PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

JAMAICA

INNER CITY BASIC SERVICES FOR THE POOR PROJECT
(IBRD-48190)

April 1, 2019

Financial, Private Sector, and Sustainable Development

Independent Evaluation Group
Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

*Currency Unit = Jamaican Dollars (J$)*

1 Jamaican Dollar = US$0.0093
US$1 = 106.9 Jamaican Dollar

**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>CRP</td>
<td>Community Renewal Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSJP</td>
<td>Citizens Security and Justice Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERR</td>
<td>economic rate of return</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBSP</td>
<td>Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICDP</td>
<td>Integrated Community Development Project</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>JPSCo</td>
<td>Jamaica Public Services Company</td>
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<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japan Social Development Fund</td>
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<td>JSIF</td>
<td>Jamaica Social Investment Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NCDP</td>
<td>National Community Development Project</td>
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<td>NCPSS</td>
<td>National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy</td>
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<td>NSWMA</td>
<td>National Solid Waste Management Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWC</td>
<td>National Water Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIOJ</td>
<td>Planning Institute of Jamaica</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>operations and maintenance</td>
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*All dollar amounts are U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated.*

**Fiscal Year**

Government: January 1 – December 31

<table>
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<tr>
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This report was prepared by Ramachandra Jammi and Diana Rangel Alfaro (consultant), who assessed the project in May 2018, and Nana Sika Ahiabor (consultant). Nicole Cherise Brown (consultant) helped plan and conduct focus group discussions with project beneficiaries. The report was peer reviewed by Deepali Tewari and panel reviewed by Lauren Kelly. Romayne Pereira and Jean-Jacques Ahouansou provided administrative support.
**Principal Ratings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>ICR</th>
<th>ICR Review</th>
<th>PPAR</th>
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<tr>
<td>Outcome</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk to Development Outcome</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Significant</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Performance</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrower Performance</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
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*Note: The Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Global Practice. The ICR Review is an intermediate Independent Evaluation Group product that seeks to independently validate the findings of the ICR. M&E quality = quality of monitoring and evaluation; PPAR = Project Performance Assessment Report.*

**Key Staff Responsible**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Appraisal</th>
<th>Completion</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Project team leader</td>
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<td>Angelica Nunez del Campo</td>
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About This Report
The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the World Bank’s self-evaluation process and to verify that the World Bank’s work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20–25 percent of the World Bank’s lending operations through fieldwork. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which executive directors or World Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government and other in-country stakeholders, interview World Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate, and apply other evaluative methods as needed.

Each PPAR is subject to technical peer review, internal IEG panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible World Bank Country Management Unit. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both World Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrower’s comments are attached to the document sent to the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report is sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEG Rating System for Public Sector Evaluations
IEG’s use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org).

Outcome: The extent to which the operation’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. Relevance refers to the relevance of the objectives. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project’s objectives are consistent with the country’s current development priorities and with current World Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, sector strategy papers, and operational policies). Efficacy is the extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. Efficiency is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared with alternatives. The efficiency dimension is not applied to development policy operations, which provide general budget support. Possible ratings for outcome: highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.

Bank performance: The extent to which services provided by the World Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan or credit closing toward the achievement of development outcomes). The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. Possible ratings for Bank performance: highly satisfactory, satisfactory, moderately satisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.
Preface

This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group on the Jamaica Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project (P091299) in Jamaica.

The project was approved on May 29, 2006, for a cost of US$32.8 million, supported by a World Bank loan of US$29.3 million. The project cost at completion was US$34.8 million, of which US$31.8 million was financed by World Bank. The project closed on December 31, 2013, two years later than scheduled.

This project was selected for a PPAR to provide insights into promoting urban resilience with a focus on informal settlements. The project represents an innovative experience for Jamaica in combining efforts to improve public safety and community capacity while upgrading urban infrastructure. The PPAR findings provide input to a major IEG evaluation on “Building Urban Resilience” (forthcoming, 2019).

The assessment is based on a review of relevant documentation, interviews with World Bank staff at headquarters and in the country office, and the findings of an IEG mission that visited Jamaica in May 2018. Project performance was discussed in interviews with officials of the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) and the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ). The IEG mission conducted six focus group discussions with project beneficiaries in five project locations and interviewed the community liaisons in each location. Their cooperation and assistance are gratefully acknowledged. The locations of the focus group discussions and the list of persons met are presented in Appendixes D and E, respectively.

Following standard IEG procedures, a copy of the draft PPAR was sent to the government officials and implementing agencies for their information and review but no comments were received.
Summary

This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of Jamaica’s Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project (ICBSP), which was approved in 2006 and closed in 2013. The development objective of the project was “to improve the quality of life in twelve of the Borrower’s inner-city areas and poor urban informal settlements by improving access to basic urban infrastructure, financial services, land tenure regularization, and enhanced public safety and community capacity.”

Country and Sector Context

Jamaica is a middle-income island state with a population of approximately 2.9 million in 2016, of which about 1.6 million, or 55 percent, reside in urban areas. At appraisal, Jamaica’s inner-city areas—a term used to describe communities in, or bordering, urban centers and communities on the periphery of towns—were characterized by decaying physical infrastructure, poor service provision, high population densities, and environmental hazards. Households living in those communities had limited access to income and employment, low skills and low wages, and were dependent on work in the informal sector. Youth unemployment was high and increasingly linked to growing social problems that create urban unrest, resulting in one of the highest homicide rates in the world, with most of the violence concentrated in the inner cities.

Recognizing the need to re-invigorate and re-integrate these communities into the fabric of society, the Government of Jamaica prioritized community development and crime and violence reduction. To that end, the government launched the Community Renewal Programme (2002) to actively foster better coordination at national and sub-national or community levels; and developed a National Security Strategy (2006) and a National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (2010).

This project was innovative for Jamaica, blending small-scale infrastructure with community-based social interventions to address community development and reduce crime and violence. Until then, the government had largely addressed violence through increasing police presence or the use of armed forces. The project also contained measures that would visibly increase safety in the neighborhoods and facilitate communication between concerned agencies and the residents to build mutual confidence.
Project Performance and Ratings

Relevance of Objective. The relevance of the project development objective is rated substantial because it was in line with government priorities as laid out in the Community Renewal Programme and the National Development Plan (“Vision 2030”), with their focus on sustainable urban development, security, and safety. The objective was also in line with the World Bank’s country partnership strategies spanning the years 2007–17, which emphasized sustained and inclusive growth, with a focus on crime prevention and reduction. However, the overarching objective of “enhancing the quality of life” was not amenable to clear definition and measurement. It also detracted from keeping the focus on crime prevention and reduction and public safety, the core rationale for the project.

Relevance of project design is rated substantial. It was responsive to the government’s desire to seek innovative ways of preventing and reducing inner-city crime and violence. The project appropriately targeted inner-city areas that were among the most affected by crime and violence. The project was an early innovative effort to address urban crime and violence by combining improvements in basic infrastructure—including those that would facilitate neighborhood interaction and surveillance—with improved access to microfinance to improve prospects for economic activity; and community-based social and capacity-building interventions for vulnerable youth and adults.

The project design was complex in relation to country capacity and experience. The number and scale of activities placed large demands on the several entities involved in the project (service providers, parish councils, community committees, and civic organizations). Some activities, integral to an inclusive urban upgrading approach, required technical expertise that went beyond the capacity of the implementing agency, as in the case of microfinance and land titling.

Efficacy is rated substantial. The project did not provide a definition or metric for “quality of life” as the overarching objective. However, the benefits derived from the project interventions were expected to collectively enhance the quality of life for the targeted communities.

At project completion, a “Citizens’ Report Card” and an impact evaluation indicated varied satisfaction with the quality of infrastructure and services. The better results were from improved road segments that exceeded targets, and from solid waste services, both of which went to most of the targeted communities. Water supply, sewerage, and electricity connections fell short of targets and covered fewer communities. Some of the works for sewerage and water main connections remained incomplete several years after project completion. Among activities that were attempted on a smaller scale, the provision of microfinance exceeded targets, but the outcomes related to small business activities were below expectations. The pilot land title regularization effort had to be scaled back from two communities to one, mainly owing to the complexity of the process. The pilot yielded limited results.

Regarding enhanced community capacity and public safety, five community centers with sports fields and recreational spaces were constructed, and zinc fencing (that had prevented
communities from having “eyes on the road”) was replaced with block walls in several areas, viewed favorably by beneficiaries. The project’s activities supported community capacity building, mediation services, skills training, and related social services, which were oversubscribed in many cases, especially for youth-related activities (sports, homework support classes, arts and crafts, remedial support, and youth camps). Feedback from the assessment at project completion shows that the beneficiaries favorably received those services.

Surveys carried out midway through the project and at completion showed an increase in citizens’ perception of safety. But this result appears to be strongly linked to the urban upgrading components because only a third of all residents indicated that the mediation and conflict resolution activities improved feelings of safety within the community.

IEG’s discussions with various project stakeholders, site visits to 5 out of the 12 communities targeted by the project, and 6 focus group discussions with beneficiaries, indicate that the benefits from the project have declined since project completion. There is limited follow-up from the concerned government agencies to secure and expand the services from the infrastructure assets provided by the project, because of a lack of resources and incentives. The community centers are under-resourced and under-utilized. Activities supporting community capacity building, mediation services, skills training, and related social services have declined or lapsed since project completion because of lack of resources. However, the sample size for some of these observations—especially from focus group discussions—are only indicative and cannot be generalized to all areas of project intervention.

In sum, there were several positive results in basic infrastructure and community-based interventions at project completion, though there are also indications of some reduction in those benefits since project completion.

Efficiency is rated modest. Although the project generated economic and social benefits that were greater than anticipated at appraisal for most investment components, implementation was delayed by two years. Project implementation was affected by procurement issues and faulty designs for infrastructure works, half of which had to be re-done.

Overall Development Outcome. Relevance of project objectives was substantial based on alignment with government priorities and related pillars of the World Bank’s country partnership strategies. Project design was innovative but did not sufficiently take into account complex institutional requirements, making it substantial overall. Efficacy was substantial, with several positive results in basic infrastructure and community-based interventions at project completion and an increased perception of safety, though there are indications of reduction in those benefits since project completion. Taken together, with modest efficiency, the overall development outcome is rated moderately satisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome. JSIF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with all relevant agencies to continue the maintenance of infrastructure under the project. These obligations are not being carried out as envisaged because of insufficient resources and a lack of ownership by the agencies involved. The discontinuance of community-based activities for
children, youth, and adults for education and life skills has rolled back the benefits that had accrued till shortly after project implementation. Based mainly on those factors, the risk to development outcome is substantial.

**Bank Performance.** The preparation and design of the project was informed to a considerable extent by lessons from Jamaica’s National Community Development Project (2002–08) and World Bank projects in other countries that addressed issues of urban upgrading, and crime and violence. However, the project did not anticipate and mitigate sufficiently the risks to implementation and sustainability of outcomes associated with a wide spread of activities, including dealing with a multiplicity of organizations with varying capacity and incentives to play their roles effectively. Quality-at-Entry Rating is therefore rated moderately satisfactory. The project team closely monitored progress through an intense supervision schedule averaging two supervision missions per year. However, the World Bank could have provided more hands-on technical support to the microfinance and land titling activities during their initial phases, given JSIF’s limited experience in the area. Bank supervision and overall Bank performance are rated moderately satisfactory. Overall Bank performance is rated moderately satisfactory.

**Borrower Performance.** The government displayed commitment to the project during preparation and implementation, especially by maintaining the pace of the project during the 2009–10 fiscal crisis. However, project agencies have not displayed sufficient ownership to sustain outcomes from the project regarding maintenance of physical assets or to provide resources and support for community-based activities that showed promise during the life of the project. This has significantly increased the risk to the sustainability of development outcomes from the project. Government performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory. JSIF’s experience with implementing World Bank projects and its expertise in community interventions were of value during project preparation and implementation. It faced, however, significant constraints helping service providers to sustain services from infrastructure developed under the project. Feedback from community focus groups suggests that there were shortcomings in ongoing communication between the JSIF and beneficiary communities during project implementation, which may have affected project performance. Implementing agency performance is rated moderately satisfactory. Overall, borrower performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory.

**Lessons**

**Addressing urban crime and violence through a two-pronged approach of improving basic infrastructure and promoting social inclusion can benefit from the combination of those individual activities that are most effective.** Jamaica’s *Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project* was an early attempt at addressing the multiple drivers of crime and violence through
improving basic infrastructure and promoting community-based social and capacity-building activities. Similar projects that are being planned or implemented in the region could benefit from greater testing and measurement of the individual and combined effects of multiple basic infrastructure improvements and community-based social interventions on public safety.

The sharp disconnect between a centralized and well-resourced agency executing infrastructure investments in a decentralized urban situation; and a multiplicity of under-resourced service agencies and local governments in charge of infrastructure maintenance can undermine long-term development outcomes. In this project, the centralized government agency JSIF was responsible for implementing infrastructure investments in several urban communities. For maintenance of this infrastructure, JSIF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with several government line agencies, and with local governments. However, without clear provision of resources for their maintenance, and appropriate incentives, the level and sustainability of services and developmental outcomes were reduced. This calls for rethinking the allocation of responsibilities and incentives among all entities involved in similar projects.

In project design, the decision to add activities that are institutionally complex and require focused expertise requires careful consideration to avoid straining resources and effort during project implementation. Under this project, land tenure regulation and provision of microfinance proved to be difficult to pursue because of process complexity and lack of focused expertise, and to that extent, diverted effort and resources that would have been better directed toward other activities by the Bank and the implementing agency.

To sustain the benefits from community-based and social services for children and youth, long-term engagement is crucial: institutional ownership should be specified, and resources for those activities must be anticipated and secured by the time project support is discontinued. Most of the services for children, youth, and adults that were started and nurtured during the project lapsed soon after project completion for want of resources and institutional ownership. This defeats the purpose of long-term engagement to encourage positive and productive behavior patterns.

