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Argentina: Basic Protection Project (PPAR)

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The Basic Protection Project was prepared in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, in the context of increased pressure to expand coverage and accessibility of Argentina’s social protection policies. The social protection system had historically been linked to the formal labor market through contributory schemes (pension benefits, unemployment insurance, family allowances, health and Show MoreThe Basic Protection Project was prepared in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, in the context of increased pressure to expand coverage and accessibility of Argentina’s social protection policies. The social protection system had historically been linked to the formal labor market through contributory schemes (pension benefits, unemployment insurance, family allowances, health and housing insurance coverage). Noncontributory programs—for children, the unemployed, and informal workers—were limited. The project aimed at strengthening and expanding Argentina’s social protection system by supporting expansion of coverage and improving the design of two income transfer programs for the unemployed and families with children. Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was low or negligible, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) The choice of indicators is critical for incentives to be effective, especially when a short implementation time is expected; but the definition of some of the DLIs and the information used to determine their targets were not discussed in detail at appraisal. (ii) This PPAR had to clarify the understanding of “effectiveness,” as it was not made explicit in project documents. (iii) Institutional strengthening of the MTESS statistics area was an important additional aspect of the World Bank’s support, given the peculiar context in which this project was implemented.

What works in public utility reform: Lessons from evaluations in the energy and water sectors

