



1. CAS/CPS Data		
Country: Republic of Cameroon		
CAS/CPS Year: FY10	CAS/CPS Period: FY10 – FY14 (originally FY10-FY13)	
CLR Period: FY10 – FY14	Date of this review: March 15, 2017	
2. Ratings		
	CLR Rating	IEG Rating
Development Outcome:	<i>Moderately Unsatisfactory¹</i>	<i>Unsatisfactory</i>
WBG Performance:	<i>Fair</i>	<i>Fair</i>
3. Executive Summary		
<p>i. Cameroon is a lower middle income, resource-rich country with large potential. Due to its location, the country is the gateway to the economies of Central Africa and plays a central role in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). The government has had a weak record with respect to implementing reforms. Its latest overall CPIA score is 3.1 (compared to the average IDA-eligible Sub-Saharan African countries of 3.2). Governance has posed a major challenge to the country's economic potential, and most of its CPIA scores for public sector management and institutions are below the African averages. Lately security has also become an important issue, with Boko Haram being active in the northern regions of the country. The economy remains predominantly rural and informal, but with rapid urbanization. The annual GDP growth rate averaged 5.1 percent during the period of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, FY10-14) and improved to almost 6 percent in 2015-2016, but poverty rates have remained essentially unaltered since 2001 (38 percent below the national poverty line in 2014), and most MDGs have not been achieved. Inequality has increased, with disparity between regions becoming increasingly pronounced. This constitutes a potential driver of fragility and conflict, particularly in the northern regions also affected by the Boko Haram. Poverty incidence is much lower in urban than in rural areas, and 90 percent of all poor people live in rural areas. The business environment improved during the period of the CAS but remains a key obstacle for economic diversification, while educational quality has been eroding, and health outcomes are generally similar to those of lower-income countries despite high levels of spending.</p> <p>ii. The Bank's strategy was well aligned with country challenges and the government's own objectives, with the emphasis of the CAS program on governance, competitiveness, and public sector services. The program generally did address key challenges for the country, and was largely unchanged in the CAS Progress Report (CASPR), at which time the CAS period was extended to include FY14, but some indicators were dropped and others were weakened primarily</p>		

¹ The CLR rated the development outcome as Fair (see para 2 of the CLR), which is a four- point scale used for rating WBG performance instead of the six- point scale for rating development outcome. Additional information from the Region indicated that the DO rating of Fair was equivalent to Moderately Unsatisfactory per the Shared Approach on Country Engagement.

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in terms of time of delivery. The program aligned quite well to the twin goals, but the poverty dimension of the WBG program could have been even stronger, including the attention to inclusion – although with a poverty rate of 37.5 percent (2014) there is strong overlap between poverty and shared prosperity issues.

iii. Under the CAS, governance was seen as Cameroon's greatest challenge to growth and development, as the pervasiveness of weak governance affected most economic transactions, and this was therefore a cross-cutting foundation theme in the CAS. However, there was very modest progress for this theme, with an overall rating of Unsatisfactory. Governance indicators over-relied on PEFA indicators that could not be verified because the government postponed the planned PEFA to 2017. The CAS and CASPR could have provided intermediate indicators to measure progress against the governance objectives. Other objectives performed somewhat better in terms of achieving targets (access to infrastructure and health services), but some indicators were insufficient to measure the achievement of objectives and are project level indicators. A number of reported indicator results could not be verified from the available documentation. The Kribi Gas to Power project provided 216 MW of electricity through an IDA guarantee project, IFC lending and later a MIGA guarantee. Average transit times for imports from the exit from the Douala port were reduced, days to register a business declined substantially (although less than planned), and some improvements in the use of natural resources, although several of the indicators could not be verified. Completion rate in primary education increased from 64 percent (2007) to 83 percent, but there were no indicators for educational quality. Some indicators provided gender disaggregation in terms of female beneficiary percentages, albeit they seem to be of unclear validity.

iv. The CAS program was reasonably well designed in light of country requirements and (significant) constraints, and proved to be quite stable with all nine objectives maintained in the CASPR. It addressed appropriate and important areas, and was designed for gradual and quite modest improvements. The effort to ground the strategy in governance as a foundational theme did not achieve substantial improvements. The results framework had weaknesses including that some of the objectives were not underpinned by strong indicators and the apparent level of ambition was in some areas quite modest. There was good Bank/IFC cooperation in some areas – in particular electricity, where MIGA was also engaged. Knowledge activities provided good support for the preparation of lending operations, and the CLR provides several examples of widespread dissemination.

v. The CASPR addressed an important stepping-up of supervision and implementation support, and also a stronger focus on a few selected operations going forward. Several safeguard issues came up that were resolved, at times after a delay. Lending was significantly above CAS expectations – including a significant amount of regional operations that were not well discussed in the CAS documents including the CLR - while the pace of advisory services and analytics (ASA) deliveries seems to have picked up somewhat after the end of the CAS period. The results framework was largely stable throughout the extended CAS period, but not enough attention was given up front to whether the results could be measured. Environment and social safeguards policies were triggered in nine closed and validated investment operations during the life of the CAS, and compliance with the policies was reported to have been achieved in most sectors. Complaints about possible fraud and corruption resulted in three substantiated cases; in two of these government entities investigated and came to satisfactory conclusions.

vi. IFC focused on development and support of the electricity and financial sector. The effort in the electricity sector was more extensive, involving multiple institutions. During the CAS period, IFC helped two microfinance institutions and, after the CAS period, IFC is in the process of developing the SME portfolio in a leading bank, as well as entities serving value chains of various agricultural commodities.

vii. IEG draws three main lessons from this CLR: First, programs addressing governance need to provide a mix of interventions commensurate with the nature of the objectives, be structured realistically to conditions on the ground and Bank instruments. Second, indicators need to be



designed keeping in mind the ability to monitor progress and to measure and assess end results. Third, Bank country program documents including CLRs need to pay clear attention where there are (as for Cameroon) significant indications of broader underlying fiduciary and governance issues.

viii. IEG also agrees with the following lessons from the CLR: Centralized approaches to strengthening governance need to be complemented with decentralized and sector-based approaches. The impact of investment lending is much higher when it is accompanied by sector policy and institutional reform which is possible only when government ownership is strong. To focus more directly on poverty reduction and spatial inequality, the World Bank needs to step up its support in those geographic areas where poverty is most pronounced. In the Far North, program design, implementation and supervision needs to be tailored to the presence of active conflict. Smooth portfolio implementation requires follow-up on procurement, financial management and safeguards, and very close collaboration with counterpart ministries. The quality of the results framework needs to be strong and it needs to be used as a tool for monitoring progress against the program.

4. Strategic Focus

Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

1. **Congruence with Country Context and Country Program.** At the time of the CAS (2010) Cameroon was coming out of a period of slow growth due to the impact of the financial crisis, but economic growth was expected to improve (as it did). Cameroon was seen as a resource-rich country with large potential and a government that had a weak record with respect to stimulating growth and implementing reforms. The generated growth was not distributed in an equitable, pro-poor manner. One explanation was governance, which posed a major challenge to the country's economic potential. Since then, security has also become an important issue, with Boko Haram being active in the northern regions of the country.

2. Cameroon's economy remains predominantly rural and informal, but with rapid urbanization. The government's overall development goals are set out in its long-term strategy, the 2035 Vision, and include poverty reduction, and becoming a middle-income and newly industrialized country, and with a fair distribution of resources between regions and between rural and urban areas. In 2009, the Government also adopted a shorter term Growth and Employment Strategy (DSCE) for the first ten years of the 2035 Vision and with several objectives to be met by 2020 including a 5.5 percent annual average GDP growth rate 2010-2020, reduce the rate of poverty from 39.9 percent in 2007 to 28.7 percent, and achieve the MDGs. Cameroon has broadly achieved its GDP growth target, but this was not enough to set the country on a path to meet the other DSCE objectives. Thus, the annual GDP growth rate averaged 5.1 percent during the period of the CAS, and improved to almost 6 percent in 2015-2016; but poverty rates have remained essentially unaltered since 2001 (38 percent below the national poverty line in 2014), and most MDGs have not been achieved. Inequality has increased, with disparity between regions becoming increasingly pronounced. This constitutes a potential driver of fragility and conflict, particularly in the northern regions also affected by the Boko Haram. Poverty incidence is also much lower in urban than in rural areas, and 90 percent of all poor people live in rural areas.

3. In this context the recent Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) emphasizes as binding constraints for poverty alleviation low rural productivity, particularly in the north, a non-conducive business environment for the formal and informal private sector, and fragility and poor governance of the public and private sectors. The business environment improved during the period of the CAS but remains a key obstacle for economic diversification (the country's overall Ease of Doing Business ranking worsened marginally between 2011 and 2016), while educational quality has been eroding, and health outcomes are generally similar to those of lower-income countries despite high levels of spending.



4. The Bank's strategy was well aligned with country challenges and the government's own objectives, given the emphasis of the CAS program on governance, competitiveness (infrastructure, business climate and use of natural resources), and public sector services (education, health, basic infrastructure and social safety nets). The program generally did address key challenges for the country, although – as discussed later in this Review– some of the objectives were not underpinned by strong indicators and the apparent level of ambition was in some areas quite modest. The program was largely unchanged in the CASPR, but some indicators were dropped and others were weakened primarily in terms of timing of delivery.

5. **Relevance of Design.** The program as articulated in the CAS, and maintained (with some changes in indicators) in the CASPR, drew on lessons from previous programs including need for simpler project design to ensure fit with the government's implementation capacity and to recognize a history of frequent differences between commitments at the political and administrative levels, underlying readiness issues, and the need for the Bank to deepen its engagement on governance. The Bank responded to these lessons by seeking to ground the strategy in governance as a foundational theme, and by including measures for transparency and accountability in several Bank operations. However, the unsuccessful governance component was supported mainly by AAA and trust fund projects, besides an FY08 operation that was not well designed. In addition, the governance indicators depended heavily on PEFA indicators that were not undertaken as envisaged during the CAS period. The lack of traction of governance reforms may have been due in part to design issue but could be largely explained by limited government ownership. In light of the lack of results for the governance component, the Bank could have considered a different mix of instruments in support of governance that might have given better results. The resulting program also addressed important areas for Cameroon's development including electricity, urban infrastructure, health and education. Also, a number of the indicators were directly project related (all indicators under objective 9 and several indicators under other objectives), with limited or no explicit links to other non-lending interventions. This indicates that the additionality of the country program was limited (that would have included possible impacts of ASA activities, trust funds and policy dialogue). For education, where quality has been eroding, it would also have been useful with an indicator on educational quality.

6. The IFC Program supported various institutions in the electricity and financial sector. The Program was key in addressing Outcome 4: Increased access to and quality of infrastructure services. For this Outcome, financed by an IFC loan, 216 MW additional capacity of power was made available through the Kribi gas power project. After the CAS period, IFC participated in sharing risks of commercial banks to lend to producer organizations in various agricultural business value chains.

Selectivity

7. The program objectives were in line with and in support of the country's stated development goals. The program was reasonably well focused and implementable, with objectives and indicators based on country experiences and diagnostics. The objectives and activities were consistent with WBG's comparative advantages and WBG capacity – in particular, the important roles played by IFC and later MIGA for the development of the electricity sector. The CAS stated that the Bank had consulted actively with other donors, including a collaborative preparation process with the African Development Bank, but the documents did not identify any resulting specific areas of WBG non-engagement to avoid overlaps.