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Director, Financial, Private Sector, and Sustainable Development
1. **Background and Context**

1.1 Jamaica is a middle-income island state with a population of approximately 2.9 million, of which about 1.6 million or 55 percent, reside in urban areas. The country had a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of US$4,798 in 2017. Real GDP per capita grew by only 0.5 percent per year between 1990 and 2017, compared to 1.5 percent for the Latin America and Caribbean region, excluding high-income countries, and 3.4 percent for middle-income countries worldwide. High levels of crime, constrained access to credit, cumbersome business regulations, and high energy costs have restricted the rate of economic growth. sources.1

1.2 At the time of project appraisal (2006), inadequate land use and urban planning had resulted in imbalanced regional development, inequitable distribution and access to services, and inequity in access to employment opportunities. This was evidenced by rundown urban centers, urban sprawl, environmental degradation, and unsafe and dilapidated housing. Peri-urban areas, or urbanizing areas in transition, were facing similar conditions, indicating that future community security and urban renewal projects should focus on communities in a range of geographic locations and stages of urbanization (World Bank 2006).

1.3 Inner cities—a term used to describe communities in or bordering urban centers as well as communities on the periphery of towns—were characterized by decaying physical infrastructure, poor service provision, high population densities, and environmental hazards. Households living in these communities had limited access to income and employment, low skills and low wages, and were dependent on work in the informal sector. Youth unemployment was high and increasingly linked to growing social problems that create urban unrest (Baker 2008).

1.4 The inner-city communities’ physical characteristics enabled criminal activity to flourish. Roads were in poor condition, making access difficult for police, service providers, and taxis. Houses were encircled by zinc fences, limiting the number of “eyes on the road” and street lighting was minimal. The ability of service providers such as the National Solid Waste Management Authority (NSWMA) and the National Water Commission (NWC) to access these inner-city communities was hampered by poor infrastructure and outbreaks of violence. At the time of appraisal, exact data on the state of service provision in the inner cities was limited, but an analysis of aggregate data and studies suggested that service coverage and quality were poor and that there were pockets of extreme deprivation. For example, sewerage systems in many inner-city communities did not exist or were in need of major repair, and solid waste collection
was irregular. Only about 50 percent of the population in the project’s target areas reported having access to in-house sanitation facilities (World Bank 2006).

1.5 Recognizing the need to re-invigorate and re-integrate these communities into the fabric of broader society, the Government of Jamaica prioritized community development and crime and violence reduction. In 1996, the government established the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) as a quasi-government agency with a mandate to reduce poverty and create an environment for sustainable development. In 2000, the Prime Minister of Jamaica established a committee of senior officials to oversee and coordinate all inner-city renewal interventions. In 2003, the government designed a Community Renewal Programme (CRP) that aimed to provide a framework for integrating human, social, economic, and environmental development in the inner cities.

1.6 More recently, high rates of crime and violence, particularly in urban areas, continue to pose a serious obstacle to the formation of social and human capital, and contributed to limiting economic growth in Jamaica. In 2003, productivity losses due to interpersonal violence–related injuries accounted for 4 percent of Jamaica’s GDP. Although homicide rates declined from a peak rate of 62 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2009 to 39.8 per 100,000 in 2012, Jamaican rates of homicide and other violent crimes remain among the highest in the region. The profile of those directly involved and affected by violent crime—perpetrators and victims alike—is typically young, unskilled, unemployed, and undereducated youth males ages 15–29 from vulnerable urban neighborhoods that suffer from higher rates of poverty, unemployment, lower educational attainment, low social capital, and low levels of investment in public spaces.2

1.7 Recent years have also witnessed an erosion of earlier gains in poverty reduction, with rising inequality, and poverty sharply increasing to 17.8 percent in 2010. In urban areas such as the Kingston Metropolitan Area, poverty rates doubled in two years, from 7 percent in 2008 to 14.4 percent in 2010. Though total unemployment in October 2016 was 12.9 percent, unemployment for those aged 14–24 was significantly higher, at 41 percent for women and 26 percent for men. It is estimated that in 2014 more than two-thirds of youth aged 18–20 in the poorest 40 percent of households were neither in school nor working, rendering them especially vulnerable to risky and violent behavior.3

1.8 In response, the Government of Jamaica launched the CRP in 2002 to actively foster better coordination at national and subnational or community levels; developed a National Security Strategy (2006); and a National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy (NCPCSS: 2010). The National Security Strategy seeks to reduce violent crime, strengthen justice and the rule of law, increase effective delivery of social intervention programs, and promote the integration of democratic governance within
the communities most at risk for crime. In line with this approach, the CRP provides a government platform for the coordination and enhancement of the delivery of government and civil society services to 100 volatile and vulnerable communities in the five most crime-affected parishes (Kingston and St. Andrew, St. Catherine, St. James, and Clarendon). The National Development Plan, “Vision 2030” highlights sustainable urban development as a key outcome in striving for a healthier environment and calls for a holistic approach in national crime reduction efforts.4

Role of the World Bank and other Development Partners

1.9 The project that is assessed in this report (Inner City Basic Services Project or ICBSP) was followed by the Integrated Community Development Project (ICDP, P146460: 2014–20), which aims to maintain a core focus on public safety enhancement and improved access to basic services in inner cities. ICDP focuses on 18 communities that were not covered by ICBSP and includes activities to enhance service providers’ capacity to operate in inner-city communities. The ICDP also continues to support the development of the Crime Observatory. Government programs, including the CRP and the Citizen Security and Justice Programme (CSJP), the flagship crime prevention program for the government. Meanwhile, programs implemented by local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will continue to operate in the ICBSP’s 12 communities.

1.10 Partnerships with international development agencies play an important role in supporting sustainable urban renewal through infrastructure development and crime and violence prevention in Jamaica. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Department for International Development (DFID), and the Canadian International Development Agency support the CJSP. The U.S. Agency for International Development carries out a wide range of programs in Jamaica spanning the sectors of crime and violence, health, education, and economic development. DFID also supports a range of community policing and deportee resettlement projects. Similarly, the European Union’s Poverty Reduction Program aims to alleviate poverty through investment in basic infrastructure and education in more than 50 vulnerable communities, while also promoting the active participation of community groups. Urban renewal projects implemented by the Government of Jamaica and/or other donors since 1994 are listed in Appendix B.
2. Objectives, Design, and their Relevance

Objectives

2.1 The project’s development objective was “to improve the quality of life in twelve of the Borrower’s inner-city areas and poor urban informal settlements by improving access to basic urban infrastructure, financial services, land tenure regularization, and enhanced public safety and community capacity.”

Components and Costs

2.2 The project’s components were as follows:

Component 1: Access to Services (project cost at appraisal: US$21.85 million; at completion: US$21.36 million) had three subcomponents:

1. Community Basic Infrastructure:

(a) Development of onsite and community-based infrastructure in 12 select inner-city communities (“Project Communities”) including: (i) construction and rehabilitation of integrated network infrastructure for water, sanitation, drainage, and secondary and tertiary roads; (ii) installation of street lighting, extension of the Borrower’s electricity network, and regularization of illegal electricity connections; (iii) construction of multipurpose, community centers in 7 of the Project Communities; and (iv) enhancement of basic infrastructure through community-based subprojects (“Community-based Subprojects”), implemented by registered legal entities of the corresponding Project Communities, including extension of household water and sanitation connections, removal and substitution of zinc fencing, improvement of neighborhood and recreational facilities, and installation of community garbage receptacles.

(b) Improvement of solid waste collection systems in Project Communities through the provision of technical assistance and the procurement of solid waste collection equipment and compactor trucks.

(c) Rehabilitation and construction of offsite network infrastructure necessary for the maintenance of water, sanitation and drainage services in Project Communities, including: (i) rehabilitation of the water reservoir and trunk mains in Kingston, bordering the Federal Gardens and Jones Town communities; and (ii) upgrading and rehabilitation of the wastewater treatment facility in Tawes Pen.
(d) **Building of capacity of parish councils** to operate, manage, and maintain basic infrastructure works (including secondary and tertiary roads, drainage infrastructure, community recreation facilities, and other basic community infrastructure) in Project Communities through the provision of technical assistance, training, basic computer equipment, and office supplies.

2. **Access to Financial Services.**

(a) **Facilitating of access to micro-finance services** within the Project Communities for use toward developing and promoting small and medium-sized businesses and incremental housing improvements, through the provision of performance-based service contracts to financial institutions that will offer to beneficiaries within Project Communities, microfinance services and technical assistance in areas including credit counseling, business plan preparation, financial management and related business support.

(b) **Orientation of financial institutions that are potential bidders for the contracts** referred to in Part 1.2(a) above, and training of Project Implementing Entity staff to evaluate bids and monitor and evaluate microfinancing activities.

(c) **Carrying out of independent technical audits of the loan portfolios** of the financial institutions contracted under Part 1.2(a) above.

3. **Land Tenure Regularization**

(a) **Carrying out of:** (i) a cadastral audit of all Project Communities, consisting of approximately 13,000 parcels of land; and (ii) an assessment of the number of parcels eligible for titling.

(b) **Development of a land titling and strategy program,** including: (i) design and implementation of informational campaigns and public consultations; and (ii) examination of the field, legal, and administrative procedures and costs required for the transferring of titles.

(c) **Provision of technical assistance to the Borrower** for the development of a broader land tenure regularization policy and program for urban and peri-urban squatter areas.

(d) **Implementation of a land titling program** on public lands in the Project Communities, including: (i) completion of register and cadastral searches and land surveys; (ii) verification of occupancy information including names, addresses, and leasing and sub-leasing arrangements; and (iii) provision of technical assistance to beneficiaries in the processing of title applications.
Component 2: Public Safety Enhancement and Capacity Building (project cost at appraisal: US$3.90 million; at completion: US$5.65 million). Enhancement of public safety in Project Communities through the provision of technical assistance in areas related to crime and violence prevention, including: (a) mediation and conflict resolution; (b) alternative livelihoods and skills development; (c) family support programs; (d) youth education and recreation programs; (e) community-based organization capacity building, including the assignment of community liaison officers to serve as full-time community facilitators in each Project Community; and (f) social marketing and public awareness campaigns.

Component 3: Project Management (project cost at appraisal: US$6.33 million; at completion: US$5.65 million) Building capacity of the Project Implementing Entity through the provision of: (a) technical assistance and training (including study tours for resettlement training) in the areas of project management and administration, including environment, resettlement, social development, crime and violence prevention, engineering, microfinance, financial management, procurement, technical monitoring and evaluation, international quality standard certification of the Project Implementing Entity’s management framework, community satisfaction surveys, and annual financial audits; (b) three motor vehicles; and (c) office equipment and furniture.

2.3 Project cost and dates. Total project cost at completion was US$34.8 million, 6 percent higher than the appraisal estimate of US$32.8 million. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loan disbursed US$31.8 million against the appraised estimate of US$29.3 million. The Borrower contributed US$3.1 million, slightly less than the planned US$3.5 million.

2.4 The project was approved on May 29, 2006 and closed on December 31, 2013, two years later than scheduled, mainly because of delays in procurement of the infrastructure works contracts. The project was restructured in November 2013 to formalize re-allocation of loan proceeds from the microfinance and land tenure subcomponents, which were discontinued during project implementation, to the public safety enhancement and capacity building component, including construction of community centers.

Relevance of Objectives

2.5 The project’s development objective of improving the quality of life in Jamaica’s inner-city areas and poor urban informal settlements remains highly relevant. Inner-city violence, poverty rates, access to basic services, and unemployment rates continue to pose challenges to sustainable and inclusive urban growth. These issues were
highlighted in the Country Assistance Strategies for FY2007–FY2009 and FY2010–FY2013 which included goals for sustained and inclusive growth as well as crime prevention and reduction. The same issues are also reflected in the latest Country Partnership Strategy for FY2014–FY2017, which raises specific issues related to improving the quality of life and reducing violence in vulnerable communities; strengthening community capacity to monitor and demand better services; and continuing support to improving public safety in targeted communities by increasing the ability to design evidence-based policies and programs on crime and violence prevention; and strengthening the capacity of the National Crime Observatory to collect, analyze, and disseminate data and statistics.

2.6 The project development objective remains highly relevant and supportive of the government’s policy priorities and urban renewal initiatives. These include the Medium-Term Socioeconomic Policy Framework 2012–15, and the National Development Plan (“Vision 2030”), with its focus on sustainable urban development, security, and safety. The project is also consistent with the National Crime Prevention and Community Safety Strategy, whose first pillar is crime prevention through community development. In addition, the project objectives are also in line with the Community Renewal Programme, which focuses on enhancing the delivery of government services to 100 vulnerable communities in the most violent parishes through supporting initiatives in the areas of urban governance, youth development, safety and justice, and socioeconomic development.

2.7 The improvement of “quality of life” which is central to the objective, is not defined in a manner that allows it to be measured or tracked except through the multiple elements contributing to it: access to basic urban infrastructure, financial services, land tenure regularization, and enhanced public safety and community capacity. The project appraisal document appears to draw the notion of quality life from the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) target 10 for improvements in the coverage and quality of water and sanitation services, and target 11 for improvements in the quality of life for slum dwellers through improved infrastructure services, access to secure tenure, and reductions in levels of crime and violence. But it does not follow through on defining “quality of life” any further (World Bank 2006, page 4).

2.8 The relevance of project objectives is rated **substantial**.

**Relevance of Design**

2.9 The project design involved several activities including development of onsite and community-based infrastructure; rehabilitation and construction of offsite network infrastructure; access to financial services; land tenure regularization; and public safety enhancement and capacity building. The implied theory of change was that all these activities would contribute to improving the “quality of life” in the target communities.
2.10 Although this is formulation is logical, it does not make clear the relative importance of the individual activities in contributing to the quality of life, or a conceptual basis for measuring and tracking quality of life. It is noted that the project design drew upon MDG target 10 for improvements in the coverage and quality of water and sanitation services, and target 11 for improvements in the quality of life for slum dwellers through improved infrastructure services, access to secure tenure and reductions in levels of crime and violence.5

2.11 However, the breadth of activities made it a complex project. While the project documents state that lessons from previous projects were considered in project design, they do not provide any significant details in this respect. For instance, the inclusion of land tenure regularization and microfinance added a measure of complexity that could have been avoided. Lessons learnt from earlier World Bank projects indicate that land registration and titling as a component in larger projects have been a source of delay in implementation; and that experience has shown that infrastructure improvements providing less than legal title can create a sufficient informal security of tenure to permit residents to invest and acquire other services (Kessides 1997). Also the microfinance component was not central to the focus of the project, and required some specialist expertise in the implementing agency; that expertise did not exist at that time. In retrospect these two components could have been taken up as separate efforts.