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What works in public utility reform:  Lessons from evaluations in the energy and water sectors
Utility reform has never been more important. The COVID-19 pandemic has badly impacted utilities across the world. Many utilities are now under intensified financial stress due to budget reductions and a loss of revenue, resulting from a sudden drop in collection rates, suspension of billing, and tariff adjustment in some countries. This, in turn, has made it more challenging to ensure continued Show MoreUtility reform has never been more important. The COVID-19 pandemic has badly impacted utilities across the world. Many utilities are now under intensified financial stress due to budget reductions and a loss of revenue, resulting from a sudden drop in collection rates, suspension of billing, and tariff adjustment in some countries. This, in turn, has made it more challenging to ensure continued service delivery. IEG recently published the synthesis Public Utility Reform: What lessons can we learn from IEG evaluations in the energy and water sectors?, a compilation of evidence of what worked and what did not work, and why, in World Bank support of public utility reforms in the energy and water sectors in its client countries. Its findings are even more relevant in the context of uncertainty about medium-to long-term outlook for recovery from the challenges imposed by COVID-19. Well before COVID-19, financial viability and institutional accountability were the two main challenges faced by public utilities in improving service outcomes in the energy and water sectors. Now, the effectiveness of utilities in these two fundamental areas remain critical for ensuring the quality and sustainability of these vital basic services during a post-pandemic recovery. Financial Viability IEG analysis reveals a range of World Bank interventions geared to support financial viability in both the energy and water sectors.   Recovering the cost of service is at the core of sector reform. Across both water and energy sectors, inadequate cost recovery is a key driver of financial underperformance. Poor bill collection and operational inefficiencies (including excessive network losses) also have a significant role. IEG finds that, while tariff reform is fundamental, improving operational efficiency of service providers is crucial for financial sustainability. The cumulative evidence indicates that when inefficiencies result in high-cost service provision, improving utilities’ operational efficiency should precede or go hand-in-hand with tariff increases. Additionally, the gains from reductions in technical and commercial losses, improvements in payment collection, financial management, and demand side management proved easier to sustain once implemented. Evidence points to the importance of strengthening utilities’ commercial orientation, which is vital for the provision of adequate and reliable services, regardless of whether the service delivery agents are under public or private ownership. Utilities that emphasize cost control, customer orientation, and responsiveness to incentives are more likely to make meaningful progress. For example, World Bank operations in Vietnam and Turkey helped improve financial sustainability of electric power utilities through technical support and policy reforms, incrementally implementing tariff and market regulations in the electricity sector. Utilities may need more financial support as they weather the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic. However, as the recently published IEG evaluation State your Business! An evaluation of World Bank Group support to the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises cautions, temporary subsidies introduced at the time of COVID-19 can pose “policy traps” supported by powerful vested interests, which can be hard to reverse once the crisis is over.   Institutional Accountability Creating the right accountability and incentives is essential for effective service delivery. In both energy and water sectors, institutional accountability is critically tied to performance.  Sustaining reforms requires competent institutions and strong administrative capacity.  Improved performance can be a first step towards attracting private sector investment.  Strengthening sector planning, utility management, capacity and skills, can improve sector outcomes. A solid sectoral fiscal, financial, and regulatory framework also defines and sets the context for leveraging markets and the private sector to support service delivery. There are multiple institutional pathways that could lay the foundation for improved and sustained service delivery. There is no single model but there are certain principles that work. In energy, improved accountability and regulatory performance drive sector outcomes. Good practices on corporate governance and regulation enable the sector environment to leverage markets and the private sector. In Rwanda, for example, the World Bank (through budget support operations), the International Finance Corporation  (through advisory services), and Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) helped the government develop sector regulatory structures and separate water and electricity utilities to improve governance, accountability and transparency. Institutional and policy reforms transformed the Rwanda Energy Group into a commercially operated state-owned enterprise and helped attract private finance. In water, improved capacity, incentives, and transparent rules on accessing funds can ensure good sector outcomes. Good financial and operational data systems are also important. In Peru, the utility Sedapal radically changed its corporate management approach and work culture, including adopting a new performance-based compensation and incentive system driven by reaching results targets. IEG’s field-based assessment confirmed a steady improvement in access coverage, basic service parameters, and operational and financial performance. Political and social challenges In both sectors, utilities' operations and management are closely linked to the political economy in which they operate. Political economy considerations can inform specific design elements, including choices of programmatic instruments vs. standalone operations, or front-loading vs. back-loading of important reform actions in a programmatic series. Experience shows that support to operations needs to match the time frame in which effective government action can reasonably take place. The World Bank’s experience shows that complementary interventions and sustained support contribute positively to favorable and enduring results. Regarding tariff reform, the institutional, political, and social challenges are considerable. Public opposition to tariff reforms reflects a lack of confidence in public service improvements and that vulnerable groups will be protected. At the same time, it is important to address potentially negative distributional consequences of reforms through such measures as differentiated tariffs and targeted assistance programs. Their success depends on the government’s ability to reach vulnerable households through fiscally sustainable programs. Read the report | Public Utility Reform: What lessons can we learn from IEG evaluations in the energy and water sectors? Pictured at top, clockwise from left: The main drinking water pipeline for 750 households in Alapars and Karenis communities (Kotayk region) being fully rehabilitated. Armenia. Photo credit: Armine Grigoryan / World Bank The control room at the thermal power station at Takoradi, Ghana, June 21, 2006. Photo credit: Jonathan Ernst/World Bank Electrical Substation in Kenya. Photo credit: Andrew Stone Windmill, Nicaragua photo credit: Ihsan Kaler Hurcan Wegala Community Water Supply and Sanitation Project. Sri Lanka. Photo credit: Simone D. McCourtie / World Bank Girl gathers drinking water from a community water pipe. Photo credit: Dominic Sansoni / World Bank

Niger: Community Action Program and Community-Based Integrated Ecosystem Management Project Phase I and II (PPAR)

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The World Bank has played a key role in helping Niger to further its rural decentralization aims. The World Bank has supported the implementation of the rural code throughout its history. It approved the Natural Resource Management Project (1995–2003) to help Niger jump-start the code implementation and followed it with the Community Action Program (2004–20), a three-phase adjustable program loan Show MoreThe World Bank has played a key role in helping Niger to further its rural decentralization aims. The World Bank has supported the implementation of the rural code throughout its history. It approved the Natural Resource Management Project (1995–2003) to help Niger jump-start the code implementation and followed it with the Community Action Program (2004–20), a three-phase adjustable program loan designed to empower local governments and communities to progressively achieve their collective local development aims in a participatory and sustainable way. This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the first and second phases of the Community Action Program (CAP-1 and CAP-2). Ratings for the First Phase of the Community Action Program are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Overall efficacy was substantial, Bank performance was satisfactory, Borrower performance was satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was modest. Ratings for the Second Phase of the Community Action Program are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Overall efficacy was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, Borrower performance was satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. Lessons from both projects include: (i) Land and resource restoration projects should support—and make evident how they are supporting—existing customary flexible tenure arrangements to ensure distributional benefits among resource users and to mitigate conflict risks. (ii) The success of natural resource restoration depends on the extent to which private or communal resource users are compensated over reasonable, short-term time frames for abstaining from using those resources until the long-term public benefits of resource restoration are achieved. (iii) Projects that support land and resource restoration can ensure that women benefit by addressing participation barriers linked to social and cultural norms. (iv) Socioeconomic and anthropological analyses, conducted before project elaboration, can support the gender aspects of production and marketing better.

