 2008 level. Moreover, these indicators do not adequately measure the stated objective: capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver education. According to the ICRR of the EFA-FTI project (FY09), the project restructuring shifted priorities away from school construction to working on incremental improvements in service delivery. Such a shift brought the focus more in line with the CAS objective. The percentage of pupils who passed the National Primary School Examination (NPSE) increased from 72 percent in 2008 to 75 percent in 2012. The ICR of the EFA-FTI project (FY09) states that in an environment with rapidly rising enrollments, and where the new students brought into the system on average have lower socioeconomic characteristics than those already enrolled, maintaining learning outcomes and quality at the same level is an achievement. IEG notes that when resources are constrained, there may be a tension between increasing enrollment and increasing quality, and the sequencing of the two becomes a matter of country context and judgment. The Bank continued to be engaged after the CAS period helping improve the learning environment in target schools and establishing monitoring systems for education interventions and outcomes through the Revitalizing Education Development (FY15, FY16) trust-funded activity. According to the December 2019 supervision report, the activity was completed, and the project development outcome was achieved, with 86 percent of schools meeting 60 percent of their performance targets (project target achieved).

13. **Objective 2: Improve access to basic health services.** This objective was supported by the Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2 (FY11) and its additional financing (FY14), and the following ASAs: Public Expenditure Review (FY10), Constraints to Service Delivery (FY15), and Health Service Delivery & System Support Project (FY16). Objective 2 had four indicators:

- Children receiving Penta-3 vaccination before 12 months of age increased from 54.8 percent in 2008 to 85 percent in 2013. The December 2013 supervision report of the Reproductive and Child Health Project (FY11) indicated that 100 percent of children received Penta-3 before 12 months of age as of July 2013. A more recent supervision report (December 2014) of the same project indicated that the percentage fell to 92 percent as of March 2014. The project indicator was dropped in March 2015.
- The share of children under 5 who slept the previous night under an insecticide treated net (ITN) increased from 26 percent in 2008 to 80 percent by 2013. Forty-five percent of children under-five were sleeping under an ITN the previous night as of July 2013. Further progress was made after the CAS period, and 65 percent of children under-five were sleeping under an ITN the previous night as of 2015.
- Deliveries conducted in health facility increased from 42 percent in 2008 to 70 percent in 2013. Sixty-five percent of births were delivered in a health facility as of July 2013. The trend continued after the CAS period, and 74.8 percent of births were delivered in a health facility by 2017.
- Framework for community-based accountability committees for each public health clinic established. The CLR reports that the framework for community-based accountability committees was established, but IEG could not verify the claim.

14. **Some progress made in access to basic health services, but efforts are needed to continue reducing maternal death rates.** The share of children receiving the Penta-3 vaccination before 12 months reached 100 percent in 2013, and monitoring. The percentage fell to 92 percent as of March 2014—still above the target of 85 percent—and monitoring of this indicator was stopped in March 2015. Protection of children with insecticide treated nets increased but fell short of the target under the CAS. Deliveries in health facilities increased but reached the program target only after the CAS period. The Reproductive and Child Health Project went beyond the CAS period and contributed to continued improvements in maternal and child health outcomes, despite challenges from the Ebola outbreak in





FY14-FY15. The government remains committed to improving health services and extended its Bank engagement in the health sector through a follow-on operation whose objectives are to increase the utilization and improve the quality of essential maternal and child health services. Sierra Leone still has one of the highest maternal death rates in the world—1,120 deaths per 100,000 live births (2017), down from 1,360 per 100,000 live births in 2010. IEG could not verify that the framework for community-based accountability committees for each public health clinic was established.

15. **Objective 3: Increase household access to safe drinking water and sanitation.** This objective was supported by the Decentralized Service Delivery Program (DSDP) I (FY10) and II (FY12), and the Energy Sector Utility Reform Project (FY14). In addition, the following ASAs contributed to the objective: Public Expenditure Review in Water Sector and Sanitation in CAR, Congo, DRC, Sierra Leone and Togo (FY12), and Public Expenditure Review (FY11). Objective 3 had three indicators:

- People with access to water increased from 64,000 in 2009 to 115,000 in 2013 in targeted areas. IEG could not verify the CLR claim that the number of people with access to safe water increased to 115,000 by 2013 because supervision reports for the DSDP II (FY12) did not monitor the number of beneficiaries with access to water. However, the ICR for the DSDP II (FY12), based on an impact evaluation, states that 183,844 people benefitted from improved water sources in rural areas as of 2017. This exceeds the target under the program.
- People with access to improved sanitation increased from 25,000 in 2009 to 35,000 by 2013. Supervision reports of the DSDP II (FY12) did not monitor this indicator during the program. But the ICR for DSDP II, based on an impact evaluation, reported that 368,351 people benefitted from the improved health and sanitation services as of 2017, exceeding the CAS target. The impact evaluation reported “health and sanitation” as an aggregate variable.
- Commercial and technical losses of national electricity distribution utility company reduced from 60 percent in 2007 to 38 percent in 2013 (Freetown). IEG could not verify CLR information that commercial and technical losses were reduced to 46 percent by the end of the CAS period. A supervision report (June 2019) of the National Electricity Distribution Utility Reform Project indicates that aggregate technical, commercial and collection (ATC&C) losses were 46 percent as of December 2018. This indicator is unrelated to the objective on drinking water and sanitation.

16. **There was modest progress on this objective, the assessment of which was also hindered by imprecise indicator monitoring.** The indicators on access to drinking water and sanitation were not monitored during the CAS period. However, according to the ICR of the DSDP II (FY12), based on a project impact evaluation, both targets were met after the CAS period, with the caveat that access to sanitation is measured as part of the aggregate “health and sanitation” sector, and it is not clear whether the indicator measures access to both health and sanitation, or could measure one or the other. Moreover, there are also issues with the comparability of the data reported by the impact evaluation and the targets under the indicators.

17. **Objective 4: Improve the capacity to manage social risks.** This objective was supported by the Youth Employment Support Project (YEP) (FY10) and ASA on Social Safety Net Support (RSR) (FY13). Objective 4 had two indicators:

- Cash-for-work programs create four million person-days of employment in target areas (of which one million for women) by 2013 with increased sustainability compared to 0 in 2008. The supervision report (June 2015) of the YEP (FY10) indicates that there were 645,893 person days provided in labor-intensive public works (cash-for-work) as of May 2013. The ISR neither monitored the breakdown by gender nor assessed sustainability of the program. The ICRR of the Youth Employment Project stated that there were 1,762,369 person-days provided in labor-intensive public works as of June 2015, without showing a breakdown by gender.



- Number of women-days employment created through the cash-for-work program increased from 0 in 2008 to 1.2 million in target areas. The YEP (FY10) did not monitor women-days employment.

18. **Progress under objective 4 was poor.** The number of person-days employment created fell well short of target, even taking into consideration progress after the CAS period. Women-days employment was not monitored. The YEP (FY10) was part of a coordinated joint response of the donors (UNDP, ILO, GTZ, EC) to an urgent Government request, and was prepared under time pressure. The Government of Sierra Leone remained committed to the project throughout. Although the project increased access to short-term employment opportunities, the available evidence indicates that sustained youth employment after such short-term opportunities was not expanded.

19. **Objective 5: Improve predictability, expenditure control and transparency in decentralization and public resource management.** The objective was supported by the Decentralized Service Delivery Program (DSDP) I (FY10) and II (FY12) and its Additional Financing (FY16; FY17), Integrated Public Financial Management Reform (PFM TAL) (FY09), Fifth Governance Reform and Growth Credit (FY12), and the Public Financial Management Improvement and Consolidation Project (PFMCP) (FY14), and the following ASAs: Strengthening Internal Audit at the Bank of SL (FY14), and Public Expenditure Review (FY10). Objective 5 had five indicators:

- Number of local councils with integrated development plans and budgets increased from 0 in 2009 to 19 by 2013. The ICRR for DSDP I (FY10) stated that 19 local councils had integrated development plans and annual budgets approved as of 2012. As of June 2018, all 19 local councils continued to have integrated development plans, annual budgets (finalized in accordance with sector plans), and procurement plans.
- Number of local councils receiving timely transfers from the crisis response facility increased from 0 in 2009 to 19 by 2013. The 19 local councils received timely transfers from the crisis response facility as of 2012. There is no information on how transfers from this facility evolved after the CAS period.
- Variance in expenditure for the 20 largest budget heads declines from 13.5 percent in 2008 to less than 7 percent in 2013. The last reported figure of 10.9 percent variance of primary spending as of December 2011 was in the March 2012 supervision report of the PFM TAL (FY09).
- Number of local councils meeting at least 75 percent of the service output targets specified in local council policy MOUs by 2013. This indicator has no target. The ICRR for DSDP I (FY09) stated that 11 out of 19 local councils met at least 75 percent of the service output targets as of 2012 (short of the project target of 15). IEG has no information about the evolution of this indicator after the CAS period.
- Process for the public oversight of public financial management (PFM) to be in place by 2013. According to the CLR, the public oversight of PFM was not in place by 2013 owing to delays in launching the PFMCP (FY14). Progress was made after the CAS period, but delays due to the Ebola outbreak, procurement problems, and a change in government in May 2018 have deferred the achievement of this target.
- The share of Ward Committees holding public meetings and reporting to Local Councils as part of annual development planning and execution cycle increases to 80 percent. The ICR of DSDP I (FY09) indicated that as of 2012, 79 percent of Ward Committees held public meetings and reporting to local councils as part of the annual development planning and execution cycle. It is unclear from the available information if this outcome was sustained after the CAS period.

20. **Some progress on Objective 5 was made during the CAS, but it is unclear if it was sustained in 2014-19.** All 19 local councils had integrated development plans and own budgets approved by 2012, and these planning and budgeting arrangements remained operational after the CAS period. The councils received timely transfers from the crisis response facility as of 2012, but there is no



information about the disbursement of these transfers after the CAS period. During the CAS, only eleven out of nineteen councils met at least 75 percent of the service output targets specified in their MOUs. Over three fourths of Ward Committees held public meetings and reported to the LCs during the CAS. Further progress in these areas remains unreported. Primary expenditure variance was reduced but remained above the target of less than 7 percent (11.9 percent in 2011), and PFM public oversight was not put in place during the CAS period as had been expected.

#### **Focus Area II: Promoting Inclusive Growth**

21. Focus Area II had four objectives: (i) improve the efficiency and transparency of agriculture and fisheries; (ii) improve the investment climate; (iii) improve access to sustainable electricity infrastructure services; and (iv) maintain and extend key transport infrastructure.

22. **Objective 6: Improved efficiency and transparency of agriculture and fisheries.** This objective was supported by the Rural and Private Sector Development Project (RPSDP) (FY07), and its additional financing (FY11), and the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (WARFP) (FY10), as well as the ASA Agricultural Sector Review (FY16). The objective had six indicators:

- 50 percent of target beneficiaries for selected value chains increase production by 20 percent (interpreted as productivity increase). At project close (2015) of the RPSDP (FY07), 56,000 beneficiaries (against a target of 25,000) exceeded the production targets for the selected value chains (cocoa, cassava, and rice).<sup>11</sup> The indicator is not clear: it should have targeted the number of beneficiaries with increases in productivity above 20 percent.
- Farmer-Based Organizations (FBOs) registered with the Ministry of Agriculture established in all districts by 2013. IEG was unable to verify this information because the RPSDP (FY07) did not monitor the formation and registration of FBOs. (FBOs were intended to be the channels to disseminate new farming technologies and improve production practices to farmers.)
- The number of Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFS)<sup>12</sup> legally established for coastal fisheries increased from none in 2008 to 4 by 2013. The July 2014 supervision report of the WARFP (FY10) states that there were no TURFs established; but four marine protected areas were established as of December 2013. Based on the ICRR for the WARFP (FY10), there were still no TURFS established as of 2016.
- Meet EU phyto-sanitary standard for fish exports by 2013. A competent sanitary authority was put in place but was not accredited by the European Union (EU) as of December 2012. Following the CAS period, the country's sanitary authority had still not been accredited by the EU as of 2016.
- Fishing vessels observed committing a serious infraction reduced from 88 percent in 2009 to 66 percent by 2013. The July 2014 supervision report of the WARFP (FY10) indicates that 49.25 percent of fishing vessels committed a serious infraction as of December 2013. However, this figure is the average for four countries (Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone). Data for this indicator was unavailable for Sierra Leone.
- Public disclosure of all fishing licenses and revenues by Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources. This indicator was not monitored. The CLR reports that information on the 2015 and 2016 fishing licenses and respective revenues is available from the Sierra Leone Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Resources' website, which IEG verified. But the data is lacking for 2017-19.

23. **Progress under Objective 6 was poor.** Of the six indicators—most of them about institutional development rather than increases in efficiency—only the ones on the number of beneficiaries increasing production per hectare for selected value chains and on disclosure of fishing licenses and

<sup>11</sup> Tons per hectare increased for production of cocoa, cassava, and rice.

<sup>12</sup> TURFS allocate secure, exclusive privileges to fish in a specified area to groups, or in rare cases individuals.

revenues showed progress. For the other four, there was either no progress or information was unavailable. The Bank made an effort to improve efficiency in agriculture. The RPSDP (FY07) helped to improve extension services in the agricultural sector. However, the ICRR for that project notes a disconnect between such services and the intended increase in farm productivity. Project design focused too much on value addition and market access, and too little on the means to get farm productivity gains. The WARFP (FY10) intended to improve governance (including transparency) in the fisheries sector of Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. The evidence available does not show fisheries governance improvement.

24. **Objective 7: Improve investment climate.** This objective was supported by ASA Sierra Leone Investment Climate (FY17), Mineral Sector Technical Assistance (MSTA) (FY10) and its additional financing (FY11), Financial Sector Development Plan Support Technical Assistance (FSDPSTA) (FY11), and IFC's Advisory Services on Capacity Building for the Bank of Sierra Leone on Monitoring Compliance of Trade Finance Facility (FY11), Removing Administrative Barriers to Investment, Tax Rollout, and Business Forum. Objective 7 had six indicators:

- Reduction in time taken to register a business from 26 days in 2007 to 10 days by 2013. Time to register a business was 12 days in 2010. The Doing Business (DB) 2014 report shows that there was no improvement during the CAS period – it took 12 days to start a business in Sierra Leone in 2013. The DB 2020 report stated that this indicator declined to 5 days in 2019.
- Reduction in time of export transactions from 31 days in 2007 to 22 days by 2013. Time to export was 26 days in 2010. The DB 2014 report shows that the time to export was 25 days in 2013. The methodology for measuring this indicator has since changed. DB 2020 states that documentary compliance for exports takes 72 hours, and border compliance takes 55 hours in 2019 (an improvement compared to 134 hours and 55 hours, respectively, in 2016). The total time needed to process an export shipment was 127 hours or 5.3 days (compared to 189 hours or 7.9 days in 2016). However, Sierra Leone's distance to the frontier score<sup>13</sup> on "trading across borders" slipped from 63.61 in 2015 (earliest data available) to 51.9 countries in 2020.
- Number of bank accounts increased to 300,000 in 2013 from 160,000 in 2005. IEG could not verify CLR information that the number of bank accounts increased to 300,000. The WB WDI reports that 15.4 percent of the population ages 15+ had an account at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider as of 2011. With a population of 3.7 million (ages 15+), this translates into more than 574,000 people with accounts. According to WDI, the number of people with accounts increased to 632,000 in 2014 and 870,000 in 2018.
- Volume and market penetration of leasing equipment financed increased from US\$6.8 million in 2009 to US\$35 million in 2013. There is no information available.
- Achieve Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) validation standards by 2013. The ICR of the MSTA (FY10) states that Sierra Leone achieved EITI compliance status in 2014. As part of the latest EITI validation of Sierra Leone in 2018, the EITI Board agreed that Sierra Leone had made meaningful progress in implementing EITI Standards but was not yet in full compliance. Therefore, the EITI Board also requested Sierra Leone to undertake corrective actions before the second validation scheduled for December 2020, including on industry engagement, license allocations, production data, and subnational transfers.
- AML/CFT regime strengthened by amendment of Anti-Money-Laundering (AML) law and establishment of FIU at BSL by 2013. The ICR of the FSDPSTA (FY11) states that a financial intelligence unit was established with oversight on AML/CFT issues, including enforcement powers, as of 2012. The anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism act was amended in 2019, primarily to widen the definition of terrorist groups (no evidence of prior amendments).

