To What Extent Does the Design of Multiphase Programmatic Approaches Meet Expectations?

MPAs aim at higher-level outcomes, but no more so than comparators. Although MPAs are more likely to support and monitor climate objectives than comparators, they are no more likely to track institutional development. Most MPAs have a well-developed learning agenda, with clarity on how learning is to be implemented and used. The typology of MPAs has evolved beyond expectations, with the Africa Region in particular moving toward more complex horizontal MPAs.

MPAs are no more likely to support higher-level outcomes than comparators. OPCS guidance is that all MPA PrDOs have at least beneficiary-level outcome indicators (see appendix B). In this evaluation, we compare the outcome level of MPA PrDOs and project development objectives (PDOs) and indicators relative to non-MPA operations by classifying them according to the plan set out in the Independent Evaluation Group’s review Results and Performance of the World Bank Group 2020 (World Bank 2020; see appendix B for definitions and examples relating to this aspect of the evaluation). We do not examine the level of ambition at which indicator targets are set. Although all MPA PrDOs and PDOs are at least intermediate outcomes, the distribution of indicators across the four outcome categories is very similar to that for non-MPAs (figure 3.1), with vertical MPAs being slightly more outcome oriented than horizontal MPAs.1 The MPAs do, however, include a higher proportion of climate-related objectives. Almost two-thirds of MPA PrDOs measure climate change mitigation or adaptation outcomes, compared with one-third of non-MPA PrDOs. Interview evidence also suggests that the ambition of outcomes is not a notable reason for choosing to use the MPA. Rather, the main motivations for preferring the approach to either a regional IPF, a stand-alone project, or a series of projects are its longer-term horizon, its lending scale, and its flexibility (figure 3.2).

Figure 3.1. Level of Ambition in Outcomes: Multiphase Programmatic Approach versus Comparators

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Figure 3.1. Level of Ambition in Outcomes: Multiphase Programmatic Approach versus Comparators

Source: Independent Evaluation Group calculations.

Note: Level 1: output (product or service provided is within the control of the client). Level 2: immediate outcome (development of the capability of a group or organization, or initial benefit to people). Level 3: intermediate outcome (stakeholders apply a new capability to solve an issue, which causes a change in the lives of the ultimate beneficiaries). Level 4: long-term outcome (sustained change in delivery or governance or a sustained benefit to a beneficiary). (See appendix B for full definitions.) The sample size for vertical MPAs is 111, and for horizontal MPAs, it is 55; the sample size for vertical comparators is 248, and for horizontal comparators, it is 99. MPA = multiphase programmatic approach.

Figure 3.2. Reasons MPAs Are Considered More Appropriate Than Regional IPF (Horizontal MPAs), Series of Projects, or Stand-Alone Projects (Vertical MPAs)

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Figure 3.2. Reasons MPAs Are Considered More Appropriate Than Regional IPF (Horizontal MPAs), Series of Projects, or Stand-Alone Projects (Vertical MPAs)

Source: Independent Evaluation Group calculations.

Note: Sample size for interviews with senior management is 13; for TTLs of vertical MPAs, it is 17; and for TTLs of horizontal MPAs, it is 10. Missing bars indicate 0 responses. GP = Global Practice; IPF = investment project financing; MPA = multiphase programmatic approach; TTL = task team leader.

It was also envisaged that MPAs would support private capital mobilization, including through guarantees, but this has not yet happened.2 Nine MPAs have aimed at and tracked private capital mobilized through PrDO, PDO, or intermediate indicators: seven in energy, one in agriculture, and one in digital development. None reported any capital mobilized, though comparators at a similar stage of implementation have not done so either. Only the Ethiopia Renewable Energy Guarantees Program currently uses a project-based guarantee (World Bank 2019a). Unfortunately, the viability of the program’s second phase was undermined when an unanticipated increase in foreign exchange risk meant that private developers were unable to secure financing. There have been no cases in which other financiers have taken responsibility for the design and implementation of follow-up phases. The Indonesia Geothermal Resource Risk Mitigation Project is an example of a sophisticated risk-sharing project but is being converted to a stand-alone project because of slow disbursement.

