



<b>1. CAS/CPS Data</b>	
<b>Country:</b> Togo	
<b>CAS/CPS Year:</b> FY08	<b>ISN Period:</b> FY08 – FY10 and FY12-FY13
<b>CLR Period:</b> FY08 –FY17	<b>Date of this review:</b> May 10, 2017

<b>2. Ratings</b>		
	<b>CLR Rating</b>	<b>IEG Rating</b>
<b>Development Outcome:</b>	<i>Not Rated</i>	<i>Not Rated</i>
<b>WBG Performance:</b>	<i>Not Rated</i>	<i>Not Rated</i>

**3. Executive Summary**

i. This is a validation of the Completion and Learning Review (CLR) for the World Bank Group’s (WBG) engagement in Togo covering two Interim Strategy Notes (ISNs) for the period, FY08-FY10; and FY12-13. In line with the CLR, IEG does not rate the overall development outcome and the WBG’s performance due to data limitations.

ii. After Togo became independent in 1960, income per capita almost doubled to reach \$534 in 1980, driven by open and market oriented policies, a boom in phosphate prices and efforts towards a more effective public administration. However, these gains were reversed during the next two decades. In the 1980s, the country followed a more inward looking economic policy and, during the 1990s, it entered a period of political tension and economic instability. Togo fell into internal and external debt service arrears including with the World Bank. Political stability returned gradually beginning in the mid-2000s and the international development community returned. Economic growth during the last decade has averaged four percent. Despite a solid growth performance, poverty declined only slightly, from 61.7 percent in 2006 to 55.1 percent in 2015. Income per capita is yet to reach the level the country had achieved in 1980. Togo’s ranking in the Human Development Index has fallen from 95<sup>th</sup> out of 124 countries in 1980 to 166<sup>th</sup> out of 187 countries in 2013. Togo recently experienced negative macroeconomic developments that brought the share of public debt over GDP from 32 percent in 2010 to 80.8 percent in 2016 financed by both domestic and external borrowings. Successful efforts at increasing public revenues from 18.8 percent of GDP in 2013 to 21.0 percent in 2015 were not enough to cover fast-growing public investments on infrastructure. Efforts at bringing the fiscal accounts under control are underway. The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved on May 5, 2017, a new three-year arrangement for Togo under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) for SDR176.16 million to support the country’s economic and financial reforms.

iii. The WBG returned to Togo in 2004 through a Country Re-Engagement Note (CRN). The CRN was followed by two successive ISNs: the first ISN (FY08-FY10); and the second ISN (FY12-13). The first ISN had the overarching goal to help Togo recover from a long period of instability and suspension of external aid and begin laying the foundations for sustained shared growth. The first ISN was aligned with the I-PRSP, which was adopted in March 2008. A Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-I) covering 2009-2011 followed. When the first ISN ended in June 2010, given the uncertainty on the timing of delivery of PRSP-II, the WBG prepared a second ISN rather than a full

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blown Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). The second ISN (FY12-13) updated the first ISN and proposed to use the two-year implementation period to consolidate Togo's knowledge base and help the country increase its aid absorption capacity to draw in external assistance once PRSP-II was in place, which happened in early 2013 with the delivery of the Strategy for Boosting Growth and Promoting Employment (SCAPE) covering 2013-2017. A CPS was not prepared then and a four-year gap emerged before the preparation of the first Country Partnership Framework (FY17). During the gap years, the WBG continued to approve operations, undertake AAA and work with other development partners. The CLR does not inform if the FY12 ISN was formally extended.

iv. The areas of engagement selected under each of the two ISNs were appropriate for the development needs of Togo at the time, well aligned with the government's strategies, and drew from the limited, but growing, analytical work available. The program objectives in the two ISNs were not selective, especially when account is taken of the two-year ISN framework, the small IDA envelope, the country's limited implementation capacity, the fragile political economy and the presence of vested interests in the areas of ISN engagement. The ISNs identified well the risks to the program but the mitigating measures were not sufficient to contain fiscal pressures that led to increases in the level of public debt.

v. The WBG program had nine objectives under three Focus Areas: (i) Improving Governance and Transparency (ii) Promotion of economic recovery and sustainable development, and (iii) Support Urgent Poverty Reduction and Social Needs. Progress achieved during 2008-2016 is uneven according to the information available. Under the first focus area, fiscal governance has improved per the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) exercises in 2008 and 2016; but progress in improving the governance of public enterprises and banks is limited. The initial privatization agenda proved ambitious. Thus, while some privatizations have taken place, key segments of the economy (including telecommunications, phosphates, utilities, and some banks) remain under state control. As to the second focus area, starting a business and trading across borders is easier now, but the intended gains in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) lag initial expectations. Port facilities have been expanded and modernized; electricity generation capacity increased helping meet a rapidly growing demand. However, lack of progress on regulations and restructuring of the telecommunications sector has delayed the implementation of the ICT agenda. Under the third focus area, Lomé low-land neighborhoods are now more resilient against floods, and gains in primary education completion rates have been made. CDD engagements have been effective and appropriate given the fragile situation of the country and social protection pilots have been undertaken. However, the initiatives under this focus area have remained at a pilot level.

vi. From FY08 to FY16, 18 Bank operations were approved for a total of \$436.3 million, of which six operations were Development Policy Operations (DPOs) for \$ 267.3 million. The first DPO for \$ 175 million helped clear arrears that Togo had accrued with IDA and to normalize its status for continued engagement. Grants amounted to \$147 million, with the bulk going to education and agriculture (\$100 million). The Bank portfolio at exit has performed well, including a high disbursement ratio. IEG ratings of completed projects were better than its comparators, at 88 percent MS or better at the binary scale for achieving development outcomes. However, the number of active projects now at risk has increased—four out seven projects under implementation are at risk of not delivering intended development outcomes. A considerable body of analytical work has now been produced, including the 2016 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD). Given the limited impact of economic growth on poverty reduction, earlier attention to the drivers of poverty reduction would have helped to fine-tune the programs by sharpening the focus on the most critical priorities for poverty reduction. Strong partnerships have been built with the government and the development community.

vii. IFC investments played a pivotal role in supporting Togo's efforts to improve the business-enabling environment, increase electricity generation capacity and expand port capacity at the Lomé container terminal. These investments helped mobilize private sector resources and resulted in improved infrastructure services and it also helped create jobs. IFC's total net investment during FY08-FY16 amounted to US\$213 million, out of which short-term trade finance guarantees represented 36.6 per cent or US\$78 million. Through its risk sharing facility, IFC supported its client



banks to expand their trade financing. During the review period, IEG has not validated any IFC investment projects. MIGA has provided one small guarantee with a gross exposure of US\$4.6 million for the company to operate in the port.

viii. The CLR puts forth several lessons regarding (a) the importance of long-term approaches for rebuilding confidence and making sustainable change in the context of political and economic volatility; (b) the importance of political economy analysis; (c) the relevance of selectivity; (d) the need for intensive supervision on the ground, (e) the need for tractability and realism in the results frameworks; (f) the adequacy of CDD approaches in fragile environments; and, (g) the central place of donor coordination to drive results on the ground.

ix. IEG adds two lessons and complement the CLR lessons with some observations. First, IEG would like to call attention to the challenges that arise from operating through sequential ISNs. As the relationship between Togo and the WBG grew, the pressure was to expand the scope of the FY12 ISN, while the implementation period remained at two years. Delays in moving to a full CPF risked leaving a sizeable program without adequate supporting results framework. IEG has documented the extended use of ISNs in countries other than Togo and noted the efforts to tighten the guidelines under the Country Engagement Notes (CEN), now in place. IEG notes that “the CENs run the risk of emulating the previous pattern of repeated ISNs. If this cycle is to be broken, and countries currently operating under CENs are expected to contribute substantially to the World Bank Group’s twin goals, senior management will need to send clear signals that a CEN should not be followed by yet another CEN, unless there is an immediate crisis.”<sup>1</sup> Second, IEG concurs with the finding of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) that IFC’s disclosure and consultation with affected communities in infrastructure projects should be undertaken in a manner that is inclusive and culturally appropriate.

x. IEG has complementary observations on the lessons that the CLR presents. First, the CLR emphasizes the importance of political economy analysis, particularly in a fragile state environment in which political commitment and reform momentum remain fluid. IEG concurs and adds that bringing on board political economy considerations facilitate making the hard choices that underpin a selective approach, which as the CLR points out, offers the best chance of achieving results without straining client resources. However, IEG would like to stress that selectivity is to be exercised up-front in the design of a program and not simply stated as a principle as the second ISN did. Second, IEG also concurs that simplicity of design is an important characteristic that affects the effectiveness of WBG engagements. The ICRR for the recently completed Private Sector Development Support Project noted: “The (unsatisfactory) outcomes highlight the need for simplicity and flexibility with respect to design in an environment such as that which existed in Togo. Almost every aspect of the design of this project was either unsuited for the situation that existed, or overly complex.”

#### 4. Strategic Focus

##### Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

1. **Congruence with Country Context and Country Program.** After Togo became independent in 1960, income per capita almost doubled to reach \$534 in 1980, measured at 2005 PPP, driven by open and market oriented policies, a boom in phosphate prices and efforts towards a more effective public administration. However, these gains were reversed during the next two decades. In the 1980s, Togo followed a more inward looking economic policies and; during the 1990s, it entered a period of political tension and economic instability. The country fell into internal and external debt service arrears including with the World Bank. Overall, the period between 1980 and 2005 saw great

<sup>1</sup> World Bank Group: Country Engagement: An Early-Stage Assessment of the Systematic Country Diagnostic and Country Partnership Framework Process and Implementation; Appendix F: Country Engagement Notes, 2017.



fluctuations in economic policies and economic performance. Efforts at structural reforms and stabilization were left unfinished and economic recovery, when it happened, proved unsustainable.

2. Political stability returned gradually beginning in the mid-2000s and the international development community re-engaged in Togo. Economic growth during the last decade has averaged four percent, while it has been five percent annually between 2011 and 2016. Despite a solid growth performance, poverty declined only slightly, from 61.7 percent in 2006 to 55.1 percent in 2015, as growth has not been inclusive. Income per capita is yet to reach the level the country had achieved in 1980, partly due to high population growth. Togo has the ninth lowest GNI per capita of the 35 countries in Sub-Saharan African with data available. The population has grown rapidly from 2.5 million in 1975 and now posts one of the faster rates of urban growth in the world—four percent annually. Togo's ranking in the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index has fallen from 95<sup>th</sup> out of 124 countries in 1980 to 166<sup>th</sup> out of 187 countries in 2013.

3. The WBG returned to Togo through a Country Re-Engagement Note (CRN) issued in December 2004 and followed with the FY08-FY10 Interim Strategy Note, whose overarching goal was to help Togo recover from a long period of instability and suspension of external aid and begin laying the foundations for sustained shared growth. The first ISN program was aligned with the I-PRSP, adopted in March 2008, which allowed the country to reach the decision point for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in November 2008. In June 2009, the country adopted the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-I), which served as a unifying framework for the various development actions during 2009–2011 and allowed Togo to arrive at the completion point of the HIPC Initiative in December 2010. Given uncertainty as to the timetable for the preparation of PRSP-II, the WBG decided to prepare a second ISN rather than a CPS. The second ISN was taken to the Board in December 2011 and was aligned with the Africa Regional Strategy that had been considered by the Executive Directors in March 2010. This second ISN proposed that the two-year period of its implementation would be used to consolidate Togo's knowledge base and help the country increase its effective aid absorption capacity, and enable it to draw in external assistance once the PRSP-II was in place. The Strategy for Boosting Growth and Promoting Employment (PRSP-II) was issued in January, 2013 for the period 2013-2017, but the WBG did not prepare a full program. A gap of four year years would open between the end of the FY12 ISN and the FY17 CPF. During these four years, the WBG continued to approve operations, undertake AAA and work with other development partners. The CLR does not inform if the FY12 ISN was formally extended.

4. The WBG program covered three focus areas: (i) improving governance and transparency (ii), promotion of economic recovery and sustainable development, and (iii) support urgent poverty reduction and social needs. The program was aligned with, I-PRSP that focused on: (i) strengthening political and economic governance, with a focus on institutional reform and fiscal governance; (ii) promoting economic recovery and sustainable development, with measures to reform state-owned enterprises and financial institutions and boost the sources of growth; and (iii) developing social sectors, human resources, and employment, with a focus on improving access to and quality of basic education and health services. The WBG program remained aligned with PRSP-I and PRSP-II, as the two strategies were expanded based on the I-PRSP.

5. **Relevance of Design.** The areas of engagement under the two ISNs were well aligned with the government priorities and with the diagnostics available at the time. The objectives under each ISN were supported by WBG operations and analytical work. For most of the objectives, other development partners contributed with parallel and often complementary efforts. The ISNs included results matrices, objectives and indicators. With hindsight, however, the design of the program did not fully consider the efforts and resources that would be needed to deliver on the objectives and results within a two- year period. Likewise, as the CLR points out, some of the reforms, as in telecommunications, were complex and not properly sequenced. The key instrument during both ISNs was budget support, which maintained focus on a selected number of objectives. Outside the budget support some of the objectives were set at a pilot stage, which facilitated their achievement but limited their impact.



