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SYNTHESIS REPORT



IDA's Crisis Response Window

Lessons from IEG Evaluations

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IDA's Crisis Response Window

Lessons from Independent Evaluation Group Evaluations

A Synthesis Report

April 9, 2019

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Abbreviations

BBB	build back better
CLRR	Completion and Learning Report Reviews
CRW	Crisis Response Window
DPF	development policy financing
ICRR	Implementation Completion and Results Report Review
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IPF	investment project financing

All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated.

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Key Messages

The Crisis Response Window (CRW) of the International Development Association (IDA) evolved from a single focus on economic shocks to include two other types of crises—natural disasters and public health emergencies. The CRW was set up as a pilot under IDA15 to address repercussions of the global financial crisis on IDA countries. It was amended when made a permanent part of IDA to address the impact of natural disasters in addition to economic shocks. When the Ebola crisis erupted in 2014, CRW coverage was revised to include public health emergencies as eligible for CRW financing.

The CRW built on IDA’s experience of crisis response and the need to respond to a perceived gap in the IDA architecture. The CRW has provided IDA with the flexibility to support countries facing shocks within IDA cycles requiring that additional resources be made available faster than possible under the regular IDA allocation framework.

The CRW aims to achieve several objectives: rapid response; transparency and predictability; support for resilience in natural disaster response; and supporting long-term development objectives. The rapid response of CRW-financed operations was to be pursued through accelerated emergency procedures for internal processing—the result has been ‘time to delivery’ shorter than World Bank averages for investment operations. Transparency and predictability in access to CRW resources was to be pursued by requiring that World Bank management inform the Board of Executive Directors of its intention to draw on CRW resources for a particular operation. Support for resilience in natural disaster response was to be pursued by including measures to strengthen vulnerable areas in each operation, and, in more recent years, incorporating “build back better” principles. Supporting long-term development was to be pursued, among other things, by protecting core spending to preserve progress in poverty reduction.

CRW funds have been requested and used regularly since 2010, and projects receiving CRW funds have performed better than the IDA average. Over the period 2010–18, half of CRW financing went to countries in the Africa Region, and around half has been for response to natural disasters. The majority of CRW finance has been used for investment project finance operations. In line with the evolving scope of the CRW, demand for CRW resources (as well as the type of crisis that is eligible for financing) has varied across IDA cycles, from IDA15’s response to economic shocks, to IDA16’s response to natural disasters, to IDA17 and IDA18’s responses to all three types of crises. Implementation Completion and Results Report Reviews show that CRW-financed operations have performed better than the average IDA operation in delivering project outcomes. The reasons for good performance vary by type of crisis.

Key Messages

Evaluations of operations receiving CRW financing to counter economic shocks identify some common factors that underpin good performance. These include building on existing operations, close coordination with partners, preparation for future crises, capacity building, and resilience improvements. Speed of preparation and simple and flexible project design contributed to success, but longer-term objectives (such as strengthening countries' capacity to mitigate crises) did not receive sufficient attention, although this may be partly due to the shorter-term focus of operations for crisis response. Finally, it is possible that stronger client ownership and commitment in crisis conditions may play a role in better performance.

Evaluations of CRW-financed operations for natural disaster response identified several features that contributed to good performance. Partnering with other international institutions, careful instrument choice (including building on existing operations through additional financing), good project design, and flexibility during implementation were common features. Moreover, "build back better" principles of resilience building, which are being incorporated into project preparation and implementation, are expected to strengthen the contribution to long-term development objectives. Client ownership and commitment may also have bolstered performance.

Financing for public health emergencies presents few lessons to date. The small number of operations point to the success of rapid preparation and partnering with other donors while identifying the challenge of supporting longer-term objectives.

Not all the objectives of the CRW are easily evaluable, especially given that CRW financing is usually pooled with regular IDA financing for operations. To improve the evaluability of the CRW, its use needs to be recognized in operational documents and self-assessments at the project and country level. It will remain difficult to judge the impact of CRW financing in practice until its use is consistently taken into account in project and country evaluations, but recent improvements in staff guidance will help. While it is methodologically challenging to attribute specific results to the CRW given the pooling of resources, more explicit reference to CRW-related activities in project and country documents (especially in Implementation Completion and Results Reports and Completion and Learning Reports) should help clarify the value added of the CRW.

IDA's flexibility and responsiveness have been enhanced by the CRW; however, with this enhanced flexibility and ability to respond quickly come potential tensions with IDA's performance-based allocation and its core principle of non earmarked financing. As financing for IDA special windows has expanded, taking a growing share of total IDA resources, it is vital to consider both the balance and potential trade-offs between greater flexibility and predictability for IDA clients and to monitor this issue.

Management Response

Management welcomes the Independent Evaluation Groups (IEG)'s three synthesis reports related to the International Development Association (IDA): (i) *Learning from IDA Experience: Lessons from IEG Evaluations, with a Focus on IDA Special Themes and Development Effectiveness*; (ii) *Synthesis Report on IDA Regional Window Program, 2003–17*; and (iii) *IDA's Crisis Response Window: Lessons from IEG Evaluations*. Together, the reports provide a useful summary of the existing evaluative evidence and provide valuable inputs to the IDA19 replenishment discussions.

The synthesis report provides a succinct yet comprehensive overview of IDA's Crisis Response Window (CRW) and the lessons learnt to date. IEG's findings and conclusions complement those in the CRW Paper presented by Management at the IDA18 Mid-Term Review. This includes its timeliness, performance, and support for build-back-better. IEG's project-level assessments and lessons provide added insight to our understanding of the CRW.

Management concurs with the report's findings on the relevance and value of the CRW. Many IDA clients face multiple and recurrent hazards that threaten longer-term development. The CRW mechanism in the IDA architecture has enabled the World Bank to respond in a timely and flexible manner to exceptionally severe events, such as health pandemics, earthquakes, or domestic impacts of the global financial crisis. By supplementing the core IDA allocations in such situations, the CRW has enabled recipient states to respond to the immediate crisis in a manner that does not undermine its longer-term development goals. The World Bank had previously responded to a crisis either by restructuring its country portfolio to release funds or redirecting IDA funds from pipeline projects, thereby reallocating resources originally intended for longer-term development. The CRW has helped the World Bank to sustain its pre-crisis IDA commitments and minimize trade-offs.

The report puts due emphasis on the fact that the performance of CRW-financed operations is better than that of the average IDA operation. This includes timely preparation, leveraging existing implementation mechanisms, protecting core social expenditure, and achieving outcomes (90 percent of CRW financing for natural disasters and 84 percent for economic shocks were rated as Moderately Satisfactory or above). Indeed, the CRW has had notable achievements on the ground. The CRW supported post-earthquake recovery in Haiti and Nepal. It helped address the Ebola crisis in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. It facilitated a transformative engagement in war-torn and cholera-impacted Yemen in partnership with the United Nations. It helped address the challenge of recurrent drought in the Horn of Africa. It helped several small states respond to repeated disasters and climate shocks despite their limited fiscal base.

The report points to potential tensions of the CRW with IDA's core principle of non-earmarked resources. IEG finds that although the PBA system remains the principal basis for the allocation of IDA resources, the use of IDA's specialized windows,

Management Response

including the CRW, may result in “potential tradeoffs between greater flexibility and predictability for IDA clients.” Management wishes to note that the CRW constitutes a small percentage of total IDA resources (2–4 percent during IDA16–18). The IDA windows have been set up to respond more fully to priorities such as crisis management and the influx of refugees and to help crowd in more private resources. In addition, they were created in the context of a significant scale-up of the IDA envelope, particularly in IDA18. The increase in non-earmarked core resources has provided the predictability and continuity in country allocations through the PBA. That said, Management will continue to review IDA’s financing structure, including the CRW and other windows, with a view to optimizing its resource allocation, balancing targeted priorities and flexibility.

1. Background and Context

Evolution of the Crisis Response Window

From the 15th replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA15) through IDA18, the Crisis Response Window (CRW) evolved from a focus on economic shocks to include two other types of crises—natural disasters and public health emergencies. The CRW was set up as a pilot under IDA15 to address repercussions related to the global financial crisis on IDA countries. When established as a permanent part of IDA, it was amended to address the impact of natural disasters in addition to economic shocks. CRW coverage was expanded to include public health emergencies when the Ebola crisis erupted in 2014.

CRW built on IDA's experience of crisis response while seeking to provide additional flexibility. IDA already had a track record of crisis response, having played an important role in postdisaster recovery and reconstruction. IDA had responded to natural disasters such as the 2004 tsunami, economic crises, and public health emergencies such as avian flu. These responses were typically financed by restructuring existing country portfolios and reallocating country allocations. Crisis response financing tended to be ad hoc rather than systematic and reallocation and restructuring processes could be time consuming. The Development Committee concluded in 2009 that “the succession of global crises and natural disasters early in the IDA15 period exposed a gap in the international aid architecture related to systematic assistance to low-income countries facing large shocks on government core spending and on the poor and vulnerable” (World Bank 2012b), and “committed to explore the benefits of a new crisis response mechanism in IDA to protect [low-income countries] from crises” (World Bank 2009b).

The CRW responds to a real need—to provide additional resources quickly in response to a crisis, ensuring that such support does not come at the cost of achieving longer-term development goals. In fact, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluations had made a strong case for a window like the CRW. The concept of a funding window was put forward in the 2006 IEG evaluation on World Bank assistance for natural disasters. The report noted “for the most vulnerable countries, contingency funding needs to be made available, whether as part of another loan, a set-aside in the Country Assistance Strategy lending program, or a free-standing catastrophe fund” (World Bank 2006). The report advocated for more investment lending, noting that longer-term activities, such as mitigation, reconstruction and institution building in addition to attention to social issues had been short-changed in the past. Then, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the 2011 IEG evaluation of the global economic crisis noted that low-income countries were far less able to bear the costs of the global financial crisis and called for greater proactivity by the World Bank on their behalf and highlighted the role of the

Chapter 1 Background and Context

CRW (World Bank 2011e). Last, IEG's recent evaluation on health notes the importance of the World Bank's financing and coordination role in responding effectively to deadly virus outbreaks, particularly in countries with lower institutional capacity and complex development partner networks (World Bank 2017j).