MPAs are designed to better support learning, as expected. OPCS guidance asks that all phases include a learning agenda and that follow-up phases provide an update on what has been learned. Almost all MPAs specify clearly what will be tested, how and by whom, and how the knowledge acquired will be used, although a few provide only an outline (see appendix B for examples). But the inclusion of a learning agenda is not exclusive to MPAs. Though not required, some series of projects have used the same approach. Examples are the Regional Climate Resilience Program for Eastern and Southern Africa (P180171) and the National Agriculture Development Program in the Democratic Republic of Congo (P169021).

The MPA is no more likely to monitor institutional outcomes than comparator operations overall. We define institutional outcomes as measured improvements in the functioning of organizational structures, management systems, or monitoring and evaluation systems. Several interviewees saw the MPA as a better means of building capacity across government cycles, but this perception is not fully supported by the portfolio analysis. As shown in figure 3.3, MPAs are no more likely to track institutional strengthening than comparator operations through PDO and PrDO indicators. This may be because OPCS guidance precludes defining PrDOs as institutional outcomes. Vertical MPAs support institutional strengthening through project management and other components to a greater extent than comparators, however.

Figure 3.3. Long-Term Institutional Development

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Figure 3.3. Long-Term Institutional Development

Source: Independent Evaluation Group calculations.

Note: Sample size for vertical MPAs is 114 and for horizontal MPAs is 36; sample size for vertical comparators is 187 and for horizontal comparators is 39. MPA = multiphase programmatic approach; PDO = project development objective; PrDO = program development objective.

Horizontal MPAs have grown significantly more complex over time, calling for careful thought on resourcing and for realism about implementation challenges. The relatively quick and large disbursements under the COVID-19 operation in 2020 (box 3.1) suggested to World Bank management that horizontal MPAs could be used more broadly to address regional development challenges relating to the energy transition, food security, and health emergency preparedness. Several such horizontal MPAs have since been approved, almost entirely in Africa, to address the perceived need for tackling development challenges at scale, with country participation encouraged by the flexibility to enter when ready and the ability to tailor the approach to country circumstances.3 But these MPAs are more complex than either the COVID-19 response operation or regional IPF, with a greater degree of country contextualization and variation in results frameworks (table 3.1). They also require more TTLs than regional IPF, and these should be seasoned staff members with advanced project management skills (“super-TTLs”).

Source: Independent Evaluation Group staff analysis.

Note: IPF = investment project financing; MPA = multiphase programmatic approach; PDO = project development objective; PrDO = program development objective; SPRP = Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan; TTL = task team leader.

Although the MPA allows financing instruments to be combined across phases, this feature has not been used to any significant extent. The 2017 Board paper was not explicit in its expectations for PforR financing. Some MPAs have highlighted the importance of being able to combine financing instruments to address different objectives within the same program, even though the approach excludes the use of development policy financing. But in practice, most of the portfolio has used IPF. Only four operations have used PforR: the second (Tanzania) phase of the Food Systems Resilience Program for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Dominican Republic Water Sector Modernization Program, the Kenya Green and Resilient Expansion of Energy Program, and the fifth (Tanzania) phase of the Accelerating Sustainable and Clean Energy Access Transformation in Eastern and Southern Africa Program. In three of these, PforR is either the sole intended instrument or is used to support a single phase in a horizontal engagement; only in the Kenya engagement is there a planned shift from IPF to PforR from one phase to another.4

Overall, on design, MPAs do better on learning, according to content analysis of program documents only. However, there is no observable difference relative to comparators in terms of outcome level (except with respect to climate-related indicators) or support to institutional development. The typology of MPAs has evolved somewhat, with nonemergency horizontal MPAs becoming increasingly complex, both because of the nature of the problems being tackled and because of greater country contextualization than is possible under a regional IPF.

To What Extent Are Multiphase Programmatic Approaches Functioning in Line with Expectations?