2.12 The project’s blending of small-scale infrastructure and community-based social interventions was innovative for the World Bank and the implementing agency, Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF), in Jamaica’s context. Prior to this, the government had largely addressed violence through increasing police presence or using the armed forces. The Project included performance-based mechanisms for microfinance, which was new for both the World Bank and JSIF.

2.13 JSIF was selected as the implementing agency based on its established track record in implementing the government’s poverty alleviation projects including the ongoing Bank-financed NCDP.6 JSIF had also developed a core competence in Bank safeguard policies and financial management and procurement procedures.

2.14 The project used clear criteria for identifying beneficiary communities to be covered by the project, with the involvement of JSIF, the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), the Ministry of National Security, and the Social Development Commission. The criteria included quantitative measures: percent of households in the community in the lowest poverty quintile, and the percent of households without access to piped water; and qualitative measures: one community from each of the five parishes with a big city, and high priority based on the Ministry of National Security’s public safety criteria and crime levels. The political affiliations of the communities were also considered, to ensure support for the project through any political turnover. A set of 12 communities was
selected, but the focus was on targeted sections in the communities, to keep within the resource constraints.

2.15 During project preparation, JSIF met with over 1,000 residents of the targeted areas through more than 120 formal meetings and focus groups in an extensive process of consultation for needs assessment and infrastructure planning. JSIF also sought community buy-in and to deal with dissatisfaction in the areas within the communities that were not covered by the project. The project also employed coordinators in communities to liaise with the contractors, and to ensure that employment benefits from construction works are maximized and equally shared within the community.

2.16 The project involved five national public service agencies,7 parish councils, community committees, and numerous civic organizations. The public service agencies were given the responsibility for operation and maintenance (O&M) of infrastructure to be built under the project, supplemented by community-led O&M for smaller and more unified project areas that also have demonstrated community-based organization capacity.

2.17 Provision was made for memoranda of understanding (MoUs) to be signed between JSIF and the service agencies to carry out the agreed responsibilities. However, the MoUs are not legally binding, and the risk of their not being honored was recognized at project appraisal, especially because of the high levels of crime and violence and the difficulty associated with collecting tariffs. To address this issue, the project design built in some incentives to supplement the agencies’ equipment and capital investment program; for instance, by purchase of garbage disposal trucks or selective offsite water and sanitation infrastructure that were both part of their capital investment program. In addition, measures were taken that would visibly increase safety in the neighborhoods and facilitate communication between the agencies and residents.

2.18 The project’s blending of small-scale infrastructure and community-based social interventions was innovative, but considering the complexity and choice of project activities, and multiple implementing entities, the relevance of project design is rated substantial.

Monitoring and Evaluation

2.19 M&E Design. The first of two main outcome indicators for the project was to provide access to improved basic infrastructure and financial services and security of tenure for 60,000 inner-city residents. This could have been stated more precisely because the range of infrastructure and services under the project were directed to different sections of the population. For instance, land titling was taken up only in two out of the six communities covered by the project. The second outcome indicator was
the percent of beneficiaries that feel safe or very safe, inside and outside the home; it was relevant to the overall objective.

2.20 The original 16 intermediate outcome indicators included the percent of beneficiaries satisfied with the quality and pressure of water service; percent of households satisfied with quality of sanitation facilities; the number of beneficiaries having opened bank accounts; and the number of titles provided to project beneficiaries. Each of these indicators can be reasonably expected to positively contribute to the project development objective of improving the quality of life. However, there was no means of estimating their relative importance, which may have provided a basis for comparing the improvement in quality of life across communities or on a before or after basis. In 2009, the project team and JSIF added new indicators that included the number of households with new or improved access to water, and number of households with new or improved access to sewer networks.

2.21 Measuring the direct impact of crime and violence prevention work in communities was difficult because records on crime were uneven and not robust, and the project relied on perception analyses to assess the project’s crime and violence prevention activities.

2.22 The M&E design included a citizen report card, and an impact evaluation study. JSIF also had a management information system in place from the National Community Development Project (P076837; FY2002–08) that was updated for the project to monitor material inputs, number of beneficiaries and additional indicators among other data points to promote efficient and transparent M&E.

2.23 The responsibility for conducting the baseline household survey was given to the design consultancy firm, HTPSE. However, the HTPSE survey of the four control communities had several shortcomings, including that the control communities were not isolated from the interventions of other government and nongovernmental organizations.

2.24 **M&E Implementation.** The M&E framework was mainstreamed in the project communities, which collected specific data. JSIF’s Community Liaison Officers verified the data through regular on-the-ground checks during sub-project implementation, and at the end of every month. In addition, a citizen report card was used in the final year of project implementation to assess residents’ satisfaction with the project. JSIF also prepared semi-annual progress reports to monitor and evaluate activities. An impact evaluation study was carried out about a year after the project’s completion. Measuring progress on the intermediate indicators using periodic surveys of the households proved difficult to implement on a yearly basis given personnel requirements and respondent fatigue.
The project also received a grant from the Japan Social Development Fund (JSDF) to support the Ministry of National Security in building the Jamaica Crime Observatory to monitor crime levels in locations across Jamaica. At the time of completion of this project, the observatory was tracking crime and violence data for four key incidence types in five parishes and was beginning to cross-validate the data. Prior to the development of the Crime Observatory, the government was unable to quantify crime details at the community level and therefore unable to factor that data into crafting a more effective prevention strategy. The Crime Observatory operates under the National Security Agency’s research and evaluation unit. The crime observatory reports 7 types of incidents in 10 parishes across the country.

M&E Utilization. The data generated from the M&E process was used to adapt the scale and scope of project activities to each community’s needs on an annual basis. For instance, high demand in some communities for assistance in obtaining birth certificates resulted in a second phase of “operation certification,” one of the activities undertaken under the project. The use of data from the crime observatory is low and does not appear in policy or decision-making. It is not apparent that the findings from the Citizen Report Card were used to make any course corrections in project implementation.

M&E for the project is rated Modest.

3. Implementation

The project was implemented in the following 12 communities. Of these the communities indicated in bold were covered by an impact evaluation at the end of the project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parish</th>
<th>Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St James</td>
<td>Flankers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarendon</td>
<td>Bucknor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine</td>
<td>Central Village; Tawes Meadows; Africa; Shelter Rock, Lauriston; Knollis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston &amp; St. Andrew</td>
<td>Jones Town; Federal Gardens, Whitfield Town; Passmore Town</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Delays in the infrastructure design process. The project leveraged a Japan Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) trust fund to hire an international consulting firm, UK-based HTSPE, Ltd., to produce designs for all the infrastructure
works. This was necessary because Jamaican firms did not have adequate experience in executing contracts of the size contemplated under the project, limiting their ability to compete in the international bidding process. However, the designs prepared by HTPSE utilized a “one-size-fits-all” approach, which reflected their limited knowledge of the variety of terrain and environment in Jamaica. The plans were also over-designed with respect to the level of seismic and hurricane risk. After these shortcomings were realized, project funds had to be diverted to re-design works (more than 50 percent of the designs had to be re-done), causing initial delays in disbursements, delays in overall implementation, and an increase in costs.

3.3 **Challenging Contracting environment.** Disbursement delays were experienced because of the reluctance of contractors to work in the project’s crime-ridden communities and because of consequent no-bid contracting processes, onerous risk premiums in bids, as well as overloading of the few contractors willing to work in the communities. The increase in costs and delays limited the capacity of the project to provide for greater sustainability of the infrastructure services.

3.4 **Complexity of process for land tenure regularization.** The process for land tenure regularization proved to be more complex than anticipated. For instance, obtaining a survey diagram which would not run counter to what exists within the National Land Agency was a challenge, especially given the nature of ad hoc settlements. Lands that were not owned by the Ministry of Housing had to be transferred to it to meet the requirements of the Housing Act. Also, additional support was needed: completion of the national cadastral map; improving the field data collection; GPS and other modern surveying instruments. Given these complications, and the limited human resources for this purpose in JSIF, the pilot in the second community was not carried out.

3.5 **Reliance on service providers with limited resources and vested interest.** Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were signed with the following agencies during preparation: National Water Council (NWC), National Solid Waste Management Authority (NSWMA), Rural Electrification Program, Jamaica Public Services Company, Ltd. and the parish councils. The ICBSP Project also had strategic partnerships with: The Benevolent Society, the University of Technology, the National Works Association, National Environmental Planning Agency, Sandals Resorts, Social Development Commission, JN Small Business, and HEART Trust/NTA among others. However, some public service providers lacked the financial capacity to extend service into the project areas and perform routine maintenance as promised. In addition, they were wary of the communities’ low capacity to pay for services. For instance, NWC faced illegal siphoning of water, but did not have the resources and capacity to monitor connections and target payment collections, especially considering the levels of violence in the communities. For similar reasons, service providers gave lower priority to serving these communities, and there was delay in handover of works to the service providers.
3.6 **Responsive implementation and supervision.** In response to the fiscal tightening and overall delays in disbursement and procurement, the project was formally restructured in July 2011 to extend the closing date by two years to December 31, 2013. The extension enabled the completion of key infrastructure works. During the February 2010 Mid-Term Review, JSIF and the Bank team recognized the need to reduce the scope of the microfinance because of lack of interest from microfinance providers because JSIF Board members were reluctant to give financial incentives to private financial institutions. The land tenure activity involved a complicated and time-consuming process with the Ministry of Housing, and JSIF did not have the human resources to devote to continuing the process beyond one community. Funds from these activities were re-allocated to public safety enhancement and capacity-building activities and community centers, the re-allocation was formalized in the November 2013 Restructuring.

3.7 **Environmental and Social Safeguards Compliance.** The project used the Borrower’s systems for safeguards implementation (O.P. 4.00 Piloting the Use of Borrower Systems to Address Environmental and Social Safeguard Issues in Bank-Supported Projects). An Equivalence and Acceptability Assessment was carried out by the Bank team. To fill the identified gaps, JSIF developed an Environmental Management Framework and a Land Acquisition and Resettlement Policy Framework that were integrated into the operational manual and became standard policy for all JSIF-funded projects.

3.8 JSIF fully complied with the provisions of the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Policy Framework, successfully screening for cases of land acquisition and preparing abbreviated resettlement action plans acceptable to the Bank. JSIF also conducted the necessary due diligence regarding donation of land to the Project, ensuring that all land transfers were properly documented and witnessed and had unencumbered titles. Beyond issues of land acquisition and resettlement, the Project successfully implemented a grievance redress system, a system for maximizing employment on works contracts within the local community, as well as a process to screen projects for a range of other social impacts, including gender relations. During the project, JSIF became the first organization in the English-speaking Caribbean to receive an International ISO 14001:2004 certification. The mission’s discussions with JSIF show that International Organization for Standardization (ISO)-certified environmental management systems have helped instill a culture of environmentally positive practices that are employed across all projects. JSIF developed a method to quickly identify non-compliance with safeguard policies by employing environmental officers, technical officers and external supervisors to monitor the civil works projects on a weekly basis. This helped to confirm that at least 80 percent of contractors working with JSIF comply with the environmental safeguards. In 2013, JSIF was named winner of the 2013 Jamaica Environmental Action Award in the waste management category.
3.9 **Fiduciary Compliance.** There were no major issues in the conduct of financial management and the final audits were unqualified. There were some undocumented expenditures during 2007 to 2009, for which JSIF carried out a reconciliation exercise and identified an overdraft in several infrastructure sub-categories. During restructuring in November 2013, funds were re-allocated between project categories to compensate for the overdraft, and all the expenditures were accounted for.

3.10 **Procurement.** The project’s procurement activities complied with the project financing agreement and the Bank’s Operations Manual. However, there were delays in the procurement process because of contractors’ reluctance to work in the project’s crime-ridden communities and consequent no-bids and high-risk premiums charged, and extended time associated with the cabinet approval required for all bids over US$400,000. Initially, many local firms were excluded from bidding for contracts over US$1.5 million, but this threshold was lowered subsequently.

**4. Achievement of the Objectives**

4.1 **Objective:** The project’s objective was: "To improve the quality of life in twelve of the Borrower’s inner-city areas and poor urban informal settlements by improving access to basic urban infrastructure, financial services, land tenure regularization, and enhanced public safety and community capacity."

4.2 The project sought to improve the quality of life in 12 of the Borrower’s inner-city areas through providing basic infrastructure, building community capacity, and providing services that were identified through participatory needs assessments, as below:

A. increasing access to basic urban infrastructure (quality of water, sanitation, solid waste collection systems, electricity, roads, drainage, and related community infrastructure)
B. facilitating access to microfinance for enterprise development and incremental home improvement for entrepreneurs and residents in project areas
C. increasing security of land tenure for eligible households in project areas
D. enhancing public safety through mediation services, community capacity building, skills training, and related social services.

4.3 In the rest of this section, outputs under each of the above groups of activities are discussed, followed by an assessment of the corresponding outcomes. The outcomes from increasing access to basic urban infrastructure (A) and enhancing public safety through community capacity building (D) are rated **substantial**, while the outcomes from microfinance and land titling are rated **modest**.
Outputs

A. increasing access to basic urban infrastructure

Roads: Road segments totaling 22.3 kilometers (km) were rehabilitated, which constituted about 80 percent of the road network in need of rehabilitation across the 12 communities (approximately 60 percent of the entire network in these communities) and exceeded the target of 10.36 km. The number of beneficiaries potentially benefiting from this intervention was 61,953 compared to a target of 60,000.

Water supply: Enabled access to 3,576 households against a target of 2,490 households in 10 communities. This was made possible through installing 8 water mains, and fire hydrants for 10 communities.

