Search

Displaying 11 - 20 of 3055

Malawi: Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Development Project, and Agricultural Development Program Support Project (PPAR)

PDF file
The World Bank has been supporting the government of Malawi in its effort to promote sustainable growth in agricultural productivity. The Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Development Project (IRLADP) supported irrigation farming through the integrated provision of hardware, mainly irrigation infrastructure, and software, mainly local and institutional capacity building. The Show MoreThe World Bank has been supporting the government of Malawi in its effort to promote sustainable growth in agricultural productivity. The Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Development Project (IRLADP) supported irrigation farming through the integrated provision of hardware, mainly irrigation infrastructure, and software, mainly local and institutional capacity building. The Agricultural Development Program Support Project (ADPSP) addressed the efficiency of decision-making at the institutional agricultural policy and farm input–productivity level. The objective of the Project Performance Assessment Report is to assess how the farm-level support of both projects contributed to sustainable increases in agricultural productivity among smallholder farmers (SHFs). Both projects fostered an integrated approach to increases in agricultural productivity by promoting the uptake of traditional measures to support supply (irrigation, modern inputs, and agronomic knowledge) together with complementary practices of improved land and water management. Ratings for the Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and Agricultural Development Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Overall efficacy was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. Ratings for the Agricultural Development Program Support Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Overall efficacy was modest, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation is modest. This assessment offers the following lessons: (i) An integrated and participatory approach to agricultural development can initiate sustainable productivity growth among SHFs. In the context of a SHF-dominated agricultural sector and low productivity, traditional support measures of input supply are needed to close agronomic yield gaps. (ii) Agricultural projects with a supply-side focus on productivity growth that ignore market linkages are unlikely to provide the right agribusiness mind-set or incentives for farmers to sustainably invest in longer-term agricultural productivity. (iii) A government’s insufficient capacity and resources for agricultural sector development make it difficult to maintain an innovative but intensive demand-driven approach to service delivery in agriculture. (iv) Sustainable land and water management practices require a comprehensive approach that goes beyond irrigation or demonstration plots. (v) For projects preparing an Agriculture Sector-Wide Approach, monitoring production outcomes without a counterfactual does not allow an understanding of what is driving the anticipated productivity increases.

Bhutan CLR Review FY15-19

PDF file
This review of the World Bank Group (WBG) Completion and Learning Review (CLR) covers the period of the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) FY15-19, as updated in the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) dated May 8, 2017. Bhutan is a small, land-locked, lower middle-income country. Between 2015 and 2019 the annual real GDP growth has varied between 6.2 percent and 3.7 percent. The country’s Show MoreThis review of the World Bank Group (WBG) Completion and Learning Review (CLR) covers the period of the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) FY15-19, as updated in the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) dated May 8, 2017. Bhutan is a small, land-locked, lower middle-income country. Between 2015 and 2019 the annual real GDP growth has varied between 6.2 percent and 3.7 percent. The country’s economic growth was bolstered in recent years by investments in hydropower. Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is now only ten percent below the threshold for upper middle-income countries. Between 2007 and 2017 the poverty headcount ratio (measured at the US$3.20 poverty line in 2011 purchasing power parity terms) dropped from 36 to 12 percent of the population. The CPS noted that Bhutan needed to sustain macroeconomic stability while creating a business environment to promote private sector growth and job creation. The hydro-led growth had created some short-term macroeconomic imbalances, which called for careful management of fiscal and monetary policies. At the same time, it was critical to provide a better investment climate that would be more conducive to private sector development, diversification of the economy and job creation. Also, Bhutan’s large stock of natural capital called for increasing its sustainable contribution to the economy, while protecting the environment and human well-being. Related challenges included rapid urbanization, low agriculture productivity, limited infrastructure, difficult topography, and vulnerability to disaster and climate change. The 2020 Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) confirmed these development challenges.