<sup>13</sup> The distance to the frontier score captures the gap between an economy's performance and a measure of best practice across the entire Doing Business sample. The scale is 0-100, with 100 representing the best performance out of the whole sample.



25. **On Objective 7, there was little improvement on the investment climate, and the indicators used to measure this objective were not always relevant.** Sierra Leone reduced the time to register a business and to execute export transactions. Using the appropriate benchmark for indicators (2010), however, shows virtually no improvement for both variables during the CAS period. Although the number of bank accounts increased significantly, there is no direct connection between such increase and the investment climate. On a positive note, Sierra Leone achieved EITI validation standards but is not yet in full compliance, and the AML/CFT regime was somewhat strengthened. Modest progress on business environment was supported by IFC Advisory Services.

26. **Objective 8: Improve access to sustainable electricity infrastructure services.** This objective was supported by the Energy Access Project (EAP) (FY13), and the Energy Sector Utility Reform Project (FY14). Objective 8 had three indicators:

- Households in Freetown with access to electricity increased from 20,000 in 2009 to 40,000 by 2013. The EAP (FY13) was slow to start, and its implementation had to wait until after the CAS period. Despite becoming effective in September 2013, more than a year after project approval (1/23/2013) the key PMU positions of financial management and procurement specialists were not filled, leading to delays in the launching of project activities, including the procuring of pre-paid meters and the associated revenue management system. The Ebola outbreak in 2014 stopped project implementation, which was resumed at end-2015 when the country was declared Ebola free. The project ICR states that 120,000 households were connected to the grid in Freetown as of July 2017.
- Average collection rates by the electric utility distribution company increased from 76 percent to 80 percent. No progress was reported during the CAS period because the EAP (FY13) was still not effective. The ICRR for the EAP (FY13) indicated that the collection rate of the Electricity Distribution and Supply Authority (EDSA) increased from 76 percent baseline in 2009 to 86 percent as of July 2017.
- Regulatory framework for independent power production established by 2013. The National Electricity Act was approved by parliament in 2011 and included the definition of independent power producers. The IDA-IFC-MIGA project supporting the first independent power producer in the country (Western Area Power Generation Project (FY17))—expected to increase generation capacity by more than 50 percent—was canceled in July 2018 because a regulatory issue impeded project progress (see paragraph 46).

27. **Objective 8 showed some progress.** However, only one target (regulatory framework put in place for independent power production) was met during the CAS period. Unfortunately, the WBG project supporting the first independent power producer was cancelled in July 2018. Progress on the other two indicators came after the CAS period because the Energy Access Project (FY13) was not effective during the CAS, and then suffered delays, including Ebola-related. By July 2017, access to electricity increased by more than targeted under the CAS. Moreover, the collection rate by the electricity distribution also exceeded the CAS target. The ICRR underscores that one of the lessons from the EAP (FY13) is that reforming the energy sector may require infrastructure investments along with changes in policies governing the sector. Some of the policy measures that helped realize results were unbundling electricity production and distribution, tariff increases, and introducing a prepayment system in revenue management.

28. **Objective 9: Maintain and extend key transport infrastructure.** This objective was supported by Infrastructure Development Project (IDPT) (Transport) (FY06) and its additional financing (FY08), the Rural and Private Sector Development Project (RPSDP) (FY07) and its additional financing (FY11), Smallholder Commercialization and Agribusiness Development Project (FY16), Matotoka-Sefadu Road Rehabilitation Project (AfDB, FY12), Lungi-Port Loko Road Upgrading Project (AfDB, FY09). In addition, the following ASAs contributed to the objective: Transport Sector Strategy - Pro Growth Pro Poor





Transport Sector Review (FY12), Airport PSP Options Study (FY10), Governance and Political Economy Constraints in Emerging Post-conflict Sierra Leone: A Multilevel Analysis (2011), Problem-Driven Political Economy Analysis (Chapter 7, 2014). Objective 9 had four indicators:

- 1,400 km of feeder roads rehabilitated by 2013. The ICRR of the IDPT (FY06) states that 270 km of feeder/rural roads were rehabilitated as of September 2013. The November 2013 supervision report of the RPSDP (FY07) indicates that additional 421 km of feeder roads were rehabilitated as of October 2012. This information shows modest progress towards the target on feeder road rehabilitation during the CAS period. Further progress was made after the CAS. The ICRR for the RPSDP (FY07) states that 971 kilometers of feeder roads were rehabilitated as of November 2015.
- Port container handling performance is improved from 8 Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit (TEUs) per hour in 2007 to 12 TEUs per hour by 2013. The ICRR of the IDPT (FY06) states that port container handling capacity increased to 238 TEUs per day or 9.91 TEUs per hour as of September 2013, short of the 12 TEUs per hour target. There is no information on how this indicator evolved after the CAS period. In addition, the ICR talks about capacity rather than actual performance (reflected in the indicator).
- Lungi Airport to remain as international airport according to ICAO safety regulations. The ICRR for the IDPT (FY06) indicates that Lungi international airport was certified by ICAO in 2011. Sierra Leone remains a member of ICAO, but it is unclear whether Lungi Airport is still certified as an international airport.
- Independent road fund established by 2013. The Road Maintenance Fund with an autonomous board was established in April 2011. It remains in operation, and the latest Auditing Report for the Fund's operations in 2016 was released in 2018.

29. **Under Objective 9, the Bank made a contribution to transport infrastructure.** Progress was modest on feeder road rehabilitation during the CAS period, but further advancement after the CAS led to more than 1,000 kilometers of feeder roads rehabilitated by November 2015 compared with the 1,400 kilometers target under the CAS. The container handling performance improved but fell short of the CAS target. Lungi Airport was certified as an international airport by ICAO in 2011, and an independent road fund was established during the CAS and continues to operate.

### **Focus Area III: Extractive Boom**

30. **Objective 10: Specific wording for the objective is not explicit in the CAS, but implicitly it was about strengthening the capacity to manage the boom in the extractive sector.** This objective was supported by the Mining Sector Technical Assistance Project (MSTAP) (FY10) and its additional financing (FY11), the Extractive Industries Technical Assistance Project Phase 2 (EITAP 2) (FY18), the ASA on Good Governance Initiative (FY13), the TA for Diagnostic and Policy Notes (FY14), and the Public Expenditure Review (FY10). Objective 10 had four indicators:

- Key regulations related to mining submitted to Cabinet after extensive consultations: Environmental and Social regulations, Precious Minerals Trading Act, Resettlement Regulations, Health and Safety Regulations. The MSTAP (FY10) ICR states that regulations related to mining were submitted to Cabinet after extensive consultations. E&S regulations, Precious Minerals Trading Act, Resettlement Regulations, Health and Safety Regulations were adopted by the Ministry of Mines and Mineral resources as of October 2012. The CLR also reports the petroleum and gas laws (2011, 2014a, 2014b), and the Extractive Industries Revenue Act (2018). The April 2019 supervision report of the EITAP 2 (FY18) states that 10 percent of the Policy Actions Matrix of the Minerals Policy was implemented as of April 2019.
- Establishment of a National Minerals Agency. The ICRR for the Mining Sector Technical Assistance (FY10) indicated that a National Minerals Agency Act was approved by Parliament in 2012 and the agency became operational in 2013.



- Prioritized vacancies for critical staffing requirements identified within the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Resources (MMR), and job descriptions and recruitment plans approved by HRMO/PSC<sup>14</sup> and recruitment underway. The human resources policy in the mining sector was not implemented during the CAS period due to initial disagreements about the allocation of functions between the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources (MMMR) and the National Minerals Agency (NPA). According to the MSTAP (FY10) ICR, the policy was adopted in 2014, after the CAS period, and has been implemented since then, including by hiring qualified staff. A complementary Management and Functional Review (MFR) of MMMR and NMA in February 2016 confirmed what was in the HR policy, and provided clear guidance on the roles, responsibilities and capacities needed for both institutions.
- Demand for Good Governance (DFGG) Strategy for Sierra Leone completed, with priority social accountability instruments and approaches laid out. IEG could not verify the completion of the DFGG strategy.

31. **Sierra Leone has made progress in modernizing its mining legislative framework and improving mining sector governance.** The CAS added this focus area at the Progress Report stage to capture the Bank's contribution in mining, with one objective (number 10), where progress was mixed. There was no explicit objective and the indicators had no date for achieving targets. Key regulations for mining were adopted by October 2012, and the National Minerals Agency became operational in 2013. A human resources policy for the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources was adopted after the CAS period, but a Demand for Good Governance Strategy appears to be pending. Iron ore mining was affected adversely by a sharp decline in world iron ore prices in 2014-2015. Prices have recovered since then and iron ore exports resumed in 2019. However, the government cancelled abruptly iron ore licenses of several major mining companies in August 2019 due to disputes over payments of fees and royalties. Such disputes were not resolved as of March 2020 and resulted in the halting of exports of the mineral which previously generated a quarter of annual export revenue.

#### Overall Assessment

32. The Bank had significant contributions in transport, electricity, and mining:
- *Transport infrastructure and its management:* Although road infrastructure in 2019 was by no means perfect, the Bank had contributed towards the improvement of feeder roads, with more than 1,000 km rehabilitated. Port capacity to handle containers also improved, primarily through an expansion of the Freetown Port Terminal. The Bank contributed to improve port infrastructure and rehabilitated and upgraded the Freetown International Airport (Lungi) runway. The airport was certified by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 2011. The Bank also supported regulatory and institutional reform, and enhancing management of the road, port and airport sectors.
  - *Electricity services:* The Bank supported the rehabilitation of the primary distribution network, strengthened the national electricity company (EDSA), and helped develop the policy framework for the power generating sector. As a result, household electricity access increased, commercial electricity losses were reduced, and the national energy company is managerially stronger.
  - *Mining Sector Governance:* The Bank contributed to develop the institutions overseeing the mining sector—Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources (MMMR) and the National Minerals Agency (NPA). In addition, it contributed to prepare key sector regulations now governing mining in Sierra Leone. Although the mining sector is going through rough times, the Bank contributions helped underpin durable sector institutional development.

<sup>14</sup> Human Resource Management Office/Public Service Commission.



33. In addition, under Focus Area I (Human Development) the Bank contributed to lengthening life expectancy and schooling, which resulted in overall human development progress as measured by the HDI index (Table 1).

	Life Expectancy at Birth	Expected Years of Schooling	Mean Years of Schooling	HDI Value
2010	49.4	8.9	3.1	0.391
2015	52.9	9.7	3.4	0.422
2018	54.3	10.2	3.6	0.438

Source: United Nations HDI Index for Sierra Leone

34. In education, the Bank contributed to improving learning conditions, and continued engaged after the CAS period helping improve the learning environment in target schools and establishing monitoring systems for education interventions and outcomes. In health, the Bank helped local councils improve service delivery by financing service operations and civil works in health and sanitation.

## 6. WBG Performance

### Lending and Investments

35. The existing portfolio when the CAS was approved comprised seven IPF operations committed during FY05-FY09 (including one operation with additional financing) amounting to US\$145 million. Two thirds of the existing portfolio (US\$98 million) were projects in Focus Area II, for energy, transport, and rural development, while one third (US\$47 million) was in Focus Area I for water, health, and public finance projects. During the CAS period, new IDA commitments totaled US\$191 million (plus an additional US\$60 million for a regional power interconnection project) comprising eight IPF operations which included one additional financing operation, and a Governance Reform and Growth Grant DPO series (US\$76 million), including supplemental financing in 2010. About 50 percent of investment lending (US\$84 million) supported Focus Area II for transport, rural development, and the financial sector, 38 percent (US\$66 million) went to Focus Area I for decentralization, youth employment, and public finance, and 5 percent (US\$8 million) went for Focus Area III to support the mining sector. A project on public sector pay and performance accounted for the rest. ASA supported objectives on education, health, social protection and jobs, investment climate, and the extractive boom.

36. During the CAS period thirty trust-funded operations amounting to US\$173 million supported mostly activities in Focus Area I. Nearly 60 percent of the volume supported projects on reproductive and child health (US\$30 million), education for all fast track initiative (US\$13.9 million), public financial management reform (US\$17.4 million), Freetown water supply rehabilitation (US\$8.5 million), and institutional reform and capacity building for decentralization of education and health services, and public finance reform (US\$26 million).

37. The FY10-FY13 CAS expired without a new WBG strategy in place and with no decision taken to extend either the strategy or the results framework, creating an extended period of time with no clear framework for accountability. The CLR lists three major shocks for the delay in preparing a new strategy: an Ebola outbreak (2014), downturn in international iron ore prices (2013), as well as a catastrophic landslide in Freetown (2017). However, it is not clear why the second factor should have held up a new strategy nor why any of those factors would justify not extending the strategy. The additional pressures on the budget required emergency financing, and the Ebola crisis overwhelmed the health system. The Bank responded with emergency budget financing (DPOs), and other emergency support to address the Ebola outbreak. Moreover, without a CAS framework in place in 2014-19, it stayed engaged with



projects in education, health, social environment, economic growth, and infrastructure. IFC and MIGA also remained engaged in Sierra Leone during this period.

38. Between FY14 and FY19, IDA approved new commitments for US\$494 million. This comprised 17 IPF operations (including four AF operations) and five DPOs. Two DPOs (including supplemental financing) for US\$60 million focused on an emergency response to the Ebola crisis in 2014. The other three operations (including supplemental financing) amounted to US\$80 million, supported implementation of PRSP-III, the emergency operations emphasized budget transparency; the three subsequent operations emphasized increasing productivity and enhancing government transparency and accountability. Eleven of the IPFs (US\$154 million) supported focus area I under the expired CAS, for health, social safety nets, skill development, and financial inclusion. The remainder went to focus area II (US\$200 million), notably for energy sector reform, agribusiness, and urban transport. Two regional projects on disease control and surveillance (for US\$58 million) were also part of the response to the Ebola crisis.

39. Sierra Leone's portfolio performance at exit, measured by outcomes rated Moderately Satisfactory or better by IEG, was better than its comparators. A total of 23 operations were closed during the period FY10-FY19,<sup>15</sup> all of which were reviewed by IEG. Of these, eighteen (78.3 percent) were rated MS or better on a binary scale, significantly above the average Bank-wide performance (72.5 percent) and the Africa Region performance (65 percent).<sup>16</sup>

40. Overall, IDA's Sierra Leone active portfolio performed well. The share of projects at risk (by number of projects) averaged 17.4 percent during FY10-FY19, lower than for the AFR Region (25.5 percent) and the World (23.1 percent). The share of commitments at risk was lower in Sierra Leone (12.8 percent) than in the AFR Region (29.1 percent) and the World (20.3 percent). Self-ratings of ongoing projects were generally satisfactory, in line with the largely good performance of projects at exit in Sierra Leone.