Sewerage: This activity was carried out only in the Federal Gardens community, where 5 sewage pipelines were rehabilitated in Federal Gardens that corresponded to 478 households against a target of 364 households. One of the 5 pipelines were in use at project completion benefiting 95 households. The remaining four pipelines were handed over to NWC for activation. The IEG mission could not get specific information as to whether the other four pipelines were activated. Anecdotal evidence from focus group discussion participants in Federal Gardens suggests that “a sewage system is absent and it is urgent that one is implemented as waste is polluting the community and can pose as a hazard.” The planned rehabilitation of the waste water treatment plant for Tawes Meadows was not implemented.

Solid Waste: One solid waste collection truck for use across 12 communities, and 51 skips (waste containers) were purchased. No target was specified. Only 30 skips (or the capacity equivalent in drums) were positioned at locations agreed upon by the communities and the National Solid Waste Management Authority (NSWMA). The others could not be used because the streets were too narrow.

Electricity: One hundred and thirty electricity household connections were regularized. No target was specified in the results framework. According to the project team, electricity regularization activities were carried out in three communities under the project: Central Village, Bucknor, and Lauriston. Other activities included installation of street lighting.

B. facilitating access to microfinance for enterprise development and incremental home improvement for entrepreneurs and residents in project areas

4.4 The project used an output-based aid mechanism for participating financial institutions to incentivize the increased provision of microcredit to the project
communities. The output indicator measured the number of households that had access to microfinance services including the number of formal microfinance loans approved and disbursed.

4.5 At project closing, 402 formal microfinance loans were disbursed in project communities, against the target of 171. However, the second phase of the microfinance subcomponent was canceled, given, among other reasons, that the microfinance institutions were already working in the communities in a limited manner, and thus did not need added financial incentive for this purpose. A JSIF report noted that 394 clients in eligible areas received over J$20.3 million (US$ 159,000 or an average loan amount of about US$400) in loans from contracted financial institutions (JSIF 2013a). The contracted microfinance institutions have also continued lending in the project areas and other inner-city areas, following the close of the official contracts.

C. increasing security of land tenure for eligible households in project areas

4.6 At project completion, 753 applications for land registration were made to the National Land Agency against a target of 200. The scope of activity was reduced from two pilot communities to only one community (Flankers), because of the complexity of process and inadequate expertise at JSIF. The IEG mission was informed that the Ministry of Housing continued the implementation process after project completion, and 42 more titles were approved by March 2015. It would not be possible to identify the number of titles that were approved, and which could be attributed to the project.

D. enhancing public safety through community capacity building, mediation services, skills training, and related social services.

4.7 Community centers and other small infrastructure improvements. Nine community centers were financed, of which four were mobile. This was against a target of three community centers. Fifty-five small infrastructure subprojects were completed against the target of 15, which applied the principles of “crime prevention through environmental design.” These subprojects were lighting for community centers, and construction of football fields, multipurpose courts, and other recreational spaces such as small parks.

4.8 Zinc fence replacement. Prior to the project, tall, nonporous zinc fences encircled homes, inhibiting the number of community members’ “eyes on the road.” The project supported the removal of this zinc fencing and substitution by block walls of lower height. Over 13,000 residents benefited from this initiative, covering 3,260 households whose homes had zinc fence substituted with block wall. There was no specific target for this activity.

4.9 Jamaica Crime Observatory. The project helped to set up the Jamaica Crime Observatory under the Ministry of National Security to monitor crime levels in
locations across Jamaica. At the time of completion of this project, the observatory was tracking crime and violence data for four key incidence types in five parishes and was beginning to cross-validate the data. Prior to the development of the Crime Observatory, the government was unable to quantify crime details at the community level and therefore unable to factor that data into crafting a more effective prevention strategy. The Crime Observatory marks a good beginning and the unit currently monitors 7 types of incidents in 10 Parishes across the country (Jamaica Crime Observatory 2018).

4.10 Capacity building, mobilization, and community outreach. The project conducted mobilization and community outreach through community liaison officers, community committees, and JSIF’s partner networks, for education, skills training, and mediation/conflict resolution interventions. There were no prior targets for these results. The outputs achieved at project completion are as below. Most of these activities have not been continued to any significant extent beyond project completion, and the implications are discussed in the section on outcomes.

- Mediation and Conflict Resolution Activities. Eighty-seven people were trained as mediators; 9,154 individuals, mainly youth, were exposed to activities focused on life skills development and violence prevention. Conflict resolution and anger management sessions covered 2,382 participants. A mentorship program was piloted in 7 communities and helped establish 431 relationships established but was later conducted only in Federal Gardens. Guidance counseling was provided to 976 participants for behavior change and handling grief.

- Youth engagement and recreation activities that offered a space for persons from various community sectors (that is, across boundaries) to integrate safely were oversubscribed. These included a sports program (5,203 participants); GSAT classes and clinics (3,283 participants); Recreational activities including dancing, arts and crafts, drama, and computer classes (6,976 participants); Reading, arts and crafts, and poster competitions (930 participants); homework classes (3,513 participants); Remedial education (622 participants); and cultural animation (943 participants); summer camps (9,708 participants). Transition seminars (2,583 participants) targeted students who were about to complete their primary education and move on to the next stage of their education.

- Parenting training was provided to 2,194 participants, and the Bridge Jamaica program provided focused social services to 10 female-headed families over the course of 2 years and also facilitated a Bridge Jamaica teen club (23 members in May 2011), to manage a range of risks, including teenage pregnancy.
• **Alternative Livelihoods and Skills Development** activities benefited from the numerous partnerships with both community-based and national training institutions, as well as the community-based organizations that managed the projects on the ground. These activities included zinc fence removal and block wall construction and onsite construction certification (972 participants with 81 receiving certification); ornamental fish rearing training (104 participants) implemented by the ministry of Agriculture; and the Sandals hospitality training initiative for 30 participants from Flankers; and auto mechanic, computer, and tile laying training for 742 participants. The HEART Trust facilitated and certified these programs and JSIF facilitated the participation of residents from Flankers. A Special Youth Employment Apprenticeship Training program operated by the Ministry of Labor for 627 participants.

• **Operation certification.** This initiative helped 3,550 residents obtain their birth certificates, in line with the government’s mandate for all Jamaicans to receive birth certificates regardless of their ability to pay. Having a birth certificate formalizes citizenship and, in Jamaica, enables access to a range of support programs, documents needed for taking standardized tests or employment. Community information fairs were used during Operation Certification registration periods to gauge community interest and to introduce them to available services.

**Outcomes**

4.11 The evidence on outcomes at or soon after project completion is contained in the following reports that were commissioned by the project and carried out by third-party private consultants or by research units at the University of the West Indies (Mona campus).

- ICBSP: Citizen Report Card (UWI 2013),
- ICBSP Microfinance Subcomponent: Analysis and Lessons Learned (JSIF 2013a)
- Land tenure regularization, the Flankers, St. James Experience (JSIF 2013b)
- Impact Evaluation of ICBSP (Trevor Hamilton and Associates 2014)
- Evaluation of the youth education and recreation (YER) program (UWI 2014).

4.12 **Evidence from focus group discussions by IEG mission.** The IEG mission supplemented the evidence from the abovementioned reports by conducting six focus group discussions in five of the six communities covered in the impact evaluation prepared at project completion. A planned seventh focus group discussion in Tawes Meadows was dropped because of the inability of the community contact to assemble the participants in time. The focus group discussion locations were Whitfield Town, Central Village, Federal Gardens, Bucknor, Flankers, and Trench Town (Kingston).10
The focus groups were conducted to ascertain present-day perceptions on the use, quality, and reliability of the services provided under the project.

4.13 The mission also met with Community Liaisons for benevolent societies to understand their role in the project and how it affected residents. The findings from the focus groups and other discussions are presented under the relevant objectives in the following paragraphs. The protocol followed for focus group discussions and a summary of the responses are presented in Appendixes C and D respectively. Table 4.1 provides the number and distribution of respondents in each focus group discussion.

Table 4.1 IEG Focus Group Discussions: Locations, Participants by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Objective/Subject Matter</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Village</td>
<td>Improving access to basic urban infrastructure;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhanced public safety and Community Capacity</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal Gardens</td>
<td>Improving access to basic urban infrastructure;</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhanced public safety and Community Capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flankers</td>
<td>Land Tenure Regularization</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench Town (Kingston)</td>
<td>Improving access to basic urban infrastructure;</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Enhanced public safety and Community Capacity</td>
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<td>Whitfield Town (F)</td>
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<td>Whitfield Town (M)</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. Outcomes from increasing access to basic urban infrastructure

4.14 Roads. For roads, the project’s Citizen Report Card recorded that the perception of improved quality ranged between 52 percent and 89 percent. This was particularly so for respondents from the Bucknor, Central Village, and Flankers communities. The impact evaluation noted that overall communities gave a 90 percent or higher rating for the quality of road work.

4.15 IEG’s site observations and feedback from focus group discussion participants and community indicate that overall, the rehabilitated roads have enabled easier and safer mobility, promoted construction of new homes and small businesses, and helped greater economic activity. They have also facilitated solid waste collection and improved the aesthetics where they are located. Feedback was more positive for Whitfield, Bucknor, Central Village, and Trench Town than in Federal Gardens and Flankers. The negative aspects were related to deterioration of the pavement, mainly to the effect of waterlogging and poor drainage.

Focus group discussion responses on outcomes from improved road segments
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bucknor</td>
<td>Improved road segments have made travel easier and safer, especially for females with small children and for the elderly. Improved the appearance of the area. Road surface is generally in good condition, though some portions show damage from rain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Village</td>
<td>Rehabilitated roads improved mobility and safety, especially during heavy rains. Females with small children and elderly benefit the most given the improvement in mobility. Small business owners can transport their merchandise with greater ease, and it is easier for customers to access their services. Additionally, people from outside the community can use the new roads and make commercial transactions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Gardens</td>
<td>The road rehabilitation component was not satisfactory/successful because there is still flooding in areas of the road and absence of sidewalks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flankers</td>
<td>Four local road stretches have been rehabilitated. Two of the rehabilitated stretches are showing cracks and potholes. On a sloping road stretch, a debris catchment was constructed, which prevents flooding, and protects nearby houses, but this is not being maintained regularly. Responsibility for this was with a local community organization, but they do not have the means to do so now. Agreement with JSIF does not appear to have been honored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench Town</td>
<td>Improved mobility within the community and more taxis are willing to enter the area. Due to the deficiencies in the water connections and waste water management, people throw residual water to the roads. Some deterioration is already noticeable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitfield Town</td>
<td>Improved ease of mobility for adults and children and enhanced the aesthetics of the surrounding area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.16  **Water supply, sewerage.** For water supply, overall, the Citizen Report Card reported that 58 percent of surveyed beneficiaries were satisfied with access to water and the quality of the service made available to them. According to the Citizen Report cards, the highest level of satisfaction was recorded in Flankers and Central Village. However, 48 percent of participants residing in Whitfield Town and 39 percent from Tawes Meadows thought their access to water was poor. For sewerage, the satisfaction rate was 59 percent.

4.17  IEG focus group discussions reveal relatively negative perceptions about the status of water access and sanitation in the project areas. Reliability of water supply is a concern in some cases. An additional aspect of feedback from the focus group discussions is that there was no adequate channel of communication with NWC for grievances to be heard or redressed.

**Focus group discussion responses on outcomes from water supply and sewerage**
**Bucknor.** The water connection program was not successful because the community center and many homes are still without a piped water connection. Although JSIF installed water pipes, the lack of a pump makes the distribution problematic, leaving residents dependent on trucked water.

**Central Village.** Beneficiaries who have obtained water connections under the project stated that running water saves them time and effort from carrying water from other sources. Some said they do not have reliable supply because the pipes installed under the project do not have good connections with the water main. They do not have any means of giving feedback to NWC. The drainage project was not satisfactorily completed, and most participants reported instances of flooding of streets and homes because of deficiencies in construction.

**Federal Gardens.** Many people in the community have not received a water connection. They also reported several problems with the waste water management, because the old manhole system is not properly connected to the main constructed under the project.

**Flankers.** Thirty houses are reported to have received new water connections under the project, and feedback is positive. No sewerage was planned. A water catchment on a sloping section was built, which helps keep water out of nearby homes during heavy rains. However, maintenance is not done regularly because of lack of funding.

**Trench Town.** For some, water connections are reliable enough to allow them to take showers in their homes. For others, the water pressure is variable. The drainage system was improperly installed, and flooding of the roads and homes occurs during heavy rains. As a result, respondents said there is risk to property, even near the Community Center.

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4.18 **Solid Waste collection.** As per the Citizens Report Card, a significant number of respondents (67 percent) were satisfied with the solid waste disposal options that were available to them. Collection services had improved significantly, with more persons being served on a weekly basis (63 percent as opposed to 35 percent at baseline).

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**Focus group discussion responses on outcomes from solid waste management**

**Bucknor.** Waste management is generally successful, but participants said that garbage collection happens only once a week and could be made more frequent.

**Central Village.** Solid waste program was “excellent.” Garbage is cleared twice a week and the community is cleaner than before the project. The program has made residents adopt a more positive approach to the storage and disposal of their waste. People have largely stopped throwing garbage by the riverside. The practice of burning trash has reduced, decreasing conflict among neighbors complaining about
the fumes. More garbage receptacles are needed at strategic locations and should be repaired and replaced as needed.

**Federal Gardens.** Disposal of garbage on the road by residents reaffirms the need for an active garbage receptacle and an environmental warden program.

**Flankers.** Garbage is cleared regularly with receptacles at vantage points in the streets.

4.19 **Electricity.** The Citizen Report Card indicates that respondents were generally satisfied with the quality of access to electricity available to them, except in Tawes Meadows, where 44 percent of respondents from that community rated their access as poor. The IEG mission found a mixed experience for electricity connections with some dissatisfaction owing to continued illegal use of electricity. For instance, in Central Village, the electricity regularization effort was successful because many residents became legal paying customers as opposed to remaining consumers who would illegally abstract electricity. Connections were offered to 150 households; 75 took up the offer. Among those with legal connections, there was a general sense of pride, and an expectation of more reliable access to electricity.