Alignment

8. The program was developed before the introduction of the WBG's twin goals, but retrospectively the program aligned quite well to these goals. The objectives did not shift during program implementation. In particular, the program addressed rural areas (where poverty is concentrated), and the CLR states that this included the northern regions that are particularly vulnerable both for climatic and security reasons although these regions were not singled out in the results framework. However, the SCD has concluded that economic growth in Cameroon has not



been inclusive, with the poorest household becoming poorer between 2001 and 2014. This indicates that the poverty dimension of the WBG program could have been even stronger, including the attention to inclusion – although with a poverty rate of 37.5 percent (2014) there is strong overlap between poverty and shared prosperity issues.

5. Development Outcome

Overview of Achievement by Objective:

9. Following the shared methodology, the assessment of the development outcomes is based on the CASPR framework. At that stage, the program period was extended by one year, through FY14. The three results areas or focus areas (one described as a cross-cutting foundation on governance, and two as results areas), and all nine objectives were maintained, three for each of the three focus areas. All objectives were reasonably well aligned with country context and development goals. There were however modifications in the CASPR to a number of the indicators – six were dropped, two were replaced, and ten were extended, leaving a total of 27 indicators. As a result of these modifications, some of the objectives were not well supported by indicators as mentioned below. It is also noticeable that a number of the country program indicators were directly taken from specific projects, which may indicate modest additionality in the country program over individual operations, and the discussion below also raises questions concerning a few of the indicator measurements. Governance indicators used PEFA indicators which could not be validated because the conduct of the PEFA was rescheduled by the government in 2017. Finally, some indicators could not be verified notwithstanding assertions that they are linked to specific Bank interventions.

Focus Area 1: Foundation Theme: Governance

10. Under the 2010 CAS, governance was seen as Cameroon's greatest challenge to growth and development, as the pervasiveness of weak governance affected most economic transactions. There were three objectives under this focus area that were supported by a number of Bank AAA. (such as for support to the accountancy profession, IDF grant to build debt management capacity, budget transparency initiative, governance and management in the education sector) and one lending operation (FY08 Transparency and Accountability Capacity Building project).

11. **Objective 1: Enhanced transparency and efficiency in public financial management**, with two indicators: (i) Scope of the legislature scrutiny of the annual budget law (PEFA indicator 27i): It was envisaged to improve this PEFA indicator to B in 2013 (from C in 2007). However, the PEFA assessment was not carried out and postponed to 2017 by the government. **Not Achieved**. The CLR also notes that little or no progress was made in this area. For example, the 2016 budget was not shared with Parliament until after the start of parliamentary deliberations. (ii) The PFM legal framework to be revised towards compliance with CEMAC (Regional Economic and Monetary Union) PFM Directives by end 2013 and implementation in 2014. **Partially Achieved** since the revised draft of the PFM legal framework in line with CEMAC Directives was sent to the Presidency for first review – in 2012 as per the ICR and ICRR for the Transparency and Accountability Capacity Building Project. More broadly, the CLR notes that progress has been limited in budget execution, public accounting, internal and external oversight and integrated financial management information systems for public finance, that budget execution rates in investment remain low, and that coherent links between procurement and commitment plans are lacking. Objective 1 was **Partially Achieved**.

12. **Objective 2: Improved sector governance focused on transparency and accountability**. After the mid-term revisions there was only one indicator for this outcome: Availability of information on resources received by service delivery units. This was by itself a rather inadequate indicator for the broadly formulated outcome, and no PEFA assessment was undertaken that was needed to measure progress. (However, more generally the CLR reports that Bank support resulted in a number of successful pilots, such as individual performance contracts in two customs offices in the Port of Douala, but this information could not be verified.) Objective 2 was **Not Achieved**.



13. **Objective 3: Improved demand-side governance and participation.** There were two indicators for this outcome: (i) Public access to key fiscal information. As for several other indicators, this cannot be verified due to the lack of a PEFA assessment. However, the CLR notes the existence of some evidence of publication of fiscal information. **Not Achieved.** (ii) Establishment of a free online communications and information-sharing platform for civil society organizations (CSOs). The CLR states that the platform was established in 2013 and event organized to train CSOs in using participative methodology to monitor public investment budgets. IEG has further been informed that the platform was supported under a grant from the Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) and a report “Global review of the GPF in Cameroon, 2014” confirms the establishment of the platform. The CLR further notes that the use of this platform is below expectations, but also notes other initiatives of the Bank to support innovative sector-based governance reforms. **Partially Achieved.** Objective 3 was **Partially Achieved.**

14. With two objectives Partially Achieved and one objective Not Achieved this focus area was **Unsatisfactory.**

Focus Area 2: Increasing Cameroon’s Competitiveness

15. **Objective 4: Increased access to and quality of infrastructure services.** There were a total of six indicators spread around the energy, transport and telecommunications sectors supported by a number of Bank operations, including Energy Sector Development project, Kribi Gas Power project, Lom Pangar Hydropower project, CEMAC Transport and Transit Facilitation project, and Central Africa Backbone project: (i) Electricity: Providing additional electricity (grid and off-grid) to villages in targeted rural areas. The target was for an increase of 200 villages (ten percent) from FY08 to FY14. This was **Not Achieved.** The Lom Pangar (FY 12) operation which is envisaged to increase hydropower generation experienced implementation delays (due to effectiveness and fiduciary issues) with construction works of the dam still underway while the Energy Sector Development Project (FY08) designed to increase access to rural areas also experienced significant implementation delays (the project’s closing date has now been extended by four years to 2017 or a total implementation period of nine years). (ii) Electricity: 216 MW of electricity to be supplied from the Kribi Gas to Power project starting in 2013. This was **Achieved** under IDA’s Kribi Gas Power Guarantee Project, by IFC lending and later by a MIGA guarantee. (iii) Transport: Dwell time for main importers at the Port of Douala was reduced by 2012 from 10.6 days to seven days by FY12 under the CEMAC Transport Transit Facilitation project, which has suffered major problems for its major road transport component, but has been successful with some other components. **Achieved.** (However, overall dwell times at the port are still very high.) (iv) and (v) Transport: Average transit times for imports from the exit from the Douala port were reduced (a) from 14.4 days to seven days to N’Djamena and from 12 days to five days to Bangui. **Achieved.** (vi) Telecom: **Achieved.** Total tele-density (active fixed and mobile subscriber per 100 inhabitants) reached 75 by 2013 and 80 by 2014 against a target of 70 by end 2013 (up from 28 in 2008), with support from the Central Africa Backbone project. This indicator was dropped from the project after the restructuring in 2014. However, the CLR notes that serious challenges remain in Cameroon’s ICT sector, which is still one of the key bottlenecks to competitiveness, and that it has fallen considerably behind that of peer sub-Saharan African countries in this area. One indicator was Not Achieved and three were Achieved. On this basis Objective 4 was **Mostly Achieved**

16. IFC and MIGA played a noticeable role in the development of the electricity sector. As mentioned above, IFC successfully helped establish 216 MW of additional capacity of power through the Kribi gas power project. In addition, Sonel, the privatized integrated national electric utility of Cameroon which had been developed during the previous CPF period, continued to be an IFC investee and played a key role as the off-taker of electricity from the generating companies. MIGA currently provides guarantees for all three IFC investees in the electricity sector.

17. **Objective 5: Improved business climate and investment in targeted value chains (agriculture, eco-tourism, and wood transformation).** There were two indicators for this outcome, of which only one (days to register a business) was clearly linked to investment climate, whereas the



linkage for the other (rice yields in rehabilitated irrigated areas) concerned value chains. It is not clear why the two quite distinct areas were combined under one objective. While the objective remained unchanged in the CASPR without any qualifications, the indicators for eco-tourism and wood transformation were dropped due to an expected restructuring of the related project. For these reasons, the two indicators are inadequate to reasonably measure progress towards the stated objective. (i) Average yields in rehabilitated irrigated areas. **Partially Achieved**. The average yield increased from the 2009 baseline of 5.2 tons per hectare to 5.8 tons in 2013 (and increased further to 6.1 tons in 2015). However, no indicators for eco-tourism or wood transformation. (ii) Days to register a business. **Partially Achieved**. The days declined from 34 in 2009 to 15 as per Doing Business 2015. (This number did not change in the Doing Business 2017, but Cameroon's ranking slipped.) This was a substantial improvement, but the CLR notes that in addition to still being six days short of the target, several important factors are preventing further reductions in registration times. (In addition, Cameroon continues to face challenges in a number of areas of the business environment, and its overall performance under the Doing Business Index has not shown sustained improvement.) Both indicators were partially achieved; on this basis Objective 5 was **Partially Achieved**.

18. **Objective 6: Improved transparency, equity and sustainability in the use of natural resources**. There were four indicators for this outcome. (i) Mining title system in compliance with established procedures for transparency and efficiency. **Partially Achieved**. The Bank provided additional information on progress towards the achievement of this indicator (through the Mining Sector Technical Assistance project) with the putting in place recently of the mining cadaster and digitization of mining title documents, but also noted that additional work is still needed to gradually fill in all types of mining rights, and to provide additional training and communications to make the system widely known. In sum, the building blocks have been put in place for transparent and efficient titling system but more work needs to be done to have the system in compliance with established procedures for transparency and efficiency, (ii) Increase in area of natural forests and plantations under sustainable forest management. **Partially Achieved**. The CLR reports that 5.4 million hectares were under sustainable management against a target of 4.5 million. However, the ICRR for the Forest and Environment Development Program does not report on the number of hectares, but reports instead some percentagewise increases, below target numbers.) The CLR summary (Annex 1) does not mention plantations for this indicator, but the CLR text informs that the area of plantations under sustainable management also increased to 7,696 ha, in excess of the target of 5,000 ha. This number could however not be validated. (iii) Area under sustainable land management practices in targeted zones. **Achieved**. The target of 10,000 hectares by 2013 (from 1,000 hectares in 2009) was far exceeded at more than 88,000 hectares. It would have been useful for the CLR to explain such a dramatic over-delivery. (iv) Facilities for which annual environmental performance report certified as compliant. **Not Achieved**. This indicator is not well explained in the CLR, but seems to refer to environmental and social management plans by energy facilities. The CLR states that the share increased from 0 percent in 2009 to 33 percent in 2013, against a target of 70 percent. However, at the time of the ICR required legislation had not been issued for this indicator. For objective 6, one indicator was achieved, two partially achieved and one not achieved. On balance, this objective was **Partially Achieved**.