The CRW was established as a pilot within IDA15 in response to the global financial crisis, approved by IDA's Executive Directors in December 2009. Its launch followed calls from the Development Committee to consider how IDA could respond to the challenges faced by low-income countries affected by the global financial crisis,¹ which had followed on the heels of the food and fuel price shocks of 2007 and 2008 and had significant and negative impacts on many non-oil-exporting low-income countries. Bank management proposed a pilot IDA CRW, which was discussed at the IDA15 Midterm Review (World Bank 2009d).² Implementation began in January 2010, making the CRW available during the second half of IDA15 (January 2010 to July 2011).³ CRW resources were additional to a country's regular IDA allocation, since the allocation system under IDA often made it difficult to mobilize incremental financing for IDA countries in the face of an unanticipated shock.

The CRW was established as a permanent feature under IDA16 to address natural disasters as well as economic crises. A permanent window was adopted as part of IDA16 to respond to exceptional crises caused by exogenous shocks, with CRW resources as part of a concerted international effort and accessed only as last resort financing.⁴ Access to CRW resources would be triggered by evidence of an economic

¹ The negative impact of the crisis was transmitted through several channels (exports, remittances, tourism and foreign direct investment) and resulted in falling growth and employment and in higher poverty.

² International Development Association (IDA) deputies endorsed launching the window under the 15th replenishment (IDA15) and discussed making the window permanent as part of the subsequent IDA16 replenishment, while emphasizing the need to ensure complementarity with other existing mechanisms for crisis support, particularly those of the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund (World Bank 2009a).

³ This was supplemented by special drawing rights (SDR) 88 million from IDA investment returns and SDR 158 million of contributions from the United Kingdom.

⁴ Although IDA deputies noted the need to respond to public health emergencies and epidemics, this issue was set aside until the IDA16 midterm review since public health emergencies would

crisis projected to reduce gross domestic product by at least 3 percentage points in a significant number of IDA countries; or exogenous price shocks with widespread impact across IDA countries. Access in the case of natural disasters would be triggered only if the disaster was exceptionally severe and intense and where existing resources were insufficient, with a presumption that a portion would be used to strengthen disaster resilience (World Bank 2010c). The desirability of building resilience into disaster response projects has been confirmed repeatedly and adopted as good practice, but there is an inevitable tension with fast crisis response (UNISDR 2015; World Bank 2017b). Access to the permanent CRW was limited to crises triggered by exogenous shocks.⁵ Under IDA16, Management was expected to consult with the Board of Executive Directors shortly after a disaster occurred to indicate that access to CRW funds would form part of IDA's response. In most cases, a note was presented to the Board informing Executive Directors of Management's intention to allocate CRW funds to a specific project and explaining the emergency to which the project responded. In addition, CRW-financed operations were eligible for accelerated emergency procedures for internal processing and Board approval (World Bank 2010a, 2010b).

IDA17 saw the addition of public health emergencies to the types of crises eligible for CRW financing. The CRW would continue to use the CRW implementation arrangements in place under IDA16. Almost immediately, the question of inclusion of public health emergencies arose due to the Ebola crisis. Extending the use of the CRW to a public health emergency was first requested as part of the Board's approval of the Ebola Emergency Response Project in September 2014. At the IDA17 Midterm Review, IDA Executive Directors formally expanded the eligibility criteria for CRW access to include public health emergencies and epidemics (World Bank 2015g).

CRW continued under IDA18, with access to CRW funds for severe economic crises, natural disasters, and public health emergencies (World Bank 2017g). The two-stage approval process established under IDA16 remained to ensure Board involvement and oversight through consultation in the first stage (informing the Board of the borrowing country's intention to access CRW resources) and simultaneous approval of CRW

require operational changes in IDA to allow for the kind of rapid financing that would be required for an effective public health emergency response (World Bank 2010a, 2010b).

⁵ For example, an economic crisis triggered by poor economic management would not merit access, while one caused by a sharp commodity price drop or a recession in major trading partners would (World Bank 2010a).

resources and specific operations in the second stage. As part of IDA18's effort to expand financing to promote resilience through crisis preparedness and response, the CRW was scaled up to special drawing rights (SDR) 2.1 billion and adjustment of financing terms was allowed for the most severe natural disasters (World Bank 2017g).⁶ After the IDA18 Midterm Review, the Board approved reallocating \$750 million from the CRW as demand for CRW resources up to that point had been modest.

Purpose and Scope of the Report

This IEG synthesis paper takes stock of experience with IDA's CRW, making use of IEG evaluative evidence. The paper synthesizes findings from existing evaluations and information on CRW performance during its pilot stage under IDA15 and subsequent IDA cycles, to inform stakeholders and promote learning. The audience for this paper is primarily internal, including management, Executive Directors (including the Committee on Development Effectiveness), and IDA deputies.

Attribution of results to CRW resources is methodologically challenging given the comingling of CRW and regular IDA resources in most CRW-financed operations. But IEG evaluations provide some basis for assessing CRW contribution to outcomes and the achievement of its objectives. CRW financing is usually used to augment financing for other IDA-supported interventions. This makes it difficult to attribute results to any single source of financing. The frequent use of CRW funds for additional financing also complicates any effort to separate results linked to CRW from other results. Nevertheless, IEG evaluations at the project, country, and sector levels provide useful information from which an assessment of CRW implementation can be derived.

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief discussion of the CRW's objectives, focusing on timeliness of CRW-financed interventions and adherence to IDA governance arrangements. The third section considers performance of CRW-financed projects and the associated country results, making use of IEG evaluations, including separate consideration of performance in response to economic shocks, natural disasters, and public health emergencies. It also draws on relevant IEG thematic and sector evaluations. The 145 projects that have received CRW financing during the reviewed period were matched with 59 associated Implementation Completion and Results Report Reviews (ICRRs), 44 country strategy


⁶ IDA financing terms would be adjusted for countries exposed to severe natural disasters leading to significant damage and losses of over one-third of gross domestic product.

Completion and Learning Report Reviews (CLRRs) and their predecessors, and four Country Program Evaluations.

2. Use of Crisis Response Window Financing

The pilot CRW under IDA15 provided financing to many IDA countries to assist them in mitigating the impact of the global financial crisis. Funding was SDR 1.053 billion (about \$1.6 billion), of which SDR 806 million (about \$1.3 billion) came from unallocated IDA general resources (about 13 percent of the estimated financing needed to protect core spending in non-oil exporting IDA-only countries) (World Bank 2009d). These IDA resources were additional to a country's regular IDA allocation. Fifty-six IDA-only countries were recognized as eligible for these funds.¹ CRW funds were allocated among these countries based primarily on estimated crisis impact and need (World Bank 2010a).² By the end of IDA15, \$1.4 billion had been committed (figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. CRW-Financed Operations by Region and IDA Cycle



Note: One project in Africa and its additional financing, both in IDA17, were regional, covering three African countries. AFR = Africa; CRW = Crisis Response Window; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; IDA = International Development Association; LCR = Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia.

CRW resources under IDA16 were not fully used. IDA deputies had set aside SDR 1.335 billion (about \$2 billion) for the CRW for IDA16, about 4 percent of IDA16

¹ Reflecting the ongoing impact of the food and fuel price crisis, 23 IDA countries were excluded because they were significant oil exporters, had higher income levels, or were in arrears to IDA or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

² The projected decline in gross domestic product growth was used as the main indicator of crisis impact, whereas per capita gross national income was used to indicate need.

resources. By the end of IDA16, \$937 million had been committed for 27 new operations or as additional financing to existing well-performing operations that could effectively respond to crisis conditions. Of these, a special CRW allocation of \$500 million went to Haiti to support recovery efforts after the 2010 earthquake. The unused amounts in the CRW were redistributed, with about \$470 million reallocated to IDA's Regional Integration Program at the time of the IDA16 Midterm Review and about \$540 million carried over to the IDA17 CRW (see figure 2.1; World Bank 2010a, 2013, 2015c).

Demand for CRW financing exceeded expectations during IDA17. At the start of IDA17, SDR 0.6 billion (about \$840 million) had been allocated to the CRW (World Bank 2014a).³ At the Midterm Review (November 2015), resources of \$900 million were added as demand was higher than expected. This constituted a doubling in size from IDA16. Resources were fully used (World Bank 2018d). By the end of IDA17, \$1,752 million had been committed for 37 new operations or as additional financing. To date under IDA18, \$350 million have been committed for six new operations or as additional financing (see figure 2.1).

Since its inception, the CRW has been used regularly, with countries in the Africa Region accounting for half of CRW commitments. Over the entire period, CRW-financed projects included 145 loans (for 139 operations).⁴ Total IDA commitments for these loans totaled \$ 7.7 billion, of which the CRW provided \$4.4 billion. A few countries drew repeatedly on the CRW: Haiti (\$608 million in CRW financing for 16 projects); Nepal (\$389 financing for five projects); Yemen, Republic of (\$364 million for three projects); and Ethiopia (\$356 million for four projects; figure 2.1, panel b, and figure 2.2, panel b).⁵


Financing in response to natural disasters has taken up about half of cumulative CRW resources. Out of the total CRW financing provided, 37 percent of (57 percent of operations) responded to an economic crisis, 49 percent (39 percent of operations) to a natural disaster, and 14 percent (4 percent of operations) to a public health emergency (figure 2.2).

³ But it was noted in the final report launching IDA17 that, in the event of exceptional circumstances, Crisis Response Window (CRW) funding could be exceeded, subject to approval by the IDA Board of Executive Directors (World Bank 2014a).

⁴ A given project may receive more than one loan with CRW financing. A parent project with CRW financing may receive additional financing, part or all of which came from the CRW.

⁵ These four countries accessed more than \$300 million each from CRW to date. Another seven countries accessed \$100 to \$300 million each.

Figure 2.2. CRW-Financed Operations Type of Crisis




Note: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. AFR = Africa; CRW = Crisis Response Window; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LCR = Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia.

Investment project financing (IPF) has been the instrument of choice in the majority of CRW-financed operations. They accounted for 86 percent of CRW commitments and 110 projects (of 145 total), out of which 63 (about half of commitments) were for additional financing. Development policy financing (DPF) constituted 13 percent of commitments and 34 operations. Although overall use of CRW funds has varied sharply year by year, investment projects have remained dominant (figure 2.3).