Niger: Community Action Program and Community-Based Integrated Ecosystem Management Project Phase I and II (PPAR)

PDF file
The World Bank has played a key role in helping Niger to further its rural decentralization aims. The World Bank has supported the implementation of the rural code throughout its history. It approved the Natural Resource Management Project (1995–2003) to help Niger jump-start the code implementation and followed it with the Community Action Program (2004–20), a three-phase adjustable program loan Show MoreThe World Bank has played a key role in helping Niger to further its rural decentralization aims. The World Bank has supported the implementation of the rural code throughout its history. It approved the Natural Resource Management Project (1995–2003) to help Niger jump-start the code implementation and followed it with the Community Action Program (2004–20), a three-phase adjustable program loan designed to empower local governments and communities to progressively achieve their collective local development aims in a participatory and sustainable way. This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the first and second phases of the Community Action Program (CAP-1 and CAP-2). Ratings for the First Phase of the Community Action Program are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Overall efficacy was substantial, Bank performance was satisfactory, Borrower performance was satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was modest. Ratings for the Second Phase of the Community Action Program are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Overall efficacy was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, Borrower performance was satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. Lessons from both projects include: (i) Land and resource restoration projects should support—and make evident how they are supporting—existing customary flexible tenure arrangements to ensure distributional benefits among resource users and to mitigate conflict risks. (ii) The success of natural resource restoration depends on the extent to which private or communal resource users are compensated over reasonable, short-term time frames for abstaining from using those resources until the long-term public benefits of resource restoration are achieved. (iii) Projects that support land and resource restoration can ensure that women benefit by addressing participation barriers linked to social and cultural norms. (iv) Socioeconomic and anthropological analyses, conducted before project elaboration, can support the gender aspects of production and marketing better.

State Your Business: What are the keys to successful reform of state-owned enterprises?