19. With one objective Mostly Achieved and two Partially Achieved, this focus area was **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

Focus Area 3: Improving Service Delivery

20. **Objective 7: Improved quality and efficiency of the education system**. This objective was primarily supported by the Education Development Capacity Building project. There were two indicators, but no indicator concerning educational attainments, which would have been appropriate given the formulation of the education indicator and also the concerns expressed in the CAS about educational quality: (i) Completion rate in primary education to increase from 64 percent (2007) to 80 percent by 2013, of whom at least 45 percent female. **Achieved** at 83 percent with gender target



also achieved as per CLR, although the latter is not mentioned in the ICR or ICRR. (ii) Efficiency in the distribution of teachers measured by a technical indicator (randomness in teacher allocation, the lower the more efficient). **Not Achieved.** The degree of randomness in teacher deployment did not decline, although there was a more equitable allocation of teachers to under-served regions. (Around this objective the CLR also notes some other areas of progress including reducing the pupil-teacher ratio in the public education system from 50:1 to 45:1, reducing primary repetition rates from 25 percent to 20 percent, and improving female-to-male enrolment rates in target areas from 0.58 to 0.82.) Outcome 7 had one indicator Achieved and one Not Achieved, based on which this outcome was **Partially Achieved.**

21. **Objective 8: Improved access and quality of health services**, supported by the Health Sector Support Investment project. This objective was supported by two appropriate indicators that however did not try and capture any changes in health outcomes: (i) Immunization DPT3 under one (years of age) from baseline of 67 percent as far back as 2004 to 73 percent in 2013, of whom at least 50 percent female. **Mostly Achieved.** The CLR states that 79.6 percent have been immunized nation-wide – well above the target, but the indicator for females is not available. IEG could not reconcile the CLR percentage with the actual numbers provided in the ISRs. Available data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) indicates an immunization rate of 89 percent in 2014 (but dropped to 84 percent in 2015) for children 12-23 months. Project and national level data show an upward trend albeit the age cohort between project and national data is different. (Also, the formulation “at least 50 percent female” could seem strange in this case and could be read as encouraging the discrimination of male babies, unless births in Cameroon should be deviating very dramatically from the normal distribution worldwide of about 106 boys born per 100 girls.) (ii) Births attended by skilled professionals to increase (very modestly) from 63 percent in 2006 to 66 percent in 2013. **Available WDI data indicates a slight increase to 64.7 percent. Partially Achieved.** The CLR gives the percentage at 65 percent. Objective 8 is thus assessed as **Mostly Achieved.**

22. **Objective 9: Improved access to basic infrastructure and social safety nets**, supported most importantly by the Urban and Water Development Support project. This objective was supported by four project-related indicators, of which the third measured three distinct aspects: (i) People benefiting from all-year access to transportation and improved sanitary conditions in targeted urban areas, to increase from a 2009 baseline of 35,000 to a 2013 target of 290,000, of whom at least 50 percent female. **Partially Achieved.** The CLR states that as of August 2015 more than 435,000 people benefited from all year access to transportation in targeted cities, with more than 50 percent female beneficiaries, referring to the ICR for the Urban and Water Development project. There is however no mention of sanitary conditions (which were part of the indicator) and the accuracy and relevance of any calculations of gender distributions for this type of measures is not clear. The source for the gender percentage in this case is also not quite clear since the ICR has a separate, broader indicator for people benefitting from urban roads, drainage and access to water, with 54 percent female direct beneficiaries. (ii) Additional people with access to improved water supply up from 6.9 million in 2009 to 8.3 million by end of 2013. **Achieved.** The CLR states that as of August 2015 8.43 million had such access, of whom more than 50 percent female. However, as for the first indicator there is no reference in the referenced ICR to gender percentages – except for the overall percentage mentioned above, and for this indicator the list of project development objectives in the ICR also notes that “baseline/target values not consistent with the available sector targets”. (iii) People in the Second Community Development Program Support Project area with improved access to (a) education, (b) health care facilities, and (c) improved water sources. **Partially Achieved.** Education: The CLR states that a total of 122,340 students in project areas had improved access to education facilities by end 2013 against a target of 103,000. However, per the ICR and IEG’s validation the total number was 44,340, below the target of 103,000. Health care facilities: 428,925 people in project areas had improved access against target of 196,000. Water source: 437,100 people against target for 2013 of 208,000. The CLR states that for all three measurements a gender target of at least 50 percent females had been met, but the ICR is clear that there were no gender-specific indicators in the project’s M&E system, so the sources for these numbers and their validity are unclear. (iv)



Number of households with access to safety nets created under the Social Safety Net Project: **Not Achieved**. Project effectiveness was delayed, and implementation of the cash transfer program started only in November 2015. With one indicator Achieved, two Partially Achieved, and one Not Achieved, this objective was **Mostly Achieved**.

23. Two objectives under this focus area were Mostly Achieved and one Partially Achieved. This focus area was **Moderately Satisfactory**.

Overall Assessment and Rating

24. The program generally did address key challenges for the country, although often with quite modest and partial objectives or indicators that overall did not address with sufficient weight the really key issues facing the country. IEG also found it very difficult to validate a number of the reported results from the available documentation. The attempt to ground the strategy in governance as a foundational theme was not successful, even if one disregards the measurement issues from the government's postponement of the PEFA, and different ways need to be found going forward to address the important governance issues. Also, with a number of the indicators being directly project related, the additionality was probably limited of the country program over the direct results of investment operations. Of the nine objectives, one objective was not achieved, five objectives were partially achieved, and three were mostly achieved. On balance, IEG rates the development outcome as **Unsatisfactory**.

Objectives	CLR Rating	IEG Rating
Focus Area 1: CAS Foundation: Governance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory
<i>Objective 1: Enhanced transparency and efficiency in public financial management.</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
<i>Objective 2: Improved sector governance focused on transparency and accountability.</i>	<i>Not Verified</i>	<i>Not Achieved</i>
<i>Objective 3: Improved demand-side governance and participation.</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Focus Area 2: Increasing Cameroon's Competitiveness	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
<i>Objective 4: Increased access to and quality of infrastructure services</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>
<i>Objective 5: Improved business climate and investment in targeted value chains (agriculture, eco-tourism, and wood transformation)</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
<i>Objective 6: Improved transparency, equity and sustainability in the use of natural resources.</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
Focus Area 3: Improving Service Delivery	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
<i>Objective 7: Improved quality and efficiency of the education system</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>	<i>Partially Achieved</i>
<i>Objective 8: Improved access and quality of health services.</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>
<i>Objective 9: Improved access to basic infrastructure and social safety nets.</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>	<i>Mostly Achieved</i>



6. WBG Performance

Lending and Investments

25. At the beginning of the CAS period there were 12 IDA operations under implementation for a total amount of \$571 million, having been approved between FY03 and FY09. They covered a number of areas including agriculture, energy, health, urban infrastructure, education, and forestry and environment. During the period FY10-14 IDA approved a total of 14 operations (including additional financings) for a total of \$862 million – this was almost double the previous CAS period (FY04-08). The lending included two unplanned projects whereas seven planned operations were dropped. Most of these had been planned for the early years of the CAS period, but some were also dropped after the tightening of the lending program in the CASPR. (After the end of FY14 three new operations have been approved - \$100 million for a Health System performance Project, \$70 million for a Community Development Program and \$100 million for an Agriculture SIL.) The lending was significantly above CAS expectations for the original CAS period –with an expected IDA allocation of \$430 million. (The discussions in the CAS and CASPR of expected lending focused on IDA availability and were otherwise unclear as to lending expectations.) During the CAS period, 18 grants and trust funds were active, of which ten for a total amount of \$87.9 million were approved during the period. This included two operations in the education sector of \$53.3 million and \$24.8 million, respectively. The first of these from the Education for All Fast-Track Initiative has been completed and rated Moderately Satisfactory by IEG.

26. Regional projects accounted for more than 30 percent of overall approvals FY10-14, for three different operations: The ongoing CEMAC Transport and Transit Facilitation project (first approved in FY07, additional financings in FY10 and 11), Central Africa Backbone project (FY10), and African Higher Education Center for Excellence project (FY14). At least two other regional projects were under implementation during the CAS period – the CEMAC Regional Institutions Support project (as per CLR, was delivered before start of CAS), and the FY06 West and Central Africa Air Transport and Security project, and there were also trust-funded regional knowledge and technical assistance activities. There was however little discussion in the CAS and no discussion in the CLR of this substantial set of operations. It should be noted that the CEMAC Transport project has suffered from significant difficulties for its road works component including from continued poor security situation in Northern Cameroon and the Central African Republic. The latest ISR rating is Moderately Unsatisfactory for progress towards achievement of PDO, while good progress has been achieved on some indicators including in Cameroon not related to road works, as mentioned above. The project was restructured in FY16, at which time the closing date was extended to January 31, 2019, resulting in a total cumulative extension of six years.

27. Cameroon has in the past had significant problems with portfolio performance. This was the case also during the FY10-14 CAS period. The CLR reports that the program faced implementation challenges including procurement delays, insufficient counterpart funding, and complexity in the social safeguards-related compensation, but that following the CASPR the Bank team provided enhanced supervision support, regular portfolio reviews and also restructured a number of projects. The disbursement ratio rose from just over ten percent FY10-11 to around or above 20 percent from FY12 onwards. IEG rated 11 completed projects during FY10-16, of which 45 percent either Satisfactory (2) or Moderately Satisfactory (3), and 55 percent either Moderately Unsatisfactory (2) or Unsatisfactory (4). Factors on the ground (such as poor performance of the government and/or implementing agencies) contributed to the negative outcomes, while other factors included weak quality at entry and insufficient supervision. The aggregate 45 percent outcome rating by numbers is well below the average Africa rating of 66 percent, but is also far below Cameroon's aggregate rating by amount at 83percent, since the five largest completed operations (by IDA amount) were rated above the line and the six smallest below. There were however no significant differences for risk to development outcome – ten of the 11 operations were rated either High or Significant. During the CAS period the percentage of projects at risk varied from a high of 62 percent (FY14) and 27 percent (FY11) – and was around 40 percent in FY15-16. Currently there are 15 operations under



implementation of which ten (67 percent) are rated S or MS in the Bank's supervision system. This is significantly above the IEG ratings by numbers for completed projects and could indicate a candor gap and high potential for downgrading on completion.

28. At the CAS inception, four IFC investment projects, with \$92.5 million of net commitments, were active with about 97 percent by amounts in the electricity sector. During FY10-14, IFC committed another \$109.3 million through seven new investments (and another three investments for \$23.5 million in FY15-16). At the end of FY16 about 78 percent of the investments were in the electricity sector (during FY10-14, 79 percent of investments by amounts were in the electricity sector). Of the 14 investments that were active during FY10-16 all are still active (except in one case where a loan was repaid with only the equity portion of IFC's investment being still active). Over 55 percent of the portfolio in dollar terms is currently rated substandard or worse. IEG has reviewed one investment in a microfinance institution, where IFC made a number of investments, and rated it Mostly Unsuccessful. Of particular concern is also the investment in the off-taker in the electricity sector, which IFC's internal Development Outcome Tracking System (DOTS) has rated as Unsuccessful mainly due to negative Return on Equity (ROE) until now. One of the issues behind the poor ROE of the off-taker is the recurrent delay in obtaining payment from the government which then also affects the generating companies where IFC and others have invested.

29. MIGA gave coverage for \$296 million during FY10-14 in support of four investments, three of which in the electricity sector and one in telecommunications. The CLR (para 22) erroneously indicates the role of MIGA guarantee for Kribi. In reality, an investor had already developed the facility with an IFC loan, whereas the MIGA guarantee facilitated the sale to another party of this investment. The Kribi Gas Power plant now benefits from an IFC loan (not an equity investment as the CLR indicates in para 49), an IDA risk guarantee and a MIGA guarantee. Also in the other facilities with current IFC and MIGA engagements, the initial developments did not have MIGA participation.

Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

30. During the CAS period – FY10-14 – the Bank delivered six pieces of economic and sector work and 11 of technical assistance. The pace seems to have picked up somewhat thereafter, with an additional three pieces of ESW and no less than 12 of technical assistance. The CLR underlines in particular ESW for the education and health sector that also helped prepare Bank lending operations, as did diagnostic and feasibility studies to support the government's pilot cash transfer program and the preparation of a Bank Social Safety Net project. Many of the technical assistance items are also linked to Bank operations. The program was also supported by a substantial number of grants and trust funds, with 18 active during the CAS period for a total amount of \$111.3 million, including several large allocations for education (\$78.1 million for two programs) and environment (\$17.3 for four programs).

31. IFC had one advisory service (AS) project approved before FY10 that was implemented during the review period. During this period, IFC approved seven new AS projects amounting to over US\$7.0 million of total funds. Of these eight projects, three have closed, and five are active. Of the three closed projects, at completion one was rated Mostly Successful, one Mostly Unsuccessful (validated subsequently by the IEG) and one Unsuccessful for Development Effectiveness. Of the five active projects, a large investment climate AS initiative has been progressing well (with about six months to go), an initiative on credit reporting/bureau with the BEAC (the Central Bank) is being rated very poorly on outcomes till date, while it is quite early in the implementation periods for the other three go.

Results Framework

32. The results framework was largely stable throughout the extended CAS period, with some weakening in the CASPR (dropping of some indicators). Most indicators had quantitative baselines and targets, or were yes/no. This framework served the program up to a point. It was however as originally designed probably too wide-ranging (nine objectives and 31 indicators), and – even more after the modifications in the CASPR – the linkages were not strong between some objectives and



their indicators (see for example objectives 5 and 6 above). Not enough attention was given up front to whether the results could be measured (as did not happen with several governance measurements due to the PEFA postponement) – and for any program implementation it would in any case be better to have indicators that can be measured periodically and thus provide feedback on progress. The inclusion in the CASPR of various gender measurements seemed “quick and dirty” as described above – with questions regarding both definitions and the validity of the reported percentages. Finally, the CLR concludes that the results framework was not used as a tool for regular engagement with the country team.

Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

33. The country program documents describe a careful CAS preparation process with a significant amount of consultations including with other development partners. The CAS describes in particular a collaborative preparation process with the African Development Bank (AfDB), where under the two institutions worked together to flesh out their proposed strategies, shared common diagnostics and sought to identify synergies. The CLR also mentions the Lom Pangar Hydropower project, where IDA collaborated with the AfDB, EIB and AFD (France).

Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

34. Environment and social safeguards policies were triggered in nine closed and validated investment operations during the CAS period. Compliance with the policies was reported to have been achieved in most sectors. Two project components for forest and sustainable land management (under the Community Development Program Support Projects, phases 1 and 2) indicated satisfactory compliance with all triggered policies, although the preparation of project instruments – especially environmental assessments - could have been improved by ensuring that environmental screening forms were properly completed. Some delays in the implementation of impact mitigation measures were also recorded during implementation, and the ICRR also reports the unofficial handling of voluntary land donations. One particular achievement of the project was the recognition and empowerment of Indigenous Peoples. This helped reduce the incidences of conflicts between the majority Bantu and Pygmies. No safeguards issues were brought to the Inspection Panel during the CAS period.

35. In the road sector, compliance with the environmental and social safeguards requirements was hampered by low capacities on the ground, and the lack of sufficient provisions in the appraisal document to mitigate social risks associated with construction works. However, the ICRR reports that all affected persons and businesses were in the end properly compensated. In education, constructions were reported in the ICR and the ICRR to be small-scale, and compliance with the safeguard policies remained consistently satisfactory. In the energy sector, Bank support was mainly for technical assistance. An environmental screening classification was nevertheless applied in anticipation of the subsequent implementation of the Environmental and Social Management plans, and other due diligence instruments. In the water sector, safeguard instruments were reported to have been prepared and properly disclosed. The ICR reports only partial compliance with the resettlement policy and does not include any statement of compliance with environmental safeguards, while the ICRR reported delays in compensation due to administrative formalities, noting further that 95 per cent of project affected populations had been compensated by the project closure.

36. In terms of fiduciary aspects, the CAS risk discussion saw Cameroon as a high-risk environment, and the CLR points out that project implementation in Cameroon has typically been affected by lengthy procurement processes, long delays in finalizing compensation under safeguard policies, and inefficiencies in the chain of public financial management. According to the Integrity Vice Presidency, a total of 28 complaints during the period FY10-16 were received about possible fraud and corruption. These complaints resulted in eight investigations for seven projects (Bank plus IFC), of which three were substantiated. In two of these cases government entities investigated and came to satisfactory conclusions, whereas in the third case a claim has been substantiated but the entity still has not paid and the project (the Cameroon component of a regional project) has therefore been



placed on the corporate watch list. These quite high numbers are likely indicative of broader underlying fiduciary and governance issues that have as yet not been overcome in spite of stronger Bank attention to procurement and fiduciary issues in its projects. It would have been appropriate for the CLR to provide a discussion of the Bank's experience with these issues and how these were addressed.

Ownership and Flexibility

37. The 2010 CAS noted as an important lesson that Bank teams should be attentive to the frequent disparity in commitment between the political and administrative levels. Several ICRRs on unsatisfactory projects completed during the period under review noted variable commitments by government and/or implementing entities during project implementation. Neither the CASPR nor the CLR say much about commitments during the CAS period, beyond noting in the CASPR the need for the Bank at that time to strengthen monitoring of progress and results. The Bank in the CASPR reasonably saw no reason to change objectives, while modifying some indicators and focusing the lending program more on larger operations and additional financing for well-performing projects. That document noted that for governance the legal framework remained weak and corruption continued to be seen as a major impediment. Given the lack of progress noted in the CASPR (in spite of some positive initiatives) it is possible that some course corrections could have been considered at that time.

WBG Internal Cooperation

38. This CAS was not formally a joint program, but there are indications of good cooperation in selected areas. Objective 4 (Increased access to and quality of infrastructure services) included an important indicator (electricity supplied from Kribi gas to power project) carried out through support from IFC (and later MIGA) together with an IDA risk guarantee. The degree of cooperation appears to have become more pronounced since FY14 with the roles of IFC and MIGA in the electricity sector and the Bank and IFC in the development of agricultural value chains. IFC had been active in the electricity sector before the review period, including with investments in the off-taker for Kribi electricity. It continued to be an important investor in the sector during the CAS period through investments, while the Bank was involved with other multilaterals in a separate project (Lom Pangar). MIGA became heavily involved in the electricity sector in FY14. After the CAS period, there has been work by the Bank and IFC on the development of agriculture value chains.

Risk Identification and Mitigation

39. The CAS discussed a number of pertinent risks including political economy risks, development effectiveness (poor track record of implementing reforms), Bank reputational risks (I with respect to the Lom Pangar project), and fiduciary risks. These risks remained relevant throughout the CAS period; in addition, with the advent of the Boko Haram security risks have come center stage in parts of the country – also amplifying inequalities in economic performance between regions. The latest IMF Article IV report (December 2015) also notes a growing fiscal deficit and a sharp rise from a low base in external debt – the CLR notes that Cameroon is at high risk of debt distress. The CLR explains that risk mitigation has been challenging but has been addressed (although the stepped-up supervision efforts after the CASCR could preferably have come sooner). According to the CLR, the reputational risks that emerged for the Lom Pangar project were mitigated effectively, with the help of extra funding for supervision work.

Overall Assessment and Rating

40. IEG rates the WBG performance as **Fair**. CAS Design: The program noted and reflected lessons from previous programs, although the program was probably still too multifaceted. It was reasonably well designed in light of country requirements and (significant) constraints, and proved to be quite stable with all nine objectives maintained in the CASPR. However, while addressing appropriate and important areas the program was designed for gradual and quite modest improvements rather than to try and really achieve substantial change. The effort to ground the



strategy in governance as a foundational theme was appropriately intended but did not achieve substantial improvements. The results framework had weaknesses including disconnect between objectives and the related indicators. The program was not formally joint between the Bank and IFC/MIGA, but there was good cooperation in some areas – in particular electricity, where the latter two entities provided significant additionality. There was good consistency between lending operations and the supporting ESW.

41. **CAS Implementation:** The Bank program included IFC activities for the important electricity component. Knowledge activities provided good support for the preparation of lending operations, and the CLR provides several examples of widespread dissemination. The CASPR maintained the nine original objectives, but addressed an important stepping-up of supervision and implementation support, which could better have taken place sooner, and also a stronger focus on a few selected operations going forward. Several safeguard issues came up that were resolved, at times after a delay. Several indicators under the governance pillar could not be verified because the government postponed the needed PEFA to 2017 – it is not clear whether the Bank pushed sufficiently and early enough in this regard. Cameroon’s performance as measured by IEG ratings (MS or better) (by number of operations) for closed projects was well below the SSA average at 45 percent (MS or better). The higher ISR ratings for projects under implementation could indicate a candor gap and potential for downgrading on completion. In spite of the various performance issues, IDA’s lending increased substantially over the previous CAS period, and with no substantive discussion in the CASPR and in the CLR.

7. Assessment of CLR Completion Report

42. The CLR is concise and well organized. It covers all important aspects and gives a balanced and open assessment of country issues and program performance. However, IEG found it difficult to validate a number of the reported outcomes against the available documentation. Some more discussion of a few points could have been welcomed, as indicated earlier in this CLRR, including the experience during the CAS period with fiduciary and governance issues in WBG operations. It would also have been useful with a discussion of the experience during the CAS period with the regional projects. There are some modest factual errors regarding IFC/MIGA – their activities could also have been given some more attention - and some discrepancies between the discussion of the results framework in the text of the CLR and in its Annex 1. The CLR gives some information of events and trends after the end of the CAS period, but this could have been done more systematically given the long delay for the preparation of this document. Finally, it would have been appropriate with a more in-depth consideration of the weaknesses in the governance component of the CAS program and the implications going forward of this experience.

8. Findings and Lessons

43. IEG draws three main lessons from this CLR:

- Programs addressing governance need to provide a mix of interventions commensurate with the nature of the objectives, be structured realistically to conditions on the ground and Bank instruments.
- Indicators need to be designed keeping in mind the ability to monitor progress and to measure and assess end results.
- Bank country program documents including CLR’s need to pay clear attention where there are (as for Cameroon) significant indications of broader underlying fiduciary and governance issues.

44. The CLR provides the following lessons with which IEG largely agrees:

- Centralized approaches to strengthening governance need to be complemented with decentralized and sector-based approaches.



- The impact of investment lending is much higher when it is accompanied by sector policy and institutional reform which is possible only when government ownership is strong.
- To focus more directly on poverty reduction and spatial inequality, the World Bank needs to step up its support in those geographic areas where poverty is most pronounced.
- In the Far North, program design, implementation and supervision needs to be tailored to the presence of active conflict.
- Smooth portfolio implementation requires follow-up on procurement, financial management and safeguards, and very close collaboration with counterpart ministries.
- The quality of the results framework needs to be strong and it needs to be used as a tool for monitoring progress against the program.



Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CAS Objectives – Cameroon

Annex Table 2: Cameroon Planned and Actual Lending, FY10-FY16

Annex Table 3: Analytical and Advisory Work for Cameroon, FY10-FY16

Annex Table 4: Cameroon Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY10-16

Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Cameroon, FY10-16

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Cameroon and Comparators, FY10-16

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Cameroon and Comparators, FY10-16

Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for the Cameroon, FY10-16

Annex Table 9: Net Disbursement and Charges for Cameroon, FY10-16

Annex Table 10: List of IFC Investments in Cameroon (US\$,000)

Annex Table 11: List of IFC Advisory Services for Cameroon (US\$)

Annex Table 12: IFC Net Commitment Activity in FY10 - FY16

Annex Table 13: List of MIGA Activities (US\$ millions)

Annex Table 14: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Cameroon

Annex Table 15: Economic and Social Indicators for Cameroon, 2010 - 2015



Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CAS Objectives – Cameroon

	CAS FY10-FY13 – Focus Area 1: CAS Foundation Theme: Governance	Actual Results	IEG Comments
Major Outcome Measures	Objective 1: Enhanced transparency and efficiency in public financial management (Partially Achieved)		
	<p>Indicator (i): Scope of the legislature scrutiny of the annual budget law (PI-27i)</p> <p>Baseline: C in 2007</p> <p>Target: B in 2013</p>	<p>This outcome was supported by the Transparency and Accountability Capacity Building Project (P084160, FY08). IEG: U of the project reports that progress was limited toward enhancing external oversight to enable the legislature and citizens to exercise scrutiny and that the rating of the scope of the legislature scrutiny of the annual budget law was unchanged. A Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) was published but no dissemination and planned capacity building activities were implemented. No PEFA assessment was undertaken during the CAS period. According to the CLR the PEFA has been rescheduled by the government to 2017. Not Achieved.</p>	Sources: CLR, ICR, ICRR
	<p>Indicator (ii): PFM legal framework</p> <p>Baseline: not compliant with CEMAC PFM Directives issued on December 2011</p> <p>Target: Revision towards compliance by end 2013 and implementation in 2014</p>	<p>The CLR reports that a revised draft of the PFM legal framework was submitted to the Presidency for first review. IEG: U and management: U of the Transparency and Accountability Capacity Building Project (P084160, FY08 report that the diagnostic of investment budget execution was completed and that the recommendations formed the basis of a draft decree submitted for Executive approval in 2012. Partially Achieved.</p>	
	Objective 2: Improved sector governance focused on transparency and accountability (Not Achieved)		
	<p>Indicator: Availability of information on resources received by service delivery units (PEFA PI-23)</p> <p>Baseline: D in 2007</p> <p>Target: B in 2013</p>	<p>This outcome was supported by the Transparency and Accountability Capacity Building Project (P084160, FY08). Management: U and IEG: U report that “data was not available to measure progress” since no PEFA assessment was undertaken during the CAS period. Not Achieved.</p>	
Objective 3: Improved demand-side governance and participation (Partially Achieved)			
<p>Indicator (i): Public access to key fiscal information (PEFA PI-10)</p> <p>Baseline: B in 2007</p> <p>Target: A in 2013</p>	<p>Progress for this outcome was supported by the Transparency and Accountability Capacity Building Project (P084160, FY08). Management: U for this project reports that the actual value was B+; in December 2012 and IEG: U reported that the target was not met. Not achieved.</p>		



	CAS FY10-FY13 – Focus Area 1: CAS Foundation Theme: Governance	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>Indicator (ii): Establishment of a free online communications and information sharing platform for civil society organizations by 2014</p> <p>Baseline: no (2010)</p> <p>Target: yes (2014)</p>	<p>According to the CLR, the platform was established in 2013. The Transparency and Accountability Capacity Building Project (P084160, FY08) supported this Outcome. Management: U for this project reports that, regarding Information and Communication Technology, the only output was the production of a strategy. However, this project closed in 2012. The platform was supported under a grant from the Governance Partnership Facility (GBF) and the establishment of the platform is confirmed in a 2014 GPF report on Cameroon. Partially Achieved.</p>	

	CAS FY10-FY13 –Focus Area 2: Increasing Cameroon’s Competitiveness	Actual Results	IEG Comments
Major Outcome Measures	Objective 4: Increased access to and quality of infrastructure services (Mostly Achieved)		
	<p>Indicator (i): Electrified villages (grid and off-grid) in targeted areas</p> <p>Baseline: 2,100 in 2008</p> <p>Target: 2,300 in 2014</p>	<p>Progress for this Outcome was supported by the Energy Sector Development Project (P104456, FY10) and by the Lom Pangar Hydropower Project (P114077, FY12). No progress was reported for this indicator because bids were only received at the end of the CAS period per the last ISR : MS of the CAS period (July 2014) and latest ISR: MS after the end of the CAS period (July 2016) Not Achieved.</p>	
	<p>Indicator (ii): Electricity supplied from Kribi gas to power project</p> <p>Baseline: 0 MW</p> <p>Target: 216 MW by Q1 2013</p>	<p>Progress for this Outcome was supported by the Kribi Gas Power Project (P110177, FY11), the IFC Project Kribi Power Development Company SA (project 25978, FY11) and by the MIGA Guarantee for Kribi Power Development Corporation and Company (FY13). No ISR or ICR was found for project P110177. IFC’s Credit Risk Rating (12/16) of Kribi Power Development Company S.A. indicated, among many other things, that “The plant has been operating since mid-May 2013. Achieved</p>	
	<p>Indicator (iii): Reduction in the operational and transactional dwell time (“dwell time for main importers”) in the Douala Port</p> <p>Baseline: 10.6 days in 2009</p> <p>Target: 8.8 days in 2013</p>	<p>Progress to this Outcome was supported by the CEMAC Transport Transit Facilitation Project (P079736, FY07). The latest ISR : MU reports that the current operational and dwell times at Douala port was 6.30 days. The target was exceeded. Achieved.</p>	



CAS FY10-FY13 –Focus Area 2: Increasing Cameroon’s Competitiveness	Actual Results	IEG Comments
<p>Indicator (iv): Average time for imports from the exit at the port of Douala to N'Djamena</p> <p>Baseline: 14.4 days in 2009</p> <p>Target: 12 days in 2013</p> <p>to Bangui</p> <p>Baseline: 12 days in 2008</p> <p>Target: 8 days in 2013</p>	<p>Progress to this Outcome was supported by the CEMAC Transport Transit Facilitation Project (P079736, FY07). The latest ISR: MU reports that the average time for imports from the exit at the port of Douala:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to N'Djamena was 7 days and - was 5 days to Bangui. <p>The target was exceeded. Achieved.</p>	
<p>Indicator (v): Total teledensity (active fixed and mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants)</p> <p>Baseline: 28.1 in 2008</p> <p>Target: 70 by end 2013</p>	<p>Progress to this Outcome was supported by the Central African Backbone Project (P108368, FY10). Management: MS for the project reports that the target was exceeded, with a total tele density of 91.7 at project closing (March 2016). No ISR reports on total tele-density before the closing of the CAS period although the CLR reports that the telecom density had increased to 75 percent in 2013. The target is achieved. Achieved.</p>	<p>IEG comment: this indicator was dropped during the 2014 restructuring. The new indicator was the following: “MoU concluded by Cameroon, Chad and CAR with at least one neighboring country to facilitate cross border interconnection regime”.</p>
<p>Objective 5: Improved business climate and investment in targeted value chains (agriculture, eco-tourism, and wood transformation) (Partially Achieved).</p>		
<p>Indicator (i): Average rice yields in rehabilitated irrigated areas</p> <p>Baseline: 5.2 tons/ha in 2009</p> <p>Target: 5.8 tons/ha in 2013</p>	<p>Progress to this Outcome was supported by the Agriculture Competitiveness Project (P112635, FY9). The latest ISR: S reported that the actual average rice yields in the rehabilitated irrigated areas was 5.97 tons/ha. The most recent ISR: S, after the end of the CAS period (April 2016) reported that the actual average yields was 6.90 tons/ha. Partially achieved.</p>	<p>This indicator only refers to agriculture value chain but not the eco-tourism and wood transformation, for which planned indicators were dropped in the CASPR without any modifications or comments regarding the stated objective.</p>
<p>Indicator (ii): Days to register a business</p> <p>Baseline: 34 in 2009</p> <p>Target: 9 by end 2013</p>	<p>According to Doing Business 2015 it takes 15 days to register a business in Cameroon. Partially Achieved.</p>	<p>The Bank’s contribution to this outcome is not clear.</p>
<p>Objective 6: Improved Transparency, equity and sustainability in the use of natural resources. (Partially Achieved)</p>		
<p>Indicator (i): Mining title system in compliance with established procedures for transparency and efficiency (Yes/No)</p>	<p>This objective was supported by the Mining Sector Technical Assistance Project (P122153, FY12) the latest ISR: S reports that the modern computerized mining</p>	<p>.</p>



	CAS FY10-FY13 –Focus Area 2: Increasing Cameroon’s Competitiveness	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>Baseline: no system in place (2009)</p> <p>Target: system in place by 2014</p>	<p>cadaster was not fully complete. The Bank has confirmed to IEG that while the mining cadaster has recently been put in place, with digitization of mining title documents and introduction of a cadastral institution for the management of mining titles, additional work is still needed to gradually fill in all types of mining rights, and to provide additional training and communications. Partially achieved.</p>	
	<p>Indicator (ii): Increase in area of natural forests and plantations under Sustainable Forest management</p> <p>Baseline: 3.5 M ha of natural forests and 0 ha of plantations in 2009</p> <p>Target: 4.5 M ha of natural forests and 5,000 ha of plantations in 2012</p>	<p>This Outcome was supported by a programmatic DPO Operation, the Forest and Environment Development Program (P070656/P073020, FY06) and by the FY12 GEF-funded Ngoyla Mintom Project (P118018) and the Community Development Program Support Project (FY04, P073629). Management: U; IEG: U for projects P070656/P073020 does not report on the number of ha of natural forests and of plantations under sustainable forest management but reports, at the end of the project (December 2011) an increase of production forests under a forest management plan from 66% to 90% (the target was 100%) and the fact that 83 of the 92 assigned long-term forest management units had a management plan. However, the last ISR of the evaluation period of project P118018 and the ICRR and ICR for project P073629 do not report on hectares of plantations, further information from the Bank has confirmed that there is no evidence for the reported increase in the areas of plantations under sustainable management, but that a key milestone towards this was achieved by a government decision to transfer 7,186 hectares of plantations to municipalities and to incorporate 500 hectares through plantations into forest reserves. Overall, the target was Partially Achieved.</p>	
	<p>Indicator (iii): Area under SLM practices in targeted zones</p> <p>Baseline: 1,000 ha by 2009</p> <p>Target: 10,000 ha by 2013</p>	<p>The Sustainable Agro-pastoral and Land Management Promotion Project under the Community Development Program Support Project (P089289, FY04) contributed to this Outcome. IEG: S reports that the areas under sustainable land management practices was far exceeded – at 88,448 hectares. Achieved.</p>	