**Focus group discussion responses on outcomes from new electricity connections**

**Bucknor.** The electricity regularization program is lagging because the regularization was phased and some residents are still yet to benefit from becoming legal paying customers. Those who had regular connections said that the of household appliances is easier, especially refrigerators, and contributes to the quality of life.

**Central.** About 50 households were offered connections and half of them took up the offer. There was a general sense of pride among those with legal connections that and the prospect of more reliable access to electricity.

**Flankers.** JSIF supported households to access legal electricity connections during the program, but more details could not be obtained.

**Federal Gardens.** Residents indicated that many of them became legal paying residents as opposed to remaining consumers who would illegally use electricity.

4.20 **Assessment of contribution of basic urban infrastructure to quality of life.** The improvements to roads and solid waste services are well spread across communities and have made a substantial contribution to the quality of life for the beneficiaries. New electricity connections were provided in only a few communities and were limited in the number of households covered, but the beneficiaries found the results favorable. The interventions for water supply and sewerage also covered fewer communities and the results have been inadequate overall.
4.21 The results from infrastructure projects were uneven for a variety of reasons, including the quality of governance, structures and processes; inadequate knowledge on the part of JSIF of community dynamics, particularly at the project inception; failures among select contractors; conflicts of varying degrees; and inadequate capacity at community level (Trevor Hamilton and Associates 2014). Since project completion, the quality of services from the infrastructure has been undermined by the lack of involvement and resources on the part of the agencies responsible for their upkeep (Trevor Hamilton and Associates 2014). NWC is lagging behind in connecting the pipe work due to lack of budgetary provision and uncertainties in the commercial viability of service to the affected households. Jamaica Public Service Company (JPSCo) is experiencing delays because it is still assessing the financial viability of its service because of uncertainties about households’ ability and willingness to pay. The NWSMA and parish councils are unable to take over their functions, such as maintenance of facilities, in a timely manner because of inadequate financing for the required operational costs. For instance, NWSMA does not have operating budget for weekly collection from skips. Parish councils are unable to adequately maintain drains because of lack of funds.

4.22 Taking into account both scale and results for the provision of basic infrastructure, its contribution to quality of life is rated substantial.

B. Outcomes from access to microfinance

4.23 The microfinance component was expected to facilitate microfinance services for productive purposes and incremental home improvements through performance-based service contracts intended to create incentives for existing financial institutions to provide microfinance services in project areas. The decision to give the first output-based assistance tranche to financial institutions in advance incentivized them to avail of this facility. However, results were low because of the lingering perception of risk in lending to inner-city clients, and enough eligible client loans could not be found. The assessment of this objective is based on information gathered by the Citizens Report Card and the impact evaluation, because the IEG mission found it impractical to trace beneficiaries of the related component. More than 20 start-up enterprises that received technical and financial assistance from the project were reported to be catalysts for stimulating economic opportunities in the communities. A modest percentage (40 percent) of respondents for the Citizen Report Card survey thought there were improvements in financial services, particularly in Central Village and Tawes Meadows, while the majority thought there was no change. Also, less than 50 percent of the respondents thought there had been improvement in job creation and business creation and development, though this may be difficult to attribute to the microfinance efforts alone.

4.24 Overall, though efforts to increase provision of financial services were relevant, and this intervention was important to pilot and test enterprise creation in areas with
high unemployment, the contribution of these services to an improved quality of life for most of the targeted population was modest.

C. Outcomes from increasing security of land tenure

4.25 Land tenure regularization was expected to provide improved access to reliable services and increase property values and develop pride of ownership. At project completion, residents in some areas in Flankers – the only community in which this effort was carried out – rated the effectiveness of the land title regularization project as high, with a 100 percent satisfaction rating for the survey and subdivision. Legal ownership of properties gave owners a sense of pride. However, by falling far short of its scope of covering two pilot communities, the contribution of this activity to improving the quality of life is rated modest.

D. Outcomes from activities to enhance public safety and community capacity

4.26 Benefits from Community Centers. The IEG mission visited all five community centers and found that overall they are being underutilized and are under-resourced. Focus group discussion respondents recognized their value as shelters in case of hurricanes or other natural disasters. However, the facilities for sports, meetings, water supply, and cooking have deteriorated to varying degrees for lack of resources. At the same time some useful activities—especially sports events, private functions, and religious events—are continuing despite the constraints. in Central Village, Bucknor, and Trench Town.

Focus group discussion responses on outcomes from Community Centers

**Bucknor.** The basketball and football fields are in good shape and well used. They provide opportunities for social contact in a positive environment. Tournaments and matches are common and people from other communities come to Bucknor to participate and watch the games. The center was provided with a good approach road, but a fence planned during the project was not constructed. Drainage is lacking, and street lights have not been installed. The center lacks provision for running water, which is a major inconvenience when activities involving a large number of participants take place. A Homework center used to be run Monday to Thursday, and summer camps were also held. While the summer camp is continuing with support from the local benevolent society, the other classes have stopped from four years ago because of lack of funding and resources. The center is rented out for events, but the kitchen is not functional at present and needs to be restored.

**Central Village.** The Community Center is used well for sports and sports competitions. It has a ballfield, and hosts inter-parish games, which has helped
reduce the stigma of violence and crime for Central Village. However, the water pipe leading to the community center is yet to be connected to the mains. The center was also using its potential as a place for mediation and conflict resolution.

**Federal Gardens.** The center is used for occasional and social events but is locked up most of the time. The netball court and football field have not been maintained properly and need restoration.

**Flankers.** The Community Center is a latent asset whose use was further diminished due to the law and order situation at the time of the IEG mission. There is a preschool being run at the center. Otherwise, the community center is not being used much, also because of lack of resources for activities and upkeep. Ad hoc funds from the local representative help for miscellaneous needs, such as painting the center’s walls.

**Trench Town.** Focus group discussion participants expressed a sense of pride in having the Community Center in the community. Trench Town is the birthplace of some famous Jamaican musicians, and the center houses a music recording studio funded by a UN agency, which attracts Jamaican musicians and tourists from around the world. The center also hosts religious ceremonies, and generally serves as a place to build relationships and talk about the needs of the community. Still, some participants considered the center to be under-utilized.

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### 4.27 Benefits from removal of zinc fences.

Removal of zinc fences generally added to the perception of safety and improved the aesthetics of the area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus group discussion responses on outcomes from replacement of zinc fences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Village.</strong> The focus group participants said that zinc fence removal did not take place even though it was part of ICBSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flankers.</strong> Only about 50 percent of the planned zinc fence removal was done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trench Town.</strong> Both females and males said that zinc fence removal and replacement with concrete walls created a sense of safety in the community that is prone to gun violence. The removal of zinc fences also beautified the community and improved value of properties and created a sense of pride.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Whitfield Town.</strong> Both female and male focus group discussion respondents noted that the community is almost cleared of zinc fences. This contributed to an increase in the perception of safety and helped improve the aesthetics of the area. According to the community liaison, the improvements had three positive effects i) people are proud of their houses and the way the community looks; ii) less garbage is thrown in public places and iii) there is less intentional damage to others’ property.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notwithstanding this, Whitfield Town was experiencing an uptick in violence (for example drive-by shootings, murders, gang violence) at the time of the IEG mission.

4.28 Benefits from children, youth, and life skills programs. The Alternative Livelihoods and Skills Development activities under the project benefited from the numerous partnerships with both community-based and national training institutions, as well as the community-based organizations that managed the projects on the ground. General results from these activities in the CRC survey included 46 percent of respondents citing job creation and educational opportunities as better or much better. The benefits to children, youth, and adults from an array of education and employment programs (including GSAT classes, recreational activities, homework classes, remedial education, youth engagement, computer training, and apprenticeship training, among others) have dissipated, because most of these activities came to a halt within a year of project completion.

Focus group discussion feedback on outcomes from children, youth, and life skills programs

Bucknor. The project helped to improve the reputation of the community. Adolescents who attended the programs were less prone to engage in violent behavior or become victims than their peers. But violence related to gangs and organized crime would not decline owing to the programs because “Dons” and other professional criminals are not beneficiaries of the project. Girls enrolled into the programs were less prone to get pregnant and quit school. Most focus group discussion participants were vocal about the negative effects of projects ending abruptly, with young children once again being left without positive guidance.

Central Village, Federal Gardens, Bucknor, and Flankers. Children were kept engaged after school and provided a balanced meal. They were supervised by some adults who were employees and others who volunteered. Programs allowed students to stay in school and gain more years of education. These arrangements were sustained for a year after the project but were gradually wound up because of lack of resources. Some help is available from local businesses and NGOs, but it is sporadic and limited.

Central Village. Some residents were given training to make cushions and sheet sets, bathroom sets, or kitchen improvements. They largely benefited from such training because their livelihoods improved. Some of those initiatives are still in place.

Whitfield Town. Youth education and recreation programs were short-lived following the project. A life skills program for ages 15–26 was conducted with football coaches acting as mentors. The participating youth were kept occupied in positive pursuits, but the program was terminated, and neither JSIF or other
institution provided continued support. The program was permanently suspended and the community notices that the youth are now “lost” and with no role models to look up to. JSIF’s presence helped only temporarily.

4.29 At project completion, about 91 percent of surveyed beneficiaries reported positive perceptions on safety. This was particularly so for respondents from Bucknor (71 percent), Central Village (65 percent), and Flankers (52 percent). However, updated data and perceptions gathered by the IEG mission suggests that the basis for such a positive assessment has reduced since project completion. The community centers are being underutilized and do not have any business plans. They require working capital to support staffing, security services, utility bills, insurance, supplies etc. to play their role in a meaningful and effective manner (Trevor Hamilton and Associates 2014). Youth education and recreational services have gradually reduced or lapsed since project completion. The Ministry of Education has not taken ownership of these activities, and there has been limited scope or success in raising resources from private sources or civic organizations. The Alternative Livelihoods program does not receive any policy support from the government, for beneficiaries to start and operate their own self-employment activities. The mediation and conflict resolution program has not been institutionalized in schools. It is noted that these conclusions are based on feedback from officials and focus group discussion participants in a sample set of communities and cannot be generalized to all project sites. Based on the generally positive results recorded at project completion and taking into account a reduction in the benefits since then, the contribution of activities to enhance public safety and community capacity to the quality of life in the targeted communities is rated substantial.

5. Efficiency

5.1 At appraisal, two approaches were used to evaluate the project investment: (a) a cost-benefit analysis for water and sewerage services that used willingness to pay to estimate the benefits; and (b) a cost-effectiveness analysis for other interventions: solid waste collection, community centers, street lighting, drainage, and roads. The willingness to pay analysis found that beneficiaries were willing to pay for water and sewerage services that were priced to earn a 12 percent rate of return on additional investment for this purpose.

5.2 At project completion, two approaches were used as well: (a) a cost-benefit analysis for interventions on roads, education, and training; and (b) a comparison of the results of a cost-effectiveness approach at appraisal to actual costs for all interventions. To compare the results at appraisal and at closing, actual costs in nominal prices were transformed to 2006 prices taking out the effect of inflation and exchange rate
fluctuation. In respect of water supply and sewerage, no benefits accrued because household connections did not materialize as anticipated.

5.3 For the other investments—roads, education, and training, a cost-benefit analysis yielded economic rates of return (ERR) of 12 percent, 16 percent, and 39 percent respectively. The ex-post ERR for roads included the benefits from reduced vehicle operating costs and time savings. The return on training was calculated by projecting the earnings (over 10 years) of the community members who obtained jobs after participating in the certificate programs. The analysis assumed that 77 percent of the salaries for the target ICBSP beneficiaries consists of external leakages and transfer payments.

5.4 The increase in jobs can be only partly attributed to the project, given that several factors outside the scope of the project influenced the job attainment rate. The IEG mission notes that community members employed during the project may not have retained their jobs as indicated by the reduction in community-based activities and services such as after-school classes and other activities.

5.5 Results of the comparison of expected to actual costs showed that: (a) real costs of interventions (at 2006 prices) were 24 percent lower than foreseen at appraisal; (b) the number of actual beneficiaries (about 62,000) was 3 percent higher than expected (60,000); the nominal unit cost per person (project cost divided by the number of beneficiaries was calculated at US$401 at the end of the project, about 27 percent lower than the US$546 at appraisal. This, however, does not explicitly consider the qualitative parameters of the infrastructure and service delivery.

5.6 Although the project-generated economic benefits were greater than anticipated at appraisal for most investment components, there were several shortcomings that negatively affected efficiency. Importantly, the project did not accrue benefits from the water and sewerage household connections during the lifetime of the project as originally anticipated in the cost benefit analysis. It is recognized that the original design of the cost benefit analysis was overly ambitious given that connecting households to the network fell outside JSIF’s responsibility. Further, there was a two-year delay in implementation, and the project’s efficiency was affected by procurement issues and faulty designs for infrastructure works, half of which had to be re-done.

5.7 Overall, efficiency is rated modest.
6. Ratings

Outcome

6.1 The relevance of objective is rated substantial because it was in line with government priorities relating to sustainable urban development, security and safety; and with the World Bank’s partnership strategies for the country, which emphasized sustained and inclusive growth, and crime prevention and reduction. However, “quality of life” as the main outcome is not amenable to measurement and attribution. The project’s design was clear and logical, but the breadth of activities and the number of implementing entities was very wide and complex to cover, resulting in a modest rating for the relevance of project design. Results from infrastructure added by the project - (roads, water supply, sewerage, electricity connections, solid waste collection) were positive overall at project completion but are since showing some deterioration from reduced attention from under-resourced service providers. The outcomes from the limited provision of microcredit during the project are difficult to isolate from other sources of funds. The scaled-down effort for land regularization during the project has not produced any further momentum since project completion. Community services for enhancing public safety and community capacity yielded positive feedback from beneficiaries at project completion, but these activities have since been gradually wound up for lack of resources and support. The contribution of these activities to improving the quality of life, and therefore efficacy, is assessed to be substantial overall. Efficiency is rated modest as it was at project completion, given the varying degree of reduction in the level and quality of services during project completion. Based on the ratings for relevance, efficacy, and efficiency, overall outcome is rated moderately satisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome

6.2 At project completion, the longer-term outlook for project outcomes was generally positive, based on the 2013 Citizen Report Card Survey, in which 85 percent of respondents answered “yes” to the question, “Do you believe the interventions will be sustainable?” However, findings from the IEG mission suggest that the ability of the communities to sustain services from the programs, assets, and infrastructure created by the project has since been undermined by reduced resources and decreased ability of service providers to recover costs. The capacity of the communities to pay for services is low, and any improvement hinges on better employment opportunities and broader economic trends in Jamaica.