41. IFC had no active investments in Sierra Leone at the start of the CPS period. The CPS stated that IFC would "actively look for investment and advisory services opportunities," but did not specify a target volume for such activities or articulate a clear strategy for them. During the period, IFC invested in one project in the plastics & rubber sector, for a net commitment of US\$2.8 million. This sector was not among the eight sectors mentioned in various places in the CAS as relevant for IFC.

42. After the end of the CPS period IFC made an additional US\$87 million in net commitments in the Western Area Power Generation Project (WAPGP, FY17) and a project in the oil, gas and mining sector (project is confidential). In WAGPG, IDA, IFC, and MIGA collaborated to support a public-private partnership electricity generation project through a US\$40 million IDA guarantee, US\$30 million IFC investment, and an expected MIGA guarantee. While this was an innovative and strategic project at the time it was approved, WBG support to the project was canceled in July 2018 because a regulatory issue impeded project progress. In FY16, IFC also invested in a hotel (relevant to the tourism sector mentioned in the CAS) and then canceled some of this investment, but no further information is available.

43. During the FY10-FY19 period, IEG validated one XPSR on an IFC investment. The investment was made in FY07 and was considered mostly unsuccessful, primarily due to its business performance.

44. During the CPS period, MIGA provided one guarantee in FY13, for US\$1.9 million, in the services sector. Over the period FY15-18, MIGA provided two guarantees in telecommunications and services,

<sup>15</sup> This assessment considers projects during the CAS period (FY10-FY13) and beyond (FY14-FY19).

<sup>16</sup> Performance was similar for projects that exited during the CAS period with eight out of ten projects rated MS or better.



for a total gross outstanding exposure of US\$103 million as of end-FY18. In FY19, MIGA provided a guarantee for a project in agribusiness, for a total gross outstanding exposure of US\$136 million. Agribusiness was related to the strategic directions for MIGA set out in the CAS, but the others were not.

#### Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

45. Bank work in Sierra Leone had a significant ASA component. The emphasis of the ESW was on diagnostics that would feed into policy dialogue, and sector work included analytics on social protection and jobs, and education. Technical assistance contributed to program priorities related to the political economy of natural resource management, debt management, and anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism. In the period following the CAS (FY14-FY19) ASA work focused on sector or macro-wide assessments such a road asset management strategy, business environment, urban development focused on Freetown, agriculture, and a policy note for the petroleum sector. The analytical work contributed to the Systematic Country Diagnostic prepared in 2017-18.

46. IFC implemented eight Advisory Services projects during the CPS period, valued at US\$9.3 million. Advisory Services focused on improving the business environment, improving the capacity of the government agency tasked with attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and export promotion, and expanding business opportunities for small and medium enterprises, and advising on a public-private partnership transaction for a hotel. These were explicitly or implicitly in line with the CAS. IEG rated the support to SMEs Unsuccessful for having a much more limited impact than intended. IEG rated the support to the FDI and export promotion agency and the PPP transaction as Mostly Successful; however, the results were not sustained over time. (As of this CLRR, the hotel has not yet opened.)

47. After the CPS period ended, IFC implemented four more AS projects for US\$5.5 million. It helped the government improve the legal and regulatory framework for secured transactions, assisted with the development of the collateral registry for such transactions and raised awareness about this new type of lending, and worked on structuring a public-private partnership (PPP) for the completion of three regional referral labs for medical testing.

#### Results Framework

48. The results framework reflected reasonably well the links between the Agenda for Change 2008-12 (PRSPII), the CAS outcomes, and the supporting WBG interventions. However, there were shortcomings, particularly related to complexity of the program and to the measurement of the program's intended results and outcomes. With nine objectives and 40 indicators, the results framework was overly complex for a country with limited administrative capacity such as Sierra Leone. Moreover, a number of indicators were not properly measurable because they had no target dates (objectives 5, 6, 8, 10), and a number of indicators were not related to the objective (for example, indicators for objective 1, and indicator 3 of objective 3) or had baselines dated well before the start of the CAS period. At the Progress Report stage (July 2012), a focus area on the extractive boom was added with a single "objective" which was not explicitly spelled out; its four indicators were process oriented and had no target dates. On the whole, Focus Area I generally had an outcome orientation, but Focus Area II and, especially, Focus Area III were more oriented to the approval of frameworks or strategies. The results framework was not extended beyond the CAS period leaving the Bank engagement without targets for six years.

#### Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

49. This was a Joint Country Assistance Strategy between the World Bank Group and the African Development Bank, although the results framework reflected only a few AfDB interventions. The World





Bank was the single largest development partner in Sierra Leone during the CAS period. The CAS Progress Report stated that the Bank, DFID (UK development agency), AfDB, and the European Union carried out joint assessments for budget support and coordinated the dialogue with the government under the Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) framework. In energy, where the Bank was a lead partner, it formed a coordination group with the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, and the Energy Access Project (FY13) was co-financed by DfID. The Bank facilitated the creation of a Development Partner Governance and Accountability Working Group to discuss governance issues among partners and with the government. The Bank also managed to mobilize co-financing of its activities in the areas of PFM, decentralization (EU), fisheries (GEF-Germany), and extractive industries. The Africa Catalytic Growth Fund<sup>17</sup> co-financed the Reproductive and Child Health Project (FY11, FY13, and FY14). In addition, a substantial share of bilateral aid that supported the program was channeled through a Multi-Donor Trust Fund whose contributors were the Australian Agency for International Development, the Department for International Development (DfID), Canada, and Italy.

50. During the CAS period Sierra Leone had a program with the IMF. Bank and IMF staff had an agenda for joint work that included preparing medium-term debt management strategies, writing joint staff advisory notes for the authorities, and assisting the authorities with the implementation of their financial sector reform strategy. This cooperation continued during 2014-19.

51. The CLR was quite thin on coordination and cooperation with development partners. It pointed out, however, that the WBG and AfDB began the implementation of the joint CAS at different times. Thus, it was difficult to carry out a joint mid-term review and resulted in the early exit of AfDB from the partnership arrangement. The WBG and AfDB did not carry out joint missions. They tried to coordinate their interventions closely, but most activities were undertaken in “parallel” mode rather than jointly, which requires a deeper integration of preparation and implementation of activities.

#### Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

52. The CLR does not discuss the Bank's portfolio compliance with safeguards. Sixteen of the twenty-three projects in Sierra Leone that were closed and validated by IEG during the period FY10-FY19 triggered environmental and social safeguard policies. This happened in projects in social protection, labor and working conditions; energy and extractives; health, nutrition and population; environment and natural resources, agriculture; transport and education. Evidence from ICRs, ICRRs, and the available PPAR indicate proper screening, preparation and disclosure of the required policy instruments. Yet, despite Bank capacity building and routine site visits, safeguard remedies were hampered by low capacity, poor staffing practices, slow procurement, and the lack of a dedicated budget for safeguards needs. Citizens were affected by property damage from the Energy Access Project (FY13). More generally, there were delays in compensation payments across the Bank portfolio, partly as a consequence of the Ebola crisis. The Bumbuna Hydroelectric Environmental and Social Management Project (FY05) closed with unsatisfactory compliance ratings and pending remedial activities that had no guaranteed source of funding.

53. Despite safeguard implementation issues, the portfolio achieved positive environmental and social outcomes such as improved natural conservation practices and skills of government employees, improved living conditions in some communities, as well as expanded access to electricity for schools and health care centers.

54. There were no reported Inspection Panel investigations for Sierra Leone during the review period.

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<sup>17</sup> A Trust Fund financed by contributions from development partners and managed by the Bank Africa Region.

### Ownership and Flexibility

55. The Agenda for Change 2008-12 (PRSP-II), a government document, was the basis for the Joint CAS, and was prepared in consultation with members of Parliament, suggesting initial ownership of the Joint strategy. The overall good portfolio performance also suggests government ownership in several areas of the WBG program. However, on the whole, ownership was uneven. Some areas of the program—such as public financial management, and public sector pay and performance—had less government ownership than others, which showed in the project ratings at exit.<sup>18</sup> In other instances (power and water) the government failed to provide any of the expected counterpart financing and did not fulfill legal and financial covenants. The Programmatic Reform and Growth Grant (3 DPOs), on the other hand, was rated Satisfactory by IEG. The government, however, did not show capacity to coordinate activities of development partners. The PLR (progress report) mentioned that deriving optimal benefits from joint strategies requires that governments lead donor coordination at the sector level and lacking such leadership in Sierra Leone prevented that different agencies pulled together in delivering the CAS agenda.

56. The PLR (progress report) (July 2012) virtually kept the Bank program unchanged, except for adding a pillar to the results framework on the “extractive boom,” reflecting the Government’s interest in the topic.

57. Although the CLR does not discuss the issue, the Bank program adapted to the Ebola crisis, which erupted in December 2013, by strengthening its engagement in the health sector and supporting the budget to deal with the pressures arising from the Ebola outbreak (see Box 1). In addition, the Ebola crisis affected the implementation of the Bank portfolio, which was put virtually on standby until the end of the outbreak in 2016. Most of the projects that were active in 2013 had to be restructured to extend their closing date or modify some of the project objectives, or both. The Bank was a member of the coalition against the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014-15, and mobilized resources as part of the Crisis Response Window.<sup>19</sup> In Sierra Leone, as part of an international effort, the Bank responded with a US\$28 million (Sierra Leone’s share) regional West Africa Ebola Emergency Response project (FY15), and by restructuring the Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2 (RCHP-II) (FY14) to add Ebola-related emergency activities. In addition, the Bank approved an Emergency Economic and Fiscal Support DPO (FY15) (EEFS) to strengthen budget management and reduce fiscal risks heightened by the Ebola epidemic, as well as improve public transparency and accountability. Bank support improved the supply of health resources through the hiring of 130 international medical workers, and enabled hazard pay to health workers for increased exposure risk. Moreover, it helped critical response activities, including surveillance, contact tracing, social mobilization, food distribution to quarantined and Ebola-affected populations, personal protection equipment, and staffing and management of the National Ebola Response Center. Missions to Sierra Leone were put on hold from December 2013 through March 2016, when the WHO declared the country Ebola-free.

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<sup>18</sup> *Unsatisfactory* rating for the Public Sector Pay and Performance project (FY12) and the Public Financial Management TAL (FY09).

<sup>19</sup> IEG, IDA’s Crisis Response Window, Lessons from IEG Evaluations, Washington: D.C., March 2019.



### Box 1: Bank Response to the Ebola Outbreak

An Ebola virus outbreak began in West Africa in December 2013. Sierra Leone reported the highest number of cases of the three most affected countries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone). According to the ICR of the Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2, four percent of health facilities closed, and malaria treatment for children and immunization coverage dropped by 39 percent and 21 percent respectively. The Ebola crisis worsened existing shortages of skilled health providers as there were 864 reported health worker deaths. Fear of contracting the disease and misinformation also contributed to a decline of health service use, exacerbated by the absence of strong community-based health education and service provision.

As part of an international effort, the Bank responded as follows:

**1. West Africa Ebola Emergency Response project (FY15, US\$28 million for Sierra Leone):** This was the key Bank response in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. According to the April 2015 ISR, in Sierra Leone, the supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE), essential drugs, and food items for Ebola-affected and quarantined population served as the first set of essential supplies for the Ebola response – and this support was complemented by other development partners. Hazard pay to Ebola response workers provided strong incentives for the workers in Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) and other response teams, as well as for workers in regular health facilities to continue the response and services. The project also contributed to avoid strikes of medical personnel in the most challenging period of October-November 2014. The project disbursed quickly, but disbursements are not disaggregated by country. In Sierra Leone, according to ISRs, the project suffered delays in implementation of some project activities due to delays at the Project Administrative Unit, but it is not clear if this affected the Ebola response activities. Nevertheless, the project had the following interim results across all three countries (country-specific results are not available): ensured availability of at least two weeks needs of PPEs and other required supplies at all Ebola Treatment Centers and referral centers (target exceeded); deployed 740 expatriate health workers to provide medical care to EVD patients and for other essential health needs (target exceeded); distributed 19,000 metric tons of food (83% of target achieved); and timely supported cash transfers to poor households. The project also funded contracts of all contact tracers in Sierra Leone. As the project is still active, an Implementation Completion Report has not been written and these results have not been independently verified by IEG.

**2. Disease Surveillance and Response in West Africa project (FY16, US\$30 million):** The project—still active—has strengthened disease surveillance and response systems in Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Senegal, and fostered regional collaboration (information exchange), coordination (regional policies and technical strategies) and resource sharing (training institutions and reference laboratories). An additional financing in the form of a grant has recently been approved by the World Bank to allow WAHO (West Africa Health Organization) to scale-up regional activities, which will contribute to the achievement of the project development objective.

**3. Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2 (RCHP-II) (FY14, US\$30 million):** The existing RCHP-II was restructured to respond to the Ebola outbreak. The main objectives of the restructuring were to finance the hiring of 130 international medical workers and enable hazard pay to health workers for increased exposure risk. The activities were complementary to the government's emergency response plan through its National Ebola Response Center. This intervention alleviated the scarcity of human resources in the public health system. Also, in one district, a study on the resilience of maternal primary care during the Ebola outbreak in rural areas showed that service utilization was less affected by the Ebola situation in part due to the hazard pay to health workers.\* However, the loss of human resources affected implementation and monitoring of RCHP-2. The ICRR notes that at project closing, continued relevance would have been more manifest had the project included or explained a pathway for health workforce development that would contribute to strengthening resilience and readiness to confront Ebola outbreaks. The ICRR rates the project Moderately Satisfactory.

**4. Emergency Economic and Fiscal Support DPO (FY15, US\$60 million):** The objective was to ensure that the Government's Ebola Response Plan was executed through adequate budgeting and transparent use of resources, consistent with strengthening longer-term fiscal management and transparency. The EEFS (FY15) ensured that Ebola workers were paid adequately and in a timely manner, and that payments were no longer made to ineligible workers. However, there were shortfalls in strengthening longer term fiscal management. The ICRR rates the project Moderately Satisfactory but with a Substantial risk to its development outcome.

\*Caulker et al, Life goes on: the resilience of maternal primary care during the Ebola outbreak in rural Sierra Leone, Public Health Action, 2017 Jun 21; 7 (Supplement 1): pp 40–46.

Source: Sierra Leone SCD (2018), ISRs for WAEERP, and ICRRs of the RCHP-II project and the EEFS DPO.



### WBG Internal Cooperation

58. IFC planned to provide Advisory Services to Sierra Leone for improving the investment climate and promoting public-private partnerships. It would also help the government streamline tax administration. These efforts were parallel to work done by IDA, rather than joint activities. There is little evidence of internal cooperation, although IFC projects were reflected in the results framework and linked to objective 7 on investment climate. The CLR mentions that both IDA and IFC were involved in the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Environmental and Social Management Project (FY05-FY13), and that IFC technical assistance complemented the Financial Sector Development Plan Support Project (P121514) and Mining Community Development and Sustainable Livelihoods Project (P123572), but does not provide details, and IEG did not find evidence of cooperation on the latter two projects. IDA-IFC-MIGA did collaborate on the preparation of the energy project that was eventually cancelled. The guarantees provided by MIGA were a parallel effort to promote investments in Sierra Leone.

### Risk Identification and Mitigation

59. From the perspective of the Bank, the key areas to address in a setting of fragility and conflict, and therefore where the main risks lie, are: building state capacity, social inclusion, and growth and jobs.<sup>20</sup> In line with these priorities, the Sierra Leone CAS identified six risks: (i) weak governance and accountability structures; (ii) limited capacity to deliver services and manage public resources; (iii) youth employment and social instability; (iv) economic shocks, including reduced external support; (v) regional volatility, including international drug trafficking; and (vi) climate change and disaster risks. The Progress Report added the risk of a 'resource curse' as a result of the extractives boom.