#### Selectivity

6. Neither of the ISNs, and especially the second one, were particularly selective considering the limiting conditions (limited local capacity, a difficult political environment, the then recent WBG reengagement, the two-year time frame, and the limited IDA envelope). However, the objectives were focused on important country priorities, had the support of both operations and analytical work, and reflected considerations of WBG comparative advantage while coordinating with other development partners. Fiscal management was a well-focused priority that had the support of all six development policy operations that absorbed more than half of the IDA resource envelope. At the same time, the programs supported substantive reforms in several difficult areas (energy, mining, banking, telecommunications and cotton) that faced strong vested interests and tested the implementation capacity of the government.

#### Alignment

7. The WBG twin goals were not yet explicitly stated corporate objectives when the ISNs were prepared. Nonetheless, the design and implementation of both ISNs were supportive of advancing towards WBG's corporate goals of reducing poverty and increasing shared prosperity in a sustainable manner. The ISNs were well aligned with the country's I-PRSP and PRSP, respectively, with their focus on poverty reduction. The second ISN broadened the focus of the program to include interventions related directly with poverty reduction, such as social safety nets, and work in education and health grew. The 2016 Systematic Country Diagnostics (SCD) has confirmed the relevance of the ISN themes for reaching the WBG corporate goals, including the emphasis on governance and good fiscal management.

### **5. Development Outcome**

#### Overview of Achievement by Objective:

8. The FY12 ISN built and expanded on the FY08 ISN framework while revising some objectives and introducing some new ones. The following discussion merges the two reforms frameworks – in line with the approach in the CLR.

#### **Focus Area I: Improving Governance and Transparency**

9. Focus area I contained two objectives: (i) improved and transparent financial management and Enhanced Procurement system and external budget control; and (ii) strengthen state capacity and managing/restructuring of key public enterprises and banks.

#### **Objective #1: Improved and transparent financial management and Enhanced Procurement system and external budget controls**<sup>2</sup>

10. All six Economic Recovery and Governance Grants/Credits contributed towards the delivery of this objective. Additional support came from analytical work and technical assistance, of which Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review (PEMFAR) in 2008/2009 and 2016, which included Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) reviews, were the most important. Partners included International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

11. Progress under this objective contributed to Togo reaching the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Completion Point (2010). The 2016 PEFA tracks considerable progress since the 2008 PEFA. This progress includes improvements in budget preparation by implementing tools and procedures that were not in place in 2009, such as macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts, and aligning strategic plans and medium term budget for some ministries, producing period reports on internal and

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<sup>2</sup> The FY12 ISN presented enhanced procurement system and external budget controls as a separate objective. The CLRR merges them because they tightly inter-related and for economy of presentation. The FY08 ISN encompassed the same material under reform of public expenditure.



external debt, and improved transparency of fiscal information by aligning the budget classifications with international standards and providing more comprehensive budget documentation. Progress was mixed in the areas that the Bank concentrated its support. Public arrears to the private sector have been eliminated and progress has been made in procurement, both corroborated by 2016 PEFA. Progress in improving budget execution controls and external controls has been more limited. Togo has been amongst the first countries in the region to adopt the Open Budget Portal initiative (BOOST), but this effort at improving transparency has been hindered by the weak internet connectivity in the country. The SCD ranks Weaknesses in Fiscal Governance as one of the top constraints to achieving the twin goals.

**Objective #2: Strengthen state capacity and managing/restructuring of key public enterprises and banks<sup>3</sup>**

12. Support for this objective came from the six Economic Growth and Governance Grants/Credits; Multi-donor Agriculture sector support project (FY11); the Financial Sector and Governance Project (FY09); and a Trust Fund for implementing Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI.) A Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Trust Fund supported the preparation of a phosphate strategy.

13. The governance of key state agencies and companies was identified early on as critical constraint to economic recovery. Both ISNs focused on improving the governance of the main state companies while, at the same time, seeking improvements in sector policies. The resulting agendas were ambitious and, consequently, the results were mixed. On cotton, a new company (NSCT---New Cotton Society of Togo) has been in operation since 2009 with producers' participation, replacing the previous state company. Cotton costs were reduced by 17 percent between 2009/2010 and 2010/2011; however, information is not available to determine if such gains have been maintained. The SCD points out that despite this restructuring and producers' participation, the share of the world price of cotton going to farmers has not increased, which reduces their incentives to improve productivity.

14. On electricity, the performance of the Togo Electric Company improved in line with the targets set by second ISN, but the gains have not been sustained and in 2016 the company was back into financial difficulties. On mining, Togo achieved EITI compliance status in 2013. The phosphate state company (SNPT) has been adequately staffed since 2011, but engagement of a private partner has not happened. An intended mining code has been drafted but not approved. Togo's mineral potential remains to be realized as unclear regulations have hindered its development. Its contribution to public revenues remains low at .7 percent of GDP. On banking, progress has been partial. Two state banks have been privatized, but the privatization of two other banks has not happened and both banks have negative equity. The ICR for Financial Sector and Governance Project (March 2017), which rates the achievement of development outcomes as Moderately Unsatisfactory, notes that the scope of the engagement was too ambitious for the limited implementing capacity in the country. Initiatives to reform the social security institution and to address the crisis of insolvent and distressed microfinance institutions remain unfinished.

**Focus Area II: Promotion of economic recovery and sustainable development**

15. Focus Area II was comprised of three objectives: (i) improved business and investment climate; (ii) increased agricultural productivity and crop output; and (iii) improved access to quality of productive infrastructure.

**Objective #3: Improved business and investment climate <sup>4</sup>**

16. Support for this objective came from the six Economic Growth and Governance Grants/Credits; Private Sector Development Operation (FY12) and Financial Sector Reform and Governance Project

<sup>3</sup> The FY08 ISN presented public enterprises and banks as separate objectives.

<sup>4</sup> Under FY08 ISN "Strengthen private sector prospects, and the knowledge on the potential drivers of economic growth."



(FY09). On the analytical side, Country Economic Memorandum/Diagnostic Trade Integration Study and Investment Climate Policy Note (both FY10), and IFC Doing Business Advisory Services contributed to the objective.

17. A notable early achievement to improve the quality of the business environment was the clearance of internal arrears between the government and the private sector. This achievement stands. Support of the WBG has centered on facilitating starting a business. The 2017 Doing Business Review ranks Togo 123 out of the 190 countries in the world for starting a business, an improvement from 130 in 2016. The number of days to start a business came down from 17 to 6 and the number of procedures has gone down to 3 from 7 between 2011 and 2016. In 2015, Doing Business named Togo as top reformer for improvements in starting a business, registering property, protecting minority investors and paying taxes. The performance under the Private Sector Development Project has fallen below expectations, however. The recently completed ICRR for the Private Sector Development Support Project, which rated unsatisfactory the achievement of Development Outcomes, notes as a project weakness the complexity of its design in a fragile environment. The development and implementation of the Public Private Partnership agenda proved overly ambitious. The SCD points to the continued very low level of private investment as a signal that the investment climate remains prohibitive for private investors.

**Objective #4: Increased agricultural productivity and crop output <sup>5</sup>**

18. Support for this objective came from Multi-Donor Agriculture Sector Support Project (FY11) and its subsequent Additional Financing (FY17); the Regional Agriculture Productivity Project (FY12), and the Agriculture Public Expenditure Review (FY12). Important partners include IFAD, ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, and BOAD (the West African Development Bank).

19. Agriculture accounts for 41 percent of Togo's GDP and is highly relevant for economic growth and inclusion. The indicators set under both ISNs have been achieved, notably for the FY12 ISN there have been increases in crop production in selected areas. Despite such improvements, the SCD notes that although agricultural production has grown recently, sectoral productivity has remained flat since the 1990s. Additional financing recently approved for the Agriculture Sector Support Project (FY17) intends to focus on scaling up previous achievements for the sector.

**Objective #5: Improved access to quality of productive infrastructure<sup>6</sup>**

20. This objective had the support of the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Energy Project (FY09), Urban Sector Review (FY08), ICT Strategy Review (FY11), Energy Sector Review (FY12), Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Energy Project (PURISE, FY09), PURISE AF (FY11) and PURISE AF (FY13). Partners include: EU (transport) AfDB (roads and urban), BOAD (roads, port and energy), China (roads, port), French Cooperation (transport), and German Cooperation (Energy and Urban).

21. By mid-2000s, the under-investment in infrastructure was considerable driven by the drop in public investment that from 13.8 percent of GDP in 1990 to 1 percent in 2013. Even after the subsequent pick-up in public investment, the infrastructure gap remains considerable in both rural and urban areas as per the 2016 SCD. Both ISNs supported reconstruction and expansion efforts. In electricity, attention focused on the basic infrastructure to recover losses in capacity and to improve access. The electricity supply network was extended by 33 Km from 2010 to 2014 and 21 transformer stations were rehabilitated, in both cases slightly exceeding the targets that had been set under the FY12 ISN. IFC (2010) invested in one of the few large independent power producers (IPPs) in Togo and by 2016 a 100 MW tri-fuel plant (gas, heavy fuel oil or diesel) was in operation. Rapid demand has absorbed this increase in capacity, as per the SCD.

22. Regarding ports, the port at Lomé is the only deep-sea port in the region and is critical to the economic performance of both the country and the region. Hence, the need for enhancing both its

<sup>5</sup> Under FY08 ISN "Re-launch the agricultural and rural economy."

<sup>6</sup> Under FY08 ISN "Develop the infrastructure to support economic growth."



capacity and its performance. IFC supported the construction, development and operation of the Lomé Container Terminal (LTC) - an extension of the port that led to a major increase in capacity. Inaugurated in 2014, it is the major and first modern container transshipment hub in West and Central Africa. Although the project helped improve the capacity of this important infrastructure, a CAO investigation concluded that the IFC due diligence and Environment and Social (E&S) review were not compliant with the requirements of its 2006 Sustainability Policy as discussed in details in the later section on safeguards and fiduciary Issues.

23. Road connections with Benin have been improved. Customs procedures and transactions have been simplified through the introduction of modern Information Management Systems (SYDONIA+) and the implementation of a one-stop-shop for external commerce. Doing Business 2017 tracks progress regarding trading across borders, with Togo out-performing regional partners. Still, Togo ranks 117 of 190 in the world.

### **Focus Area III: Support Urgent Poverty Reduction and Social Needs**

24. Objectives under Focus Area III included improved access of communities to basic social and local development services (including youth employment); improved quality and access to basic education and health services; Improved social protection and inclusion (including gender); and improved management of the environment and natural disasters.

#### **Objective # 6: Improved access of communities to basic social and local development services (including youth employment)<sup>7</sup>**

25. This objective had the support of the Community Development Project (FY08) with additional financing; The Emergency Poverty Reduction Program (FY07), Community-Driven Development/Safety Net Project (FY12). Partners included World Food Program, French Cooperation, and UNDP.

26. Targets set under both ISNs in support of basic services and economic opportunities of selected communities have been achieved. Under the first ISN, the original targets (250 basic services and 200 economic opportunities) were exceeded by 2013 under the Community Development Project, which IEG rated as Satisfactory. Under the Community-Driven Development/Safety Net Project (FY12) additional gains were made in supporting the launching and completion of community infrastructure and income generating subprojects.

#### **Objective # 7: Improved quality and access to basic education and health services<sup>8</sup>**

27. Support for improved social services came from Emergency Poverty Reduction Program (FY07; FY08) and the Community Development Project (CDP, FY08.) Support for education came from the grant Education for All EFA-FTI (FY11) and Education Sector TA (FY10). Support for health came through the Health Sector Country Status Report (FY11) and the Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition Services Project (FY14). Notable development partners included UNICEF and the French Cooperation.

28. For the first ISN, measuring impact on health and education has been hampered by the lack of baselines. For the second ISN, targeted primary completion rates were met and surpassed - increasing from 65 percent in 2009 to 84 percent in 2014. The SCD confirms the gains that have been made in primary education, while it places health as a critical constraint to achieving the twin goals, noting the weak performance of the health outcomes in Togo, despite high budgetary allocations by regional standards.

<sup>7</sup> Under FY08 ISN stated as “Promote community driven development.” Develop the infrastructure support for growth.”

<sup>8</sup> Objective #7 was introduced by FY12ISN





**Objective #8: Improved social protection and inclusion (including gender)<sup>9</sup>**

29. This objective had the support of the Community-Driven Development/Safety Nets Project (FY12) together with analytical work on poverty and gender, the FY12 Poverty and Gender Assessment. Technical assistance was provided under the Cash for Work/Social Protection TA (FY11/12).

30. The Bank helped review social protection policies and revise social protection regulations, which as per the CLR have been drafted but not yet adopted. The pilot engagement to improve access to social protection is on track; the indicators set under FY12 ISN have been partially met. Notably, the targeted number of people benefitting from Social Safety Needs has surpassed the 70,000 target by 2016.

**Objective #9: Improved management of the environment and natural disasters<sup>10</sup>**

31. The following operations supported this objective: Lomé Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance (LICUS, FY08), Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Energy Project (PURISE, FY09), PURISE AF (FY11) and PURISE AF (FY13) and Integrated Disaster and Land Management Project (FY12). The program is aligned with the National Action Program (NAPA) and the National Investment Program for the Environment and Natural resources (PNIERN). Partners include the West African Development Bank, the ECOWAS Investment Bank, the European Union, and International Labor Organization (ILO.)

