The Results and Performance of the World Bank Group (RAP) 2024 report by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) is the 14th annual report in the series. The RAP series aggregates and interprets evidence on World Bank Group performance, mainly using IEG’s validations of World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) self-evaluations of projects and country programs. These validations summarize the extent to which the Bank Group institutions have achieved key aspects of project and country program design, implementation, and results.

The RAP series follows the principles of continuity, symmetry, and innovation. RAP 2024 maintains continuity with earlier reports by reviewing performance over a 10-year period based on ratings from IEG validations using standardized methodologies (box O.1). It maintains the principle of symmetry across institutions by analyzing common or similar factors linked to performance while also acknowledging their differences. Hence, RAP includes separate chapters for World Bank, IFC, MIGA, and country programs, which allows more in-depth discussion of performance trends and relevant topics for each institution. RAP 2024 includes innovative analysis of (i) processing time for IFC investment projects, (ii) risk identification and mitigation, (iii) IFC work quality and additionality, (iv) the Country Opinion Surveys, and (v) results measurement in IFC investment projects.

RAP 2024 can inform the learning and accountability processes of the Bank Group’s Board of Executive Directors. The evidence presented in this report focuses on significant changes and substantive patterns in performance relevant to the institutions of the Bank Group, but it does not identify causal relationships. Drawing on this evidence, the Board can use RAP 2024 for learning because it helps the Board further examine the challenges facing Bank Group institutions and highlights the levers that can be pulled to enhance their performance. Furthermore, RAP 2024 aids accountability because it helps the Board understand trends and changes in portfolio performance.

RAP 2024 is produced at a time when the work of the Bank Group is increasingly exposed to risky contexts and periodic shocks. The Bank Group has committed to giving increased priority and resources to lower-income countries and countries classified as fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS), where most of the world’s poor people reside (World Bank 2024c, 2024e). The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent shocks to global food and fuel prices have highlighted the importance of building resilience and responding proactively to domestic and external shocks. Climate change is likely to make such shocks more frequent and more severe. Previous IEG evidence has described areas where the Bank Group has successfully responded to increased risks and maintained performance, for example, through rapidly adapting its operational and country portfolios, adjusting lending volumes, and using new digital technologies during the COVID-19 pandemic (World Bank 2022h, 2024a, 2024b). Building on these findings, this report highlights challenges confronted in risky contexts at a portfolio level and suggests responses that can help enhance performance.

Key Findings

RAP 2024 highlights several cross-cutting findings. Although the World Bank, IFC, and MIGA have different business models and different evaluation methodologies for operations and projects (box O.1), some common themes and findings emerge that are outlined in this section. While the ratings themselves cannot be compared across institutions because different methodologies are used, rating trends can be compared.

The Bank Group’s performance ratings have plateaued or declined, which is linked to exposure in riskier country contexts. For the World Bank, ratings for operations have recently plateaued because of increased portfolio exposure in FCS. For IFC and MIGA, recent declines have been driven primarily by declining outcome ratings in International Development Association (IDA) and blend countries (without significant portfolio shifts toward IDA and blend or FCS). Bank Group country program development outcome ratings are 19 percentage points lower for both IDA-eligible countries, compared with those eligible under the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and 21 percentage points lower for FCS countries than for non-FCS countries. In contrast, Bank Group performance in country program ratings has remained at the same levels in FCS, IDA, and blend countries.

COVID-19 has not yet affected the overall ratings of the operations of the World Bank, although the performance of IFC advisory services and IFC investment projects with financial institutions has been negatively affected. The Bank Group’s response to COVID-19 appears to have mitigated negative impacts on the ratings of World Bank projects. For IFC investment projects with financial institutions, some clients were able to adapt to COVID-19, but the pandemic detracted from the success of other clients. For IFC advisory services, performance suffered despite proactive support and restructurings.