60. The public health risk of a severe disease outbreak materialized immediately after the CAS period, changing the country's development trajectory and affecting the structure of the Bank assistance program. Although the risk of such a public health crisis was not mentioned in the CAS, it is fair to say that this was a difficult risk to identify. While the PLR correctly suggested an additional risk related to sustainable management of the country's resource wealth, the discussion of this risk was biased towards mitigating the impact of the extractives boom. The downside scenario of depressed mining prices, which materialized in 2014-15, was not considered.

61. With the exception of developing governance in the mining sector, the implementation of mitigating measures was inadequate. Weak implementation capacity, in particular, was an across-the-board risk to the Bank program. The country program intended to mitigate this risk by developing a professional civil service cadre, supporting the government's decentralization strategy, and mainstreaming capacity building. In practice, however, the implementation of the Public Sector Pay & Performance (FY12)—the key intervention to mitigate weak civil service capacity—was poor. According to the project ICRR, while there were new recruits in middle and senior levels of the civil service, there is no direct evidence regarding the qualification and quality of the recruits, and the project did not produce tangible enhancements in civil service performance and productivity. Moreover, while the capacity of local councils (LCs) improved under decentralization, such improvement fell significantly short of target.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> IEG, World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States—An Independent Evaluation, Washington, DC, January 2014.

<sup>21</sup> According to the ICRR of the Decentralized Service Delivery Program II (FY12) the LCs' aggregate Comprehensive Local Government Performance Assessment System (CLoGPAS) score increased from 42 percent in May 2012 to 60.2 percent by the end of 2017, not achieving the original target of 75 percent.

62. With domestic capacity remaining weak, the Bank (and other donors) kept its program going primarily through Project Implementation Units that were outside the normal civil service.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, the civil service constraints were addressed by relying on outside long-term advisers. While pragmatic, this short-term approach to weak capacity was unsustainable. In this environment, the Bank projects that were successful had proactive Bank supervision teams that reacted quickly to project slippages.

#### Overall Assessment

##### Design

63. The areas of engagement were appropriate for Sierra Leone's development needs. The strategy was in line with the Agenda for Change 2008-12 (PRSP-II), drawing on existing analytical work, and a number of technical assistance interventions intended to develop domestic capacity. While capacity was developed—for example for local councils to have integrated development plans and budgets—it still remains a significant constraint for program implementation. The results framework reflected reasonably well the links between the Agenda for Change 2008-12, the CAS outcomes and indicators, and the supporting World Bank Group interventions. However, the results framework was too complex, and the program was not selective considering the limited IDA envelope and the constraints on domestic absorptive and implementation capacity. In addition, the results framework was not extended beyond the CAS period, leaving the Bank engagement without targets for six years. The CAS overestimated the capacity of the country to deliver on public sector reforms, particularly in areas such as public finance management, which usually takes longer time and where the policy environment was not very supportive. The CAS identified risks correctly—with the exception of the downside risk of mining prices—but mitigating measures were inadequate. In particular, measures to mitigate the lack of domestic administrative capacity—such as developing a cadre of professional civil servants and strengthening local council capacity—were insufficient.

##### Implementation

64. The concept of a Joint CAS with AfDB was not implemented in practice. At the same time, the Bank managed to mobilize considerable trust-funding to complement its operations. Overall, the portfolio performed well. Analytical work supported the program, and technical assistance helped develop capacity in a number of areas. Generally, in those areas where performance was weak, such as public sector management or public sector pay and performance, project design was far too ambitious for a country emerging from a major conflict or the government was not fully committed to the project's goals. A significant lesson from projects that performed well such as the Programmatic Reform and Growth Grant series (three DPO operations) is that embedding policy reforms in the Government's reform agenda instills greater government ownership of the program and diminishes the risk of delays or shortcomings in achieving objectives. Moreover, the programmatic DPOs benefitted from substantial analytical work, with each successive operation incorporating lessons from the previous one.<sup>23</sup> IDA and IFC worked on improving the business environment (objective 7) through parallel engagements. The CLR does not elaborate on how the two institutions collaborated in the area of parallel engagements.

65. Project implementation suffered significant disruption during 2014-15 due to the Ebola crisis, and projects had to be restructured to change the end date or modify objectives, or both. The ICRRs of many of the projects that were active during this time rated them Satisfactory or Mostly Satisfactory, mainly due to simple design, capable PIUs, and good Bank supervision. Projects in areas with complex

<sup>22</sup> IEG, World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, An Independent Evaluation, Washington, DC, January 2014.

<sup>23</sup> For example, GRG-2 had nine prior actions, which taxed excessively the administrative and technical capacity of the government. GRG-3 reduced the number of prior actions from 9 to 5, by increasing their focus and selecting those that were truly critical.





design and/or weak government ownership, such as public sector management and energy and water, performed less well. Despite individual projects performing relatively well, many CAS objectives were not fully achieved through FY19.

## **7. Assessment of CLR**

66. The CLR presents an assessment of CPS design and World Bank Group implementation performance, but the evidence and analysis provided are uneven. There are several shortcomings. First, the CLR did not distinguish between the CAS and post-CAS periods, which makes difficult an assessment of progress made under the CAS itself. Second, the CLR did not assess the implications of a prolonged period without a CAS accountability framework, or how the Bank program adapted to the Ebola outbreak. Third, the CLR did not provide a sufficient discussion of how IFC, MIGA, and IDA cooperated in the areas where they had either parallel activities, such as in the business environment in the case of IDA and IFC, or joint activities in the energy sector. Fourth, the CLR had no discussion of compliance with safeguard issues, which were significant in the Bank' portfolio. Fifth, the lessons section was quite thin considering that the CLR covers 10 years of WBG operations. In particular, IEG would have expected solid lessons from WBG's attempt to have a joint CAS with the AfDB, which ended early, at the PLR stage (July 2012), and from the Bank's adaptability to the Ebola outbreak.

## **8. Findings and Lessons**

67. The lessons are not spelled out clearly in the CLR. Still, the CLR suggests that close collaboration with development partners, a sound understanding of the country's political economy, and a simplified project design are all important drivers of implementation success in a fragile institutional environment, such as in Sierra Leone. In addition, the CLR points to the importance of making proper adjustments to the CAS results framework at the PLR stage in order to maintain the usefulness of the results framework for evaluating progress under the program.

68. During FY10-FY19, the WBG supported Sierra Leone to implement interventions addressing the country's development goals. The FY10-FY13 program was not selective considering the limited IDA envelope and the constraints on local absorptive capacity, and CAS government ownership was uneven. Bank portfolio performance at exit was good, especially considering the disruption caused by the Ebola crisis on project implementation. Despite the lack of selectivity, the Sierra Leone experience suggests that the Bank can maintain a higher than average portfolio quality—most projects were rated MS or above—in a low capacity environment. Projects that did better had a simpler design and, especially, proactive supervision to bring projects back on track following slippages. The latter—exemplified for example by the Mineral Sector Technical Assistance project (FY10) and the Energy Access project (FY13)—was critical after the disruptions caused by the Ebola outbreak. The Bank helped the country respond to the Ebola crisis by supporting public health and mitigating the fiscal impact.

69. IEG has identified the following lessons:

70. The response to the Ebola outbreak suggests the need for a multipronged approach: (a) alleviate the scarcity of human resources in the public health system by hiring properly trained international medical workers; (b) ensure hazard pay to health workers for increased exposure risk; and (iii) support technically and financially budget operations to back the campaign to fight the Ebola epidemic, and ensure readiness and control of resources.

71. New modalities may be needed to maintain accountability during times of turmoil in low-income countries. The absence of a Bank framework for accountability during 2014-19 indicates a need in cases



such as Sierra Leone for having a lighter modality for bridging the gap to a new strategy when one expires in the midst of significant change that overwhelms domestic capacity.

72. The experience of individual projects in weak areas of the program such as public financial management indicate the importance of taking into account client incentives. Under the Public Sector Pay and Performance project (exited FY18) a new pay structure was held up for fiscal reasons. The elements of a performance management system were introduced but there is no evidence that they either contributed to better human resource management or improved civil service performance. Insufficient incentives played a role, as the client noted that achieving the disbursement linked indicators would not lead to a proportionate budget increase for the agencies that had to implement the respective reforms.

73. Developing appropriate policy environments is key for the success of investment projects. Under the Public Financial Management TAL (exited FY15) the objective of sustainably improving the credibility of fiscal and budget management was not achieved, and similarly there was no improvement in transparency of fiscal and budget management. The main lesson was that in the absence of a conducive PFM policy environment, it is difficult to achieve objectives through investment project financing alone.

74. In the same vein, a lesson from the Energy Access Project (FY13) is that reforming the energy sector may require changes in policies governing the sector in addition to infrastructure investments. Some of the policies that helped realize results were unbundling electricity production and distribution, tariff increases, and introducing a prepayment system in revenue collections.

75. The overriding consideration in countries such as Sierra Leone is to design projects with country constraints in mind. The Power and Water project (exited FY11) provided access to electricity, water, and solid waste collection. However, with exception of water sanitation, sustainability for the expanded service provision was not achieved. Project design of a multi-sector project was far too ambitious for a country emerging from a major conflict, and the government was not fully committed to the project's goals (as manifested by failure to provide any counterpart financing and the non-fulfillment of some legal and financial covenants).



**Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CPS Objectives – Sierra Leone**

**Annex Table 2: Sierra Leone Planned and Actual Lending, FY10-FY20 (US\$, millions)**

**Annex Table 3: Advisory Services & Analytics for Sierra Leone, FY10-20**

**Annex Table 4: Sierra Leone Active Trust Funds in FY10-19 (US\$, millions)**

**Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Sierra Leone, FY10-19 (US\$, millions)**

**Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Sierra Leone and Comparators, FY10-19**

**Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Sierra Leone and Comparators, FY10-19**

**Annex Table 8: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Sierra Leone (US\$, millions)**

**Annex Table 9: Economic and Social Indicators for Sierra Leone, FY10-18**

**Annex Table 10: List of IFC Investments in Sierra Leone (US\$, millions)**

**Annex Table 11: List of IFC Advisory Services in Sierra Leone (US\$, millions)**

**Annex Table 12: List of MIGA Projects Active in Sierra Leone, FY10-20 (US\$, millions)**

**Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CPS Objectives – Sierra Leone**

	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area I: Human Development	Actual Results	IEG Comments
<u>Major Outcome Measures</u>	<b>1. CPS Objective: Improved capacity to effectively and efficiently deliver education</b>		
	<b>Indicator 1:</b> Primary Completion Rate from 67% in 2010/2011 to 70%	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The CLR reports that the completion rate was 70% by 2013. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P115782 reports that the completion rate was 76% in 2011. The <a href="#">WDI</a> reports that the completion rate fell to 63% in 2013.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The CLR reports that the completion rate decreased to 58.3% in 2015 due to Ebola virus outbreak. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The <a href="#">WDI</a> reports that the primary completion rate was 59.8% in 2015 and improved to 81.8% in 2018.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Sierra Leone EFA FTI Program (P115782, FY09) and the following ASAs: Higher and Tertiary Education Sector Policy Note (P128677, FY13), Education Country Status Report (with UNICEF and Pole de Dakar) (FY14), Education Sector Plan (2018-2020), A Study on the Completion and Transition from the Primary to the JSS Secondary School Level in Sierra Leone (WB commissioned study, 2013), SABER Country Report on Early Childhood Development (2013), SABER Country Report on Teachers (2013), SABER Country Report on Engaging the Private Sector in Education (2014), Updating the education sector Capacity Development Strategy for the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, Sierra Leone (2014).</p>
	<b>Indicator 2:</b> Enrollment for girls at JSS increased from 40.9% in 2008 to 43.9% in 2013. (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The CLR reports that girl's enrollment at Junior Secondary Schools (JSS) was 48.2% by 2013. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P115782 reports that the percentage of girls enrolled in junior secondary schools was 45% in 2011.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The CLR reports enrollment of girls at JSS improved to 57% in 2017. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The <a href="#">WDI</a> reports that the enrollment of females in secondary schools (gross) was 41.1% in 2017.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Sierra Leone EFA FTI Program (P115782, FY09)</p>
<b>2. CPS Objective: Improved access to basic health services</b>			
	<b>Indicator 1:</b> Children receiving Penta-3 vaccination before 12	<u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u>	The objective was supported by the Reproductive and Child



	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area I: Human Development	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	months of age increased from 54.8 % in 2008 to 85% in 2013. (WB)	<p>The December 2013 <a href="#">ISR: S</a> of P110535 reports that 100% of children received Penta-3 before 12 months of age as of July 2013.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u>            The December 2014 <a href="#">ISR: MS</a> of P110535 reports that the percentage fell to 92% as of March 2014. The <a href="#">ICR: MS</a> of P110535 reports that this indicator was dropped in March 2015.</p> <p>The April 2019 <a href="#">ISR: MS</a> of P153064 reports that 55% of children under 23 months received all the recommended vaccines (including Penta-3) as of June 2018.</p>	Health Project - Phase 2 (P110535, FY11) and its additional financing (P132753, FY14), Health Service Delivery & System Support Project (P153064, FY16) and the following ASAs: Public Expenditure Review (P102464, FY11) and Constraints to Service Delivery (P133319, FY15).
	<b>Indicator 2:</b> Children under 5 who slept the previous night under an insecticide treated net increased from 26% in 2008 to 80% by 2013. (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u>            The December 2013 <a href="#">ISR: S</a> of P110535 reports that 45% of children under-five sleeping under an ITN the previous night as of July 2013.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u>            The <a href="#">IEG ICRR: MS</a> of P110535 reports that 65% of children under-five sleeping under an ITN the previous night as of 2015.</p>	The objective was supported by the Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2 (P110535, FY11) and its additional financing (P132753, FY14)
	<b>Indicator 3:</b> Deliveries conducted in health facility increased from 42% in 2008 to 70% in 2013. (AfDB/WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u>            The December 2013 <a href="#">ISR: S</a> of P110535 reports that 65% of births were delivered in a health facility as of July 2013.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u>            The <a href="#">IEG ICRR: MS</a> of P110535 reports that 74.8% of births were delivered in a health facility as of 2017.</p>	The objective was supported by the Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2 (P110535, FY11) and its additional financing (P132753, FY14),
	<b>Indicator 4:</b> Framework for community-based accountability committees for each public health clinic established (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u>            The CLR reports that the framework for community-based accountability committees was established but this could not be verified.</p> <p>The supporting project (P110535) did not monitor this indicator.</p>	The objective was supported by the Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2 (P110535, FY11) and its additional financing (P132753, FY14)
<b>3. CPS Objective: Increased household access to safe drinking water and sanitation</b>			
	<b>Indicator 1:</b> People with access to water increased from 64,000 in 2009 to 115,000 in 2013 in targeted areas. (AfDB/WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u>            The CLR reports that number of people with access to safe water was</p>	The objective was supported by the Decentralized Service Delivery Program (DSDP) II and II AF (P119355, FY12);