6.3 Community programs for violence prevention, youth education, and recreation and alternative livelihood programs have gradually declined in scope or lapsed for lack of resources. During the IEG mission’s field visit to Central Village and Federal Gardens, focus group members and other beneficiaries pointed out that most of the community programs started during the project lapsed after the project closed, mainly because of lack of funding. Other organizations have attempted to step in and continue
homework and after-school programs, but these interventions have been intermittent and on a small scale. Attempts by community leaders to reach out to private entities did not yield any significant response. Overall, it is not clear whether resources will be available to continue or restore many of the violence prevention, youth education and recreation, and alternative livelihood programs that were started under the project.

6.4 Community Centers supported by the project were envisioned to be self-supporting entities. However, feedback from leaders of the Community Centers visited by the IEG mission shows that this has not worked out as planned. The Community Centers generally find it difficult to raise revenue on their activities and have to depend on ad hoc grants from the government, and support from religious and nongovernmental organizations for basic maintenance.

6.5 In respect of physical infrastructure, JSIF signed a MoU with all relevant agencies for continuing maintenance of infrastructure under the project. These obligations are not being carried out as envisaged because of insufficient resources and a lack of ownership on part of the agencies. The project supported training for community maintenance committees as well as the development of a maintenance plan for the infrastructure works. The committees were expected to retain capacity to do minor repairs themselves and engage the relevant authorities should major repairs be necessary. The IEG mission found little evidence of this in its site visits to selected locations.

6.6 The risk to the development outcome is **substantial**.

**World Bank Performance**

**Quality at Entry**

6.7 The preparation and design of the project were informed by lessons learned from the Jamaica NCDP and World Bank projects in other countries that addressed issues of urban upgrading, crime, and violence. Some experiences that were adopted were the inclusion of an impact evaluation in the project’s design, and specific activities such as removing zinc fences typically used in the type of communities addressed by the project, to contribute to increased citizen security, as had been experienced in South Africa.

6.8 The project team identified the main risks to project implementation and proposed mitigation measures that were integrated in the project’s activities. For instance, the risk that violence might affect implementation was mitigated by several short and medium-term initiatives, including public safety-sensitive infrastructure planning, mediation initiatives and job training and skills development, targeting vulnerable groups. Given the moderate risk for environmental management, the project supported the implementation of the ISO 14000 Environmental Management Certification.
6.9 The project team could have paid closer attention to external procurement issues, such as the low willingness of firms to enter communities because of violence, and the subsequent risk premiums charged. Finally, the Bank team could have more closely anticipated the extended timeframe associated with the land tenure and microfinance subcomponents, as well as the practicality of the original M&E framework.

6.10 Quality-at-Entry was rated \textit{moderately satisfactory}.

\textbf{Quality of Supervision}

6.11 The project team closely monitored progress through an intense supervision schedule averaging two supervision missions per year during the project duration and identified and responded to major implementation challenges.

6.12 For instance, the World Bank supervision team worked closely with JSIF to prioritize works when the national economic crisis prompted a tightened fiscal framework. During the mid-term review the World Bank team adjusted the project’s scope, particularly in regard to the microfinance subcomponent for lack of interest by microfinance providers, and to limit the land tenure activities to one community because of the complicated and time-consuming process with the Ministry of Housing.

6.13 Given the National Solid Waste Management Authority’s capacity limitations, the project incorporated new approaches to solid waste management that focused on reinforcing community efforts in collection, cleanup, awareness and neighborhood beautification. In respect of the crime observatory, JSIF acknowledged the value of the Bank’s assistance, though this mission found that significant progress is yet to be made in this effort.

6.14 JSIF noted that financial management support from the Bank could have been strengthened through more consistent feedback from the financial management specialist participating as an integrated member of the team conducting supervision missions. JSIF also noted that the World Bank could have provided more hands-on technical support on the microfinance and land titling activities during their initial phases, given JSIF’s limited experience in these areas.

6.15 The quality of the World Bank’s supervision is rated \textit{moderately satisfactory}.

6.16 Overall, the World Bank’s performance is rated \textit{moderately satisfactory}.

\textbf{Borrower Performance}

\textbf{Government Performance}

6.17 The government requested the World Bank’s support for this project in the context of a spike in crime and violence in several communities in the country, that had
brought this issue to the top of the national agenda. The government worked with the World Bank in preparing a project that integrated infrastructure with crime and violence prevention and integrated the project as a pillar of its larger Community Recovery Programme (CRP). The government displayed commitment to the project during preparation and implementation. Especially during the 2009–10 fiscal crisis, the government ensured that the project had enough funds to move forward. It also supported the project through providing additional funds for personnel, electricity, and other expenses incurred by JSIF. All covenants and agreements were complied with over the duration of the project.

6.18 However, the government does not appear to have played a proactive role in ensuring that various units of the government honored their MoUs with JSIF, at least to some extent, in ensuring the maintenance of basic infrastructure and facilities provided under the project. There is no clarity of ownership on the part of government units for upkeep of basic infrastructure and for the community-centered services for youth and children that had been started under the project. Both the physical facilities and community services have been starved of resources after project completion, and most activities have been discontinued. This greatly undoes much of the positive outcomes that were realized at project completion and increases the risk to development outcome.

6.19 On balance, government performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory.

Implementing Agency Performance

6.20 The Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) was the implementing agency for the project. JSIF’s previous experience with implementing Bank projects and its expertise in community interventions, were of value during project preparation and implementation, but it faced significant constraints in having service providers sustain services from infrastructure developed by JSIF.

6.21 Prior to project commencement, JSIF, along with other public entities, conducted a detailed process to select communities for inclusion in the project, independently of the World Bank. (see section on relevance of design). JSIF employed clear socioeconomic criteria in the selection target communities and was also pragmatic in balancing the political party allegiance of the selected communities, to ensure broad-based support for the project.

6.22 JSIF used community-based contracting throughout the life of the project, to ensure that employment benefits from construction works were maximized and equally shared within the community. JSIF also entrusted community committees with the responsibility of monitoring and coordinating project progress as well as providing consistent hands-on assistance through assigning JSIF Community Liaison Officers to each community. By project approval, JSIF had 18 months of bidding documents prepared.
6.23 With this project, JSIF was the first English-speaking Caribbean country to use borrower systems for implementing environmental and social safeguard policies. In the process, JSIF received the ISO 14001 certification for environmental management, and in 2013, JSIF was named winner of the 2013 Jamaica Environmental Action Award in the waste management category. The mission’s discussions confirm that JSIF maintains staff dedicated to implementing safeguard policies, and their expertise is used across all projects implemented by JSIF and serves the requirements of other donor agencies.

6.24 During project implementation, JSIF disseminated results from the project by sharing various results stories with local newspapers and radio talk shows. In addition, JSIF played a significant role in connecting community residents with other government, non-profit and private sector projects of interest. In the 2013 Citizen Report Card survey, 62 percent of respondents felt that the JSIF Project team was organized and well prepared.

6.25 JSIF experienced a shortage of staff with technical expertise in microfinance and land titling, two activities included under the project; the scope of these was reduced following the project’s mid-term review because of a lack of buy-in from all actors, and because of cumbersome procedures. There was limited expertise in JSIF to deal with land tenure regularization and microfinance.

6.26 JSIF had little authority or political leverage to motivate the service providers who had signed MoUs with JSIF to sustain service from the infrastructure that had been built during the project; this proved to be a major factor in increasing risk to the development outcome.

6.27 Feedback from a focus group study commissioned by JSIF suggests that inter-agency collaboration does not appear to have been the intent from the outset (Moncrieffe 2011). JSIF’s lack of direct contact with the communities affected the implementation of the project. Respondents (who included office bearers of the community committees, beneficiaries—male, female, elderly, and those with disabilities; youth at risk; and community liaison officers)—felt that JSIF could have done more to communicate in a consistent manner with community committees and to follow up sufficiently on community priorities.

6.28 There were some shortcomings in financial management, which were detected and resolved during project implementation. These mainly related to undocumented expenditures from 2007 to 2009, which were subsequently reconciled and accounted for. JSIF also experienced high turnover of staff during implementation, especially affecting continuity in financial management.

6.29 Implementing agency performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

6.30 Overall, borrower performance is rated **moderately unsatisfactory**.
7. Lessons

7.1 Addressing urban crime and violence through a two-pronged approach of improving basic infrastructure and promoting social inclusion can benefit from the combination of those individual activities that are most effective. Jamaica’s Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project was an early attempt at addressing the multiple drivers of crime and violence through improving basic infrastructure and promoting community-based social and capacity-building activities. Similar projects that are being planned or implemented in the region could benefit from greater testing and measurement of the individual and combined effects of multiple basic infrastructure improvements and community-based social interventions on public safety.

7.2 The sharp disconnect between a centralized and well-resourced agency executing infrastructure investments in a decentralized urban situation; and a multiplicity of under-resourced service agencies and local governments in charge of infrastructure maintenance can undermine long-term development outcomes. In this project, the centralized government agency JSIF was responsible for implementing infrastructure investments in several urban communities. For maintenance of this infrastructure, JSIF signed a MoU with several government line agencies, and with local governments. However, without clear provision of resources for their maintenance, and appropriate incentives, the level and sustainability of services and developmental outcomes was reduced. This calls for rethinking the allocation of responsibilities and incentives among all entities involved in similar projects.

7.3 In project design, the decision to add activities that are institutionally complex and require focused expertise requires careful consideration to avoid straining resources and effort during project implementation. Under this project, land tenure regulation and provision of microfinance proved to be difficult to pursue because of process complexity and lack of focused expertise, and to that extent, diverted effort and resources that would have been better directed toward other activities by the Bank and the implementing agency.

7.4 To sustain the benefits from community-based and social services for children and youth, long-term engagement is crucial: institutional ownership should be specified, and resources for those activities must be anticipated and secured by the time project support is discontinued. Most of the services for children, youth, and adults that were started and nurtured during the project lapsed soon after project completion for want of resources and institutional ownership. This defeats the purpose of long-term engagement to encourage positive and productive behavior patterns.
The National Community Development Project (NCDP: P076837; Project cost: US$30 million; IBRD Loan: US$15 million) had the two-fold objective of (i) helping communities in the most affected areas, by providing basic services and temporary employment opportunities, and (ii) assisting the Government of Jamaica in its efforts to promote greater social and community development, especially among the poor.

National Water Council (NWC), National Solid Waste Management Authority (NSWMA), Rural Electrification Program, Jamaica Public Services Company, Ltd; and the National Land Agency

HTPSE Ltd. has since been acquired by Development Alternatives Inc (dai.com) in 2014.

IEG was not able to obtain any information on the status of the mobile community centers.

A planned seventh focus group discussion in Tawes Meadows was dropped because of the inability of the community contact to assemble the focus group discussion participants in time.

A charity group organized to serve a community through programs, sponsorships and donations

The cost-benefit analysis’ original design, however, was overly ambitious given that connecting households to the network fell outside JSIF’s responsibility.
References


http://www.oas.org/en/


Team: Deon Edwards-Kerr; Joan Spencer-Ernandez; Paula Daley-Morris, PhD. Submitted to the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF), Kingston, Jamaica.

---. 2013. “Final Report: Inner City Basic Services for The Poor Project: Citizen’s Report Card.” Centre for Leadership and Governance, Department of Government. Research Team: Dr. Lloyd Waller; Dr. Olivene Burke; and Ms. Nicola Satchell. Submitted to the Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF), Kingston, Jamaica


### Appendix A. Basic Data Sheet

#### Table A.1. Key Project Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financing</th>
<th>Appraisal Estimate ($, millions)</th>
<th>Actual or Current Estimate ($, millions)</th>
<th>Actual as Percent of Appraisal Estimate</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total project costs</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>106%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan amount</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>108%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cofinancing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancellation</td>
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#### Table A.2. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disbursements</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07</th>
<th>FY08</th>
<th>FY09</th>
<th>FY10</th>
<th>FY11</th>
<th>FY12</th>
<th>FY13</th>
<th>FY14</th>
<th>FY15</th>
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<tr>
<td>Appraisal estimate ($, millions)</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actual ($, millions)</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>31.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actual as percent of appraisal</td>
<td>/</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>108%</td>
<td>108%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date of final disbursement</td>
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<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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#### Table A.3. Project Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Original</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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<tr>
<td>Concept review</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negotiations</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board approval</td>
<td>3/29/2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing</td>
<td>05/04/2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>06/27/2006</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing date</td>
<td>12/31/2011</td>
<td>02/02/2008</td>
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## Table A.4. Staff Time and Cost

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<th>Stage of Project Cycle</th>
<th>World Bank Budget Only</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff time (no. weeks)</td>
<td>Cost* ($, thousands)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lending</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY05</td>
<td>22.02</td>
<td>150.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY06</td>
<td>55.46</td>
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<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
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<td>478.75</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Supervision or ICR</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FY07</td>
<td>26.96</td>
<td>151.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY08</td>
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<td>FY11</td>
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<td>FY14</td>
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<td>17.72</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
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**Note:** ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report.

a. Including travel and consultant costs.