	CAS FY10-FY13 –Focus Area 2: Increasing Cameroon’s Competitiveness	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>Indicator (iv): Facilities for which annual environmental performance report certified as compliant by MinEP with EMP</p> <p>Baseline: 0% in 2009</p> <p>Target: 70% by end 2013</p>	<p>Progress for this Outcome was supported by the Environmental and Social Capacity Building for the Energy Sector Project (P109588, FY08). IEG: U for this project reports that “This indicator requires legislation that requests energy facilities to prepare and submit annual performance reports to the ICE /MinEP. At the time of the ICR, such legislation has not yet been issued and no annual environmental performance reports were prepared by or certified during the project’s lifetime”. Not Achieved.</p>	
	CAS FY10-FY13 –Focus Area 3: Improving Service Delivery	Actual Results	IEG Comments
Major Outcome Measures	Objective 7: Improved quality and efficiency of the education system (Partially Achieved)		
	<p>Indicator (i): Completion rate in primary education</p> <p>Baseline: 64% in 2007</p> <p>Target: 80% by 2013 – of whom at least 45 percent are female</p>	<p>This Outcome was supported by the Education Development Capacity Building Project (P075964, FY05). IEG: MU reports that the primary completion rate increased to 83% in 2010..However, IEG: MU and Management: MU do not report on female completion rate in primary education. Achieved</p>	
	<p>Indicator (ii): Efficiency in the distribution of teachers measured by a low degree of randomness in teacher allocation</p> <p>Baseline: 45% by 2009</p> <p>Target: 25% by 2013</p>	<p>Progress for this Outcome was supported by the Education Development Capacity Building Project (P075964, FY05). IEG: MU reports that the indicator decreased from 45% to 42% in 2010. Not achieved.</p>	
	Objective 8: Improved access and quality of health services (Mostly Achieved)		
	<p>Indicator (i): Immunization DPT3 under-1</p> <p>Baseline: 67% in 2004</p> <p>Target: 73% in 2013 – of whom at least 50 percent are female</p>	<p>Progress for this Outcome was supported by the Health Sector Support Investment (P104525, FY08).</p> <p>The last ISR: S of the CAS period reported that 56% of the end target of the number of children immunized in targeted areas was achieved (56,895 children over 100,000). The last ISR: S for the project (in April 2016, after the CAS period) reported an actual value of 232,971 children immunized compared to a target of 200,000. These projects numbers could not be reconciled with the numbers set as CAS indicators.</p> <p>In addition, both ISRs do not present female-related indicators. Mostly Achieved.</p>	<p>Available data from WDI refers to the 12-23 months, not for children under 1, indicating an immunization rate of about 73% in 2004 and 89% in 2013; but dropped to 84% in 2015.</p> <p>The project data and national data (albeit with different age group) point to an upward trend during the review period.</p>



	CAS FY10-FY13 –Focus Area 3: Improving Service Delivery	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p>Indicator (ii): Births attended by skilled professional</p> <p>Baseline: 63% in 2006</p> <p>Target: 66% in 2013</p>	<p>This Outcome was supported by the Health Sector Support Investment (P104525, FY08). The last ISR: S of the CAS period reported that 35,287 births were attended compared to a baseline of 30,000). The Project Paper for the Additional Financing of this operation reported that 57,139 births were attended by skilled professional in target areas in December 2013 compared to a target of 60,000 by December 2017. These projects numbers could not be reconciled with the numbers set as CAS indicators. Partially Achieved.</p>	<p>Available data from WDI shows a slight increase from 63% in 2006 to 64.7% in 2014.</p> <p>Project and national data point to an upward but modest uptake.</p>
Objective 9: Improved access to basic infrastructure and social safety nets (Mostly Achieved)			
	<p>Indicator (i): People benefiting from all-year access to transportation and improved sanitary conditions in targeted urban areas</p> <p>Baseline: 35,000 in 2009</p> <p>Target: 290,000 by end 2013, of whom at least 50 percent are female</p>	<p>This objective was supported by the Urban and Water Development Support Project (P084002, FY07). As reported in IEG: MS over 435,000 people had all year access to urban roads in the targeted settlements . However, the ICRR does not report how many people benefited from sanitary conditions. IEG: MS also reports that 54% of the beneficiaries of all project activities were women. Partially Achieved.</p>	
	<p>Indicator (ii): Additional people with access to improved water supply (IDA+OBA)</p> <p>Baseline: 6.9 million in 2009</p> <p>Target: 8.3 million by end 2013, of whom at least 50% are female</p>	<p>Progress for this Outcome was supported by the Urban and Water Development Support Project (P084002, FY07) and by the Cameroon Water Affermage – OBA for Coverage Expansion (P106794, FY09, IEG: MU). Management: MS and IEG: MS for project P084002 report that more than 8.43 million people were provided with access to improved water sources in August 2014 and that about 54% of the direct project beneficiaries of the urban/water components were women. Achieved.</p>	
	<p>Indicator (iii): People in the second community Development Program Support Project area with improved access to:</p> <p><u>Education facilities:</u> Baseline: 78,000 in 2009 Target: 103,000 in 2013 of whom at least 50 percent are female</p>	<p>This Outcome was supported by the Community Development Support Project (P113027, FY09).</p> <p>Education Facilities: IEG: MS reports that 44,340 students have better access to educational facilities in the project area. There is no disaggregation of female indicators. Not Achieved.</p>	<p>The project supporting this objective seems to have a positive impact but the numbers reported in the ICR for project P13027 are very different from the CAS.</p>



	CAS FY10-FY13 –Focus Area 3: Improving Service Delivery	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	<p><u>Health care facilities:</u> Baseline: 66,000 in 2009 Target: 196,000 in 2013 of whom at least 50 percent are female</p> <p><u>Improved water source:</u> Baseline: 92,000 in 2009 Target: 208,000 in 2013 of whom at least 50 percent are female</p>	<p>Health care facilities: IEG: MS reports that 428,925 people have better access to health care facilities. However, there is no disaggregation of female beneficiaries. Mostly Achieved.</p> <p>Improved water source: IEG: MS reports that 437,100 people have better access to improved water points target was achieved. However, there is no disaggregation of female beneficiaries. Mostly Achieved.</p>	
	<p>Indicator (iv): Number of households with access to safety nets created under the Social Safety Net Project</p> <p>Baseline: 0 in 2012</p> <p>Target: 15,000 by 2014</p>	<p>Progress for this Outcome was supported by the Social Safety Net Project (P128534). Effectiveness was delayed and the implementation of the cash transfer program started only in November 2015 (after the end of the CAS period). Not achieved per the last ISR: MS during the CAS period. The latest ISR : MU (December 2016) reports that 20,500 households benefited from cash transfer programs.</p>	



Annex Table 2: Cameroon Planned and Actual Lending, FY10-FY16

Project ID	Project name	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Proposed Amount	Approved IDA Amount*	Outcome Rating	Comments
Project Planned Under CPS/CPSPR 2010-2014									
P110177	Kribi Guarantee	2010	2012		15		82	No Rating	
P108368	Central Africa Backbone APL1A***	2010	2010	2016	3		9.9		Part of a regional project
P115259	CEMAC Transport and Transit Facilitation Project 1st AF***	2009	2010		150		150		Part of a regional project
P125915	CEMAC Transport and Transit Facilitation Project 2nd AF***	2011	2011		112		112		Part of a regional project
P112975	Competitive Value Chains	2010	2010	2017	40		30	LIR: MU	
P121027	PDUE AF	2010	2011		29.7		28.7		
P114077	Lom Pangar	2011	2012	2019	100		132	LIR: MS	
DROPPED	Central Africa Backbone APL1B	2011			5				DROPPED
DROPPED	Regional Fisheries	2011			10				DROPPED
DROPPED	Protected Areas	2012			50				DROPPED
P122153	Mining TA	2012	2012	2019	15		30	LIR: S	
P117102	Urban Sanitation	2012	2011	2017	50		30	LIR: MU	
DROPPED	TACD AF	2013			15				DROPPED
DROPPED	Agri -Competitiveness AF	2013			60				DROPPED
DROPPED	Regional Fisheries	2013			10				DROPPED
P144637	PNDP III (Community Dev. Prog. Sup. Project)	2013	2016	2020	40		70	LIR: S	
P128534	Safety Nets	2013	2013	2019	15		50	LIR: MU	
DROPPED	Transport-Douala-N'Djamena corridor	2013				70			DROPPED
P143940	Dyke Rehabilitation	2013	2013	2017	108		108	LIR: MS	
P143417	Agriculture SIL	2014	2015	2020		80	100	LIR: S	
P146795	Health Sector Support SWAP AF	2014	2014			20	20		
Total Planned					827.7	170	952.6		
Unplanned Projects during the CPS Period									
P156679	CM-Health System Performance Project		2016	2021			100	LIR: S	
P143801	CM - Multimodal Transport Project		2014	2021			71	LIR: MU	
P126974	African Higher Education Center for Excellence Project***		2014	2020			8	LIR: S	Part of a regional project
Total Unplanned							179		



On-going Projects during the CPS/CSPSR Period		Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount		
P079736	CEMAC Transport and Transit Facilitation Project***	2007	2016	147	LIR: MU	Part of a regional project
P112635	CM-Agricultural Competitiveness Project	2009	2017	60	LIR: MS	
P113027	CM-Com Dev Prog Sup APL-II	2009	2014	40	IEG: MS	
P084160	CM-Transp & Account CB (FY08)	2008	2013	15	IEG: U	
P104456	CM-Energy Sector Development SIL (FY08)	2008	2017	65	LIR: S	
P104525	CM-Health Sector Supp. SWAP SIL (FY08)	2008	2018	25	LIR: S	
P109588	CM-Env. Capacity Energy SIL (FY08)	2008	2013	20	IEG: U	
P084002	CM-Urban and Water D. SIL (FY07)	2007	2016	80	IEG: MS	
P070656	CM-Forestry & Env DPL (FY06)	2006	2012	25	IEG: U	
P075964	CM-Edu Dev CB (FY05)	2005	2013	18	IEG: MU	
P073629	CM-Com Dev Prog Sup APL (FY04)	2004	2010	20	IEG: S	
P074490	CM-Douala Infrastructure (FY03)	2003	2010	56	IEG: S	
Total On-going				572		

Source: Cameroon CPS and PR, WB Business Intelligence Table 2a.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 12/20/16

* Total approved: \$862 million. Calculated as: Total Approved: \$952.6 minus PNDP III, FY 16 (\$70 million) and Health Sector (\$100million), FY 16 plus two unplanned Multimodal and AFR HE (\$8m)

*** Part of a regional project

LIR: Latest internal rating. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory. CPS/CSPSR was FY10-14. However, lending data covers up to FY16 for information.