32. Lomé is part of a submerging coast and lagoon system within coastal dunes. Flooding of Lomé has been recurrent and is a constant concern because it takes time for floods to recede, which strains pumping infrastructure. The lowest lands are inhabited mostly by the poor and their numbers have been increasing with internal migration. The two ISNs provided support to mitigate this risk. Notable achievements included cleaning out 122 km of drains and rehabilitation of 22.2 km of drains. Per the CLR there are more than 1.5 million beneficiaries. A full environmental analysis was carried out in 2010. In response to the 2010 floods a Post Disaster Needs Assessment was completed (FY11) with the financial support of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GDFRR), the WB and UNDP. An early warning system has yet to be installed. Under the first ISN Togo reduced the threat of avian influenza. A 2016 outbreak was managed effectively jointly by the health and agriculture ministries.

33. In sum, progress towards the objectives selected for WBG support under the three focus areas was uneven according to information available. Under the first focus area, fiscal governance has improved as verified by PEFA exercises (2008, 2016), with notable gains in public procurement. Advances, though, on managing/restructuring of key public enterprises and banks have been subdued, most notably on banking and mining. Several state-owned enterprises identified for privatization have been taken-off the table. Some progress is also noted for the second focus area. It is now easier to start a business and to trade across borders, but the development and implementation of the Public Private partnership agenda proved overly ambitious. Productivity of selected crops under pilot engagements has improved, but national agricultural productivity remains stagnant, calling for scaling-up support efforts, which the Bank is launching. The improvements in productive infrastructure are notable in electricity and ports. Port facilities have been expanded and modernized; electricity generation capacity increased helping meet partially a rapidly growing demand. However, lack of progress regarding regulations and restructuring of the telecommunications sector has delayed implementation of the ICT agenda. Under the third focus area, progress include partial gains in Lomé's resilience against floods and gains in primary education completion rates. CDD engagements have been effective and appropriate to the fragile situation of the country. Social protection pilots have been undertaken. Overall, the initiatives under this focus area have remained at a pilot level.

<sup>9</sup> Objective #8 was introduced by FY12ISN.

<sup>10</sup> Objective #9 was introduced by FY12 ISN. FY08, though, had “Develop the animal and human health systems.”



## 6. WBG Performance

### Lending and Investments

34. The existing portfolio when the FY08 ISN was approved comprised of four projects; these were all LICUS TF grants—Economic Recovery and Institutional Re-engagement (FY08); Emergency Program for Poverty Reduction (FY07); Avian Influenza Control (FY08); and Lomé Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance (FY08.) From FY08 to FY16, 18 operations were approved for a total of \$436.3 million. Ten of the projects were foreseen in the ISNs, and eight were not planned. Six (6) operations were DPFs for a total of \$ 267.3 million – 61 percent of total lending FY08-16. The first DPF for \$175 million went to clear arrears that the country had accrued with IDA and to normalize the situation for continued engagement. The approved operations included four instances of additional financing. Besides DPFs, eight (8) areas were addressed using investment project financing, in many cases together with the budget support operations: community development (2), financial sector, infrastructure rehabilitation, mining, maternal and child health support, agriculture, private sector development. Resources from grants amounted to \$147 million, with the bulk going to education and agriculture, \$100 million.

35. Togo's performance at exit is better than its comparators. Of eight completed projects validated by IEG, seven (or 88 percent) were rated MS or better on a binary scale, far above the average Bank-wide performance (71 percent) and the Africa Region performance (65 percent). The risk to development outcome is moderate or lower for 38 percent of the projects, higher than the African region (35 percent) but still below the Bank-wide average (49 percent). The disbursement ratio during the period at 31 percent of net commitments surpasses the Africa region and the Bank-wide average, both at 22 percent. The percentage number of projects at risk during the period stands at 22 percent, which is in line with the African region (22 percent) and the Bank (20 percent) during the same period. However, the percentage of projects at risk has increased in recent years to reach 57 percent in 2016----four out of seven projects under implementation are now at risk.

36. IFC investments played a pivotal role in supporting Togo's efforts to improve the business-enabling environment. IFC's key engagements in Togo during the two ISN periods included its investments in Lomé Container Terminals and an independent power plant. IFC was lead arranger of these projects and helped mobilize additional private sector investments. IFC also invested in the health sector and in banking services. IFC's total net investment during FY08-FY16 amounted to US\$213 million, out of which short-term trade finance guarantees represented 36.6 percent or US\$78 million. These investments resulted in improved infrastructure services and they also helped create jobs. Through its risk sharing facility, IFC supported its client banks to expand their trade financing. During the review period, IEG did not validate any IFC investment projects through its Evaluation Notes. MIGA has provided one small guarantee with a gross exposure of US\$4.6 million for the company to operate in the port.

### Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

37. The long absence of the WBG from Togo created considerable knowledge gaps. Efforts to close them began with the CRN and continued during the two ISNs. Through the period 2008-2016, fifteen (15) pieces of analytical work have been produced, with the complement of additional analytical work by other development partners. The analytical work has fed into project design and technical assistance. It has also provided an important input into the Systematic Country Diagnostic (2016.) Emphasis has been given to the work on governance and economic growth with FEMFAR (FY09), Corporate Governance Assessment (ROS; FY09, FY16), Country Economic Memorandum (CEM, FY10); Growth Diagnostics (FY10), Investment Climate Note (FY10); DeMPA Diagnostics (FY11), and Economic Governance Diagnostics (FY16.) Sector work includes: health, energy, service delivery, water, and environment. A poverty and gender analysis was conducted in FY12. Technical assistance has likewise contributed, especially since 2010 and in support of key program priorities that include EITI implementation, education, ICT, financial sector, mining, use of country systems and statistical capacity building. It is pertinent to highlight the work of other partners such as the IMF, the EU and the African Development Bank on governance and public financial management. With hindsight, given



the limited impact of economic growth on poverty reduction, earlier attention to the links between economic opportunities, jobs and poverty reduction could have helped sharpen the ISN interventions, the second especially.

38. During the implementation of the two ISNs, IFC approved two Advisory Service (AS) projects to support improvements in investment climate with the total approval amount of US\$1.3 million. One project was completed and another project was terminated. IEG has not validated any AS projects during the period.

#### Results Framework

39. The results framework for the first ISN included precise, relevant and measurable indicators that allowed accessing the traction of WBG re-engagement in the country---for instance, eliminating arrears from the public budget to the private sector. The second ISN broadened the scope of the engagement and kept the two- year implementation period. As it turned out, the FY12 ISN Results Framework (RF) would remain in place for four additional years. While, the WBG continued to engage in the areas reflected in the RF, the indicators and targets that were set for the end of FY12 were not updated. Thus, a larger engagement grew without a proper supporting results framework to monitor and track progress beyond the prescribed two- year implementation period.

#### Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

40. During the two ISN periods, the WBG strengthened its collaboration with development partners. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) generally led overall coordination and IDA led in areas such as private sector development support and on economic governance. Cooperation around the budget support operations stands out as the Bank maintained a close coordination with the IMF, European Union (EU) and African Development Bank (AfDB). In the agriculture sector, the WBG catalyzed donor assistance from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in support of the government's national agriculture strategy. On social protection, the WBG's conditional cash transfer and school feeding programs leveraged the efforts of UNICEF and the World Food Program (WFP), respectively. The WBG also coordinated with key partners in energy, urban infrastructure, and public financial management. While IDA supported an active dialogue with civil society, little direct support was provided to non-state actors. In some sectors, the WBG was the main development partner, notably in promoting the private sector agenda and the telecommunications sector, and in directly supporting mining sector governance (AfDB) and the EU also supported Togo's adherence to the EITI initiative). The CLR reports that, under UN leadership, Togo's development partners, including the WBG, coordinate their actions and jointly monitor progress on national development plans.

#### Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

41. Out of the eight operations that were completed and validated by IEG during the review period, safeguard policies were applicable to two projects: Community Development ERL (FY08) and the Education for All-Fast Track Initiative Program (FY10.) Environmental and Social Frameworks (ESMF) and a Resettlement Policy Frameworks (RPF) were prepared for both projects. Regarding the Community Development Project, the instances of non-compliance reported were corrected at the end of the project and the Minister of Environment confirmed compliance with environmental and social protection requirements. On the education project, the ICR does not state explicitly whether there was compliance with all safeguard issues. The ICRR for the Private Sector Development Support Project (FY11) notes that most components that would have given rise to safeguard concerns were cancelled during the restructuring of the Project. The ICRR notes that national procurement regulations introduced in 2012 created the obligation of complying with both national and Bank rules, which delayed implementation.

42. For the Lomé Container Terminal project in which IFC invested, the Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) opened an investigation after it received complaints from local inhabitants regarding accelerated coastal erosion in their communities. On August 8, 2016, CAO released its investigation report that identified non-compliance in IFC's appraisal and supervision of the project, particularly relating to: (a) the identification and management of potential risks and impacts of the



project on coastal erosion, and (b) stakeholder engagement around these issues. CAO concluded that IFC's environmental and social reviews during the due diligence phase of the investment had not been compliant with the requirements of IFC's 2006 Sustainability Policy. IFC and its client had agreed on actions relevant to the analysis of the project's impact on coastal erosion already in February 2016, but the CAO decided to keep this investigation open for monitoring purposes.

43. During the review period, the Vice Presidency for Integrity (INT) reports that seven complaints were received that led to two investigations. Of the two investigations, one was substantiated involving Lome Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project. Follow-up actions have not been initiated.

#### Ownership and Flexibility

44. Ownership of program was stronger during the period of the first ISN as the government engaged in getting the economy going and rebuilding institutions. The authorities sought at that time the engagement of the international development community to help provide and finance the needed technical and policy expertise. Ownership, however, waned at times as the economy took off and the country could access financial markets on easier terms. This affected the implementation of EGGC6, the last DPO that was approved in December 2013, but for which disbursement was delayed by almost a year as the macroeconomic situation worsened significantly. As the reform momentum waned, the relatively ambitious reform program supported by the Bank and the broader donor community faltered. Eventually, the macroeconomic situation was brought under control, the interest in reforms improved, and the EGGC6 resources were disbursed. More generally, the WBG program was flexible in various ways, with two short-term programs and where the second ISN made use of the opportunity to adjust the program to reflect progress in implementation and changed circumstances. Moreover, the first five DPO operations were designed on stand-alone basis, which provided added flexibility. Lastly, the WBG reacted well, in terms of financial, technical assistance and working with other development partners, to natural event occurrences such as the floods that affected Lomé in 2010.

#### WBG Internal Cooperation

45. Both institutions worked on improving the business environment, the banking and the power sectors (Objectives 2, 3, and 6), whereas there were no parallel engagements regarding the port facilities. The CLR does not inform on how the two institutions collaborated in the areas of parallel engagements.

#### Risk Identification and Mitigation

46. The identified risks for the two ISNs (political, vested interests, macroeconomic, fiduciary and implementation capacity) were on target, but the mitigating strategies were weak. First, the political risk was relevant because Togo was coming out of a long and difficult period of uncertainty and the politics had yet to settle down. Second, vested interests, critical to several interventions, may have slowed down program implementation; the emphasis of the WBG and other development partners on enhancing transparency and openness for the development programs was not enough of a mitigation measure, and a greater attention to the political economy aspects of reform would have been warranted. Third, macroeconomic policies were important to the ISN programs given the strong reliance on DPOs. Although most of the DPOs proceeded smoothly, negative macroeconomic developments affected the implementation of the last DPO operation, which was intended as the first of a programmatic series. The programmatic series was cancelled. Monitoring by the IMF and the Bank, the purported mitigating measure, proved insufficient to avoid macroeconomic derailment. Fourth, fiduciary and implementation capacity was a risk to the program across the board. The ICRs and other documentation emphasize the risk, which was addressed adequately in the context of each project.

#### Overall Assessment

47. The areas of engagement selected under each of the two ISNs were appropriate for the development needs of Togo at the time and well aligned with its strategies, reflected the I-PSRPS and the PRSP. The areas of engagement drew well from the limited, but growing, analytical work available.



The results framework for the first ISN allowed tracking the traction of WBG re-engagement through critical indicators, such as the clearance of internal public budget arrears. However, the scope and content of its design were demanding for a two- year period. The second ISN built and expanded on the first ISN, while still retaining a two-year implementation period. As a result, the programs in the ISNs were not selective, especially when additional account is taken of the small IDA envelope, the limited implementation capacity, the fragile political economy and the presence of vested interests in the areas of ISN engagement. The ISN programs overestimated the capacity of the country to advance several ambitious reforms simultaneously. The ISN identified well the risks to the program but the mitigating measures were not sufficient to contain fiscal pressures that led to increases in the level of public debt.

48. The WB and the IFC worked on improving the business environment, the banking and the power sectors (Objectives 2, 3, and 6), whereas there were no parallel engagements regarding the port facilities. The CLR does not inform on how the two institutions collaborated in the areas of parallel engagements. A considerable body of analytical work has now been produced, including the 2016 SCD. Given the limited impact of economic growth on poverty reduction, earlier attention to the drivers of poverty reduction could have helped fine-tune the supporting programs. Strong partnerships have been built with the government and the development community covering all the objectives of WBG engagement as stated in the ISNs. Finally, the capacity to design and implement WBG projects has been enhanced, although design and implementation issues remain a paramount concern.