Web Resource
State Your Business: What are the keys to successful reform of state-owned enterprises?
State-Owned Enterprises SOEs are critical to many developing and emerging economies where the lives of millions of citizens are deeply affected by how these enterprises are run. Governments use SOEs to provide services across multiple sectors and to address the impacts of economic downturns or crises, such as the current COVID-19 crisis.  Show MoreState-Owned Enterprises SOEs are critical to many developing and emerging economies where the lives of millions of citizens are deeply affected by how these enterprises are run. Governments use SOEs to provide services across multiple sectors and to address the impacts of economic downturns or crises, such as the current COVID-19 crisis.   Although many SOEs are run well and have made important economic contributions, many others suffer from low productivity and efficiency, which have a detrimental impact on growth and consumer access to services. SOEs’ mixed institutional mandates and their political importance often pose performance and governance challenges. Poor performance can also generate substantial public fiscal losses. Aware of the importance of SOE reform to achieving economic development and service delivery goals, the World Bank Group (WBG) has long supported developing countries to address the associated challenges.   IEG recently published the evaluation State Your Business! An Evaluation of World Bank Group Support to the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, its first systematic assessment of the Bank Group’s support for the reform of SOEs, focusing on the energy and financial sectors, where Bank Group investments in the last decade have surpassed USD 70 billion. The political importance of SOEs can impose substantial challenges to introducing and sustaining reforms. Such political economy risk factors help to explain why countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt, and Indonesia have signaled their intent to privatize state-owned banks but later halted efforts because of internal political constraints. The allocation and pricing of power and finance can evoke intense public reaction and mobilize vested interests.  Further, temporary crisis response programs can turn into irreversible “policy traps”, locking SOEs in to underfunded mandates even if it damages their long-term viability.    IEG’s evaluation sheds light on key factors driving successful SOE reforms and points to risks and obstacles that limit reforms with potentially dire consequences for SOE performance and delivery of services to the public. These factors include:   Sector competition  Research on the subject shows that enhanced competition improves SOE performance in both the financial and power sectors, both by itself and in combination with other reforms. First, there is strong evidence that SOEs perform better in the power sector (and in general) when competitive conditions prevail at the sector and enterprise levels. For example, an econometric assessment of power sector data for 36 developing and transition countries over 18 years found that gains in economic performance stemmed mainly from allowing private participation.   Privatization or regulatory reforms were less effective without a competitive market. Private sector participation can take various forms and involve different functions of the power market (generation, transmission, distribution, and retail). A key aim of Bank Group support has been to strengthen competition and regulation in SOE markets, in part to foster a level playing field between SOEs and private companies  One example of WBG support to achieve a more competitive power market is in Vietnam, where Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) and other SOEs dominated power generation. EVN also fully owned the entity that operates and maintains the national transmission grid.   The Bank Group engaged comprehensively in all aspects of the power sector (rural electrification, generation, transmission, distribution, load dispatch, renewables, development of wholesale and retail power markets, regulatory aspects, and SOE reform), using a wide range of instruments. The credibility and trust generated enabled the Bank Group to support the government in sequencing sector wide reform.  In 2012, EVN unbundled its generation subsidiaries into three separate generation companies, at the same time as the launch of Vietnam’s competitive generation market, in which independent power producers and generation companies compete in a power pool to sell to individual buyers. As of 2016, 24 percent of installed capacity in Vietnamese power generation was privately held.   In the financial sector, research shows bank concentration is more constraining to firms’ access to credit in countries with higher shares of state bank ownership. More competitive environments enhance the benefits of bank privatization.  The Bank Group's private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has committed to promoting “competitive neutrality” in the SOEs that it invests in.   Given the greater success of reforms with better competitive conditions, the IEG report recommends that the World Bank Group should gear up to do more competition analysis at the sector and project level, as part of a selectivity framework for engaging in SOE reform.  Control of Corruption  The oversight and accountability challenges of SOEs noted above can make them hard to manage and frequently exposes them to corruption. Corruption powerfully undermines SOE performance. In Ukraine, for example, widespread corruption impeded the progress of SOE reforms. By June 2018, more than 194 of the 793 criminal proceedings handled by Ukraine’s National Anticorruption Bureau dealt with about 50 SOEs and their officials, according to an OECD report. In Kenya, petty corruption among field staff responsible for installing and reading electricity meters reportedly hindered efforts to stem power system losses.   The IEG report finds that a country’s control of corruption is strongly associated with the likelihood of SOE reform success. Other things being equal, a country with high control of corruption is more than twice as likely to see SOE reform interventions succeed as a country with low control of corruption. In conditions of low control of corruption, it is more difficult to strengthen the governance, regulation, or performance of public enterprises.  IEG thus recommends that the Bank Group apply a selectivity framework for its engagements on SOE reform that considers country governance conditions. Where corruption control in the country is weak, IEG recommends that World Bank Group either sequence SOE reforms (first addressing public governance) or actively mitigate corruption risks through close attention to the strength of client commitment, supervision, simplicity of project design, and appropriate sequencing.  Mobilizing Private Finance  In its review of the Bank Group's experience, IEG found positive experiences from collaboration across its institutions, a key to mobilizing private financing and capabilities. Yet, IEG found these examples somewhat infrequent. The IEG report recommends scaling up the collaborative approach known as “Maximizing Finance for Development” (MFD) to enhance internal coordination among WBG units and help mobilize private financing and capacity including through ownership reforms such as privatization and public-private partnerships.  However, the recommendation to prioritize private solutions for SOE reforms through an MFD “cascade” approach is not a call for privatization alone. Rather, the World Bank Group should consider a full range of options, including improving regulation and competition, strengthening SOEs’ corporate governance, or supporting ownership reform. The end goal may range from better preparing SOEs to tap private capital markets, to creating a level playing field for competition between private companies and SOEs, to public-private partnerships or outright privatization.    Sequential and Complementary Support  IEG found that sequential and complementary interventions, often involving more than one Bank Group institution, aid successful reform. This includes good prior analytic work. For example, over many years, WBG strategies and programs in Bangladesh’s power sector were aligned with successive government five-year plans. Since at least 2004, the Bank Group engaged in unbundling and building technical capacity through financing and technical assistance. This covered regulation, generation, transmission, and distribution.   The World Bank also supported the successful Power Cell, which channeled technical, planning, and coordination support to government while facilitating the role of private power producers. The regulator, Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission, benefited from WBG support since its creation. The World Bank, IFC, and MIGA (the WBG’s agency for insuring against political risk) were all involved in a “cascade” approach in supporting independent power providers. Over time, sector performance improved in reduced losses, reduced arrears, and an elimination of the energy gap, with the Bank Group as a trusted partner bringing expertise in the field, access to global expertise, long-standing relationships with key government agencies, coordination of donors, and a consistent policy view.  Through selectivity, coordination and sequencing, the Bank Group can help client countries better serve their citizens through SOE reform. This is especially pressing now as governments cope with the effects of the pandemic and launch economic recovery efforts.   Read IEG's Evaluation: State Your Business! An Evaluation of World Bank Group Support to the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises Pictured above, clockwise from top left: 1. The Akuapem Rural Bank Ltd., founded in 1980, in the town of Mamfe, Ghana, June 19, 2006. Photo credit : Jonathan Ernst / World Bank 2. Kabul Afghanistan: Mirwais Zamkaniwal, 27 years old, Northwest Kabul Breshna Sub Station Manager, on site. Photo credit: Graham Crouch / World Bank 3. A female entrepreneur is visiting a bank in Vientiane. Vientiane, Lao PDR. Photo credit: Stanislas Fradelizi / World Bank 4. Interior of power plant. Kenya. Photo credit: Curt Carnemark / World Bank    