Bank Group performance can be improved even with risks increasing. First, the quality of the design of operations and projects is strongly associated with better results. Quality of design can include realism and relevance of objectives with respect to country context and appropriate sequencing of interventions. Second, across the Bank Group portfolio, effective risk identification and proactive risk management—particularly for risks under direct or indirect Bank Group control—are linked with stronger performance. This finding is particularly important in FCS, where the analysis of World Bank Systematic Operations Risk-Rating Tool ratings shows that larger risk reductions during implementation were associated with better outcomes, whereas failure to mitigate risks contributed to lower outcomes. Third, client capacity challenges are linked to lower performance across institutions, particularly in FCS or in IDA-eligible countries. Developing public and private clients’ organizational capacity to adapt to changing contexts and implement fit-for-purpose solutions (for example, in procurement), implement coordination mechanisms, and establish performance reporting systems can contribute to better outcomes.

The Bank Group’s implementation of results monitoring could enhance outcome ratings and contributions to development effectiveness. Gaps in the design and implementation of results monitoring are persistent concerns in project and Country Program Evaluations and in IEG thematic evaluations. Monitoring and evaluation practices are subject to World Bank influence and are correlated with outcome ratings. Despite improvements over the past decade, more than one-third of World Bank operations rated by IEG have inadequate monitoring and evaluation practices. MIGA is behind on submitting self-evaluations of guarantee projects, which hinders both accountability and learning. IFC could also improve the measurement of outcomes, particularly market outcomes (that is, changes in the market beyond those narrowly linked to the project). IEG validations identified that 83 percent of country programs over the past 10 years had major inadequacies in their results frameworks.

Trends in Performance

Performance ratings across the Bank Group’s institutions have not consistently increased over the long term.1 For the World Bank, project ratings have plateaued after a steady increase over the past decade. IFC project ratings recovered in the past five years but remain lower than they were a decade ago. MIGA project ratings declined slightly over the past decade.

• World Bank project outcome ratings increased from an average rating of 3.8 (out of a maximum rating of 6) in 2013 to 4.3 in 2020, then plateaued at this level between FY 2020 and FY23. World Bank performance has trended gradually upward since FY13, reaching 4.3 in FY23.
• The development outcome ratings of IFC investment projects improved over the medium term, from 41 percent mostly successful or better (calendar year [CY]16–18) to 51 percent mostly successful or better (CY21–23), but they remain lower than they were a decade ago (53 percent in CY13–15). IFC work quality ratings have declined over the past decade, from 62 percent satisfactory or better (CY13–15) to 55 percent (CY21–23).
• The development effectiveness ratings of IFC advisory services improved over the medium term, from 41 percent mostly successful or better (FY16–18) to 50 percent mostly successful or better (FY21–23), but they remained below 61 percent in FY13–15. Work quality ratings improved from 48 percent satisfactory or better (FY16–18) to 59 percent (FY21–23).
• The development outcome ratings of MIGA guarantee projects declined slightly, from 69 percent satisfactory or better in FY13–18 to 68 percent satisfactory or better in FY18–23. In the 15 MIGA guarantee projects that IEG validated during FY21–23, MIGA fully or partially achieved 81 percent of the intended project-level outcomes, but only 66 percent of the intended foreign investment–level outcomes. (Project-level outcomes refer, for example, to benefits to stakeholders, society, the environment, and the economy. Foreign investment–level outcomes refer, for example, to creating positive demonstration effects that signal opportunities to other market participants or potential capital providers.)
• The development outcomes improved in Bank Group country programs from 68 percent moderately satisfactory or above in FY13 to 78 percent moderately satisfactory or above in FY20. Bank Group performance in country programs was stagnant through FY20, with low ratings observed in approximately 40 percent of country programs.

World Bank operations and Bank Group country programs in FCS are exerting downward pressure on overall outcome ratings. The plateau in World Bank outcome ratings is mostly due to an increase in the share of FCS operations in the portfolio, which have lower ratings on average for most of the FY13–23 period. The proportion of projects with full or partial exposure to FCS increased from 31 percent in FY20 to 37 percent in FY23, magnifying the effect of their lower average ratings on the overall World Bank average outcome rating. The share of country programs in FCS with development outcomes rated moderately satisfactory or above is 55 percent, compared with 76 percent in non-FCS countries between FY13 and FY23.