## **7. Assessment of CLR Completion Report**

49. The CLR is well-crafted and informative. The CLR presentation of the areas of engagement skillfully combining the indicators from each ISN under common themes provides a comprehensive view of the achievements and short-falls in reaching the indicators set under the ISNs. The CLR also strives to present updated information on the status of indicators, where possible. This approach illustrates that, as noted in the CLR, several of the indicators were met later than originally envisioned, confirming that the objectives were overly ambitious. The CLR, however, could have explained the gaps between the first and the second ISNs and between the second ISN and today. Apparently delays and uncertainty about the preparation of a PRSP was a factor, but a PRSP was available by early 2013. The WBG would end up operating in Togo for four years without a formal well-articulated results framework; an examination of the drivers of the gap that emerged could have provided the WBG with relevant insights and lessons on the challenges of operating and preparing full strategies in fragile environments. Lastly, the CLR could have reported on the efforts on gender and their impact.

## **8. Findings and Lessons**

50. The CLR puts forth several lessons regarding (a) the importance of long-term approaches for rebuilding confidence and making sustainable change in the context of political and economic volatility; (b) the importance of political economy analysis; (c) the relevance of selectivity; (d) the need for intensive supervision on the ground, (e) the need for tractability and realism in the results frameworks; (f) the adequacy of CDD approaches in fragile environments; and, (g) the central place of donor coordination to drive results on the ground.

51. IEG adds two lessons and complement the CLR lessons with some observations. First, IEG would like to call attention to the challenges that arise from operating through sequential ISNs. As the relationship between Togo and the WBG grew, with a larger body of analytical work and a larger agenda under implementation, the pressure was to expand the scope of the FY12 ISN, while the implementation period remained at two years. Delays in moving to a full CPF risked leaving a sizeable program in place without an adequate supporting results framework, as it happened here. The Togo experience confirms concerns regarding the use of an ISN for extended engagements in a wide variety of circumstances, including countries with growing engagements. In the case of Togo, the WBG remained actively engaged for four years after the completion of the FY12 ISN without an adequate supporting results framework. IEG has documented the extended use of ISNs in countries other than Togo and noted the efforts to tighten the guidelines under the Country Engagement Notes



(CEN), now in place. IEG notes that “the CENs run the risk of emulating the previous pattern of repeated ISNs. If this cycle is to be broken, and countries currently operating under CENs are expected to contribute substantially to the World Bank Group’s twin goals, senior management will need to send clear signals that a CEN should not be followed by yet another CEN, unless there is an immediate crisis.”<sup>11</sup> Second, IEG concurs with the finding of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) that IFC’s disclosure to and consultation with affected communities in infrastructure projects should be undertaken in a manner that is inclusive and culturally appropriate.

52. IEG has complementary observations on the lessons that the CLR presents. First, it agrees that long-term approaches are critical to rebuilding confidence and making sustainable change in the context of political and economic volatility. Second, the CLR emphasizes the importance of political economy analysis, particularly in a fragile state environment in which political commitment and reform momentum remain fluid. IEG concurs and adds that bringing on board political economy considerations facilitates making the hard choices that underpin a selective approach, which as the CLR points out, offers the best chance of achieving results without straining client resources. However, it is important that selectivity be exercised up-front in the design of a program and not simply stated as a principle as FY12 ISN did. Third, IEG also concurs that simplicity of design is an important design characteristic that affects the effectiveness of WBG engagements. The ICRR for the recently completed Private Sector Development Support Project noted: “The (unsatisfactory) outcomes highlight the need for simplicity and flexibility with respect to design in an environment such as that which existed in Togo. Almost every aspect of the design of this project was either unsuited for the situation that existed, or overly complex.”

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<sup>11</sup> World Bank Group: Country Engagement: An Early-Stage Assessment of the Systematic Country Diagnostic and Country Partnership Framework Process and Implementation; Appendix F: Country Engagement Notes, 2017.

**Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of ISN Objectives – Togo**

**Annex Table 2: Togo Planned and Actual Lending, FY08-FY16**

**Annex Table 3: Analytical and Advisory Work for Togo, FY08-FY16**

**Annex Table 4: Togo Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY08-16**

**Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Togo, FY08-16**

**Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Togo and Comparators, FY08-16**

**Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Togo and Comparators, FY08-16**

**Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for Togo, FY08-16**

**Annex Table 9: Net Disbursement and Charges for Togo, FY08-16**

**Annex Table 10: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Togo**

**Annex Table 11: Economic and Social Indicators for Togo, 2008 – 2015**

**Annex Table 12: List of IFC Investments in Togo**

**Annex Table 13: List of IFC Advisory Services in Togo**

**Annex Table 14: IFC net commitment activity in Togo, FY08 - FY16**

**Annex Table 15: List of MIGA Activities in Togo, 2008-2016**







**Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of ISN Objectives – Togo**

	<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Improve Governance and Transparency</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Improving Economic Governance and State Capacity</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p><b>Objective #1: Improved and transparent financial management and Enhanced Procurement system and external budget controls</b> <sup>12</sup></p>			
<p><b>Major Outcome Measures</b></p>	<p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator I.1: Improved budget execution controls</b></p> <p>Deviation of actual expenditures from budgeted expenditure Baseline: 6.9% (end-2007) Target: less than 5% in each semester and the whole year</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Integrated budget execution system in place</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> Functioning Audit and Financial Inspection Unit</p>	<p>The Economic Recovery and Governance Grant - ERGG 1 (P110618, FY08), 2 (P113456, FY09) and 3 (P117282, FY10) and the Economic Recovery and International Re-Engagement (ERIREG) RETF (P110239, FY08) supported this indicator. The WBG also prepared a Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review - PAMFAR (P111063, FY10), and a PEFA assessment. As reported in the CLR, the deviations were: 5.94% (2008, see <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 1); 7.5% (2010); 7.7% (2012); 15.4% (2013); 10.2% (2014).</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> in 2009 the Government extended the integrated budget execution information system (SIGFIP) to the Treasury – it is operational since January 2010 (see <a href="#">IEG: MS</a> for ERGG3).</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> <a href="#">IEG: MS</a> for the ERGG3 reports that the Government prepared and implemented a procedures manual for the General Finance Inspectorate and established and made operational the Court of Accounts.</p>	
	<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator II.5: Timely information to spending units on ceilings for expenditure commitments</b></p> <p>Number of months in advance the spending units receive ceilings on expenditure commitments Baseline: 0 (2010) Target: 2 (2011)</p>	<p>The Financial Sector and Governance Project - FSGP (P111064, FY09), the ERGG 4 (P122806, FY11) and the Strengthening Capacity of the Accountancy Profession project (P124628, FY11) supported this indicator. A Country Procurement Assessment Report was also completed (FY13). <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 4 reports no progress on this indicator, as of 2011, explaining that “The cash ceiling committee meets and does set cash ceilings. However, these ceilings are not communicated to the spending departments”. The CLR reports that the target was achieved in 2015, since the spending units received</p>	

<sup>12</sup> The second ISN present presents Enhanced procurement system and external budget controls as a separate objective. The first ISN encompasses the same material under Reform Public expenditure.



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Improve Governance and Transparency</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Improving Economic Governance and State Capacity</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p><u>Target A:</u> 2011 state accounts are closed using the SGFIP functions</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> Cash management planning system through the preparation of monthly tables with estimation of revenues and expenditures are operationalized</p>	<p>ceilings immediately after the finance law is voted.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the target was achieved in 2012 and that the Loi de Règlement (budget review act) was adopted by the Parliament in 2014 (see Togo national Assembly <a href="#">information</a> on Finance Laws). On the basis of the available WBG's documents, IEG cannot verify if the target was achieved.</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 4 reports that Togo introduced a cash management committee and a cash management system. The CLR reports that the target was achieved in 2014 and repeated the following year; however, this ICRR and the ICRRS for the subsequent ERGGs do not report on the preparation on such tables.</p>	
<p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator I.2:</b> <b>Improved public procurement institutional framework</b></p> <p>(i) Existence of an institutional framework that reflects the standards of the WAEMU Directive Baseline: Institutional framework inconsistent with WAEMU Directive</p> <p>(ii) Number of contract awards published Baseline: 0</p>	<p>The ERGG 1 (P110618, FY08), 2 (P113456, FY09) and 3 (P117282, FY10) and the ERIREG RETF (P110239, FY08) supported this indicator. The WBG also prepared a PAMFAR (P111063, FY10).</p> <p>(i) <a href="#">IEG: MS</a> for ERGG 1 reports that a new public procurement law was voted in by the National Assembly on June 26, 2009, and the full procurement code was adopted in November 2009 and adopted since 2012.</p> <p>(ii) The CLR reports that since January 2012, awarded contracts are published on the official website of the procurement directorate (DNCMP) and in newspapers, along with new contracts on a monthly basis. <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 1 and <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 2 report that an agreement was reached to make available ex post the list of contracts awarded, in the gazette L'Entrepreneur published by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Togo. <a href="#">Management: S</a> for the ERGG 3 reports that a procurement website has been created and that the first issue of procurement newspaper was published in December 2010, where all</p>	



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Improve Governance and Transparency</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Improving Economic Governance and State Capacity</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p><u>Target A:</u> Procurement reform program adopted and being implemented</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> Procurement journal operational for publication of contract awards</p> <p><u>Target C:</u> New public procurement code adopted</p>	<p>procurement notices and contract awards are published.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 1 reports that the action plan for public procurement reforms was adopted and that a <i>National Committee for Coordination and Monitoring of Procurement Reforms</i> was created. <a href="#">Management: S</a> for the ERGG 3 reports that the action plan was implemented by the Budget, Treasury, Financial Controls and Procurement Departments.</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 1 and <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 2 report that an agreement was reached to make available ex post the list of contracts awarded, in the gazette L'Entrepreneur.</p> <p><u>Target C:</u> <a href="#">IEG: MS</a> for ERGG 1 reports that a new public procurement law was voted on June 26, 2009, and that the full procurement code was adopted in November 2009.</p>	
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator II.6:</b> <b>Enhanced procurement controls</b></p> <p>% of procurement notices and contract awards reviewed by the General Procurement Department publicly available Baseline: 0 (2010) Target: 100 (2011)</p>	<p>The ERGG series and the ERIREG RETF (P110239, FY08) supported this indicator. The WBG also prepared a PAMFAR (P111063, FY10).</p> <p><a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 4 reports that 100% of procurement notices are publicly available and that the publication of the procurement notice is a condition for approval of the award. It also reports that 37% of the procurement awards are published.</p> <p><a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 4 reports that "For enforcement it is necessary to put in place a legal review of the final award which only approves the purchase after the award has been published. This legal review will be implemented in 2012. Once this is the case, 100% publication of procurement awards can also be expected". The CLR reports that contract awards are published after legal review by the DNCMP or the ministries' internal control committees (CCMP) - no more recent WBG document permits to verify that all</p>	<p>The ICRR reports the following additional information: "As 100% completion of the latter element requires an extra step in the procurement process which was not foreseen by the prior action (the development of the procurement website and the publication of a Procurement Newspaper), nor discussed by the team, this indicator is considered 100% achieved because 100% of procurement notices are being published, while the authorities have exerted adequate action to</p>



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Improve Governance and Transparency</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Improving Economic Governance and State Capacity</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p><u>Target A:</u> 2010 procurement contracts audited</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> Implementation decrees that define the mandate of the General Procurement Department and determines the threshold for procurement are adopted</p>	<p>contract awards are published after legal review by the DNCMP.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the target was achieved in 2010, 2013 (for 2011 contracts), 2014 (for 2012 contracts) and in 2015 (2013 contracts). <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for ERGG 4 reports that procurement audits were carried out for contracts issued in FY11 and 12.</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> the CLR reports that the implementation decree has been adopted in May 2011 (Decree No 2011-059/PR, see <a href="#">Decree</a>).</p>	<p>arrive at 100% publication of the procurement awards”.</p>
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator II.7:</b> <b>Improved external controls</b></p> <p><u>Target A:</u> A system to follow up on the auditors’ recommendations is implemented</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> IGF and IGE staff on risk and performance approaches are trained</p>	<p>The CLR lists three main achievements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Court of Accounts (COA) became operational in 2010, with external audit function that complements the internal audit function of the Finance Inspectorate. The legal framework for the COA was in place as of 2009, as reported in <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 2</li> <li>- The financial statements for 2007 and 2008 have been submitted by four state-owned enterprises (SOTOCO, CEET, SNPT and Togo Telecom) to the COA – this was a prior action for ERGG 4, as reported in <a href="#">Management: S</a> for the ERGG 3</li> <li>- External control has improved with the above measures and legislation aimed at improving external controls has been passed although not much has been achieved for its implementation</li> </ul> <p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the target is not yet achieved and that a pilot committee has been created to work on this system.</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 5 reports that a training on the risk-based approach took place in February 2012 for IGF and IGE staff. The CLR reports that the target has been achieved in 2014, following a risk mapping for the Ministry of Economy and</p>	<p>No baseline or target was set, in the ISN, for this indicator, at the exception of the three process indicators reported as Targets A, B and C.</p>



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Improve Governance and Transparency</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Improving Economic Governance and State Capacity</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p><u>Target C:</u> Court of Accounts has submitted the report on the execution of the 2007 accounts to Parliament</p>	<p>Finance, and in 2015 for the Ministries of Agriculture and of Post.</p> <p><u>Target C:</u> the accounts were reviewed in 2008 and 2009 (see <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for ERGG 4). The CLR indicates that reports were produced for 2010-2013 (see <a href="#">Management: U</a> for ERGG 6), which have enabled Parliament to vote on Budget Review Acts for 2010-2013 and that the execution report for 2014 has been completed and submitted to Parliament but not voted on.</p>	
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator II.7:</b> <b>Improved capacity to monitor the PRSP outcomes and deliver results</b></p>	<p>The CLR reports that the target was achieved, since the Statistical Capacity Building TA (P143797, FY13) supported the modernization of the National Statistical System, which led to the creation of a national statistical office (see <a href="#">information</a> from the statistic office). The CLR also reports that the grant supported institutional capacity building, improvements in the quality of data production and access to data through household surveys and the production of socioeconomic indicators, of national accounts data, the analysis of population data, and the dissemination of reports.</p>	<p>No baseline or target was set, in the ISN, for this indicator.</p>
<p><b>Objective #2: Strengthen state capacity and managing/restructuring of key public enterprises and banks<sup>13</sup></b></p>		
<p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator I.3:</b> <b>New cotton company is operating satisfactorily and cotton production has rebounded</b></p> <p>Seed cotton production level has increased by 50% Baseline: 48,000 tons (end of 2007-08 crop season)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> New SOTOCO (NSCT) created with strong farmer participation in its capital and management</p>	<p>The ERGG 1 (P110618, FY08), 2 (P113456, FY09) and 3 (P117282, FY10), supported this indicator. <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 5 reports that cotton production increased from 27,857 tons in 2009 to 79,600 in 2011 and to 80,340 tons in 2012.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> the target was achieved since the NSCT was created by decree (2009-011/PR) in 2009 and since farmers received training to strengthen their representational abilities, and their organization (see <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 1).</p>	

<sup>13</sup> The first ISN presented public enterprises and banks as separate objectives.