State Your Business: What are the keys to successful reform of state-owned enterprises?

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State Your Business: What are the keys to successful reform of state-owned enterprises?
State-Owned Enterprises SOEs are critical to many developing and emerging economies where the lives of millions of citizens are deeply affected by how these enterprises are run. Governments use SOEs to provide services across multiple sectors and to address the impacts of economic downturns or crises, such as the current COVID-19 crisis.  Show MoreState-Owned Enterprises SOEs are critical to many developing and emerging economies where the lives of millions of citizens are deeply affected by how these enterprises are run. Governments use SOEs to provide services across multiple sectors and to address the impacts of economic downturns or crises, such as the current COVID-19 crisis.   Although many SOEs are run well and have made important economic contributions, many others suffer from low productivity and efficiency, which have a detrimental impact on growth and consumer access to services. SOEs’ mixed institutional mandates and their political importance often pose performance and governance challenges. Poor performance can also generate substantial public fiscal losses. Aware of the importance of SOE reform to achieving economic development and service delivery goals, the World Bank Group (WBG) has long supported developing countries to address the associated challenges.   IEG recently published the evaluation State Your Business! An Evaluation of World Bank Group Support to the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, its first systematic assessment of the Bank Group’s support for the reform of SOEs, focusing on the energy and financial sectors, where Bank Group investments in the last decade have surpassed USD 70 billion. The political importance of SOEs can impose substantial challenges to introducing and sustaining reforms. Such political economy risk factors help to explain why countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt, and Indonesia have signaled their intent to privatize state-owned banks but later halted efforts because of internal political constraints. The allocation and pricing of power and finance can evoke intense public reaction and mobilize vested interests.  Further, temporary crisis response programs can turn into irreversible “policy traps”, locking SOEs in to underfunded mandates even if it damages their long-term viability.    IEG’s evaluation sheds light on key factors driving successful SOE reforms and points to risks and obstacles that limit reforms with potentially dire consequences for SOE performance and delivery of services to the public. These factors include:   Sector competition  Research on the subject shows that enhanced competition improves SOE performance in both the financial and power sectors, both by itself and in combination with other reforms. First, there is strong evidence that SOEs perform better in the power sector (and in general) when competitive conditions prevail at the sector and enterprise levels. For example, an econometric assessment of power sector data for 36 developing and transition countries over 18 years found that gains in economic performance stemmed mainly from allowing private participation.   Privatization or regulatory reforms were less effective without a competitive market. Private sector participation can take various forms and involve different functions of the power market (generation, transmission, distribution, and retail). A key aim of Bank Group support has been to strengthen competition and regulation in SOE markets, in part to foster a level playing field between SOEs and private companies  One example of WBG support to achieve a more competitive power market is in Vietnam, where Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) and other SOEs dominated power generation. EVN also fully owned the entity that operates and maintains the national transmission grid.   The Bank Group engaged comprehensively in all aspects of the power sector (rural electrification, generation, transmission, distribution, load dispatch, renewables, development of wholesale and retail power markets, regulatory aspects, and SOE reform), using a wide range of instruments. The credibility and trust generated enabled the Bank Group to support the government in sequencing sector wide reform.  In 2012, EVN unbundled its generation subsidiaries into three separate generation companies, at the same time as the launch of Vietnam’s competitive generation market, in which independent power producers and generation companies compete in a power pool to sell to individual buyers. As of 2016, 24 percent of installed capacity in Vietnamese power generation was privately held.   In the financial sector, research shows bank concentration is more constraining to firms’ access to credit in countries with higher shares of state bank ownership. More competitive environments enhance the benefits of bank privatization.  The Bank Group's private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has committed to promoting “competitive neutrality” in the SOEs that it invests in.   