There is evidence, albeit mixed, that MPAs better support coherence, continuity, and learning. Although the age of the portfolio precludes any definitive conclusion on adaptation, early evidence suggests that there is no difference between MPAs and non-MPAs in terms of the frequency of and the underlying reasons for restructuring.

Coherence

The MPA’s convening power was expected to strengthen programmatic coherence. The 2017 Board paper refers to coherence but is not explicit about underlying expectations or definitions. In evaluation, coherence is typically defined in terms of how a program fits with others in the country, sector, or institution. All projects, under an MPA or not, are expected to be coherent. However, the MPA is expected to better support programmatic coherence because it is expected to convene partnerships better, both within the Bank Group (internal coherence) and externally (external coherence). In addition, the MPA was expected to be strongly anchored in the strategic priorities described in the country strategies (strategic coherence).

There is no evidence that MPAs are any different from non-MPAs in anchoring country strategies. We reviewed Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs) and asked two questions. First, are the MPAs designed to address constraints prioritized by the CPFs? Second, do CPFs clearly influence the rationale for selecting an MPA? Although MPAs address strategic constraints prioritized in the country strategies, the rationale for selecting the approach is mostly not presented in CPFs, with a few exceptions (for example, the Fiji Tourism Development Program and Improving Nutrition Outcomes Using the Multiphase Programmatic Approach in Madagascar). This omission may be occurring for two reasons: (i) the youth of the portfolio and its lack of alignment with the timing of preparation of the CPF and (ii) pipeline projects and programs not typically being well fleshed out in country strategies.

Evidence that the MPA supports stronger complementarity with development partners comes entirely from interviews.5 The evaluation assessed whether MPAs complement, co-implement, or coordinate with the activities of development partners. Cofinancing by development partners is no higher under the approach than under comparators. However, interviewees pointed out that cofinancing picks up only one aspect of external partnership and that much collaboration takes the form of undocumented dialogue, knowledge sharing, and coordination, often around learning. In the Western Balkans Trade and Transport Facilitation and Serbia Railway Sector Modernization Programs, for example, clients and World Bank teams emphasized the role of the MPA in supporting the priorities of the European Union, with which the World Bank coordinates closely. Under the Accelerating Transport and Trade Connectivity in Eastern South Asia Program, trust-funded consultations between the two countries participating in the MPA and India, which shares borders with both, have led to greater regional dialogue and pragmatic solutions to specific border issues. The Horn of Africa Groundwater for Resilience Project led to development partners and the World Bank sharing knowledge on technical and operational solutions to problems in the borderlands that had been challenging to find.

Longer time horizons are seen to support partnerships in vertical MPAs, suggesting improved external coherence (figure 3.4). Fifty-three percent of the TTLs of vertical MPAs interviewed for this evaluation referred to complementary partner interventions in the sector or to coordination around these interventions. The longer-term horizon anchoring the program facilitates partnerships and aligns better with the longer-term government strategies, including those designed to span political cycles, as in Côte d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, and Kenya. In fragile environments where the World Bank has not been lending regularly, the MPA is seen as signaling a long-term commitment that anchors partner expectations, as in the Central African Republic. TTLs also noted that in the early stages of implementation, the role played by the MPA in supporting alignment around complex development agendas, such as nutrition and food security, is not captured by project documents.

Figure 3.4. Multiphase Programmatic Approach–Related Features Perceived to Support Coherence

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Figure 3.4. Multiphase Programmatic Approach–Related Features Perceived to Support Coherence

Source: Independent Evaluation Group calculations based on interview data.

Note: Sample size for interviews with TTLs of vertical MPAs is 17, and for horizontal MPAs, it is 10. Missing bars indicate zero responses. MPA = multiphase programmatic approach; TTL = task team leader.