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 1:</b>  <i>Improve Governance and Transparency</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 2:</b>  <i>Improving Economic Governance and State Capacity</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p><u>Target B:</u> Management controls and strategic partner in place</p>	<p><u>Target B:</u> the CLR reports that the status of this indicator is unknown.</p>	
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator II.7: Management of NSCT is enhanced</b></p> <p>Baseline: FCFA 415/ton (2010-11 season)            Target: 5% reduction (2011-12 season)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Adopt the terms of reference of the consultant and initiate the study on private sector participation in the NSCT</p>	<p>As reported in the CLR, unit costs were reduced by 17% between 2009 and 2010-2011 (<a href="#">Management: MS</a> for ERGG 4).</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the target was achieved and that after discussions with the government, the option of a study on private sector participation was dropped and the terms of reference were reoriented toward the preparation of a strategic plan for the cotton sector, which was validated in June 2013 (see <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 5).</p>	<p>The CLR reports the following for this indicator: "The baseline figure was not specified in the ISN for FY12-13. The ICR for the ERGG-4 operation, prepared in June 2012, indicates that a 2011 study had estimated cotton production costs to be FCFA 415/ton in 2010-11 as compared to FCFA 502/ton in 2009-10."</p>
<p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator I.4: Phosphate sector strategic development plan is adopted, and phosphate production has increased</b></p> <p>Phosphate production level has increased            Baseline: 150,000 tons (first quarter of 2008)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> The company, SNPT, is adequately staffed, successive annual business plans are adopted, and installation of new equipment has commenced</p>	<p>As reported in the CLR, phosphate production increased to 725,547 tons (2009). <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the ERGG 1 reports that production increased slightly from 750,000 tons in 2007 to 850,000 tons in 2008.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the target was achieved in 2011. This information could not be verified by IEG on the basis of the available WBG documents.</p>	<p>The ISN did not present a specific target for this indicator.</p>
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator II.2: Improved transparency and accountability in the phosphate sector</b></p> <p>Togo submitting its Validation Report towards becoming an EITI compliant country            Baseline: Not yet compliant (2011)</p>	<p>The CLR reports that a validation Report has been submitted in 2013 and that the EITI compliance status was achieved in 2013 (see <a href="#">Management: U</a> for ERGG 6). The Togo EITI implementation support TA (P123524, FY13) supported this indicator (see Output <a href="#">report</a>).</p>	



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Improve Governance and Transparency</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Improving Economic Governance and State Capacity</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p>Target: Togo has achieved validation or been granted compliant status (2013)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> An IT system for the management of the stocks and spare parts of SNPT is created and functional</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> The existing Mining Code is updated and submitted to Parliament for approval</p> <p><u>Target C:</u> The strategic plan for Phase 2 and 3, which includes the search for private partner investors, is completed</p>	<p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the target was not achieved.</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> the CLR reports that the draft mining code was prepared in 2014, but not yet adopted (see <a href="#">2014 EITI report</a> for Togo).</p> <p><u>Target C:</u> the CLR reports that the target was not achieved since a 50/50 ownership with a private entity was attempted in 2001 but failed in 2003.</p>	
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator II.4:</b> <b>Enhanced financial situation of CEET (Compagnie Energie Electrique du Togo)</b></p> <p>Increase in the turnover of CEET (excluding Contour Global charges) Baseline: FCFA 55 billion (2010) Target: 7% increase (2011)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Recommendations of the organizational audit of CEET are implemented</p>	<p>As reported in <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for ERGG 4, the turnover of CEET (excluding Contour Global charges) increased by 22% as of December 2011 (from FCFA 55 billion in 2010 to FCFA 67 billion in 2011), following a tariff adjustment effective January 1, 2011. The ICRR reports that, consequently, CEET's operating loss of FCFA 3.8 billion in 2010 became a profit of FCFA 1.4 billion in 2011. It adds that since then the turnover continued to increase (FCFA 96.8 billion (2012); FCFA 108 billion (2013); FCFA 96.6 billion (2014); FCFA 107.7 billion (2015)).</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the target was achieved. This could not be verified by IEG.</p>	<p>The CLR reports the following for this indicator: "the Baseline was not specified in ISN for FY12-13. The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the ERGG-4 operation, prepared in June 2012, indicates that turnover (excluding Contour Global) increased from FCFA 55 billion in 2010 to FCFA 67 billion in 2011".</p>
<p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator I.5:</b> <b>Banking sector is restructured and recapitalization of at least the two state banks started</b></p> <p>Net worth of BCTI and UTB are at least 8%, consistent with WAEMU prudential norms Baseline: Net worth of both banks negative (end-2007)</p>	<p>As reported in <a href="#">Management: MU</a> for the financial sector and governance project (P111064, FY09), the BCTI and UTB have not been privatized and BCTI remains with high negative equity. As of June 2016, the net worth of the Banks was -43% for BCTI and -13.5% for UTB. The CLR adds that the two banks' capitalization, which needs to attain the minimum capital standards (FCFA 5 billion before July 2017) set by the WAEMU, is at about FCFA 36 billion and FCFA 50 billion, respectively.</p>	



	<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Improve Governance and Transparency</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Improving Economic Governance and State Capacity</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
	<p><u>Target A:</u> The three largest banks with negative equity have a credible restructuring plan under satisfactory implementation according to the timetable</p>	<p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that BTD (2012) and BIA (2013) were privatized but that the process was unsuccessful; BTCI is under receivership and has a provisional restructuring plan, but UTB does not and its management has changed in June 2016 (see <a href="#">Management: MU</a>).</p>	
	<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator II.3: Improved performance of BTCI, UTB and BIA</b> The three targeted banks have entered into partnerships (which involve the sale of a majority of shares) with strategic banking investors Baseline: 0 (2011) Target: 2 banks by 2012, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> bank by 2013</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Financial restructuring of BTCI, UTB and BIA completed</p>	<p>As reported in <a href="#">Management: MU</a> for the financial sector and governance project (P111064, FY09), two targeted banks (BIA and BTD) have entered into public-private partnerships as of 2013. The CLR reports that the two others state-owned banks continue to face challenges and that no solution has been yet decided.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> only 55% of BIA capital was transferred to Attijariwafa Bank in September 2013 and the two other banks were not privatized (<a href="#">Management: MU</a> for project P111064).</p>	
	<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Help the Economic Recovery</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Deepening Economic Recovery and Promoting Sustainable Development</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p><b><u>Major Outcome Measures</u></b></p>	<p><b>Objective #3: Improved business and investment climate</b></p> <p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator II.4: Plan to clear the arrears vis-à-vis the private sector is in place and under implementation; clarity on the potential drivers of economic growth</b></p> <p>Level of domestic arrears to the private sector Baseline: FCFA 278.37 billion (end-2005), equivalent to US\$528.3m</p>	<p>The CLR reports that the target was achieved, since domestic arrears were cleared. It also reports that the ERIREG RETF (P110239, FY08) supported this indicator; the Grant Reporting and Monitoring <a href="#">Report</a> for the RETF does not report such achievement.</p>	





<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Help the Economic Recovery</i> <b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Deepening Economic Recovery and Promoting Sustainable Development</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p><u>Target A:</u> Adoption of a strategic plan to clear the government's domestic arrears</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> Completion of a Sources of Growth study and discussion of the study in Togo</p>	<p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the status for this target is unknown.</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> the target was achieved in 2010, with the preparation of the Sources of Growth-Country Economic Memorandum (P113161, FY10, see <a href="#">report</a>).</p>	
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator I.1:</b> <b>Improved business and investment climate (strategic area)</b></p> <p>Number of procedures to start a business Baseline: 7 (2011) Target: 5 (2013)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Procedures to register a business reviewed and streamlined</p>	<p>The last <a href="#">ISR: MU</a> of the ISN period (June 2014) for the Private Sector Development Support Project (P122326, FY11) indicates that, according to Doing Business data, the number of procedures was still 7 in 2013 and consequently that the target was not achieved during the ISN period. However, as reported in the last <a href="#">ISR: MU</a> (June 2016), the number of procedures was reduced from 7 in 2011 to 6 in 2015 and as of June 2016.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the status for this target is unknown. Information above seems to indicate that the target has been achieved.</p>	
<p><b>Objective #4: Increased agricultural productivity and crop output</b></p>		
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator I.2:</b> <b>Increased crop output</b></p> <p>Volume of crop output (tons): <i>Baseline:</i> Coffee 13,000 tons; Cocoa 6,000 tons; Husked Rice 0 tons; Warranted Corn 0 tons (2010) <i>Target:</i> Coffee 15,000 tons; Cocoa 7,000 tons; Husked Rice 3,000 tons; Warranted Corn 800 tons (2013)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Farmers provided with improved technologies, advisory services, and access to better quality agricultural inputs</p>	<p>The last <a href="#">ISR: S</a> of the ISN period (October 2014) for the Agricultural Sector Support Project (P118045, FY11), reported that data for coffee and cocoa were not yet available, although the activities had started. It also reported that the production of rice had reached 1,517 tons and that the production of corn had reached 2,898 tons, as of May 2014. On the basis of this information, the target was partially achieved at the end of the ISN period. The latest <a href="#">ISR: S</a> (January 2017) reported the following crop outputs, as of November 2016: Coffee 16,092 tons; Cocoa 10,384 tons; Husked Rice 6,722 tons; and Warranted Corn 11,384 tons.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> see information reported for previous indicator (Indicator II.2).</p>	



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Help the Economic Recovery</i> <b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Deepening Economic Recovery and Promoting Sustainable Development</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p><b>Objective #5: Improved access to quality of productive infrastructure</b></p>		
<p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator II.1:</b> <b>Adoption and commenced implementation of a strategic development plan for the Lomé Port, and key port services improved</b></p> <p>Action plan under implementation Baseline: No formal integrated plan exists (2008)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Completion of a national strategic plan for the port</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> Adoption of an action plan to implement the strategic development plan</p>	<p>The CLR reports that the ERIREG RETF (P110239, FY08) supported this indicator; the Grant Reporting and Monitoring <a href="#">Report</a> indicates that port studies have been completed and that additional funding has been obtained to prepare a port master plan. However, as reported in the CLR, the status of the planned national strategic plan for the port is not confirmed. The IFC has also supported the extension and improvement in the Lome container port (see IFC <a href="#">information</a>)– in 2013, after the end of the ISNFY08-10 period. The CLR reports improvement in congestion, customs and time to handle and deliver containers beyond the ISN timeframe.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the status for the target is unknown.</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> the CLR reports that the status for the target is unknown.</p>	
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator I.3:</b> <b>Improved Access to Electricity</b></p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Number of transformer stations rehabilitated Baseline: 0 (2010) Target: 20 (2013)</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> Extension of electricity supply network Baseline: 0 (2010) Target: 30 km (2013)</p>	<p><u>Target A:</u> <a href="#">Management: S</a> for the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Energy Project (P113415, FY09) reports that 20 transformer stations were rehabilitated, as of December 2013 (and 25 as of June 2016 – the CLR reports 21 as of 2014).</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> <a href="#">Management: S</a> for the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Energy Project (P113415, FY09) reports that the electricity supply network was extended by 36km, as of June 2016 – the CLR reports 33km as of 2014.</p>	
<p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator II.2:</b> <b>Agreement between Government and cocoa/coffee professional organization on rehabilitation plan to increase production of cocoa/coffee</b></p>	<p>The Grant Reporting and Monitoring <a href="#">Report</a> for the ERIREG RETF (P110239, FY08) indicates that a coffee/cocoa strategy was completed and used for the design of a WB lending project. As reported in the CLR, a sector rehabilitation plan supported by the Agricultural Sector Support Project (P118045, FY11) has</p>	