Given the greater success of reforms with better competitive conditions, the IEG report recommends that the World Bank Group should gear up to do more competition analysis at the sector and project level, as part of a selectivity framework for engaging in SOE reform.  Control of Corruption  The oversight and accountability challenges of SOEs noted above can make them hard to manage and frequently exposes them to corruption. Corruption powerfully undermines SOE performance. In Ukraine, for example, widespread corruption impeded the progress of SOE reforms. By June 2018, more than 194 of the 793 criminal proceedings handled by Ukraine’s National Anticorruption Bureau dealt with about 50 SOEs and their officials, according to an OECD report. In Kenya, petty corruption among field staff responsible for installing and reading electricity meters reportedly hindered efforts to stem power system losses.   The IEG report finds that a country’s control of corruption is strongly associated with the likelihood of SOE reform success. Other things being equal, a country with high control of corruption is more than twice as likely to see SOE reform interventions succeed as a country with low control of corruption. In conditions of low control of corruption, it is more difficult to strengthen the governance, regulation, or performance of public enterprises.  IEG thus recommends that the Bank Group apply a selectivity framework for its engagements on SOE reform that considers country governance conditions. Where corruption control in the country is weak, IEG recommends that World Bank Group either sequence SOE reforms (first addressing public governance) or actively mitigate corruption risks through close attention to the strength of client commitment, supervision, simplicity of project design, and appropriate sequencing.  Mobilizing Private Finance  In its review of the Bank Group's experience, IEG found positive experiences from collaboration across its institutions, a key to mobilizing private financing and capabilities. Yet, IEG found these examples somewhat infrequent. The IEG report recommends scaling up the collaborative approach known as “Maximizing Finance for Development” (MFD) to enhance internal coordination among WBG units and help mobilize private financing and capacity including through ownership reforms such as privatization and public-private partnerships.  However, the recommendation to prioritize private solutions for SOE reforms through an MFD “cascade” approach is not a call for privatization alone. Rather, the World Bank Group should consider a full range of options, including improving regulation and competition, strengthening SOEs’ corporate governance, or supporting ownership reform. The end goal may range from better preparing SOEs to tap private capital markets, to creating a level playing field for competition between private companies and SOEs, to public-private partnerships or outright privatization.    Sequential and Complementary Support  IEG found that sequential and complementary interventions, often involving more than one Bank Group institution, aid successful reform. This includes good prior analytic work. For example, over many years, WBG strategies and programs in Bangladesh’s power sector were aligned with successive government five-year plans. Since at least 2004, the Bank Group engaged in unbundling and building technical capacity through financing and technical assistance. This covered regulation, generation, transmission, and distribution.   The World Bank also supported the successful Power Cell, which channeled technical, planning, and coordination support to government while facilitating the role of private power producers. The regulator, Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission, benefited from WBG support since its creation. The World Bank, IFC, and MIGA (the WBG’s agency for insuring against political risk) were all involved in a “cascade” approach in supporting independent power providers. Over time, sector performance improved in reduced losses, reduced arrears, and an elimination of the energy gap, with the Bank Group as a trusted partner bringing expertise in the field, access to global expertise, long-standing relationships with key government agencies, coordination of donors, and a consistent policy view.  Through selectivity, coordination and sequencing, the Bank Group can help client countries better serve their citizens through SOE reform. This is especially pressing now as governments cope with the effects of the pandemic and launch economic recovery efforts.   Read IEG's Evaluation: State Your Business! An Evaluation of World Bank Group Support to the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises Pictured above, clockwise from top left: 1. The Akuapem Rural Bank Ltd., founded in 1980, in the town of Mamfe, Ghana, June 19, 2006. Photo credit : Jonathan Ernst / World Bank 2. Kabul Afghanistan: Mirwais Zamkaniwal, 27 years old, Northwest Kabul Breshna Sub Station Manager, on site. Photo credit: Graham Crouch / World Bank 3. A female entrepreneur is visiting a bank in Vientiane. Vientiane, Lao PDR. Photo credit: Stanislas Fradelizi / World Bank 4. Interior of power plant. Kenya. Photo credit: Curt Carnemark / World Bank    