	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area I: Human Development	Actual Results	IEG Comments
		<p>increased to 115,000 by 2013. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>P119355 did not monitor explicitly the number of beneficiaries from expanded access to water in the ISRs.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: MS</a> of P119355 reports that 183,844 people benefitted from the improved water sources as of 2017.</p>	<p>P156548, FY16; P162615, FY17) and the following ASAs: Public Expenditure Review WSS in CAR, Congo, DRC, Sierra Leone and Togo (P117017, FY12), and Public Expenditure Review (P102464, FY11).</p> <p>The <a href="#">Sierra Leone Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2017</a> report that 67.8% of surveyed households used improved sources of drinking water.</p>
	<p><b>Indicator 2:</b> People with access to improved sanitation increased from 25,000 in 2009 to 35,000 by 2013. (AfDB/WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The CLR reports that the number of people with access to improved sanitation was increased to 35,000 by 2013. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>P119355 did not monitor explicitly the number of beneficiaries from improved sanitation in the ISRs.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: MS</a> of P119355 reports that 368,351 people benefitted from the improved health and sanitation services as of 2017.</p> <p>The April 2019 <a href="#">ISR: MS</a> of P153064 reports that 40.7% of inspected households have improved sanitation facilities as of December 2018.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Decentralized Service Delivery Program (DSDP) II and II AF (P119355, FY12; P156548, FY16; P162615, FY17), Health Service Delivery &amp; System Support Project (P153064, FY16)</p> <p>The <a href="#">Sierra Leone Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2017</a> report that 48.2% of surveyed households used improved sanitation.</p>
	<p><b>Indicator 3:</b> Commercial and technical losses reduced from 60% in 2007 to 38% in 2013 (Freetown). (WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013</u> The supporting project, DSDP, did not monitor this indicator.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The June 2019 <a href="#">ISR: MS</a> of P120304 reports that aggregate technical, commercial and collection (ATC&amp;C) losses were 46% as of December 2018.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Decentralized Service Delivery Program (DSDP) II and II AF (P119355, FY12; P156548, FY16; P162615, FY17) and the Energy Sector Utility Reform Project (P120304, FY14)</p>
<p><b>4. CPS Objective: Improved capacity to manage social risks</b></p>			
	<p><b>Indicator 1:</b> Cash for work programs create 4 million person days of employment in target areas by 2013 with increased</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The June 2015 <a href="#">ISR: S</a> of P121052 reports that there were 645,893 person days provided in labor-intensive public</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Youth Employment Support (P121052, FY10) and the following ASAs: Social Safety</p>

	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area I: Human Development	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	sustainability (of which 1 million women) from 0 in 2008 (AfDB/WB)	works (cash for work) as of May 2013. The ISR did not monitor the gender breakdown.  <u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P121052 reports that there were 1,762,369 person-days provided in labor-intensive public works as of June 2015. The gender breakdown was not monitored.	Net Support (RSR) (P126843, FY13) and Public Expenditure Review (P102464, FY11)  At the PLR stage, the indicator target was modified from the original: 2.5 million
	<b>Indicator 2:</b> Number of women days employment created through cash for work program increased from 0 in 2008 to 1.2 million in target areas. (WB)	<u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The CLR reports that women employment created through cash for work program reached 0.793 million days. IEG could not verify this information.  The supporting project did not monitor women employment.	The objective was supported by the Youth Employment Support (P121052, FY10)  At the PLR stage, the indicator target was modified from the original: 250,000
<b>5. CPS Objective: Improve predictability, expenditure control and transparency in decentralization and public resource management</b>			
	<b>Indicator 1:</b> Number of councils with integrated development plans and budgets increased from 0 in 2009 to 19 by 2013. (WB)	<u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P113757 reports that 19 local councils had integrated development plans and budgets as of 2012.  <u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P119355 reports that all 19 local councils had integrated development plans, budgets (finalized in accordance with sector plans), and procurement plans (which included LC transfers and project funds) as of June 2018.	The objective was supported by the Decentralized Service Delivery Program (DSDP) (P113757, FY10), DSDP II and II AF (P119355, FY12; P156548, FY16; P162615, FY17) and the following ASAs: Strengthening Internal Audit at the Bank of SL (P125908, FY14), and Public Expenditure Review (P102464, FY11)
	<b>Indicator 2:</b> Number of councils receiving timely transfers from crisis response facility increased from 0 in 2009 to 19 by 2013.	<u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: MS</a> of P113757 reports that 19 local councils received timely transfers from the crisis response facility as of 2012.	The objective was supported by the Decentralized Service Delivery Program (DSDP) (P113757, FY10), DSDP II and II AF (P119355, FY12; P156548, FY16; P162615, FY17)
	<b>Indicator 3:</b> Variance in expenditure for the 20 largest budget heads declines from 13.5% in 2008 to <7% in 2013. (WB)	<u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P108069 reports that the indicator was revised. The <a href="#">ICR: MS</a> of P108069 report that the indicator was revised during the mid-term review in June 2012 to only include primary	The objective was supported by the Integrated Public Financial Management Reform (P108069, FY09) and the Fifth Governance Reform and Growth Credit (P126355, FY12)

	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area I: Human Development	Actual Results	IEG Comments
		<p>expenditure. The last reported figure was in the March 2012 <a href="#">ISR:S</a> of P108069 : 10.9% variance as of December 2011.</p> <p>Progress during FY14-19: The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P108069 reports that the variance between actual primary expenditures and budgeted expenditures was 7.9% as of March 2014.</p> <p>The <a href="#">ICR:MS</a> of P126355 reports that the variance in expenditure composition between actual and originally budgeted primary expenditure was 13.6% in 2014. However, this figure is for primary expenditure only and not total expenditure as per the indicator.</p>	
	<b>Indicator 4:</b> Number of councils meeting at least 75% of the service output targets specified in local council policy MOUs by 2013 (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P113757 reports that 11 out of 19 local councils met at least 75% of the service output targets as of 2012.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Decentralized Service Delivery Program (DSDP) (P113757, FY10).</p> <p>The indicator has no target.</p>
	<b>Indicator 5:</b> Process for the public oversight of PFM to be in place by 2013. (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The CLR reports that due to the delay in the implementation of P133424, the process for the public oversight was not realized.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Public Financial Management Improvement and Consolidation Project (P133424, FY14).</p> <p>Indicator not well defined.</p>
	<b>Indicator 6:</b> Ward Committees holding public meetings and reporting to Local Councils as part of annual development planning and execution cycle increases to 80%	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: MS</a> of P113757 reports that 79% of Ward Committees held public meetings and reporting to local councils as part of annual development planning and execution cycle as of 2012.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Decentralized Service Delivery Program (DSDP) (P113757, FY10).</p>
	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area II: Promoting Inclusive Growth	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<b>6. CPS Objective: Improved efficiency and transparency of agriculture and fisheries</b>		
<b>Major Outcome Measure</b> 5	<b>Indicator 1:</b> 50% of target beneficiaries for selected value chains (list) increase production by 20% (AfDB/WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: MS</a> of P096105 reports that 17,491 beneficiaries achieved a 20 percent increase in production as of 2011. With a target beneficiary of</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Rural and Private Sector Development Project (P096105, FY07) and its additional financing (P125256, FY11), and the ASA</p>

	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area II: Promoting Inclusive Growth	Actual Results	IEG Comments
		<p>300,000 before the AF, this implies a 5.8% share.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: MS</a> of P096105 reports that 56,000 beneficiaries increased production by 20% compared to the target of 50,000 (112%) as of November 2015.</p>	<p>Agricultural Sector Review (P146159, FY16)</p>
	<p><b>Indicator 2:</b> FBOs registered with the Ministry of Agriculture established in all districts by 2013. (WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The supporting project did not monitor if all the districts had registered FBOs.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Rural and Private Sector Development Project (P096105, FY07) and its additional financing (P125256, FY11)</p>
	<p><b>Indicator 3:</b> Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFS) legally established for coastal fisheries increased from none in 2008 to 4 by 2013. (WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The July 2014 <a href="#">ISR: MS</a> of P106063 reports that there were no TURFs established, only that 4 marine protected areas have been established as of December 2013.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P106063 reports that there were 0 TURFS established as of 2016.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (P106063, FY10)</p>
	<p><b>Indicator 4:</b> Meet EU phyto-sanitary standard for fish exports by 2013 (AfDB/WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The July 2014 <a href="#">ISR: MS</a> of P106063 reports that a competent sanitary authority is in place but has not been accredited by the European Union as of December 2012.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P106063 reports that no competent sanitary authority has been accredited for certification of exports to the European Union as of 2016.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (P106063, FY10)</p>
	<p><b>Indicator 5:</b> Fishing vessels observed committing a serious infraction reduced from 88% in 2009 to 66% by 2013. (WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The July 2014 <a href="#">ISR: MS</a> of P106063 reports that 49.25% of fishing vessels committed serious infraction as of December 2013. However, this figure is the average for four countries (Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone).</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (P106063, FY10)</p>

	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area II: Promoting Inclusive Growth	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p><b>Indicator 6:</b> Public disclosure of all fishing licenses and revenues by Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (WB)</p>	<p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: MS</a> of P106063 reports that this indicator was unavailable for Sierra Leone after 2013.</p> <p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> THE CLR reports that license list were released from 2011 and publication on the website was regular starting in 2013. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>P106063 did not monitor this indicator.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> Information on fishing vessel licenses (2015-2019) and Ministry revenues (2016 &amp; 2018) can be accessed through the Ministry's website (<a href="https://www.mfmr.gov.sl/publications/">https://www.mfmr.gov.sl/publications/</a>).</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (P106063, FY10)</p> <p>The indicator does not have a target date.</p>
<b>7. CPS Objective: Improved investment climate</b>			
	<p><b>Indicator 1:</b> Reduction in time taken to register a business from 26 days in 2007 to 10 days by 2013 (IFC/WB).</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The Doing Business 2014 <a href="#">report</a> shows that it takes 12 days to start a business in 2013.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The Doing Business 2020 <a href="#">report</a> shows that it takes 5 days to start a business in 2019.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the ASA Sierra Leone Investment Climate (P161810, FY17).</p>
	<p><b>Indicator 2:</b> Reduction in time of export transactions from 31 days in 2007 to 22 days by 2013.</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The Doing Business 2014 <a href="#">report</a> shows that the time to export was 25 days in 2013.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> It should be noted that the current methodology of the DB reports starting with the 2016 report may not be compatible with the methodology used for estimating the original baseline and target.</p> <p>The Doing Business 2016 <a href="#">report</a> shows that documentary compliance for exports takes 134 hours and border compliance takes 55 hours in 2015. The total time to export is 189 hours or 7.8 days.</p> <p>The Doing Business 2020 <a href="#">report</a> shows that documentary compliance for exports takes 72 hours and border</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the ASA Sierra Leone Investment Climate (P161810, FY17).</p>



CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area II: Promoting Inclusive Growth	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>compliance takes 55 hours in 2019. The total time to export is 127 hours or 5.3 days.</p>	
<p><b>Indicator 3:</b> Number of bank accounts increased to 300,000 in 2013 from 160,000 in 2005 (WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The CLR reports that the number of bank accounts increased to 300,000. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The WB WDI reports that 15.4% of the population ages 15+ had an account at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider as of 2011. With a population of 3.7 million (ages 15+), this translates to more than 574,000 people with accounts.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The WB WDI reports that 15.6% of the population ages 15+ had an account at a financial institution or with a mobile-money-service provider as of 2014 or 632,000 people. By 2018, the number of people with accounts increased to 19.85% or 870,000.</p>	<p>IEG could not confirm which projects supported this indicator.</p>
<p><b>Indicator 4:</b> Volume and market penetration of leasing equipment financed increased from US\$6.8 million in 2009 to US\$35 million in 2013 (IFC).</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> IEG could not validate the achievement of this indicator.</p>	<p>IEG could not confirm which projects supported this indicator</p>
<p><b>Indicator 5:</b> Achieve EITI validation standards by 2013. (AfDB/WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: S</a> of P099357 reports that Sierra Leone achieved EITI compliance status only in 2014.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The latest EITI validation of Sierra Leone was in <a href="#">2018</a>.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Mineral Sector Technical Assistance (P099357, FY10) and its additional financing (P124633, FY11) and the ASA</p>
<p><b>Indicator 6:</b> AML/CFT regime strengthened by amendment of AML law and establishment of FIU at BSL by 2013. (WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: MU</a> of P121514 reports that an financial intelligence unit was established with oversight on AML/CFT issues including enforcement powers as of 2012 (<a href="#">Bank of Sierra Leone</a>).</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism act was amended in 2019 (<a href="#">Bank of Sierra Leone</a>).</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Financial Sector Development Plan Support Project (P121514, FY11)</p>
<p><b>8. CPS Objective: Improved access to sustainable electricity infrastructure services</b></p>		

CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area II: Promoting Inclusive Growth	Actual Results	IEG Comments
<p><b>Indicator 1:</b> Households in Freetown with access to electricity increased from 20,000 in 2009 to 40,000 by 2013. (AfDB/WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The September 2013 <a href="#">ISR: S</a> of P126180 reports that the project was not yet effective at the end of the CAS Period.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: MS</a> of P126180 reports that 120,000 households were connected as of July 2017.</p> <p>The June 2019 <a href="#">ISR:MS</a> of P120304 reports that 286,000 people were provided with new or improved electricity service as of April 2019.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Energy Access Project (P126180, FY13), and the Energy Sector Utility Reform Project (P120304, FY14)</p>
<p><b>Indicator 2:</b> Average collection rates increased from 76% to 80% (WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The September 2013 <a href="#">ISR: S</a> of P126180 reports that the project was not yet effective at the end of the CAS Period.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P126180 reports that the collection rate of the Electricity Distribution and Supply Authority (EDSA) increased from 76% (2009) at the baseline to 86% as of July 2017.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Energy Access Project (P126180, FY13)</p> <p>Indicator has no target date.</p>
<p><b>Indicator 3:</b> Regulatory framework for independent power production established by 2013</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The <a href="#">National Electricity Act</a> was approved by parliament in 2011. The Act provides a framework for launching and operating independent power producers.</p>	<p>IEG could not confirm which projects supported this indicator</p>
<p><b>9. CPS Objective: Maintain and extend key transport infrastructure</b></p>		
<p><b>Indicator 1:</b> 1,400km of feeder roads rehabilitated by 2013 (AfDB/WB)</p>	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The CLR reports that 1,400 km of feeder roads were rehabilitated. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P078389 reports that 270 km of feeder/rural roads were rehabilitated as of September 2013.</p> <p>The November 2013 <a href="#">ISR: S</a> of P096105 reports that 421 km of feeder roads were rehabilitated as of October 2012.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P096105 reports that 971 kms of feeder roads were rehabilitated as of November 2015.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Infrastructure Development Project (Transport) (P078389, FY06) and its additional financing (P110968, FY08), the Rural and Private Sector Development Project (P096105, FY07) and its additional financing (P125256, FY11), Smallholder Commercialization and Agribusiness Development Project (P153437, FY16), Matotoka-Sefadu Road Rehabilitation Project (AfDB, FY12), Lungi-Port Loko Road</p>