For IFC and MIGA, declining project ratings in IDA and blend countries were the major contributor to overall declines in development outcome ratings. For IFC investment projects, the development outcome ratings of IDA and blend projects declined from 54 percent mostly successful or better (CY13–15) to 46 percent (CY21–23), and the outcome ratings of FCS in IDA and blend countries declined sharply, from 50 percent mostly successful or better to 18 percent over the same period. For IFC advisory services, ratings of projects in IDA and blend countries declined from 59 percent mostly successful or better in FY13–15 to 43 percent in FY21–23, even though there were fewer projects in these countries over the latter period. The share of FCS projects in the overall active IFC investment portfolio has remained stable (at 11 percent); however, the number of projects in FCS has been increasing since FY21. Development outcome ratings of MIGA projects in IDA and blend countries declined from 74 percent satisfactory or better to 50 percent between FY13–18 and FY18–23, and ratings for MIGA projects in Sub-Saharan Africa declined from 72 percent satisfactory or better to 50 percent over the same period.

Challenges Influencing Performance

A wide variety of challenges affected the performance of Bank Group operations and projects. RAP undertook an analysis of the key challenges that affected project outcomes, including those linked to country context (over which the Bank Group has limited or no influence); institutional capacity of clients and stakeholders (over which the Bank Group has indirect influence); and factors related to project design, finance, and monitoring and evaluation (over which the Bank Group has direct influence).

Country context challenges were common throughout the portfolio but were more acute in FCS:

• The World Bank identified institutional capacity and financial management challenges in 75 and 76 percent of operations, respectively. In FCS, political interference and electoral cycles were intense challenges, identified in 74 and 80 percent of operations, respectively.
• The most prevalent challenges for IFC investment projects overall—and in several subgroups (IDA and blend, IDA and blend in FCS, and Latin America and the Caribbean)—were heightened business and economic risks. Risks related to business models, cyclicality, or the operating environment occurred in 25 percent of projects reviewed, and risks related to economic issues occurred in 24 percent of projects. In IDA and blend projects in FCS, civil unrest (which occurred in 21 percent of these projects) and asset quality (which occurred in 25 percent of projects and included factors such as nonperforming loans in a financial institution’s portfolio) were prevalent.
• The most prevalent challenges for MIGA projects were cost overruns and construction delays (which occurred in 46 percent of projects reviewed, mostly in real sector projects), quality of the company that owns and implements the project (which occurred in 31 percent of projects and included the company’s ability, technical expertise, and track record), and legal or regulatory risk (which occurred in 27 percent of projects).

COVID-19 has affected the implementation of World Bank operations but not its performance. For operations that have closed since FY20, an increasing proportion of their life span occurred since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, yet the outcome ratings of these operations are similar. Recent IEG evaluations and RAP 2023 suggest that the World Bank responded to the pandemic by increasing restructuring and applying lessons from past crises. These actions led to 60 percent of World Bank country programs substantially realigning their portfolios to address the evolving needs arising from the pandemic (World Bank 2022h).

Although some IFC clients were able to adapt to the challenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic, the consequences of the pandemic detracted from the success of other clients. COVID-19 was identified as a factor in 19 percent of IFC investment projects in CY20–23. However, it was among the top factors only in the Financial Institutions Group. The consequences included drops in business volumes, banks forced to curtail loans to small and medium enterprises, and clients being downsized. Financial institutions with strong risk management, sound credit underwriting, and flexible business strategies were better able to withstand crises such as COVID-19. Conversely, COVID-19 was the most important factor in explaining why the development effectiveness of evaluated IFC advisory services projects declined during FY21–23, despite proactive actions during project design and supervision. The time frame for adaptation may also have been a factor: IFC advisory services projects are typically implemented in three years, whereas IFC investments are typically evaluated between five and seven years after financing is provided.

Operational and Country Program Design

The World Bank has opportunities to reinforce performance by improving aspects of operational design, especially in FCS. More successful World Bank operations, for example, grounded their design in practical operational lessons and insights, aligned objectives with on-the-ground realities, and sequenced tasks responsively. Since FY20, a growing share of World Bank operations in FCS improved alignment with their contexts by having more objectives focus on expanding access to services in addition to continuing efforts to preserve institutional strengths. Moreover, IEG evaluations have indicated the importance of World Bank efforts in, for example, the Geo-Enabling Initiative for Monitoring and Supervision in reinforcing elements of performance that are relevant for the design of operations (World Bank 2021d). The operations designed or restructured to include a focus on access to services in FCS received significantly higher average outcome ratings, although increased access does not necessarily contribute to improved outcomes—for example, improved learning or gender equality (World Bank 2024a, 2024b). Nonetheless, in some FCS contexts, sustaining service access may be both appropriate and more feasible.