Nearly all interviewed TTLs of horizontal MPAs highlighted several advantages of the MPA relating to partnerships. Partnerships are seen as being the cornerstone of the MPA by the majority of TTLs of horizontal MPAs, for several reasons. First, the common program objective and indicators support coherence with regional objectives. Second, development partners can target funding to phases of the program that align with their own budgetary cycles. Even when not providing funding, partners saw the MPA in some cases as providing a base engagement, so that the phasing and sequencing over the long term generated more opportunities to complement the program. Third, regional platforms can mobilize funds even when partners do not have a funding relationship with individual countries in the program. Fourth, the regional platforms embedded in partner regional institutions support regular exchange of information and experiences and strengthen partnerships with and within regional economic communities.6 Clients also perceived that exchange of experiences and regular interaction within various regional platforms support programmatic coherence, as does the engagement of regional economic communities and institutions. Some clients noted that individual country objectives could change over time, or commitment to regional integration could weaken, which would put programmatic coherence at risk.

Contrary to expectation, MPAs are no better at supporting cross-sector collaboration within the Bank Group, suggesting the approach does not improve internal coherence. The expectation was that the MPA would better motivate cross-sector collaboration. This was driven by the assumption of the 2017 Board paper that the MPA would integrate elements of country dialogue that would otherwise be confined to individual operations. Both portfolio review and interview data suggest that cross–General Practice collaboration is no different across MPAs than across comparators. Interviewees working in areas that are traditionally multisectoral in approach—for example, food security or nutrition—collaborate the same way across MPAs and non-MPAs.

Even in fragile contexts, the graduated, iterative approach of the MPA and its programmatic structure can help maintain consensus on the program and manage risks to coherence. Sixty percent of TTLs of horizontal MPAs and 53 percent of TTLs of vertical MPAs see the MPA as supportive of building consensus on the program (figure 3.4 presents a breakdown by MPA characteristic). Four of the five TTLs of vertical MPAs covering FCS noted that the long-term horizon of the MPA supported consensus building among key stakeholders. For horizontal MPAs, TTLs from four of six of the programs covering FCS perceived that cross-country learning and collaboration supported consensus building. Ninety percent of TTLs of horizontal MPAs also highlighted that the menu-based approach permitted countries to contextualize the program to their own level of readiness or their own needs, even within the larger common regional framework. This contextualization supported client ownership and helped build consensus on the larger program-level goals across very different countries.

Continuity

The long-term horizon and the programmatic structure of vertical MPAs were expected to support uninterrupted engagement, without much clarity in the 2017 Board paper on what continuity meant for the horizontal MPAs. The 2017 Board paper saw continuity mainly in terms of a stable engagement with the client across a longer time horizon and, therefore, as applying more to vertical MPAs. Because the portfolio is young, portfolio-based evidence on continuity comes mainly from the three vertical MPAs that have closed phase 1 successfully.

Two design features of the MPA support continuity: the longer-term horizon and overlapping phases. Overlapping phases are very common among the more advanced MPAs. The second phases of the three vertical MPAs that have moved beyond a first phase started 16, 54, and 56 months, respectively, before the planned closure of the first phase. Although series of projects share the design feature of overlapping phases, the few respondents who were able to compare noted that continuity was stronger under MPAs, provided there was a long-term strategy to anchor the program. Some pipeline MPAs were converted to series of projects at a late stage of program preparation and carried forward design features of the MPA, including overlapping phases.

Risks to program continuity—or the risk of cancellation—have not materialized to a significant extent so far, though some programs face severe challenges, and two are being converted to stand-alone engagements. There are three examples of risks to program continuity materializing because of implementation challenges. In the first case, the program design was not adequately tailored to the client context, and the client’s regulations did not support the implementation of phase 1. This was compounded by a series of shocks (the pandemic and a macroeconomic crisis leading to civil unrest). In two other cases, the policy framework for successful program implementation never materialized. All three cases were characterized by very low disbursements, reportedly affecting the World Bank’s commitment to the program. However, risks to program implementation are no different for MPAs than for non-MPAs.