The demand for CRW resources has varied across IDA cycles even as the types of crises eligible for access has expanded. After its first two years, little CRW finance was called on to address economic crises, while starting in FY12, the need for CRW financing for natural disasters has varied year by year, with heaviest use in FY17. Public health emergencies were less frequent, with only two years when CRW financing was requested (figure 2.4).

Figure 2.3. CRW-Financed Operations by Instrument Type and Fiscal Year



Note: One investment project and its additional financing, both in FY15, were regional, covering three countries. FY = fiscal year.

Figure 2.4. CRW-Financed Operations by Approval Fiscal Year and Crisis Type



Note: A public health emergency investment project and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. FY = fiscal year.

3. Crisis Response Window Performance in Ensuring Timeliness, Transparency, and Predictability

The objectives of the CRW can be found in a series of IDA papers.¹ The discussion of the CRW includes a long and shifting list of objectives. Under the pilot, the key objective was to help countries deal with the impact of the global economic crisis by providing additional resources for short-term crisis mitigation to reduce the impact on countries' long-term development activities. It was expected that CRW would provide financial assistance to protect core spending on health, education, social safety nets, infrastructure and agriculture. Teams were encouraged to use instruments which would result in projects being rapidly implemented (World Bank 2009d).

When permanent CRW was established, its key objective was to protect core spending in the short-term and avoid derailing long-term development objectives. Other aims were (i) establishing a more systematic approach for IDA to respond to severe crises caused by exogenous shocks; (ii) enhancing IDA's capacity to provide rapid response and effectively participate in global disaster response efforts; and (iii) providing additional and predictable financing to countries hit by crises. Since natural disaster response was added to the CRW, a portion of CRW resources was to be used to strengthen disaster resilience with eligibility for only exceptionally severe and intense disasters. A two-stage process for eligibility was designed to ensure a systematic, predictable, and transparent allocation of CRW resources (World Bank 2010c). It was emphasized that special IDA windows like the CRW should not undermine core IDA objectives.

How did the CRW perform against these objectives? Some areas are easier to assess than others, and four of those against which performance can be judged are considered in this report.² They are the objectives of (i) rapid response, (ii) transparency and predictability,

¹ The main IDA reports in which CRW objectives are discussed are World Bank 2009c, 2009d, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012, 2015f, and 2018e.

² The IDA18 midterm review report on CRW addressed a different list of CRW objectives and found that the CRW has generally performed well against them. The report presents evidence that the CRW responded to the most severe crises. It argues that burden-sharing was reasonable so that access to CRW remained a last resort, with CRW funding comprising less than one-sixth of overall planned crisis response including other donors (although this ratio was not validated

(iii) support for resilience, and (iv) supporting long-term development objectives. Rapid response or the timeliness of CRW response to crises is discussed below. Transparency and predictability, as operationalized through the CRW eligibility process, is also discussed. Consideration of CRW's performance in helping countries return to their long-term development path is the focus of chapter 4, which also looks at support for resilience to future natural disasters and whether recently, CRW has helped countries comply with the principle of "build back better" (BBB). A brief discussion of the implications of special window financing for IDA core allocations concludes this chapter.

Timeliness

Quick response is essential in addressing a crisis, and there are indications that IDA's responses to various crises have been more rapid because of the CRW. The speed of response to the global financial crisis was striking. With financing from CRW, IDA prepared and delivered 51 operations (\$884 million in CRW financing) between February and end-June 2010. For natural disasters, IDA teams mobilized quickly, typically sending a team within a week of receiving a request from the government. After information was collected, usually in a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment undertaken in coordination with development partners, a request was made to the Board via a technical briefing to access CRW. The median time from the disaster date and the Board technical briefing was 86 days (World Bank 2018e).³

CRW operations have been timely, with average "time to delivery" much shorter than the average for World Bank IPF operations, and their speed in disbursing financing has been improving. Time to Delivery (average number of months for an investment project to move from concept note review to first disbursement) has fallen steadily, from an average of 20 months in FY10 to below six months since FY15 (figure 3.1).⁴ By this measure, CRW-financed operations have performed significantly better than World Bank-wide averages for investment operations. CRW-financed operations have also been timely in disbursement when gauged by median time from approval to first

ex post). Further, within the Bank Group, countries with greater uncommitted performance-based IDA allocations at the time of a crisis received relatively less CRW financing (adjusted for crisis severity), according to the report. Last, the IDA midterm review concludes that the CRW exercised flexibility when needed in special cases like the Ebola crisis (World Bank 2018e).


³ There is no benchmark for this indicator.

⁴ For time to delivery, the mean rather than the median is used, matching practice for World Bank-wide statistics.

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disbursement, with an average of 4.8 months (compared with 7.1 months for other IDA operations). CRW funded IPF median time from approval to disbursement of 5.5 months was shorter than other IDA IPF time to disbursement of 8.1 months, while CRW-financed DPF time to disbursement of 1.5 months was shorter than for other IDA DPFs (2.3 months), as reported in the IDA18 Midterm Review report on CRW (World Bank 2018e). This better-than-average and improving performance is evidence of the CRW's success in timely preparation and processing of operations.

Figure 3.1. Time to Delivery for CRW-Financed Operations



Note: Investment operations only. Time to delivery is average number of months from concept stage to first disbursement. For some operations missing concept review dates, the date of technical briefing to the Board is used. Years with data from fewer than five operations are omitted. Due to limited data, additional financing are included in the CRW operations. World Bank-wide data only available starting in FY12. The mean is used to allow comparison to World Bank reporting. The overall mean for FY10–17 for CRW operations was 14.2 while the median was 11.9 (and the World Bank average was 26.6). Without additional financing, the average for CRW operations for FY10–17 is 15.2. For some operations missing concept dates, the date of technical briefing to the Board is used, which raises the average time to delivery of CRW operations. By all these calculations, CRW operations were timely.

Speed in preparation and time to disbursement varied depending on the type of crisis, with public health emergency projects moving extremely fast. CRW operations for economic shocks had an average time from concept review to first disbursement of 19 months while those for natural disaster averaged 11 months. The six public health emergency projects averaged 3.5 months from concept review to first disbursement. As discussed in chapter 4, CRW timeliness may reflect the decision to attach CRW financing to operations likely to proceed quickly all the way to disbursement, in line with CRW guidance for teams to use instruments which result in projects being rapidly implemented (World Bank 2011d).

Transparency and Predictability

A second objective of the CRW—transparency and predictability—was operationalized through the CRW eligibility process, with good compliance. The two-stage process for access to CRW resources was designed to ensure a systematic, predictable, and transparent allocation of CRW resources, and CRW operations have followed the procedures set up for access. CRW-financed operations are required to lay out the justification for access to CRW funds in technical briefings to the Board, providing evidence that the country has been hit by an eligible crisis. The requirement for consulting with the Board on access to CRW was established with IDA16.⁵ Since then, all use of CRW has required an Eligibility Note submitted to the Board in advance of project preparation, except for Haiti. The response to Haiti’s earthquake was instead discussed with the IDA deputies as part of IDA16. However, important information in the Eligibility Notes was rarely incorporated into project documentation, and while acknowledgment of CRW funding was usually included in project documents, it rarely made it into project or country evaluations. These omissions have made it difficult to assess the adequacy of transparency and predictability, or achievement of other objectives discussed in the Eligibility Notes, beyond confirming compliance with the governance arrangements for access to CRW funds.

Tension with Core IDA Principles

IDA’s flexibility in response to special situations has been enhanced by the CRW which has proven to be useful complement to the IDA performance-based allocation system. But concerns have been voiced that the increasing use of special windows for IDA could undermine the performance-based allocation system. Special IDA windows have grown as a share of total IDA commitments, from 8 percent in IDA15 to 16 percent in IDA17. Within this total, CRW financing during IDA16 constituted about 1.5 percent of total IDA commitments, doubled to about 3 percent during IDA17 and underwent a significant scale-up in IDA18 to about 4 percent of much-expanded IDA resources, which was adjusted downwards in response to modest demand to about 3 percent at the time of the IDA18 Midterm Review (World Bank 2018f). As the use of IDA special windows has expanded, taking a growing share out of total IDA resources, Bank Management has argued that it is important to consider the trade-offs between the additional responsiveness of the windows and “the core IDA principle of non-earmarked country funding, which provides predictable, countercyclical funding in

⁵ The establishment of the CRW as a permanent window included a requirement to prepare a note for the Board on eligibility for access to CRW resources (World Bank 2010c).

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alignment with client priorities” (World Bank 2018d). The trade-offs associated with greater use of special windows and the core IDA principle of non earmarked financing could benefit from monitoring.

4. Crisis Response Window Performance in Supporting Long-Term Development Results

Another objective of the CRW is to return crisis-affected IDA countries to their long-term development paths. CRW financing is intended to help protect core spending on health, education, social safety nets, infrastructure, and agriculture in the short-term, thereby avoiding an erosion of progress achieved or a derailment of progress toward long-term development objectives. Progress toward this objective was assessed by reviewing IEG project and country-level evaluations for CRW-financed operations and try to assess the contribution of CRW. Findings and lessons at the project level from ICRRs and from the available country evaluations are reviewed and then grouped according to the type of crisis addressed. Suggestions on how to improve the evaluability of CRW's contribution to development effectiveness are included.

Attributions of the impact of CRW financing is made challenging by the fact that CRW funds are typically blended with other financing in supporting a project or operation. Omission of references to CRW financing in some project and most country documents further complicates attribution of impact. Moreover, CRW is rarely acknowledged in project or country evaluations. Nevertheless, and while the number of evaluations of CRW-financed operations completed to date is limited, they still provide valuable insights on the impact of the CRW and on how to improve the design and implementation of CRW-financed operations to strengthen development effectiveness.


CRW Performance at the Project Level

IEG ratings are available for many CRW-financed operations, but the bulk have not yet been evaluated. In total, IEG has rated 40 percent of CRW-financed operations constituting 23 percent of CRW financing (or 59 projects and \$1.0 billion). Not surprisingly, older projects are more likely to have been rated, and many newer operations have yet to close.¹ Almost two-thirds of IDA15 CRW projects have been rated, compared with a quarter of IDA16, 10 percent of IDA17, and none for IDA18. Since the CRW began as a vehicle to address economic shocks in the wake of the global financial crisis, almost 60 percent of projects responding to economic shocks have been rated, constituting 50 percent of financing, but only small proportions of natural disaster or public health emergency operations have been rated (Figure 4.1, panel a).