IFC work quality (which includes front-end work, particularly project preparation and design, and project supervision and administration) is strongly associated with the performance of IFC investment and advisory services projects. A review of 19 IFC investment projects whose work quality was rated unsatisfactory or whose development outcomes were rated highly unsuccessful during CY21–23 found three front-end work quality factors that contributed to weak development outcomes: (i) market assessment (15 projects); (ii) client quality (10 projects); and (iii) assumptions, financial models, and project costs (9 projects). In addition, in FY21–23, the work quality of IFC advisory services projects was 59 percent satisfactory or better, whereas only 9 percent of projects with low work quality ratings achieved positive development effectiveness ratings.

While project preparation times must be sufficient to ensure strong design and implementation readiness, World Bank operations with very long preparation times (above the 90th percentile) have lower outcomes. The World Bank has recently made efforts to shorten project preparation times (World Bank 2024c), which currently average two years from initiation to approval, including 10 percent of projects being prepared in less than seven months (including emergency operations and much of the COVID-19 response), and 10 percent of projects requiring nearly four years or more. Operations with the longest preparation times (more than 1,393 days) are more likely to encounter significant challenges with elements of their design and the development of institutional capacity. These operations also have significantly lower outcome, Bank performance, and monitoring and evaluation ratings on average. Shorter preparation time was not statistically associated with lower outcomes, however, which likely reflects the complex relationships between preparation time, design quality, and implementation readiness.

For IFC investment projects, spending sufficient time on front-end work may be particularly important in challenging contexts and for complex projects. Average IFC investment processing time is just over 12 months, with little difference between mostly successful or better and mostly unsuccessful or worse projects. However, in challenging contexts (specifically, in Africa, Middle East and North Africa, FCS, and IDA and blend), processing mostly successful or better IFC investment projects takes a few months longer than processing mostly unsuccessful or worse projects and projects that are especially complex (such as those in the Infrastructure industry group). Reducing key front-end work quality and preparation factors (such as market assessment; client quality; or assumptions, financial models, and project costs) may contribute to weaker development outcomes. For example, assumptions not based on feasibility studies or market assessments could contribute negatively to development outcomes. Finally, IFC advisory services cannot accurately measure preimplementation scoping time because not all advisory services projects go through the Concept Note stage (for example, some subprojects of approved programmatic umbrellas or “fast-track” projects that were follow-ons from previous engagements). In addition, out of the 411 standard advisory services projects evaluated and validated by IEG (FY13–23), 67 projects (16 percent) did not record a Concept Note date.

Collaboration among Bank Group institutions has improved over the past decade but could be further strengthened. The Bank Group has sought to improve synergies on country programs between institutions for almost three decades. Bank Group collaboration has increased: before FY16, less than half of country programs demonstrated collaboration in at least one program, compared with 85 percent since then. However, only half of Country Partnership Frameworks since FY16 have demonstrated collaboration in more than one sector (with three-quarters of all collaboration in energy, agriculture, infrastructure, financial, or investment). The institutions have yet to consistently leverage each other’s capacities across Country Partnership Framework periods and in multiple sectors. IEG evidence suggests that successful Bank Group collaboration on country programs rests on its institutions working toward a shared view of the priorities within a given sector. This includes a shared understanding of actors, opportunities and constraints to grow the sector, what needs to be done to address constraints, and the alignment of objectives across both public and private sectors.

Risk Identification, Mitigation, and Adaptation

Risk identification and mitigation measures enhance responses to challenges and are associated with improved outcome ratings. The Systematic Operations Risk-Rating Tool helps address key challenges the World Bank faces. Identifying and then mitigating risk through the Systematic Operations Risk-Rating Tool is useful because project risk ratings assigned by management and outcome ratings are correlated. For example, increases in risk ratings during implementation correlate with decreases in outcome ratings. Larger risk reductions during implementation were associated with better outcomes, whereas failure to respond to risks contributed to lower outcomes. Operations that identified and mitigated risks undertook, for example, extensive political economy analysis and drew lessons from the World Bank’s previous operations and economic and sector work. A similar finding arises from a desk-based review of IEG evaluations and validations in CY20–23 for key factors linked to the performance of IFC investment projects. The review showed that, when assessing the risk of investment projects, IFC must focus on client quality and on broader factors related to market developments in the sector and the country’s macroeconomic challenges.