Liberia: Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project (PPAR)

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The project development objective of the Liberia Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project (IPFMRP) was to improve the budget coverage, fiscal policy management, financial control, and oversight of government finances of the recipient. The project was restructured in 2016, but the project development objective remained unchanged. Four subobjectives are assessed for this review: (i) Show MoreThe project development objective of the Liberia Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project (IPFMRP) was to improve the budget coverage, fiscal policy management, financial control, and oversight of government finances of the recipient. The project was restructured in 2016, but the project development objective remained unchanged. Four subobjectives are assessed for this review: (i) improve budget coverage, (ii) improve fiscal policy management, (iii) improve financial control, and (iv) improve oversight of government finances. Ratings for the Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Overall efficacy is modest, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance is moderately unsatisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation is negligible. Lessons from this project include: (i) Effective support for enhancing revenue mobilization and administration can benefit from combining technical assistance with logistical support. (ii) The use of PEFA composite indicators as results indicators is often not advisable. (iii) Superficial reviews and overoptimistic ratings in ISRs can negatively affect project implementation and outcomes. (iv) Effective and sustainable PFM reforms require continuous engagement to overcome political challenges.

State Your Business!

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An Evaluation of World Bank Group Support to the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, FY08-18
This is IEG’s first systematic assessment of World Bank Group’s support for the reform of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), looking at what works and the factors of success. It parallels Bank Group efforts to provide more integrated support to SOE reform in client countries and to empower staff with new tools. This is IEG’s first systematic assessment of World Bank Group’s support for the reform of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), looking at what works and the factors of success. It parallels Bank Group efforts to provide more integrated support to SOE reform in client countries and to empower staff with new tools.

Nigeria CLR Review FY14-19

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This review of the World Bank Group’s (WBG) Completion and Learning Review (CLR) covers the original period of the Nigeria Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), FY14-17, and the update and extension through FY19 as per the Second Performance and Learning Review (PLR) dated May 2018. The implementation of the CPS program was supported by 26 Bank operations with commitments of US$3.7 billion under Show MoreThis review of the World Bank Group’s (WBG) Completion and Learning Review (CLR) covers the original period of the Nigeria Country Partnership Strategy (CPS), FY14-17, and the update and extension through FY19 as per the Second Performance and Learning Review (PLR) dated May 2018. The implementation of the CPS program was supported by 26 Bank operations with commitments of US$3.7 billion under implementation at the beginning of the CPS and 38 new operations with commitments of US$9.4 billion. IFC invested in 28 projects for US$1.1 billion. MIGA issued three guarantees for US$549 million. The CPS design was well aligned with the challenges the country faced and the stated priorities of government. It also responded well to the challenges that arose during implementation. The CLR drew five lessons. Three of the lessons are: (i) achieving significant impact requires commitment beyond the horizon of a CPS, especially in areas such as energy and conflict mitigation; (ii) it can be difficult to accurately gauge the success or failure of results-based operations since they do not respond to traditional Bank tools for measuring success; and (iii) more care is needed in the selection of CPF objectives and results. In addition, IEG highlights the following two lessons from the CLR and builds on them: (i) The experience from expanding coverage of social assistance programs nationally under a common approach provides lessons that can be used to scale up engagements in other areas. Mainly, to combine the use of federal-level rules, policy coordination mechanisms, monitoring systems and data sharing with state-level program implementation and monitoring systems. (ii) Efforts to address design and implementation challenges included the creation of State Coordination Units to break logjams and the Multi-Sectoral Crisis Response Project (MCRP) to bring together efforts in infrastructure rehabilitation and service delivery in three conflictafflicted states. Further progress could entail absorbing and streamlining within the MCRP sectoral program delivery and institutional structures so as to reduce the number of PIUs and facilitate synergies.