Learning

More advanced MPAs used learning to inform subsequent phases under both types of MPAs. As noted under evaluation question 1 (see chapter 2), most MPAs do embed learning plans. Evidence from MPAs that have progressed past phase 1 suggests that MPAs are using learning as envisaged. Portfolio analysis shows that this learning is mostly institutional and used to inform the design and implementation of subsequent phases. Six of the seven MPAs that have progressed to a second phase show strong evidence of redesign based on new technical and institutional knowledge.7 Of these seven, the four horizontal MPAs refer to the importance of sharing practical knowledge across project implementation units and of working through and strengthening regional organizations (see examples in box 3.2), including for data sharing (Western Balkans Trade and Transport Facilitation, West Africa Unique Identification for Regional Integration and Inclusion Program, West Africa Food System Resilience Program, and Food Systems Resilience Program for Eastern and Southern Africa). The three vertical MPAs also emphasize institutional learning, especially Advancing Sustainability in Performance, Infrastructure, and Reliability of the Energy Sector in the West Bank and Gaza.

Learning is perceived as more effective under the MPA. As evidenced by interviews, 70 percent of TTLs of horizontal MPAs and 47 percent of TTLs of vertical MPAs see MPAs as embedding learning differently from non-MPAs. Almost half the respondents experienced with vertical MPAs and 90 percent of the respondents experienced with horizontal MPAs provided concrete examples of incorporating distinct activities relating to learning. Vertical MPAs have a significantly longer learning horizon than horizontal MPAs, suggesting that the benefits of investing in learning may also become visible at a later stage. Moreover, although the percentage of respondents experienced with vertical MPAs who explicitly noted differences in learning was lower, more than half did not comment on the topic. All but two clients had positive views on learning under the MPA, mostly validating TTL views; however, only 12 interviews were conducted with clients across 5 programs, so this should not be interpreted as highly representative of a majority view among clients in general.

Horizontal TTLs were strongly positive on learning, highlighting its role in supporting operational standardization and replicability. The Board paper had expected learning under horizontal MPAs to strengthen these areas.8 In practice, the majority of horizontal MPAs are at early stages of implementation. However, TTLs were able to provide concrete examples of how learning is supported through regional hubs that serve as repositories for both technical and operational knowledge. Horizontal MPAs use regional platforms, typically housed in the implementing regional partner’s facility, to support learning in a manner perceived as unique to the approach. These platforms are perceived to have become learning hubs supporting operational efficiency and problem-solving across countries (for example, the Accelerating Sustainable and Clean Energy Access Transformation Program, the West Africa Food System Resilience Program, and the Horn of Africa Groundwater for Resilience Project). TTLs highlighted that since countries enter the MPA based on willingness rather than readiness, activities are typically contextualized, so entrants at earlier stages of preparation can learn from more advanced incumbents. This feature is unique to the horizontal MPA. Clients agreed that regional platforms facilitated peer-to-peer learning, helpful both for improving operational efficiency (for example, shared templates for tenders, lessons learned from mistakes in phase 1, and shared consultants across countries in the same program) and for technical learning (for example, operationalization of trade facilitation–related digital platforms, strengthened coordination, and data sharing across border agencies). The perception of strengthened support to learning under horizontal MPAs could be driven by non-MPA regional projects having less flexibility on the timing and content of phases across countries.

The TTLs of vertical MPAs mainly highlighted that the longer-term horizon and phasing of the approach allows for investment in learning that can inform design during implementation. In some cases, the MPA was designed to have significant overlap between phase 1 and phase 2, with more learning expected between phase 2 and phase 3. TTLs also highlighted that the vertical MPAs allowed time for experimentation where new knowledge is being built. Clients also perceived that capacity building over the longer term was expected to sustain beyond the life of the program. The deep, in-country engagement under the vertical MPAs also permitted time to implement institutional and service integration across agencies, identified as a challenge for complex, cross-cutting programs such as those supporting client resilience or those taking sectorwide approaches.

Learning is perceived to be better supported under MPAs, though resourcing and reporting are the same under MPAs and non-MPAs. Although TTLs and senior management note that learning is working as expected in most cases, reporting is limited and no World Bank budget for learning was identifiable for MPAs. Learning is largely donor financed, both through trust-funded analytical and advisory work linked to the program and through multidonor trust funds managed centrally (typically by Global Practices, such as Health, Nutrition, and Population). Although this is also true for non-MPAs, the MPA was expected to incorporate and use learning more effectively, and this evaluation expected resourcing to be commensurate with these expectations. The institutional arrangements for implementing learning plans and managing knowledge are also uneven.