## Table A.5. Task Team Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title*</th>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lending</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhas Jha</td>
<td>Sr. Urban Specialist</td>
<td>FPSI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taimur Samad</td>
<td>Urban Specialist</td>
<td>LCSUW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernice Van Bronkhorst</td>
<td>St. Urban Specialist</td>
<td>LCSUW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asger Christensen</td>
<td>Lead Social Development Specialist</td>
<td>SASDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Njomo</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>LCSFM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norma Rodriguez</td>
<td>Procurement Analyst</td>
<td>LCSPT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel A. Hoornweg</td>
<td>Lead Urban Specialist</td>
<td>FEU</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Supervision of ICR</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Angelica Nunez</td>
<td>Sr. Urban Specialist</td>
<td>LCSDU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valerie Joy-Santos Eunice</td>
<td>Sr. Urban Specialist</td>
<td>LCSDU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anjali Acharya</td>
<td>Environmental Spec.</td>
<td>ENV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>---------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asger Christensen</td>
<td>Lead Social Development Specialist</td>
<td>SASDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katherine M. Shafer Coleman</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>LCSHE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leanne Farrell</td>
<td>Junior Professional Associate</td>
<td>LCSSA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael J. Goldberg</td>
<td>Sr Private Sector Development</td>
<td>LCSPF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellen Hamilton</td>
<td>Sr Urban Planner</td>
<td>LCSUW</td>
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<td>Daniel A. Hoornweg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panneer Selvam Lakshminarayanan</td>
<td>Regional Safeguards Adviser</td>
<td>EAPCO</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Patricia E. Macgowan</td>
<td>Senior Procurement Specialist</td>
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<td>Emmanuel N. Njomo</td>
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<td>Taimur Samad</td>
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<td>Heinrich K. Unger</td>
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<td>Bernice K. Van Bronkhorst</td>
<td>Sr Urban Specialist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunita Varada</td>
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<td>Evelyn Villatoro</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Eiseman</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>LCSDU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patricia Acevedo</td>
<td>Program Assistant</td>
<td>LCSDU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: ICR = Implementation Completion and Results Report.
a. At time of appraisal and closure, respectively.
## Appendix B. Urban Renewal Programs: Jamaica, 1944–Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funder</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica Urban Poverty Project</td>
<td>1997–2000</td>
<td>World Habitat, UK</td>
<td>Poverty alleviation through training, infrastructure improvement and maintenance, housing restoration and construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner-City Renewal Programme</td>
<td>2000–2005</td>
<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Improvements in physical and social infrastructure; reduction in crime and violence and stimulation of economic and employment opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner City Housing Project [ICHP]</td>
<td>2004–2008</td>
<td>National Housing Trust</td>
<td>Construction of 5000 new housing units in 15 inner city communities. Project included related physical and social infrastructure, as well as social development program to address psychosocial needs of residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project [ICBSP]</td>
<td>2006–2013</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD]/The World Bank/GOJ</td>
<td>Improve quality of life in 12 Jamaican inner-city areas and poor urban informal settlements through improved access to basic urban infrastructure, financial services, land tenure regularization, enhanced community capacity and improvements in public safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Habitat Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme [PSUP]</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Improve living conditions of the urban poor; strengthen capacity of local, central and regional institutions and key stakeholders’ in settlement and slum improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Funder</td>
<td>Objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston Urban Renewal Programme [KURP]</td>
<td>2009–2010</td>
<td>GOJ/Inter-American Development Bank [IDB]</td>
<td>Infrastructural and social intervention initiative, including income-generating activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Renewal Programme [CRP]</td>
<td>2013–2014</td>
<td>GOJ/International Development Partners</td>
<td>Project aimed at improving community empowerment, housing, sanitation and waste disposal, economic opportunity, recreation, dispute resolution and crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Community Development Project [ICDP]</td>
<td>2014–2020</td>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>Provision of basic infrastructure and social services in 18 communities islandwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Reduction Programme [PRP]*</td>
<td>2014–2018</td>
<td>European Union/ GOJ</td>
<td>Support the governance, physical transformation, socioeconomic development, and youth development components of the CRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of the downtown Kingston Urban Renewal project</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>People's Republic of China/GOJ</td>
<td>Expansion of development area and rejuvenation of Downtown Kingston to promote investments in the capital city</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mullings et al 2018
Appendix C. Focus Group Discussion Protocol

The focus group discussion and design applied the following good practice as outlined in the “Guidelines for Conducting Effective Focus Groups to Assess Learning Activities.” This manual outlines the requirements for professional, effective focus group interviews for systematic gathering and analysis of data.

Accordingly, the FGD group size was capped around 12. The venue was away from the Bank office and in community centers that were close to where the respondents resided. The FGDs excluded formal officials whose presence may have inhibited respondents from speaking frankly. Respondents were briefed about confidentiality, the purpose of the FGD; that the discussion was being recorded; and the way the discussion findings would be used by IEG. Where feasible, separated discussions were conducted for women and men.

Guidelines for Conducting Effective Focus Groups to Assess Learning Activities

1. **Definition**: A focus group is a structured interview with a small group of respondents designed to answer specific research questions for scientific purposes. Focus group interviews involve a formal, rigorous approach to data collection:

2. **Purpose**: The purpose of focus group research is to gather data, including opinions, perceptions, values, and ideas to make data-driven recommendations for programs and policies. The uses of focus groups differ greatly in topic, scope, and end product, but they can be used for two functions: Program evaluations and needs assessments.

3. **Size**: A focus group works best with 6 to 12 people. This allows for inclusion of enough people to provide breadth of viewpoints, yet ensures that every respondent has enough “air time” to participate with depth.

4. **Venue**: The most desirable venue for focus groups away from headquarters is field offices. Field offices are most desirable because they normally do not charge for use of their conference rooms. If we do not have a field office in a country with focus group interviews, then the next best venue is a first-rate hotel with conference rooms or suites that can be used as meeting rooms.

5. **Duration**: Focus groups usually last from 90 to 120 minutes, without a break. This allows time for following through on each major line of questioning without exhausting participants (or the moderator). Longer sessions lead to moderator and respondent burnout.
6. **Focus Groups in Relation to Other Methods**: “Focus group discussions” or FGDs use similar techniques based on group dynamics and facilitation but are less structured and formal. An individual, executive, or key informant interview is also a structured discussion designed to answer a specific research question for scientific purposes, but it is limited to one respondent at a time.

Focus groups can be used in tandem with surveys, key informant interviews, and/or direct observation of a learning program:

7. **Research Ethics**: Focus group researchers must be committed to the highest professional standards.

- Provide in advance verbal or written notice of the research purpose, methods, and setting.

- Assure participants that anonymity will be upheld in all written reports. Focus group respondents are guaranteed anonymity (if possible and appropriate) but never confidentiality—the researcher cannot control whether and what other participants will report outside the focus group. Inform participants that the interviews will be tape recorded (for purposes of accurate data analysis by the researcher only) and that a note-taker will be present.

- State that you will omit reference to any names or identifying characteristics in the report. Phrases such as “several women” or “some group members” will be used instead.

- Explain how the recorded material will be used after the session.

- Explain how IEG will use the final report.

---

Appendix D. Focus Group Discussion Protocol and Findings

The IEG mission conducted six focus group discussions (FGDs) with project beneficiaries in five projects locations and interviewed the community liaisons in each location. The five project locations were chosen to provide a diverse set of beneficiary views, in areas that were both high and low performing in several of the project intervention areas. The list of FGD locations and the number of participants by gender is presented in Table D.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Objective/Subject Matter</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Village</td>
<td>Improving access to basic urban infrastructure; Enhanced public safety and Community Capacity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Gardens</td>
<td>Improving access to basic urban infrastructure; Enhanced public safety and Community Capacity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flankers</td>
<td>Land Tenure Regularization</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trench Town (Kingston)</td>
<td>Improving access to basic urban infrastructure; Enhanced public safety and Community Capacity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whitfield Town (F)</td>
<td>Enhanced public safety and Community Capacity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whitfield Town M)</td>
<td>Enhanced public safety and Community Capacity</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>58</strong></td>
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</table>

Each FGD was capped at a level of 12 beneficiaries. The venue selected was a community center close to where respondents resided. The FGDs excluded formal officials whose presence may have inhibited respondents from speaking frankly. Respondents were briefed about confidentiality, the purpose of the FGD; that the discussion was being recorded; and the way the discussion findings would be used by IEG. Where feasible, separated discussions were conducted for women and men.
Bucknor (Parish of Clarendon)

Community Center/Social Interventions:

- The Community Center lacked, from the beginning, of running water. This was a major inconvenient when activates were ongoing because participants were not able to spend long periods of time in the training activities at the CC.

- In spite of the water issue at the community center, it provided great help to the community. The homework center was particularly useful because it improved students’ performance and provide mothers with spare time to work or do household chores. Additionally, parents were at ease because they knew their children were in a safe environment.

- Youth participating in the Community Center activities became more active in the community and created a more extensive network of friends with other participants.

- A young female took a training course in nursing during 2007. According to her testimony, her livelihood and earning capacity is now improved.

- After project completion, the Community Center is no longer used. No services, except for the summer program, are ongoing.

- After the homework programs finalized, parents noticed a significant worsen in children school performance.

- All parents expressed their desire to restore after-school activities at the Community Center. They observed the benefits for the participants and desire the same for their children.

Community Physical Infrastructure:

Water connections:

- Running water is an issue in the community. Although JSIF installed water pipes, the lack of the pump makes the distribution problematic. Often, some households lack of running water and need to relay on water delivered by trucks. This is highly problematic because there is uncertainty on when water will be available.

- The deficiency in running water in households affects certain groups in a worse manner.
The elderly: the physical effort that they have to make to transport water limits their capacity to shower and, do other chores that require water.

Females with small children: They have to devote a great deal of time and effort to transport water. Sometimes they have to leave their children unattended.

**Roads Improvement:**
- All participants agreed that the rehabilitation in roads is significant, creates positive externalities for the community as a whole and improvements and benefits currently remain.
- Fixed and improved roads make travel easier and safer, especially for females with small children and the elderly.

**Legalization of electricity connections to households:**
- All participants agreed that household electrification largely improves lives of all beneficiaries. In fact, all agreed that one of the groups that benefit more from the project where the ones got legal electricity connections.
- Before household electrification, many participants did chores at night under dangerous conditions (using kerosene lamps or candles) and they were much less efficient.
- Use of household appliances is easier (refrigerators) and involves a great improvement in quality of life.
- Beneficiaries can work and do chores at home with safety. That produces more income and efficiency when running the household.

**Street Lighting**
- All participants agreed that improvements in street lighting created a sense of safety.
- However, not all the community enjoys from street lighting and lights often go on and off. When this happens, there is a sense of unsafety. This was especially emphasized by females.
- Due to deficiencies in street lighting, activities must start early and not prolong into the night to avoid walking around in darkness.
- Movement ability is limited specially at night.
• Deficiency street lighting is the main reason for residents to feel unsafe at night.

Drainage:

• All participants agreed that the drainage has deficiencies. It does not always filter rain water and causes the following:
  o Damage to the roads (not the ones funded by JSIF).
  o Flooding around the community center after heavy rains.
  o Some households are affected by rain and mud creates around households and even inside. People has to clean residuals with shovels.
  o In some areas of the community, “mini rivers” form and people must remove their shoes and walk in semi-flooded streets.
  o Females with small children and the elderly are the most affected. Mothers have to carry their kids through the street. Elderly people are afraid to move around and fall.
  o When flooding occurs, and street lighting fails, the situation gets worse, especially for people with children.

Solid Waste:

• Garbage receptacles are a good practice. They create a change in people behavior because they don’t keep garbage at home for long periods and they recycle.

• Overall, people are satisfied with receptacles and they agreed in their positive effects in the community.

• Participants expressed that garbage collection should come more often, currently it only happens once a week.

2b. Findings from conversation with the community liaison –

• At the beginning of the project implementation, the Bucknor Benevolent Society (BBS) was created (year 2006). The BBS is composed by a President, a Secretary, an Assistant and a Committee.

• During the project implementation, especially during early stages, conflict arise among the members of the community. Residents demanded JSIF to hire residents to develop the project instead of hiring external contractors.
Community Center:

- After School Programs for homework assistance for grades 1 to 4.
- After School Programs for GSAT training for grades 5 and 6.
- Skills and livelihood training for young people.
- Once the program concluded, activities were suspended due to the lack of funding.
- Summer Camps for youth initiated during the program. The benevolent society has been able to raise funding for their continuation. This is the only initiative that remains.

Community Physical Infrastructure:

- The ICBSP developed the following infrastructure projects:
  - Roads
  - Basketball/Football field
  - Installation of pipes for water supply. However, a pump is needed to ensure supply and that aspect as overlooked during the program implementation.
  - Small community park
  - Legalization of electrification connections (however only one of two phases was concluded).

Central Village (St. Catherine)

Main Messages from the FGD

Community Center/Social Interventions:

- Participants expressed that the football and netball competitions organized at the Community Center help to create a sense of community in Central Village. This was specially the case for youth.
- Former students expressed that the Homework programs improved their school performance. This was specially the case when parents could not help children with school work.
• The GSAT program allowed students in getting better scores and be admitted into good schools.

• Both programs also included extracurricular activities such as sites visits to Apple Valley, Accompong and Outameni. According to the parents, those experiences helped children acquiring knowledge of life beyond their communities and improved their attitude.

• Overall, participants agreed in that both programs allowed students to stay in school and gain more years of education.

• Parents expressed that both interventions, Homework Programs and GSAT Programs, allow their children to concentrate more in school and avoid engaging in risky behavior.

• Additionally, parents expressed that the programs made them feel at ease with respect of the safety of their children. They knew that they were in a safe place under the care of responsible adults.

• Some residents took a training to make cushions and sheet sets, bathroom sets or kitchen improvements. They largely benefited from such training because their livelihoods improved. Finally, expressed that some of those initiatives are still in place.

**Roads Improvement:**

• All participants agreed that roads improvement created benefits for all residents. Mobility around the community was greatly increased.

• Improvement of roads also fostered safety, especially during heavy rains. Some participants recalled people falling and getting injured due to bad roads and heavy rains.

• Commercial activity improved because small business owners can move around their merchandise. Additionally, outside the community can use the new roads and make commercial transactions.

• Females with small children and elderly benefit the most given the improvement in mobility.

**Legalization of electricity connections to households:**

• Participants expressed that before the project they had illegal electricity access due to the high cost of formal connections.
• There was a general sense of proud to be paying consumers of electricity and have a reliable access to energy.