Liberia: Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project (PPAR)

PDF file
The project development objective of the Liberia Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project (IPFMRP) was to improve the budget coverage, fiscal policy management, financial control, and oversight of government finances of the recipient. The project was restructured in 2016, but the project development objective remained unchanged. Four subobjectives are assessed for this review: (i) Show MoreThe project development objective of the Liberia Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project (IPFMRP) was to improve the budget coverage, fiscal policy management, financial control, and oversight of government finances of the recipient. The project was restructured in 2016, but the project development objective remained unchanged. Four subobjectives are assessed for this review: (i) improve budget coverage, (ii) improve fiscal policy management, (iii) improve financial control, and (iv) improve oversight of government finances. Ratings for the Integrated Public Financial Management Reform Project are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Overall efficacy is modest, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance is moderately unsatisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation is negligible. Lessons from this project include: (i) Effective support for enhancing revenue mobilization and administration can benefit from combining technical assistance with logistical support. (ii) The use of PEFA composite indicators as results indicators is often not advisable. (iii) Superficial reviews and overoptimistic ratings in ISRs can negatively affect project implementation and outcomes. (iv) Effective and sustainable PFM reforms require continuous engagement to overcome political challenges.

Brazil: National Biodiversity Mainstreaming and Institutional Consolidation Project and Sustainable Cerrado Initiative (PPAR)

PDF file
Brazil is the most biodiverse country in the world, holding an estimated one-fifth of all known flora and fauna species. It also contains a wide range of climate types in seven major biomes, including the vast Amazon and now largely depleted Atlantic rainforests, the Cerrado savanna (which covering 2 million square kilometers is second in size only to Amazônia), the semiarid Caatinga, the world’s Show MoreBrazil is the most biodiverse country in the world, holding an estimated one-fifth of all known flora and fauna species. It also contains a wide range of climate types in seven major biomes, including the vast Amazon and now largely depleted Atlantic rainforests, the Cerrado savanna (which covering 2 million square kilometers is second in size only to Amazônia), the semiarid Caatinga, the world’s largest Pantanal wetlands, and an extensive coastline. The National Biodiversity Mainstreaming and Institutional Consolidation Project (PROBIO 2) was funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). Its project development objectives were (i) to promote mainstreaming of biodiversity at the national level in key public and private sector planning strategies and practices, and (ii) to consolidate and strengthen institutional capacity to produce and disseminate relevant biodiversity information. The project development objectives of the Sustainable Cerrado Initiative (GEF Cerrado) were to enhance biodiversity conservation in, and improve environmental and natural resource management of, the Cerrado in Brazil’s territory through appropriate policies and practices. Ratings from the National Biodiversity Mainstreaming and Institutional Consolidation Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Overall efficacy was satisfactory, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was modest. Ratings for the Sustainable Cerrado Initiative are as follows: Outcome was moderately unsatisfactory, Overall efficacy was modest, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was modest. Lessons from the project include: (i) A critical element for the success of projects that seek to promote the mainstreaming of biodiversity across sectors, both public and private, is strong ownership and active participation across the project’s life by the institutions involved. (ii) A firm up-front understanding of the underlying political, economic, and territorial contexts of the geographic area in which a project is seeking to establish new or expand existing protected areas is essential to properly gauge the possibilities of achieving such an objective. (iii) Experience in Brazil (and elsewhere) has shown that government commitment to project objectives and design can shift significantly over time due to changes in administrations, both at the federal and state government levels. (iv) Learning from environment projects that use concessional financing, both successful and unsuccessful, can have policy implications that extend beyond the original project’s intentions.