Adaptation

The MPA was expected to support adaptation better because of two design features—the long-term horizon and the programmatic structure—that allowed for longer-term and complex undertakings to be broken into shorter, more tractable phases. Stability of engagement over the longer horizon would permit a larger number of preset checkpoints for self-evaluation and course correction. At the same time, the programmatic structure of the MPA allowed for the program to be informed by lessons learned in earlier phases.

However, there is little evidence that adaptation under MPAs is different from under non-MPAs, with emerging data from advanced programs insufficient to draw any broad conclusions. Overall, there is no significant difference between MPAs and non-MPAs in terms of the frequency of or underlying reasons for restructuring (figure 3.5). However, when MPAs restructure, they do so earlier than comparators. It is unclear whether this is an indication of adaptability—it may simply reflect that preparation was inadequate, necessitating restructuring during implementation, as is also the case for non-MPAs. The share of first restructurings unrelated to external or country-specific events is identical across the two groups.

Figure 3.5. Reasons for Restructuring

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Figure 3.5. Reasons for Restructuring

Source: Independent Evaluation Group calculations based on 15 MPA and 22 comparator restructurings.

Note: MPA = multiphase programmatic approach.

The underlying reasons for restructurings are mainly driven by country context. These reasons may be factors external to the program that pose a risk to continuity (for example, political instability, shifting client expectations and priorities, other shocks, or low institutional capacity) or to business as usual (for example, moving financing around components of the project or resetting targets against results indicators). These factors are corroborated by interview evidence: within the factors identified by TTLs and senior management that can hinder implementation, political context and client context dominate.9 The nature of restructuring is also similar across MPAs and non-MPAs—for example, adjustments to indicators, closing-date extensions, or reallocation of funding. The lack of uniqueness in adaptation of the MPA may be because of the age of the evaluation portfolio: only 11 operations had been restructured as of December 2023, 10 of which were vertical MPAs.

To What Extent Has the Enabling Environment Supported Multiphase Programmatic Approaches as Intended?

The authorizing environment is supportive of MPAs and recognizes the potential of the approach for recurrent development challenges requiring continuous support. However, the approach is typically used to support a complex range of activities, often under challenging implementation conditions, and calls for adequate resourcing, guidance, systems support, and patience to enable adequate design and client engagement.

This evaluation question was addressed entirely through interviews with clients, senior management, and TTLs. The enabling environment was assessed along two main avenues: (i) Has the enabling environment changed since 2018, and how? and (ii) What seem to be the emerging aspects of the enabling environment?

The respondents perceive the MPA as having the potential to deliver on complex challenges if expectations are realistic and programs are well supported. Its long-term horizon and phased, learning-based support are seen as advantages by clients, senior management, and TTLs, especially in FCS. But it is misleading to suppose that the World Bank’s relatively rapid deployment of the large-scale COVID-19 response will translate to nonemergency contexts. The iterative nature of the MPA is critical to its effectiveness, and there should be no expectation that MPAs are more likely to generate large, front-loaded disbursements than non-MPAs, especially in fragile contexts.

Client Authorizing Environment

According to most interviews with clients, senior management, and TTLs, the decision to use the MPA had been taken by the World Bank and not the government. Only in the Dominican Republic and the Horn of Africa programs was the World Bank asked to support already articulated programs, whose designers recognized the need for something beyond business as usual, whether motivated by a longer-term horizon or by the flexibility to accommodate participants at different stages of readiness. However, even when the approach originated externally, several World Bank counterparts acknowledged its benefits. These were largely the same as those expected under the MPA theory of action (especially flexibility and cross-country learning for horizontal MPAs), though one client observed that phasing also enabled fiscally constrained countries to manage their borrowing more effectively.