¹ For IDA16, 20 of 27 operations remain active; 33 of 38 IDA17 operations are active and all six IDA18 operations are active.

Figure 4.1. CRW-Financed Operations and IEG Ratings

a. CRW-financed operations rated by IEG (no.)



b. IEG ratings of CRW-financed operations



Note: A given project may receive more than one loan with CRW financing. A parent project with CRW financing may receive additional financing, part or all of which came from the CRW. Multiple projects with CRW financing may be rated together by IEG as part of a series. Health Emergency is public health emergencies. CRW = Crisis Response Window; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.

CRW-financed operations have performed better than the average IDA operation for project outcome and for Bank performance. Of the CRW operations with completion reports reviewed by IEG, 80 percent of operations (and 85 percent of financing) were rated moderately satisfactory or higher for outcome.² This performance surpasses that of all of IDA (68 percent by number and 75 percent by commitments rated moderately satisfactory or higher for projects closed during FY12–14). Within this group, as for IDA overall, IPFs appear to have performed better than DPFs, but the sample is small.³ Ratings for Bank performance are moderately satisfactory or better for 86 percent of CRW-financed projects (88 percent of financing) and also surpass overall IDA performance (70 percent of operations or 79 percent of commitments for projects closed during FY12–14 (figure 4.1, panel b; table 4.1; appendix C).

² Outcome ratings are based on ratings for (i) the relevance of objectives; (ii) efficacy or achievement of the project development objective; and (iii) efficiency (for invest investment policy financing (IPF) only).

³ Within rated CRW operations, 87 percent of IPFs were moderately satisfactory or higher for outcome compared with 70 percent of development policy financing (DPFs), with a sample composed of 32 IPFs and 27 DPFs. This performance is better than for IDA overall, with 71 percent of FY12–14 IPF operations rated moderately satisfactory or higher and 60 percent of DPFs.

The performance of CRW-financed operations for economic shocks was the strongest. More than 80 percent of rated economic shock operations (and 84 percent by financing) were rated moderately satisfactory or better by IEG. About 70 percent of natural disaster operations (and near 90 percent by financing) were rated moderately satisfactory or better. Too few public health emergency operations have been rated for the average to mean much yet. The first wave of CRW operations, prepared rapidly during the last 18 months of IDA15, have performed very well (figure 4.1, panel b; table 4.1).

Table 4.1. IEG Outcome Ratings, by Crisis Type

Rating	Economic Shock			Natural Disaster			Public Health Emergency			All CRW Operations		
	Proj. (no.)	IDA (\$, m)	o/w:	Proj. (no.)	IDA (\$, m)	o/w:	Proj. (no.)	IDA (\$, m)	o/w:	Proj. (no.)	IDA (\$, m)	o/w:
			CRW (\$, m)			CRW (\$, m)			CRW (\$, m)			
HS	1	55	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	55	5
S	11	275	129	3	415	110	—	—	—	14	690	239
MS	27	1,379	598	4	73	65	2	80	20	33	1,532	683
MU	8	336	110	3	28	28	—	—	—	11	364	138
U	1	71	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	71	16
NR	34	1,623	765	47	2,772	1,994	4	620	600	85	4,965	3,359
Total	82	3,738	1,622	57	3,288	2,197	6	700	620	145	7,726	4,439

Note: A public health emergency project and its additional financing were regional covering three countries. — = not available; comm = commitment; CRW = Crisis Window Response (commitment); HS = highly satisfactory; IDA = International Development Association (commitment); IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; m = millions; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; NR = not rated; Proj. = projects; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.

A common factor in poorly performing operations is a failure to take account of limited government capacity and the higher risks of complex projects or programs. For the nearly 20 percent of projects with moderately unsatisfactory ratings or worse, one lesson commonly recorded in ICRRs is that project or program design often did not sufficiently take into account the limited implementation capacity of the government. Especially in the wake of a crisis, project design should account for the capacity of country counterparts. For development policy operations, the complexity of prior actions and the degree of coordination needed between government departments should be a critical input in designing reform programs.

Crisis Response Window Performance at the Country Level

A review of country-level evaluations found that CRW financing was infrequently mentioned in self-evaluations (Completion and Learning Reports) or the IEG reviews. The 145 projects that received CRW funding were matched to available country

evaluations by IEG. The review included 44 IEG reviews of country strategy self-evaluations (CLRRs and their predecessors), and four Country Program Evaluations. This review found that the CRW was mentioned in country evaluations rarely, if at all. Even in cases where an operation was financed entirely from the CRW and supported the objectives and focus areas of the country program, this was not mentioned in the country evaluation. Although several IEG evaluations of country programs commented on the flexibility and responsiveness of IDA to a crisis and noted where countries adjusted their programs to meet the emergencies that arose, they did not explain how the CRW helped. Exceptions are the 2016 clustered Country Program Evaluation on small states that noted that demand for CRW finance in small states was very strong in response to cyclones; the evaluation for Liberia (2017) which identified the role of the CRW, both in addressing the Ebola epidemic and in providing supplemental financing for poverty reduction DPFs; the CLRR (2016) for Mozambique, which notes “the [Completion and Learning Report] does not report on what the World Bank did to mitigate the risks (for the program) except for the impact of floods in early 2014 where the World Bank provided emergency funding from the CRW”; and the Solomon Islands 2017 CLRR, which notes that the IDA allocation was leveraged by financing from the regional IDA program as well as CRW.

Strengthening the Evaluability of CRW Financing

Given the effort involved in justifying access to CRW financing ex ante, it is surprising that ex post self-evaluations rarely mention CRW financing. CRW-financed operations are required to lay out the justification for access to CRW funds in technical briefings to the Board, but this information is rarely mentioned in project documents or in the subsequent project or country self-evaluations. Project documents sometimes note, for example, that CRW financing has been used to address the financing gap caused by a crisis but no link to results is made. Project documents do occasionally indicate that CRW financing has been used to support objectives related to addressing the impact of the crisis. For example, project documents for Liberia’s Second Additional Financing Road Asset Management operation, which received CRW financing, describe how the operation helped to prevent the erosion of core development spending in health, education, social welfare, security and decentralization. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, project documents describe how CRW financing helped the investment program shift from mining and infrastructure to social sectors after the financial crisis.

To improve the evaluability of the CRW, its use needs to be more routinely recognized in operational documents and self-assessments at the project and country level. CRW resources are often pooled with regular IDA financing for operations as part of an

ongoing effort under emergency situations to leverage existing operations, mechanisms and capacity to reduce the administrative burden on the client (and the World Bank). Many CRW operations were prepared as additional financing, which uses the implementation arrangements and capacities of the parent project for support. This consolidation enables the client to have common reporting requirements for both CRW and non-CRW funding streams. The World Bank likewise stands to gain by leveraging economies of scale through the pooling of its internal budgetary resources. However, this pooling of financing raises methodological challenges in evaluating the value added of the CRW. The CRW has not become a standard part of self-evaluation. CRW operations were found to follow the main elements of the procedures set up for access to CRW financing; however, at the end of the country cycle, IEG country evaluations provide only some hints on the impact of CRW at the country level. It will remain difficult to judge CRW financing in practice until its use is consistently included in project and country evaluations, but recent efforts should assist. For IDA18, staff guidance on CRW processing includes templates that specify the use and size of CRW funds on the first page of Project Appraisal Documents. While it is methodologically challenging to attribute specific results to the CRW given the pooling of resources, more explicit reference to CRW-related activities in project and country documents, especially in ICRs and Completion and Learning Reports, should help clarify the value added by the CRW.

Countering Economic Shocks through the Crisis Response Window

CRW financing to counter the economic shocks of the global financial crisis was substantial and delivered quickly; this part of the window was not accessed again until FY17. CRW funding for economic shocks amounted to 82 operations totaling \$1,622 million from the beginning of the CRW pilot in mid-FY10 to end 2018. Of these, 75 projects (with \$1,106 million of CRW funding) were approved during FY10 and FY11 in response to the global financial crisis. This funding was significant for the countries receiving it, with the allocations for FY10–11 representing 9.5 percent of countries' regular IDA allocations. After the CRW's launch in December 2009, 51 operations (\$884 million in CRW financing) were approved to end-June 2010. In FY11, another 24 projects (with \$516 million of CRW financing) were approved, all in response to the global crisis. CRW funding to respond to economic shocks was not accessed again until FY17. Altogether, CRW operations in response to economic shocks have been undertaken by 48 countries, of which 27 were in the Africa Region. Two-thirds of CRW commitments went to projects in the Africa Region. Forty-nine were new operations, and the rest were provided as additional financing. Additional financing was extended to well-performing active operations that were expected to help crisis mitigation, or

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
where achievement of the project development objectives was threatened by crisis-related financial constraints. Additional financing amounted to \$501 million, or 35 percent of CRW commitments aimed at countering economic shocks (figure 4.2; appendixes A and B).

Table 4.2. CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, FY10–19

Region	Projects		CRW Commitment	
	(no.)	(percent)	(\$, millions)	(percent)
Africa	56	69	1,028	63
East Asia and Pacific	7	9	166	10
Europe and Central Asia	5	6	57	4
Latin America and the Caribbean	4	5	60	4
Middle East and North Africa	2	2	42	3
South Asia	8	10	270	17
Total	82	100	1,622	100

Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window.

Figure 4.2. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, by Region



Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.

Within CRW-financed operations, those addressing economic crises performed better than other CRW operations and better than IDA averages, according to IEG outcome ratings. To date, more than half of CRW projects for economic shocks have been rated by

IEG, and 81 percent of these (84 percent of financing) received an outcome rating of moderately satisfactory or better. IEG's ratings of Bank performance are similar. It is important to note that many fewer IPF operations than DPFs have been closed and rated so the apparent superior performance of economic crisis CRW operations may not be sustained (tables 4.1 and 4.3; figure 4.3).