	<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 2:</b> <i>Help the Economic Recovery</i> <b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 1:</b> <i>Deepening Economic Recovery and Promoting Sustainable Development</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
	<p>Existence of a sector rehabilitation plan under implementation Baseline: No rehabilitation plan in place (end-2007)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Completion of a diagnostic study of the cocoa/coffee sector</p>	<p>been under implementation since 2013. However, the review of the ISRs for the 2014/2015 period for project P118045 does not permit to verify this information. The CLR also reports that support to the sector led to an increase in coffee and cocoa production through the provision of improved technologies, advisory services, and access to better-quality agricultural inputs; the strengthening of the capacity of producer organizations and the creation of an inter-professional council for coffee and cocoa (CICC-Togo) in September 2014 – the last <a href="#">ISR:S</a> for project P11804 (January 2017) reports an increase of crops, the adoption of new techniques and increased participation in trainings.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> See above.</p>	
	<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 3:</b> <i>Provide for Urgent Social Needs</i> <b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 3:</b> <i>Addressing Urgent Poverty Reduction and Social Needs</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p><b>Major Outcome Measures</b></p>	<p><b>Objective # 6: Improved access of communities to basic social and local development services (including youth employment.)</b></p> <p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator III.1:</b> <b>Increased access to improved basic social services (health, education and water services and increased access to economic opportunities) in targeted rural communities</b></p> <p>(i) Enrollment ratios in the target communities Baseline: TBD (2008)</p>	<p>(i) <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for the Community Development Project -CDP (P110943, FY08) indicates that 97,367 students were enrolled in the constructed or rehabilitated schools (as of September 2013) – the CLR reports that</p>	<p>The CLR indicates the following note: <i>Baseline data for 2008 not available.</i> In addition, no specific target was included in the ISR.</p>



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 3:</b> <i>Provide for Urgent Social Needs</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 3:</b> <i>Addressing Urgent Poverty Reduction and Social Needs</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p>(ii) Share of the population in the target communities that have visited a primary health center Baseline: TBD (2008)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Completion of at least 250 basic services sub-projects and 200 economic opportunities sub-projects by end of project implementation</p>	<p>updated figures are not available since the program did not continue tracking enrollment.</p> <p>(ii) <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for project P110943 reports that about 145,000 patients visited the 23 health centers in 2013 – the CLR reports that the number of unique visitors could not be calculated and that, for 2015, health center visits are estimated at 2,657,067, or 38.87% of the total population.</p> <p>For both sub-indicators, no data was available for the end of the ISR; achievements were not reported before the end of 2013.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> as reported in <a href="#">Management: MS</a> for project P110943, 290 basic socioeconomic infrastructure subprojects and 294 income-generating subprojects were completed, as of September 2013. In addition, 215 basic socioeconomic infrastructure subprojects and 208 income-generating subprojects were completed, as of November 2016, as part of the Community Development and Safety Nets Project (P127200, FY12), as per the last <a href="#">ISR: S</a> (April 2017). These achievements are beyond the ISN time frame.</p>	
<p><b>Objective # 7: Improved quality and access to basic education and health services</b></p>		
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator III.1:</b> <b>Improved quality of primary education</b></p> <p>Primary completion rate (%) Baseline: 63.2% (2010) Target: 66% (2013)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Textbooks of the EFA-FTI project purchased</p>	<p><a href="#">IEG: MS</a> for the Education For All-Fast Track Initiative Program (P116384, FY11) reports that the primary completion rate increased from 65% in 2009 to 83.6% in 2014.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> 9 million reading and math textbooks were purchased and delivered to primary schools as of December 2014, exceeding the project's target of 1.6 million (see <a href="#">IEG: MS</a> for project P116384).</p>	
<p><b>Objective #8 Improved social protection and inclusion (including gender)</b></p>		
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator III.2:</b> <b>Improved access to social protection</b></p>		



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 3:</b> <i>Provide for Urgent Social Needs</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 3:</b> <i>Addressing Urgent Poverty Reduction and Social Needs</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p>(i) Number of community mobilization schemes Baseline: 600 (2011) Target: 900 (2013)</p> <p>(ii) Number of people covered by Social Safety Nets Baseline: 36,000 Target: 70,000 estimated</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Existing social protection policies reviewed and streamlined</p>	<p>(i) The CLR reports that this target has been supported by the Community Development and Safety Nets Project (P127200, FY12) and that 633 communities benefited from community mobilization schemes. However, the review of the ISRs does not permit to verify this information since they do not present an indicator for this target.</p> <p>(ii) the last <a href="#">ISR: MS</a> after the end of the ISN period (February 2015) for the Community Development and Safety Nets Project (P127200, FY12) reported that 4,129 people were covered by the Safety Nets Program, as of March 2014. Consequently, the target was not achieved during the ISN period. The latest <a href="#">ISR: S</a> (April 2017) indicates that a total of 77,795 people are covered by Safety Nets Programs, as of February 2017, including 47,550 covered by the school feeding programs, 12,590 by labor-intensive public works, and 17,665 by cash transfer programs (2016).</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that a review of social protection programs was conducted in 2012 and that a national social protection policy was drafted in 2012 (see the Grant Reporting and Monitoring <a href="#">Report</a> for the Cash for Work Program TA, P121533, FY11) and is being updated for adoption by government.</p>	
<p><b>Objective #9: Improved management of the environment and natural disasters</b></p>		
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator I.4: Drainage Rehabilitation</b></p> <p>Km of drains cleaned Baseline: 0 (2010) Target: 80 km (2013)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Drainage systems cleaned</p>	<p><a href="#">Management: S</a> for the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Energy Project (P113415, FY09) and its additional financing reports that 42km of drains have been cleaned, as of December 2013 (and 121 km as of June 2016 while the CLR reports that the target was achieved in 2014).</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> see above.</p>	
<p><b>ISN FY12-13 Indicator III.3: Flood reduction, especially in Lome township and its environs</b></p>	<p><a href="#">Management: S</a> for the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Energy Project (P113415, FY09) and its additional financing reports that 8km of drains were rehabilitated or</p>	



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 3:</b> <i>Provide for Urgent Social Needs</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 3:</b> <i>Addressing Urgent Poverty Reduction and Social Needs</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p>Number of kilometers of rehabilitated drainage network Baseline: 0 (2010) Target: 30 km (2013)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> An early warning system installed</p>	<p>constructed, as of December 2013 (and 31.3km, as of June 2016).</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> The Integrated Disaster and Land Management Project (P123922, FY14) supports this target. However, as reported in the last <a href="#">ISR: S</a> (April 2017), such system has not been developed yet.</p>	
<p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator II.2:</b> <b>Reduced flooding in the Bé community of Lomé benefiting from rehabilitated drainage; adoption of a road, drainage and solid waste reform program for key urban areas, incorporating the lessons from the LICUS-supported Lomé pilot</b></p> <p>Level of flooding in the Bé community with rehabilitated drains Baseline: Extensive seasonal flooding in the community (2008)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Drainage works completed in a selected disadvantaged Lomé neighborhood (Bé) and a stretch of road in Bé that has become a bottleneck to traffic flow rehabilitated</p>	<p>The Grant Reporting and Monitoring <a href="#">Report</a> for the Lomé Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project (P111338, FY08) indicates that the project supported the rehabilitation of a 2.4km of road in Lomé as well as drainage works, street lighting and side street treatment that allowed water to be captured and directed into the main drainage system.</p> <p>In parallel, thanks to the Emergency Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Energy Project (P113415, FY09) and its additional financing operation, the number of people protected against periodic flooding increased from 2,000 (in May 2009) to more than 585,000 in June 2016 (see <a href="#">Management: S</a>). The ICRR also reports on a reduced exposure to flooding in the neighborhood. However, these improvements have been achieved in 2016, 6 years after the end of the ISN period.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> The Grant Reporting and Monitoring <a href="#">Report</a> for Project P111338 reports on the rehabilitation of a 2.4km of road in Lomé (and that traffic jams disappeared as a result of it) as well as the completion of drainage works, achieved in 2010.</p>	<p>The ISN did not present a specific target for this indicator.</p>
<p><b>ISN FY08-10 Indicator III.1:</b> <b>The threat posed by highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) to humans and the poultry sector is minimized</b></p> <p>(i) Number of monthly HPAI inter-ministerial committees held Baseline: 0 (end-2007)</p>	<p>The Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response Project (P108484, FY08) supported this outcome. No project document was found in the WBG' systems to verify outcomes.</p> <p>(i) The CLR reports that target was achieved, with interdepartmental committee meetings held monthly during outbreaks – and that no meeting has been hold for the August 2016</p>	<p>No specific target was set for the two sub-indicators (i) and (ii).</p>



<p><b>ISN FY08-10: Focus Area 3:</b> <i>Provide for Urgent Social Needs</i></p> <p><b>ISN FY12-13: Focus Area 3:</b> <i>Addressing Urgent Poverty Reduction and Social Needs</i></p>	<p><b>Actual Results</b></p>	<p><b>IEG Comments</b></p>
<p>(ii) Number of responses to outbreak missions conducted jointly by public health and animal health services compared to the number of reported outbreaks Baseline: 0 joint missions compared to 2 reported outbreaks (2007)</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> Avian Flu Control Program and Outbreak Containment Plan are in place</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> A centralized crisis management unit has been established</p> <p><u>Target C:</u> An inter-ministerial committee (comprising, among others, health, livestock, trade, environment, finance, security, population) is established and functioning</p>	<p>outbreaks, but a press conference was held that represented all involved departments.</p> <p>(ii) The CLR reports that the target was achieved, since the two outbreaks of avian influenza reported in August 2016 have been managed jointly by the health and agriculture ministries. It also reports that at least 5 joint missions have been conducted following the positive diagnosis of H5N1 by the central laboratory veterinarians.</p> <p><u>Target A:</u> the CLR reports that the target was not achieved; an Interdepartmental Committee on prevention of and fight against avian influenza was established in February 2006 and a National Technical Committee in May 2006, but neither institution is operationalized; planning document in place but not funded.</p> <p><u>Target B:</u> the CLR reports that a Crisis Unit was established at the time of the first crisis in 2007 and reactivated during August 2016 to manage outbreaks in Adétikopé and Adidogomé. No project document was found in the WBG' systems to verify outcomes.</p> <p><u>Target C:</u> the CLR reports that the target is not achieved since the inter-ministerial committee, was created in February 2006 but not yet operationalized.</p>	



**Annex Table 2: Togo Planned and Actual Lending, FY08-FY16**

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Proposed Amount	Approved IDA Amount	Outcome Rating
<b>Project Planned Under ISN FY08-10 and ISN FY12-13</b>					<i>ISNFY08-10</i>	<i>ISNFY12-13</i>		
P110618	Economic Recovery and Governance Grant (ERGG)*	2008	2008	2009	170.6		175.0	IEG: MS
P110943	Community Development Project	2008	2008	2014	17.2		17.2	IEG: S
P111064	Financial Sector and Governance Reform TA Project	2009	2009	2016	10.0		12.0	LIR: MU
P113415	Emergency Infrastructure Rehab.	2009	2009	2016	10.0		25.0	LIR: S
P113456	Development Policy Operation (ERGG2)	2009	2009	2010	12.0		20.0	IEG: MS
	Support to Growth-inducing Sectors	2010			9.0			Cancelled
P117282	Development Policy Operation (ERGG3)	2010	2010	2011	12.0		16.3	IEG: MS
	Regional Abidjan Lagos Transport and Trade Facilitation	2010			5.0			
P127200	Community Development and Safety Net	2012	2012	2018		14.0	14.0	LIR: S
P126897	Economic Recovery & Gov. Grant 5	2012	2012	2013		14.0	14.0	IEG: MS
P126899	Emergency Infrac Rehab Add Financing	2012	2013			14.0	14.0	Cancelled
P132208	Development Policy Operation (ERGG 6)	2013	2014	2015		10.0	14.0	NR
	Energy Project	2013				20.0		Cancelled
	WA Reg Communications Infrastructure	2013				10.0		
<b>Total Planned</b>					<b>245.8</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>321.5</b>	
<b>Unplanned Projects during ISN FY08-10 and ISN FY12-13</b>								
P149277	TOGO Mining Governance and Development		2016	2021			15.0	LIR: MS
P143843	TG- Maternal and Child Health Support		2014	2019			14.0	LIR: MS
P146598	TG-PDCplus Additional Financing		2014				12.1	
P118045	TG:Agricultural Sector Support Project		2011	2017			9.0	LIR: S
P122326	TG-Priv Sec Development Support		2011	2016			13.0	IEG: U
P122806	TG-Economic Recovery & Gov. Grant 4		2011	2012			28.0	IEG: MS
P125049	TG-Emergency Infrastructure Rehab AF		2011				15.0	
P121067	TG-additional financing under CDP (FY10)		2010				8.7	
<b>Total Unplanned</b>							<b>114.8</b>	
<b>On-going Projects during ISN FY08-10 and ISN FY12-13</b>			<b>Approval FY</b>	<b>Closing FY</b>			<b>Approved Amount</b>	
	None							
<b>Total On-going</b>							<b>0.0</b>	

Source: Togo ISN FY8-10 and ISN FY12-13, WB Business Intelligence Table 2b.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 4/17/17

\*LIR: Latest internal rating. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory.