Contrary to the expectations of the 2017 Board paper, shifts in government priorities have not yet affected the implementation of later phases. Previous experience with adaptable program loans had indicated that client support for long-term programs often turned out to be more vulnerable to political cycles than initially presumed (World Bank 2017). However, interviews suggest that MPA objectives have been sufficiently strategic or universal to command broad political support and that risks to continuity, whether external shocks or changing priorities, are broadly similar across MPAs and other operations and are addressed in the same way through restructuring.10

TTLs and clients note that efficiencies in preparation can be jeopardized if countries under horizontal MPAs are at different stages of readiness. In the West Africa Unique Identification for Regional Integration and Inclusion Program, for example, Benin and Togo already had the legal and institutional pillars in place before approval, but the other second-phase participants, Burkina Faso and Niger, did not. Some TTLs and clients also observed that, as with non-MPAs, internal pressure to approve operations quickly had shifted activities from preparation to implementation and delayed effectiveness, unfairly contributing to a perception of underperformance and putting subsequent phases at risk.

World Bank Authorizing Environment

The World Bank authorizing environment has shifted toward stronger support for MPAs since 2018, mainly because of an expectation that MPAs will deliver scale with speed. On the plus side, this means that staff feel supported in choosing the approach. But according to senior management, the growing enthusiasm for MPAs is largely motivated by the perception that the approach allows for lending rapidly at scale. This perception is linked to the relative speed at which the COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan was disbursed. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the COVID-19 response was an outlier. Senior management and TTLs cautioned that although there may be operational efficiencies down the line, for the most part, MPAs are slow-moving, complex programs, and that the World Bank leadership’s expectations of speedy results may be unfounded. The overall authorizing environment was characterized by managerial incentives, awareness and capacity, and budget (figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6. Factors Cited as Critical in the World Bank Authorizing Environment

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Figure 3.6. Factors Cited as Critical in the World Bank Authorizing Environment

Source: Independent Evaluation Group calculations.

Note: “Managerial incentives” refers to ownership of the MPA and encouragement to prepare programs under the approach by World Bank leadership; “awareness and capacity” refers to Operations Policy and Country Services guidance being adequate and consistent to teams, as well as to awareness of the MPA in practice among Country Management Units; “budget” refers to preparation and supervision of the World Bank budget (excludes trust funds). The sample size for interviews with senior management is 13; for TTLs of vertical MPAs, it is 17; and for TTLs of horizontal MPAs, it is 10. MPA = multiphase programmatic approach; TTL = task team leader.

This push for larger MPAs was not envisaged in the 2017 Board paper, which mainly focused on the approach being suitable for learning-based, iterative engagements that could address complex development challenges. The push may also conflict with the emphasis on long-term continuity. A third of senior management and TTLs highlighted that pressure to disburse and deliver results fast could erode World Bank support for follow-up phases in programs that face early challenges in implementation. Several observed that there was a push to cancel funds prematurely, sometimes as early as two years, which reflected a tension between ambition and reality.

A further threat to continuity lies in uncertainty over the programming of IDA funds. This risk was identified in the 2017 Board paper, which highlighted that the availability of and conditions attached to World Bank financing might change during the implementation of the MPA. Most client interviewees did not mention any concerns over the World Bank’s commitment to future phases, contingent on performance, but at least one said they had been unaware that the World Bank was not committing to the entire program. About half of senior managers and a fifth of TTLs also pointed out that the current pipeline will lead to a bunching of demand for IDA funds in fiscal year 2026. One MPA may be converted to a stand-alone project because the Country Management Unit lacked the resources to fully fund the second phase. As the portfolio expands, maintaining the credibility of the approach may entail a crowding out of financing for other engagements and reduced flexibility of the broader country program.

Continuity of World Bank technical support is also undermined by the obligatory 4-year rotation of international TTLs, which is even more problematic in the context of a 10-year engagement than it is in a 5- or 6-year engagement. Two clients mentioned that changes in TTLs had disrupted understandings between the World Bank and implementing agencies. It may be that sustaining MPA client relationships comes to depend more on local staff, who may require significant support and training. All senior managers and TTLs working in FCS highlighted the need to ensure management and TTL commitment to the program.