Lao People's Democratic Republic: Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric and Social and Environment Projects (PPAR)

PDF file
The Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project (NT2 HPP) was a major undertaking in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) when the country’s energy sector was nascent, the overall economy was transitioning from central planning to greater market orientation, and private participation was limited in the energy sector. The NT2 HPP was developed primarily to export electricity to Thailand to boost Show MoreThe Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project (NT2 HPP) was a major undertaking in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) when the country’s energy sector was nascent, the overall economy was transitioning from central planning to greater market orientation, and private participation was limited in the energy sector. The NT2 HPP was developed primarily to export electricity to Thailand to boost economic growth in Lao PDR in support of the implementation of the country’s Growth and Poverty Elimination Strategy. The project was also designed to be catalytic—a model to guide subsequent exploitation of the country’s extensive hydropower resources. Ratings for the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. The NT2 HPP—given its scale, complexity, and significance—provides many lessons for consideration in future hydropower development initiatives: (i) A project design to capture more comprehensive development outcomes from hydropower, as recommended in the World Bank’s Water Working Note “Directions in Hydropower: Scaling Up for Development,” needs to balance its ambitions with the corresponding implementation capacity, particularly as it relates to experience with environmental protection and social development that may exceed the capabilities of many hydropower developers (World Bank 2009a). (ii) Strategically catalytic interventions, such as the NT2 HPP, can lead to transformational impacts when there is a commitment to and capacity for implementing follow-on actions such as replicating and mainstreaming its features. In the NT2 HPP, power financing through a PPP was catalytic in helping to develop the sector and fueling export-led growth. (iii) Bank Group (and other IFI) participation, including the use of guarantees, can be instrumental in mitigating risks and enhancing the private sector’s confidence to mobilize in nascent markets with unexploited potential and scalable investment opportunities. (iv) A government’s adherence to its commitment to implement a sound development strategy may be a more significant driver for achieving broader poverty alleviation outcomes than earmarking revenues for specific expenditures that are fungible within a general budget. (v) Hydropower can produce sizable global environmental benefits in terms of combating climate change, although the negative impacts that can arise from greenhouse gas emissions from storage reservoirs should also be accounted for.

What the World Bank Group’s Performance Results Cannot Tell Us About Development Outcomes