NR: ISR Rating not yet available





**Annex Table 3: Analytical and Advisory Work for Togo, FY08-FY16**

Proj ID	Economic and Sector Work	Fiscal year	Output Type	Total Cost
P104205	TG-Policy Notes & Needs Assessment (FY08)	FY08	Economic and Sector Work	191
P111063	TG-PEMFAR	FY09	Public Expenditure Review (PER)	319
P115627	GCMCG: Togo Country Assessment	FY09	Corporate Governance Assessment (ROSC)	71
P113161	TG-Sources of Growth/CEM	FY10	Country Economic Memorandum (CEM)	714
P117307	Togo - Growth Diagnostics	FY10	Economic and Sector Work	19
P118178	TG - ROSC A&A	FY10	Accounting and Auditing Assessment (ROSC)	68
P119200	TG: Investment Climate Policy Note	FY10	Economic and Sector Work	166
P113147	TG-Env & Soc Background Reviews	FY11	Economic and Sector Work	241
P123039	DeMPA Assessment - Togo	FY11	General Economy, Macroeconomics, and Growth Study	93
P123694	IHP+: Togo Health Country Status Report	FY11	Health Sector Review	206
P123185	Technical Notes on Gender and Poverty	FY12	Poverty Assessment (PA)	225
P121776	Togo Energy Sector Policy Review	FY14	Sector or Thematic Study/Note	85
P146418	Togo Service Delivery Indicators	FY16	Sector or Thematic Study/Note	533
P152775	SPEAU Water Supply Policy Dialogue	FY16	Sector or Thematic Study/Note	67
P157186	Economic Governance Diagnostics	FY16	Sector or Thematic Study/Note	37
Proj ID	Technical Assistance	Fiscal year	Output Type	Total Cost
P111682	TG-Education Sector Program (FY10)	FY10	Technical Assistance	81
P117965	Togo - ICT Policy Dialogue	FY10	Technical Assistance	37
P121533	TG:Cash for Work Program: Togo & Liberia	FY11	Technical Assistance	110
P122400	Togo: ICT Strategy	FY11	Technical Assistance	83
P124996	TG-Post Disaster Needs Assessment (FY11)	FY11	Technical Assistance	58
P127394	Togo - ICT Sector TA	FY12	Technical Assistance	58
P129007	TG Social Protection	FY12	Technical Assistance	223
P127711	Togo: #10161 Financial Sector Devt Strat	FY13	Technical Assistance	242
P118985	Togo - Use of country System	FY14	Technical Assistance	79
P123524	TOGO EITI Implementation Support	FY14	Technical Assistance	66
P132820	Togo - ICT Sector TA	FY14	Technical Assistance	103
P133075	Togo Governance Action Plan	FY14	Technical Assistance	38
P143797	Togo: Statistical Capacity Building	FY16	Technical Assistance	13
P143864	Togo Mineral Sector TA	FY16	Technical Assistance	69
P146403	TOGO-Mining Law and Cadastre	FY16	Technical Assistance	227
P148172	TOGO REFORM PLAN FOR DEBT MANAGEMENT	FY16	Technical Assistance	65
P156440	Household Survey	FY16	Technical Assistance	112

Source: WB Business Intelligence 4/17/17



**Annex Table 4: Togo Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY08-16**

Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount	Outcome Rating
P146294	TOGO - Education and Institutional Strengthening Project 2	TF 18062	2015	2019	27,800,000	
P149942	REDD+ Readiness preparation - Togo	TF 18779	2015	2019	3,800,000	
P132208	TG - Economic Recovery and Governance Credit 6	TF 13880	2014	2016	375,842	
P123922	Integrated Disaster and Land Management Project	TF 13715	2014	2017	3,000,000	
P144484	Cash Transfer Program for Vulnerable Children in Northern Togo	TF 14860	2014	2018	2,550,000	
P129495	TG - M&E Capacity Strengthening	TF 13016	2013	2016	432,484	
P124198	TG-Integrated Disaster and Land Management	TF 11243	2012	2017	5,453,704	
P124198	TG-Integrated Disaster and Land Management	TF 11245	2012	2017	3,703,703	
P123922	Integrated Disaster and Land Management Project	TF 11010	2012	2017	7,290,000	
P123922	Integrated Disaster and Land Management Project	TF 98701	2012	2015	500,000	
P118045	Togo Agricultural Sector Support Project	TF 99275	2011	2015	9,000,000	
P118045	Togo Agricultural Sector Support Project	TF 99289	2011	2017	19,000,000	
P124628	Strengthening the capacity of the accountancy profession in Togo	TF 99402	2011	2014	335,500	
P117906	Togo: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Implementation	TF 98712	2011	2014	274,600	
P116384	TG- Education For All-Fast Track Initiative Program	TF 97340	2011	2015	45,000,000	IEG: MS
P121574	Togo Private Sector Revitalization	TF 96690	2010	2016	1,100,000	
P115066	Togo Efficient Lighting Program	TF 94675	2009	2016	1,818,182	
P108918	EPPR - Expansion Phase - GA with Savanes	TF 92968	2009	2010	318,200	
P108918	EPPR - Expansion Phase - GA with Savanes	TF 92967	2009	2010	318,200	
P108918	EPPR - Expansion Phase - GA with Savanes	TF 92966	2009	2010	318,200	
P110943	TG-Community Dev. Project ERL (FY08)	TF 93124	2009	2012	7,000,000	
P111338	Lome Infra. Rehab. & Maintenance Project	TF 92322	2008	2010	1,575,000	
P108484	TG-Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response Project	TF 91731	2008	2009	559,900	
P110239	TG-Economic Recovery and International Re-engagement	TF 91657	2008	2011	1,573,630	
P108918	EPPR - Expansion Phase - GA with Savanes	TF 91353	2008	2010	445,400	
P105385	Poverty Reduction Emergency Program - Savanes and BNL	TF 90492	2008	2010	1,235,000	
P108828	EPPR - Consolidation Phase - Maritime GA#090493 - LICUS Ref. No. 58	TF 90493	2008	2010	2,235,000	
P104408	National Strategy for the Development of Statistics (NSDS)	TF 57664	2007	2009	84,932	
	<b>Total</b>				<b>147,097,477</b>	

Source: Client Connection as of 2/13/17

\*\* IEG Validates RETF that are 5M and above



**Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Togo, FY08-16**

Exit FY	Proj ID	Project name	Total Evaluated (\$M)	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
2008	P110618	TG-Economic Recovery and Gov. Grant I	164.4	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2010	P113456	TG-P113456-ERGG 2	21.3	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2011	P117282	TG-Economic Recovery & Gov. Grant 3	16.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2012	P122806	TG-Economic Recovery & Gov. Grant 4	28.7	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2013	P126897	TG-Economic Recovery & Gov. Credit 5	13.7	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	HIGH
2014	P110943	TG-Community Dev. Project ERL (FY08)	25.3	SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2015	P116384	TG- Education For All-FTI Program	0.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2016	P122326	TG-Priv Sec Development Support	4.7	UNSATISFACTORY	HIGH
<b>Total</b>			<b>274.1</b>		

Source: AO Key IEG Ratings as of 5/3/17

**Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Togo and Comparators, FY08-16**

Region	Total Evaluated (\$M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (\$)	Outcome % Sat (No)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (\$)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (No)
Togo	274.1	8	98.3	87.5	19.7	37.5
AFR	34,186.7	682	70.3	65.3	36.2	35.4
World	199,785.5	2,329	82.5	71.4	61.4	49.3

Source: WB AO as of 5/3/17

\* With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.

**Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Togo and Comparators, FY08-16**

Fiscal year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Ave FY08-16
<b>Togo</b>										
# Proj	10	11	6	10	11	11	10	10	7	10
# Proj At Risk	2	2		1	1	2	1	4	4	2
% Proj At Risk	20.0	18.2	-	10.0	9.1	18.2	10.0	40.0	57.1	22.2
Net Comm Amt	24.9	84.0	83.0	176.5	180.2	189.8	186.8	172.6	111.4	134
Comm At Risk		17.2		25.9	25.9	70.8	13.0	41.1	64.6	37
% Commit at Risk		20.5		14.7	14.4	37.3	7.0	23.8	58.0	27.5
<b>AFR</b>										
# Proj	530	582	597	644	627	566	620	643	659	608
# Proj At Risk	111	150	152	133	127	128	138	136	144	135
% Proj At Risk	20.9	25.8	25.5	20.7	20.3	22.6	22.3	21.2	21.9	22.3
Net Comm Amt	24,041.3	29,334.3	35,438.5	38,884.9	40,416.8	42,649.1	49,142.6	54,586.3	59,033.9	41,503
Comm At Risk	6,042.6	7,322.0	9,703.1	8,269.7	6,504.6	14,310.8	16,548.2	16,000.3	18,949.8	11,517
% Commit at Risk	25.1	25.0	27.4	21.3	16.1	33.6	33.7	29.3	32.1	27.7
<b>World</b>										
# Proj	1,832	1,925	1,990	2,059	2,029	1,964	2,048	2,022	1,975	1,983
# Proj At Risk	312	386	410	382	387	414	412	444	422	397
% Proj At Risk	17.0	20.1	20.6	18.6	19.1	21.1	20.1	22.0	21.4	20.0
Net Comm Amt	110,835.9	135,706.0	162,975.3	171,755.3	173,706.1	176,202.6	192,610.1	201,045.2	220,331.5	171,685
Comm At Risk	18,967.7	20,857.8	28,963.1	23,850.0	24,465.0	40,805.6	40,933.5	45,987.7	44,244.9	32,119
% Commit at Risk	17.1	15.4	17.8	13.9	14.1	23.2	21.3	22.9	20.1	18.7

Source: WB BI as of 4/17/17

**Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for Togo, FY08-16**

Fiscal Year	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Overall Result
<b>Togo</b>										
Disbursement Ratio (%)		11.5	24.2	45.6	25.5	25.9	34.9	30.0	40.2	31.1
Inv Disb in FY		1.9	12.5	23.0	27.3	26.5	34.8	25.4	35.0	186.3
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY		16.4	51.7	50.5	107.0	102.5	99.6	84.6	87.0	599.4
<b>AFR</b>										
Disbursement Ratio (%)	22.7	23.8	24.0	19.4	21.4	22.5	23.1	24.5	19.6	22.2
Inv Disb in FY	3,340.1	3,564.2	4,251.0	4,703.1	5,260.3	5,652.1	6,143.9	6,473.2	5,572.5	44,960.4
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	14,734.1	14,954.7	17,704.1	24,298.4	24,595.0	25,175.9	26,540.4	26,463.6	28,377.1	202,843.3
<b>World</b>										
Disbursement Ratio (%)	22.2	26.5	26.9	22.4	20.8	20.6	20.8	21.8	19.5	22.1
Inv Disb in FY	14,561.7	18,062.5	20,928.8	20,933.4	21,048.2	20,510.7	20,757.7	21,853.7	21,152.9	179,809.5
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	65,651.9	68,133.5	77,760.8	93,516.5	101,234.3	99,588.3	99,854.3	100,344.9	108,600.3	814,684.9

\* Calculated as IBRD/IDA Disbursements in FY / Opening Undisbursed Amount at FY. Restricted to Lending Instrument Type = Investment.  
AO disbursement ratio table as of 4/17/17



**Annex Table 9: Net Disbursement and Charges for Togo, FY08-16**

<b>Period</b>	<b>Disb. Amt.</b>	<b>Repay Amt.</b>	<b>Net Amt.</b>	<b>Charges</b>	<b>Fees</b>	<b>Net Transfer</b>
FY08	163,057,879.1	106,420,090.3	56,637,788.8	-	37,837,173.9	18,800,614.9
FY09	1,887,187.7	21,110,041.9	(19,222,854.1)	-	4,447,630.9	(23,670,485.0)
FY10	33,852,781.9	22,065,858.9	11,786,923.0	-	4,151,883.3	7,635,039.7
FY11	64,156,366.5	11,205,830.7	52,950,535.8	-	2,360,601.7	50,589,934.2
FY12	30,677,777.6	-	30,677,777.6	-	-	30,677,777.6
FY13	40,521,367.4	-	40,521,367.4	-	57,580.7	40,463,786.7
FY14	23,852,029.2	-	23,852,029.2	-	104,268.7	23,747,760.5
FY15	43,112,316.0	-	43,112,316.0	-	152,917.4	42,959,398.6
FY16	26,695,536.9	-	26,695,536.9	-	226,273.5	26,469,263.4
<b>Report Total</b>	<b>427,813,242.4</b>	<b>160,801,821.7</b>	<b>267,011,420.6</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>49,338,330.2</b>	<b>217,673,090.5</b>