IDA's experience in implementing the pilot CRW identified important elements of success in providing significant additional resources quickly. These included building on existing operations, close coordination with partners, preparation for future crises, capacity building, and resilience improvements. A World Bank report, prepared in October 2012 for the IDA15 replenishment, reviewed IDA experience under the pilot CRW. According to this report, the pilot CRW highlighted IDA's comparative advantage in responding to diverse country-specific situations and mobilizing support to affected sectors, helped by strong analytics. IDA country projects presented an efficient way to intervene quickly in the wake of economic shocks either through additional financing, which represented over 40 percent of pilot CRW resources, or through new projects that were aligned with existing implementation capacity. In addition, IDA's close coordination with other development partners such as the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, regional development banks and bilateral partners was seen to have helped address the critical gaps in emergency assistance and ensure a targeted response in areas where the CRW could make the most impact.

Table 4.3. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks, by Region, FY10–19

Rating	AFR		EAP		ECA		LCR		MNA		SAR		Total	
	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)
HS	1	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	5
S	6	69	2	19	2	27	1	14	—	—	—	—	11	129
MS	16	347	4	67	3	30	1	2	—	—	3	10	27	598
MU	6	64	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	46	8	110
U	1	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	16
NR	26	527	1	80	—	—	2	44	2	44	3	122	34	765
Total	56	1,028	7	166	5	57	4	60	2	42	8	271	82	1,630

Note: A public health emergency project and its additional financing were regional covering three countries. — = not available; AFR = Africa; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; HS = highly satisfactory; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; LCR = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = millions; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; NR = not rated; S = satisfactory; SAR = South Asia; U = unsatisfactory.

The experience gained from implementing the pilot CRW drew attention to the need to help countries prepare for the impact of multiple crises occurring simultaneously or in

close proximity, noting that climate change is expected to increase such trends (and response to natural disasters, to which CRW was extended after the pilot, requires a longer-term framework of investments to build countries' resilience over time). In addition, the experience gained re-emphasized the need for a continuous focus on strengthening countries' capacity to mitigate crises and improve their resilience (World Bank 2012b).

Lessons from a sample of ICRRs for CRW economic shock operations emphasize that speed of preparation and simple and flexible project design are important but longer-term objectives cannot be ignored. A review of ICRRs found multiple examples of CRW financing that allowed countries to continue social spending from spending on health in Mozambique to energy in Burundi to urban poverty in Djibouti—evidence that, at least in some cases, the CRW's objective was being achieved.⁴ ICRRs also highlighted that project design in postcrisis situations needs to account for various constraints. Bank teams need to strike a balance among speed, implementation risk, and project quality. In postcrisis situations, client capacity is often weakened, and project design and implementation should be simpler and be accompanied by technical assistance during implementation. For example, geographic targeting with more resources allocated to poorer households was found to work well for horizontal equity. In the case of the Senegal project, its highly satisfactory rating can be attributed partly to its innovative design that advocated social connection programs as the best way to achieve the water and sanitation Millennium Development Goals. Also, the implementation structures for ongoing operations may not fit the needs of a crisis response project, and technical assistance for project implementation may be warranted. An emerging lesson from the sample of ICRRs suggests that the World Bank could do more to guide the client toward longer-term benefits, for example, by suggesting alternatives to the system of cash transfers in Mongolia (table 4.4). Finally, stronger client ownership and commitment in crisis conditions may play a role in stronger performance.

⁴ Seven Implementation Completion and Results Report Reviews (ICRRS) for economic shock operations were selected for intensive review. Six of these were operations fully financed by CRW resources, under the hypothesis that such operations would be more likely to aim for CRW's high-level objective of protecting core spending and long-term development objectives. The seventh was the sole operation rated highly satisfactory and so might present useful lessons.

Table 4.4. Selected ICRRs for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shocks

Country	Project	Project ID	IDA (\$, m)	CRW (\$, m)	IEG Rating
Burundi	Emergency Energy Project from IDA CRW	P122217	15	15	MS
Central African Republic	Economic Management and Governance Reform Grant III	P120534	9	9	MU
Djibouti	Urban Poverty Reduction Project	P120190	3	3	MU
Mongolia	Second Development Policy Financing	P117421	30	30	MS
Mozambique	Health Commodity Security Project	P121060	39	39	MS
Senegal	Water and Sanitation	P109986	55	5	HS
Tanzania	Second Social Action Fund	P120881	35	35	S

Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window (commitment); HS = highly satisfactory; ICRR = Implementation Completion and Results Report; IDA = International Development Association; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.

Addressing Natural Disasters through the Crisis Response Window

CRW financing to address natural disasters included 57 projects accounting for \$2.2 billion in commitments. During IDA16, the CRW was used almost exclusively by countries that had been affected by natural disasters. Twenty-six projects financed from CRW, totaling \$937 million, addressed the fall-out from cyclones in Samoa and Tonga, drought in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, the earthquake in Haiti, and floods in Mozambique, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, a regional Horn of Africa project responded to drought. During IDA17, twenty-six projects for natural disasters were financed from CRW, totaling \$ 1.2 billion, for cyclones in Vanuatu and Tuvalu, drought in Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, earthquakes in Nepal, floods in Solomon Islands, Malawi, Myanmar, famine/drought in Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and the Republic of Yemen, and a hurricane in Haiti. During IDA18 so far, \$70 million in CRW funds have been allocated for hurricane recovery in Dominica and a cyclone in Tonga. Notably, 39 of the 57 CRW-supported projects intended to address natural disasters were designed in the aftermath of extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods, cyclones or hurricanes. These weather events are linked to climate change. Viewed in this light, the CRW reinforces IDA’s commitment to strengthening long-term climate change adaptation.

CRW financing for natural disasters flowed mostly to the Africa and Latin America regions and has favored IPF. About one-third of natural disaster-related commitments have been for projects in the Africa Region, with almost an equal share in the Latin America region. Of the 57 projects with CRW financing for natural disasters during IDA16, IDA17, and IDA18, IPF was the most common instrument used, with only six

uses of DPFs and one Program-for-Results. Out of the 57 operations, 28 were additional or supplemental financing (table 4.5; appendixes A and B).

Table 4.5. CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disasters, by Region, FY10–19

Region	Project		CRW Commitment	
	(no.)	(percent)	(\$, millions)	(percent)
Africa	18	32	753	34
East Asia and Pacific	12	21	212	10
Europe and Central Asia	1	2	100	5
Latin America and the Caribbean	19	33	694	32
Middle East and North Africa	4	7	138	6
South Asia	3	5	300	14
Total	57	100	2,197	100

Few natural disaster CRW-financed operations have been rated by IEG; to date, three of the 10 projects rated have fallen short on outcomes. Of 57 natural disaster projects, only 10 (and \$203 million in CRW financing) have been rated by IEG. Seven have been rated moderately satisfactory or above for outcome as well as Bank performance. Three projects were rated moderately unsatisfactory—two of which were rated moderately unsatisfactory for both outcome and Bank performance, the third of which was rated moderately satisfactory for Bank performance (table 4.6; appendix C).

Table 4.6. IEG Outcome Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disaster, by Region, FY10–19

Rating	AFR		EAP		ECA		LCR		MNA		SAR		Total	
	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)	(no.)	(\$, m)
HS	2	100	1	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	110
S	—	—	2	7	—	—	1	8	0	0	1	50	4	64
MS	—	—	1	3	—	—	1	20	1	5	—	—	3	28
MU	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
U	16	653	8	192	1	100	17	666	3	133	2	250	47	1,994
NR	18	753	12	212	1	100	19	694	4	138	3	300	57	2,197
Total	2	100	1	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	110

Note: — = not available; AFR = Africa; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; HS = highly satisfactory; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; LCR = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = millions; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; NR = not rated; S = satisfactory; SAR = South Asia; U = unsatisfactory.

ICRRs for CRW-financed operations addressing natural disasters identify features that contributed to better performance—partnering with other international institutions, careful instrument choice, good project design, and flexibility during implementation.

Development outcomes for IPFs in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia and a DPF in Samoa were rated satisfactory for development outcome. Contributing to this rating for the health and nutrition project in the Horn of Africa was the successful partnering with other agencies, in particular, UNHCR. This partnering helped to generate substantial efficiency gains. Instrument choice was difficult for Samoa, given the combination of a need to disburse funds rapidly after a cyclone but also for longer-term reforms, a development policy operation was selected. The instrument choice for Ethiopia – IPF – provided suitable support to the program and facilitated ongoing program evaluation, learning and adjustments. The importance of good project design that included advance analytic work and technical design in addition to addressing client capacity was a key lesson that emerged from these three projects. For Haiti’s urban project, redesign was needed at the midterm review, as a consequence of which the project was able to set up a strong foundation for disaster response efforts in public neighborhood infrastructure. By comparison, (complex) project design and (weak) client capacity influenced the moderately unsatisfactory rating for a Second Additional Financing for Power Access and Diversification in Djibouti’s energy project and the DPFs for Haiti and Tuvalu. As for economic shock operations, client ownership and commitment may play a role in boosting performance (table 4.7).

Table 4.7. ICRRs for CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disasters

Country	Project	IDA (\$, millions)	CRW (\$, millions)	IEG Rating
Djibouti	Second AF for Power Access and Diversification	5	5	MU
Ethiopia	Productive Safety Nets Project Third Adaptable Program Loan	370	70	S
Haiti	Economic Reconstruction and Growth Development Policy Credit	20	20	MU
Haiti	Urban Community-Driven Development Project	8	8	MS
Horn of Africa	Horn of Africa Emergency Health and Nutrition Project	30	30	S
Nepal	Road Sector Development Project	55	50	MS
Samoa	Development Policy Operation	15	10	S
Samoa	Agriculture and Fisheries Cyclone Response	5	5	MS
Solomon Islands	Economic Reform and Recovery Operation	5	2	MS
Tuvalu	Supplemental Financing for Second Development Policy Operation	3	3	MU ^a

Note: AF = Additional Financing; CRW = Crisis Response Window; DPO = development policy operation; ICCR = Implementation Completion and Results Report Review; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.

a. The ICRR notes that MU was the rating given to the entire series of DPFs for Tuvalu, focusing primarily on DPO1 and DPO2 with an IDA commitment (revised) of \$7.5 million and \$7.7 million (actual), with little information on the CRW-financed supplemental operation.