	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area II: Promoting Inclusive Growth	Actual Results	IEG Comments
		The June 2019 <a href="#">ISR: S</a> of P153437 reports that 166.5 km of feeder roads were rehabilitated and maintained as of May 2019.	Upgrading Project (AfDB, FY09) and the following ASAs: Transport Sector Strategy - Pro Growth Pro Poor Transport Sector Review (P130377, FY12), Airport PSP Options Study (P112977, FY10), Governance and Political Economy Constraints in Emerging Postconflict Sierra Leone: A Multilevel Analysis (2011), Problem-Driven Political Economy Analysis (Chapter 7, 2014),
	<b>Indicator 3:</b> Port container handling performance is improved from 8 TEUs/hr in 2007 to 12 TEUs/hr by 2013. (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The CLR reports that port container handling in 2013 was 12 TEUs per hour. IEG could not verify this information.</p> <p>The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P078389 reports port container handling capacity increased to 238 TEUs per day or 9.91 TEUs per hr as of September 2013.</p>	The objective was supported by the Infrastructure Development Project (Transport) (P078389, FY06) and its additional financing (P110968, FY08)
	<b>Indicator 4:</b> Lungi Airport to remain as international airport according to ICAO safety regulations (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P078389 reports that Lungi international airport was certified by ICAO in 2011.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> Sierra Leone continues to be a member state of <a href="#">ICAO</a>.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Infrastructure Development Project (Transport) (P078389, FY06) and its additional financing (P110968, FY08)</p> <p>Indicator has no target date.</p>
	<b>Indicator 5:</b> Independent road fund established by 2013. (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The IEG <a href="#">ICRR: MS</a> of P078389 reports that the Road Maintenance Fund with an autonomous board was established on April 2011.</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The Road Maintenance Fund remains operational.</p>	The objective was supported by the Infrastructure Development Project (Transport) (P078389, FY06) and its additional financing (P110968, FY08)
	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area III: Extractive Boom	Actual Results	IEG Comments
<b>Major Outcome Measures</b>	<b>10. CPS Objective: not available</b>		
	<b>Indicator 1:</b> Key regulations related to mining submitted to Cabinet after	<u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u>	The objective was supported by the Mineral Sector Technical

	CPS FY10-FY19: Focus Area III: Extractive Boom	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	extensive consultations: E&S regulations, Precious Minerals Trading Act, Resettlement Regulations, Health and Safety Regulations (WB)	<p>The <a href="#">ICR: S</a> of P099357 reports that new regulations related to mining were submitted to Cabinet after extensive consultations. <a href="#">E&amp;S regulations</a>, <a href="#">Precious Minerals Trading</a>, <a href="#">Resettlement Regulations</a>, <a href="#">Health and Safety Regulations</a> were adopted by the Ministry of Mines and Mineral (now <a href="#">National Minerals Agency</a>) resources as of October 2012. The CLR also reports that the petroleum and gas laws (<a href="#">2011</a>, <a href="#">2014a</a>, <a href="#">2014b</a>) and the Extractive Industries Revenue Act (<a href="#">2018</a>).</p> <p><u>Progress during FY14-19:</u> The April 2019 <a href="#">ISR: S</a> of P160719 reports that 10% of the Policy Actions Matrix of the Minerals Policy has been implemented as of April 2019.</p>	<p>Assistance (P099357, FY10) and its additional financing (P124633, FY11), Extractive Industries Technical Assistance Project Phase 2 (P160719, FY18), and the following ASAs: TA for Diagnostic and Policy Notes (P123194, FY14) and Public Expenditure Review (P102464, FY11)</p> <p>The indicator has no target date.</p>
	<b>Indicator 2:</b> Establishment of National Minerals Agency (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The <a href="#">IEG: MS</a> of P099357 reports that National Minerals Agency Act was approved by Parliament in 2012 and became operational in 2013.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Mineral Sector Technical Assistance (P099357, FY10) and its additional financing (P124633, FY11)</p> <p>The indicator has no target date.</p>
	<b>Indicator 3:</b> Prioritized vacancies for critical staffing requirements identified within the Ministry of Mines and Minerals Resources (MMR) completed and job descriptions and recruitment plans approved by HRMO/PSC and recruitment underway (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> The <a href="#">ICR: S</a> of P099357 reports that the human resource policy was implemented only in 2014.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Mineral Sector Technical Assistance (P099357, FY10) and its additional financing (P124633, FY11)</p> <p>The indicator has no target date.</p>
	<b>Indicator 4:</b> DFGG Strategy for Sierra Leone completed, with priority social accountability instruments and approaches laid out (WB)	<p><u>Status as of December 31, 2013:</u> IEG could not verify the completion of the DFGG strategy.</p>	<p>The objective was supported by the Good Governance Initiative (P124776, FY13)</p> <p>The indicator has no target date.</p>



**Annex Table 2: Sierra Leone Planned and Actual Lending, FY10-FY20 (US\$, millions)**

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Proposed Amount	Approved IDA Amount
<b>Project Planned Under CAS/PLR FY10-13</b>					<b>CAS</b>	<b>CASPR</b>	
P107335**	SL-GRG 3 DPL	2010	2010	2011	10		10
P113757	SL-Decentr. Serv. Del. Program (FY10)	2010	2010	2012	20		20
P099357**	SL-Mineral Sector Technical Assistance	2010	2010	2017	4		4
P121514	Financial Sector Support TA Project	2010	2011	2018	2		4
P121052	SL-Youth Employment Support (FY10)	2010	2010	2015	20		20
P121056	SL:GRGC-3 Suppl.Credit (Crisis Window)	2010	2010	2010	5		7
P117822**	SL-GRGG 4 BUDGET SUPPORT (DPL)	2011	2011	2012	7		10
DROPPED	Infrastructure I (energy/transport)	2011			15		
P126355**	SL-DPL 5 - Budget Support	2012	2012	2013	7		24
P119355	SL:Decentralized Service Delivery Prog 2	2012	2012	2018	13		26
P128208	SL-Public Sector Pay & Performance(FY12)	2012	2012	2018		17	17
P133107**	SL-GRGC-6 Gov Reform & Growth Grant FY13	2013	2014	2015	7		25
DROPPED	Infrastructure II (TBD)	2013			15		
	SL - Energy Access Project	2013				25	
<b>Regional</b>							
DROPPED	Regional Mining Sector TA Initiative (incl. EITI++)	2012			2		
P129565^	Regional Agriculture	2012	2012	2019	4		
<b>Total Planned</b>					<b>135</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>167</b>
<b>Additional Projects during the CAS Period</b>			<b>Approval FY</b>	<b>Closing FY</b>	<b>Proposed Amount</b>	<b>Proposed Amount</b>	<b>Approved IDA Amount</b>
P124633	SL Extractive Industries TA (EITAP)		2011	2017			4
P125256	SL:Rural & Private Sector Devt. Add Fin.		2011	2016			20
P113266	Regional WAPP APL4 (Phase 1) CSLG		2012	2021			60
<b>Total Additional Projects</b>							<b>84</b>
<b>Projects Approved before the CAS period and on-going during the CAS period</b>			<b>Approval FY</b>	<b>Closing FY</b>			<b>Approved IDA Amount</b>
P108069	SL-Public Financial Management TAL (FY09)		2009	2015			4
P110968	SL IDP Transport Additional Financing		2008	2014			11





P103740	SL-Hlth Sect Rec & Dev -Add Fin (FY07)		2007	2010			8
P096105	SL-Rural Dev & Priv Sec Dev SIL		2007	2016			30
P078389	SL-IDP Transp (FY06)		2006	2014			44
P086801	SL-Bumbuna Env. and Social SIL (FY05)		2005	2013			13
P087203	SL-Power & Water SIL (FY05)		2005	2011			35
<b>Total</b>							<b>145</b>
Projects Approved during the period FY14-19 (after the CAS period)		Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Proposed Amount	Approved IDA Amount
P133424	PFM Improvement and Consolidation		2014	2021			12
P143588	SL Safety Nets Project		2014	2023			7
P120304	SL-Energy Sector Utility Reform		2014	2023			40
P132753	SL-Repr & Child Hlth2, 2nd Add Fin (FY14)		2014	2015			13
P146726	SL-Emergency Econ and Fiscal Support Op		2015	2016			30
P153437	SL-Agribusines Development Support Proj		2016	2022			40
P153064	SL-Health Service Delivery & System Supp		2016	2021			10
P157333	SL-Supplemental Financing for EEFS Op		2016	2016			30
P154454	Social Safety Nets Additional Financing		2016				10
P162667	PFMICP-Additional Financing		2017				10
P156651	Productivity and Transparency Support Cr		2017	2019			30
P163161	Sierra Leone REDiSL AF		2017				10
P160719	EITAP2		2018	2023			20
P166075	Freetown Emergency Recovery Project		2018	2021			10
P165639	SL Supplemental Financing for PTSC-I		2018	2018			10
P166390	Energy Sector Utility Reform Project A		2019				50
P166601	Financial Inclusion		2019	2025			12
P164353	IRUMP		2019	2024			50
P168259	SL Second Productivity and Transparency		2019	2020			40
P160295	SL-Agro-Processing Competitiveness Proj		2019	2024			10
P163723	Sierra Leone Skills Development Project		2019	2024			20
P167757	Sierra Leone SSN Second AF		2020				30
<b>TOTAL FY14-20</b>							<b>494</b>
<b>Regional</b>							
P152359	Ebola Emergency Response Project		2015	2021			28



P154807	Disease Surveillance & Response in WA	2016	2024			30
<b>Total Regional</b>						<b>58</b>

Source: Sierra Leone CAS and CASPR, WB Business Intelligence Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 3/6/2020

\*LIR: Latest internal rating. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory.

^ No commitment allocated for Sierra Leone

\*\* Rating from Parent Project

# Not Rated

**Annex Table 3: Advisory Services & Analytics for Sierra Leone, FY10-20**

Proj ID	ASA	Fiscal year	Practice	Product Line	RAS
P162720	Sierra Leone Economic Diversification Study	2020	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	AA	N
P166699	Strengthening SP Disaster Responsiveness and Integration	2020	Social Protection & Jobs	AA	N
P167093	Unlock the Potential for Grid Connected Solar PV through Private Sector in Sierra Leone	2020	Energy & Extractives	AA	N
P133644	Supporting Community-based Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR ) in Sierra Leone	2019	Urban, Resilience and Land	AA	N
P156341	Jobs and Youth Transitions in Post-Ebola Sierra Leone	2019	Social Protection & Jobs	AA	N
P160852	Strengthening Operational and Institutional Elements of the Social Protection System	2019	Social Protection & Jobs	AA	N
P168220	Sierra Leone Economic Update	2019	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	AA	N
P169285	Sierra Leone Business Environment	2019	Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation	AA	N
P169468	Teacher Quality and Management Study	2019	Education	AA	N
P169681	Support to the Sierra Leone Land Agenda	2019	Urban, Resilience and Land	AA	N
P171178	TA for Sierra Leone Local Service Delivery & Decentralization Support	2019	Governance	AA	N
P150141	Local Development Partnership for Mining	2018	Governance	AA	N
P150566	SL Road Asset Management Strategy	2018	Transport	AA	N
P156659	Technical Assistance and Capacity Building for the Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey	2018	Poverty and Equity	AA	N
P162534	Technical Assistance in the Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene Sectors for the Republic of Sierra Leone (P162534).	2018	Water	AA	N
P164667	Freetown: Urban Sector Review	2018	Urban, Resilience and Land	AA	N
P144542	SL-YESP Skills Devt Impact Evaluation	2017	Social Protection & Jobs	IE	N
P148833	Developing Sierra Leone's Social Protection System through Common Targeting Mechanisms	2017	Social Protection & Jobs	TA	N
P149562	Sierra Leone AML/Anti-Corruption	2017	Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation	TA	N
P149646	Sierra Leone NRA	2017	Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation	TA	N
P157700	Ebola Tourism Recovery	2017	Other	TA	N



Proj ID	ASA	Fiscal year	Practice	Product Line	RAS
P161810	Sierra Leone Investment Climate	2017	Other	AA	N
P163071	Sierra Leone Justice Services for the Poor Preparation Seed Fund	2017	Governance	AA	N
P146159	Sierra Leone Agricultural Sector Review	2016	Agriculture and Food	TA	N
P152227	Sierra Leone Cross-Border Trade and Inclusive Growth Study	2016	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	EW	N
P131677	KTF-ICT for Improving Basic Service	FY15	Transport	TA	N
P132874	Sierra Leone Growth Pole Diagnostic	FY15	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	EW	N
P133316	SL - Poverty Assessment (FY13)	FY15	Poverty and Equity	EW	N
P133319	SL-Constraints to Service Delivery	FY15	Governance	EW	N
P144860	PPP Process, Pipeline, and Cap. building	FY15	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	TA	N
P151624	Technical Assistance for Data Collection	FY15	Poverty and Equity	TA	N
P123194	SL-Policy Note	FY14	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	EW	N
P125908	Sierra Leone #10067 Streng Int. Audit	FY14	Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation	TA	N
P145733	Sierra Leone Education Sector Plan	FY14	Education	TA	N
P146725	Sierra Leone Public Inv Management	FY14	Governance	TA	N
P124776	SL-Good Governance Initiative (FY13)	FY13	Governance	TA	N
P126843	SL-Social Safety Net Support (RSR)	FY13	Social Protection & Jobs	EW	N
P128677	SL-Higher and Tertiary Education (FY12)	FY13	Education	EW	N
P130722	SL-DTIS Update	FY13	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	EW	N
P143854	SL-Policy & Diagnostic Notes	FY13	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	EW	N
P144565	Sierra Leone - MTDS training	FY13	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	EW	N
P103211	SL-CPAR (FY09-FY10)	FY11	Governance	EW	N
P121945	Sierra Leone Reform Plan	FY11	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	TA	N
P122586	SL: PEFA (National & Sub-National)	FY11	Governance	EW	N
P102464	SL-PUBLIC EXPENDITURE REVIEW	FY10	Governance	EW	N
P117515	DeMPA Assessment - Sierra Leone	FY10	Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment	EW	N
P118954	Sierra Leone AML/CFT TA	FY10	Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation	TA	N

Source: WB BI Reporting as of 2/27/2020 and ASA Standard Report Monitoring as of 2/25/2020

Note: In addition to the ASA listed here, the country team produced some additional stand-alone reports that are cited in Annex 1.