Annex Table 3: Analytical and Advisory Work for Cameroon, FY10-FY16

Proj ID	Economic and Sector Work	Fiscal year Delivered	Output Type
P144132	Cameroon - Country Economic Memorandum	FY17	Country Economic Memorandum (CEM)
P143140	CM--Skills Development	FY15	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P143153	CM - Agric Sector Strat Options Analysis	FY15	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P123368	CM Country Health Status Report	FY14	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P127605	CAMEROON - Policy Notes Work	FY14	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P122787	CM-Cross-Border Trade Between Nigeria and CEMAC Countries	FY13	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P121291	CM: Marine Fisheries Sector	FY12	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P121672	CM Fiscal Decentralization Analysis	FY12	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P117757	CM: Social Protection AAA	FY11	Other Social Protection Study
Proj ID	Technical Assistance	Fiscal year	Output Type
P146274	Cameroon Poverty Statistics	FY16	Technical Assistance
P152596	CM-Proc Quick Wins for CM Cap. Dev. Prog	FY16	Technical Assistance
P153599	Cameroon textbooks policy note	FY16	Technical Assistance
P154310	Cameroon MTDS follow up mission	FY16	Technical Assistance
P107203	Cameroon EITI	FY15	Technical Assistance
P123672	CM: TFF Douala Trade Single Window	FY15	Technical Assistance
P132261	CM - TFF - Single Window Payment Systems	FY15	Technical Assistance
P145573	Land-use Planning Dialogue for REDD+	FY15	Technical Assistance
P146242	CSO-Cameroon EITI	FY15	Technical Assistance
P148262	CMR PFM TA SUPPORT TO PROGRAM BUDGET	FY15	Technical Assistance
P148739	Housing Finance Diagnostic Review	FY15	Technical Assistance
P153350	Cameroon - SP policy dialogue	FY15	Technical Assistance
P121410	CM:Strengn safety net response to crises	FY14	Technical Assistance
P130893	AgriFin-Cameroon-CamCCul	FY14	Technical Assistance
P131634	CM Risk Analysis in Customs	FY14	Technical Assistance
P133674	CM Review of PFM Master Plan	FY14	Technical Assistance
P129012	CM TA Sanaga Basin Plan	FY13	Technical Assistance
P145728	CM-GPE Education CSR and ESP	FY13	Technical Assistance
P117899	Piloting intensification of livestock	FY12	Technical Assistance
P119798	CM: Support Customs for an Integrity Plan	FY12	Technical Assistance
P117404	CM: Dev. of Sanitation Strategy -FY11	FY11	Technical Assistance
P122165	Reform Plan CAMEROON	FY11	Technical Assistance
P116709	Cameroon ToT - Financial Analysis Course	FY10	Technical Assistance

Source: WB Business Intelligence 11/30/16



Annex Table 4: Cameroon Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY10-16

Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount	Outcome Rating
P156679	Health System Performance Reinforcement Project	TF A1706	2016	2017	650,000	
P143417	Agriculture Investment and Market Development Project	TF A1906	2016	2020	2,700,000	
P104525	Cameroon Health Sector Support Investment (SWAP)	TF 17128	2015	2018	20,000,000	LIR: S
P133338	CAMEROON--Equity and Quality for Improved Learning Project	TF 16665	2014	2019	53,300,000	LIR: MS
P146795	Additional Financing to Cameroon Health Sector Support Project	TF 16400	2014	2016	850,000	
P124293	CM -- FCPF REDD READINESS	TF 15355	2014	2019	3,600,000	
P118018	Cameroon: NGOYLA MINTOM PROJECT	TF 11856	2013	2017	3,500,000	
P121253	Support Caisse Autonome d'Amortissement (CAA) - Cameroon	TF 99403	2012	2015	482,000	
P121742	Cameroon Phase II: EITI Implemen	TF 97366	2011	2012	200,000	
P125132	GPF Development Marketplace Partner	TF 98783	2011	2013	476,000	
P116437	Education for All-Fast Track Initiative	TF 97256	2011	2012	24,800,000	IEG: MS
P124293	CM -- FCPF REDD READINESS	TF 94198	2011	2013	200,000	
P106778	Support to the Accountancy Profession ONECCA CAMEROON	TF 97049	2010	2014	499,400	
P115788	Development Marketplace for the African Diaspora in Europe Winning Projects	TF 93981	2009	2011	33,874	
P110924	Cameroon Mineral Sector Institutional Capacity Building Project	TF 92307	2009	2012	454,283	
P106794	CAMEROON WATER AFFERMAGE - OBA for Coverage Expansion	TF 91503	2008	2014	2,250,000	
P106794	CAMEROON WATER AFFERMAGE - OBA for Coverage Expansion	TF 91509	2008	2014	3,000,000	
P105910	AVIAN AND HUMAN INFLUENZA PREVENTION AND CONTROL IN CAMEROON	TF 91093	2008	2011	1,270,000	
P099682	CM-Cities Alliance Douala Dev Strategy	TF 57223	2007	2011	460,000	
P089289	Sustainable Agro-Pastoral and Land Management Promotion under the PNDP	TF 56925	2007	2012	6,000,000	IEG: S
P073020	Cameroon Forest & Environment Sector Program (FESP)	TF 56544	2006	2012	10,000,000	IEG: U
Total					134,725,557	

Source: Client Connection as of 11/30/16

** IEG Validates RETF that are 5M and above



Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Cameroon, FY10-16

Exit FY	Proj ID	Project name	Total Evaluated (\$M) *	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
2010	P073629	CM-Com Dev Prog Sup APL (FY04)	20.6	SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2010	P074490	CM-Douala Infrastructure (FY03)	66.2	SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2012	P070656	CM-Forestry & Env DPL (FY06)	10.0	UNSATISFACTORY	HIGH
2012	P073020	CM GEF Forest & Env DPL (FY06)	12.6	UNSATISFACTORY	HIGH
2012	P116437	CM-EFA-FTI: SUPPORT TO EDUCATION SECTOR	24.6	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2013	P075964	CM-Edu Dev CB (FY05)	13.8	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2013	P084160	CM-Transp & Account CB (FY08)	3.7	UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2013	P109588	CM-Env. Capacity Energy SIL (FY08)	6.2	UNSATISFACTORY	HIGH
2014	P106794	GPOBA W3: Cameroon Water	1.8	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2014	P113027	CM-Com Dev Prog Sup APL-II	39.5	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2016	P084002	CM-Urban and Water D. SIL (FY07)	90.9	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	HIGH
		Total	289.9		

Source: AO Key IEG Ratings as of 11/30/16

P089289 Not included on the extract

* Funded from both IDA and Trust Fund



Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Cameroon and Comparators, FY10-16

Region	Total Evaluated (\$M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat (\$)	Outcome % Sat (No)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (\$)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (No)
Cameroon	250.9	12	86.6	50.0	26.4	16.7
AFR	25,650.8	522	70.5	66.0	36.5	34.7
World	152,703.9	1,722	82.9	71.1	60.8	48.5

Advisory Services Approved pre-FY10 but active during FY10-16

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US\$
557187	AfDB Growth Oriented Women Enterprises in Cameroon Guarantee and Advisory Services Program	2008	2010	CLOSED	SBA	427,237
	Sub-Total					427,237
	TOTAL					7,046,950

Source: IFC AS Data as of 7-31-16; FIG: Financial Institutions Group; MAS: Manufacturing, Agribusiness and Services; FAM: Finance and Markets; TAC: Trade and Competitiveness

* With IEG new methodology for evaluating projects, institutional development impact and sustainability are no longer rated separately.



Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Cameroon and Comparators, FY10-16

Fiscal year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Ave FY10-16
Cameroon								
# Proj	12	15	16	15	13	14	15	14
# Proj At Risk	4	4	8	7	8	5	6	6
% Proj At Risk	33.3	26.7	50.0	46.7	61.5	35.7	40.0	42.0
Net Comm Amt	400.7	483.6	583.3	692.7	754.7	854.7	932.8	672
Comm At Risk	83.2	136.0	311.9	374.2	495.4	283.4	234.5	274
% Commit at Risk	20.8	28.1	53.5	54.0	65.6	33.2	25.1	40.8
AFR								
# Proj	597	644	627	566	620	643	659	622
# Proj At Risk	152	133	127	128	138	136	144	137
% Proj At Risk	25.5	20.7	20.3	22.6	22.3	21.2	21.9	22.0
Net Comm Amt	35,438.5	38,884.9	40,416.8	42,649.1	49,142.6	54,586.3	59,033.9	45,736
Comm At Risk	9,703.1	8,269.7	6,504.6	14,310.8	16,548.2	16,000.3	18,949.8	12,898
% Commit at Risk	27.4	21.3	16.1	33.6	33.7	29.3	32.1	28.2
World								
# Proj	1,990	2,059	2,029	1,964	2,048	2,022	1,975	2,012
# Proj At Risk	410	382	387	414	412	444	422	410
% Proj At Risk	20.6	18.6	19.1	21.1	20.1	22.0	21.4	20.4
Net Comm Amt	162,975.3	171,755.3	173,706.1	176,202.6	192,610.1	201,045.2	220,331.5	185,518
Comm At Risk	28,963.1	23,850.0	24,465.0	40,805.6	40,933.5	45,987.7	44,244.9	35,607
% Commit at Risk	17.8	13.9	14.1	23.2	21.3	22.9	20.1	19.2

Source: WB BI as of 11/30/16



Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for the Cameroon, FY10-16

Fiscal Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Overall Result
Cameroon								
Disbursement Ratio (%)	11.8	10.6	18.8	23.4	16.9	22.8	23.9	18.9
Inv Disb in FY	39.1	35.5	68.8	107.3	80.3	108.7	109.9	549.7
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	330.3	334.2	366.1	457.9	475.6	477.2	459.9	2,901.3
AFR								
Disbursement Ratio (%)	24.0	19.4	21.4	22.5	23.1	24.5	19.6	22.0
Inv Disb in FY	4,251.0	4,703.1	5,260.3	5,652.1	6,143.9	6,473.2	5,572.5	38,056.1
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	17,704.1	24,298.4	24,595.0	25,175.9	26,540.4	26,463.6	28,377.1	173,154.5
World								
Disbursement Ratio (%)	26.9	22.4	20.8	20.6	20.8	21.8	19.5	21.6
Inv Disb in FY	20,928.8	20,933.4	21,048.2	20,510.7	20,757.7	21,853.7	21,152.9	147,185.4
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	77,760.8	93,516.5	101,234.3	99,588.3	99,854.3	100,344.9	108,600.3	680,899.4

* Calculated as IBRD/IDA Disbursements in FY / Opening Undisbursed Amount at FY. Restricted to Lending Instrument Type = Investment. AO disbursement ratio table as of 11/30/16

Annex Table 9: Net Disbursement and Charges for Cameroon, FY10-16

Period	Disb. Amt.	Repay Amt.	Net Amt.	Charges	Fees	Net Transfer
FY10	85,739,975.2	6,969,765.1	78,770,210.1	1,400,307.3	1,779,712.4	75,590,190.4
FY11	78,010,087.2	7,699,413.2	70,310,674.0	1,156,386.2	2,563,906.5	66,590,381.4
FY12	78,464,458.4	8,089,920.5	70,374,537.9	912,352.8	2,956,638.2	66,505,546.9
FY13	139,844,444.8	9,591,680.5	130,252,764.4	668,696.6	4,265,324.1	125,318,743.7
FY14	134,543,869.0	9,626,934.0	124,916,935.0	425,564.9	5,029,840.0	119,461,530.1
FY15	121,274,262.5	9,757,689.3	111,516,573.2	182,770.5	5,497,509.5	105,836,293.2
FY16	115,037,499.0	4,538,603.3	110,498,895.7	151,684.4	6,425,474.4	103,921,736.9
Report Total	752,914,596.1	56,274,005.9	696,640,590.2	4,897,762.6	28,518,405.1	663,224,422.5