CRW Objective of Support for Resilience Build Back Better Principles

The CRW committed to strengthen resilience to future shocks as part of the response to natural disasters, which in recent years has translated to adoption the principle of BBB. Although the CRW is designed to provide speedy responses to crises—in this case, natural disasters—it also aims to foster resilience to future natural disasters, despite the inevitable tension between these two goals.⁵ Since it is expected that CRW financing will be applied to well-designed operations, those addressing natural disasters should, in theory, already apply BBB principles in their design (box 4.1).

⁵ When the permanent CRW was established, it was specified that “unless addressed by preexisting projects, CRW resources would be provided under the presumption that a portion of these resources would be used to strengthen disaster resilience” (World Bank 2010c).

Box 4.1. Build Back Better Principles Emerge from Global Review

“Build back better” was set out as part of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015, and it is considered good practice in World Bank operations (UNISDR 2015, World Bank 2017b). Recently, a 2018 World Bank report, *Building Back Better: Achieving Resilience Through Stronger, Faster and More Inclusive Post-Disaster Reconstruction*, examined extensive evidence on disaster resilience and proposed “build back better” principles as good practice. Build back better leads to repaired or replaced assets being more resilient, and the recovery process being shorter, more efficient, and not leaving anyone behind. The report reviewed experience in 149 countries, including 17 small island states. It found that, in small island states in particular, better postdisaster recovery and reconstruction efforts reduced annual losses by an average of 59 percent. When countries rebuild stronger, faster and more inclusively after natural disasters, they can reduce the impact on people’s livelihoods and well-being by as much as 31 percent, potentially cutting global average losses from \$555 to \$382 billion per year (Hallegatte 2018).

CRW-financed operations for natural disaster response since the establishment of the Sendai Framework in 2015 have generally followed BBB principles, with some projects incorporating elements of resilience building such as better construction standards, new technologies, and improved government capacity. A sample of CRW-financed operations illuminates how BBB is being incorporated. Five disaster relief projects with CRW financing approved during IDA15, IDA16, and IDA17 that included BBB were selected to see how those elements were incorporated into design and implementation. The projects from Bangladesh, Malawi, Nepal, Tonga, and Bosnia and Herzegovina include a variety of detailed BBB actions. In Bangladesh, the project is funding new technologies for farmers to improve resilience to saline water inundation and studies to assess reconstruction of shelters and embankments that would withstand disasters.⁶ The Malawi project is helping reconstruct critical public infrastructure (roads, schools and health facilities) to improved standards and developing national building codes. The Nepal project is financing multihazard resistant core housing units, applying resilient and innovative technologies for constructing rural homes. In Tonga, the project is strengthening government ability to BBB and supporting retrofitting and construction of dwellings according to “resistant standards.” The Bosnia and Herzegovina project supports better resilience of infrastructure to future flooding and landslides. Although ICRRs are not yet available, supervision reports on the Bangladesh project, which has been under implementation the longest, provide some early lessons: (i) supporting country systems is critical for timely response; (ii) multisector projects require adequate planning for coordination and implementation arrangements; (iii) land acquisition procedures for emergency situations need to be accelerated; (iv) a well-defined results

⁶ Note that because the Bangladesh project was part of the pilot CRW during IDA15, it is defined as responding to an economic crisis, the underlying reason for which is a cyclone.

and monitoring and evaluation framework enhances achievement of outcome; and (v) regular community consultations can guide the appropriate choice of investments and generate practical improvements to increase impact.

Responding to Public Health Emergencies through the Crisis Response Window

During IDA17, the CRW was used to respond to a public health emergency (Ebola) as an exception to CRW policy, and the CRW was expanded to include such crises. Six public health emergency projects have been approved, with CRW financing of \$620 million. The World Bank was a vital member of the coalition against the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 and 2015 and mobilized needed financial resources (World Bank 2017j). Part of this response was \$420 million from the CRW for Ebola in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2015. Most recently, in 2017, IDA allocated \$200 million from the CRW to the Republic of Yemen to cope with one of the world’s worst cholera outbreaks amid continuous conflict that had driven gross domestic product down by 40 percent. The World Bank responded within two months with additional financing of \$200 million in the form of an IDA grant completely financed by CRW resources (table 4.8).

Table 4.8. CRW Allocations for Public Health Emergencies, FY10–19

Region	Projects		CRW Commitment	
	(no.)	(percent)	(\$, millions)	(percent)
Africa	5	83	420	67
Middle East and North Africa	1	17	200	32
Total	6	100	620	100

Note: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. CRW = Crisis Response Window.

There is yet little evaluative evidence about the public health emergency CRW operations, but the two available ICRRs point to the success of rapid preparation and partnering with other donors while falling short on longer-term objectives. It is worth noting that while a postdisaster CRW operation is designed and implemented in the aftermath of a crisis, a public health emergency operation is often designed and implemented during an ongoing epidemic, a factor which may contribute to variations in performance. The two evaluated projects are moderately satisfactory on outcome and Bank performance. The Sierra Leone DPF aimed to strengthen budget management and reduce fiscal risks heightened by the Ebola epidemic as well as improve public transparency and accountability. It was rated moderately satisfactory due to shortfalls in strengthening longer-term fiscal management. The other ICRR is for a Guinea DPF, which aimed to strengthen management of public funds in response to the Ebola crisis

and address related macroeconomic and fiscal shocks. Processing had a compressed schedule of six weeks and was undertaken in close cooperation with a multidonor support group. While the operation introduced monitoring and accountability arrangements critical to ensuring effective use of donor support and triggered early steps toward public financial reform, none of the original targets were fully achieved. Importantly, no supervision report was prepared for this operation, partly explained by the high-risk operational environment, preventing adequate verification of monitoring and evaluation data (table 4.9; appendix C).

Table 4.9. IEG Outcome Ratings for Crisis Response Window Allocations for Health, by Region

Rating	AFR		MNA		Total	
	Projects (no.)	CRW comm. (\$, millions)	Projects (no.)	CRW comm. (\$, millions)	Projects (no.)	CRW comm. (\$, millions)
S	—	—	—	—	—	—
MS	2	20	—	—	2	20
MU	—	—	—	—	—	—
U	—	—	—	—	—	—
NR	3	400	1	200	4	600
Total	5	420	1	200	6	620

Note: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. comm. = commitment; CRW = Crisis Response Window; IEG = Independent Evaluation Group; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; NR = not rated; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.

Country and sector evaluations illuminate the important role of the World Bank in fighting the Ebola epidemic, but acknowledgment of CRW assistance is scarce. The recent IEG evaluation on Bank Group support to health services notes the importance of capable health systems in responding effectively to deadly virus outbreaks. It noted also that the World Bank’s financing and coordination role are more important in countries with lower institutional capacity and more complex development partner networks, implicitly supporting CRW’s role on health in IDA countries (World Bank 2017j). Of the four countries that have been allocated CRW financing for public health emergencies, country-level evaluations are available for two. In the case of Guinea, the Ebola Emergency Response Project and its additional financing and the Emergency Macroeconomic and Fiscal Support Grant supported the country program objective to contribute in the short term to the control of the Ebola outbreak and the availability of selected essential health services, while mitigating social and economic impacts. IEG rated this objective as achieved in its 2017 CLRR. However, the role played by the CRW was not discussed. By contrast, the 2017 CLRR for Liberia noted that the CRW supported the regional Ebola emergency operations and provided supplemental

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financing for a the ongoing programmatic DPF series. The Ebola Emergency Response Project and its additional financing helped to support two objectives of the country program that targeted the improved capacity of health service delivery in selected secondary level health facilities and improved protection of poor and vulnerable households. Both objectives were rated as mostly achieved by IEG.

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Appendix A. Projects with Crisis Response Window Funding, by Crisis Type

Table A.1. Crisis Response Window Funding for Economic Shocks

IDA Cycle	FY	Country	Project Name	Lending Instrument	AF or SF	IDA Comm. (\$, millions)	CRW Comm. (\$, millions)	IEG Outcome Rating
IDA15	FY10	Senegal	Water and Sanitation Millennium Project	IPF		55.0	5.1	HS
IDA15	FY10	Maldives	Economic Stabilization and Recovery Credit	DPF		13.7	1.6	MU
IDA15	FY10	Haiti	Infrastructure and Institutional Emergency Recovery Project	IPF		65.0	25.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Road Sector Project	IPF		27.8	8.8	S
IDA15	FY10	Lesotho	Second Poverty Reduction Support Credit and Grant (PRSCG-2)	DPF		25.0	10.2	MS
IDA15	FY10	Rwanda	Sixth Poverty Reduction Support Grant	DPF		115.8	29.8	MS
IDA15	FY10	Republic of Yemen	Social Fund for Development Phase IV Project	IPF		60.0	38.8	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Nepal	Second HNP and HIV/AIDS Project	IPF		129.2	44.2	MU
IDA15	FY10	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Lao Uplands Food Security Improvement Project	IPF		10.0	10.0	S
IDA15	FY10	Bhutan	Second Urban Development Project	IPF		12.0	3.6	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Benin	Sixth Poverty Reduction Development Policy Financing	DPF		30.0	9.9	MU
IDA15	FY10	Kenya	Kenya Youth Empowerment Project	IPF		60.0	30.0	S
IDA15	FY10	São Tomé and Príncipe	Additional Financing for the Social Sector Support Project	IPF	AF	2.1	1.1	MS

Appendix A
 Projects with Crisis Response
 Window Funding, by Crisis Type

IDA15	FY10	Côte d'Ivoire	Third Economic Governance and Recovery Grant	DPF		90.0	15.0	MS
IDA15	FY10	Tajikistan	Additional Financing for Energy Emergency Recovery Assistance Project	IPF	AF	15.0	15.0	MS
IDA15	FY10	Samoa	Economic Crisis Recovery Support Credit	DPF		20.0	20.0	MS
IDA15	FY10	Ghana	Social Opportunities Project	IPF		88.6	47.5	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Togo	Third Economic Recovery and Governance Grant	DPF		16.3	4.3	MS
IDA15	FY10	Uganda	Uganda Health Systems Strengthening Project	IPF		130.0	30.0	MS
IDA15	FY10	Nepal	Additional Financing for Social Safety Nets Project	IPF	AF	47.8	44.8	MS
IDA15	FY10	Tanzania	Transport Sector Support Project	IPF		270.0	15.2	MS
IDA15	FY10	Kenya	Kenya Electricity Expansion Project	IPF		330.0	29.9	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Tanzania	Tanzania Strategic Cities Project	IPF		163.0	10.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Tanzania	Tanzania Agriculture Sector Development Project - Second Additional Financing	IPF	AF	35.0	35.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Senegal	Transport and Urban Mobility Project	IPF		55.0	5.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Senegal	Fourth Poverty Reduction Support Development Policy Financing	DPF		43.0	9.4	MU
IDA15	FY10	Nicaragua	Additional Financing for Fourth Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project	IPF	AF	39.3	14.2	S
IDA15	FY10	Comoros	Emergency Crises Response Project	IPF		5.3	1.5	S
IDA15	FY10	Afghanistan	Additional Financing for Strengthening Health Activities for the Rural Poor Project	IPF	AF	49.0	49.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Mali	Fourth Poverty Reduction Support Credit	DPF		70.5	15.6	U
IDA15	FY10	Tanzania	Second Social Action Fund Project - Additional Financing - Additional Credit II	IPF	AF	35.0	35.0	n.a.