**Annex Table 4: Sierra Leone Active Trust Funds in FY10-19 (US\$, millions)**

Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount
<b>Trust Fund Approved after the CAS Period FY10-13</b>					
P162166	Monitoring Post Ebola Recovery Funds: A Focus on Service Delivery	TF A8495	2019	2022	0.7
P161814	Sierra Leone Audit Service Capacity Building Support Project	TF A3851	2017	2019	0.3
P157778	Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey	TF A2240	2016	2019	1.4
P156759	West Africa Region Fisheries Program AF Guinea, Sierra Leone & Liberia	TF A3533	2017	2021	4.0
P155339	Strengthening Community Mobilization and Local Council Service Delivery in the Post-Ebola Context	TF A4737	2017	2021	2.8
P154904	Labor-intensive Public Works to Mitigate Ebola Impacts	TF A1023	2016	2017	3.0
P153437	Smallholder Commercialization and Agribusiness Development Project	TF A7690	2018	2019	1.8
P153064	Health Service Delivery & System Support Project	TF A2598	2016	2019	5.5
P146726	Sierra Leone - Emergency Economic and Fiscal Support Operation	TF 15359	2014	2016	0.1
P143588	Sierra Leone Safety Nets Project	TF A0806	2016	2019	4.3
P133424	Public Financial Management Improvement and Consolidation Project	TF 17201	2015	2018	4.6
P133070	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF A2012	2016	2018	1.0
	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF 17720	2015	2017	2.5
	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF 16568	2015	2018	17.9
P132753	Sierra Leone - Reproductive and Child Health II Project - Second Additional Financing	TF 15055	2014	2015	0.9
P130302	SL-Strengthening National M&E	TF 14717	2014	2017	0.5
<b>Trust Fund Approved and Active during the CAS Period FY10-13</b>					
P128653	Sierra Leone Infrastructure Development Fund	TF 10710	2012	2015	0.8
P128030	Strengthening of Accounting Profession in Sierra-Leone	TF 12571	2013	2016	0.5
P126185	Sierra Leone Technical Advisory Facility	TF 99537	2011	2014	0.8
P126180	Sierra Leone Energy Access Project - Sierra Leone Infrastructure Development Fund	TF 13246	2013	2018	16.0
P124242	West Africa Regional Fisheries Program APL A1 - Additional Financing	TF 10655	2012	2016	8.0
P123572	Sierra Leone Artisanal Mining Community Development and Sustainable Livelihoods	TF 99111	2012	2016	2.8
P122622	Sierra Leone-Rapid Response Growth Poles: Community-Based Livelihood and Food Support Program	TF 97914	2011	2015	2.8
P122065	West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program APL (WAAPP-1C)	TF 99510	2011	2017	10.0
P119355	Decentralized Service Delivery Program II	TF 12665	2012	2014	6.0



Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount
<b>Trust Fund Approved after the CAS Period FY10-13</b>					
P162166	Monitoring Post Ebola Recovery Funds: A Focus on Service Delivery	TF A8495	2019	2022	0.7
P161814	Sierra Leone Audit Service Capacity Building Support Project	TF A3851	2017	2019	0.3
P157778	Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey	TF A2240	2016	2019	1.4
P156759	West Africa Region Fisheries Program AF Guinea, Sierra Leone & Liberia	TF A3533	2017	2021	4.0
P155339	Strengthening Community Mobilization and Local Council Service Delivery in the Post-Ebola Context	TF A4737	2017	2021	2.8
P154904	Labor-intensive Public Works to Mitigate Ebola Impacts	TF A1023	2016	2017	3.0
P153437	Smallholder Commercialization and Agribusiness Development Project	TF A7690	2018	2019	1.8
P153064	Health Service Delivery & System Support Project	TF A2598	2016	2019	5.5
P146726	Sierra Leone - Emergency Economic and Fiscal Support Operation	TF 15359	2014	2016	0.1
P143588	Sierra Leone Safety Nets Project	TF A0806	2016	2019	4.3
P133424	Public Financial Management Improvement and Consolidation Project	TF 17201	2015	2018	4.6
P133070	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF A2012	2016	2018	1.0
	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF 17720	2015	2017	2.5
	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF 16568	2015	2018	17.9
P132753	Sierra Leone - Reproductive and Child Health II Project - Second Additional Financing	TF 15055	2014	2015	0.9
P130302	SL-Strengthening National M&E	TF 14717	2014	2017	0.5
P118226	Second Additional Financing to NSAP - Food Crisis Response	TF 95661	2010	2011	1.0
P116944	Capacity Building for Strengthening Social Capital in SL Special JSDF Facility for Facilitating Future Sustainability	TF 94804	2010	2011	0.4
	Capacity Building for Strengthening Social Capital in SL Special JSDF Facility for Facilitating Future Sustainability	TF 94337	2009	2011	0.1
	Capacity Building for Strengthening Social Capital in SL Special JSDF Facility for Facilitating Future Sustainability	TF 93966	2009	2012	1.0
P115836	Wetlands Conservation Project	TF 98957	2011	2016	1.8
P115782	Sierra Leone EFA FTI Program	TF 92755	2009	2013	13.9
P115130	Institutional Capacity Building for Combating Corruption in Sierra Leone	TF 96085	2010	2014	0.5
P114113	Strengthening Capacity for Diaspora Engagement Project	TF 93688	2009	2012	0.5
P113141	Additional Financing to NSAP - Food Crisis Response	TF 92671	2009	2011	7.0





Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount
<b>Trust Fund Approved after the CAS Period FY10-13</b>					
P162166	Monitoring Post Ebola Recovery Funds: A Focus on Service Delivery	TF A8495	2019	2022	0.7
P161814	Sierra Leone Audit Service Capacity Building Support Project	TF A3851	2017	2019	0.3
P157778	Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey	TF A2240	2016	2019	1.4
P156759	West Africa Region Fisheries Program AF Guinea, Sierra Leone & Liberia	TF A3533	2017	2021	4.0
P155339	Strengthening Community Mobilization and Local Council Service Delivery in the Post-Ebola Context	TF A4737	2017	2021	2.8
P154904	Labor-intensive Public Works to Mitigate Ebola Impacts	TF A1023	2016	2017	3.0
P153437	Smallholder Commercialization and Agribusiness Development Project	TF A7690	2018	2019	1.8
P153064	Health Service Delivery & System Support Project	TF A2598	2016	2019	5.5
P146726	Sierra Leone - Emergency Economic and Fiscal Support Operation	TF 15359	2014	2016	0.1
P143588	Sierra Leone Safety Nets Project	TF A0806	2016	2019	4.3
P133424	Public Financial Management Improvement and Consolidation Project	TF 17201	2015	2018	4.6
P133070	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF A2012	2016	2018	1.0
	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF 17720	2015	2017	2.5
	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF 16568	2015	2018	17.9
P132753	Sierra Leone - Reproductive and Child Health II Project - Second Additional Financing	TF 15055	2014	2015	0.9
P130302	SL-Strengthening National M&E	TF 14717	2014	2017	0.5
P112769	Sierra Leone STATCAP	TF 92801	2009	2011	0.1
P110535	Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2	TF 15054	2014	2017	5.0
	Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2	TF 12691	2013	2017	5.7
	Reproductive and Child Health Project - Phase 2	TF 96812	2011	2017	20.0
P109368	SL - Support to Basic Education - CARITAS MAKENI SCHOOL REHABILITATION/CONSTRUCTION PROJECT	TF 91155	2008	2012	0.5
P109364	Skills Training and Career Development Project for Disadvantaged and Disabled Youths	TF 95500	2010	2011	0.4
	Skills Training and Career Development Project for Disadvantaged and Disabled Youths	TF 91056	2008	2010	0.4
P109339	Vocational Training for Youths with Disabilities in Western Area and Kono Districts	TF 95498	2010	2012	0.4
	Vocational Training for Youths with Disabilities in Western Area and Kono Districts	TF 91059	2008	2010	0.5
P109287	Sierra Leone: Promoting Sustainable Youth Employment through Youth Entrepreneurship	TF 91046	2008	2011	0.2



Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount
<b>Trust Fund Approved after the CAS Period FY10-13</b>					
P162166	Monitoring Post Ebola Recovery Funds: A Focus on Service Delivery	TF A8495	2019	2022	0.7
P161814	Sierra Leone Audit Service Capacity Building Support Project	TF A3851	2017	2019	0.3
P157778	Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey	TF A2240	2016	2019	1.4
P156759	West Africa Region Fisheries Program AF Guinea, Sierra Leone & Liberia	TF A3533	2017	2021	4.0
P155339	Strengthening Community Mobilization and Local Council Service Delivery in the Post-Ebola Context	TF A4737	2017	2021	2.8
P154904	Labor-intensive Public Works to Mitigate Ebola Impacts	TF A1023	2016	2017	3.0
P153437	Smallholder Commercialization and Agribusiness Development Project	TF A7690	2018	2019	1.8
P153064	Health Service Delivery & System Support Project	TF A2598	2016	2019	5.5
P146726	Sierra Leone - Emergency Economic and Fiscal Support Operation	TF 15359	2014	2016	0.1
P143588	Sierra Leone Safety Nets Project	TF A0806	2016	2019	4.3
P133424	Public Financial Management Improvement and Consolidation Project	TF 17201	2015	2018	4.6
P133070	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF A2012	2016	2018	1.0
	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF 17720	2015	2017	2.5
	Sierra Leone - REVITALIZING EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE	TF 16568	2015	2018	17.9
P132753	Sierra Leone - Reproductive and Child Health II Project - Second Additional Financing	TF 15055	2014	2015	0.9
P130302	SL-Strengthening National M&E	TF 14717	2014	2017	0.5
P109165	Sierra Leone: Promoting Sustainable Youth Employment through Capacity Building	TF 91048	2008	2011	0.2
P108069	Integrated Public Financial Management Reform	TF 95389	2010	2015	17.4
P104662	Freetown Water Supply Rehabilitation	TF 91108	2008	2011	8.5
P099939	Sierra Leone: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	TF 93541	2009	2011	0.3
P099357	Sierra Leone Mineral Sector Technical Assistance	TF 11786	2012	2017	1.7
P094307	SL-GEF Biodiversity Conservation Project	TF 96537	2010	2016	5.0
P093878	SL Bumbuna Hydroelectric Completion (CN)	TF 56937	2006	2014	7.1
P078613	INSTITUTIONAL REFORM & CAPACITY BUILDING	TF 57251	2007	2011	0.9
	INSTITUTIONAL REFORM & CAPACITY BUILDING	TF 56653	2007	2011	25.3
<b>Total</b>					173.2

Source: Client Connection as of 2/25/2020

\*RETF only

\*\* IEG Validates RETF that are 5M and above



**Annex Table: 5 IEG Project Ratings for Sierra Leone, FY10-19 (US\$, millions)**

Exit FY	Proj ID	Project name	Total Evaluated	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
2018	P119355	SL:Decentralized Service Delivery Prog 2	24.1	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	#
2018	P121514	Financial Sector Support TA Project	2.2	UNSATISFACTORY	#
2018	P126180	Sierra Leone Energy Access Proj. - SLIDF	0.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	#
2018	P128208	SL-Public Sector Pay & Performance(FY12)	14.0	UNSATISFACTORY	#
2017	P099357	SL-Mineral Sector Technical Assistance	7.4	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	#
2017	P110535	SL-Reprod. & Child Health II Proj (FY10)	12.7	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	#
2016	P094307	SL-GEF Biodiversity Conservation Project	0.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2016	P096105	SL-Rural Dev & Priv Sec Dev SIL	49.7	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2016	P115836	SL-GEF Wetlands Conservation (FY11)	0.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2016	P146726	SL-Emergency Econ and Fiscal Support Op	29.9	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2015	P108069	SL-Public Financial Management TAL (FY09)	4.2	UNSATISFACTORY	HIGH
2015	P121052	SL-Youth Employment Support (FY10)	20.8	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2014	P078389	SL-IDP Transp (FY06)	55.7	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	HIGH
2013	P086801	SL-Bumbuna Env. and Social SIL (FY05)	20.5	UNSATISFACTORY	HIGH
2013	P115782	SL EFA/ FTI Program	0.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	HIGH
2012	P113757	SL-Decentr. Serv. Del. Program (FY10)	20.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2011	P087203	SL-Power & Water SIL (FY05)	35.0	UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2011	P117822	SL-GRGG 4 BUDGET SUPPORT (DPL)	9.8	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2010	P074128	SL-Health Sec Reconstr & Dev (FY03)	29.7	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2010	P074320	SL-Basic Edu Rehab (FY03)	22.6	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2010	P079335	SL-Natl Soc Action (FY03)	37.9	SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2010	P107335	SL-GRG 3 DPL	17.0	SATISFACTORY	HIGH
2010	P121056	SL:GRGC-3 Suppl.Credit (Crisis Window)	0.0	SATISFACTORY	HIGH
<b>Total</b>			<b>413.2</b>		

Source: AO Key IEG Ratings as of 1/23/2020

Note: IEG Risk to DO rating was dropped in July 2017 following the reform of the simplified ICRs but a narrative evaluation for Risk to Development Outcome was kept.

**Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Sierra Leone and Comparators, FY10-19**

Region	Total Evaluated (\$M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (\$)	Outcome % Sat (No)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (\$)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (No)
Sierra Leone	413.3	23	81.7	78.3	10.7	11.8
AFR	43,923.8	782	67.5	65.0	31.1	31.6
World Bank	232,074.2	2,571	82.5	72.5	53.9	45.4

Source: WB AO as of 2/13/2020

**Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Sierra Leone and Comparators, FY10-19**

Fiscal year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Ave FY14-19
<b>Sierra Leone</b>											
# Proj	8	8	10	8	10	10	9	9	8	12	9
# Proj At Risk	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	2	2	2
% Proj At Risk	25.0	12.5	10.0	12.5	10.0	20.0	33.3	11.1	25.0	16.7	17.4
Net Comm Amt (\$M)	180.5	183.0	213.0	184.0	208.6	200.6	173.6	206.0	189.0	341.0	207.9
Comm At Risk (\$M)	47.5	22.0		8.0	4.0	16.0	56.0	4.0	62.0	20.0	26.6
% Commit at Risk	26.3	12.0		4.3	1.9	8.0	32.3	1.9	32.8	5.9	12.8
<b>AFR</b>											
# Proj	418	434	418	403	438	458	474	502	534	574	465
# Proj At Risk	125	105	102	106	115	111	124	135	129	133	119
% Proj At Risk	29.9	24.2	24.4	26.3	26.3	24.2	26.2	26.9	24.2	23.2	25.5
Net Comm Amt (\$M)	33,745.8	37,010.2	38,492.7	40,799.0	46,621.7	51,993.5	56,089.8	61,022.2	70,673.9	77,737.5	51,419
Comm At Risk (\$M)	9,358.4	7,801.2	6,223.2	13,938.0	16,171.5	15,372.2	18,235.0	19,934.3	19,902.5	22,582.2	14,952
% Commit at Risk	27.7	21.1	16.2	34.2	34.7	29.6	32.5	32.7	28.2	29.0	29.1

Fiscal year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Ave FY14-19
<b>World</b>											
# Proj	1,449	1,454	1,371	1,337	1,386	1,402	1,398	1,459	1,497	1,570	1,432
# Proj At Risk	328	302	304	339	329	339	336	344	348	346	332
% Proj At Risk	22.6	20.8	22.2	25.4	23.7	24.2	24.0	23.6	23.2	22.0	23.1
Net Comm Amt (\$M)	155,683.9	165,792.3	166,208.1	169,430.6	183,153.9	191,907.8	207,350.0	212,502.9	229,965.6	243,812.2	192,581
Comm At Risk (\$M)	27,683.8	22,573.0	23,324.5	39,638.0	39,748.6	44,430.7	42,715.1	50,837.9	48,148.8	51,949.5	39,105
% Commit at Risk	17.8	13.6	14.0	23.4	21.7	23.2	20.6	23.9	20.9	21.3	20.3

Source: WB AO as 2/13/2020  
Agreement type: IBRD/IDA Only

**Annex Table 8: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Sierra Leone (US\$, millions)**

Development Partners	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
<b>All Donors, Total</b>	<b>458.3</b>	<b>423.89</b>	<b>439.75</b>	<b>449.07</b>	<b>914.03</b>	<b>946.82</b>	<b>693.26</b>	<b>541.17</b>	<b>505.9</b>
<b>DAC Countries, Total</b>	<b>190.9</b>	<b>173.15</b>	<b>188.08</b>	<b>207.71</b>	<b>524.3</b>	<b>536.82</b>	<b>400.91</b>	<b>282.79</b>	<b>255.11</b>
Australia	0.32	1.44	1.39	3.67	1.61	10.82	0.17	1.98	0.59
Austria	0.13	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.77	0.19	0.07	0.05	0.04
Belgium	0.11	0.01	0.01	0.01	1.37	1.44	1.44	0.01	..
Canada	33.02	6.69	5.53	5.12	9.92	13.09	1.63	1.39	2.05
Czech Republic	0.02	0.05	..	..	0.14	..	0.01	0.01	..
Denmark	4.78	3.76	3.43	0.15	4.15	0.15	-0.04	-0.07	..
Finland	1.54	3.67	2.27	2.35	2.47	0.84	0.36	0.59	0.25
France	0.32	0.43	0.06	0.44	0.19	0.2	0.43	0.42	0.57
Germany	13.32	16.7	14.06	10.87	25.05	4.96	18.04	17.22	25.54
Greece	0.17	0.19	0.17	..	0.02	0.01	0	..	..
Hungary	..	..	..	..	..	0.02	0	0.01	..
Iceland	..	0.09	0.11	..	0.21	..	..	..	1.16
Ireland	11.91	12.67	15.38	12.05	16.26	11.45	11.91	13.8	14.38
Italy	0.34	1.17	0.35	0.63	9.96	7.13	1.46	0.95	2.2
Japan	12.21	26.66	20.6	42.91	13.28	29.18	13.39	10.65	9.2