Solid Waste:
• According to participants, garbage receptacles modified people’s behavior in a positive manner.
• The community is cleaner because garbage is placed in a single place instead of the streets or water bodies.
• Additionally, residents no longer burn trash, eliminating conflict among neighbors because of the fumes.

Water connections:
• Some participants expressed that their households got water connections under the projects. They stated that having running water save them time and effort because they don’t have to carry water from other sources anymore.
• However, other participants do not have reliable running water in their households because the pipes installed under the ICBSP not always have good connections to the Old Main.

Zinc Fence Removal
• According to some participants, zinc fence removal was part of the ICBSP, however it didn’t materialize.

Drainage:
• With the exception of one participants, the rest reported flooding of streets and homes due to deficiencies in drainage.
• Participants expressed fear to have property damage because of heavy rains when the drainage is not working properly.

I. Trench Town (Kingston) – Public Safety/Capacity Building and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) – April 16th 2018
Main messages from the Females FGD

Community Center/Social Interventions:

- Participants (primarily mothers) expressed that the GSAT and Homework programs improved students’ grades. Some children could finish High School and they are now about to attend college. Participants attribute that improvement to the programs.

- Residents stated that the Youth Engagement Programs provided participants with market valued skills. According to their testimonies, several youth persons could become technicians, leave the inner-city and earn good incomes.

- All participants expressed their desire to have the programs reinstalled in the community.

Urban Violence

- Participants expressed that violence in the community targets, primarily, males. Females are victims as bystanders of when a male family member is involved in crime.

- However, females must move around within the community with more care than males because they must avoid “hot spots” of violence.

- Overall, violence largely limits mobility for all members of the community.

- Mothers with adolescent boys are the ones expressing more concern about urban violence. According to their testimonies, shootings and violent conflict are not uncommon. Therefore, they are continuously worried about their sons staying at the streets and must encourage them to stay home, especially after sunset.

- According to their testimonies, adolescents that attended the programs were less prone to engage in violent behavior or become victims than their peers. However, they agreed that violence related to gangs and organized crime would not decline due to the programs because “Dons” and other professional criminals are not beneficiaries of the project.

- Participants expressed that violence is aggravated by uneducated young people that lack from alternatives to spend time in a productive way.

- Females are victims of domestic violence rather than crime related violence. According to the testimonies, unemployed males or males engaged in criminal activities are more violent partners. Wives and girlfriends need to be extra
careful and use a “non-provocative language” when talking to them. If males don’t like women’s attitude they hit them. This creates more violence as some family members of the female retaliate.

CPTED Principles

- All participants agreed that zinc fence removal creates a sense of safety in the community. According to the testimonies, gunshots are harder to penetrate a concrete wall as opposed to a zinc fence. Additionally, visibility in improved and criminals have less opportunity to hide.

- The removal of zinc fences also beautified the community and creates a sense of pride.

- According to one participant, the rehabilitation of the roads has one unexpected disadvantage: since it is easier to move around, criminals easily escape after a shooting while driving a car.

Main messages from the Males FGD

Community Center/Social Interventions:

Changes in Behavior

- Participants report a change in their behavior after their participation in the Summer Camps and Life-skills and Youth Engagement Programs. According to the testimonies, the interventions provide them with tools and skills to interact to other persons in a non-violent manner.

- Team assignments imbedded in the programs allowed participants to learn how to solve differences, cooperate to reach a shared goal and, to reach agreements in a non-violent way.

- Participants expressed that working in teams allowed them to peacefully interact with people with different opinions and hold conversations without escalating into violent disputes.

Homework and GSAT Programs

- Fathers expressed that their children largely benefited from the interventions. According to their testimonies some could win scholarships and attend higher levels of education.
• According to participants, the GSAT program especially benefited children from uneducated parents. One participant described how a girl from an illiterate father is now enrolled in College due to the support from the program.

• Participants also stated that girls enrolled into the programs were less prone to get pregnant and quit school.

• Some participants expressed that after the program was finalized, violence escalated because young/g people had no activities or guidance.

• The suspension of programs caused setbacks in the community. People start losing what was gained and violent confrontation is more common.

In the 2013 CRC, 89% of respondents felt that they manage conflict much better since the intervention, and 43% felt that since the intervention they can work things out better with neighbors.

CPTED Principles

• Participants expressed to feel safer after the zinc fence removal, especially when during shootings.

• Additionally, they expressed that the substitution of zinc fences with concrete walls increased the value of their properties.

• There was less violence in the community due to the presence of the programs and short-term employment opportunities for road rehabilitation and zinc fence removal.

CPTED techniques were applied in the: (i) lighting for community center; (ii) the construction of football fields, multipurpose courts and other recreational spaces; (iii) fencing of both residential (zinc-fence substitution) and community recreational facilities; and (iv) road rehabilitation, including the repair of manhole covers located in the roadway.

Program Exit

This group was particularly vocal about the effects of projects ending abruptly. They identified many negative effects and provided specific examples.

• During the implementation of the program, there were short-term employment opportunities for the youth (road rehabilitation and zinc fence removal, mainly). This created
Trench Town – Public Safety and Infrastructure Rehabilitation

Community Center/Social Interventions:

- Participants expressed a sense of pride in having the community center in the community. A record studio inside the center but, funded by the UN attracts foreign visitors.

- Trench Town is the birth town of major Jamaican musicians and well-known international visitors, working in the industry visit the town, the center and the recording studio.

- People expressed that the Community Center is particularly busy on Sundays because it hosts also hosts religious ceremonies.

- According to participants, the Center is under-utilized.

- The Center could also host business to increase transit, facilitate long lasting events and contribute to community initiatives.

- The community center (when hosting church functions and other social activities), serves residents as a place to build relationships and talk about the needs of the community.

- Participants expressed that the community center serves as shelter during times of hurricanes or extreme weather. They feel safe about the resilience of the building and its capacity to protect people from natural disasters.

Homework and GSAT Programs

- Participants expressed that after-school programs allowed their children to perform better at school and even receive scholarships.

Water connections:

There are mixed experiences among residents.

- For some, water connections allow them to take shower in their homes. Before, they were forced to carry water from different sources to their households.

- However not all residents enjoy of water connections. According to some testimonies, some people still must obtain water from other sources and carry buckets to their homes.
• Participants report several problems with the waste water managements, since the old manhole system is not properly connected to the main constructed under the project. As a result, some people throw residual water into the roads and streets. Some residents’ toilets are connected to the old manhole. When it becomes full, they dispose the waste on the streets.

**Roads Improvement:**

• Residents agreed that the fixed roads improve mobility within the community and more taxis are willing to enter the area.

• Due to the deficiencies in the water connections and waste water management, people throw residual water to the roads. Some deterioration is already noticeable.

**Whitfield Town Female Focus Group**

(1) **Mediation and Conflict Resolution Program**—The majority of the women were unaware of this particular component of the program and expressed an interest in attending the workshops once they are restarted in the community. The women also were of the view that the men needed to be targeted and should participate in the mediation and conflict workshops because domestic violence toward women still occurs in the community. I recommend that JSIF is more proactive in ensuring the public is aware of these workshops.

(2) **Alternative Livelihoods and skills development**—This component appeared to not be very holistic in its content and only provided training in Vector Control techniques. The feedback of the participants indicated the need for a diverse offering of skills development in the area of wood work, literacy and numeracy classes, computer training and evening classes. The alternative livelihoods and skills development should be expanded to not only target youth, but also single parents and older adults above the age of 30 years old. The inclusion of single parent mothers in the skills development training program would enable them to earn an income and assist their child/children with their education. It is important that employment opportunities are available for the men who are beneficiaries of skills training so that they do not resort to criminality or gang violence.

(3) **Parenting Programs and Reproductive Health Workshops**—It is recommended that a parenting program and reproductive health workshop be implemented in Whitfield Town for the women, to assist female headed households with multiple children.
(4) Youth Education and Recreation Programs— GSAT, Homework and Summer Camp Initiatives. These programs seemed to have positively impacted the lives of not only the children, but also the parents in terms of providing an opportunity to fulfill educational pursuits and empower future generations. The only criticism is that these programs were short-lived and need to be re-started and continuity of these initiatives ought to be maintained for full benefits to be derived.

(5) Community/Multi-Purpose Center— A community center is absent in Whitfield Town and serious consideration should be given to the development of such a structure to act as a hub for educational and skills training for youth and adults and as a center for mediation and conflict resolution, parenting and sports development.

(6) Community Based Infrastructure- (A) Road Rehabilitation and (D) Zinc Fence Removal. The road rehabilitation and zinc fence removal component was successful for the most part in terms of benefits derived such as: ease of mobility for adults and children, aesthetic enhancement of surroundings, and most importantly an increase in the perception of safety (as it relates to the replacement of zinc fences with walls). Notwithstanding, Whitfield Town is currently experiencing violence (for example, drive by shootings, murders, gang violence, and domestic violence) and a soft intervention approach that is inclusive and holistic for youth and adults needs to be implemented in order to complement the successful community-based infrastructure development.

Whitfield Town Male Focus Group

(1) Mediation and Conflict Resolution Program—I recommend that such a program be implemented and partnerships with Peace Management Initiative or Dispute Resolution Foundation could be forged to ensure continuity of workshops which would enable men to communicate among each other and engage more appropriately with women in the community.

(2) Alternative Livelihoods and skills development— This component appeared to be successful to the extent that persons recognized how to engage with persons of different perspectives and to compromise. The continuity and sustainability of this initiative is key and partnerships with Heart Trust, the National Youth Service, and Jamaica Foundation for Life-Long Learning should be developed.

(3) Parenting Programs and Reproductive Health Workshops— It is recommended that a parenting program and reproductive health workshops be implemented in Whitfield Town for the men, to assist men with multiple children.

(4) Youth Education and Recreation Programs— GSAT, Homework and Summer Camp Initiatives. These programs appear to have been moderately successful in terms of their impact because
youth had a healthy alternative to gang violence and crime and more viable options to become a productive member of society. There is still a disconnect in terms of a more targeted approach to ensure that the 16–20-year-old cohort attends the program and benefits to the extent that they avoid a life of criminality. These programs should also be expanded to all zones in Whitfield Town as it seems to have been concentrated only in a few zones during its operation. Special attention should be given to the enhancement of the multi-purpose park on Waltham Road provided by JSIF and especially the utilization of sports, for example football or cricket to resolve disputes, unite youth and develop a culture of leadership and discipline.

(5) Employment Opportunities—Attention needs to be given to providing employment opportunities to the men who are trained with different life skills.

(6) Community Based Infrastructure: (A)Road Rehabilitation and(D) Zinc Fence Removal. The road rehabilitation and zinc fence removal component was successful for the most part in terms of benefits derived such as: ease of mobility for adults and children, aesthetic enhancement of surroundings, and most importantly an increase in the perception of safety (as it relates to the replacement of zinc fences with walls).

Notwithstanding, Whitfield Town is currently experiencing violence (for example drive by shootings, murders, gang violence and domestic violence) and a soft intervention approach that is inclusive and holistic for youth and adults needs to be implemented in order to complement the successful community-based infrastructure development.

Federal Gardens Focus Group

(2) Alternative Livelihoods and Skills Development—This initiative was not implemented and as a result many youth and adults are eager to participate so they can acquire skills to earn and income.

(4) Youth Education and Recreation Programs—GSAT, Homework and Summer Camp Initiatives. These programs were short-lived and need to be restarted and they appear to have positively impacted the children. Literacy and numeracy classes are needed for adults and youth just like in Central Village.

(5) Community/Multi-Purpose Center—The residents shared similar sentiments to participants in the Central Village Focus Group. In Federal Gardens, the center is hardly used or locked up and mostly parties and few social events are held. My observation is that the Multi-Purpose Centre is a latent asset. There is still an absence of computer training classes, life skills programs and other activities that would attract usage particularly by adults and the elderly. Serious consideration should be given to maximizing the full potential of such a structure to act as a hub for educational and skills training for youth and adults and as a center for mediation and conflict resolution, parenting, and sports development. In addition, the netball and football field are completely destroyed and need to be restored.
(6) Community-Based Infrastructure

(A) Road Rehabilitation: The road rehabilitation component was not satisfactory/successful because there is still flooding in areas of the road and absence of sidewalks. More road improvement should be undertaken.

(B) Sewage: A sewage system is absent, and it is urgent that one is implemented as waste is polluting the community and can pose a hazard.

(C) Water Connection: The program was not satisfactory because many persons did not receive a water connection. As a result, residents engage in disposal of waste water on the road and this magnifies the absence of a sewage system and damages the road.

(E) Garbage Receptacle: The disposal of garbage on the road by residents reaffirms the need for an active garbage receptacle and environmental warden program in order to correct for the improper disposal of garbage.
# Appendix E. List of Persons Met

## Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Omar Sweeney</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
<td>Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Loy Malcolm</td>
<td>General Manager, Project Management</td>
<td>JSIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Mona Sue-Ho</td>
<td>Social Development Manager</td>
<td>JSIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Milton Clarke</td>
<td>Environmental Specialist</td>
<td>JSIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Rudyard Williams</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>JSIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Dale Colquhoun</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>JSIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Kimberley Wilson</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Analyst</td>
<td>JSIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Scarlett Gillings</td>
<td>(Former) Managing Director</td>
<td>JSIF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Barbara Scott</td>
<td>Director of External Cooperation and Management</td>
<td>Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS. Ayanna Anderson-Brown</td>
<td>Project Economist</td>
<td>PIOJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rochelle Grey</td>
<td>Director, Research and Evaluation (Acting)</td>
<td>Jamaica Crime Observatory (Ministry of National Security)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## At Selected Communities

### Community Liaisons

## Multilateral, regional, and bilateral development partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camila Mejia Giraldo</td>
<td>Modernization of the State Specialist</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## World Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abhas Kumar Jha</td>
<td>Practice Manager, Urban, DRM EAP 1</td>
<td>TTL at appraisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelica Nunez del Campo</td>
<td>Senior Operations Officer, Op Policy, Quality &amp; Inv Lending</td>
<td>TTL at completion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>