World Bank Client Connection 10/21/16

Annex Table 10: List of IFC Investments in Cameroon (US\$,000)
Investments Committed in FY10-FY16

Project ID	Institution Number	Cmt FY	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm	Loan Risk Rating	Equity Risk Rating
28098	630185	2016	Finance & Insurance	G	15,000	15,000	-	15,000	5B	
34915	806500	2015	Agriculture and Forestry	E	4,278	4,278	-	4,278	3B	
34916	803631	2015	Agriculture and Forestry	E	4,266	4,266	-	4,266	3A	
34471	776784	2014	Electric Power	G	8,000	8,000	-	8,000		4B
35284	566673	2014	Finance & Insurance	E	287		287	287		6
25978	619652	2012	Electric Power	G	511,978	51,529	-	51,529	4B	
31582	710087	2012	Finance & Insurance	E	5,000	5,000	-	5,000	4A	
27995	521181	2010	Finance & Insurance	E	12,000	16,000	-	16,000	5B	
28529	660173	2010	Electric Power	G	115,517	26,974	-	26,974	3B	
28659	534023	2010	Chemicals	E	1,504	1,516	-	1,516	6	
Sub-Total					677,828	132,562	287	132,849		

Investments Committed pre-FY10 but active during FY10-16

Project ID	Institution Number	CMT FY	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm	Loan Risk Rating	Equity Risk Rating
27966	630227	2009	Finance & Insurance	G	1,073		913	913		5B
27993	566673	2009	Finance & Insurance	E	451		451	451		6
25392	566673	2008	Finance & Insurance	G	5,442	1,396	381	1,777		6
11579	54265	2006	Electric Power	E	500,669	89,355	-	89,355	5A	
Sub-Total					507,636	90,751	1,746	92,497		
TOTAL					1,185,464	223,313	2,032	225,345		

Source: IFC-MIS Extract as of end July 31, 2016



Annex Table 11: List of IFC Advisory Services for Cameroon (US\$)

Advisory Services Approved in FY10-16

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US\$
600986	Afriland First Bank Cmr AS SME	2016	2018	ACTIVE	FIG	582,433
601329	Cargill Cocoa - Cameroon	2016	2020	ACTIVE	MAS	974,378
599800	Advans Cameroon MCF Cohort TA	2015	2019	ACTIVE	FIG	1,333,287
600343	CEMAC - Credit Reporting Project	2014	2018	ACTIVE	FAM	818,548
594287	Cameroon Investment Climate Reform Program	2013	2017	ACTIVE	TAC	1,698,387
572947	CommDev FEDEC Cty Invest	2012	2014	CLOSED	SBA	274,062
571667	EB-Accion CMR TA	2010	2014	CLOSED	A2F	938,618
	Sub-Total					6,619,713

Advisory Services Approved pre-FY10 but active during FY10-16

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US\$
557187	AfDB Growth Oriented Women Enterprises in Cameroon Guarantee and Advisory Services Program	2008	2010	CLOSED	SBA	427,237
	Sub-Total					427,237
	TOTAL					7,046,950

Source: IFC AS Data as of 7-31-16; FIG: Financial Institutions Group; MAS: Manufacturing, Agribusiness and Services; FAM: Finance and Markets; TAC: Trade and Competitiveness

Annex Table 12: IFC net commitment activity in FY10 - FY16

	Pre-FY10	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Financial Markets	3,141,578					286,718			3,428,295
Trade Finance (TF)		16,000,000		5,000,000				15,000,000	36,000,000
MAS		1,516,154					8,543,433		10,059,587
Infrastructure	89,355,000	26,973,828		51,528,773		8,000,000			175,857,602
Total	92,496,578	44,489,982		56,528,773		8,286,718	8,543,433	15,000,000	225,345,484



Annex Table 13: List of MIGA Activities (US\$ millions)

ID	Contract Enterprise	FY	Project Status	Sector	Investor	Max Gross Issuance
12242	Kribi Power Development Corporation	2014	Active	Power	Netherlands	78.2
12218	Dibamba Power Development Corporation	2014	Active	Power	Netherlands	31.5
12214	ENE0 Cameroon	2014	Active	Power	Netherlands	180.0
10072	HTT Telecom S.A.	2012	Active	Telecommunications	Switzerland	6.5
Total						296.2

Source: MIGA 12/19/16

Annex Table 14: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Cameroon

Development Partners	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Australia	0.32	0.69	2.65	1.44	0.83	..
Austria	0.34	0.32	0.4	0.25	0.28	..
Belgium	4.25	4.61	2.36	4.84	9.56	..
Canada	7.2	12.23	5.02	2.65	2.53	..
Czech Republic	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.02	..
Denmark	0.21	0.11	..	0.59
Finland	0.42	0.45	0.29	0.37	2.54	..
France	82.08	148.93	88.51	172.04	167.11	..
Germany	90.53	97.08	88.84	83.76	87.39	..
Greece	0.16	0.15	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.1
Ireland	0.37	0.52	0.85	0.63	0.76	..
Italy	4.3	3.89	1.86	2.74	3.09	..
Japan	42.03	24.01	16	41.32	25.05	..
Korea	2.57	4.3	15.51	7.18	11.36	..
Luxembourg	0.24	0.45	0.44	0.6	0.54	..
Netherlands	0.17
New Zealand	0.03	..
Norway	0.4	0.5	0.83	1.14	1.06	..
Poland	0.11	0.16	0.06	0.04	0.02	..
Portugal	0.01	0	0.03	..
Spain	9.04	4.17	0.42	-0.53	-0.03	..
Sweden	0.62	1.76	1.92	1.67	2.22	1.67
Switzerland	2.22	1.86	2.65	2.97	3.21	..
United Kingdom	1.03	0.82	1.96	1.32	88.15	..
United States	18.38	19.32	26.72	36.48	40.65	..



DAC Countries, Total	267.06	326.39	257.47	361.69	446.53	1.77
African Development Bank [AfDB]	3.69
African Development Fund [AfDF]	57.55	34.69	75.36	37.74	68.52	..
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa [BADEA]	-0.1	-1.16	1.04	4.76	1.99	..
EU Institutions [EU]	74.22	56.94	99.28	85.56	124.81	..
Food and Agriculture Organisation [FAO]	0.49
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization [GAVI]	11.92	25.83	22.98	23.12	20.87	30.29
Global Environment Facility [GEF]	3.58	0.83	1.61	0.57	1.23	..
Global Fund	11.98	73.27	19.85	39.19	21.7	62.46
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]	0.64	0.21	0.16	0.32	0.27	0.22
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD]
International Development Association [IDA]	82.82	73.02	87.77	157.81	125.53	..
IFAD	3.11	1.6	4.68	5.57	7	..
International Finance Corporation [IFC]
International Labour Organisation [ILO]	0.98	1.08
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	..	-1.26	-2.44	-3.63	-5.24	-31.18
Islamic Development Bank [IsDB]	2.17	-1.47	9.74	10.57	8.63	..
OPEC Fund for International Development [OFID]	-1.34	-1.61	0.56	2.06	4.71	..
UNAIDS	0.54	0.71	0.72	1.37	1.01	0.96
UNDP	3.87	2.29	1.81	2.21	1.88	1.97
UNFPA	4.1	3.61	2.88	3.9	3.26	3.06
UNHCR	3.35	..	0.14	3.3
UNICEF	6.4	6.84	5.98	6.68	9.09	10.26
WFP	5.16	9.25	5.82	4.51	2.17	4.76
World Health Organisation [WHO]	..	1.46	1.1	1.46	1.16	1.82
Multilateral, Total	273.66	285.05	340.02	385.34	398.59	87.92
Hungary	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06
Israel	0.2	0.27	0.18	0.11	0.09	0.1
Kuwait (KFAED)	-0.8	-1.2	-1.54	-1.06	-1.45	-1.39
Lithuania	0.01
Romania	..	0.16	0.22	0.16	0.01	0.04
Russia	0.06	..	6.32	0.15
Thailand	0.01
Turkey	0.45	0.42	0.47	2.46	1.98	..
United Arab Emirates	0.3	0.24	0.22	0.16	0.22	..
Non-DAC Countries, Total	0.2	-0.07	-0.34	1.89	7.17	-1.09
Development Partners Total	540.92	611.37	597.15	748.92	852.29	88.6



Annex Table 15: Economic and Social Indicators for Cameroon, 2010 – 2015

Series Name	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Growth and Inflation						
GDP growth (annual %)	3.3	4.1	4.6	5.6	5.9	6.2
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	0.7	1.5	2.0	2.9	3.3	3.6
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$)	2,490.0	2,580.0	2,670.0	2,780.0	2,960.0	3,080.0
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$) (Millions)	1,170.0	1,210.0	1,230.0	1,290.0	1,350.0	1,330.0
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	1.3	2.9	2.9	1.9	1.9	2.7
Composition of GDP (%)						
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	23.4	23.6	23.2	22.9	22.2	23.9
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	29.9	29.6	30.2	29.9	30.1	27.8
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	46.7	46.9	46.6	47.2	47.8	48.2
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	19.0	20.6	19.2	19.4	20.5	21.0
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	13.4	12.5	11.6	11.3	11.3	12.6
External Accounts						
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	17.3	18.4	18.8	20.7	21.7	17.0
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	23.0	26.5	26.6	28.9	31.2	25.9
Current account balance (% of GDP)	(3.6)	(2.8)	(3.6)	(3.8)
External debt stocks (% of GNI)	13.7	11.8	14.4	16.9	16.4	..
Total debt service (% of GNI)	0.9	1.3	0.9	0.8	1.4	..
Total reserves in months of imports	6.5	4.4	4.6	4.3
Fiscal Accounts ¹						
General government revenue (% of GDP)	16.582	17.936	17.949	17.954	18.109	17.858
General government total expenditure (% of GDP)	17.667	20.534	19.54	21.906	22.747	20.54
General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	-1.085	-2.598	-1.59	-3.951	-4.638	-2.682
General government gross debt (% of GDP)	11.527	13.245	15.429	18.657	27.543	29.015
Health						
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	53.7	54.1	54.6	55.0	55.5	..



Series Name	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	84.0	82.0	85.0	89.0	87.0	84.0
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	44.7	44.9	45.2	45.4	45.6	45.8
Improved water source (% of population with access)	50.2	51.0	51.9	52.7	52.7	52.7
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	66.2	64.4	62.4	60.4	58.6	57.1
Education						
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	25.3	26.7	29.8	..	34.4	..
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	106.2	105.9	110.8	..	113.6	..
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	..	47.3	50.5	52.3	56.4	..
Population						
Population, total (Millions)	20,590,666	21,119,065	21,659,488	22,211,166	22,773,014	23,344,179
Population growth (annual %)	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Urban population (% of total)	51.5	52.1	52.7	53.3	53.8	54.4

Source: DDP as of 10/21/16

*International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016

** IMF estimates start after 2014