Ukraine Country Program Evaluation (Approach Paper)

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Ukraine has significant economic potential, but over the past decade economic growth has been slow and highly volatile. A lower-middle-income country with a population of 44 million and a per-capita gross national income of $2,660 in 2018, Ukraine is endowed with a well-educated and entrepreneurial population, vast areas of fertile land, other natural resources, and a geographic location at the Show MoreUkraine has significant economic potential, but over the past decade economic growth has been slow and highly volatile. A lower-middle-income country with a population of 44 million and a per-capita gross national income of $2,660 in 2018, Ukraine is endowed with a well-educated and entrepreneurial population, vast areas of fertile land, other natural resources, and a geographic location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia.2 Ukraine aspires to join the European Union (EU), but after decades of stagnation, income per capita remains far below that of its neighbors and comparators. The primary goal of this Country Program Evaluation (CPE) is to assess the development effectiveness of World Bank Group support to Ukraine between fiscal years (FY)12 and FY20. A key focus of the CPE will be to examine how well the Bank Group adapted its support to Ukraine’s changing circumstances over the evaluation period and helped build resilience in the face of major crises. The CPE is also expected to provide strategic insights for the preparation of the next Ukraine Country Partnership Framework (CPF), scheduled for FY22.

Comoros CLR Review FY14-19

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This review of the Comoros Completion and Learning Review (CLR) of the World Bank Group (WBG) Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) covers the CPS period, FY14-FY19, and the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) of December 2018. This is the first CPS for Comoros following a series of Interim Strategy Notes (ISNs), the latest of which was prepared in 2010. The WBG programs under the ISNs were Show MoreThis review of the Comoros Completion and Learning Review (CLR) of the World Bank Group (WBG) Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) covers the CPS period, FY14-FY19, and the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) of December 2018. This is the first CPS for Comoros following a series of Interim Strategy Notes (ISNs), the latest of which was prepared in 2010. The WBG programs under the ISNs were limited in scope reflecting the high level of political instability, serious governance issues and related low IDA allocations. The CLR highlighted several lessons about a need to ensure a streamlined project design and flexibility in implementation; value of increased WBG presence on the ground; importance of donor coordination; and a need for greater realism and selectivity in the program. IEG particularly agrees that there is need for greater realism and selectivity in the program, throughout the program, beyond the governance area on which the lesson in the CLR focuses. Being excessively ambitious with respect to institutional targets in a fragile environment increases the risk of program underperformance. IEG adds the following lesson: The decision on a large program expansion at the PLR stage requires a detailed discussion and careful justification in the PLR document because it poses a longer-term implementation risk.

Croatia: Revenue Administration Modernization Project (PPAR)

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The development objective of the Croatia Revenue Administration Modernization Project was to achieve further improvements in tax efficiency, taxpayer services, and tax compliance through capacity building and systems improvement in the Croatia Tax Administration (CTA). For purposes of this review, three sub-objectives are assessed: (i) improvements in efficiency; (ii) improvements in taxpayer Show MoreThe development objective of the Croatia Revenue Administration Modernization Project was to achieve further improvements in tax efficiency, taxpayer services, and tax compliance through capacity building and systems improvement in the Croatia Tax Administration (CTA). For purposes of this review, three sub-objectives are assessed: (i) improvements in efficiency; (ii) improvements in taxpayer services; and (iii) improvements in tax compliance. Ratings for the Revenue Administration Modernization Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome was negligible, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately unsatisfactory. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) Poor quality at entry and lack of readiness for implementation contributed to significant implementation delays and limited results. (ii) Given that the main driver of the tax administration reforms was Croatia’s bid for membership of the EU, the project could have better secured the government’s commitment to reforms up front. (iii) In projects aiming to improve tax revenue administration, the right balance must be struck between institutional reform and hardware needs (buildings and information and communications technologies). (iv) High TTL turnover could be mitigated by ensuring adequate capacity in the field with the presence of competent local staff.