Development Partners	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Korea	0.09	0.21	0.17	0.15	7.51	1.42	10.51	4.93	12.12
Luxembourg	0.1	0.15	0.15	0.51	0.18	0.01	..	..	..
Netherlands	1.1	0.21	0.13	..	7.95	..	0.11	0.01	..
New Zealand	0.02	..	..	0.04	1.7	0.01	0.09	0.08	0.01
Norway	2.98	3.52	2.57	2.46	1.48	6.95	5.18	2.27	2.07
Poland	0.01	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Portugal	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	..	..	0.05	0.05	0.01
Slovenia	0.02	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Spain	1.94	0.72	0.65	0.61	7.73	1.28	0.53	0.94	1.15
Sweden	0.5	0.8	1.37	0.36	3.16	2.2	0.15	0.7	0.77
Switzerland	0.06	0.53	0.36	0.48	2.8	0.07	0.06	0.43	0.02
United Kingdom	84.79	73.56	99.54	109.43	391.42	332.63	207.4	151.88	125
United States	21.09	19.87	19.72	15.45	14.97	112.77	127.96	74.52	57.99
<b>Multilaterals, Total</b>	<b>266.52</b>	<b>245.75</b>	<b>248.98</b>	<b>237.55</b>	<b>382.63</b>	<b>402.82</b>	<b>277.42</b>	<b>248.46</b>	<b>201.91</b>
EU Institutions	80.34	71.55	74.58	75.88	77.72	74.18	87.33	51.44	74.18
International Monetary Fund, Total	40.68	8.85	-0.28	6.49	40.57	131.01	66.83	38.14	3.63
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	40.68	8.85	-0.28	6.49	40.57	131.01	66.83	38.14	3.63
Regional Development Banks, Total	20.55	41.53	40.74	39.09	62.02	52.25	34.73	16.27	13.75
African Development Bank, Total	17.57	27.63	35.2	35.61	59.05	43.49	17.63	11.63	11.96
African Development Bank [AfDB]	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	..
African Development Fund [AfDF]	17.57	27.63	35.2	35.61	59.05	43.49	17.63	11.63	11.96
Islamic Development Bank [IsDB]	2.98	13.9	5.54	3.47	2.97	8.76	17.1	4.63	1.79
United Nations, Total	29.99	30.86	37.68	30.56	32.51	35.19	29.21	23.26	20.27
Food and Agriculture Organisation [FAO]	..	..	..	0.75	..	..	..	..	0.71
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]	0.29	0.18	0.22	0.41	0.39	0.27	0.34	0.18	0.35
IFAD	3.41	7.2	11.61	7.89	9.51	10.73	9.13	3.25	0.94
International Labour Organisation [ILO]	..	..	0.38	0.39	0.3	0.32	0.32	0.45	0.57
UNAIDS	0.7	0.78	0.46	0.72	0.66	0.87	0.64	0.53	0.12
UNDP	5.78	5.24	5.31	4.76	5.24	5.82	5.22	5.77	5.07
UNFPA	2.59	2.25	2.43	2.8	2.57	2.36	1.83	1.46	1.46
UNHCR	0.68	..	2.12	1.87	..	..	..	..	0.1
UNICEF	10.19	9.21	8.85	7.41	10.06	10.08	9.85	9.06	7.01
UN Peacebuilding Fund [UNPBF]	4.88	3.71	4.49	0.72	2.48	2.22	0.33	1.34	1.62
WFP	1.47	1.1	1.01	1.4	0.23	0.35	0.05	..	1.21
World Health Organisation [WHO]	..	1.19	0.8	1.44	1.07	2.19	1.5	1.21	1.11

Development Partners	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
World Bank Group, Total	57.29	60.54	64.83	43.62	118.76	77.96	25.15	65.89	28.84
World Bank, Total	57.29	60.54	64.83	43.62	118.76	77.96	25.15	65.89	28.84
International Development Association [IDA]	57.29	60.54	64.83	43.62	118.76	77.96	25.15	65.89	28.84
Other Multilateral, Total	37.67	32.42	31.44	41.92	51.05	32.23	34.17	53.47	61.24
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa [BADEA]	8.51	3.26	5.86	7.52	1.96	0.02	..	..	..
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization [GAVI]	8.06	2.12	7.88	4.66	7.77	11.84	2.82	6.61	11.71
Global Environment Facility [GEF]	1.94	2.24	1.24	3.2	2.45	3.1	2.8	2.28	0.05
Global Fund	17.84	24.08	14.93	17.31	31.06	12.76	27.43	41.94	40.53
OPEC Fund for International Development [OFID]	1.32	0.72	1.52	9.22	7.81	4.51	1.12	2.65	8.95
<b>Non-DAC Countries, Total</b>	<b>0.88</b>	<b>4.99</b>	<b>2.69</b>	<b>3.81</b>	<b>7.11</b>	<b>7.18</b>	<b>14.93</b>	<b>9.91</b>	<b>48.88</b>
Estonia	..	..	..	..	0.05	0.03	..	0.03	..
Israel	0.04	0.06	0.13	0.01	0.14	0.01	0.09	0.2	0.03
Kuwait	0.65	4.68	2.38	3.62	2.5	0.42	13.7	5.05	35.82
Lithuania	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.01	..
Malta	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.03	..
Russia	..	..	0.04	..	1.5	2.48	..	..	..
Thailand	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	0.1	..
Turkey	0.04	0.14	0.12	0.17	0.45	0.6	0.2	0.64	0.06
United Arab Emirates	0.15	0.11	0.02	0.01	2.46	3.16	0.9	0.36	9.43
<b>Private Donors, Total</b>	<b>0.74</b>	<b>3.44</b>	<b>1.88</b>	<b>5.16</b>	<b>8.31</b>	<b>6.14</b>	<b>4.93</b>	<b>7.93</b>	<b>9</b>
Arcus Foundation	..	..	..	..	..	0.21	..	0.08	0.01
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation	0.74	3.44	1.88	1.52	3.32	3.97	2.18	4.55	1.39
C&A Foundation	..	..	..	..	0.66	..	..	..	..
Charity Projects Ltd (Comic Relief)	..	..	..	3.65	3.83	1.97	2.33	2.67	2.72
Conrad N. Hilton Foundation	..	..	..	..	0.5	..	0.18	0.18	0.18
Ford Foundation	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.04
H&M Foundation	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.33	0.33
MasterCard Foundation	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.14
MAVA Foundation	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3.38
Omidyar Network Fund, Inc.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.05
Wellcome Trust	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.12	0.19
United Postcode Lotteries, Total	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.58
Swedish Postcode Lottery	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.58

Source: OECD Stat. DAC2a as of 2/13/2020

Data only available until FY18

**Annex Table 9: Economic and Social Indicators for Sierra Leone, FY10-18**

Series Name										Sierra Leone	SSA	World
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Average 2010-2018		
<b>Growth and Inflation</b>												
GDP growth (real annual %)	5.3	6.3	15.2	20.7	4.6	(20.6)	6.1	4.2	3.4	5.0	3.6	3.0
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	3.0	3.9	12.6	18.1	2.3	(22.3)	3.8	2.0	1.3	2.7	0.9	1.8
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	1,200.0	1,240.0	1,490.0	1,720.0	1,760.0	1,400.0	1,330.0	1,500.0	1,490.0	1,458.9	3,515.3	15,296.3
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)	420.0	430.0	530.0	660.0	700.0	550.0	490.0	520.0	490.0	532.2	1,610.4	10,477.3
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	7.2	6.8	6.6	5.5	4.6	6.7	10.9	18.2	16.0	9.2	4.8	2.7
<b>Composition of GDP (%)</b>												
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	52.9	54.6	50.6	48.0	51.8	58.7	58.2	60.3	58.9	54.9	15.6	3.6
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	7.8	7.9	14.5	21.2	15.6	4.6	5.6	5.2	5.3	9.7	26.5	26.3
Services, value added (% of GDP)	35.3	35.3	32.6	28.5	29.8	33.9	33.3	32.4	32.3	32.6	51.3	64.0
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	30.7	41.5	25.6	14.4	13.1	15.6	18.9	18.0	13.1	21.2	21.0	23.5
<b>External Accounts</b>												
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	16.8	16.3	32.9	28.6	30.8	19.4	24.9	26.1	17.5	23.7	27.9	29.8
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	34.5	64.5	60.4	58.8	52.4	47.4	54.5	48.0	39.2	51.1	29.5	29.1
Current account balance (% of GDP)	(22.7)	(65.0)	(31.8)	(15.0)	(9.4)	(23.8)	(4.4)	(14.1)	(15.8)	-22.5		
External debt stocks (% of GNI)	35.7	36.2	34.0	28.5	29.1	37.3	48.8	47.3	45.1	38.0		
Total debt service (% of GNI)	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.7	1.3	1.2	1.6	1.5	0.9	2.3	
Total reserves in months of imports	4.1	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.2	3.0	3.9	3.9	3.5	3.0	5.1	12.9
<b>Fiscal Accounts <sup>1</sup></b>												
General government revenue (% of GDP)	15.2	17.0	15.2	13.3	14.0	16.2	14.9	14.6	15.7	15.1	19.5	
General government total expenditure (% of GDP)	20.2	21.5	20.3	15.7	17.6	20.7	23.3	23.4	21.5	20.5	22.9	
General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	(5.0)	(4.5)	(5.2)	(2.4)	(3.6)	(4.5)	(8.5)	(8.8)	(5.8)	-5.4	-3.3	
General government gross debt (% of GDP)	46.8	44.8	36.8	30.5	35.0	44.9	55.5	57.9	63.0	46.1	36.7	
<b>Health</b>												
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	49.4	50.2	51.0	51.7	52.4	52.9	53.4	53.9	..	51.9	59.0	71.5

Series Name										Sierra Leone	SSA	World
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Average 2010-2018		
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	86.0	89.0	91.0	92.0	83.0	86.0	84.0	90.0	90.0	87.9	72.8	85.1
People using safely managed sanitation services (% of pop)	11.3	11.6	11.9	12.2	12.5	12.8	13.1	13.3	..	12.3		41.0
People using at least basic drinking water services (% of pop)	51.9	53.2	54.5	55.8	57.1	58.3	59.6	60.8	..	56.4	57.7	88.1
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	108.3	103.9	99.6	95.5	91.5	87.8	84.4	81.3	78.5	92.3	58.6	32.6
<b>Education</b>												
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	..	6.3	8.0	8.7	..	9.3	12.5	12.3	13.9	10.1	28.3	46.0
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	..	113.8	116.6	118.2	..	116.1	118.2	124.5	112.8	117.2	98.5	103.5
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	..	39.5	44.0	38.9	..	39.1	41.4	41.8	..	40.8	42.7	74.2
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..		8.9	34.8
<b>Population</b>												
population, total	6,415,634	6,563,240	6,712,581	6,863,980	7,017,144	7,171,914	7,328,838	7,488,431	7,650,154	7,023,546	970,916,035	7,256,942,214
population growth (annual %)	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.7	1.2
Urban population (% of total)	38.9	39.2	39.6	40.0	40.4	40.8	41.2	41.6	42.1	40.4	38.1	53.5
Rural population (% of total pop)	61.1	60.8	60.4	60.0	59.6	59.2	58.8	58.4	57.9	59.6	61.9	46.5
<b>Poverty</b>												
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of pop)	..	52.2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	52.2		12.7
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of pop)	..	52.9	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	52.9		
Rural poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of rural pop)	..	66.1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	66.1		
Urban poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of urban pop)	..	31.2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	31.2		
GINI index (World Bank estimate)	..	34.0	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	34.0		

Source: WB Databank World Development Indicators 2/25/2020

\*International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2019



**Annex Table 10: List of IFC Investments in Sierra Leone (US\$, millions)**

Investments Committed in FY10-FY20

Project ID	Cmt FY		Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Orig Cmt-IFC Bal	Net Commitment (LN)	Net Commitment (EQ)	Total Net Commitment (LN+EQ)
40101	2019	32211	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	60.0	-	60.0	60.0
34971	2017	34971	Active	Electric Power	27.0	27.0	-	27.0
37341	2016	35151	Closed	Accommodation & Tourism Services	9.7	(0.7)	-	(0.7)
30082	2012	30082	Closed	Plastics & Rubber	2.8	2.8	-	2.8
<b>Sub-Total</b>					<b>99.5</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>60.0</b>	<b>89.2</b>

Regional Projects

28783	2010	28783	Active	Collective Investment Vehicles	13.5	-	13.5	13.5
<b>Sub-Total of Investments Committed FY10-20</b>					<b>113.0</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>73.5</b>	<b>102.7</b>

Investments Committed pre-FY10 but active during FY10-FY20

Project ID	CMT FY		Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Orig Cmt-IFC Bal	Net Commitment (LN)	Net Commitment (EQ)	Total Net Commitment (LN+EQ)
					-	-	-	-
<b>Sub-Total</b>					<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>					<b>113.0</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>73.5</b>	<b>102.7</b>

Source: IFC-MIS Extract as of 1/13/2020

Note: IFC Investment Commitments excludes Short Term Finance

\* Regional Project. The amount listed is for the whole region.

**Annex Table 11: List of IFC Advisory Services in Sierra Leone (US\$, millions)**

Advisory Services Approved in FY10-20

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Area	Total Funds Managed by IFC
603023	Gas-to-power Market Creation in Sub-Saharan Africa	2019	2020	ACTIVE	INR	1.95
604082	Sierra Rutile Advisory Program	2019	2022	ACTIVE	INR	2.00
602343	Sierra Leone Regional Labs	2018	2020	HOLD	CPC-PPP	0.74
600318	Sierra Leone STCR	2014	2018	ACTIVE	EFI	0.77
595527	Sierra Leone Credit Bureau Project - Phase 1	2012	2013	CLOSED	FAM	0.12
573287	Venture SME Management Solutions, Sierra Leone	2010	2013	CLOSED	MAS	0.42
<b>Sub-Total</b>						<b>6.0</b>



**Advisory Services Approved pre-FY10 but active during FY10-20**

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Area	Total Funds Managed by IFC
28407	Cape SierraHotel	2009	2011	CLOSED	CPC-PPP	0.02
562368	SL Removing of Administrative Barriers to Investment (RABI) Ext Phase 2	2009	2011	CLOSED	TAC	1.86
565247	Promoting Investment and Export for Sierra Leone	2009	2012	CLOSED	TAC	1.68
565967	Sierra Leone Tourism	2009	2011	CLOSED	TAC	2.00
561268	Sierra Leone Tax Simplification Rollout	2008	2012	CLOSED	TAC	2.05
548665	Sierra Leone Business Forum	2007	2010	CLOSED	TAC	1.12
	<b>Sub-Total</b>					<b>8.73</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>					<b>14.7</b>

Source: IFC AS Portal Data as of 1/13/2020

**Annex Table 12: List of MIGA Projects Active in Sierra Leone, FY10-20 (US\$, millions)**

Project ID	Project Title	Project Status	Fiscal Year	Sector	Investor Country	Max Gross Issuance
10886	Sky Handling Partner Sierra Leone Limited	Active	2015	Services	France	4.8
13516	SONATEL Mobile Telecom Services / Orange (SL) Limited	Active	2018	Telecommunications	Senegal	97.8
14164	Sierra Tropical Limited	Active	2018	Agribusiness	Singapore	36.0
	<b>Total</b>					<b>138.6</b>

Source: MIGA with Project Brief as of 2/25/20