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IDA15	FY10	Malawi	Third Poverty Reduction Support Development Policy Financing	DPF		54.0	14.0	MS
IDA15	FY10	Djibouti	Additional Financing for Djibouti Urban Poverty Reduction Project	IPF	AF	2.9	2.9	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Sierra Leone	Supplemental Financing for the Third Governance Reform and Growth Credit	DPF		7.0	7.0	S
IDA15	FY10	Lao People's Democratic Republic	Sixth Poverty Reduction Support Operation	DPF		20.0	10.0	MS
IDA15	FY10	Côte d'Ivoire	Additional Financing for Côte d'Ivoire Emergency Urban Infrastructure Project	IPF	AF	50.0	15.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Democratic Republic of Congo	Additional Financing for the Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project	IPF	AF	40.0	40.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Tajikistan	Fourth Programmatic Development Policy Financing	DPF		25.4	8.6	MS
IDA15	FY10	Afghanistan	Additional Financing for Strengthening Higher Education Project and Amendment to the Development Grant	IPF	AF	20.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Moldova	Economic Recovery Development Policy Financing	DPF		25.0	11.1	S
IDA15	FY10	Liberia	Youth, Employment, Skills Project	IPF		6.0	6.0	MU
IDA15	FY10	Mauritania	Additional Financing for the Urban Development Project	IPF	AF	25.5	15.5	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Mongolia	Multi-Sectoral Technical Assistance Project	IPF		12.0	7.2	MS
IDA15	FY10	Guinea-Bissau	Second Economic Governance Reform Development Policy Financing	DPF		6.0	6.0	S
IDA15	FY10	Honduras	Social Protection Project	IPF		40.0	18.6	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Burkina Faso	Tenth Poverty Reduction Support Grant	DPF		90.0	19.9	MU

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IDA15	FY10	Gambia, The	Third Education Sector Project in Support of the Second Phase of the Education Sector Program - First Additional Financing	IPF	AF	5.5	5.5	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Togo	Additional Financing for Community Development Project	IPF	AF	8.7	8.7	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Liberia	Additional Financing for Urban and Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project	IPF	AF	20.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY10	Sierra Leone	Youth Employment Support Project	IPF		20.0	20.0	MS
IDA15	FY10	Malawi	Additional Financing for Third Social Action Fund Project (Phase II)	IPF	AF	14.0	14.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY11	Benin	Additional Financing for National Community-Driven Development Support Project	IPF	AF	12.0	12.0	S
IDA15	FY11	Guinea-Bissau	Emergency Electricity & Water Rehabilitation Project	IPF		12.7	12.7	n.a.
IDA15	FY11	Sri Lanka	Small and Medium Enterprise Development Facility Project	IPF		57.4	57.4	MS
IDA15	FY11	Lesotho	Additional Financing for the Integrated Transport Project	IPF	AF	15.0	5.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY11	Central African Republic	Third Economic Management and Governance Reform Grant	DPF		8.8	8.8	MU
IDA15	FY11	Malawi	Additional Financing for Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Development Project	IPF	AF	12.7	12.7	S
IDA15	FY11	Zambia	Additional Financing for the Increased Access to Electricity Services Project	IPF	AF	20.0	10.0	n.a.
IDA15	FY11	Bangladesh	Additional Financing for the Emergency 2007 Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project	IPF	AF	75.0	49.6	MS

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Window Funding, by Crisis Type

IDA15	FY11	Central African Republic	Additional Financing for the Emergency Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project	IPF	AF	23.9	10.1	n.a.
IDA15	FY11	Cameroon	Urban and Water Development Support Project - Additional Financing	IPF	AF	28.7	28.7	n.a.
IDA15	FY11	Uganda	Eighth Poverty Reduction Support Development Policy Financing	DPF		100.0	40.1	MS
IDA15	FY11	Kosovo	First Sustainable Employment Development Policy Operation Program	DPF		6.3	6.3	MS
IDA15	FY11	Ethiopia	Agricultural Growth Program	IPF		150.0	86.4	MS
IDA15	FY11	Gambia, The	Growth and Competitiveness Project	IPF		12.0	5.1	MS
IDA15	FY11	Liberia	Reengagement and Reform Support Program III	DPF		11.0	6.0	MS
IDA15	FY11	Mozambique	Water Services and Institutional Support Project	IPF		37.0	26.1	n.a.
IDA15	FY11	Burkina Faso	Additional Financing for a Transport Sector Project	IPF	AF	16.0	16.0	MS
IDA15	FY11	Mali	Additional Financing for Rural Community Development Project	IPF	AF	11.2	11.2	n.a.
IDA15	FY11	Mozambique	Health Commodity Security Project	IPF		39.0	39.0	MS
IDA15	FY11	Burundi	Emergency Energy Project	IPF		15.4	15.4	MS
IDA15	FY11	Kyrgyz Republic	Emergency Recovery Project	IPF		70.0	15.7	S
IDA15	FY11	Guyana	Improving Teacher Education Project	IPF		4.2	1.8	MS
IDA15	FY11	Zambia	Second Additional Financing for Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project	IPF	AF	15.0	9.7	MU
IDA15	FY11	Mongolia	Second Development Policy Financing	DPF		29.7	29.7	MS
IDA17	FY17	Liberia	LR-PRSC III	DPF		40.0	8.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Chad	Development Policy Operations	DPF	SF	80.0	80.0	n.a.

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 Projects with Crisis Response
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IDA17	FY17	Guinea	West Africa Agric Prod Program (WAAPP-1C)	IPF	AF	23.0	15.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Liberia	Second AF LR Road Asset Management	IPF	AF	40.0	12.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Guinea	GN: Economic Governance Technical Assist	IPF	AF	22.0	7.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Sierra Leone	Productivity and Transparency Support Cr	DPF		30.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA18	FY18	Mongolia	Economic Management Support Operation First DPF	DPF		120.0	80.0	n.a.

Note: Projects are sorted (oldest to newest) by approval date. AF = additional financing; FY = approval year; DPF = development policy financing; IPF = investment project financing. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory; n.a. = not available.

Table A.2. Crisis Response Window Funding for Natural Disasters

IDA Cycle	FY	Country	Project Name	Lending Instrument	AF or SF	IDA Amt (\$, millions)	CRW Amt (\$, millions)	IEG Outcome Rating
IDA16	FY12	Africa Regional Project	Horn of Africa Emergency Health and Nutrition Project	IPF		30.0	30.0	S
IDA16	FY12	Haiti	Haiti Education for All Project - Phase II	IPF		70.0	70.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY12	Haiti	Disaster Risk Management and Reconstruction Project	IPF		60.0	60.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY12	Haiti	Relaunching Agriculture: Strengthening Agriculture Public Services II Project	IPF		40.0	40.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY12	Kenya	Health Sector Support Project - Additional Financing	IPF	AF	56.8	56.8	n.a.
IDA16	FY12	Ethiopia	Additional Financing Productive Safety Net APL III Project	IPF	AF	370.0	70.0	S
IDA16	FY12	Kenya	Additional Financing for Water and Sanitation Services Improvement Project	IPF	AF	300.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY12	Djibouti	Social Safety Net Project	IPF		5.0	5.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY12	Djibouti	Second Additional Financing for Power Access and Diversification Project	IPF	AF	5.2	5.2	MU
IDA16	FY12	Djibouti	Additional Financing for Rural Community Development and Water Mobilization Project (PRODERMO)	IPF	AF	3.0	3.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY13	Haiti	Rebuilding Energy Infrastructure and Access Project	IPF		90.0	90.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY13	Haiti	Additional Financing for Infrastructure and Institutions Emergency Recovery Project	IPF	AF	35.0	35.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY13	Haiti	Improving Maternal and Child Health through Integrated Social Services Project	IPF		70.0	70.0	n.a.

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IDA16	FY13	Haiti	Business Development and Investment Project	IPF		20.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY13	Haiti	Economic Reconstruction and Growth Development Policy Financing	DPF		20.0	20.0	MU
IDA16	FY14	Samoa	Development Policy Financing	DPF		15.0	10.0	S
IDA16	FY14	Mozambique	National Water Resources Development Flood Response Project	IPF	AF	32.0	32.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY14	Samoa	Enhanced Road Access Project	IPF		20.0	5.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY14	Samoa	Agriculture and Fisheries Cyclone Response Project	IPF		5.0	5.0	MS
IDA16	FY14	Mozambique	Roads and Bridges Management Maintenance Project Phase II	IPF	AF	39.4	39.4	n.a.
IDA16	FY14	St. Vincent and the Grenadines	Regional Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project - Additional Financing	IPF	AF	35.6	19.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY14	Haiti	Center & Artibonite Regional Development Project	IPF		50.0	50.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY14	Haiti	Cultural Heritage and Tourism Sector	IPF		45.0	45.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY14	Tonga	Cyclone Reconstruction	IPF		12.0	12.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY14	St. Lucia	Disaster Vulnerability Reduction Project	IPF		41.0	17.0	n.a.
IDA16	FY14	Haiti	Urban CDD Project AF	IPF	AF	7.5	7.5	MS
IDA16	FY14	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Floods Emergency Recovery Project	IPF		100.0	100.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY15	Solomon Islands	Solomon Islands Rural Development Program II	IPF		9.0	4.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY15	Solomon Islands	Economic Reform and Recovery DPO	DPF		5.0	2.0	MS
IDA17	FY15	Malawi	Floods Emergency Recovery	IPF		80.0	80.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY15	Nepal	Financial sector stability DPC2	DPF		100.0	50.0	n.a.