Web Resource
What the World Bank Group’s Performance Results Cannot Tell Us About Development Outcomes
Many World Bank Group projects display strong performance. These results however tell us little about the Bank Group’s aggregate contributions and higher-level development outcomes—the results measurement systems are designed to tell a different type of performance story. The World Bank Group’s (WBG) results measurement systems for projects, programs, and thematic areas are purposefully Show MoreMany World Bank Group projects display strong performance. These results however tell us little about the Bank Group’s aggregate contributions and higher-level development outcomes—the results measurement systems are designed to tell a different type of performance story. The World Bank Group’s (WBG) results measurement systems for projects, programs, and thematic areas are purposefully designed. Generally, they focus on collecting data on indicators that can be attributed to Bank Group interventions. They help verify whether targets have been met. They provide consistency in displaying results across portfolios. Importantly, they allow shareholders to hold the Bank Group accountable. In our flagship report, IEG aggregates and analyzes much of this data to give the big picture on the Results and Performance of the World Bank Group (RAP 2020). The 2020 RAP report finds that the World Bank and MIGA performs strongly overall, and that IFC’s decline in ratings that started ten years ago appears to have halted. We welcome you to dive deeper into how various arms and instruments of the Bank Group perform, and what factors help explain these trends. At the same time, while being able to attribute results to Bank Group projects remains important for reasons of accountability, there is also a need to better capture how the institution contributes to lasting positive change in client countries. We refer to this as higher-level development outcomes—social and economic change on the ground which Bank Group interventions cannot achieve singlehandedly, but which the institution can meaningfully add to, over time. How well does the World Bank Group contribute to these sorts of development results? RAP 2020 finds that answering this question would require searching beyond the institution’s existing results measurement systems. Limited evidence on higher-level outcomes is gathered Following an analysis of the Bank Group’s results reporting—from projects to country programs to thematic priorities such as gender and climate change—the RAP 2020 arrived at the conclusion that the World Bank Group collects limited systematic evidence on its contribution to higher-level outcomes. Higher-level outcomes stem from the interplay of different projects and types of Bank Group engagements—lending, knowledge, and convening—over time. The World Bank Group’s Board has requested more evidence on these sorts of development outcomes and how the interventions help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Better evidence on higher level outcomes would also help with learning, reflections on strategy, and course corrections where needed. Many of the World Bank Group’s existing corporate results measurement systems were designed to collect data needed for ratings and for process and compliance monitoring. These systems do what they were designed to do. For example, individual projects’ self-evaluations mostly do a good job at capturing project-level results. IEG rates these self-evaluations, as part of a system that provides consistency in displaying results across sectors, across types of projects, and across time. Yet combining performance ratings from individual projects cannot give a clear picture of the important development outcomes to which the Bank Group contributes—the Bank Group’s contribution to higher-level outcomes amounts to more than the sum of its parts. And ratings are not the same as outcomes. IFC, under its 3.0 strategy, has adopted tools to help it more clearly work toward outcomes. Through its AIMM system, IFC assesses all investments for their anticipated direct and indirect effects, including catalytic effects on markets. It is too early to tell how IFC’s new tools will influence outcome achievement and incentives. Although IFC can ensure alignment between projects and IFC’s higher-level goals because of its focused business model, the World Bank operates with objectives that are more diverse because of its diverse sector and country contexts. Results in thematic areas focus more on compliance than outcomes Consider gender and climate change. The Bank Group is committed to achieving important outcomes for its global work in key areas such as gender and climate change. Its measurement systems, however, place more emphasis on the input level—such as compliance with climate co-benefit commitments and gender tags—than on capturing changes arising from Bank Group operations. The climate change results measurement system, for example, uses 35 targets and indicators to monitor how well the WBG integrates climate change into operations and strategies. 90 percent of these indicators relate to actions under the Bank Group’s control, including inputs (such as financing for climate action), internal processes (such as greenhouse gas accounting), and outputs (such as the number of activities that support cities with climate-related policies). This approach is useful to track fulfillment of corporate commitments, drive accountability, and ensure operations adhere to process requirements. In a nutshell, the system creates incentives to mainstream climate action. But the system has limited focus on the quality of programs and on understanding the higher-level change the programs are meant to support. What an outcome orientation would mean Imagine a situation where staff spend less time checking boxes and collecting data that the Bank Group needs for its own internal reporting purposes and have more time engaging with clients on programs’ contribution to development outcomes. Imagine a situation where data, evidence, and systems oriented the Bank Group toward achieving higher-level outcomes. We call this outcome orientation. An outcome orientation means both generating evidence on what works, what does not, and why; and using this feedback to engage clients and adapt programs to boost contribution to development outcomes. Many parts of the World Bank Group are already studying their outcomes, learning from data and evidence, and adjusting interventions. Some of the corporate results systems could better support staff in this. IEG’s newly published evaluation on The World Bank Group Outcome Orientation at the Country Level finds that the country-level results measurement system does not effectively support teams in making course corrections to country programs. *** The World Bank Group’s results measurement systems bring rigor and discipline to performance assessment, and there remains a strong case for assessing Bank Group achievements at the project level so that they can be accounted for in a focused way. At the same time, more deliberately contributing to development outcomes requires shifting focus beyond the project level and beyond current results measurement and incentives structures. IEG is to this end committed to supporting the World Bank Group’s outcome orientation. Read Results and Performance of the World Bank Group 2020

Public Utility Reform: What lessons can we learn from IEG evaluations in the energy and water sectors?

PDF file
Public Utility Reform: What lessons can we learn from IEG evaluations in the energy and water sectors?
This synthesis provides a review of operationally relevant findings and lessons from World Bank-supported utility reforms in the energy and water sectors, as identified in IEG evaluation products.This synthesis provides a review of operationally relevant findings and lessons from World Bank-supported utility reforms in the energy and water sectors, as identified in IEG evaluation products.

State Your Business!

Web Resource
An Evaluation of World Bank Group Support to the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, FY08-18
This is IEG’s first systematic assessment of World Bank Group’s support for the reform of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), looking at what works and the factors of success. It parallels Bank Group efforts to provide more integrated support to SOE reform in client countries and to empower staff with new tools. This is IEG’s first systematic assessment of World Bank Group’s support for the reform of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), looking at what works and the factors of success. It parallels Bank Group efforts to provide more integrated support to SOE reform in client countries and to empower staff with new tools.