Highlights

This evaluation assesses the evolution and performance of the World Bank Group’s support during FY 2013–23, including the evolution and relevance of its strategy and engagement, contributions to statebuilding in Somalia, and adaptations of support to Somalia’s fragility context.

Somalia—characterized as a failed state at the beginning of the evaluation period—continues to be affected by some of the most severe development challenges related to conflict and fragility, extreme poverty, governance, and climate change.

The federal government is competing for authority with nonstate actors and subnational entities. It struggles to perform core state functions and to provide basic services while being highly dependent on development partner grants. Unsettled political and constitutional disputes among different layers of government and an overlap with coexisting traditional structures impede progress on statebuilding.

Introduction: Purpose of the Evaluation

The Somalia Country Program Evaluation (CPE) assesses the performance of the World Bank Group’s support during FY 2013–23. It reviews the extent to which the Bank Group adequately prepared for a regularization of relations with Somalia and customized its support to the country’s conflict and fragility situation and the nation’s development objectives while drawing on lessons from program implementation experience. It covers the decade since reengagement in Somalia started in 2012 and spans two Bank Group strategies: the Interim Strategy Note (ISN; FY14–16) and the Country Partnership Framework (CPF; FY19–23). It informed the preparation of the Somalia CPF FY24–28 and may also be relevant to reengagement in other situations of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) and to the implementation of the Bank Group’s FCV strategy (2020–25).

The CPE evaluates the relevance and effectiveness of Bank Group engagement with Somalia. It assesses the sequencing of support activities and coordination with development partners, and addresses three questions:

1. To what extent has the Bank Group adapted its support to Somalia’s evolving development challenges, risks, and fragility context?
2. To what extent has the Bank Group contributed to building the capacity of the state to support Somalia’s longer-term development, including for managing the government’s resources and delivering services?
3. To what extent were the Bank Group’s modalities of engagement and program design appropriate for Somalia’s situation of fragility and conflict?

The evaluation is based on the triangulation of evidence from reviews of Bank Group documents and literature, its advisory services and analytics (ASA) and lending portfolios, semistructured interviews, and analysis of available data and surveys and geocoded project locations. The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) conducted a mission to Somalia and Kenya in June 2023. The mission interviewed more than 100 Bank Group staff; officials from the Federal Government of Somalia and several federal member states; development partners; implementation agencies; and representatives of civil society, academia, and think tanks. Details on the approach and methodology are in appendix A.

Country Context and Main Development Challenges

By 2012, much of Somalia’s human and physical capital had been destroyed after a decades-long civil war, and the country was considered a failed state. At the start of the evaluation period, in 2013, Somalia remained mired in conflict, burdened by internal displacements, and split into competing jurisdictions, in addition to experiencing daunting economic and environmental challenges. Much of the country was under the control of the Al-Shabaab insurgency group.1

Multiple overlapping development and fragility constraints have challenged Somalia. These include (i) regional instability related to its geopolitical location at the Horn of Africa; (ii) high insecurity and high levels of conflict and violence; (iii) a protracted statebuilding process and power contestation from different actors; (iv) high and increasing poverty; (v) limited institutional capacity for service delivery that is fracturing citizen trust and the social contract; (vi) susceptibility to natural disasters and effects of climate change, and related food insecurity and citizen displacement; (vii) low growth and lack of economic opportunities; (viii) discrimination against women; and (ix) a large youth bulge.

Somalia is among the poorest and most fragile countries in the world. The country ranks near the bottom (162 out of 166) in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Overlapping crises related to the COVID-19 pandemic, a prolonged drought, and macroeconomic shocks from rising food and fuel costs have over time worsened socioeconomic conditions (World Bank 2022c). Poverty has been increasing as a result of multiple shocks, with 54 percent of Somalis living below the national poverty line in 2022, compared with 28 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa (Somalia 2023b). Economic growth has lagged behind population growth in recent years, resulting in negative per capita GDP growth (figure 1.1). A per capita income of $592 puts Somalia among the five poorest countries in the world. In terms of gender equity, Somalia scores consistently low on the Women, Business and the Law indicator (46.9 out of 100) compared with the regional average for Sub-Saharan Africa (74.0; World Bank n.d.).