Adaptive management can help respond to client challenges in country programs and World Bank operations. Adaptive management is an iterative approach to decision-making whereby interventions and portfolios are adjusted based on evidence and evolving context (World Bank 2020d). As such, it encompasses managing risk effectively, seizing new opportunities, and developing fit-for-purpose solutions. An IEG analysis of Country Opinion Surveys found that when respondents had less favorable perceptions of adaptive practices, such as responsiveness, flexibility, and accessibility, the country programs had lower Bank Group performance and development outcome ratings. Furthermore, analysis of text discussing adaptive management in operations found a statistically significant correlation between positive sentiments on adaptive management and higher outcome ratings. Specific examples of risk-responsive adaptations included changes to scope, timelines, activities, results frameworks, budgets, and procurement. Examples of adaptive management outside of risk management included scaling up projects based on lessons learned or supporting new activities through cost savings during implementation.

In IFC advisory services projects, however, adaptive management did not always result in improved development effectiveness ratings, particularly with respect to restructuring during COVID-19. To better understand the reasons for declining IFC advisory services ratings despite consistent IFC work quality, IEG undertook a desk review of 31 projects validated by IEG for which development effectiveness was rated mostly unsuccessful or worse, but work quality was rated satisfactory or excellent. For 25 of these projects, COVID-19 strongly contributed to weak development effectiveness. Nineteen of these projects were restructured, 11 of them explicitly due to COVID-19. Seven of these projects were restructured early (between March 2020 and July 2020). Regardless, the restructuring was insufficient: all 11 projects received weak development effectiveness ratings, demonstrating that adaptive management was inadequate in these projects. Other prevalent factors in the weak development effectiveness ratings included the client’s commitment or motivation (11 projects), change in scope or premature termination of advisory services (11 projects, 5 of which were at IFC’s initiative, while 6 were not), and project design (8 projects).

The consolidation of all Bank Group guarantees under MIGA presents both a risk and an opportunity. Until recently, MIGA provided only political risk guarantees to the private sector and was responsible for the supervision of only environmental and social safeguards and country risk assessment. The consolidation of all current World Bank and IFC guarantees under MIGA may require MIGA to develop the capacity to supervise both public and private sector guarantees.

Client Quality and Capacity Building

Client selection and complementary capacity building are powerful levers that IFC can use to positively influence development outcomes. Client quality includes the ability, technical expertise, or track record of the IFC client, including the quality of the client management team and their skills, contractor competency, familiarity, and acumen. This factor was highlighted in 41 percent of CY20–23 IFC investment projects that IEG reviewed. It had a positive influence on IFC investment development outcomes 75 percent of the time overall but less often for Africa (41 percent) and FCS projects (50 percent). Selecting clients with proven or promising business models, good financials, strong risk management frameworks, and flexible business strategies can mitigate business risk and help clients, particularly financial institutions, withstand shocks like COVID-19. This review of IEG evaluations and validations showed that in challenging contexts where selecting high-quality clients may not be feasible, IFC can influence client quality by providing support for capacity building.

The World Bank can also undertake institutional capacity building to address challenges associated with lower ratings. Various World Bank and external studies have identified institutional capacity as a critical issue for improving development effectiveness (OECD 2008; Otoo et al. 2009; World Bank 2005a, 2005b, 2017a, 2018a, 2018b, 2022b; World Bank Group 2017). In the World Bank, institutional capacity building means improving the effectiveness of country development by changing the formal and informal rules that structure interactions across multiple organizations (World Bank 2005b, 2018b; World Bank Group 2017). RAP 2024 finds that there is a nonlinear relationship between the number of institutional capacity challenges and the outcome rating. Specifically, the negative effect on outcome ratings becomes more pronounced when there is more than one challenge, with a more noticeable downward shift in outcome ratings as the number of challenges identified increases from one to three. Substantial improvements in outcome ratings can be achieved through mitigating institutional capacity risks. Successful operations often included extensive efforts to build institutional capacity, such as developing formal coordination mechanisms and shared reporting systems.