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IDA17	FY15	Nepal	Earthquake Housing Reconstruction Project	IPF		200.0	200.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY16	Solomon Islands	AF for SB-Rapid Employment Project	IPF	AF	1.5	1.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY16	Tuvalu	Supplemental Financing for Second DPO	DPF	SF	3.0	3.0	MU ^a
IDA17	FY16	Vanuatu	Infrastructure Reconstruction and Improvement Project	IPF		50.0	50.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY16	Ethiopia	Additional Financing PSNP IV	IPF	AF	100.0	100.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Myanmar	Flood and Landslide Emergency Recovery Project	IPF		200.0	100.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Nepal	Road Sector Development Project	IPF	AF	55.0	50.0	MS
IDA17	FY17	Malawi	Second Additional Financing for MASAF IV	IPF	AF	70.0	11.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Malawi	Malawi Drought Recovery and Resilience	IPF		104.0	9.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Madagascar	Social Safety Net Drought Response	IPF	AF	35.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Lesotho	Crisis response AF to SA project	IPF		20.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Mozambique	Emergency Resilient Recovery Project AF	IPF	AF	20.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Mozambique	Social Safety Net project	IPF	AF	10.0	10.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Kenya	AF for the NSNP	P4R	AF	50.0	35.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Ethiopia	ET Productive Safety Nets Project 4	IPF	AF	108.1	100.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	South Sudan	Emergency Food and Nutrition	IPF		50.0	50.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Yemen, Rep.	Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project	IPF	AF	200.0	125.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Somalia	Emergency Drought Response and Recovery Project	IPF		50.0	50.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Haiti	Disaster Risk Management & Reconstruction	IPF	AF	20.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Haiti	Agriculture and Rural Development	IPF	AF	35.0	35.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Haiti	Sustainable Rural WSS Project	IPF	AF	20.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY17	Haiti	Improving Maternal and Child Health	IPF	AF	25.0	25.0	n.a.

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IDA18	FY18	Dominica	Emergency Agricultural Livelihoods and Climate Resilience Project	IPF		25.0	20.0	n.a.
IDA18	FY18	Dominica	Housing Recovery Project	IPF	AF	40.0	30.0	n.a.
IDA18	FY18	Tonga	Supplemental Financing to the Second Inclusive Growth Development Policy Operation	DPF	AF	10.0	10.0	n.a.
IDA18	FY19	Tonga	Additional Financing to Pacific Resilience Project under the Pacific Resilience Program	IPF	AF	14.95	10.00	n.a.

Note: Projects are sorted (oldest to newest) by approval date. DPF = development policy financing; FY = approval year; IPF = investment project financing; P4R = Program-for-Results. HS = highly satisfactory; S = satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; U = unsatisfactory; n.a. = not available.

a. The ICRR notes that MU was the rating given to the entire series of DPOs, focusing primarily on DPO1 and DPO2 with an IDA commitment (revised) of \$7.5 million and \$7.7 million (actual) with little information on the CRW-financed supplemental.

Table A.3. Crisis Response Window Funding for Public Health Emergencies

IDA Cycle	FY	Country	Project Name	Lending Instrument	AF or SF	IDA Amt (\$, millions)	CRW Amt (\$, millions)	IEG Outcome Rating
IDA17	FY15	Guinea	Ebola Emergency Response Project	IPF		25.0	25.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY15	Liberia	Ebola Emergency Response Project	IPF		52.0	52.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY15	Sierra Leona	Ebola Emergency Response Project	IPF		28.0	28.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY 15	Liberia	Poverty Reduction Support Credit II	DPF		30.0	10.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY 15	Guinea	Emergency Macroeconomic and Fiscal Support Grant	DPF		50.0	10.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY 15	Guinea	Ebola Emergency Response Project – Additional Financing	IPF	AF	72.0	72.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY 15	Liberia	Ebola Emergency Response Project – Additional Financing	IPF	AF	115.0	115.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY 15	Sierra Leona	Ebola Emergency Response Project – Additional Financing	IPF	AF	98.0	98.0	n.a.
IDA17	FY 15	Sierra Leona	Emergency Economic and Fiscal Support Operation (EEFSO)	DPF		30.0	10.0	MS
IDA18	FY 18	Yemen, Rep.	Yemen Emergency Health and Nutrition Project Second Additional Financing	IPF	AF	200.0	200.0	n.a.

Note: The Ebola Emergency Response Project and its additional financing were both regional projects covering Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. They are split by country here to show financing amounts. Projects are sorted (oldest to newest) by approval date. FY = approval fiscal year; DPF = development policy financing; IPF = investment project financing. HS = highly satisfactory; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; n.a. = not available; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.

Appendix B. Instruments Used with Crisis Response Window Financing, by Crisis Type

Table B.1. Instruments Used with Crisis Response Window Financing for Economic Shocks

Instrument	Projects					Projects Rated				
	No.	IDA (\$, m)	CRW (\$, m)	% of IDA	% of CRW	No.	IDA (\$, m)	CRW (\$, m)	% of IDA	% of CRW
Development policy financing	25	1,077.5	471.3	28.8	29.0	21	807.5	283.2	38.2	33.0
Investment project financing	57	2,660.8	1,150.7	71.2	70.9	27	1,308.1	574.0	61.8	67.0
Total	82	3,738	1,622	100	100	48	2,116	857	100	100

Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window (commitment); IDA = International Development Association (commitment); m = millions.

Table B.2. Instruments Used with Crisis Response Window Financing for Natural Disasters

Instrument	Projects					Projects Rated				
	No.	IDA (\$, m)	CRW (\$, m)	% of IDA	% of CRW	No.	IDA (\$, m)	CRW (\$, m)	% of IDA	% of CRW
Development policy financing	6	153.0	95.0	4.7	4.3	4	43.0	35.0	8.3	17.2
Program-for-Results	1	50.0	35.0	1.5	1.6	—	—	—	—	—
Investment project financing	50	3,085.1	2,066.9	93.8	94.1	6	472.7	167.7	91.6	82.6
Total	57	3,288	2,197	100	100	10	516	203	100	100

Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window (commitment); IDA = International Development Association (commitment); m = millions.

Table B.3. Instruments Used with Crisis Response Window Financing for Public Health Emergencies

Instrument	Projects					Projects Rated				
	No.	IDA (\$, m)	CRW (\$, m)	% of IDA	% of CRW	No.	IDA (\$, m)	CRW (\$, m)	% of IDA	% of CRW
Development policy financing	3	110	30	15.7	4.8	2	80	20	100	100
Investment project financing	3	590	590	84.3	95.2	0	—	—	—	—
Total	6	700	620	100	100	2	80	20	100	100

Note: An investment project and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. ICRR Ratings for Bank Performance. CRW = Crisis Response Window (commitment); IDA = International Development Association (commitment); m = millions.

Appendix C. Bank Performance Ratings for Crisis Response Window–Financed Operations

Table C.1. Bank Performance Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations, by Crisis Type, FY10–19

	Rating				Not Rated	Total
	S	MS	MU	U		
Economic Shock						
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	11	30	6	—	35	82
IDA commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	369	1,379	294	—	1,698	3,738
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	119	594	95	—	814	1,622
Natural Disaster						
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	1	7	2	—	47	57
IDA commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	30	461	25	—	2,772	3,288
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	30	148	25	—	1,994	2,197
Public Health						
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	2	—	—	4	6
IDA commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	80	—	—	620	700
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	20	—	—	600	620

Note: A public health emergency project and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. CRW = Crisis Response Window; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.

Table C.2. Bank Performance Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Economic Shock, by Region, FY10–19

Region	Rating				Not Rated
	S	MS	MU	U	
Africa					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	6	19	5	—	26
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	49	401	51	—	527
East Asia and Pacific					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	2	4	—	—	1
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	29	57	—	—	80
Europe and Central Asia					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	2	3	—	—	0
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	27	30	—	—	0
Latin America and the Caribbean					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	1	1	—	—	2
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	14	2	—	—	44
Middle East and North Africa					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	—	—	—	2
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	—	—	—	42
South Asia					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	3	1	—	4
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	104	44	—	122
Total					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	11	30	6	—	35
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	119	594	95	—	814

Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.

Appendix C
Bank Performance Ratings for Crisis
Response Window–Financed Operations

Table C.3. Bank Performance Ratings for CRW-Financed Operations for Natural Disaster, by Region, FY10–19

Region	Rating				Not Rated
	S	MS	MU	U	
Africa					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	1	1	—	—	16
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	30.0	70.0	—	—	653.2
East Asia and Pacific					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	4	—	—	9
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	20.0	—	—	192.0
Europe and Central Asia					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	—	—	—	1
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	—	—	—	100.0
Latin America and the Caribbean					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	1	1	—	17
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	7.5	20	—	666.0
Middle East and North Africa					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	—	1	—	3
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	—	5.2	—	133.0
South Asia					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	1	—	—	2
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	50.0	—	—	250.0
Total					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	1	6	2	—	48
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	30.0	144.5	25.2	—	1,997.2

Note: CRW = Crisis Response Window; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.

Table C.4. Bank Performance Ratings for CRW Allocations for Public Health, by Region, FY10–19

Region	Rating				Not Rated
	S	MS	MU	U	
Africa					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	2	—	—	3
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	20.0	—	—	400
Middle East and North Africa					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	—	—	—	1
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	—	—	—	200
Total					
Projects (<i>no.</i>)	—	2	—	—	4
CRW commitment (\$, <i>millions</i>)	—	20.0	—	—	600.0

Note: A project in Africa and its additional financing were regional, covering three countries. CRW = Crisis Response Window; MS = moderately satisfactory; MU = moderately unsatisfactory; S = satisfactory; U = unsatisfactory.