Figure 1.1. Economic Growth in Somalia

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Figure 1.1. Economic Growth in Somalia

Source: World Bank 2024c.

Note: t = estimated growth rates.

The country also has some of the weakest human development indicators in the world (table 1.1). Somalia scored last (193 out of 193 countries) in the 2022 Human Development Index value. Average life expectancy in 2021 was 55 years, and maternal mortality stood at 621 for every 100,000 births (World Development Indicators database). Population displacements have resulted in rapid urbanization, with about 75 percent of the 2.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in urban centers in 2018.2 This unplanned urban growth has led to slum expansion and environmental degradation in Somali cities (World Bank 2020g). In addition, Somalia has one of the highest fertility rates (6.2 in 2022) in the world, with 80 percent of its population below age 35. The country faces a large youth bulge, which, combined with a high youth unemployment rate (27 percent), especially in urban areas, is a key driver of fragility (World Bank 2018b).

Sources: ACLED (https://acleddata.com/data/), IDMC (https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data/), ITU (https://datahub.itu.int/data/?e=SOM), and WDI (https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&country=ARE).

Note: ACLED = Armed Conflict Location and Event Data; IDMC = Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; ITU = International Telecommunications Union; WDI = World Development Indicators; — = not available.a. ACLED defines “violence against civilians” as violent events where an organized armed group inflicts violence on unarmed noncombatants.

Existing crises are compounded by the country’s high vulnerability to natural disasters. Somalia contributes just 0.08 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions but is ranked the second-most climate-vulnerable country in the world (ICRC 2021). Many Somalis are nomadic or seminomadic herders, and livestock production provides income to 60 percent of the population (Famine Early Warning Systems Network 2020). These traditional rural livelihoods are highly vulnerable to drought, which in 2021 alone displaced about 1 million additional people in Somalia (UNHCR and NRC 2022). The number of people in Somalia facing crisis hunger levels was subsequently expected to rise to more than 7 million (44 percent of the population). In 2021, almost half the population required humanitarian assistance (World Bank 2022c).

Weak domestic revenue mobilization hinders the federal government’s ability to restore and supply basic services, which have been fragmented and privatized. With little ability to finance core state functions and services, Somalia has been highly dependent on external assistance. The average ratio of official development aid to GDP reached 23 percent between 2020 and 2022. However, 82 percent of 2022 official development aid was off budget (World Bank 2024l). Domestic revenue mobilization is extremely low, with a tax-to-GDP ratio of 3.2 percent, compared with an 18 percent average in Sub-Saharan Africa.3 On-budget external grants accounted for 64 percent of federal government revenue (Somalia 2021). As a result, the federal government has very limited capacity for service delivery, further undermining citizen trust and authority.

A key challenge to statebuilding is that the federal government, armed nonstate actors (primarily Al-Shabaab but also the Islamic State and local militias), and semi-independent subnational governments compete for authority in the eyes of the people. As a result, security and politics remain highly volatile. The country continues to face high levels of conflict and violence, mainly because of the armed insurgency of Al-Shabaab, which controls wide swathes of the country and has frequently perpetrated violence in urban centers (Faruk 2022). In addition, Somalia’s strategic geopolitical location in the Horn of Africa and abutting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden subject it to the competing interests of international actors.

Political and constitutional disputes remain unsettled among different layers of government, and between government and traditional governance structures. Under the 2012 Provisional Constitution, Somalia is a federal republic, and the federal member states enjoy a degree of autonomy over regional affairs. However, significant tensions exist between the federal government and the federal member states, and among the federal member states, because of competition for authority and resources, including security sector management and the control of key economic assets and revenue-generating infrastructure and aid distribution (Heritage Institute 2013, 2021).

Despite considerable challenges, Somalia also has significant sources of resilience. The weakening or absence of a central state since 1991 has increased the importance of personal networks as a source of resilience. Strong intragroup support and family relations across the Horn of Africa have often provided a safety net to stave off the most severe impacts of drought, conflict, and displacement. Somalia’s private sector provides many basic services and is another source of resilience.