*World Bank Client Connection 4/18/17*



**Annex Table 10: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Togo**

Development Partners	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
<b>All Donors, Total</b>	<b>330.14</b>	<b>494.52</b>	<b>403.38</b>	<b>542.38</b>	<b>245.08</b>	<b>226.32</b>	<b>210.96</b>	<b>199.63</b>
<b>DAC Countries, Total</b>	<b>176.06</b>	<b>361.95</b>	<b>252.73</b>	<b>327.44</b>	<b>114.48</b>	<b>82.6</b>	<b>79.8</b>	<b>90.14</b>
Australia	..	..	0.09	0.74	0.44	2.4	0.12	0.19
Austria	0.89	14.58	0.72	31.5	0.16	0.11	0.07	0.07
Belgium	2.58	62.4	5.03	88.01	0.72	0.74	0.79	10.59
Canada	2.61	2.5	23.05	1.41	5.67	1.9	0.46	0.31
Czech Republic	0.01	..	..	..	..	..	0.01	..
Denmark	0.69	1.25	1.27	0.99	0.99	0.35	..	..
Finland	0.16	0.2	0.41	0.32	0.23	0.34	0.29	0.31
France	127.68	40.51	168.02	36.78	22.55	25.25	31.93	29.12
Germany	8.44	24.03	8.84	33.73	8.33	18.48	28.79	34.21
Greece	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01
Hungary	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0
Iceland	..	0.12	..	..	..	0.1	..	0.01
Ireland	0.53	0.14	..	0.13	..	..	..	..
Italy	1.31	3.04	11.53	0.94	0.47	0.52	1.1	2.1
Japan	0.33	34.09	7.54	9.27	15.63	23.75	10.17	4.24
Korea	0.06	0.06	0.1	0.2	0.13	0.09	0.33	0.5
Luxembourg	0.59	0.73	0.85	0.9	0.65	0.5	1.05	1.1
Netherlands	13.2	0.88	17.62	..	..	..	..	..
Norway	0.05	0.08	0.09	0.26	0.23	0.27	0.17	0.64
Poland	0.04	0.01	..	..	..	..	..	..
Portugal	..	..	..	..	0	0.01	0	0.01
Spain	3.45	3.8	1.59	26.5	51.66	0.42	0.75	0.26
Sweden	0.75	0.38	0.34	14.23	0.69	0.7	1.3	1.27
Switzerland	0.64	158.94	1.71	75.95	2.5	2.56	-0.83	2.09
United Kingdom	9.03	10.42	-0.08	1.92	0.05	..	..	0.05
United States	3	3.78	3.98	3.64	3.38	4.09	3.27	3.04
<b>Multilaterals, Total</b>	<b>152.83</b>	<b>131.67</b>	<b>149.89</b>	<b>214.57</b>	<b>127.13</b>	<b>137.8</b>	<b>132.35</b>	<b>102.31</b>
EU Institutions	39.02	46.36	48.92	45.77	27.5	34.1	35.39	25.21
International Monetary Fund, Total	47.63	41.29	43.64	13.89	..	-1.77	-12.23	-16.23
IMF	47.63	41.29	43.64	13.89	..	-1.77	-12.23	-16.23
Regional Development Banks, Total	-7.94	3.59	14.96	49.78	36.88	15.69	24.27	28.53
African Development Bank, Total	-7.6	-0.21	-1.3	35.77	29.43	11.47	21.12	21.48
African Development Bank	..	..	..	..	..	0.09	0	0.02
African Development Fund	-7.6	-0.21	-1.3	35.77	29.43	11.38	21.11	21.46
Islamic Development Bank	-0.34	3.8	16.26	14.01	7.45	4.22	3.15	7.05
United Nations, Total	14.12	12.74	12.14	8.01	16.43	16.33	14.12	17.22



Food and Agriculture Organisation	..	..	..	..	..	0.37	..	..
International Atomic Energy Agency	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.03	0.03
IFAD	-0.23	-0.8	-0.71	-3.7	1.98	4.58	1.95	1.78
International Labour Organisation	..	..	..	..	0.23	0.28	0.28	0.21
UNAIDS	0.3	0.32	0.43	0.38	0.35	0.47	0.37	0.5
UNDP	5.57	6.78	5.84	4.58	4.71	4.61	5.62	4.98
UNFPA	1.69	1.43	1.45	1.34	1.55	1.39	1.23	1.45
UNHCR	0.18	0.39	0.58	..	2.52	..	..	2.31
UNICEF	4.25	4.45	3.53	4.59	3.91	3.77	3.66	4.64
UNTA	0.49	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
WFP	1.87	0.17	1.02	0	..	0.02	..	..
World Health Organisation	..	..	..	0.82	1.19	0.85	0.98	1.33
World Bank Group	47.57	6.25	7.93	55.86	36.94	30.76	40.37	26.01
World Bank, Total	47.57	6.25	7.93	55.86	36.94	30.76	40.37	26.01
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
International Development Association	47.57	6.25	7.93	55.86	36.94	30.76	40.37	26.01
International Finance Corporation	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
<b>Other Multilateral, Total</b>	<b>12.43</b>	<b>21.44</b>	<b>22.3</b>	<b>41.26</b>	<b>9.37</b>	<b>42.69</b>	<b>30.43</b>	<b>21.57</b>
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa	0.15	1.7	0.31	5.39	0.23	0.3	1.47	1.96
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	3.44	3.13	3.01	4.3	0.04	6.83	9.14	6.9
Global Environment Facility	0.07	..	0.66	0.62	3.62	3.86	3.94	3.34
Global Fund	10.28	14.52	18.81	30.95	5.47	31.69	17.82	8.55
OPEC Fund for International Development	-1.51	2.09	-0.49	..	..	..	-1.94	0.83
<b>Non-DAC Countries, Total</b>	<b>1.25</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0.76</b>	<b>0.37</b>	<b>3.47</b>	<b>5.93</b>	<b>-1.2</b>	<b>7.18</b>
Azerbaijan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.01
Israel	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.17	0.04	0.06	0.01
Kuwait (KFAED)	-0.67	..	..	..	2.44	5.25	-1.81	6.78
Malta	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.01	..
Romania	..	..	..	0.01	..	0.02	..	0
Russia	..	..	..	..	0.01	..	..	..
Thailand	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0.02
Turkey	0.01	..	0.5	0.06	0.1	0.38	0.3	0.09
United Arab Emirates	1.86	0.85	0.21	0.28	0.75	0.24	0.24	0.26

Source: OECD Stat, [DAC2a] as of 4/19/17



Annex Table 11: Economic and Social Indicators for Togo, 2008 – 2015

Series Name									Togo	SSA	World
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average 2008-2015		
<b>Growth and Inflation</b>											
GDP growth (annual %)	2.2	3.5	4.0	4.9	4.8	4.0	5.9	5.4	4.3	4.3	2.2
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	(0.5)	0.7	1.2	2.1	2.0	1.2	3.1	2.6	1.6	1.5	1.0
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	1,020.0	1,040.0	1,050.0	1,070.0	1,110.0	1,130.0	1,270.0	1,330.0	1,127.5	3,188.3	13,766.4
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$) (Millions)	400.0	440.0	450.0	460.0	480.0	500.0	550.0	540.0	477.5	1,462.9	9,983.6
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	8.7	3.3	1.8	3.6	2.6	1.8	0.2	1.8	3.0	5.9	3.9
<b>Poverty Data</b>											
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of pop)	..	..	..	54.2	..	..	..	..	54.2	44.1	14.0
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of pop)	..	..	..	58.7	..	..	..	55.1	56.9		
Rural poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of rural pop)	..	..	..	73.4	..	..	..	68.7	71.1		
Urban poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of urban pop)	..	..	..	34.6	..	..	..	35.9	35.3		
GINI index (World Bank estimate)	..	..	..	46.0	..	..	..	..	46.0		
<b>Composition of GDP (%)</b>											
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	40.7	32.9	31.0	30.8	42.6	39.7	42.0	40.7	37.5	18.6	3.9
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	18.2	24.9	24.9	22.8	19.1	19.0	19.3	18.7	20.8	27.6	28.4
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	41.1	51.1	52.3	53.7	39.0	41.3	38.8	40.7	44.7	53.9	67.6
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	14.0	16.0	18.0	17.4	24.1	24.5	23.8	25.5	20.4	19.9	23.5
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	0.9	2.4	1.8	1.4	10.4	4.9	4.7	(4.7)	2.7	19.3	24.8
<b>External Accounts</b>											
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	35.5	36.7	40.2	39.4	46.7	52.7	44.5	42.2	42.2	31.2	29.7
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	51.9	52.3	57.3	56.3	60.5	72.3	62.9	67.6	60.2	32.3	29.1
Current account balance (% of GDP)	(7.0)	(5.6)	(6.3)	(8.0)	(7.6)	(13.9)	(10.2)	(11.3)	-8.7		

Series Name									Togo	SSA	World
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Average 2008-2015		
External debt stocks (% of GNI)	58.8	61.7	46.3	19.5	22.8	26.1	24.5	29.1	36.1		
Total debt service (% of GNI)	7.0	1.9	1.3	0.5	0.7	1.5	1.4	1.6	2.0	1.7	
Total reserves in months of imports	4.0	4.7	4.4	3.5	2.1	1.9	2.1	..	3.2	5.2	13.4
<b>Fiscal Accounts <sup>11</sup></b>											
General government revenue (% of GDP)	17.0	17.3	20.1	19.8	20.0	21.5	20.5	21.9	19.8		
General government total expenditure (% of GDP)	17.9	21.2	22.5	26.2	26.4	26.7	27.3	30.8	24.9		
General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	(0.9)	(3.9)	(2.5)	(6.5)	(6.4)	(5.2)	(6.8)	(8.9)	-5.1		
General government gross debt (% of GDP)	96.0	85.8	48.8	42.4	44.7	56.4	65.2	75.6	64.4		
<b>Health</b>											
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	56.0	56.6	57.3	57.9	58.6	59.1	59.7	60.1	58.2	57.1	70.8
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	81.0	78.0	83.0	85.0	84.0	84.0	87.0	88.0	83.8	72.6	84.6
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.6	11.6	11.6	11.5	28.6	65.6
Improved water source (% of population with access)	41.6	42.0	42.3	42.7	43.1	43.5	43.8	44.2	42.9	52.4	81.6
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	62.5	60.9	59.3	57.9	56.5	55.0	53.6	52.3	57.3	63.1	35.7
<b>Education</b>											
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	4.7	7.2	7.3	9.2	10.7	13.7	15.0	17.5	10.7	18.6	39.8
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	111.5	125.9	128.4	125.9	128.5	128.7	125.1	121.8	124.5	97.3	105.3
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	..	..	..	54.7	..	..	..	..	54.7	40.4	72.1
<b>Population</b>											
Population, total (Millions)	6,052,937	6,219,761	6,390,851	6,566,179	6,745,581	6,928,719	7,115,163	7,304,578	6,665,471	912,129,475	7,050,208,548
Population growth (annual %)	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.8	1.2
Urban population (% of total)	36.6	37.1	37.5	38.0	38.5	39.0	39.5	40.0	38.3	36.0	52.2

Source: DDP as of 4/17/17

\*International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016

**Annex Table 12: List of IFC Investments in Togo**  
**Investments Committed in FY08-FY16**

Project ID	Cmt FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Original Loan	Original Equity	Original CMT	Loan Cancel	Equity Cancel	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm
35886	2016	Active	Transportation and Warehousing	G	11,224	10,979	-	10,979	-	-	10,979	-	10,979
36234	2015	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	7,500	7,500	-	7,500	3,750	-	3,750	-	3,750
34433	2014	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	7,500	26,811	-	26,811	-	-	26,811	-	26,811
29197	2011	Active	Transportation and Warehousing	G	396,474	122,421	-	122,421	3,252	-	119,170	-	119,170
27849	2010	Active	Electric Power	G	14,000	8,500	5,500	14,000	-	259	14,000	5,241	13,741
27514	2009	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	2,750	51,848	-	51,848	-	-	51,848	-	51,848
<b>Sub-Total</b>					<b>439,447</b>	<b>228,058</b>	<b>5,500</b>	<b>233,558</b>	<b>7,002</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>226,557</b>	<b>5,241</b>	<b>226,298</b>

**Investments Committed pre-FY08 but active during FY08-16**

Project ID	CMT FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Original Loan	Original Equity	Original CMT	Loan Cancel	Equity Cancel	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm
<b>Sub-Total</b>					<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>					<b>439,447</b>	<b>228,058</b>	<b>5,500</b>	<b>233,558</b>	<b>7,002</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>226,557</b>	<b>5,241</b>	<b>226,298</b>

Source: IFC-MIS Extract as of end July 31, 2017

**Annex Table 13: List of IFC Advisory Services in Togo  
Advisory Services Approved in FY08-16**

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US\$
584067	Togo Investment Climate Reform Program	2013	2015	CLOSED	TAC	716,098
593310	OHADA Implementation Component of Togo IC Program	2012	2016	TERMINATED	IC	650,000
	<b>Sub-Total</b>					<b>1,366,098</b>

**Advisory Services Approved pre-FY08 but active during FY08-16**

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US\$
	None					
	<b>Sub-Total</b>					<b>-</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>					<b>1,366,098</b>

Source: IFC AS Data as of 3-28-17

**Annex Table 14: IFC net commitment activity in Togo, FY08 - FY16**

		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Financial Markets		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,500,000	(3,750,000)	3,750,000
Trade Finance (TF)		-	4,995,000	6,641,653	5,430,946	7,688,905	8,930,814	9,840,457	16,517,116	18,048,826	78,093,717
Health, Education, Life Sciences	Health	272,700	(258,840)	(73,400)	87,500	(75,800)	19,480	(522,700)	-	-	(551,060)
Infrastructure	Transportation & Warehousing	-	-	-	123,041,750	(16,107,500)	760,331	3,045,473	(3,632,034)	11,029,167	118,137,186
	Electric Power	-	-	14,000,000	-	-	(259,200)	-	-	-	13,740,800
<b>Total</b>		<b>272,700</b>	<b>4,736,160</b>	<b>20,568,253</b>	<b>128,560,196</b>	<b>(8,494,396)</b>	<b>9,451,426</b>	<b>12,363,230</b>	<b>20,385,082</b>	<b>25,327,992</b>	<b>213,170,644</b>

Source: IFC MIS as of 4/20/17



**Annex Table 15: List of MIGA Activities in Togo, 2008-2016**

ID	Contract Enterprise	FY	Project Status	Sector	Investor	Max Gross Issuance
6699	Cotecna Inspection S.A. Bureau de Liaison du Togo	2011	Not Active	Services	Switzerland	4.6
<b>Total</b>						4.6

Source: MIGA 4-19-17