Results Monitoring

Gaps in the design and implementation of results monitoring are a persistent concern identified across IEG evaluations. These evaluations include project and Country Program Evaluations covered by RAP and recent IEG thematic evaluations (World Bank 2024a, 2024b).

Results frameworks in Country Partnership Frameworks have persistent shortcomings that affect their ability to support implementation. The evidence indicates that a weak results framework is “a key determinant of unsatisfactory outcome performance at the country program level” (World Bank 2015d, 1). Nevertheless, 83 percent of Completion and Learning Review Validations reported major inadequacies in results frameworks.2 Moreover, there has been no substantial improvement in countries with two Completion and Learning Review Validations: out of 81 countries, 16 improved their results frameworks to a good rating, while 9 declined to fair or below in their most recent Completion and Learning Review Validation. Frequent shortcomings are noted with the intervention logic and the chosen indicators. For example, indicators may focus on inputs or outputs rather than outcomes, or they may be overly reliant on indicators of operations that fail to capture the full extent of the country program objectives and do not properly account for the contributions of advisory services and analytics, IFC, MIGA, policy dialogue, development policy financing, or the Bank Group’s convening role. Although Performance and Learning Reviews often adjust the results framework, many weaknesses remain unresolved. Previous IEG reports raised these concerns and also found that these practices generate incentives not aligned with an outcome orientation at the country level (World Bank 2020d, 2022c).

MIGA is behind on submitting self-evaluations of its guarantee projects, which prevents IEG from having an accurate picture of its overall development outcome ratings. A total of 19 MIGA projects are pending self-evaluations for the FY21–23 period (45 percent of planned self-evaluations during this period). Of these 19 projects, 11 involved engagements from MIGA’s legal team, including renegotiation of possible investment term modifications. As a result, self-evaluations of these MIGA projects were postponed. The pending self-evaluations from MIGA mean that it is difficult to comment too definitively on trends in development outcome ratings.

IFC could improve the measurement of outcomes, particularly market outcomes, by recording more complete information about projects. IEG conducted a desk-based review of 173 IFC investment projects evaluated and validated by IEG during CY21–23. The review identified 842 individual outcomes (676 project-level outcomes and 166 market-level outcomes). IEG could not verify 96 outcomes, of which 76 were project-level outcomes and 20 were market-level outcomes. This represents 11 percent of the total project-level outcomes and 12 percent of the total market-level outcomes. During the RAP 2023 Board discussions, IFC management noted that the introduction of the Anticipated Impact Measurement and Monitoring system—an ex ante monitoring tool—in 2017 overcomes the issue of verifying outcomes. To assess this assertion, IEG conducted an analysis of 21 projects evaluated and validated by IEG with “live” Anticipated Impact Measurement and Monitoring scores (projects that IFC assigned ex ante Anticipated Impact Measurement and Monitoring scores at Board approval). The analysis found that 22 percent of outcomes did not have an indicator in the tracking system (17 percent of project-level outcomes and 43 percent of market-level outcomes). Moreover, IFC could not track most market-level outcomes because these outcomes did not have indicators or indicators were never tracked. Therefore, the identification and tracking of outcome indicators, particularly for market outcomes, remains a challenge.

Despite improvements in monitoring and evaluation quality over time, one-third of World Bank operations received ratings of modest or negligible. The average monitoring and evaluation quality rating of investment project financing and Program-for-Results increased from 2.1 in FY13 to 2.6 in FY20. Since FY20, the average rating has plateaued between 2.6 and 2.7. This indicates that although 64 percent of operations were rated as substantial and above in FY23, there are few examples of high-quality practice, and more than one-third of operations remain with inadequate monitoring and evaluation practices. World Bank projects with challenges in project data and monitoring have lower outcome ratings. Challenges included poorly designed or misaligned metrics that failed to capture intended outcomes, difficulty setting appropriate targets because of missing baselines, and low quality of progress reporting. Recent evaluations, including RAP 2021 and RAP 2023, have identified opportunities for enhancing indicators, data availability and baselines, and reporting and supervision.